ALACKÝ UNIVERSITY IN OLOMOUC FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY OF THE
LIFE FATE OF THE REPORT OFFICER AND MILITARY DIPLOMATE OF THE BRIGADE GENERAL OF OLDŘICH SILENT (1898 ̶ 1990) MAGISTERSKÁ DIP
. Radim Staněk Leader: PhDr. Pavel Kreisinger
OLOMOUC 2015
HONORARY STATEMENT: I declare that I have prepared the diploma thesis independently, based on the above sources and literature. Radim Stanek
2
I would like to thank the supervisor of my diploma thesis PhDr. Pavel Kreisinger for his valuable advice, patience, always helpful approach and willingness to help me. I would also like to thank the experts from all the archives I visited during my research, who always helped me find my way around the studied materials. Last but not least, I also thank my family for their support during my research work.
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Contents 1.
Introduction ……………………………………… ………………………………………….. …………………. 5
2.
Sources and literature …………………. ………………………………………….. ……………… 7
3.
Young years ………………………………………… ………………………………………….. …….. 15
4.
5.
3.1.
Childhood …………………………………………. ………………………………………….. …… 15
3.2.
In the Austro-Hungarian Army and Russian Legions (1916–1920) …………………. 16
Interwar career (1920–1939) ……. ………………………………………….. ……….. 24 4.1.https://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/ads?client=ca-pub-2025287964322501&output=html&h=280&adk=3316849697&adf=3263411121&pi=t.aa~a.791033702~i.82~rp.1&w=950&fwrn=4&fwrnh=100&lmt=1637079085&num_ads=1&rafmt=1&armr=3&sem=mc&pwprc=8576066767&psa=1&ad_type=text_image&format=950×280&url=https%3A%2F%2Fadoc.pub%2Fivotni-osudy-zpravodajskeho-dstojnika.html&flash=0&fwr=0&pra=3&rh=200&rw=949&rpe=1&resp_fmts=3&wgl=1&fa=27&uach=WyJXaW5kb3dzIiwiMTAuMC4wIiwieDg2IiwiIiwiOTUuMC40NjM4LjY5IixbXSxudWxsLG51bGwsIjY0Il0.&dt=1637077625575&bpp=159&bdt=1982&idt=159&shv=r20211111&mjsv=m202111100101&ptt=9&saldr=aa&abxe=1&cookie=ID%3Dd5e2e6db92bd5e30-228561f2aacc00cf%3AT%3D1637021895%3ART%3D1637021895%3AS%3DALNI_MZ9Z2P1KZNTBjatFIaEde232V8bBQ&prev_fmts=0x0%2C307x250%2C982x280%2C1349x625%2C950x280&nras=3&correlator=1011245596538&frm=20&pv=1&ga_vid=72963090.1637021896&ga_sid=1637077625&ga_hid=1346907515&ga_fc=1&u_tz=-300&u_his=1&u_h=768&u_w=1366&u_ah=728&u_aw=1366&u_cd=24&dmc=8&adx=368&ady=1984&biw=1349&bih=625&scr_x=0&scr_y=0&eid=31063703%2C21067496&oid=2&psts=AGkb-H9wmss3ftiAgqjAVoA-obK7B6rQT1jMTnxJYUSKE1U1QEvDHlvywBsoJlMkkSKF3I0DucAPknRPwDw%2CAGkb-H8lKMocpz47woc6vETFrkNTlM6YSrlcU3rSvywdKKEAZT3mkWLRrOgNGxfqkVpDWQJGV0DkpHwzRA&pvsid=1616790102313099&pem=11&tmod=1436071561&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&eae=0&fc=1408&brdim=0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C625&vis=1&rsz=%7C%7Cs%7C&abl=NS&fu=128&bc=31&ifi=5&uci=a!5&btvi=2&fsb=1&xpc=KFC7lhqY0b&p=https%3A//adoc.pub&dtd=M
Ordinary and Staff Officer of the Czechoslovak Army (1920–1932) …. 24
4.2.
Officer of the search group of the 2nd Department of the General Staff (1932–1937) ….. 28
4.3.
Military Attaché in Switzerland (1937-1938) …………………………………….. …. 39
World War II (1939–1945) ………………………………. …………………………. 51 5.1.
Moravc’s “eleven” – moving to Great Britain (1939) ……….. 51
5.2.
Beginnings in Great Britain (1939) ……………………………………. ………………… 55
5.3.
In France (1939-1940) ……………………………………. …………………………….. 63
5.4.
Back in the UK and the conflict with Col. Moravcem (1940–1941) …………… 78
5.5.
Liaison Officer of the Dutch Army (1941–1942) ………………………. 82
5.6. Officer of the Staff for the Building of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces (1942–1945) ……………………………….. ………………………………………….. ………………. 85 5.7. Liaison officer with the 3rd US Army and chief of the US military mission in Czechoslovakia (1945) …………………………. ……………………… 91 6.
7.
Post-war years (1945–1990) ……….. ………………………………………….. …………….. 99 6.1.
Senior Officer of the Czechoslovak Army (1945–1949) ……….. 99
6.2.
Retirement and subsequent persecution (1949–1951) ……………………………………. 103
6.3.
Life after release and rehabilitation (1951–1990) ……………………………………. 114
Conclusion …………………………………………. ………………………………………….. …………. 126https://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/ads?client=ca-pub-2025287964322501&output=html&h=280&adk=3316849697&adf=908221301&pi=t.aa~a.791033702~i.178~rp.1&w=950&fwrn=4&fwrnh=100&lmt=1637079094&num_ads=1&rafmt=1&armr=3&sem=mc&pwprc=8576066767&psa=1&ad_type=text_image&format=950×280&url=https%3A%2F%2Fadoc.pub%2Fivotni-osudy-zpravodajskeho-dstojnika.html&flash=0&fwr=0&pra=3&rh=200&rw=949&rpe=1&resp_fmts=3&wgl=1&fa=27&adsid=ChEIgMrNjAYQrducgNSMkZX4ARJIABSZlyZ417jOy6nPb7YmGAzGIM_oBe3F3zHC8OqEaU_i_Wj1M4M9Ze-8t0Zl3WS5xXT8mcJSfDcgy8UDzMZgVOPow5OwkTb1&uach=WyJXaW5kb3dzIiwiMTAuMC4wIiwieDg2IiwiIiwiOTUuMC40NjM4LjY5IixbXSxudWxsLG51bGwsIjY0Il0.&dt=1637077626034&bpp=139&bdt=2441&idt=139&shv=r20211111&mjsv=m202111100101&ptt=9&saldr=aa&abxe=1&cookie=ID%3Dd5e2e6db92bd5e30-228561f2aacc00cf%3AT%3D1637021895%3ART%3D1637021895%3AS%3DALNI_MZ9Z2P1KZNTBjatFIaEde232V8bBQ&prev_fmts=0x0%2C307x250%2C982x280%2C1349x625%2C950x280%2C950x280&nras=4&correlator=1011245596538&frm=20&pv=1&ga_vid=72963090.1637021896&ga_sid=1637077625&ga_hid=1346907515&ga_fc=1&u_tz=-300&u_his=1&u_h=768&u_w=1366&u_ah=728&u_aw=1366&u_cd=24&dmc=8&adx=368&ady=3164&biw=1349&bih=625&scr_x=0&scr_y=781&eid=31063703%2C21067496&oid=2&psts=AGkb-H9wmss3ftiAgqjAVoA-obK7B6rQT1jMTnxJYUSKE1U1QEvDHlvywBsoJlMkkSKF3I0DucAPknRPwDw%2CAGkb-H8lKMocpz47woc6vETFrkNTlM6YSrlcU3rSvywdKKEAZT3mkWLRrOgNGxfqkVpDWQJGV0DkpHwzRA%2CAGkb-H-_8Tb38NzH-gfggpWcG1aRFD5iZblPJEbQNJ4aCcZ4sDH5kMCRL-sqFEGNw8gDmjdYNluAoKY3S1M%2CAGkb-H_h1ldh6UdseeRbPdj8mOIzRh31qs1LBbikUyrWnPYrcedJz-14RXCPoLtkiyc_kbxeKiOEpMoIJLM&pvsid=1616790102313099&pem=11&tmod=1436071561&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&eae=0&fc=1408&brdim=0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C0%2C1366%2C728%2C1366%2C625&vis=1&rsz=%7C%7Cs%7C&abl=NS&fu=128&bc=31&jar=2021-11-16-16&ifi=6&uci=a!6&btvi=3&fsb=1&xpc=3sIf0HBbjV&p=https%3A//adoc.pub&dtd=M
List of sources and literature ………………………………………. …………………………… 128 List of abbreviations used …………. ………………………………………….. …………………. 134 Summary …………………….. ………………………………………….. …………………………………. 136 Annexes …….. ………………………………………….. ………………………………………….. ……… 137 Annotation ………………………………… ………………………………………….. ……………………… 148
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1.
Introduction
If we ask someone if they have heard of Brigadier General Oldřich Tichý, we will not get a positive answer in the vast majority of cases. However, no one can blame this ignorance, because Oldřich Tichý is not really a well-known figure in Czech history. One of the aims of the presented work is to contribute at least to alleviating that shortcoming and to help Oldřich Tichý step out of the imaginary shadow of history. Oldřich Tichý is a very interesting personality for research for several reasons. First of all, it is the attraction of the topic itself, which results from the various stages of Tichý’s life, whether it is his service in the Czechoslovak legions in Russia, his work as an intelligence officer or military diplomat or his post-war fate when he reached the position of senior military official. subsequently became a victim of persecution, behind which the communist regime stood. Secondly, the possibility of processing Oldřich Tichý’s destinies is also attractive because no one has systematically dealt with them so far. This opens up a relatively wide field of research and authorship. The third reason is the topicality of the topic, because Oldřich Tichý does not belong to the very distant past. He was the longest living member of the so-called Moravc’s “eleven”, 1 who died in 1990. The aim of this work is to reconstruct the life of Oldřich Tichý and thus create his comprehensive biography. Of course, Tichý’s personality cannot be taken in isolation. It is necessary to place it in the overall context of the time, which will also make the work a probe into certain historical issues, such as the Czechoslovak intelligence service in the interwar period and during World War II, or military diplomacy. After all, it is possible to take an excursion with Oldřich Tichý throughout the twentieth century, which is made possible not only by his biographical data, but also by the fact that he was directly influenced by almost all major events in Czech history dating back to the last century. Of course, the question arose as to whether the current absence of professional interest in the person of Oldřich Tichý had no reason in the lack of a source base.
It was a group of 11 intelligence officers and their commanders, Col. gšt. František Moravec, who flew from Czechoslovakia to Great Britain on March 14, 1939 as part of the so-called “Transfer” operation. See below. 1
5
However, very soon after the start of the research, it turned out that a relatively large amount of materials are stored in the Czech archives. Given that this work is primarily a biography, it proved to be the best way to proceed in describing the life of Tichý chronologically and not, for example, thematically, which would also be possible, but probably not entirely practical.
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2.
Sources and literature
The most important source of information for research work is mainly archival or other sources. Based on their careful analysis, mutual comparison and their comparison with secondary literature, the life destinies of Oldřich Tichý can be reconstructed. Relatively many sources have been preserved to this day in the person of General Tichý. Silent memoirs must be mentioned in the first place.2 However, this is not a classical memory. These are Tichý’s remarks and comments on his activities as an intelligence officer and military diplomat, as well as his comments on the publication of his superior, Gen. František Moravec.3 Other important sources are deposited in various archives. First of all, it is necessary to list the materials stored in the Military Central Archive – the Administrative Archive of the Army of the Czech Republic in Olomouc (hereinafter referred to as the VÚA – SA AČR). This is the fund Personnel Materials of Professional Soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, 4 which provides basic information about Tichý’s military service, but also information about his persecution by the communist authorities or attempts at rehabilitation. Here it is necessary to mention the master sheets, which provide the most basic personnel data. In a brief but very clear form, they document Oldřich Tichý’s military career since 1916, when he enlisted as a one-year volunteer in the Austro-Hungarian army, until he was retired in 1949 and subsequently demoted from brigadier general to reserve soldier in 1950.5 Tribal the sheets also contain an insert that maps Tichý’s career during World War II.6 Another interesting source is the final report from the course for senior commanders, which he graduated from the Military University and in which Tichý is excellently evaluated. Other materials from the VÚA ̶ SA AČR related to the person of Oldřich Tichý were created only after the Second World War. The decree by which Tichý was transferred to retirement on 1 August 1949 dates from June 1949. The Basic Personal Letter is also dated to 1949, containing not only data on Tichý ‘s career, but also valuable 2
TICHÝ, Oldřich: Z pamětí zpravodajce. Notes on the activities of the 2nd Department and to the book gen. Frant. Moravce (hereinafter referred to as the Rapporteur’s Memory). History and Military (hereinafter HaV), 39, 1990, No. 4, pp. 119-131; Same: From the memory of the rapporteur (II.). HaV, 40, 1991, No. 1, pp. 122-140. 3 MORAVEC, František: Spion, whom they did not believe (hereinafter only Spy). Prague 2014. 4 VÚA – SA AČR, fund (hereinafter only f.) Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý. 5 The last entry in the master lists comes from February 1951. VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list. 6 Ibid.
7
information about Tichý’s family and his relatives. A relatively large amount of material deposited in the VÚA ̶ SA AČR testifies to the persecution of Tichý by the communist regime. In this context, we can mention, for example, the decision of the Ministry of National Defense (hereinafter referred to as the NGO) to withdraw its rank or various opinions. Other materials include attempts to rehabilitate Oldřich Tichý from 1968/69 and 1991.7 The Military Central Archive – Military Historical Archive in Prague (hereinafter VÚA – VHA) contains documents concerning Tichý’s military career as well. In terms of other personnel materials, in contrast to the VÚA – SA AČR, these are mainly the collections of Qualification Documents8 and Legionářský poslužný spis.9 Regarding individual qualification documents, including their originals, clean copies and special inserts, they map Tichý’s military career in great detail. Another valuable source of information is reports and records from military studies and training that Oldřich Tichý completed. Mention may be made, for example, of a course for officers at the Infantry Training School in Milovice, completion of a monthly telegraph course, completion of an army gas course and studies at the Military University in Prague and at the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris. It is also worth mentioning the material of the Regional Military Administration (KVS) Prague, which kept brief records of Oldřich Tichý and various agendas concerning his person from 1949 until his death in 1990. The correspondence provided by Oldřich Tichý also provides useful information. addressed the KVS, in which he reported to him, for example, his medical stays, asked for confirmation of receiving an old-age pension, informed about changes in employment or the death of his wife, etc. Documents from the collection of 37.10, which provide information about the silent activities of the intelligence officer and allow insight into the activities of the entire Czechoslovak intelligence service during the Second World War, are of great importance for the work. In this sense, the documents from the signature concerning the Karel, 11 radio station, which was part of the Paris branch of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, are absolutely crucial.
7
VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý. Military Central Archive – Military Historical Archive (hereinafter only VÚA – VHA), collection (hereinafter only sb.) Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý. 9 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 10 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37 (Military Intelligence Command). 11 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-153 (Radiostan Karel). 8
8
Materials from the Military Intelligence collection, 12 which also includes documents concerning the resumption of intelligence cooperation with the French shortly after the arrival of Czechoslovak correspondents in London in March 1939 and the subsequent re-establishment of cooperation with Switzerland, are also of great benefit. It can be pointed out that Oldřich Tichý played an important, in the case of Switzerland even significant, to both. The archives stored in the collection of 20.13, which contain information about Tichý’s further war activities, should not be left out either. There are also interesting materials in the National Archives in Prague (NA). The funds of the Hubert Ripka Archive14 and the Prague II Police Headquarters – population records must be mentioned in particular.15 As for the Hubert Ripka Archive fund, it is worth mentioning the US Army documents – entry into the Czechoslovak Republic. area. 16 These are materials proposing Tichý, then in the rank of colonel, together with JUDr. Ivo Ducháček as a liaison for military and civil affairs at the headquarters of the US 3rd Army, with which Tichý also entered Czechoslovak territory after six years of exile. In the Police Headquarters Prague II – Population Register fund, you can find, for example, a registration for Tichý’s permanent residence, an application for the issuance of new motor vehicle documents, an application for motor vehicle registration, an extract from the criminal record and Tichý’s firearms pass. However, it is important that the application for the issuance of new documents for the motor vehicle and the firearms pass are also included in photographs by Oldřich Tichý. For the period of Tichý’s persecution after 1948, but also for the period of his work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, Materials located in the Archive of the Security Forces in Prague (hereinafter referred to as ABS) are of fundamental importance. Specifically, it is mainly the fund H-34217 containing materials that map the course of the investigation of General Tichý in 1950. Here must be listed interrogation protocols written with Oldřich Tichý, as well as various opinions on him. The interrogation protocol, especially the one from February 23, 1950, could be used as a certain basic skeleton of a large part of the diploma thesis, because Tichý gradually described his 12
VÚA – VHA, sb. Military intelligence. VÚA – VHA, sb. 20 (Ministry of National Defense London). 14 NA, f. Hubert Ripka Archive (AHR). 15 NA, f. Police Headquarters Prague II – population records (hereinafter only PŘPII – EO). 16 NA, f. AHR, kart. 226, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory). 17 Security Forces Archive (hereinafter referred to as ABS), f. H (Historical Fund), a. No. H-342-1; ABS, H, and H-342-2. 13
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military career from his arrival in the intelligence department until his retirement.18 The fund also includes files that contain information on the monitoring of Tichý, even after his release from TNP Mírov in 1951. The StB still led the volume a. No. 641123 MV, which was destroyed. In addition, Tichý was also a registered person for the investigation file stored under archive number V-16757 MV. This file was registered with Marie Urbanová and was also destroyed. Materials concerning Oldřich Tichý’s daughter Taťána Cihelková have also been preserved in ABS. It is a volume a. No. 625312 MV maintained under the pseudonym “Klapková” .19 The volume contains very valuable and interesting materials, the first of which is the decision to establish an agency union for her person under the pseudonym. Fund 302 (Military Counterintelligence Administration) and Fund Z (Report Maps prepared by the Study Institute of the Ministry of the Interior) also provide some important information. Oldřich Tichý’s personal prison file, which was supposed to be part of the Corps of Correctional Education Administration fund deposited in the NA, could also contribute to the issue of persecution of Tichý the Communist. Unfortunately, the personal files of the persons included in the Forced Labor Camps (hereinafter referred to as TNP) have not been preserved and it is not clear in what form they were kept. Only the registration cards of persons imprisoned in the TNP with their date of birth since 1911 are stored in the mentioned fund. Archive of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (hereinafter only MÚA AV ČR). In this case, it is the archives that are part of the Edvard Beneš collection.22 Work with materials from this collection was complicated by the incompleteness of signatures and the fact that the relevant signatures relate to collection 38, which was created by removing parts of archives from the original Beneš archive by the Ministry of the Interior. (hereinafter referred to as the MoI) after 1948. In the 1980s, “fond 38” was reunited with the archives of Edvard Beneš, but unfortunately it was diversified. As a result, it was necessary to study ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950. ABS, f. Svazkové agendy, a. 20 NA, statement of PhDr. Alena Šimánková, March 21, 2014. 21 Jiří Bílek also mentions this list in his article Tábor forced labor camp Mírov. BÍLEK, Jiří: Tábor nucené práce Mírov (hereinafter only Tábor). HaV, 47, 1998, No. 4, pp. 91-116. 22 Masaryk Institute and Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, f. Edvard Beneš. 18 19
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25 different cartons and rely on a lucky coincidence that they will be able to find beneficial material. Although certain material concerning Tichý was found in the mentioned fund, in most cases it was the same material that contains the above-mentioned funds in ABS, NA, or VÚA – VHA. Therefore, in the end, the materials from the IAA AS CR were not used in the work. The author of each work of a professional nature must deal with current research on the topic and relevant literature. As has already been mentioned, no one has dealt with the personality of General Tichý in detail. However, the absence of a comprehensive personnel study or monograph dealing specifically with Oldřich Tichý does not mean that there are no studies or articles at least partially devoted to General Tichý. Some publications contain his medallions. In the first place is the work of Jiří Šolc entitled Beside the President, 23 which contains two short medallions, the first focusing mainly on the interwar and war period, the second on the postwar period. Next
Oldřich
Tichý
‘s medallion is
part
of the
Zlatice publication
Zudové-Leškové bearing the name Forgotten Elite.24 In this case, it is a comprehensive biographical medallion. The book also provides basic comprehensive knowledge on the topic of Czechoslovak military diplomacy in 1938-1945. Somewhat more briefly than in the previous case, General Tichý discusses a summary of basic information from his life included before the first part of his memoirs in the journal Historie a vojenství, specifically in the fourth issue of 1990. The author of this biographical introduction is historian Jiří Valenta.25 Despite the brevity and presentation of only basic information about General Tichý, for example, the medallion in Jiří Šolc’s work did not go without factual shortcomings. It states, among other things, that Tichý “was retired on August 1, 1948.” The other two mentioned authors, who devoted more space to Silent Life, agree on this. However, there is a discrepancy in the retirement of Oldřich Tichý. While the medallion presented in History and the Military speaks of the spring of 1949.27 23
ŠOLC, Jiří: Beside the President. General František Moravec and his intelligence service in the light of archival documents (hereinafter referred to as The President’s Side). Prague 2007, pp. 110 and 169. 24 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Zlatica: The Forgotten Elite. Czechoslovak military diplomats in the years 1938-1945 (hereinafter referred to as the Forgotten Elite). Prague 2011, pp. 240. 25 TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory, pp. 119-120. 26 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 169. 27 TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory, p. 120.
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in Zlatice Zudová-Lešková’s book, we learn that Tichý “was granted leave on 1 June 1949 and transferred to retirement two months later.” 28 General Tichý. It is strange that General Tichý’s medallion is completely missing in the publication Military Personalities of the Czechoslovak Resistance 1939-1945.29 The basic facts about Tichý’s military career can also be found in Alex Maskalík’s extensive encyclopaedic work. 30 A brief biography of Oldřich Tichý, authored by Bernard Panuš, who, however, focuses only on Tichý’s participation in the First World War and his subsequent work in the legions, should not be left out. 31 All other work devoted to a certain space of General Tichý already contains rather specific information related to a certain stage of Tichý’s official activity and serves mainly to complete the overall picture. It is probably not surprising that his work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service is the most represented in this sense. Two publications must be mentioned from the larger works synthesizing the Czechoslovak intelligence service in the interwar period and during the Second World War. On the one hand, it is Šolc’s book Along the President, 32 which describes in great detail the organizational structure and functioning of the Czechoslovak intelligence service under the direction of František Moravec, and then the work signed by the author trio Jan Gebhart, Jaroslav Koutek and Jan Kuklík and which is entitled On the fronts of the secret war.33 It is probably not surprising that his work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service is the most represented in this sense. Two publications must be mentioned from the larger works synthesizing the Czechoslovak intelligence service in the interwar period and during the Second World War. On the one hand, it is Šolc’s book Along the President, 32 which describes in great detail the organizational structure and functioning of the Czechoslovak intelligence service under the direction of František Moravec, and then the work signed by the author trio Jan Gebhart, Jaroslav Koutek and Jan Kuklík and which is entitled On the fronts of the secret war.33 It is probably not surprising that his work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service is the most represented in this sense. Two publications must be mentioned from the larger works synthesizing the Czechoslovak intelligence service in the interwar period and during the Second World War. On the one hand, it is Šolc’s book Along the President, 32 which describes in great detail the organizational structure and functioning of the Czechoslovak intelligence service under the direction of František Moravec, and then the work signed by the author trio Jan Gebhart, Jaroslav Koutek and Jan Kuklík and which is entitled On the fronts of the secret war.33
28
ZUDOVÁ – LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, s. 241. LÁNÍK, Jaroslav et al .: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939–1945. Prague 2005. 30 MASKALIK, Alex: Elite of the Army. Czechoslovak military general 1918-1992 (hereinafter the Elite Army). Bánská Bystrica 2012, pp. 603. 31 PANUŠ, Bernard: Tichý Oldřich. In: http://www.karelvasatko.cz/zivotopisy-legionaru/ruske-legie/tichy-oldich [cit. October 18, 2014]. 32 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President. Despite its undeniable contribution, this publication must be approached with some caution. Although this is the second, revised and expanded edition, it contains, albeit to a lesser extent than the first edition (ŠOLC, J .: In the Service of the President. General František Moravec in the Light of Archival Documents. Prague 1994), some factual errors and inaccuracies. Stanislav Kokoška pointed out the most serious shortcomings of the first edition in 1994. See KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Moravc’s Intelligence Service without Legends? HaV, 43, 1994, No. 6, pp. 171-178. 33 GEBHART, Jan – KOUTEK, Jaroslav – KUKLIK, Jan: Na frontach tajne valky. Chapters from the struggle of Czechoslovak intelligence against Nazism in the years 1938–1941 (hereinafter referred to as On the Fronts). Prague 1989. 29
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The work of Jaroslav and Stanislav Kokošková also represents a great contribution. The Dispute over Agent A ̶ 54.34 a certain space and personality of General Tichý, who, among other things, took part in establishing the very first contact with Agent A-54. . Party interests must not remain or work named Brigadier General Josef Bartik, 36
of which
the author
is
Paul
Kreisinger.
The
book
also discusses
about the intelligence officer and colleague Oldřich Tichý, General Bartík. Due to the very close professional proximity of both men, we can also find valuable information about General Tichý in Pavel Kreiser’s publication. Leaving aside the above-mentioned publications, there are still partial studies, again mainly on the topic of the Czechoslovak intelligence service. It is necessary to mention the article by Emil Strankmüller Czechoslovak Offensive Intelligence from March 1939.37 further study by Jaroslav Kokoška (Painter) London Intelligence Group Col. Moravce on the eve of World War II38 and Karel Straka’s contribution Renewal of Czechoslovak-French intelligence cooperation between March and August 1939.39 Other works devoted partly to the fate of Oldřich Tichý must mention Pavel Kresinger’s article The Year 1941 in Czechoslovakia. military intelligence.
34
KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Dispute over Agent A-54. Chapters from the history of the Czechoslovak intelligence service (hereinafter referred to as the Agent Dispute). Prague 1994. 35 See AMORT, Čestmír – JEDLIČKA, Ivan M .: The Secret of the Spy A-54: From Unknown Acts of the Second Department (hereinafter referred to as the Secret of the Spy). Prague 1965; STRÖBINGER, Rudolf: Stopa leads to René: Documentary reportage. Prague 1965. 36 KREISINGER, Pavel: Brigadier General Josef Bartík. Intelligence officer and participant in the first and second Czechoslovak resistance (hereinafter referred to as the Brigadier General). Prague 2011. 37 STRANKMÜLLER, Emil: Czechoslovak Offensive News since March 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Czechoslovak Offensive News). The Resistance and the Revolution of 1970, pp. 189–229. 38 KOKOŠKA (MALÍŘ), Jaroslav: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina plk. Moravce on the eve of World War II (hereinafter referred to as the London Intelligence Group). HaV, 38, 1989, No. 4, pp. 68-89. 39 STRAKA, Karel: Renewal of Czechoslovak-French Intelligence Cooperation between March and August 1939 (hereinafter referred to as Renewal). In: http://www.vhu.cz/obnova-ceskoslovensko-francouzskezpravodajske-kooperace-mezi-breznem-a-srpnem-1939/ [cit. February 14, 2015]. 40 KREISINGER, Pavel: Year 1941 in Czechoslovakia. military intelligence. Personnel crisis in Moravcov’s intelligence “eleven” (hereinafter only Year 1941). In: KUDRNA, Ladislav (ed.): The War Year 1941 in the Czechoslovak Domestic and Foreign Resistance. Proceedings of the international conference. Prague 2012, pp. 11–19. military intelligence. Personnel crisis in Moravcov’s intelligence “eleven” (hereinafter only Year 1941). In: KUDRNA, Ladislav (ed.): The War Year 1941 in the Czechoslovak Domestic and Foreign Resistance. Proceedings of the international conference. Prague 2012, pp. 11–19. military intelligence. Personnel crisis in Moravcov’s intelligence “eleven” (hereinafter only Year 1941). In: KUDRNA, Ladislav (ed.): The War Year 1941 in the Czechoslovak Domestic and Foreign Resistance. Proceedings of the international conference. Prague 2012, pp. 11–19.
13
and began acting as a liaison officer with the Dutch army in Great Britain. General Tichý’s post-war destinies were practically unaffected by secondary literature. The study of Věra Břachová entitled Destruction of the Czechoslovak Officers Corps can only be used marginally in this sense. army in February 194841 or Jiří Bílek’s article Tábor forced labor Mírov.42 While in the case of Jiří Bílek Oldřich Tichý is mentioned only in the list of senior officers who were interned in the camp, in the study of Věra Břachová Tichý’s name does not figure at all and its contribution a summary of the issue of the liquidation of the officer corps of the Czechoslovak army by the communist regime after 1948. This is how Oldřich Tichý’s military career ended.
41
BŘACHOVÁ, Věra: Destrukce officnického sboru čs. Army after February 1948 (hereinafter Destruction). HaV, 41, 1992, No. 3, pp. 109-127. 42 BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, pp. 91–116.
14
3.
Young years
3.1.
Childhood
Oldřich Tichý was born on January 30, 1898 in the East Bohemian village of Nechanice to Mr. and Mrs. Hynek Tichý, the owner of an inn in Sadová, 43, and Františka Tichá, née Matějovská. Oldřich still had three siblings, but from archival sources it seems that only he and his sister Božena survived adulthood.44 Both parents were of Czech nationality and most likely also Catholics, because
Oldřich
Tichý’s personal materials
also
appear
in the relevant
column of
religion.
Roman Catholic. June 1915 graduation exam. The Czech language was also taught here, but Oldřich Tichý also studied German and French, and, as evidenced by his later staffing materials, French did better.48 In the future, however, there was a lack of knowledge of the German language due to his intelligence work. of course, he caught up, as evidenced by post-war records.49 After high school, this 164-cm-tall young man with auburn hair, black eyebrows, brown eyes, and an eagle nose50 began studying mechanical engineering 43
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 10. 1. 1950, p. 1; VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal letter I. 44 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 10. 1. 1950; In the personal insert of an unnumbered master certificate from the period of the Second World War, the name and address of Tichý’s sister Božena Tichá are given in the column “closest relative”. VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Personal insert to the Tribal Certificate, March 12, 1940; In 1949, his sister was most likely after his death, because the column in the Basic Personal Letter, where Tichý was to state the nationalities of his blood relatives, did not contain any record. VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic Personal Letter, May 26, 1949, p. 23. 45 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. 46 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Application for professional officers and sergeants, 11 May 1946. 47 II. Czech state real school in Brno. At present, the name of the school is Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36. Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36: History of the school. In: http://www.gymkren.cz/o-gymnaziu-krenovabrno/historie-skoly/ [cit. October 18, 2014]. 48 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 49 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal sheet, 26. 5. 1949, p. 5. 50 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. Oldřich Tichý, Application for professional officers and sergeants by profession, 11 May 1946. 47 II. Czech state real school in Brno. At present, the name of the school is Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36. Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36: History of the school. In: http://www.gymkren.cz/o-gymnaziu-krenovabrno/historie-skoly/ [cit. October 18, 2014]. 48 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 49 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal sheet, 26. 5. 1949, p. 5. 50 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. Oldřich Tichý, Application for professional officers and sergeants by profession, 11 May 1946. 47 II. Czech state real school in Brno. At present, the name of the school is Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36. Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36: History of the school. In: http://www.gymkren.cz/o-gymnaziu-krenovabrno/historie-skoly/ [cit. October 18, 2014]. 48 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 49 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal sheet, 26. 5. 1949, p. 5. 50 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. cz / o-gymnaziu-krenovabrno / historie-skoly / [cit. October 18, 2014]. 48 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 49 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal sheet, 26. 5. 1949, p. 5. 50 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. cz / o-gymnaziu-krenovabrno / historie-skoly / [cit. October 18, 2014]. 48 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 49 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal sheet, 26. 5. 1949, p. 5. 50 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I.
15
at the C. and K. Czech Technical University in Prague.51 However, he interrupted his studies after two semesters in May 1915, because his life was affected by the First World War.52
3.2.
In the Austro-Hungarian Army and Russian Legions (1916–1920)
Oldřich Tichý enlisted in the Austro-Hungarian army during a voluntary conscription on May 10, 1916 as a so-called one-year volunteer. In practice, this meant that he was to serve 12 months of active service and then be placed in reserve for 11 years.53 “One-year-olds” differed from other soldiers by a characteristic patch on the uniform in the form of a yellow ribbon with a black stripe. Students or more educated young men became one-year volunteers, as this type of military service initially required at least a successful completion of a real grammar school, later it was sufficient to achieve secondary education in general.54 the service counted as reserve officers, which was matched by their training. From a research point of view, Tichý’s military affiliation in the Austro-Hungarian army seems to be problematic. While a number of materials show that Oldřich Tichý was assigned to the 78.55 Infantry Regiment, according to one of the documents, it could be the 18.56 Infantry Regiment. Due to the not entirely unambiguous implementation of the number 18, it may have happened that the number 78 was confused with copying the data in other documents. near Tichý’s native Nechanice, and it is therefore obvious that Oldřich Tichý would probably enlist a military body 55 according to one of the documents could be the Infantry Regiment No. 18.56 None of the variants can be accepted with absolute certainty. Due to the not entirely unambiguous implementation of the number 18, it may have happened that the number 78 was confused with copying the data in other documents. near Tichý’s native Nechanice, and it is therefore obvious that Oldřich Tichý would probably enlist a military body 55 according to one of the documents could be the Infantry Regiment No. 18.56 None of the variants can be accepted with absolute certainty. Due to the not entirely unambiguous implementation of the number 18, it may have happened that the number 78 was confused with copying the data in other documents. near Tichý’s native Nechanice, and it is therefore obvious that Oldřich Tichý would probably enlist a military body
51
Contemporary Czech Technical University. CTU in Prague: History. In: http://www.cvut.cz/historie [cit. October 18, 2014]. 52 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Kmenový list I; VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý. 53 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Kmenový list I. 54 PERNES, Jiří et al. Under the imperial banner. History of the Habsburg Army 1526 ̶ 1918 (hereinafter referred to as the Imperial Battalion). Prague 2003, p. 308. 55 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list; VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, First edition of qualification document, 1922. 56 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý, No. 1110f. 57 PERNES, J. et al. Under the Imperial Battalion, p. 330.
16
to Hradec. On the other hand, although the No. 78 Infantry Regiment was stationed in Osijek, Hungary, Tichý’s classification with him cannot be completely ruled out, although this regiment is not one of the regiments supplemented from Bohemia.58 Regiment No. 78 also supports the fact that Tichý course at the officer’s school of the 13th Army Corps in Rijeka, which is about 330 kilometers from Osijek. The course ran from the beginning of June to the end of October 1916.59 Tichý completed it with success and was promoted to the rank of corporal.60 Here he most likely fell into Russian captivity on August 4, 1917, and subsequently ended up in a prison camp in Darnice on the outskirts of Kiev.61 This is where Tichý’s legionary career began. Oldřich Tichý spent three months in the prisoner of war camp, and on November 20, 1917, he still enlisted in the Czechoslovak army in Darnice. This was followed by a transfer to Zhytomyr, where Tichý was assigned to the rank of 10th Company of the 1st Czechoslovak Reserve Regiment, which was part of the 1st Czechoslovak Hussite Rifle Division, on November 25, 1917. The entry into the Czechoslovak army for Tichý did not represent such a complicated matter. After the success of the Czechoslovaks in the battle of Zborov, the Russians finally allowed unlimited recruitment of prisoners, even directly in the front zone. Thanks to this, the prisoners were no longer transported from the central camp in Darnice to distant prison camps deep inside Russia.63 Among other things, Tichý Garrigu Masaryk’s visit to the prison camp could motivate Tichý to join the Czechoslovak army,
58
PERNES, J. et al. Under the Imperial Battalion, p. 330. VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Prvopis kvalifikační listiny, 1922; VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 60 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Original qualification document, 1922. 61 According to some documents, Tichý fell into Russian captivity “at Orange”. VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Personal statement, 1920. 62 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Prvopis kvalifikační listiny, 1922; VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 63 KLÍPA, Bohumír ̶ PICHLÍK, Karel ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, Jitka: Czechoslovak Legionnaires (1914 ̶ 1920) (hereinafter referred to as Czechoslovak Legionnaires). Prague 1996, pp. 105 ̶ 106. 64 Ibid., Pp. 107. 65 Ibid., Pp. 107 ̶ 108. 59
17
Relatively soon after his enlistment in the 1st Czechoslovak Reserve Regiment, on December 14, 1917, Tichý was assigned to the regimental non-commissioned officer school. He completed a two-month non-commissioned officer course, and on April 29, 1918, he was promoted to the rank of corporal.66 The time lag can be easily explained, as Tichý, of course, underwent combat operations with his unit. He first took part in the departure of the 1st Czechoslovak Reserve Regiment from Zhytomyr to Tambov and the subsequent fighting at Bachmač with the Germans.67 The Reserve Regiment began preparing for its departure on February 20, 1918, following reports of advancing German troops. German troops began to re-launch the initiative and began occupying Ukraine with the intention of getting the Bolsheviks to sign peace. On February 23, 1918, the 1st Czechoslovak Reserve Regiment withdrew from Zhytomyr. The regiment headed for Borispol, where he had to stay for a few days and wait for further orders. Since the regiment did not receive any orders, it was decided to leave Borispol. The regiment finally arrived in Jagotín on March 7, where two trains were waiting for it.68 Given that part of the regiment traveling on the second of the trains joined the battle of Bachmač on March 10, which took place from March 8 to 13, it can be concluded that Tichý also rode with his unit in the second train, as his helpful legionary file proves his participation in the fighting at Bachmač. Although neither train was to join the fight, the commander of the other train decided pkpt. He twisted help at the request of the 6th Czechoslovak Rifle “Hanácký” Regiment, whose weak left wing in the village Peski threatened that the Germans would bypass it and thus directly endanger the railway line. Thanks to the frontal attack of the 6th Regiment, which was also supported by the III. battalion 1. reserve regiment, finally managed to force the Germans to retreat. Of the units of the 1st Reserve Regiment, only III. battalion commanded by Lt. Col. Obrovec. From the 1st Reserve Regiment, 12 men were wounded near Bachmač, one of whom later succumbed to his injuries.69 After the Battle of Bachmač, Czechoslovak troops wanted to move to the Pacific port of Vladivostok and from there to France, where they were to take part in the fighting against the Germans in the west. queue. However, this was initially assumed by 66 69 After the Battle of Bachmač, Czechoslovak troops wanted to move to the Pacific port of Vladivostok and from there to France, where they were to take part in the fighting against the Germans on the Western Front. However, this was initially assumed by 66 69 After the Battle of Bachmač, Czechoslovak troops wanted to move to the Pacific port of Vladivostok and from there to France, where they were to take part in the fighting against the Germans on the Western Front. However, this was initially assumed by 66
VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. Ibid. 68 KRAUTSTENGL, Gustav: Lift from the History of the 9th Infantry Regiment of Karel Havlíček Borovský. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Battle of Buzuluk and the jubilee festivities on 5 and 6 July 1928 (hereinafter referred to as the Excerpt from History). Bridge 1928, p. 5. 69 Ibid. 67
18
to travel thousands of kilometers along the Trans-Siberian Highway, now also a country in which a civil war broke out.70 Again, both parts of the 1st Reserve Regiment met in Platonovka, which was a small station not far from Tambov, the destination of the transfer from Zhytomyr. Not far from Platonovka, in the town of Razskazov, the regiment was reorganized and replenished. The trains in which the Tichý Regiment was transported set off again on April 22, 1918.71 Unfortunately, this time it is no longer possible to determine from which of which trains Oldřich Tichý traveled. The situation of Czechoslovak troops in Russia became more and more complicated. Already on March 3, 1918, the Soviet government, under the influence of the German ultimatum, had to sign a very unfavorable and disgraceful Brestlitev peace for Russia, which ratified the Soviet Congress on March 17. As Lenin’s expectations of the revolution in Germany still did not materialize, some members of the government, such as Lev Trotsky, began to think of a possible alliance with the Treaty, based on renewed hostility with Germany. However, the situation of the Soviet government was not easy at all. By the Peace of Brestlitev, she pledged to disarm the army and exchange prisoners. However, an armed army corps moved on Soviet territory, which also claimed to be part of the French army and which was composed of Austro-Hungarian prisoners.72 On March 23 and 24, 1918, the situation was discussed by the presidium of the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council. Members who lacked Masaryk’s leadership, as he was already traveling through the Far East and Japan to the United States at the time, tried to find a solution. Some have suggested that the Czechoslovak soldiers forced their way east to Vladivostok by force, which, however, was resolutely refused by Chief of Staff Gen. Michail Diterichs. Instead, negotiations continued with the Soviet authorities, and an agreement was finally reached in Penza with the Soviet chairman of the Kuraev pension area on the partial disarmament of the Czechoslovak corps.73 A telegram from one of the members of the Soviet government, Joseph Stalin, approved the agreement. The Soviet government thus recognized the Czechoslovak demands for the immediate movement of train transports east to Vladivostok and guaranteed free passage through Russia and the whole of Siberia, and promised 70 Instead, negotiations continued with the Soviet authorities, and an agreement was finally reached in Penza with the Soviet chairman of the Kuraev pension area on the partial disarmament of the Czechoslovak corps.73 A telegram from one of the members of the Soviet government, Joseph Stalin, approved the agreement. The Soviet government thus recognized the Czechoslovak demands for the immediate movement of train transports east to Vladivostok and guaranteed free passage through Russia and the whole of Siberia, and promised 70 Instead, negotiations continued with the Soviet authorities, and an agreement was finally reached in Penza with the Soviet chairman of the Kuraev pension area on the partial disarmament of the Czechoslovak corps.73 A telegram from one of the members of the Soviet government, Joseph Stalin, approved the agreement. The Soviet government thus recognized the Czechoslovak demands for the immediate movement of train transports east to Vladivostok and guaranteed free passage through Russia and the whole of Siberia, and promised 70
KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, p. 170. KRAUTSTENGL, G .: Elevator from History, p. 5 ̶ 6. 72 KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, pp. 143. 73 FIC, Victor M .: Czechoslovak Legions in Russia and the Struggle for the Establishment of Czechoslovakia 1914 ̶ 1918. II. part. The Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legions, the beginning of their armed conflict, March ̶ May 1918 (hereinafter referred to as the Czechoslovak Legions. Part II). Brno 2007, pp. 35 and 53; KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, pp. 143-144. 71
19
that the organization and unity of the church will be preserved. It was also emphasized that the Czechoslovak Corps did not move as a fighting force, and that it would retain only a small amount of weapons in order to protect its trains from bandits.74 However, the agreement practically dealt only with the passage of Penza itself. Moreover, after the first Japanese troops, ie the soldiers of the Agreement, landed in Vladivostok, Siberian Soviet leaders became even more concerned about the transfer of not fully disarmed Czechoslovak train transports, and on April 21, the Siberian Soviets received instructions that Czechoslovak troops were not allowed to travel east. 75 Various provocations by the Soviets also began to arise, and various incidents complicating the already difficult situation of the Czechoslovak army also increased. An example is the well-known Chelyabinsk incident. In addition to the train of Czechoslovak troops, a train with Russian refugees stood at the Chelyabinsk railway station for some time, in the last three carriages of which there were also Hungarian prisoners. It was quiet all the time, but when a train with refugees began to leave the station on May 14, one of the Hungarian prisoners threw a piece of iron from the car, which struck a Czechoslovak soldier standing nearby. He suffered a severe injury, fainted, and lacked little to keep rolling under the wheels of a passing train. His comrades-in-arms immediately stopped the train, found the culprit among the detained Hungarians and began to lynch him. The general battle that broke out had to be directed by the summoned Czechoslovak guard. The Bolshevik guard did not intervene and the whole incident would eventually end immediately after the Hungarians left, however, a part of the local internationalist company was also a Hungarian unit, which, on behalf of its representative on the Chelyabinsk Soviet committee, demanded an investigation into the whole matter and action against the Czechoslovaks. When the commission of inquiry ordered the detention of the intervening Czechoslovak guard and one of the delegates sent by the Czechoslovak command to intervene in favor of the guard members, it occupied 3,000 Czechoslovak soldiers in Chelyabinsk, disarmed several Bolsheviks and seized weapons in the military commissariat. However, the Czechoslovaks proclaimed that their entire action was not directed against the Soviet government, but aimed to force the Soviets to release detained Czechoslovak soldiers. In addition, the command promised to punish the soldiers When the commission of inquiry ordered the detention of the intervening Czechoslovak guard and one of the delegates sent by the Czechoslovak command to intervene in favor of the guard members, it occupied 3,000 Czechoslovak soldiers in Chelyabinsk, disarmed several Bolsheviks and seized weapons in the military commissariat. However, the Czechoslovaks proclaimed that their entire action was not directed against the Soviet government, but aimed to force the Soviets to release detained Czechoslovak soldiers. In addition, the command promised to punish the soldiers When the commission of inquiry ordered the detention of the intervening Czechoslovak guard and one of the delegates sent by the Czechoslovak command to intervene in favor of the guard members, it occupied 3,000 Czechoslovak soldiers in Chelyabinsk, disarmed several Bolsheviks and seized weapons in the military commissariat. However, the Czechoslovaks proclaimed that their entire action was not directed against the Soviet government, but aimed to force the Soviets to release detained Czechoslovak soldiers. In addition, the command promised to punish the soldiers However, the Czechoslovaks proclaimed that their entire action was not directed against the Soviet government, but aimed to force the Soviets to release detained Czechoslovak soldiers. In addition, the command promised to punish the soldiers However, the Czechoslovaks proclaimed that their entire action was not directed against the Soviet government, but aimed to force the Soviets to release detained Czechoslovak soldiers. In addition, the command promised to punish the soldiers
74 75
FIC, VM: Czechoslovak Legions. II. part, p. 52. KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, p. 170.
20
responsible for the lynching of the Hungarian. The Soviets then, aware that the Czechoslovaks had control of the entire city, retreated and released the detained soldiers.76 In particular, officers and soldiers in transports rapidly lost confidence in the Soviet government, which was caused, among other things, by the desperately slow course of the movement. On May 20, in Chelyabinsk, representatives of both Czechoslovak divisions agreed with the present members of the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council and the commanders of the individual echelons who stood at Chelyabinsk railway station to establish an Interim Executive Committee, whose task will be to clear the way east. The committee consisted of four members of the branch, four representatives of the team and commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 7th Regiment, who gained all command authority over the Czechoslovak units located in the area between Penza and Irkutsk.77 that negotiations with the Soviet government no longer make sense was definitively confirmed on May 23, when a telegram was intercepted in Chelyabinsk calling on the Soviets “to detain, disarm and dismantle all the echelons and parts of the Czechoslovak Republic. Army Corps. ”78 The first military clashes with the Soviets then took place on May 24, 1918 in the Chelyabinsk section of Lt. Col. Sergei Vojcechovsky.79 Probably the most difficult situation got into a pension group of troops under the command of Lt. Col. Stanislav Čeček, forming the rear guard of the entire corps. Oldřich Tichý also took part in the battles of this group in the rank of corporal. On May 28, 1918.80 1st Reserve Regiment and 1st Artillery Brigade. Their opponent was the Soviet garrison in Penza, a mixture of Latvians, Czech and German internationalists and Russians, numbering about 3,800 men. The Soviets were much better armed, especially with the weapons handed over to them by Czechoslovak troops, and the Penza, which was located near the main centers of military power, was approaching Soviet reinforcements. During the 28th and 29th of May, Czechoslovak soldiers, including members of the 1st Reserve Regiment, occupied Penz. The Czechoslovak losses amounted to 30 dead and about a hundred wounded. In contrast, on the Soviet side, losses 76 which was located near the main centers of military power, in addition, Soviet reinforcements approached. During the 28th and 29th of May, Czechoslovak soldiers, including members of the 1st Reserve Regiment, occupied Penz. The Czechoslovak losses amounted to 30 dead and about a hundred wounded. In contrast, on the Soviet side, losses 76 which was located near the main centers of military power, in addition, Soviet reinforcements approached. During the 28th and 29th of May, Czechoslovak soldiers, including members of the 1st Reserve Regiment, occupied Penz. The Czechoslovak losses amounted to 30 dead and about a hundred wounded. In contrast, on the Soviet side, losses 76
FIC, VM: Czechoslovak Legion. II. vol., pp. 261-262. Irkutsk was an imaginary frontier, as troops already east of Irkutsk could reach Vladivostok safely. Ibid., P. 252; KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, pp. 174. 78 FIC, VM: Czechoslovak Legions. II. part, p. 294. 79 KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, p. 176. 80 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 77
21
climbed to 200 dead and 2,000 captured, the rest dispersed. Subsequently, the vanguard of the Čeček group managed to seize the bridge over the Volga, and by June 3, 1918, the entire group was transported to the left east bank of the river.81 the Volga front from June 6 to November 3, 1918.83 During these military actions, there were several changes in the Silent Legionary’s career. On July 5, Tichý was promoted to sergeant. In July, as a result of the formation of four new companies within the 1st Reserve Regiment, the 10th Company, in which Tichý was assigned, was renamed the 13th Company. During August, however, the designation of the 13th Company changed again to the original 10th, and the entire regiment underwent changes. The current 1st Reserve Regiment was merged with the 1st. the Kurgan marching battalion and the Independent Davlekan half-battalion, which created a new combat body, which was given the designation of the 9th Czechoslovak Rifle Regiment Karel Havlíček Borovský.84 In 1918, Tichý underwent further service. In October, as an officer-waiting, he became commander of one of the platoon 10th Company with retroactive effect from June 1, 1918.85 In November, Tichý was transferred to the same office, but to the 1st Company. 86 The beginning of 1919 meant another promotion for Oldřich Tichý. On January 6, he was appointed ensign, gaining his first rank as an officer. He completed a business trip to Omsk in March and another to Krasnoyarsk at the turn of June and July.87 Unfortunately, it is not known in what matter he made both business trips. In addition, between April 15 and June 23, he took part in a campaign on the so-called Manx Front, which were battles around the highway, which were to allow the passage of transports of Czechoslovak legionaries to Vladivostok. Soon after his return from Krasnoyarsk, Tichý acquired the rank of lieutenant on July 7, 1919.88 This time, however, it was not a matter of promotion, but of renaming, because Tichý’s current
81
KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, p. 177; KRAUTSTENGL, G .: Lift from history, p. 7. 82 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 83 The period from 6 June to 31 October 1918 is sometimes indicated. Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 The Legionnaire’s Service File admits two dates when Tichý was appointed platoon leader, on October 9 or 10, 1918. Ibid. In contrast, only the date 9 October 1918 is given in the Tribal Letters. Compare VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý; Tribal list I. and II. 86 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid.
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the rank of ensign was previously abolished in the Czechoslovak army and gradually replaced by the rank of lieutenant.89 By order of 23 July 1919, Oldřich Tichý received his first decoration, the Order of St. George IV degree.90 Unfortunately, it is not possible to read from any documents what specifically he received this award for. In August, Tichý was appointed commander of the half company, ie two platoons, in the 1st Company.91 Between January 15 and February 7, 1920, Tichý again participated in combat operations against Soviet troops during the departure of III. Rifle Division from Kanska to Cheremchov. On April 16, he was promoted again, gaining the rank of lieutenant with retroactive effect from April 1. He fell ill at the beginning of June, but recovered very soon, and finally the way home followed.92 On June 8, 1920, Tichý traveled to Czechoslovakia. On that June day, he boarded the ship Protesilaus and sailed from Vladivostok to Vancouver, Canada, along with the 29th transport of Czechoslovak legionnaires. From there, the legionnaires moved by rail to the Valcartier military camp and then to Halifax, where they boarded the Minecahda, where they sailed for Germany on June 18, 93 from where they continued by train to their homeland. After a two-month journey, they finally arrived in Czechoslovakia on August 4, 1920.94
89
PANUŠ, B .: Military education in Czechoslovakia. legions. In: http://www.karelvasatko.cz/historieceskoslovenskych-legii/odborne-clanky/vseobecne-k-cs-legiim/vojenske-kolstvi-v-slegiich [cit. 19/11/2014]. 90 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 94 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý.
23
4.
Interwar career (1920–1939)
4.1.
Ordinary and Staff Officer of the Czechoslovak Army (1920–1932)
After returning to his homeland, Oldřich Tichý decided to remain in the army. His service in the legions was counted from November 25, 1917 to August 31, 1920.95 After his activation, he was included on September 5, 1920 in the rank of lieutenant in the tribal number of Infantry Regiment No. 9, to the 1st Reserve Company.96 Regiment No. 9 was created on October 11, 1920 from the 9th Czechoslovak Rifle Regiment Karel Havlíček Borovský within the unification of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces, while also taking over the predecessor of the honorary
name
“Karel
Havlíček
Borovský”.
The
headquarters were located
in Most
and hierarchically the regiment fell under the command of the Second Infantry Brigade.97 Oldřich Tichý also served initially in Most and in December 1920 he was accepted into the category of professional officers. Already during the autumn of 1920, he completed an instructor course at the Provincial Military School in Chomutov. This course, which ran from September 14 to October 9, 1920, was completed by Tichý with very good results.98 During 1921, there were several important moments in Tichý’s military career. In the spring of 1921, Tichý received two more honors, namely the Czechoslovak War Cross in March and in April the Order of MR Štefánik “Falcon with Swords”, for bravery in battle and for special merits in Siberia. For him, the summer of 1921 meant, on the one hand, a reassignment within the 9th Infantry Regiment from the 1st Reserve Company to the 5th Half-Company, and, on the other hand, the third award in a row, as on 14. July 1921 Tichý received the Italian War Merit Cross. On November 1, 1921, Tichý was promoted to the rank of captain.99 From November 15, 1921 to August 26, 1922, Capt. Quiet at the École Spéciale Militaire, a special military school for infantry, in Saint-
95
Oldřich Tichý’s personal statement, which is a part of his service file, states as the date of the end of the legionary service September 1, 1920. VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionářský poslužný spis, Oldřich Tichý, Personal statement. Confirmation from a later period, however, states August 31, 1920. VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Confirmation for personal department of MNO, appendix to the personal benefit statement, 31 July 1924. 96 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 97 FIEDLER, Jiří – SLUKA, Václav: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces of the Czechoslovak Republic 1920–1938 (hereinafter referred to as the Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces). Prague 2006, p. 488. 98 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list, copy for subdivision; VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý,
24
Cyru.100 Officers from a number of countries came here, and so the composition of the individual companies formed from the students was truly international. Undoubtedly, this was a demanding study, in which great emphasis was placed on expanding theoretical knowledge, but also on physical training and practical activities. The normal school day began with an alarm at a quarter to six, and at six o’clock in the morning the students sat deeply immersed in books in the study. During the day, students were forced to run between different rooms and at different times of the day they also had to undergo various physical activities, starting with fairly common physical exercise, running with obstacles through ditches, horseback riding, digging trenches and ending with shooting or fencing. In addition to studying military theory, tactical training, geography or topography, students also learned foreign languages here. The difficulty of school days was alleviated at least by the fact that foreign students could live in the city outside the barracks. The atmosphere of the study can be helped by the memory of Ladislav Preininger, who, like Tichý, went through the school in Saint-Cyr: “We spend almost a whole day in the study. In the afternoon horseback riding in the riding hall. Trot, gallop. Then night or rather evening exercises. 101 Shortly after returning from France, on October 1, 1922, Tichý was assigned as an instructor and assistant commander of the information courses to the Military Infantry Training School. in Milovice.102 In Milovice, he also met for the first time his future collaborator in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, František Fryč, who also worked as an instructor in Milovice. 103 Here Tichý used his experience from France, as he cooperated with the French military mission in Milovice for four years.104 In 1923 there was a fundamental change in Oldřich Tichý’s personal life, as he married Karel Cucová in December of that year.105 Tichý’s wife came from the family of Antonín and Karla Cucov. Her father owned a staple shop in Lysá nad Labem, in which the young Karla also worked.106 Two years later,
100
VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualifying documents, Oldřich Tichý, Prvopis kvalifikační listiny, 1922. PREININGER, Ladislav: Přísaha. Diaries of a French Legionnaire 1913 ̶ 1940. Prague 2001, p. 316. 102 At about the same time, Tichý was described as surplus. It was abolished by Tichý in 1926. VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal Letter I. 103 ABS, f. 302, a. No. 302-57-2, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Karel Paleček, 25 November 1949, p. 57. 104 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), P. 132. 105 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Original qualification document, 1922, supplemented in 1933. 106 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal certificate, 26. 5. 1949. 101
25
on January 2, 1925, their only daughter Taťána was born, with the full name of Taťána Marie Božena Tichá.107 in 1927, on July 2, Tichý joined the 1st year of the War School109 and on July 9 he was promoted to the rank of staff captain. As a student at the War School, he gained theoretical and practical experience in various training schools and in various weapons.110 On October 30, he entered a self – course in Prague, which ended with excellent results on December 15, 1927. Tichý also completed an army gas course in Olomouc with excellent results (3. January ̶ January 21, 1928) and the telegraphic course in Kutná Hora (May 2 června June 2, 1928) .111 Based on the Decree of the MNO of September 1928, Capt. Tichý went to France for the second time for study reasons. From October 1, 1928, he became a first-year student at the École Supérieure de Guerre. years at the École Supérieure de Guerre with an overall rating of “very good”, Tichý returned to his homeland. Due to his high military education, he was destined to perform the highest staff or command positions in the army. In addition, he could 107 Tichý went to France for the second time for study reasons. From October 1, 1928, he became a first-year student at the École Supérieure de Guerre. years at the École Supérieure de Guerre with an overall rating of “very good”, Tichý returned to his homeland. Due to his high military education, he was destined to perform the highest staff or command positions in the army. In addition, he could 107 Tichý went to France for the second time for study reasons. From October 1, 1928, he became a first-year student at the École Supérieure de Guerre. years at the École Supérieure de Guerre with an overall rating of “very good”, Tichý returned to his homeland. Due to his high military education, he was destined to perform the highest staff or command positions in the army. In addition, he could 107 for only two to four Czechoslovak officers were admitted to the school each year.113 After successfully completing two years at the École Supérieure de Guerre with an overall grade of “very good”, Tichý returned to his homeland. Due to his high military education, he was destined to perform the highest staff or command positions in the army. In addition, he could 107 for only two to four Czechoslovak officers were admitted to the school each year.113 After successfully completing two years at the École Supérieure de Guerre with an overall grade of “very good”, Tichý returned to his homeland. Due to his high military education, he was destined to perform the highest staff or command positions in the army. In addition, he could 107
VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Original qualification document, 1922, supplemented in 1933. 109 The War School was established on the basis of a decree of the Ministry of National Defense on 1 November 1921 by renaming the Courts for the Education of General Staff Officers. The school was based in Prague and was directly subordinate to the Chief of the Armed Forces. By decree of the President of the Republic published by the NGO, the school was renamed the University of War on October 1, 1934. During its existence, the school was attended by a total of 361 domestic and 23 foreign students, who thus obtained the title of officer of the General Staff. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, pp. 667 ̶ 668. 110 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Original qualification document, 1922, added in 1933; VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for cleanpoint Qualification documents, part I, 1927. 111 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for cleanpoint Qualification documents, part I, 1927. 112 Ibid .; The École Supérieure de Guerre was a military training institute of the French army for the training of general staff officers. The school was founded in 1879 and was located in Versailles and was under the command of the État-Major Général of the French army. This institute became a model for the above-mentioned War School in Prague. By the autumn of 1938, 45 Czechoslovak officers and generals had graduated from the French Institute. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, p. 205. 113 Ibid. 108 Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for cleanpoint Qualification documents, part I, 1927. 112 Ibid .; The École Supérieure de Guerre was a military training institute of the French army for the training of general staff officers. The school was founded in 1879 and was located in Versailles and was under the command of the État-Major Général of the French army. This institute became a model for the above-mentioned War School in Prague. By the autumn of 1938, 45 Czechoslovak officers and generals had graduated from the French Institute. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, p. 205. 113 Ibid. 108 Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for cleanpoint Qualification documents, part I, 1927. 112 Ibid .; The École Supérieure de Guerre was a military training institute of the French army for the training of general staff officers. The school was founded in 1879 and was located in Versailles and was under the command of the État-Major Général of the French army. This institute became a model for the above-mentioned War School in Prague. By the autumn of 1938, 45 Czechoslovak officers and generals had graduated from the French Institute. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, p. 205. 113 Ibid. 108 it was located in Versailles and was under the command of the État-Major Général of the French army. This institute became a model for the above-mentioned War School in Prague. By the autumn of 1938, 45 Czechoslovak officers and generals had graduated from the French Institute. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, p. 205. 113 Ibid. 108 it was located in Versailles and was under the command of the État-Major Général of the French army. This institute became a model for the above-mentioned War School in Prague. By the autumn of 1938, 45 Czechoslovak officers and generals had graduated from the French Institute. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, p. 205. 113 Ibid. 108
26
to use the abbreviation gšt., Ie “General Staff” after the abbreviation of his rank. 114
Tichý was officially assigned
to the
group of officers of the
General
Staff
with effect
from 31 July 1930115 and in order from 1 April 1930.116 Oldřich Tichý did not return to the military school in Milovice. On September 30, 1930, he was incorporated into the tribal count of the Provincial Military Headquarters in Bratislava and spent the next two years in Slovakia. On the day exactly one year after his enlistment in Bratislava, Tichý was enlisted in another infantry unit, this time with the Infantry Regiment No. 17.117. Within the regiment, Tichý was embodied in the 7th Company. He spent one year here. The Slovak office became the last stop before Oldřich Tichý’s accession to the second department of the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense, in other words to the then Czechoslovak military intelligence service. Throughout his military service as a rank-and-file officer, Tichý’s personnel materials contain excellent ratings and praise words from his commanders. He always performed his duties by example, his degree of qualification was described as excellent and his personality bore the following characteristics: “Calm, steady nature, very gentle and sensitive, healthy ambitious and proactive. He has an extremely sharp observation and clear judgment, especially on tactical issues, he gets into situations very quickly and he makes decisions quickly and correctly. Very diligent, tireless and extremely conscientious. ”119 It is worth noting that in 1932 his superiors Tichý recommended a possible further assignment to the third, ie the operational department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.120 However, this never happened. He always performed his duties by example, his degree of qualification was described as excellent and his personality bore the following characteristics: “Calm, steady nature, very gentle and sensitive, healthy ambitious and proactive. He has an extremely sharp observation and clear judgment, especially on tactical issues, he gets into situations very quickly and he makes decisions quickly and correctly. Very diligent, tireless and extremely conscientious. ”119 It is worth noting that in 1932 his superiors Tichý recommended a possible further assignment to the third, ie the operational department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.120 However, this never happened. He always performed his duties by example, his degree of qualification was described as excellent and his personality bore the following characteristics: “Calm, steady nature, very gentle and sensitive, healthy ambitious and proactive. He has an extremely sharp observation and clear judgment, especially on tactical issues, he gets into situations very quickly and he makes decisions quickly and correctly. Very diligent, tireless and extremely conscientious. ”119 It is worth noting that in 1932 his superiors Tichý recommended a possible further assignment to the third, ie the operational department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.120 However, this never happened. He has an extremely sharp observation and clear judgment, especially on tactical issues, he gets into situations very quickly and he makes decisions quickly and correctly. Very diligent, tireless and extremely conscientious. ”119 It is worth noting that in 1932 his superiors Tichý recommended a possible further assignment to the third, ie the operational department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.120 However, this never happened. He has an extremely sharp observation and clear judgment, especially on tactical issues, he gets into situations very quickly and he makes decisions quickly and correctly. Very diligent, tireless and extremely conscientious. ”119 It is worth noting that in 1932 his superiors Tichý recommended a possible further assignment to the third, ie the operational department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.120 However, this never happened.
HANZLIK, Frantisek: Vojak. The example of Oscar Dogs. In: FASORA, Lukáš – HANUŠ, Jiří – MALÍŘ, Jiří – VYKOUPIL, Libor (ed.): Man in Moravia in the First Half of the 20th Century. Brno 2011, p. 292. 115 On the same date, it was also deleted from the records of the Infantry Regiment No. 9. VÚA – SA ACR, f. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to the clean document Qualification documents, part I, 1930. 117 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet II. 118 FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, pp. 491 ̶ 492. 119 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to the clean document Qualification documents, part II, 1932. 120 Ibid. 114
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4.2.
Officer of the search unit of the 2nd Department of the General Staff (1932–1937)
Tichý was assigned to the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense in June 1932. On the basis of a telegram arrived at the Provincial Military Headquarters in Bratislava, Tichý was to report to the Second Department of the General Staff on June 20, 1932, which was the Intelligence Department.121 at that time they formed groups of study, search, foreign, general and auxiliary office. The department has been headed by a brig since 1927. gene. JUDr. Vladimir Chalupa. The second division lasted in this organizational division until 1933, when the search party was divided into a reconnaissance section (P ̶ 1) headed by Lt. Col. gšt. František Dastych and the defensive section (P ̶ 2), led by Maj. František Jandera.122 Maj. Jandera was a very problematic personality, especially because of his positive attitude towards alcohol. Oldřich Tichý characterized him as follows: “If I knew him, I was impressed by the bohemian, he liked to drink, he got drunk, so [it] was sometimes seen in the office that he was not sober. He committed malversace123 at the box office and was removed from the department. ”124 Oldřich Tichý was assigned to the search party. At the time he joined the second department of the General Staff, Col. Mojmír Soukup, head of the search group, that the department’s activities are already well developed towards Hungary and Austria, but for the time being the intelligence activities are lagging behind Germany.125
embed
intelligence
activities
directed
against
Germany
was characterized in 1934, mainly efforts to obtain agents. The Czechoslovak intelligence service considered men and women who had shown resistance to the regime in their own country to be suitable agency workers. This resistance could be conditioned by political, national, religious and social reasons, it was also accompanied by sympathy for Czechoslovakia and a willingness to cooperate with intelligence. There were very few people who offered Czechoslovak intelligence themselves cooperation. A much larger group consisted of people who had a relevant presumption that, due to their unfavorable living conditions, or due to their nature, they would be able to raise money for agency activities.126 121
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 2; VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for the original of the qualification document, 1932. 122 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 27. 123 Embezzlement. 124 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 8. 125 Ibid., P. 16. 126 ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 30.
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The “Throat Cutter” action must be mentioned in this context. This project for recruiting agents was implemented through a brokerage office, the so-called “Bankhaus D”, 127 located in Podmokle in Děčín. One of the brokers, Franz Dobianer, 128, who worked in Berlin and had worked for the Czechoslovak intelligence service since 1931, provided financial loans to people who found themselves in the field of Czechoslovak intelligence as potentially selected collaborators. Everything took place on a legal basis, but the broker provided the loans to the relevant persons so that they would get into financial trouble over time. The intention was subsequently to take advantage of their situation and to persuade them, through their difficulties, to cooperate, ie to take action in favor of Czechoslovakia.129 Although the course of the whole event was far from smooth, as one lieutenant in Flensburg reported the matter and the German authorities subsequently began restricting and banning advertisements for loan offers, 130 it could not be considered a failure. During the four years of operation of the office, about 25 members of the German army were obtained for cooperation, three of whom had the rank of officer, two members of the Reich passport and customs control, five police officers and five gendarmes. In addition, the office gained about a hundred people from the civil sector, and a private detective agency worked for the Czechoslovak correspondents in Berlin thanks to “Bankhaus D “.131 The” Hrdlořez “event is interesting from another point of view. The villa in which Dobianer132 lived was located in close proximity to the railway line leading across the German border to Podmokel. Agents who arrived on this route
127
FÁREK, František: Footprints disappear in the archive (hereinafter only Footprints disappear). Prague 1975, p. 115. KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Before the war broke out. Germans in the service of Czechoslovakia. intelligence services in 1935 1̶ 939 (hereinafter referred to as Before the war broke out). In: http://dejinyasoucasnost.cz/archiv/2007/4/nez-vypuklavalka-/ [cit. January 30, 2015]. 129 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 16. 130 Ibid. 131 FÁREK, F. Footprints Disappear, p. 116. 132 František Fárek mentions it under the name František Daubner. Ibid., Pp. 110. 133 ABS, f. Z, a. No. Z-6-314-1, Report for Minister Rudolf Barák on the activities of the Czechoslovak intelligence service in the years 1920 ̶ 1945 prepared by the First Special Department of the Ministry of the Interior, 22. 12. 1957, p. 3. 134 FÁREK, F .: Footprints disappear, p. 115. 128
29
Other options for recruiting cooperation have also considered the use of cocaine. Oldřich Tichý himself, in his opinion, had at least two meetings with the man to whom his superior, Col. Soukupa pointed out a lady. She knew of one of her acquaintances that he was smuggling cocaine, and it was Col. who alerted him. A group with whether it could not be used. Tichý met the “acquaintance” in question twice at the Fénix café in Prague, where he confirmed that he was in contact with acquaintances in Germany and was actually smuggling cocaine. He explained to Tichý how the psychology of a cocaine addict works, that he, if he lacks the drug, will do everything in his power to get it. He responded positively to Tichý’s question as to whether he could recruit cocaine workers in Germany for the purposes of the Czechoslovak intelligence service. But in the end, the whole plan came together, for the person in question never attended another meeting.135 Of course, a number of agents worked for the second department. For example, at least a few of them, which Oldřich Tichý explicitly mentioned after the war, will be mentioned. Agent Spiess, for example, worked for the second headquarters. It was an agent, Col. Soukupa, who worked at the Ministry of Aviation in Berlin and naturally supplied news from the field of aviation. Among other things, he provided the second department with information on the basis of which Czechoslovak correspondents could for the first time get an idea of the organization of the German Air Force and the existence of dive bombers. Col. dealt directly with Spiess. Soukup, while Tichý often took part in these negotiations and once also brought Spiess money to Zurich, Switzerland. However, Agent Spiess fell silent in 1934/1935. According to Col. Soukup was discovered by the Germans and sentenced to death.136 In the same spirit, Tichý’s colleague from the second department, František Fryč, also commented on the end of Agent Speisse.137 It is not clear which agent it was. Jaroslav Koutek stated in one of his works that a kind of Spies was an agent with the designation A ̶ 51.138. He provided valuable information on, among other things, the construction of defense bunkers in Bavaria, as well as information from the western borders. Thanks to some data that 135 that a certain Spies was an agent named A-51.138 Agent A-51 was discussed in more detail by the publicist Karel Pacner.139 According to him, it was a German officer who offered his services to the second department in the mid-1930s. He provided valuable information on, among other things, the construction of defense bunkers in Bavaria, as well as information from the western borders. Thanks to some data that 135 that a certain Spies was an agent named A-51.138 Agent A-51 was discussed in more detail by the publicist Karel Pacner.139 According to him, it was a German officer who offered his services to the second department in the mid-1930s. He provided valuable information on, among other things, the construction of defense bunkers in Bavaria, as well as information from the western borders. Thanks to some data that 135
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 16. Ibid., p. 17. 137 ABS, f. 302, a. No. 302-73-1, Protocol written with Col. vv František Fryč, 3. 1. 1950, p. 27. 138 KOUTEK, Jaroslav: Tichá fronta. Prague 1985, pp. 18. 139 PACNER, Karel: Czechoslovakia in Special Services: Views into the History of Czechoslovak Intelligence Services 1914 ̶ 1989. Part I. 1914 ̶ 1939. Prague 2002, pp. 343. 136
30
As he added, the French could detect and intercept many German agents who were interested in their fortification system on the so-called Maginot Line. He also drew Prague’s attention to several important agents, but the Czechoslovak correspondents never managed to find out who actually did them such good services. They assumed it was an anti-Nazi from the German military intelligence, the Abwehr. The way Karel Pacner portrayed Agent A-51 evokes an attempt to put this agent on the level of the much more famous agent A-54 and to glorify A-51, just as Čestmír Amort and Ivan Jedlička did in A-54.140 Jaroslav and Stanislav Kokošek they stated that at the beginning of the search operation against Edmund Kalmar141 was “an Abwehr officer report from the Engineer Staff No. 16 in Weiden.” 142 This officer first worked for Lt. Col. gšt. Václav Kopačka and later for Maj. gšt. Emil Strankmüller.143 Although the authors themselves did not mark the agent with the code A-51, it is most likely the same person mentioned by Jiří Plachý when he stated that on February 2, 1938, Edmund Kalmár was arrested, to whose arrest he contributed. most probably agent’s report A ̶ 51.144 For the sake of completeness, it can be added that Zlatica Zudová-Lešková mentioned the name Ing. Andrej Engel, and this name was changed to Andrej Sokol in 1946.145 Among the other agents that Oldřich Tichý remembered after the war, Maj. František Pokorný. Due to the fact that he married the German Reich, Countess von Arnim146 and had contacts with German industrial circles, he was deployed in Germany as an industrial spy. 147 At the time of Tichý’s arrival in the second department, however, he was already retiring from an agency point of view.148 According to František Fryč, he also supplied false reports, which resulted in his detection and then the release of services for the second department. In addition, Pokorný also traded in weapons, and Fryč commented on him in the sense that he was more of a “chaser than an agent” and only 140
AMORT, No. ̶ JEDLIČKA, IM: The secret of the spy. Cpt. gšt. Edmund Kalmár was a Czechoslovak officer of Hungarian nationality who worked for the Third Reich. In detail on his case, eg KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, pp. 47 ̶ 51; KOKOŠKA, J. ̶ KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, pp. 103 ̶ 104; PLACHÝ, Jiří: Throat Trials at the Prague Divisional Court in the Years 1937 – 1938 (hereinafter referred to as Throat Trials). In: Historica Pragensia: historický sborník Muzea hlavní města Prahy, 2, 2005, pp. 170 ̶ 175. 142 KOKOŠKA, J. ̶ KOKOŠKA, S .: Spor o agenta, p. 104. 143 Ibid. 144 PLACHÝ, Jiří: Hrdelní procesy, s. 170. 145 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 279. 146 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, p. 125. 147 ABS, f. 302, a. No. 302-73-1, Protocol written with Col. vv František Fryč, 3. 1. 1950, pp. 27 ̶ 28. 148 His activity definitively ceased with the departure of Col. Soukupa. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 17. 141
31
the benefit of his agency work can be considered the acquisition of the above-mentioned Spiesse for cooperation with the second department.149 Ing. Karel Staller, 150 director of Zbrojovka Brno, who provided information on the activities of the Habsburgs. The Habsburgs were not among the main interests of the second department, but, as Oldřich Tichý noted, reports of them were a kind of “hobby” Col. Soukupa.151 We can also mention Mrs. Hrdílková, the wife of an industrialist and also Miss Rývová, the editor of Lidové noviny, whom Col. Soukup called the “Madonna of Sleeping Cars” .152 A certain Mrs. Riv is also mentioned in the official record of the HSOBZ, 153 as the secretary of Col. Soukupa.154 The question remains whether Miss Rývová and Mrs. Rivová are one and the same person. The mentioned Mrs. Rivová was detained and interrogated by the Germans after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. In her testimony, she tried to protect Col. Soukupa and aroused suspicion that she had an affair with him.155 Given Miss Rývová’s above-mentioned designation as “Madonna of Sleeping Cars”, Miss Rývová and Mrs. Rivová could indeed be one person. Otto Strasser is also worth mentioning. The nominee was to be the police chief in Opole and was one of those people who was adamant that Hitler’s regime in Germany would last only a few months.156 In the case of Otto Strasser, the question is whether it is a coincidence or perhaps inaccurate information Tichý said. Otto Strasser was also the name of the leader of the so-called Black Front. He was a former supporter of Hitler within the NSDAP, but he broke up with Hitler before 1933, emigrated to Czechoslovakia and founded an opposition movement in Prague called the Black Front. Black Front Intelligence Reconnaissance Network, that she had an affair with him. Otto Strasser is also worth mentioning. The nominee was to be the police chief in Opole and was one of those people who was adamant that Hitler’s regime in Germany would last only a few months.156 In the case of Otto Strasser, the question is whether it is a coincidence or perhaps inaccurate information Tichý said. Otto Strasser was also the name of the leader of the so-called Black Front. He was a former supporter of Hitler within the NSDAP, but he broke up with Hitler before 1933, emigrated to Czechoslovakia and founded an opposition movement in Prague called the Black Front. Black Front Intelligence Reconnaissance Network, that she had an affair with him. Otto Strasser is also worth mentioning. The nominee was to be the police chief in Opole and was one of those people who was adamant that Hitler’s regime in Germany would last only a few months.156 In the case of Otto Strasser, the question is whether it is a coincidence or perhaps inaccurate information Tichý said. Otto Strasser was also the name of the leader of the so-called Black Front. He was a former supporter of Hitler within the NSDAP, but he broke up with Hitler before 1933, emigrated to Czechoslovakia and founded an opposition movement in Prague called the Black Front. Black Front Intelligence Reconnaissance Network, 155 In view of Miss Rývová’s abovementioned designation as the ‘Madonna of Sleeping Cars’, both Ms Rývová and Ms Rivová could indeed be one person. Otto Strasser is also worth mentioning. The nominee was to be the police chief in Opole and was one of those people who was adamant that Hitler’s regime in Germany would last only a few months.156 In the case of Otto Strasser, the question is whether it is a coincidence or perhaps inaccurate information Tichý said. Otto Strasser was also the name of the leader of the so-called Black Front. He was a former supporter of Hitler within the NSDAP, but he broke up with Hitler before 1933, emigrated to Czechoslovakia and founded an opposition movement in Prague called the Black Front. Black Front Intelligence Reconnaissance Network, 155 In view of Miss Rývová’s abovementioned designation as the ‘Madonna of Sleeping Cars’, both Ms Rývová and Ms Rivová could indeed be one person. Otto Strasser is also worth mentioning. The nominee was to be the police chief in Opole and was one of those people who was adamant that Hitler’s regime in Germany would last only a few months.156 In the case of Otto Strasser, the question is whether it is a coincidence or perhaps inaccurate information Tichý said. Otto Strasser was also the name of the leader of the so-called Black Front. He was a former supporter of Hitler within the NSDAP, but he broke up with Hitler before 1933, emigrated to Czechoslovakia and founded an opposition movement in Prague called the Black Front. Black Front Intelligence Reconnaissance Network,
149
ABS, No. 302, No. 302-73-1, Protocol written with Col. vv František Fryč, 3 January 1950, pp. 27 ̶ 28. Before Ing. Karel Staller, director of Brno’s Zbrojovka, participated in the construction of the famous Czechoslovak light machine gun Bren. In the interwar period, he cooperated with the Czechoslovak intelligence service. During World War II, he remained in command of the company and, despite great danger, began cooperating with the military resistance in the Protectorate. After February 1948, he had to secretly leave Czechoslovakia to escape communist persecution. Martin Krčál discussed the fate of Karel Staller in detail. See KRČÁL, Martin: Karel Staller. Life with a double face. Activities of the General Directorate of Zbrojovka Brno during the occupation. Prague 2012. 151 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, pp. 124. 152 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 18. 153 Main Administration of Defense Intelligence. It was a military intelligence service, which was originally established at the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Soviet Union and later also operated as part of the Czechoslovak Army. For more details on this issue, eg KUDRNA, Ladislav: Military Defense Intelligence (1945 ̶ 1950). Development, organizational structures, staffing. Paměť a dějiny, 3, 2008, No. 1, pp. 76 ̶ 89. 154 ABS, f. 302, a. 6. 4. 1946, p. 6. 155 Ibid. 156 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 18. 150 of the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Soviet Union and later also served as part of the Czechoslovak Army. For more details on this issue, eg KUDRNA, Ladislav: Military Defense Intelligence (1945 ̶ 1950). Development, organizational structures, staffing. Paměť a dějiny, 3, 2008, No. 1, pp. 76 ̶ 89. 154 ABS, f. 302, a. 6. 4. 1946, p. 6. 155 Ibid. 156 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 18. 150 of the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Soviet Union and later also served as part of the Czechoslovak Army. For more details on this issue, eg KUDRNA, Ladislav: Military Defense Intelligence (1945 ̶ 1950). Development, organizational structures, staffing. Paměť a dějiny, 3, 2008, No. 1, pp. 76 ̶ 89. 154 ABS, f. 302, a. 6. 4. 1946, p. 6. 155 Ibid. 156 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 18. 150 Official record of the HSOBZ – extract from the report of the agent 54 (from the 2nd section of the capital), 4 April 1946, p. 6. 155 Ibid. 156 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 18. 150 Official record of the HSOBZ – extract from the report of the agent 54 (from the 2nd section of the capital), 4 April 1946, p. 6. 155 Ibid. 156 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 18. 150
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who, on the instructions of Otto Strasser, worked for the Czechoslovak intelligence service, was then liquidated in Berlin in August 1937.157 The main Hungarian agent, with whom the Czechoslovak military attaché in Budapest, Major. gšt. Jan Heřman158 and later Maj. gšt. Bohumil Klein, 159 was “Zoltán”. According to the department, it was he who in the past provided the complete material for the reports on Hungary. He delivered news of both military and political nature. In addition, the second department had several smaller agents who delivered regular messages.160 Important military messages were supplied to the second department by Maj.
Adi
from Innsbruck. Tichý met this agent in person in the presence of Capt. František Fryč, in Switzerland. The main purpose of the meeting was to draw Adi’s attention to his rather reckless behavior with regard to women and drinking and, above all, to persuade him to report even more intensively on the Austrian army as such and on the penetration of Nazism into it and into Austria in general.161 The year 1934 marked a time of change for the intelligence department. At the turn of 1933 and 1934, after the departure of the second department, gen. Retirement cottages Col. gšt. Šimon Drgač, in whose person the department gained for the first time the head, who had a military university education. Although he did not remain in the position of head, he was at the birth of the modern functional and organizational form of the second department, which did not undergo fundamental changes, except for personnel, practically until the second half of the 1930s.162 Another important personnel change took place in the autumn of 1934. On September 30, Lt. Col. joined the intelligence department. gšt. František Moravec.163 Around the circumstances of the appointment of Lt. Col. Moravec, the head of the search party has a number of ambiguities. His qualification record is too brief in this respect and does not provide any details. On the other hand, Moravec himself stated that he had joined the second division that “the assignment was not without intrigue and delay.” 164 It is possible that political pressures played a role in terms of protection and promotion of the interests of the agrarian party. Although such effects are not documented, they cannot be 157 163 Around the circumstances of the appointment of Lt. Col. Moravec, the head of the search party has a number of ambiguities. His qualification record is too brief in this respect and does not provide any details. On the other hand, Moravec himself stated that he had joined the second division that “the assignment was not without intrigue and delay.” 164 It is possible that political pressures played a role in terms of protection and promotion of the interests of the agrarian party. Although such effects are not documented, they cannot be 157 163 Around the circumstances of the appointment of Lt. Col. Moravec, the head of the search party has a number of ambiguities. His qualification record is too brief in this respect and does not provide any details. On the other hand, Moravec himself stated that he had joined the second division that “the assignment was not without intrigue and delay.” 164 It is possible that political pressures played a role in terms of protection and promotion of the interests of the agrarian party. Although such effects are not documented, they cannot be 157 that political pressures in the sense of protection and promotion of the interests of the agrarian party played a role. Although such effects are not documented, they cannot be 157 that political pressures in the sense of protection and promotion of the interests of the agrarian party played a role. Although such effects are not documented, they cannot be 157
KOKOŠKA, S .: Before the war broke out. He held the office from January 1932 to September 1937. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Forgotten Elite, p. 31. 159 He held the office from September 1937 until the end of April 1939. Ibid. 160 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 19. 161 Ibid. 162 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 27. 163 KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 36. 164 MORAVEC, František: Spion, whom he did not believe. Prague 1990, pp. 21. 158
33
clearly refuted and could be hidden, for example, in the decisions of the Chief of General Staff, or other generals with greater influence.165 According to Oldřich Tichý, Moravec was helped to get to the second department by the Gen. Lva Prchaly. Moravec reported to the head of the second department, Col. Drgac’s suspicion that gen. Fugitive, then Deputy Chief of Staff, is an agent who works for Germany. Due to the high function of the gene. The fugitive caused such a serious accusation. In order for the whole matter to be investigated as secretly as possible and in the greatest possible silence, Lt. Col. Moravec transferred to the General Staff. It soon became clear that the agent was not a gene. She fled, but a certain carpenter. Lt. Col. However, Moravec already stayed with the General Staff.166 It can be said that relations between Tichý and Moravec did not have very good relations from the very beginning. This needs to be kept in mind, as their differences of opinion and character culminated in 1941 with the departure of Oldřich Tichý from Czechoslovak correspondents. Until that moment, however, in 1934, there was still relatively much time left. Oldřich Tichý evaluated František Moravec as follows: “Educated, intelligent, excellent organizer, excellent intelligence, extremely hardworking and capable, talented, smart. However, he was morbidly vain, the prestigious questions surpassed everything else, arrogant, often rude, native intrigue. He once said in his presence that he was a gray eminence. ”167 The coexistence with Moravec in the second ward can be demonstrated on a concrete example. Tichý described her as follows: “He didn’t like me. We lived side by side like a dog and a cat. Lt. Col. gšt. He told Havel when he arrived at headquarters that he would try to get me out of the department. […] Each General Staff officer had to take command of the unit. Moravec was to go to the battalion. Drgač called me directly in person and told me the above fact, stating that he was counting on me in his (Moravc’s) place. In a few days, Moravec reprimanded me very uncomfortably for being with the head of the department and not reporting it to him. I told him I had nothing to say about the head of the department calling me in person and talking to me in confidence. ”169 Moravec’s somewhat exaggerated reaction can be understood, for 165
In more detail on this issue ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, pp. 46 ̶ 48. TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory, pp. 119 ̶ 120. 167 Ibid., P. group A (study) intelligence department of the General Staff. Especially in the post-war period, he was one of František Moravec’s staunch opponents and critics. MASKALÍK, A .: Army Elite, pp. 216; ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 49. 169 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, p. 122. 166
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he really lacked the military practice mentioned. Experience in the command of an infantry battalion or artillery division, or cavalry banners was one of the conditions for promoting a candidate to the rank of colonel. The highest military unit that fell under Moravc’s command was the infantry company or non-commissioned officer school, which, however, stood at the same level.170 It is worth noting that the successor of Col. Drgače Col. gšt. František Hájek made a great effort and used his connections to ensure that Moravec met this condition at least formally. Hájek personally discussed the whole matter with the commander of the 3rd Division II. choir gen. František Melichar 171, who gave his consent for Moravec to commute twice a week to the unit in Litoměřice and command the battalion there. However, Moravec never fulfilled the condition.172 In 1934, the filling of the leading positions of both sections also changed, which formed a search party. Oldřich Tichý became the head of the intelligence section (P ̶ 1) and the position of head of the defense section (P ̶ 2) was taken by Capt. Josef Bartík.173 Unfortunately, the exact dates of his appointment to the position of head of the intelligence section are missing from Oldřich Tichý’s qualification documents. He took up this position in the rank of Major General, to which he was promoted on February 10, 1933.174 Since 1933, in connection with the ever-increasing threat it began to pose
Nazi
Germany,
began
to develop
and
deepen
Czechoslovak-French intelligence cooperation, which was directly related to air cooperation, in which air cooperation was also planned in the event of an outbreak of war. The fact that very little intelligence work against him until the early 1930s can be attributed to the general consideration of intelligence work against Weimar Germany as a very delicate problem, as Czechoslovakia sought to curb military activity at the borders while maintaining correct Czechoslovak-German relations. , and there was also the opinion of the General Staff, which relied on the presence of the Allied Control Commission in Germany.175 Alone 170
ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 51. MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, p. 413. 172 ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 51. 173 KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 37. 174 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Kmenový list; TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, pp. 119. 175 STRAKA, KAREL: Czechoslovak and French Military Intelligence 1933 ̶ 1938. HaV, 58, 2009, No. 2, p. 44. 171
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After the war, Tichý recalled that he had performed the task concerning Poland practically only once, in 1935 or 1936. Tichý then received a direct personal order from Col. Drgač, according to whom he was to go to the area of Moravian Ostrava and find out whether the reports according to which the Poles were supposed to prepare for the invasion of Czechoslovak territory in the period around 28 October are based on the truth. Tichý had to summarize the results in a report that was to be submitted to the Czechoslovak government. At the same time as Tichý, Major was instructed in the whole matter. Procházka, then head of the second department of the Provincial Military Department in Brno, to arrive in Moravian Ostrava. Oldřich Tichý, on the basis of reports provided by the agents of the Brno Regional Military Headquarters and the Police Headquarters in Moravská Ostrava, found out
possible
deeper
cooperation
with Poles
in the
field of
military
The news was not surprising, as Czechoslovak-Polish relations were marked at all levels in the second half of the 1930s by still smoldering reminiscences from the Polish side over the dispute over the Těšín region. In addition, the author of the Polish foreign and domestic policy concept, Józef Piłsudski, was opposed to Czechoslovakia, and a different attitude towards Russia certainly did not benefit from mutual relations, because while Poland wanted to push it out of Europe in the spirit of the Piłsudski concept, Czechoslovakia stabilizing element.177 Nevertheless, with the growing ambitions of the Third Reich, some cooperation was finally realized, mainly in the exchange of information about the German armed forces and the military potential of Germany in general. For this purpose, several conferences were held. However, the mutual Czech-Slovak conditions gradually worsened again and the Poles began to carry out diversionary activities in the Těšín region, Spiš, Orava or Subcarpathian Russia. This led to the Czechoslovak party launching a search intelligence operation against Poland in 1938. Nevertheless, it is necessary to add that at the turn of 1938 and 1939, Czechoslovak correspondents still left a relatively large space for the operation of Polish intelligence in Czechoslovak territory, which worked here against the Third Reich.178
176
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 20. GEBHART, Jan ̶ KUKLÍK, Jan: Czechoslovak-Polish military intelligence relations in the spring and summer of 1939. HaV, 41, 1992, No. 3, p. 66. 178 Ibid., Pp. 74 ̶ 75. 177
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For the sake of completeness, it should be added that since May 1936, cooperation with the Soviet Union
has also been taking place at the intelligence level , as a joint
Czechoslovak-Soviet agency exchange with the code name “Vonapo 20”, whose commander became Capt. Karel Paleček.179 However, we cannot talk about any greater cooperation with the British. The role of British liaison officer in Czechoslovakia was performed by Maj. Harold Gibson. However, he joined the cooperation at the turn of 1938 and 1939. On the other hand, it then played a decisive role in the departure of Moravc’s intelligence group to London on the eve of the German invasion.180 As the danger from Nazi Germany grew, so did the need for the second materials, which of course required agents. Apart from the above-mentioned sample, Paul Thümmel, an agent with the code number ̶ 54, was undoubtedly the most famous agent who worked for the second department, and Tichý could not ignore him in his statement: “In the next period, there was no large agent until A-54 was obtained. He was an agent of the largest format that the Second General Staff Department ever had.” 181 It makes no sense to describe in detail all the circumstances and activities of A-54 for the Czechoslovak intelligence service. Jaroslav and Stanislav Kokošek have already critically discussed this, 182 therefore only a few basic facts will be mentioned. Unfortunately, the mentioned pair of authors failed to use the commentary of Oldřich Tichý in their work, who directly participated in the first contact with agent A-54. Pavel Kreisinger drew attention to this shortcoming in his work. 184 Head of the Intelligence Section Oldřich Tichý said of the acceptance of the anonymous letter: He then conducted the letter to the correct addressee (for example, service offers, patent offers, notices, statements, etc.). 179
KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 42. ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 59. 181 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, pp. 18 ̶ 19. 182 See KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent. 183 See KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 43. 184 Ibid. 185 The general address in this case is the Ministry of National Defense, Nachrichten Abtlg., Prague. Ibid. 180
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The offer also concerned defense intelligence. Bartík handed it over to Moravec and they immediately discussed it. Both were apparently in favor of her immediate adoption. Then I got it for comment and Capt. Fryč independently of each other. ”186 Tichý and Fryč expressed the opinion that the offer should not be answered immediately. Unfortunately, František Moravec later twisted this conclusion somewhat in the sense that Tichý was against sending a reply. However, Tichý states in his remarks that his “answer was not absolutely negative, so that it never, never reacted” 187 because “it contradicts the basic law of intelligence.” 188 The first meeting with the future agent A-54 took place on April 6, 1936. and Vejprty. The group that met with the new agent was led by Lt. Col. Moravec, it also consisted of Maj. Bartík and Maj. Quiet as the two main experts, Capt. Fryč and škpt. Josef Fořt, as specialists in matters of the German secret service and several other officers of the intelligence department in the position of technicians and assistants.189 The second department of the General Staff attached considerable importance to the meeting, as evidenced by the representative composition of the group.190 It is not necessary to further develop the course of further cooperation with A-54, as it has been sufficiently affected by the already mentioned literature and it will be discussed in some places. In conclusion, however, Oldřich Tichý personally evaluated Agent A-54 in his memoirs: “It is indisputable that the paid, professional Agent A-54 provided us with important messages that were highly valued by the Allies as well. He was probably the best and most important agent of our intelligence in terms of the news he supplied us. It is also self-evident that in terms of his service he worked for the Germans. An objective evaluation of the methods and results of Agent A-54’s work belongs only to our historians, who have access to the necessary documents. However, A-54 was not the only source of news for our intelligence. ”191 From the last sentence, it can be concluded that Oldřich Tichý did not agree with the post-war glorification of agent A-54, even at a time when the critical work of Kokošek’s historians was not yet available. Another turning point in Tichý’s career and life in general was 1937. In the summer of that year, Tichý was already in the position of head of the intelligence section for some time in the intelligence department at the top of the service rankings. Hierarchically above it 186 However, A-54 was not the only source of news for our intelligence. ”191 From the last sentence, it can be concluded that Oldřich Tichý did not agree with the post-war glorification of agent A-54, even at a time when the critical work of Kokošek’s historians was not yet available. Another turning point in Tichý’s career and life in general was 1937. In the summer of that year, Tichý was already in the position of head of the intelligence section for some time in the intelligence department at the top of the service rankings. Hierarchically above it 186 However, A-54 was not the only source of news for our intelligence. ”191 From the last sentence, it can be concluded that Oldřich Tichý did not agree with the post-war glorification of agent A-54, even at a time when the critical work of Kokošek’s historians was not yet available. Another turning point in Tichý’s career and life in general was 1937. In the summer of that year, Tichý was already in the position of head of the intelligence section for some time in the intelligence department at the top of the service rankings. Hierarchically above it 186 In the summer of that year, Tichý, in the position of head of the intelligence section, worked for some time within the intelligence department at the top of the service rankings. Hierarchically above it 186 In the summer of that year, Tichý, in the position of head of the intelligence section, worked for some time within the intelligence department at the top of the service rankings. Hierarchically above it 186
TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur, p. 126. Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 21. 190 KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 43. 191 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, p. 128. 187
38
stood the successor of Col. Drgače as the head of the second department, Col. gšt. František Hájek and also Lt. Col. Moravec, who during the partial reorganization of the second department replaced from 1 July 1937 to the position of head of the search group Col. Soukup. František Fryč (agent records, specialist in photographic work and secret inks), Capt. Karel Doležal (records of files concerning Germany and Austria, photographic work, secret inks), Maj. Alois Frank (records of special files concerning Austria), Maj. Antonín Longa (records of special files concerning Hungary, documentation of a general nature) and Maj. Karel Paleček (agenda of the VONAPO 20 exchange) .193 On 10. On July 1, Tichý was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel-General, with effect from 1 July.194. His next career stop was to become the office of a military attaché in Switzerland.
4.3. Offices of the
Military Attaché in Switzerland (1937–1938) of the Military
Attaché,
resp.
Offices of
military
attachés of the
Republic
Czechoslovaks began to emerge soon after the founding of Czechoslovakia. Their original purpose was primarily to organize the return of legionnaires to their homeland. When this task was fulfilled and after the unification of the Czechoslovak army, military diplomatic missions at the Czechoslovak embassies functioned mainly in the countries of close allies, but not only in them. Between 1919 and 1924, military attaché offices were established in Poland (June 1919), Yugoslavia (September 1919), Austria (January 1920), Italy (May 1920), Romania (November 1920), Germany (March 1921), France (after reorganization in December 1921), Hungary (February 1922) and Great Britain (November 1924) .195 From the mid-1930s, the number of military attachés operating at Czechoslovak embassies began to increase. Czechoslovakia thus
192
ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 46. KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, p. 57. 194 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list II. 195 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 19. 193
39
responded to the deteriorating political situation in Europe, which led to a growing need for more information, especially of a military nature. From 1936, the potential possibility of transferring the Czechoslovak resistance abroad in the event of war was reflected in the establishment of offices abroad. After all, this was also the reason why relatively large sums of money began to be deposited abroad, specifically in France, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands.196 Intelligence officers were sent to the Netherlands and also to Switzerland before the establishment of military secondment offices, as evidenced by that the offices of military attachés were to serve largely to legalize the activities of the intelligence service. The intelligence officer based in the Netherlands was Capt. Rudolf Šiman, who successfully started building an advanced agency exchange here, which bore the code designation “Libuše”. Major was sent to Switzerland. Karel Sedláček, who was to build an agency network against Germany here according to the plan of the Czechoslovak intelligence service from 1936. Sedláček also acted deftly and, using the cover provided by the “official” position of correspondent of the telegraph company Radio de la Europe Centrale, he succeeded in building the advanced agency exchange “Kazi” .197 In both countries mentioned above, the office of military attaché was officially established on October 15, 1937. In the case of Switzerland, the office was established in Bern, and the first and only pre-war Czechoslovak military attaché operating directly in Switzerland became Lt. Col. on the same date. gšt. Oldrich Tichy. Tichý stated about his nomination for the position of military attaché: “It was decided to send a military attaché to Switzerland in July 1937 while I was on vacation. At the end of the holiday, Capt. Fryč with the mission of Col. Moravec to indicate whether I would go to the position of military attaché. I replied that I would change my mind, and upon my return from vacation I would report. ”198 Silent upon his return, Col. He gave Moravec a positive answer. In addition to the usual representative duties of the military attaché, Oldřich Tichý was, of course, to play an especially important intelligence role in Switzerland. One of the main tasks was to prepare suitable conditions in Switzerland for conducting intelligence work in the event of a military conflict with Germany. This in practice 196 that I will change my mind, and I will report upon my return from vacation. ”198 Silent upon his return, Col. He gave Moravec a positive answer. In addition to the usual representative duties of the military attaché, Oldřich Tichý was, of course, to play an especially important intelligence role in Switzerland. One of the main tasks was to prepare suitable conditions in Switzerland for conducting intelligence work in the event of a military conflict with Germany. This in practice 196 that I will change my mind, and I will report upon my return from vacation. ”198 Silent upon his return, Col. He gave Moravec a positive answer. In addition to the usual representative duties of the military attaché, Oldřich Tichý was, of course, to play an especially important intelligence role in Switzerland. One of the main tasks was to prepare suitable conditions in Switzerland for conducting intelligence work in the event of a military conflict with Germany. This in practice 196
KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, p. 60. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 19; ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 2021. 198 Ibid., Pp. 22. 197
40
involved mainly in cooperation with Capt. Sedláček created a network of mailboxes to which the agents of the second department could turn, further ensured a functional radio connection with the General Staff and passed on the obtained intelligence information. Tichý traveled to Switzerland in early November 1937. He traveled alone, carrying in his courier’s luggage “cryptographic items, stamps, some money and a cash register.” Roger Masson, Chief of Intelligence of the Swiss Army’s General Staff.201 This officer was Silent’s most important ally on the Swiss side. Moreover, Tichý and Masson were not only united by a working relationship but also by a deep friendship.202 The first meeting of the two men took place at the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris, where they both studied in the same way between 1928 and 1930. At that time, the major of the Swiss army was still characterized by Tichý as an elegant, modest, intelligent and highly cultural officer. Tichý remarked at his address: “He was the man to whom I gave my highest rating to man – he was Cyrano. That says it all. ”203 Before Tichý left for Switzerland, Lt. Col. arrived. Masson to Prague for a social visit in order to create favorable conditions for the Silent Reception in Switzerland.204 According to František Fryč, this visit took place either on the initiative of Maj.
gšt
Rudolf
Kučera, the
then
Czechoslovak
military
attaché
in Austria, 205 who himself took part in the aforementioned Masson’s visit, or at the instigation of Col. Moravce.206 Masson himself often remembered his visit to Prague. Oldřich Tichý took it around Prague, a gala lunch and dinner were organized, and issues related to the equipment of the Prague Second Department were also discussed. Tichý remembered for the rest of his life what he had said to Masson during a tour of Prague at the time: “Masson, we were and will be.” 207 According to Tichý, Lt. Col. Masson made a lot of remarks, especially given how devotedly during Silent 199
His family has so far remained in Prague and arrived in Switzerland to find Tichý only in January 1938. TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), Pp. 124. 200 ABS, f. H, a. Č. H-342-1 , Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 23. 201 Ibid. 202 TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), P. 122. 203 Ibid. 204 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. During his time in the office of military attaché, he was also accredited for Switzerland. ZUDOVÁLEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, pp. 27. 206 ABS, f. 302, a. Č. 302-73-1, Protokol sepsaný s plk. vv František Fryč, 3. 1. 1950, p. 5. 207 TICHÝ, O .:
41
operations in Switzerland and subsequently during the war, and cooperated proactively with the Czechoslovak intelligence service.208 When Tichý arrived in Bern, he was immediately told by Lt. Col. Masson said that he had a room in the Bahnhotel opposite the station and was a guest of the Swiss Army’s General Staff until he found his own accommodation.209 Since Tichý did not want to abuse Swiss hospitality for too long, he immediately began to find out about the apartment and office facilities. At first he considered the possibility of serving directly at the embassy, but due to the cramped circumstances, he preferred to look for an office elsewhere on the ambassador’s advice. On the same day that he stayed at the Bahnhotel, he found a suitable boarding house that served as his temporary residence.210 Then Tichý could begin to perform his duties, make the first official visits and introductions to other representatives of the Swiss army, various ambassadors and other military attachés. Lt. Col. was very helpful in Tichý in this procedure. Masson. Diplomatically, Tichý was subject to Ambassador Rudolf KünzluJizerský.211 After Tichý became acquainted with the military attachés of France, Germany, Italy and the United States of America, he also visited the Czechoslovak Consul Jan Laška212 in Zurich, during which the Capt. Sedláček, who, moreover, maintained a very close contact with Laška due to his intelligence work.213 Tichý’s own diplomatic activity in Switzerland was not as important as his intelligence activity. Nevertheless, even diplomatic activity cannot be described as uninteresting, and Oldřich Tichý did not avoid some “diplomatic faux pas”, especially during the first official visits. For the purpose of these visits, Tichý’s secretary Künzl-Jizerský prepared business cards for Tichý, which were to be distributed to all embassies. When Tichý visited the French 208
TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), P. 123. Ibid., P. 124. 210 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. DEJMEK, Jindřich ̶ MICHÁLEK, Slavomír ̶ NĚMEČEK, Jan: Diplomacie Československa (hereinafter Diplomacie). II. part. Biographical Dictionary of Czechoslovak Diplomats (1918 ̶ 1992). Prague 2013, p. 134. 212 He was appointed consul in Switzerland in August 1933. In May 1938, his office was promoted to consulate general. Jan Laška worked in Zurich until the end of the republic. In March 1939, following the position of the envoy in Bern, Bohdan Štrér, he handed over his office to the Germans and returned to the protectorate. Ibid., Pp. 140. 213 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 23; TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), Pp. 124. 209
42
military attaché, his French counterpart at a social party found that Tichý was alone for the time being and invited him to a ball in the evening to the Portuguese envoy and his wife, the daughter of Portuguese President António Óscar de Fragos Carmona.214 This visit took place and what followed Tichý recalls the memory: “The second or third day afterwards, the envoy [Künzl-Jizerský] called me and told me with some surprise that I also had business cards ready for the Portuguese embassy. This was reported to him by his secretary, who took care of many things for me. The envoy told me to kindly note that diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Portugal had been interrupted (the machine gun affair) and that I could not hand in my business cards there. As a sinner, I confessed that the first people I came in contact with were the Portuguese. The ambassador understood me as a human being, but business cards were not allowed to be handed over. ”215 So-called The “machine gun affair” really stood in the face of a very serious diplomatic conflict between Czechoslovakia and Portugal. At that time, Portugal ordered a larger number of machine guns in Czechoslovakia. However, the Czechoslovak government, especially fearing that the weapons would not be delivered to the Francoist insurgents fighting the Republican government in the Spanish Civil War, suspended the entire supply. The reaction of the Portuguese side was not long in coming, and all diplomatic relations were interrupted by Portugal at the beginning of August 1937, for almost forty long years.216 In his activities in Switzerland, Tichý had one significant advantage, as this country was not unknown to him. environment. During his service with the Second Department of the General Staff, he had the opportunity to visit Switzerland quite many times, either during trips directly behind the capt. Sedláček or behind šktp. Shiman to the Netherlands, or at meetings with some agents.217
Capt. Sedláček, who successfully
built the “Kazi” headquarters before the establishment of the Czechoslovak military attaché’s office, prepared the ground for Tichý very well for his position as military attaché. intelligence with them so far
214
Klima, Jan: History of Portugal. Prague 2007, p. 364. TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), P. 124. 216 Diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Portugal were not resumed until the mid-1970s. DEJMEK, Jindrich: Diplomacie Ceskoslovenska. Part I. Outline of the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy (1918 ̶ 1992). Prague 2012, p. 60. 217 TICHÝ, O .: From the memory of the rapporteur (II.), P. 124. 215
43
He did not act, and as a result, after the Silent Arrival, the construction of a network of mailboxes that could be used for the transmission of intelligence information could begin.218 However, the preparation of the background for intelligence activities could not be completely kept secret. The Czechoslovak consulate, in one room of which was a walkie-talkie, currently used for training purposes, was originally housed in a small house on the outskirts of Zurich. Later, the consulate moved to a much larger building, which officially belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter the MFA), to which the consulate was subject, but in fact belonged to the MNO building. Oldřich Tichý also took part in the transaction through which the building was purchased. It was nothing more than the technical preparation of Czechoslovak intelligence in Switzerland for the war. It is not entirely clear what even surfaced in Prague, however, the Law of the People published an article in Czechoslovakia in the sense that “military attaché Lt. Col. gšt. Tichý buys a large villa for President Beneš in Switzerland ”.219 Despite this inconvenience, however, it was possible to build a network of individual mailboxes. Tichý found his own housing in January 1938 in a house belonging to a Swiss bank, which, before he moved in, restored it and painted one of the local apartments. It was an apartment, or rather a residence, which in all respects provided a very solid background for diplomatic and intelligence activities. The apartment with seven rooms, a kitchen, a covered veranda and a garden was sufficiently representative and also provided a convenient place to set up an office that Tichý could not and did not want to have at the embassy, for on the one hand, he needed to receive certain people at any time, and on the other hand, he also needed to broadcast from his own radio, which was operated by rtm. Karel Broukal, 220, who also took care of Tichý’s administrative agenda.221 The connection with Czechoslovakia was realized in three basic ways, namely encrypted telegrams sent from the post office, courier connection and after the commissioning of the above-mentioned radio also added a radio connection. 222 For the purposes of intelligence activities, the office of the Czechoslovak military attaché also had considerable financial resources, of which CZK 8 million was available to Tichý at his cash desk.223 Other funds were deposited in the bank, amounting to approximately 200,000 Swiss francs. 221 The connection with Czechoslovakia was thus realized in three basic ways, namely by encrypted telegrams sent from the post offices, by courier connection, and after the above-mentioned radio was put into operation, a radio connection was also added. 222 For the purposes of intelligence activities, the office of the Czechoslovak military attaché also had considerable financial resources, of which CZK 8 million was available to Tichý at his cash desk.223 Other funds were deposited in the bank, amounting to approximately 200,000 Swiss francs. 221 The connection with Czechoslovakia was thus realized in three basic ways, namely by encrypted telegrams sent from the post offices, by courier connection, and after the above-mentioned radio was put into operation, a radio connection was also added. 222 For the purposes of intelligence activities, the office of the Czechoslovak military attaché also had considerable financial resources, of which CZK 8 million was available to Tichý at his cash desk.223 Other funds were deposited in the bank, amounting to approximately 200,000 Swiss francs.
218
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichým, 23. 2. 1950, p. 24. TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), s. The Forgotten Elite, p. 22. 222 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), P. 126. 223 He later sent one million CZK back to Prague. Ibid., Pp. 127. 219
44
in cash and 180,000 in the savings book.224 The military attaché and the Czechoslovak envoy had the right to dispose of these funds, but only in agreement with the military attaché.225 Tichý gradually became acquainted with the people selected by the capt. Sedláček and intelligence with them in order to get them for cooperation.226 How such meetings took place can be evidenced by a specific example: “According to the prepared list of people, I chose the easiest case for the first time. The lightest is because he was a proven fighter who was a clutch and a mailbox for our foreign action in the First World War. We visited Mrs. Jurzová. Sedláček reacted well to the situation I was creating. After a pleasant conversation at the coffee shop, we went to see the farm. Sedláček with Mrs. Jurzová, me and Mr. Jurza and we got into a situation when we were alone and I could tell what was going on. I gave Mr. Jurz the code name “Funeral” because he told me he was born after his father’s death. He accepted the task with enthusiasm, and his address was given to Agent A-54. It is known that he received messages of great importance. ‘ Sedláčka, or after an introductory acquaintance mediated by Sedláček himself, Tichý completed a number. A total of 14 mailboxes were obtained in the event of war.228 Tichý used only persons of Czech origin and never the original Swiss citizens.229 Among the persons obtained by Tichý for cooperation who passed on valuable intelligence, Ms. Feldscherová must be mentioned in the first place. . She was the wife of a senior official in the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech origin born in České Budějovice and daughter of a colonel of the Austro-Hungarian army. Mrs. Feldscher passed on various messages, including political or military ones.230 Her maid was an Reich German, and when she returned from a visit to her homeland, she passed on information to her mistress about the situation in Germany. To illustrate, we can mention, for example, the message Tichý received from Mrs. Fletscherová and which he sent to Prague. The report warned Prague that the efforts of Stefan Osusky, Czechoslovak
224
ABS, No. 302, No. 302-96-2, Protocol written with Col. vv Karel Sedláček, 21 November 1949, p. 7. TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), p. 127. 226 ABS, f. H, a. s brig. gene. vv Oldřichem Tichým, 23. 2. 1950, p. 24. 227 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), p. written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 24. 229 Ibid., p. 25. 230 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), p. 125. 225
45
ambassador in Paris, it is useless and that France is not going to go to war for Czechoslovakia.231 JUDr. Millieta, a well-known lawyer who had an office in Vienna and also worked in Belgrade, and his wife, Mrs. Millieta, née Kopecká, who was a former singer of the National Theater. Tichý also received a number of interesting observations from them. In addition, Tichý gained contacts thanks to the previous activities of the Capt. Sedláčka also, for example, in St. St. Gallen. Specifically, it was the owner of the fur plant Alfons Stavavek, who passed on news from the Vorarlberg area.233 Furthermore, news came from co-workers also from Geneva or Basel. 234 The list of collaborators of the Czechoslovak intelligence service in Switzerland is not exhaustive, but it is sufficient for illustration. Most of these people subsequently played a relatively important role during the war. Tichý did not cooperate much with other intelligence services, except for the Swiss. However, the cooperation with her took place mainly on the basis of a good friendship between Tichý and Lt. Col. Massonem. He reported on Germany and, as Tichý remarked, “did not ask for any counter-services.” 235 The two men met in Bern for information, and Masson never visited Tichý in his office. or apartment. During one of the meetings, Tichý, for example, learned how a German military attaché told Masson that Tichý was enjoying some of Masson’s special favors. Masson, of course, tried to seduce the old acquaintance with Tichý from the time of his military studies in Paris.236 The question remains as to how much the friendship between the two men could have aroused or intensified the German interest in Tichý. Sure, the interest of German correspondents could increase, but no doubt the Germans would be interested in Tichý even without his friendship with Lt. Col. Masson, as, given Switzerland’s excellent geographical position for intelligence work against Germany, it was in their interest to have some
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 24. Ibid., p. 25. 233 ABS, f. 302, sign. 302-96-2, Protocol written with Col. vv Karel Sedláček, 21. 11. 1949, p. 3. 234 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 25. 235 Ibid. 236 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), Pp. 126. 232
46
the Germans could not doubt the suspect in this regard. After all, Tichý convinced himself that the Germans were watching him closely several times, for example during some of his trips to or from Prague, when he safely noticed that one and the same man was traveling with him in both directions and watching him.237 Tichý on he even stumbled upon him once again at the beginning of the war during his trip to Lausanne. After all, traveling intelligence officers always carried considerable risks, let alone at the turbulent end of the 1930s. Oldřich Tichý, of course, did not escape the various deceptions of German customs officers, however, like other intelligence officers, Tichý mostly knew how to deal with such situations. He himself remembered very well one such incident: “I once went to Prague and there is a customs and passport inspection at the border station (either Feldkirch or Buchs). They took my diplomatic passport; I’m waiting for him to give it back to me. I see the dispatcher coming to the train to signal his departure. I got off the train and made a fuss that my passport had not been returned. They brought me a passport after this scene. These passports were not unknown. The passport did not return, the passenger without the passport was detained, interrogated or arrested during another search or on the other side of the border. ”238 But back to Tichý’s own intelligence activities. Oldřich Tichý always praised the very smooth cooperation with the embassy and consulate, especially with Consul Laška, to whom he had no problem, even if he had to notify Škpt during the deep night. Sedláčka about the next day’s meeting.239 But not everything was so ideal. Can’t say that Tichý would directly complain about it, but from the context of his statement there is a certain dissatisfaction. The point is that Tichý never received any major instructions or assignments from the second department during his stay.240 This fact is rather contrasted by the rebuke of his superior, Col. Moravec during the partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1938. Moravec then addressed Tichý the question of whether he was asleep in Switzerland, that he had not noticed the movements of the army in Germany towards the Czechoslovak border. However, neither Tichý nor Sedláček had absolutely no news about it. Naturally, Tichý also verified the whole matter with Lt. Col. 240 This fact is rather contrasted by the rebuke of his superior, Col. Moravec during the partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1938. Moravec then addressed Tichý the question of whether he was asleep in Switzerland, that he had not noticed the movements of the army in Germany towards the Czechoslovak border. However, neither Tichý nor Sedláček had absolutely no news about it. Naturally, Tichý also verified the whole matter with Lt. Col. 240 This fact is rather contrasted by the rebuke of his superior, Col. Moravec during the partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1938. Moravec then addressed Tichý the question of whether he was asleep in Switzerland, that he had not noticed the movements of the army in Germany towards the Czechoslovak border. However, neither Tichý nor Sedláček had absolutely no news about it. Naturally, Tichý also verified the whole matter with Lt. Col.
237
TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), P. 126. Ibid. 239 Ibid., Pp. 127. 240 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, pp. 24,238
47
Masson and also with the French military attaché. But neither of them knew anything.241 The last stage of the Silent operation in Switzerland began in the autumn of 1938. During the mobilization of the Czechoslovak army, it was necessary to bring as many conscripts from abroad as well. Oldřich Tichý thus cooperated very closely with the Czechoslovak embassy in Switzerland and sent branka to Czechoslovakia via Italy, Yugoslavia and Romania.242 After the Munich Agreement, however, it became more than clear that all offensive activities of military diplomats and reporters would have to be largely muted or even abolished altogether.243 Around mid-October 1938, Tichý received an order from Prague to liquidate the office of military attaché and return to Prague within a week. Very soon, the order was amended to the effect that that Tichý immediately arrives in person in Prague. Here he received detailed instructions, according to which he was to liquidate the office of military attaché, agency materials, cash and a savings book with the money deposited by the second department he had to hand over to the administration of the depot. Sedláčka and state furniture to send to Paris to the local Czechoslovak military attaché244 Col. gšt. Václav Kalin.245 Even before Tichý went back to Switzerland to solve the newly assigned tasks, he sent an encrypted one from Prague.
telegram to
his
wife,
to
have already
started to
prepare
departure
to Czechoslovakia. In his memoirs, he paid an imaginary tribute to her for preparing herself for their departure.246 In his remarks on the activities of the Second Department, Tichý did not state exactly that he had to be removed from office in the autumn of 1938 as the only Czechoslovak military attaché. .247 Undoubtedly, his appeal was a response to German pressure to end offensive intelligence activities against them, but Tichý was not the only one affected by that pressure. Lt. Col. also experienced a similar fate. Josef Svoboda, 248 who held the office of Czechoslovak Military Attaché 241
TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory (II.), Pp. 127 ̶ 128. Ibid., Pp. 128. 243 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 22. 244 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 73. 246 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), S. 128. 247 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, p. 121. 248 Josef Svoboda was appointed military attaché in the Netherlands in November 1937, and was also accredited for Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 23. 242
48
in the Netherlands.249 Initiation to terminate Lt. Col. Freedoms were officially financial reasons. But in reality they only camouflaged the proclamation of the end of intelligence intelligence against Nazi Germany.250 Lt. Col. Tichý, of course, as a military officer, accepted the order and fully complied. Although he understood his appeal rationally, leaving Switzerland had a very bitter taste for him. He remarked: “Be that as it may, I had the impression that I was leaving my post as a maid who was given immediate notice. I am aware that nothing could be done. ”251 Given the need for Tichý to leave quickly, there was not enough time for an official diplomatic farewell. The only farewell at the official level was prepared by Lt. Col. Masson in the form of lunch with the staff of the Swiss army. On this occasion, Silent Massona asked that in the event that that Czechoslovakia would need it, he could turn around. Masson, of course, immediately promised him any help.252 As will be seen, Masson kept his promise. When leaving Switzerland, Tichý was also very impressed by the actions of the French military attaché. According to Tichý, the French attaché said at the farewell in response to the turbulent events and consequences of the Munich agreement “he threw the saber on the table and said that he was ashamed to be French and that he asked for retirement immediately.” left.254 On November 1, 1938, Tichý and his family traveled by plane to Prague. After returning to his homeland, Lt. Col. Tichý did not return to the intelligence department of the General Staff, at least not professionally. Immediately upon arrival, Tichý handed over intelligence materials and things he had brought from Switzerland, to the second ward and immediately learned of his inclusion in the delimitation commission.255 Shortly after his arrival, he himself remarked: . I was aware, as I was told, that I had been revoked at the behest of the Germans. ”256
249
KOKOŠKA (MALÍŘ), J .: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina, s. 69. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, s. 23. 251 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), S. 128. 252 Ibid., Pp. 128 ̶ 129. 253 Ibid., Pp. 128. 254 Ibid. 255 Ibid. 256 Ibid., Pp. 129. 250
49
He was assigned to the commission on November 1, 1938, temporarily.257 Unfortunately, Tichý mentioned his work in the delimitation commission only briefly and devoted more space only to the characteristics of his co-workers in the commission.258 The head of the commission, resp. The head of the General Staff’s border management department with Germany was Gen. Otakar Zahalka, 259 his deputy then Col. Libor Vítěz. Silent also mentioned Col. Studlara, Lt. Col. Kadainku and Maj. Ressela. In addition, the commission also met with the former head of the intelligence section, now Col. gšt. František Dastych. In the case of Col. It is necessary to add Studlar that he was not assigned to the delimitation commission, but to the Directorate of Fortification Works, and he came to the commission at the invitation of Col. Kadainky for English lessons.260 Own commission
activities and atmosphere
The time
in
which
Tichý
joined the delimitation commission can be depicted on the basis of Tichý’s memories: “It was a sad job in the delimitation commission, and by the time I joined it, it was not much. In our free time we learned English. It was useful to me after arriving in England. We did not receive any more specific messages. It was just very serious about the Germans’ strange behavior in delimitation issues and their lack of interest in resolving them. Then news began to spread of some troop movements, etc. ”261
257
VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for the clearing Qualification documents, part I, 1938. 258 See ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 27. 259 MASKALÍK, A: Elite armády, p. 670. 260 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Ulrich Pacific, 23. 2. 1950, p. 27. 261 SILENT, O .: From memory rapporteur (II.), p. 129.
50
5th
World War II (1939-1945)
1.5
Moravc’s “Eleven” – Moving to Great Britain (1939)
News of the German aggression, which was to bring about the end of the Second Republic, was available to the Czechoslovak military intelligence service from several different sources. The French intelligence service Service de Renseignement (hereinafter referred to as the SR) first submitted to the Czechoslovak counterparts a report of a general nature, which it subsequently specified on 11 March in the sense that it would be a violent action and which would take place on 14 or 15 March.262 information also from own sources. Some reports indicated the movement of German troops from their peacekeepers closer to the borders of Czechoslovakia, and valuable clues were also provided by the military attaché in Berlin, Col. Anthony Hron, 263 who reported on the requisition of civilian freight
cars
and
particularly
of
the intended
German
intervention
in Czechoslovakia in the near future, provided that the Czechoslovak government does not restore order.264 Czechoslovak reporters could only get a more comprehensive idea of the next developments after meeting with Agent A-54, which took place on 11 March. SA ̶ 54 met Capt. František Fryč in a restaurant at Turnov railway station. This was followed by a transfer to Prague, to the apartment of Maj. Bohumil Dítěte, where his own meeting took place under the leadership of Maj. Emil Strankmüller.265 Suffice it to say that A-54 described the details of the planned German invasion and, above all, confirmed that it would take place on March 15, 2666. On March 12, 1939, Colonel Moravec, together with his deputy Maj. Strankmüller met with the Prague exponent of the British military intelligence service, Military Intelligence, Maj. Harold Gibson.267 The purpose of the sudden meeting was to discuss the instructions given by Maj.
262
KREISINGER, P .: Brigádní generál, p. 57. Antonín Jan Hron held the office of Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Germany from October 1937 to the end of June 1939. Until mid-October 1937 he also had accreditation for the Netherlands and until May 1938 for Denmark. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, p. 29. 264 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, p. 118. 265 Details of proceedings in KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute agent, pp. 118 ̶ 121. 266 KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, pp. 57. 267 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 123 ̶ 124. 263
51
allowed the intelligence to the activities even after the occupation of the republic, and the British are ready to provide the Czechoslovak intelligence with appropriate facilities.268 The offer of Major Gibson Col. Moravec took advantage. Moravec’s original intention was for eleven other intelligence officers to go to London with him, but Maj. Bohumil Dítě, a member of the defense section, who was hastily recalled from Slovakia, did not make it. The final list formed together with Col. gšt. František Moravec the following officers: Lt. Col. gšt. Oldrich Tichy, Maj. gšt. Emil Strankmüller, Maj. conc. Josef Bartík, Maj. rammer. Karel Paleček, Maj. ride. Alois Frank, Capt. rammer. František Fryč, Capt. rammer. Vladimir Cigna, Capt. Infantryman Václav Sláma, Capt. rammer. Josef Fořt, šktp. ride. Jaroslav Tauer.269 It has long been speculated which factors influenced Colonel Moravec the most when making decisions, whom to take with you. For a long time, it was believed that the requirement that none of the intelligence officers who had the opportunity to meet Agent A-54 would remain in Prague played a decisive role. Today, this view is already obsolete. The demand for the greatest possible expertise seems to be much more probable, especially with a focus on offensive and defensive intelligence against Germany, the effort not to expose the most engaged officers to German city and, last but not least, personal sympathy.270 In the case of Oldřich Tichý, however, Moravec’s sympathies with success. The name of Oldřich Tichý was last on Moravc’s list only on the evening of March 13. Interestingly, at this time Tichý no longer fell under military intelligence, since since November 1938, when he ended up as a military attaché in Bern, Switzerland, he served on the delimitation commission MNO.271 Tichý himself recalled the circumstances of becoming part of the group heading to London as follows: „13. Mrs. Mill [i] etová, who has just visited Prague (she is a former singer of the National Theater in Prague, Mrs. Kopecká), was at our dinner for March. We were just finishing our soup when the phone rang ̶ škpt. Fryč told me that I should come to the colonel immediately. Moravec in important matters. I didn’t delay and went to headquarters. Moravec explained the situation to me. He said on the orders of gen. Fialy is leaving the intelligence group on a business trip to England to continue working against Germany. He’s counting on me to work with France. That I know what would come of me if I stayed. 268 asked me Mrs. Mill [i] etová, who has just visited Prague (she is a former singer of the National Theater in Prague, Mrs. Kopecká), was at our dinner for March. We were just finishing our soup when the phone rang ̶ škpt. Fryč told me that I should come to the colonel immediately. Moravec in important matters. I didn’t delay and went to headquarters. Moravec explained the situation to me. He said on the orders of gen. Fialy is leaving the intelligence group on a business trip to England to continue working against Germany. He’s counting on me to work with France. That I know what would come of me if I stayed. 268 asked me Mrs. Mill [i] etová, who has just visited Prague (she is a former singer of the National Theater in Prague, Mrs. Kopecká), was at our dinner for March. We were just finishing our soup when the phone rang ̶ škpt. Fryč told me that I should come to the colonel immediately. Moravec in important matters. I didn’t delay and went to headquarters. Moravec explained the situation to me. He said on the orders of gen. Fialy is leaving the intelligence group on a business trip to England to continue working against Germany. He’s counting on me to work with France. That I know what would come of me if I stayed. 268 asked me I didn’t delay and went to headquarters. Moravec explained the situation to me. He said on the orders of gen. Fialy is leaving the intelligence group on a business trip to England to continue working against Germany. He’s counting on me to work with France. That I know what would come of me if I stayed. 268 asked me I didn’t delay and went to headquarters. Moravec explained the situation to me. He said on the orders of gen. Fialy is leaving the intelligence group on a business trip to England to continue working against Germany. He’s counting on me to work with France. That I know what would come of me if I stayed. 268 asked me
KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 124. KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 58. 270 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, p. 126. 271 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to the clean document Qualification documents, 1937. 269
52
obligatory whether I will go with him. Otherwise, he would take another place on my plane. I replied in a binding manner that I would go. He told me to come to his office the next day around noon with my luggage going as he was on a business trip. At home, I have to say that I am going on a business trip to Slovakia for three or four days. ” They were to be expelled from Czechoslovakia only subsequently. On March 14 at 5:45 pm, Oldřich Tichý flew out of Prague together with other members of the “Moravc’s Eleven”. Pilot Cpt. Virula, who flew the plane, received precise instructions, that his task is to take twelve men on board in Prague and immediately transport them to London.274 Oldřich Tichý recalled the course of the flight as follows: “Shortly after departure, I realized that these civilian pilots, on a civilian flight, in an extraordinary flight, were situation, they would land if ordered from the country. Why not? That’s why I got up from my seat on the flight over Germany, stood behind the pilot and watched the altimeter. We flew in a heavy snowstorm. All the way over Germany to about Düsseldorf (according to the flight attendant), we flew in such a blizzard that the position lights on the wings of the plane were not visible. Maybe that was our luck. My intention was, if they were ordered by radio to land, to force them, under the threat of two pistols, to continue flying. It’s clear. They would have an alibi, they were forced to continue flying (in case of implementation, I could have been perhaps the first hijacker or the first terrorist). Good thing I didn’t become one, of course. ”275 Of course, it can’t be assumed that the Germans didn’t know about the whole operation. In fact, it can be said with certainty that, given that the Nazi intelligence command had been operating in Prague since the morning of 14 March, the German aggressors had undoubtedly noticed preparations for the launch of a special Dutch flight. Nevertheless, the Germans already had their informant in Ruzyně, who most likely betrayed them.276 272 Undoubtedly, the German aggressors noticed the preparations for the launch of a special Dutch flight. Nevertheless, the Germans already had their informant in Ruzyně, who most likely betrayed them.276 272 Undoubtedly, the German aggressors noticed the preparations for the launch of a special Dutch flight. Nevertheless, the Germans already had their informant in Ruzyně, who most likely betrayed them.276 272
TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, pp. 129 ̶ 130. VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Personal insert to the master certificate. 274 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 129; KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 58. 275 TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory, p. 130. 276 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an Agent, p. 130. As one of the examples of physical The presence of Major Abwehr Heinz Schmalschläger, who had the following tasks during the Nazi occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March during the Nazi March occupation of Bohemia and Moravia: there in II. seize the department and secure all intelligence. In particular, he had the task of 273
53
On the route Prague
̶
London there was one stopover in Rotterdam
and at 10.40 pm the plane landed at London’s Croydon Airport. British journalists were already waiting for the Czechoslovak correspondent at the airport. Oldřich Tichý remembered that when the flight attendant opened the plane’s door, someone from the outside immediately slammed it on. Tichý remarked about the whole situation: “No one was allowed out, not even the crew. We understood the reason only after maybe ten, maybe fifteen men could be clearly identified from the window, mostly with cameras in their hands, who trotted closer to our plane. At first glance, it was clear to me that they were reporters. Only later did we learn that they had received the echo from Holland. That if they hurry, they’ll catch a unique solo carp for their newsroom. ”277 Indeed. Early in the morning 15. On March 1, readers could see prominent headlines highlighting the landing of the mysterious plane in almost every London newspaper, and the next day the information appeared in the press in other countries.278 At the airport, Col. joined the Czechoslovak intelligence officers. Beaumont, a former British military attaché in Prague, accompanied by reporters to central London. Intelligence officers were accommodated at the Van Dyke Hotel, not far from Hyde Park.279 A new stage of intelligence work began for Czechoslovak officers in the new post. First of all, there had to be a study of the imported intelligence material, the use of defense and intelligence material for the British intelligence service, as well as the consolidation of the existing information network and its expansion. In addition, the new position required the establishment of the most reliable connection possible with the homeland, or more precisely with the emerging domestic resistance. The issue of the removal of the wives and children of the Czechoslovak correspondents also remained very sensitive. Of course, their families were in danger after March 15
pay attention to the file of those agents who worked against the empire [however, the file was already on the soil of Great Britain, where it was taken by a group of Col. Moravce]. Schmalschläger decided not to leave anything to chance and demanded “permission to go to Prague beforehand to be on time in time. He went as a film director (director) one or two days before to Prague, where he was waiting for the arrival of German troops. ”ABS Prague, f. 52, sign. 52-87-4, German Military Intelligence Service, Defense ̶ Abwehr, AST Prague – ANEST Brno, book – typescript, p. 39. 277 Oral statement gen vv Oldřich Tichý of March 17, 1990. Cited by KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA , S .: Dispute over an Agent, p. 131. 278 Ibid., P. 131. 279 The British prepared accommodation for Moravc’s group first in the Victoria Hotel, but due to the presence of several relentless journalists in the hotel lobby, it was decided that in the morning the Czechoslovak correspondents would move to another location, the Van Dyke Hotel. Ibid., Pp. 131-132.
54
detention by the Germans and thus a potential threat of possible blackmail arose for intelligence officers in London.280
5.2.
Beginnings in Great Britain (1939)
The initial phase of the intelligence activities of Moravc’s eleven-member group was not easy at all. The very legal position of the group vis-à-vis the British authorities was very problematic, as there was considerable uncertainty in this regard. Immediately upon arrival, the members of the group lived in Britain illegally under false names, and contact with the British intelligence service, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), was essentially at a conspiratorial level.281 Col. Moravec assumed that the whole situation would be clarified at the first meeting with the head of the SIS military section, Col. Stewart Menzies, which took place on March 17. However, the meeting did not resolve much as a result. Menzies condemned Moravec to the mournful fate of Czechoslovakia and expressed his feelings in the sense that he was looking forward to future cooperation.282 Embarrassed
impressed
at the
head of the
“Eleven”
also
the first
visit to
the Czechoslovak embassy, where it was instead of Jan Masaryk, who was at that time outside London, welcomed the legation councilor Karel Lisický that Masaryk represented and managed the embassy, and Czechoslovak military attache in Britain, Colonel. gšt. Josef Kalla.283 The atmosphere at the embassy seemed very chaotic, helpless, and the local officials were not very clear about the purpose of the stay of Czechoslovak correspondents in London.284 At least a dinner at Lt. Col. Kally, in whose apartment the Czechoslovak correspondents met very often, which took place on March 16,
280
KREISINGER, P .: Brigádní generál, p. 60. KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Spor o agenta, s. 133. 282 STRANKMÜLLER, E .: Čs. offensive intelligence, p. 191. 283 The Czechoslovak Military Attaché was appointed in October 1936, and in November 1938 he also received accreditation for the Netherlands. He remained in office in March 1939 and refused to return to the protectorate, for which the MNO in liquidation fired him in September 1939 and the Nazis recruited him. However, he remained in the position of military attaché until March 1945, when he became deputy commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in Great Britain. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 36 ̶ 37. 284 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, pp. 133; STRANKMÜLLER, E .: Čs. offensive intelligence, pp. 191. 281
55
and which was also attended by gen. Chorny, then a Soviet military attaché in London. The evening resulted in an informal agreement on certain intelligence cooperation.285 The specific features of intelligence cooperation did not begin to be negotiated until the beginning of April, when Major returned to London permanently. Gibson. He also became a liaison officer between MI-6, ie the military component of the SIS, and a group of Czechoslovak correspondents. Practically throughout April, regular meetings took place in conspiratorial apartments between Moravec’s group and Maj. Gibson, who provided the Czechoslovaks with everything they needed, such as accommodation, issuing documents, setting up post offices, etc. 286 However, the conditions of the Czechoslovak correspondents remained difficult. Group
is
trying to
firmly
anchor
in the British
environment
as well as
in the environment
Czechoslovak emigrants. The families of the intelligence officers remained in the Protectorate for the time being and their fate was uncertain. In addition, another fundamental issue has arisen, namely the question of finance. On March 17, Col. arrived in London. František Hájek, who has worked in The Hague so far. In addition to offering Col. Moravec’s mediation of contacts with other diplomats, especially from the Balkan states, also brought with him money that had been deposited in the Netherlands for intelligence purposes until then. There were now 109,000 Dutch guilders immediately available, and another £ 20,000 lay in the private account of an English bank. These funds became the basis of the fund, thanks to which the intelligence group Col. Moravce to function as a financially independent organization.287 Very soon afterwards, Czechoslovak correspondents obtained additional funding, this time from Switzerland. It is certain that the money was provided by Capt. Sedláček, who was still working in Switzerland at the time. However, there are discrepancies in how intelligence money got from Switzerland to London. In the literature, the most common version is that the money was transported to London in person by škpt. Sedláček, similar to Col. Hájek.288 However, according to Sedláček himself, the money went to London by post. According to Sedláček, he obeyed the call in the letter 288 However, according to Sedláček himself, the money went to London by post. According to Sedláček, he obeyed the call in the letter 288 However, according to Sedláček himself, the money went to London by post. According to Sedláček, he obeyed the call in the letter
285
KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 133; ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 73. ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 73. 287 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an Agent, p. 133. 288 Compare STRANKMÜLLER, E .: Cs. offensive intelligence, p. 192; ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, pp. 73. 286
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signed by Mr. Fischer, which was the code name of Lt. Col. Tichý, 289 to hand over the funds deposited in Switzerland in an envelope to Tichý, the designated British consul.290 Sedláček did so, according to his statement, and when in the second half of March, at the request of Lt. Col. Tichý arrived in London and in the apartment Lt. Col. Kally met with other intelligence officers, allegedly making sure the money arrived in London in
order.291 Sedláček plays a vital role in thathttps://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/ads?client=ca-pub-2025287964322501&output=html&h=280&adk=3316849697&adf=3684329264&pi=t.aa~a.791033702~i.1554~rp.1&w=950&fwrn=4&fwrnh=100&lmt=1637082998&num_ads=1&rafmt=1&armr=3&sem=mc&pwprc=8576066767&psa=1&ad_type=text_image&format=950×280&url=https%3A%2F%2Fadoc.pub%2Fivotni-osudy-zpravodajskeho-dstojnika.html&flash=0&fwr=0&pra=3&rh=200&rw=949&rpe=1&resp_fmts=3&wgl=1&fa=27&uach=WyJXaW5kb3dzIiwiMTAuMC4wIiwieDg2IiwiIiwiOTUuMC40NjM4LjY5IixbXSxudWxsLG51bGwsIjY0Il0.&dt=1637077626418&bpp=139&bdt=2824&idt=139&shv=r20211111&mjsv=m202111100101&ptt=9&saldr=aa&abxe=1&cookie=ID%3Dd5e2e6db92bd5e30-228561f2aacc00cf%3AT%3D1637021895%3ART%3D1637021895%3AS%3DALNI_MZ9Z2P1KZNTBjatFIaEde232V8bBQ&prev_fmts=0x0%2C307x250%2C982x280%2C1349x625%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280&nras=5&correlator=1011245596538&frm=20&pv=1&ga_vid=72963090.1637021896&ga_sid=1637077625&ga_hid=1346907515&ga_fc=1&u_tz=-300&u_his=1&u_h=768&u_w=1366&u_ah=728&u_aw=1366&u_cd=24&dmc=8&adx=368&ady=34368&biw=1349&bih=625&scr_x=0&scr_y=31884&eid=31063703%2C21067496&oid=2&psts=AGkb-H9wmss3ftiAgqjAVoA-obK7B6rQT1jMTnxJYUSKE1U1QEvDHlvywBsoJlMkkSKF3I0DucAPknRPwDw%2CAGkb-H8lKMocpz47woc6vETFrkNTlM6YSrlcU3rSvywdKKEAZT3mkWLRrOgNGxfqkVpDWQJGV0DkpHwzRA%2CAGkb-H-_8Tb38NzH-gfggpWcG1aRFD5iZblPJEbQNJ4aCcZ4sDH5kMCRL-sqFEGNw8gDmjdYNluAoKY3S1M%2CAGkb-H_h1ldh6UdseeRbPdj8mOIzRh31qs1LBbikUyrWnPYrcedJz-14RXCPoLtkiyc_kbxeKiOEpMoIJLM%2CAGkb-H8Ip938LqXdwfC0nH8qlUq8VoeFb9PJc-snEcr71YB7sSyXRAfZz_HHfASP3a4X7k3DQWF8V-ZusfM&pvsid=1616790102313099&pem=11&tmod=1436071561&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&eae=0&fc=1408&brdim=0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C0%2C1366%2C728%2C1366%2C625&vis=1&rsz=%7C%7Cs%7C&abl=NS&fu=128&bc=31&ifi=7&uci=a!7&btvi=4&fsb=1&xpc=HWQmNplxQU&p=https%3A//adoc.pub&dtd=M
the intelligence money got to London at all. When Sedláček decided to go to Bern on his own initiative to collect intelligence money on March 15, he encountered opposition from Ambassador Bohdan Štrér, according to whom everything, including the deposited money, was to be handed over to the Germans. Only after diligent negotiations did he manage to persuade Štrér to at least agree to deposit the funds in the safe of the Bern Cantonal Bank, from where they could only be exempted against a double signature, ie the signing of Štrér and Sedláček at the same time. Exactly in this way, following the notification from London and further diligent persuasion, Štrér škpt. Sedláček won.292 According to Jan Němeček, Bohdan Štrér proceeded as follows. On 16 March, at the invitation of the German Legation Council, even before receiving the order from the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs and without contacting the Swiss authorities, the Czechoslovak embassy in German hands, while handing over to the Germans the file material as well as the office equipment and cash. The truth remains that at least before March 15, they destroyed the embassy’s confidential files. Štrér then defended the quick issue of the embassy to the Germans in an effort to save funds in the amount of three and a half million crowns originally deposited in the treasury of the military attaché, which could then serve the group of Col. Moravce v Londýn.293 For the sake of completeness, it should be added that the question of the usability of the funds supplied from Switzerland was probably complicated by the fact that part of the money was deposited in a book, but the intelligence group and Sedláček himself did not know the password. Oldřich Tichý remarked: “Furthermore, Capt. Sedlacek, who stayed for several days; Col. dealt with him. Moravec and Maj. Strankmüller, I’m 289
Zlatica Zudová-Lešková states that this pseudonym belonged to Karel Tichý. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, p. 281. But this is most likely a mistake, because rt. Karel Tichý did not work in such a position as to contact škpt regarding finances. Saddlery. 290 In the minutes, Sedláček stated that he had already forgotten the name of the said consul. ABS, 302, sign. 302-962, Protocol written with Col. vv Karel Sedláček, 21 November 1949, p. 8. 291 Ibid., p. 11. 292 Ibid., p. 7; KOKOŠKA (MALÍŘ), J: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina, pp. 70 ̶ 71. 293 NĚMEČEK, Jan: Twilight and the Dawn of Czechoslovak Diplomacy. March 15, 1939 and Czechoslovak embassies. Prague 2008, pp. 212.
57
he was only asked for an opinion on how the money deposited in the book in Switzerland could be withdrawn, since the password was unknown. ”294 However, this Silent Statement raises some doubts. In a service record made in London on April 11, 1939, which describes Sedláček’s efforts to obtain money from Ambassador Štrér, it can be read that the Swiss did not want to pay the money stored on the book for several reasons. On the one hand, there was to be a lack of cash, as the bank had recently been rehabilitated by the state, and as another reason they stated that “the slogan’s password is known to Lt. Col. Tichý “.295 Very soon after the arrival of Col. Moravec and his team in London also raised the issue of further cooperation with the French. Lt. Col. found out that he was counted on to cooperate with the French correspondents as part of the continuation of intelligence activities against Germany. Quiet practically before leaving for London from Col. Moravce.296 After all, Oldřich Tichý was more than suitable for such a task. Due to his stays in France, first at the École Special Militaire in St. Cyrus and then at the École Supériuere de Guerre, Tichý spoke very good French and knew the local environment. Moreover, during his time with the Second Department of the General Staff, especially in 1934-1937,297, he naturally worked with the French intelligence service. However, the new cooperation first had to be mutually agreed. After Munich, there was a significant slowdown in cooperation, but contacts were not completely interrupted. The role of the connecting link in this direction was played by Col. Kalina, Czechoslovak military attaché in Paris. František Moravec was very well aware of Kalin’s position in Paris, and therefore committed him to a state of subordination in the second half of March, which Kalina himself confirmed in writing at the end of April. Kalina came to the headquarters of the French Slovak Republic practically every day and it was confirmed that not only Moravc’s group but also the French were interested in further cooperation.298 Despite mutual interest in cooperation, joint activities in the pre-Munich form could not be resumed. At that time, on the one hand, the “deuxième bureau [second department, note. aut.], ie the analytical component of the French General Staff of National Defense ”299 and further professional 294 298 Despite the mutual interest in cooperation, joint activities in the form of pre-Munich could not be resumed. At that time, on the one hand, the “deuxième bureau [second department, note. aut.], ie the analytical component of the French General Staff of National Defense ”299 and further professional 294 298 Despite the mutual interest in cooperation, joint activities in the form of pre-Munich could not be resumed. At that time, on the one hand, the “deuxième bureau [second department, note. aut.], ie the analytical component of the French General Staff of National Defense ”299 and further professional 294
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Action „GENERAL“, Protocol written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 30. 295 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-150-24 (Various official records), Service record, 11. 4. 1939. 296 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), P. 132. 297 Ibid. 298 STRAKA, K .: Restoration, p. 2. 299 Ibid.
58
the base of Moravc’s “eleven” was much narrower than the complete pre-war second division, as the group de facto consisted only of selected representatives of the intelligence and defense section of Group B (search) of the second division. Many reporters that would be needed to perform the new tasks remained in Prague. The radio designer Ing. Jan Budík, head of the eavesdropping service, Capt. Alois Čáslavka, Maj. František Fárek, who organized the first advanced agency exchange, as well as the head of the German section of the study group, Lt. Col. Tomáš Houška, head of the agency search headquarters against Germany, Lt. Col. Václav Kopačka, his close collaborator Capt. Antonín Kukula, an expert on the Hungarian army, Capt. Antonín Longa, a representative of the foreign group Lt. Col. Alois Moravec, head of the cipher and liaison group Lt. Col. Josef Růžka and an expert of the intelligence section of Capt. Josef Rybář. All mentioned were, at the instigation of Col. Moravce included in the list of 59 people who were to leave the Protectorate for the West with the help of several embassies.300 However, the newly mentioned officers had to do without the above-mentioned officers, at least for the time being. Many reporters who remained in Czechoslovakia, however, almost immediately joined the resistance and began either on their own, or within the emerging underground organizations, building the basic parts of the domestic intelligence apparatus.301 Gradually, Col. Moravec and the other members of his team could be relieved, at least in the sense that they could count on the help of a number of Czechoslovak reporters at a distance from the Protectorate or other countries. A shining example is Maj. Fárka, škpt. Čáslavka and škpt. Long. Immediately after the occupation, these three officers began illegal activities as the so-called “Councils” group 302, and gradually other individuals and organizations began to cooperate with them. It is important, however, that the “Councils” contacted the French Consulate General, Col. at the beginning of April, on their own initiative. Moravce in the matter of direct cooperation. Similarly, for example, Maj. Alexander Fritscher, who had been a correspondent for the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Warsaw, Poland, since January.303 The British initially had little hope of successful “eleven” intelligence, but gradually their attitudes began to change.304 In contrast, 300 that the “Councilors” had already contacted the French Consulate General, Col. Moravce in the matter of direct cooperation. Similarly, for example, Maj. Alexander Fritscher, who had been a correspondent for the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Warsaw, Poland, since January.303 The British initially had little hope of successful “eleven” intelligence, but gradually their attitudes began to change.304 In contrast, 300 that the “Councilors” had already contacted the French Consulate General, Col. Moravce in the matter of direct cooperation. Similarly, for example, Maj. Alexander Fritscher, who had been a correspondent for the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Warsaw, Poland, since January.303 The British initially had little hope of successful “eleven” intelligence, but gradually their attitudes began to change.304 In contrast, 300
KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 134 ̶ 135. Ibid., P. 135. 302 GEBHART, J. – KOUTEK, J. – KUKLÍK, J .: On the fronts, p. 95. 303 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over agent, p. 135. 304 ŠOLC, J .: Po boku prezidenta, p. 73. 301
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From the beginning, the French were much more optimistic about the Czechoslovaks. This stemmed not only from previous cooperation, but also from growing tensions throughout Europe and the potential of Czechoslovak correspondents to monitor those parts of Germany where the French could “see” only with great difficulty or rather not at all, ie not only to the German western regions but also to parts of the Third Reich lying further to the east.305 A personal meeting of Czechoslovak and French intelligence officers for a cooperation agreement took place very early on 17 April in Calais due to the difficult situation following the arrival of Moravc’s group in London.306 . The Moravian was represented by Oldřich Tichý, the French side was represented by Maj. Henri Gouyou, former Permanent Representative of the Slovak Republic in Prague, and Maj. Henri Navarre, who has headed the German section at the Slovak headquarters since 1937. How much the French cared about the agreement on mutual cooperation is evidenced, among other things, by the request of Col. Louise Riveta, commander of the deuxième bureau of the French General Staff, to begin cooperation as soon as possible, which Gouya and Navarre interpreted Lt. Col. Silent. It must be said that the French had already prepared a more precise concept and from the beginning they were counting on the location of an unspecified intelligence unit on French territory. Lt. Col. However, Tichý responded to these details with the words: “I replied that these details would be agreed upon by the bosses [Moravec and Rivet, note. 307 the Czechoslovak demands for the most conspiratorial features of cooperation possible, both in France and in relation to the British, were also willing to meet Tichý’s interpretation. Although they managed to break the British resistance, who were not originally in favor of Czechoslovak-French cooperation, the British still closely monitored the ongoing negotiations. This fact is by no means illogical, because the English naturally did not want to, so to speak, “let go” of the source of intelligence, which the Moravian group, despite British pessimism, could become.308 Lt. Col. Tichý did not fail to emphasize during the meeting that, despite the great interest of Czechoslovak correspondents in cooperating with the French, it will not be possible for members of Moravc’s group to fully engage until their families get out of the Protectorate. what Moravc’s group could, despite British pessimism, become.308 Lt. Col. Tichý did not fail to emphasize during the meeting that, despite the great interest of Czechoslovak correspondents in cooperating with the French, it will not be possible for members of Moravc’s group to fully engage until their families get out of the Protectorate. what Moravc’s group could, despite British pessimism, become.308 Lt. Col. Tichý did not fail to emphasize during the meeting that, despite the great interest of Czechoslovak correspondents in cooperating with the French, it will not be possible for members of Moravc’s group to fully engage until their families get out of the Protectorate.
305
STRAKA, Karel: Obnova, p. 2. VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Oldřich Tichý’s Report on the Meeting with the Smurfs, April 20, 1939; ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, pp. 106. 307 VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Oldřich Tichý’s Report on the Meeting with the Smurfs, April 20, 1939. 308 ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 106. 306
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rapporteurs. Both Gouyou and Navarre fully understood this argument. They only demanded that the final cooperation agreement be concluded as soon as possible.309 The final agreement on the establishment of an intelligence center on French territory was finally negotiated at the end of April, Col. Moravec with his French counterpart Col. Rivetem. Thanks to this agreement, Major was able to travel to Paris on April 30. Thumb along with Capt. Fryč, as representatives of the newly established Czechoslovak intelligence branch in Paris with the code name “Karel” .310 Tichý, however, remained in London for the time being. He had three months to go to the Paris branch. During this period, several, to Tichý’s other destinies, relatively important events took place. After March 1939, most Czechoslovak exiles and emigrants went to Poland, where one of the important foreign centers of the Czechoslovak resistance began to form.311 Col. Moravec was aware of its importance and therefore decided to send one of his men to Poland, who was primarily to act as a mediator between London, Paris and the resistance in his homeland and to discuss urgent issues and any requests from home that they had, to the direct connection between home and Warsaw, a much more specific form than would be the case in London, for example. In addition, the seconded officer was to cooperate with the Polish intelligence service against Germany and, last but not least, to ensure that the families of Moravc’s “eleven” reporters, whose illegal passage to Poland had in the meantime organized a skpt. Čáslavka, 312 safely got to London.313 For this task originally Col. Moravec counted on Lt. Col. Quiet, however, circumstances did not allow it. Oldřich Tichý remarked: “I should have been sent to Warsaw to help the families after the transition, to transport them to England, but because I had a severe flu, Major was sent instead. Bartík and then Maj. Frank. ”314
309
VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Oldřich Tichý’s Report on the Meeting with the Smurfs, April 20, 1939. 310 KOKOŠKA (PAINTER), Jaroslav: London Intelligence Group, pp. 72. 311 GEBHART, Jan ̶ KUKLÍK , Jan: Velké dějiny země Koruny české (hereinafter referred to as Velké dějiny). Volume XV a. 1938 ̶ 1945. Prague ̶ Litomyšl 2006, pp. 288 ̶ 289. 312 Klára Procházková discussed the evacuation of the families of members of Moravcov’s “eleven”. See PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Klára: The Life Fates of a Intelligence Officer and Military Diplomat of Colonel Alois Čáslavka (1899–1963). Olomouc 2015 (unpublished diploma thesis), pp. 60 ̶ 70. 313 KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, pp. 61 and 64. 314 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with brig . gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 31.
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The silent indisposition really prevented him from being sent to Poland. But it is worth noting that not all of his intelligence colleagues saw his flu illness so clearly. Maj. Paleček described Tichý as follows: “He was neither brave nor cowardly. He appeared to be a type of sick officer. He was prone to colds and was anxiously careful. Still, he had enough physical strength. Nevertheless, he often sinned when he needed it. At the time of our arrival in England, it was necessary to send an officer to Poland to settle the situation there. Moravec wanted to send Tichý. Tichý collapsed completely and immediately fell ill. Despite the fact that we agreed that it was not a dangerous journey, he remained ill with the fixed idea that Moravec sent him on this journey to get rid of him in some way. Bartík then flew to Poland instead. It wasn’t a pleasant situation for Tichý either, but he came to terms with it, making excuses for his illness only when he stayed put. . It dates back to the time of the First Republic. According to his statement, he once gave Col. Moravec for Tichý’s task of directing Paleček somewhat in the negotiations, allegedly because he “smelled the group” and in general because he is “peculiar” .316 re-establishment of Silent Intelligence in Switzerland. On July 8, 1939, during a visit to Col. Kally learned from Mrs. Kall that a Swiss man who had introduced himself as Captain Hausmann had come and was looking for a colonel. Quiet. In addition to Tichý, Col. also took part in the meeting in the Kallov apartment. Moravec.318 After disclosing his identity, Hausmann said that “he is in direct contact with official circles and as far as the intelligence service is in direct contact with Lt. Col. Masson, head of the 2nd dept. hl. Staff of the Swiss Army “.319 Cpt. Hans Hausmann, a member of the Swiss intelligence section, offered the rapporteurs mutual assistance and cooperation between the two services. Although this was the first contact with Moravec’s group, Hausmann certainly did not lose he offered the rapporteurs mutual assistance and cooperation between the two services. Although this was the first contact with Moravec’s group, Hausmann certainly did not lose he offered the rapporteurs mutual assistance and cooperation between the two services. Although this was the first contact with Moravec’s group, Hausmann certainly did not lose
315
ABS, 302, sign. 302-57-2, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Karel Paleček, 25 November 1949, pp. 57 ̶ 58. 316 ABS, f. 302, sign. 302-57-2, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Karel Paleček, November 29, 1949, pp. 106. 317 Ibid. 318 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, s. 131. 319 VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Business Record of the Meeting with H. Hausmann, 8 July 1939, p. 1.
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time, he spoke very concretely and, as a result, further cooperation could be immediately agreed and clearly defined. Above all, the conditions of security of the agents of the Czechoslovak intelligence service were agreed upon. For example, in the event of detention by the Swiss security authorities, the agents were to declare that they were working for Switzerland, then contact the agreed address by telephone, then report with the password “Kälin 846” and indicate where they were. Capt. Was to be notified immediately. Hausmann, who was already supposed to take care of everything he needed. During a face-to-face meeting with Hausmann, the detained agent was to report the password “Kälin 846” again for inspection.320 A messaging procedure was also agreed. This was to be done by letters, telephone or telegrams. From London to Switzerland, letters were to be sent in any name to “St. St. Gallen, PO Box 846 ”. The messages were to be transmitted by telephone to the given number, while both parties were to report the password “Rütli”. If it is necessary to send a telegram, these should be sent directly to Capt. Hausmann. In the opposite direction, the messages were to be sent either by post, in this case to a London address, to the name “Josef Fischer”, or the messages were to be delivered by telephone. For this purpose, two telephone numbers were to operate, both in the name “Fiedler”. In addition, Capt. Hausmann promised that he would be willing to attend, after being invited to a control meeting, that he would provide possible shelter for the agents and, if necessary, mediate the meeting between them and the Czechoslovak correspondents.321 Cooperation was thus agreed. In the opposite direction, the messages were to be sent either by post, in this case to a London address, to the name “Josef Fischer”, or the messages were to be delivered by telephone. For this purpose, two telephone numbers were to operate, both in the name “Fiedler”. In addition, Capt. Hausmann promised that he would be willing to attend, after being invited to a control meeting, that he would provide possible shelter for the agents and, if necessary, mediate the meeting between them and the Czechoslovak correspondents.321 Cooperation was thus agreed. In the opposite direction, the messages were to be sent either by post, in this case to a London address, to the name “Josef Fischer”, or the messages were to be delivered by telephone. For this purpose, two telephone numbers were to operate, both in the name “Fiedler”. In addition, Capt. Hausmann promised that he would be willing to attend, after being invited to a control meeting, that he would provide possible shelter for the agents and, if necessary, mediate the meeting between them and the Czechoslovak correspondents.321 Cooperation was thus agreed.
5.3.
In France (1939-1940)
Lt. Col. Oldřich Tichý was assigned to the Paris branch office on July 29, 1939,322, but in fact he did not start working as its head until the beginning of August, 323 when the branch office was renamed from “Karla” to “Karla” .324 Tichý was already accompanied to France by his wife and daughter, who like the family
320
VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Business Record of the Meeting with H. Hausmann, 8 July 1939, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 321 Ibid., P. 2 ̶ 3. 322 VÚA – VHA, p. Qualification documents, Personal insert to the Master Certificate. 323 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 30. 324 KOKOŠKA (MALÍŘ), Jaroslav: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina, p. 75.
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the other members of the “eleven” arrived in London at the end of July.325 Along with Tichý and his family, the family of Maj. Palečka and škpt. Fryč who were already there and worked in the Pacific expozituře.326 position in an agency involved the following: “I am the head of a managed work was in charge of relations with other French departments, the military administration, I have led two intelligence maps with relevant
notes, I
helped with encryption and decryption
327 For the sake of completeness, it should be added that Tichý was officially enlisted in the Czechoslovak army in France on the basis of a chord dated October 2, 1939 and was embodied in the Military Administration of the Czechoslovak National Committee.328 After Oldřich Tichý, other staff, namely Capt. in the bay. Jaroslav Krátký, lieutenant colonel flight. in the bay. Hugo Weyrich and former foreign legionnaire Viktor Falta.329 In addition, there were a total of four radio operators in the branch, namely rt. Karel Barva (recalled to London in autumn 1939), rt. František Malý (recalled in the spring of 1940), rt. Vilém Marek and rt. Vaclav Rettich. The last two nominees remained at the Paris branch until the end of its operation.330 The branch was housed in a rented Parisian villa on 13th Avenue Victor Hugo, near where the Czechoslovak National Committee and its Military Administration were located.
Under the administration of the
National
Committee
, the “Karel”
branch came into regular contact, it was not subject to any of the mentioned institutions and functioned as essentially a separate part of the London intelligence group, Col. Moravec, who could control it from London and to whom all intelligence information obtained by the branch was also sent. The basic tasks of the branch included mediating the connection of Moravcov’s group with the correspondents who remained in Prague, as well as establishing and maintaining a radio connection with the radio stations of the domestic resistance and with the stations of other Czechoslovak exchanges abroad, providing a courier connection.
to the countries concerned, with the help of the French intelligence service and French legions, the management of the intelligence network against Germany and ensuring the timely transmission of reports
325
KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 67. ABS, f. H, a. -342-1, Protocol written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 32. 327 Ibid., p. 33. 328 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list II. 329 ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, pp. 106. 330 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, pp. 39. 326
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from the Kazi headquarters in Switzerland to London and in Paris, cooperating with the French intelligence service on the exchange of information concerning Germany.331 they had enough space for offices and a radio station. Then Tichý reported to gen. Sergei Ingra332 and Col. Václav Kalina. He subsequently visited Col. Rivet, who welcomed Tichý, reaffirmed his optimistic expectations for cooperation and confirmed Maj. Gouyou as a liaison officer to whom Czechoslovak correspondents are to turn with anything necessary. Tichý applied on that occasion for the possibility of using French courier mail and for issuing a French passport for his person.333 Both of his requests were granted, and the passport was issued to Tichý in the name of Oscar Tabbot.334 Shortly afterwards, Tichý needed a new passport. From the spring until the fateful September 1, 1939, Czechoslovak correspondents worked in Paris, but of course not only them, especially to uncover German plans to start a war in Europe, respectively. primarily against Poland. According to Col. The Czechoslovak intelligence correspondents obtained the first accurate information about the military aggression against Poland through Agent A-54. Col. Moravec wrote in his memoirs: “Then A ̶ 54 turned to service matters. He announced that the White Plan (Fall Weiss), ie the plan to attack Poland, was complete. He had no details, but he would get them for us soon. Now that he can only say that the main idea of the plan ̶ as before the Green plan ̶ is a lightning and devastating strike against Poland, to be phased out as soon as possible. Only waiting action is expected from the West. The interim date for the attack on Poland is September 1. ”335 However, this was not true. The first more comprehensive information about the planned invasion of Poland was provided by the branch of “Charles”, which received it on May 15, 1939 from Maj. Gouyou. The seventh point of his report reads: “Him. heads. the staff is studying a plan to attack Poland. 70 divisions, divided into 8 armies, are to be deployed. The attack is to have the main one
331
ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, pp. 106 ̶ 107. From the end of July 1939 he worked in France, where he established a military office at the Czechoslovak embassy. In November, after the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Committee, the office was transformed into the Czechoslovak military administration, and Ingr served as its chief until June 1940. He participated in the evacuation of Czechoslovak soldiers from France, and in Britain, after the formation of the Czechoslovak interim government, he became Minister of National Defense in July 1940. LÁNÍK, Jaroslav et al .: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939 ̶ 1940. Praha 2005, s. 113. 333 ABS, f. H, a. Č. H-342-1, Protokol sepsaný s brig. gene. vv Oldrich Pacific, 23. 2. 1950, p. 32. 334 TICHÝ, O .: from memory rapporteur (II.), p. 129. 335 MORAVEC, F .: Spy, pp. 332 300.
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efforts in the north across the corridor and is said to be supported by demonstration efforts from Prussian Silesia. If this plan succeeds, it counts. the staff with the occupation of Warsaw within 8 days. ”336 The meeting with Agent A-54 did not take place until July 8 in The Hague, and the meeting actually dealt with the German campaign in Poland. The answer to the question of exactly when the attack will take place, but the agent did not say, not even outright for a simple reason. He didn’t know her. The report, which was handed over to London by the Paris branch on July 22 and spoke of a well-informed Viennese source, Rafael Melichar, could have suggested. According to his statement, “at the end of August, Germany is expected to start a war action in informed circles.” Czechoslovak reporters had the opportunity to more accurately estimate the specific date of the start of German war operations from the information on the schedule of work in progress in order to adjust the strategic roads leading to the Polish border. A relatively large number of them were obtained during July 1939, and it must be said that they essentially agreed with Agent A-54’s claims that the situation would begin to escalate from 15 August. There was also a large amount of data on concentration, strength and the composition of troops in Moravia and Slovakia. Most likely, due to their seemingly marginal nature and the absence of qualified analysts in London, who would draw the appropriate conclusions from the data, Col. Moravec paid no attention.338 At the beginning of August 1939, at a time when Oldřich Tichý was already working at the head of the “Karel” branch, another meeting with Agent A-54 took place in The Hague. Although the results of the meeting were later significantly distorted and glorified, A ̶ 54 practically only confirmed in terms of date that, unless the deadline is changed, military action by Germany can be expected from 15 August.339 During his first month in the branch, he worked Silent on the full resumption of his Swiss contacts, the strengthening of further cooperation with the Swiss intelligence service, the concept of cooperation with the French was also completed, and the need to know the exact date of the beginning of the German invasion of Poland became more and more urgent. Relatively important for further intelligence cooperation 336 that, unless the deadline is changed, military action by Germany can be expected from 15 August.339 During the first month of his tenure at the branch, Tichý worked to fully restore his Swiss contacts, strengthen further cooperation with the Swiss intelligence service, and complete the concept of cooperation with the French, and the need to know the exact date of the beginning of the German invasion of Poland became more and more urgent. Relatively important for further intelligence cooperation 336 that, unless the deadline is changed, military action by Germany can be expected from 15 August.339 During the first month of his tenure at the branch, Tichý worked to fully restore his Swiss contacts, strengthen further cooperation with the Swiss intelligence service, and complete the concept of cooperation with the French, and the need to know the exact date of the beginning of the German invasion of Poland became more and more urgent. Relatively important for further intelligence cooperation 336 the concept of cooperation with the French was also being finalized, and the need to know the exact date of the beginning of the German invasion of Poland became more and more urgent. Relatively important for further intelligence cooperation 336 the concept of cooperation with the French was also being finalized, and the need to know the exact date of the beginning of the German invasion of Poland became more and more urgent. Relatively important for further intelligence cooperation 336
VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-1 (Radiostanice Karel), Report „Šmidry“, 15. 5. 1939. VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-1 (Radiostanice Karel), Zpráva „Medák hlásí“, s. 22. 7. 1939. 338 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Spor o agenta, s. 145 ̶ 146. 339 Ibid., P. 146 ̶ 147. 337
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Negotiations with the French, but even more so with the Swiss allies, took place at the Paris branch on August 23 and 24, 1939. However, this negotiation was preceded by the Silent Journey to Switzerland and the rapidly accelerating course of events. On August 19, just before noon, Lt. Col. called. Silent from Paris to London to pass on the latest knowledge he gained from the French intelligence allies. His phone call was very worrying: “The situation is getting serious, the midfielders who were to be released remain, other midfielders are being called; eastward movements of troops. A rapid decline in events is expected, leading to a similar period as in September 1938. There is permanence. Until now there has been peace – but now there is a great ripple and it is estimated that further measures will be taken in the coming days. I myself am in contact with the relevant officials and I will report any new situation. ”340 For the sake of completeness, it should be added that Col. received the same day. Moravec from the British liaison officer information about German plans to launch military operations against Poland, which is expected in the period from 20 to 30 August. In addition, pedestrian agents working for the Czechoslovak foreign branches, especially the Dutch “Libuše”, managed to penetrate the interior of the Third Reich and obtain during the end of June and August a lot of information about the strength and state of preparedness of German troops for the Polish campaign. Only the intelligence “ace”, Agent A-54, did not report.341 At the time, he was working for the German Abwehr, which ultimately resulted in a large-scale crackdown by the Reich security forces on the resistance in the Protectorate.342 It is not known exactly when , but between August 19 and 23, Lt. Col. Tichý went to Lausanne, Switzerland. Not far from here, in Vevey, Lt. Col. had his house and family. Masson. Immediately after arriving in Lausanne, Tichý called his Bernese office and asked for an appointment. The two men met that afternoon at a train station restaurant. Although a form of cooperation with the Swiss had already been agreed in London in July, but very specifically, Tichý still wanted to ask Masson for help. Of course, he came to his aid and promised to send a man to Paris whom Tichý could trust absolutely. Lt. Col. Masson is with Silent The two men met that afternoon at a train station restaurant. Although a form of cooperation with the Swiss had already been agreed in London in July, but very specifically, Tichý still wanted to ask Masson for help. Of course, he came to his aid and promised to send a man to Paris whom Tichý could trust absolutely. Lt. Col. Masson is with Silent The two men met that afternoon at a train station restaurant. Although a form of cooperation with the Swiss had already been agreed in London in July, but very specifically, Tichý still wanted to ask Masson for help. Of course, he came to his aid and promised to send a man to Paris whom Tichý could trust absolutely. Lt. Col. Masson is with Silent
340
VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official call record Lt. Col. Tichého, 19. 8. 1939. 341 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over agent, p. 148. 342 Detailed information about this event KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about agent, p. 149 ̶ 151.
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343 In Lausanne, too, he again encountered a man who, as mentioned above, had followed him during one of his missions while working in Switzerland as a military attaché. But Tichý’s journey had other goals. One of them was a meeting with Capt. Farmer. Tichý wanted to introduce him to the overall situation and told Sedláček that after meeting with a Swiss officer, who would be sent by Lt. Col. Masson, will send to Switzerland Maj. Fryč to inform Sedláček about the details of further cooperation with the Swiss. Such a procedure was logical, as Sedláček did not know either Masson or Hausmann.344 Sedláček did not make the best impression on Tichý during the meeting, and his subsequent activities contributed to Tichý’s embarrassment, as is clear from the minutes of the 23rd and 24th meetings in Paris. Lt. Col. Tichý, a summoner from London, also took part in Tichý. Bartík. Lt. Col. During his trip to Switzerland, Tichý also revised the mailboxes. Based on this revision, it was subsequently revealed that one of the mailboxes will need to be completely abolished. On August 23, Capt. Hausmann and announced that he was being sent by Lt. Col. Masson. Tichý learned that Massmann’s promised officer, whom he could trust completely, was Hausmann. During the negotiations, the conditions of intelligence cooperation with the Swiss agreed in June were specified and supplemented. Cpt. Hausmann confirmed that he would make his entire apparatus available to the Czechoslovak correspondents, and the Swiss side would pass on to the Czechoslovaks all news of an offensive nature as well as all military-political material concerning Germany, which it would send either directly to London or to the Paris branch. He also stressed the readiness to provide protection to agents on Swiss soil. In return, Hausmann also demanded that military and political reports concerning Germany be sent to the Czechoslovak correspondents, and stressed that if information on the preparations for the German accession against Switzerland was intercepted, these reports would be sent as quickly as possible. He also requested a similar approach in the case of information about the German accession to the Allies.345 However, several important innovations were also addressed during the negotiations. Cpt. Hausmann offered the possibility of securing entry visas through the Swiss Embassy in London for any passport for a person of any nationality, which would 343 In return, Hausmann also demanded that military and political reports concerning Germany be sent to the Czechoslovak correspondents, and stressed that if information on the preparations for the German accession against Switzerland was intercepted, these reports would be sent as quickly as possible. He also requested a similar approach in the case of information about the German accession to the Allies.345 However, several important innovations were also addressed during the negotiations. Cpt. Hausmann offered the possibility of securing entry visas through the Swiss Embassy in London for any passport for a person of any nationality, which would 343 In return, Hausmann also demanded that military and political reports concerning Germany be sent to the Czechoslovak correspondents, and stressed that if information on the preparations for the German accession against Switzerland was intercepted, these messages would be sent as quickly as possible. He also requested a similar approach in the case of information about the German accession to the Allies.345 However, several important innovations were also addressed during the negotiations. Cpt. Hausmann offered the possibility of securing entry visas through the Swiss Embassy in London for any passport for a person of any nationality, which would 343 He also requested a similar approach in the case of information about the German accession to the Allies.345 However, several important innovations were also addressed during the negotiations. Cpt. Hausmann offered the possibility of securing entry visas through the Swiss Embassy in London for any passport for a person of any nationality, which would 343 He also requested a similar approach in the case of information about the German accession to the Allies.345 However, several important innovations were also addressed during the negotiations. Cpt. Hausmann offered the possibility of securing entry visas through the Swiss Embassy in London for any passport for a person of any nationality, which would 343
TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), Pp. 129. Ibid., Pp. 129 ̶ 130. 345 VÚA – VHA, p. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Business Record of the Meeting with H. Hausmann, August 25, 1939, pp. 1 ̶ 3. 344
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the Czechoslovak correspondents needed to send to Switzerland and similarly that he was able to arrange a residence permit for all the relevant persons staying in Switzerland. Furthermore, Capt. Hausmann with the possible arrival of couriers from the protectorate. In this matter, he reassured Tichý and Bartík that he was willing and able to provide everything necessary to ensure that potential couriers avoided difficulties with the Swiss authorities and that they were sent safely to London, Paris, or another designated place. The couriers were to be notified in order to contact the number in St. Petersburg upon arrival in Switzerland. Gallen and announced the slogan “London 333”. This will notify Hausmann, who will then arrange everything necessary. Couriers were also to request the same call if they were detained. In the event that, for any reason, it is not possible to contact the number, Hausmann had prepared an alternative variant in the form of a Bern number, at which the person concerned was to ask Dr. Balsigera. This, as well as the aforementioned slogan “London 333”, was to be received by only a few absolutely reliable persons and only in exceptional cases. Cpt. Hausmann also stated that, in case of urgency, it would be possible to contact him through the Swiss military attaché in Paris, and the person in question was to report as early as June under the agreed motto “Kälin 846” .346 Cpt. Hausmann also stated at the meeting that he was ready to provide everything necessary for a Czechoslovak officer to settle permanently in Switzerland and work directly with him. The Swiss willingness even went so far as to require Hausmann to, in the event of consent from the Czechoslovak side, be informed in advance whether the officer in question was married or single, so that he could prepare his accommodation accordingly.347 The officer who established close cooperation with Hausmann in Switzerland became a captain. Farmer. However, this happened rather despite the reservations of Lt. Col. Silent. During the negotiations, the issue of further activities of the CCTV was also addressed. Saddlery. Part of the official record of the meeting, made by Major. Bartík, is the opinion of Lt. Col. Tichý in Sedláčková’s affair, which states: Sedláček could apply as today’s time requires. Capt. Sedláček succumbs to psychosis, fears his surroundings, declares himself that he cannot stay anywhere with an English passport, because he is being talked about everywhere in boarding houses and hotels Silent. During the negotiations, the issue of further activities of the CCTV was also addressed. Saddlery. Part of the official record of the meeting, made by Major. Bartík, is the opinion of Lt. Col. Tichý in Sedláčková’s affair, which states: Sedláček could apply as today’s time requires. Capt. Sedláček succumbs to psychosis, fears his surroundings, declares himself that he cannot stay anywhere with an English passport, because he is being talked about everywhere in boarding houses and hotels Silent. During the negotiations, the issue of further activities of the CCTV was also addressed. Saddlery. Part of the official record of the meeting, made by Major. Bartík, is the opinion of Lt. Col. Tichý in Sedláčková’s affair, which states: Sedláček could apply as today’s time requires. Capt. Sedláček succumbs to psychosis, fears his surroundings, declares himself that he cannot stay anywhere with an English passport, because he is being talked about everywhere in boarding houses and hotels
346
VÚA – VHA, sb. Military intelligence, intelligence contact with Switzerland London – 1939, service record of the meeting H. Hausmann, 25. 8. 1939, p. 3 ̶ fourth 347 Ibid, p. 2.
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in English, and when he answers German there is distrust of him. Lt. Col. Tichý states that Sedláček impresses the sufferer and decays mentally and physically in a foreign environment. Lt. Col. Tichý proposes to move Sedláček to France, for example to Besançon, from where he could, according to the provisions of the reports. Paris branch and news. headquarters in London to manage the news. 348 Sedláček’s appeal from Switzerland had, moreover, been considered before, but for different reasons. Already in the planning phase of sending Czechoslovak correspondents to Paris, the possibility of withdrawing skpt was considered. Peasants from Zurich for a transitional period and make him along with his Swiss network available Maj. Paleček.349 However, this did not materialize. Even in connection with Tichý’s report, Sedláček was not withdrawn from Switzerland and, on the contrary, his subsequent close cooperation with Capt. Hausmann. The last crucial point which was discussed at the meeting was cooperation with the French. Maj. Navarre assured Tichý that he would give him all the messages Col. had asked for. Moravec, and will also supply press reviews. Navarre only demanded that everything be kept secret and not even passed on to British correspondents in the transcripts. Maj. Navarre also expressed the wish that when transmitting reports from the Czechoslovak side, the degrees of credibility should be indicated and the sources from which the reports came to be specified.350 However, the Czechoslovaks could not fully fulfill this, at least not in the case of reports obtained from Switzerland. Hausmann, on the other hand, demanded that the sources of where the messages came from should not be specified in the Czechoslovak-Swiss transmission of messages, so that mutual cooperation could be kept as secret as possible. 351 Based on the results of the negotiations in Paris, further intelligence activities were carried out. Czechoslovak correspondents praised the cooperation with the Swiss. After all, the Czechoslovak-Swiss intelligence cooperation can basically be considered the most fundamental success of the Paris branch. Cpt. Hausmann accommodated Capt. Peas in a villa in St. Gallen, 352 where Sedláček also had a walkie-talkie at his disposal. Without interruption until the end of the war, Sedláček then passed on through the 348
VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official record of proceedings at Czechoslovakia. military branch in Paris on 23 and 24 August 1939, p. 1. 349 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over agent, pp. 132 ̶ 133. 350 VÚA – VHA, p. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official record of proceedings at Czechoslovakia. military branch in Paris on 23 and 24 August 1939, p. 2. 351 VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Service Record of the Meeting with H. Hausmann, August 25, 1939, pp. 1 ̶ 3 352 Both officers were in such close daily contact that Hausmann’s family considered Sedláček practically a member his family and his children called him “Uncle Tom.” MORAVEC, F .: Spy, pp. 305.
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news and instructions to Sedláček from the West flowed through the same stations or through mailboxes, or through the French embassy in Bern. Tichý remarked about this mechanism: “It was a great contribution to our intelligence and also a contribution to our intelligence to the Allies.” 353 Unfortunately, despite initial considerable optimism and prospects for smooth and effective cooperation, time has shown that different. However, this did not become fully apparent until later, although the first indications can already be read in the official record of the above-mentioned Paris meeting: “Lt. Col. Tichý believes that Šmidra [pseudonym Maj. Gouyou, note. author] was in many cases sabotaged by two officers of the 2nd Department, who are not in favor of us and who have always expressed doubts about the importance of the messages we have sent them. Lt. Col. Tichý hopes to be in direct contact with Maj. Navarre-m will bring everything in order. ”354 On the other hand, for example, Maj. Paleček blamed great blame for the problematic cooperation with the French at the expense of Maj. Gouyou. He characterized him as an inefficient, slow man who put things off, and had “a kind of light, sloppy French relationship.” 355 As mentioned above, Agent A-54 had not made himself known since the second meeting in The Hague in early August. Since several times he received Col. On August 25, Lt. Col. Tichý to Paris to check with the relevant mailbox in Switzerland to see if there was a telegram from A ̶ 54. Tichý immediately ruled it out, because in the case that he would actually arrive in the mailbox by telegram, it would be Lt. Col. Silent notified, and in addition the mailbox had an order to send a possible letter or telegram immediately. Nevertheless, Tichý promised to convince himself.356 Nevertheless, a number of findings were again available, which necessarily had to keep the Czechoslovak correspondents and their allies boiling. On the same day, Col. Moravec asked Lt. Col. Tichý about checking the mailbox in Switzerland, there was a list of reports: “Německu there is a lot of traffic and movement in Germany, so no one knows about it at the moment. Šmidra arrived in the morning, intercepting a telephone conversation between their high-ranking political dignitaries, in which it was said that 353 that he would be convinced.356 Nevertheless, there was again a wealth of knowledge that had necessarily kept the Czechoslovak correspondents and their allies boiling. On the same day, Col. Moravec asked Lt. Col. Tichý about checking the mailbox in Switzerland, there was a list of reports: “Německu there is a lot of traffic and movement in Germany, so no one knows about it at the moment. Šmidra arrived in the morning, intercepting a telephone conversation between their high-ranking political dignitaries, in which it was said that 353 that he would be convinced.356 Nevertheless, there was again a wealth of knowledge that had necessarily kept the Czechoslovak correspondents and their allies boiling. On the same day, Col. Moravec asked Lt. Col. Tichý about checking the mailbox in Switzerland, there was a list of reports: “Německu there is a lot of traffic and movement in Germany, so no one knows about it at the moment. Šmidra arrived in the morning, intercepting a telephone conversation between their high-ranking political dignitaries, in which it was said that 353
TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), P. 131. VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official record of proceedings at Czechoslovakia. military branch in Paris on 23 and 24 August 1939, p. 2. 355 ABS, f. 302, sign. 302-57-2, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Karel Paleček, 25 November 1949, pp. 183. 356 VÚA – VHA, p. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Service record, 25. 8. 1939. 354
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357 On the same day at a quarter to eleven o’clock in the evening, the Paris branch forwarded to London a report on the distribution of German troops, the occupation of the western border along its entire length, although the borders had not yet been closed, and In the last two days, the rapidly more intensive operation of German radio stations.358 On 27 August, Lt. Col. again. Tichý to London and said that a war timetable had been introduced in the Protectorate on the night of August 26-27, and that midfielders up to the age of 55 could be seen in the transports, and that rail links with Poland had already been cut off on August 25. .359 On August 30, Lt. Col. Tichý passed on to London very specific information about the movements of German artillery and armor that had taken place two days earlier. At the same time, he expressed a very contrasting opinion of the French political representation on the whole situation: There are reports in the same circles that Hitler has invited the Polish ambassador today and told him that Germany is willing to negotiate with Poland if the Gdańsk and Corridor issue, which must be resolved in favor of Germany without negotiation, does not arise. ”360 Although Czechoslovak, French and British reporters had a number of clues and suspected that the war between Germany and Poland was approaching, they could not find out the exact date of the beginning of combat operations until the last moment. Today, the completely overestimated contribution of Agent A-54, which was especially credited to Col., is also surpassed. Moravec. When Third Reich troops invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, short diplomatic attempts were made to persuade Germany to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. But these efforts soon proved in vain, and Britain and France declared hostility to Germany.361 It was now vital for the intelligence services to find out when the Germans would also attack France and Great Britain westward. Although the Czechoslovaks and their allies did not know when this would happen, they had no doubt that it would happen. The first general information was received by the Paris branch office from a cover agent 361 Now it was vital for the intelligence services to find out when the Germans would also attack France and Great Britain westward. Although the Czechoslovaks and their allies did not know when this would happen, they had no doubt that it would happen. The first general information was received by the Paris branch office from a cover agent 361 Now it was vital for the intelligence services to find out when the Germans would also attack France and Great Britain westward. Although the Czechoslovaks and their allies did not know when this would happen, they had no doubt that it would happen. The first general information was received by the Paris branch office from a cover agent
357
VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Service record, 25. 8. 1939. VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Telephone message from the branch from Paris, 25. 8. 1939. 359 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official call record Lt. Col. Tichého, 27 August 1939. 360 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official call record Lt. Col. Tichého, 30. 8. 1939. 361 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 152. 358
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362 According to his report, a meeting of Hitler’s headquarters took place at Heidebreck Castle in Silesia on September 20, 1939. with a violation of Belgian neutrality.363 A month later, a telegram from the Green arrived in Paris [code name doc. Vladimíra Krajiny364, note author], which contained a statement that a campaign to the West was being decided in Germany. However, the German General Staff opposed this, considering such a war to be politically lost. A possible attack, if it had already taken place, was then to be led through the Netherlands with armored divisions at the head and a supporting attack of 1,500 aircraft on Great Britain.365 Already 2. On November, the “Havelsky” report was given from Paris to London [code name Cpt. Hans Hausmann, note author], which discussed the change in attitudes of the German generality. Col. However, Moravec did not pay much attention to the report.366 According to French sources, military operations were to take place on November 6 and 7, while reports from the Protectorate spoke about half a month. Although time has shown that all predictions were wrong, the Czechoslovak correspondents had no idea that Hitler himself had already begun to postpone the start of the attack on the West on November 7, in the end by several months. They assumed only that their greatest “star”, Agent A-54, did not warn of any danger.367 At the beginning of 1940, a completely different form of cooperation with the French correspondents began to show more than how optimistic and hopeful she appeared during the cooperation negotiations and shortly afterwards. He took care of contact with his French colleagues in Paris
362
It was the pseudonym of the political emigrant Georg Leonhard, who had originally collaborated with the “Vonapo 20” exchange since June 1938. By the end of the First Republic, it had the code A ̶ 1102. This agent had contacts at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of War in Berlin. Ibid., P. 153. 363 VÚA – VHA, p. 37, sign. 37-144-2 (Radiostan Karel), Situation Report No. 64, September 27, 1939. 364 Doc. Vladimír Krajina worked as a member of the PU since November 1939. Since 1940, he has been significantly involved in the activities of the resistance organization INTRODUCTION, the top body of Czech resistance. His close associates also included the well-known “Three Kings”. Thanks to his domestic intelligence network, he was one of the best-informed men in the Protectorate and delivered over 20,000 telegrams to London via radio stations. He was not discovered by the Nazis during the Heydrichiad, however, he had to hide in the Bohemian Paradise, which meant isolation for him. The Gestapo finally caught up with him at the end of January 1943. The landscape underwent a number of interrogations, but he was spared because KH Frank counted on him as a key element in forming a Czech government that would span the period from the fall of the Protectorate to the re-establishment. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-18. 365 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. The Gestapo finally caught up with him at the end of January 1943. The landscape underwent a number of interrogations, but he was spared because KH Frank counted on him as a key element in forming a Czech government that would span the period from the fall of the Protectorate to the re-establishment. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-18. 365 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. The Gestapo finally caught up with him at the end of January 1943. The landscape underwent a number of interrogations, but he was spared because KH Frank counted on him as a key element in forming a Czech government that would span the period from the fall of the Protectorate to the re-establishment. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-18. 365 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. Frank counted as a key article for the formation of a Czech government that would span the period from the fall of the Protectorate to the restoration of the republic. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-18. 365 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. Frank counted as a key article for the formation of a Czech government that would span the period from the fall of the Protectorate to the restoration of the republic. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-18. 365 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159.
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Lt. Col. Silent. Despite initial guarantees, the French side approached cooperation slowly and not exactly willingly. The French practically tried to get the entire Czechoslovak intelligence service under their control, and especially the Paris branch, which logically could never do without French news. In connection with the French approach, one can quote Jiří Šolc: “They paid more attention to the attempts to fully subordinate the intelligence service, control all connections and activities of the “Karel” exchange, routes and operations and penetrate into conspiratorial contexts, which resulted in mutual misunderstandings. The implementation of the plans thus dragged on and was tied to administrative obstacles, often intentionally created by the French side. ”368 This can be demonstrated by a concrete example. At the beginning of February 1940, gen. Faucher, head of the French military mission under the Czechoslovak government, 369 complained Col. Moravec on the activities of the intelligence branch in Paris and especially on the activities of Lt. Col. Silent. Gene. Faucher blamed Tichý for his lack of loyalty to the French Slovak Republic, as well as his political exposure and constant contact with Czechoslovak political leaders in Paris. In addition, Faucher was also annoyed by the fact that Tichý passed on to some members of the Czechoslovak National Committee reports which, according to French intelligence, were to remain only in the hands of competent professional intelligence services, and also criticized Lt. Col.’s efforts. Silent aid for the rescue of Czechoslovak refugees from Hungary, which, according to Faucher, could lead to the compromise of the French intelligence authorities. It must be said that Col. Moravec defended Tichý against Faucher and, according to Faucher, fully approved all the problematic points of Tichý’s activities.370 In connection with the expected military actions against France, Lt. Col. Tichý also tried to propose an organizational change to London headquarters, based on the experience of intelligence officers at the Paris branch. The organization should for the next time be such that it is sufficient and satisfying in any case, ie that it is not paralyzed even in the event of a total war. Tichý argued that the courier connection, which is already quite slow, would be even longer and more irregular in this case. From an agency point of view, Tichý opposed the adoption of the principle of reserving the ownership of an agent. Agent working for the Czechoslovak 368 370 In connection with the expected military actions against France, Lt. Col. Tichý also tried to propose an organizational change to London headquarters, based on the experience of intelligence officers at the Paris branch. The organization should for the next time be such that it is sufficient and satisfying in any case, ie that it is not paralyzed even in the event of a total war. Tichý argued that the courier connection, which is already quite slow, would be even longer and more irregular in this case. From an agency point of view, Tichý opposed the adoption of the principle of reserving the ownership of an agent. Agent working for the Czechoslovak 368 370 In connection with the expected military actions against France, Lt. Col. Tichý also tried to propose an organizational change to London headquarters, based on the experience of intelligence officers at the Paris branch. The organization should for the next time be such that it is sufficient and satisfying in any case, ie that it is not paralyzed even in the event of a total war. Tichý argued that the courier connection, which is already quite slow, would be even longer and more irregular in this case. From an agency point of view, Tichý opposed the adoption of the principle of reserving the ownership of an agent. Agent working for the Czechoslovak 368 to suffice and satisfy in any case, ie not to be paralyzed even in the case of total war. Tichý argued that the courier connection, which is already quite slow, would be even longer and more irregular in this case. From an agency point of view, Tichý opposed the adoption of the principle of reserving the ownership of an agent. Agent working for the Czechoslovak 368 to suffice and satisfy in any case, ie not to be paralyzed even in the case of total war. Tichý argued that the courier connection, which is already quite slow, would be even longer and more irregular in this case. From an agency point of view, Tichý opposed the adoption of the principle of reserving the ownership of an agent. Agent working for the Czechoslovak 368
ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 110. VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-112-1 (Telegrams for Dr. Beneš and answers to them), Answer of Dr. Beneš for a telephone message to Gen. Ingra, September 7, 1939. 370 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Letter to the Chief of Czechoslovakia. military administration in the case of the French SR, 5 February 1940, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 369
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interests as a whole should be led and guided by an intelligence group that could “immediately, under the best conditions and in the shortest possible time, ie effectively influence them in time” .371 However, it still needs to return to the end of January 1940, when Agent A provided a relatively extensive list of information concerning German preparations for an air strike against England as well as preparations for a ground strike in the direction of the Franco-Belgian border. But the elaboration did not contain any specific date. On the morning of April 9, the Czechoslovak correspondents received an officially confirmed report that the troops of the Third Reich had invaded Denmark and Norway, ie that the action had previously been signaled by information from the “Libuše” and “Kazi” branches, as well as reports from “Arno” and “Havel”. However, it was still not possible to determine when an attack on France could be expected. Agent A-54’s letter, which arrived in Paris at the very end of April and in which the agent only confirmed the information already known.3772 Although a telegram arrived in Paris on May 1 and a letter on May 3, there was nothing at all about the start of the German attack.374 On May 10, the Germans launched a strike against the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the first troops invaded also to France.375 Lt. Col. Tichý, like other representatives of the Paris branch, thus began to rapidly reduce the time they still had to spend in France. France’s military situation deteriorated rapidly in June 1940, when France also declared war on Italy, and the attackers managed to break through the defensive lines. 376 Thus arose the need to evacuate the Paris branch. Maj. Gouyou had previously mentioned this possibility of evacuation to Tichý, after which Lt. Col. Tichý notified Gen. in this matter. Ingra. However, Gouyou later denied his mention of the evacuation and, on the contrary, declared that Paris would never be evacuated.377
371
VÚA – VHA, sb. 20, sign. 20-21-13 (Supplement to News Diaries), Explanatory Memorandum Lt. Col. Tichého, 21. 2. 1940. 372 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, 164. 373 This issue is discussed in great detail and comprehensively in KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, s 165 ̶ 167. 374 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, pp. 166 ̶ 167. 375 SHAW, Antony: The Second World War Day by Day (hereinafter referred to as the Second World War). Prague 2004, pp. 20. 376 Encyclopedic Dictionary of Czech History 1938 ̶ 1945. Keyword: Czechoslovak ground forces in France. In: http://www.usd.cas.cz/UserFiles/File/Publikace/Slovnik38_45.pdf [cit. March 1, 2015]. 377 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 47.
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its agency network connected to the German emigration, which was well informed in this matter and encouraged evacuation.378 Oldřich Tichý learned that French preparations for the evacuation were in full swing: “Gen. Ingr called me to the military administration to report to him on the situation at the front. I went there, and since I no longer spoke to Gouya that day, I called him by phone and asked him to come to the gene. Ingrovi. He replied that he had absolutely no time, after which I told him that I had to talk to him and that I was leaving for him. As I entered the search party’s yard, I saw a row of cars loading and fires where file material was being burned. I asked Gouya what was going on, that he didn’t tell me anything. He replied, to keep calm, that it was a preparation for evacuation. When asked what would happen to us, he replied that he would arrange the matter. I went to Col. To Rivet, who was just around, and I told him what would happen to us, that we had no cars. He replied that he had not received as many cars as he had requested and needed, and that he had to burn the material. ”379 Following this finding, Tichý hurried to the Military Administration for a gene. Ingrem, reported the whole situation to him and asked him to remember the reporter in the “Karel” branch, despite the lack of cars. In the meantime, he also managed to contact Maj. Thumb up to immediately start preparing all the material for moving. In the end, the Czechoslovak correspondents received the cars and, as Tichý later stated, they carefully guarded them after the assignment.380 The next day, they traveled with all the equipment and intelligence materials from Paris. Despite some ignorance on the part of the French, it cannot be said that Lt. Col. Tichý did not expect an evacuation as a relatively probable eventuality. This is evidenced by the fact that he apparently decided in March to move his family from Paris and the families of other officers. He therefore asked Lt. Weyrich to rent two villas in Souillac for that purpose. Tichý knew the city very well, as he and his family spent their holidays here after the first year at the École Supérieure de Guerre.381 Souillac was also a convenient place for families because it was only about 90 kilometers east of Bordeaux, where after the situation escalated in June the gene also targeted. Ingr and the French High Command.382 In Souillac, they found temporary refuge because he and his family spent their holidays here after the first year at the École Supérieure de Guerre.381 Souillac was also a convenient place to house families because it was only about 90 kilometers east of Bordeaux, where the gene also headed after the situation escalated in June. Ingr and the French High Command.382 In Souillac, they found temporary refuge because he and his family spent their holidays here after the first year at the École Supérieure de Guerre.381 Souillac was also a convenient place to house families because it was only about 90 kilometers east of Bordeaux, where the gene also headed after the situation escalated in June. Ingr and the French High Command.382 In Souillac, they found temporary refuge
378
ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, pp. 110 ̶ 111. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 47. 380 SILENT , O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), S. 136. 381 Ibid., Pp. 136 ̶ 137. 382 GEBHART, J. ̶ KUKLÍK, J .: Velké dějiny, p. 460. 379
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wives and children gen. Ingra, Col. gšt. Čeňka Kudláčka, 383 Col. gšt. Jaroslava Vedrala, 384 Maj. Palečka, škpt. Fryče, Lt. Weyrich and, of course, Lt. Col. Silent. A total of 16 people stayed in Souillac, including three small children. Tichý later added: “Only by this measure were [families] saved or at least saved from the experience of the retreat.” During the retreat, at one of the stops in the city of Uzerche, probably on June 18, the group learned Lt. Col. Tichý from the radio about the armistice. In response, Tichý ordered the burning of most of the material, with the exception of the cash register and cipher keys, which were too important and one of the things the reporters had until “self-destruction.” 387 From there, the members of the group set out on two trips to Bordeaux, where Tichý immediately contacted the French headquarters and Maj. Gouyou. He then left with Col. Kudláček to warn families about leaving France. To the families of Lt. Col. Tichý, Maj. Palečka and škpt. Fryče offered gen. Inger the next day the opportunity to travel by boat to Casablanca. But all three wives denied it. Very soon a report arrived from London for Tichý and his colleagues from the branch to report to Arcachon, where the cruiser Gallate was to take them on board by order of the British Admiralty. Lt. Col. Quiet so on the orders of gen. Ingra handed over the agenda to Col. Kudláček, he connected with all the married members of the Paris branch and went with them to the port of Arcachon.388 As it might seem that the trip to London must have taken place without complications, this was not the case. Even in Arcachon, an unpleasant situation arose when the motor ship, which had a colonel. Tichý and the others were transported to the cruiser, ran aground, and the embarkation lasted another two days. Especially for three small 383
Čeněk Kudláček co-founded the Defense of the Nation in March 1939 and until his departure from the Protectorate in November 1939 he was the head of its headquarters. From mid-December, he served as Deputy Chief of the Military Administration of the Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris, and from February to July 1940 he headed the 1st Department of the NGO. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 165. 384 Jaroslav Vedral worked in the military resistance from March 1939, in which he held the position of head of the intelligence department and chief of staff of the Central Command of the Defense of the Nation until the end of 1939. After being forced to leave the Protectorate, in February 1940 he enlisted in the Military Administration of the Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris, where he became the head of the 2nd Department. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, s. 165. 385 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), S. 137. 386 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign.
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children the group had with them had to be very uncomfortable, as the commander of the local field hospital refused Tichý’s request to allow the children to sleep in the hospital and all had to wait until the final boarding “on the beach, where especially in the morning winter ”.389 During the trip to England they still had to change at the port of St. Jean de Luz on another ship, but they finally got to Plymouth, England. A nostalgic event took place here, as the group saw the ocean liner Bathory moored in the port, where the wives and children of intelligence officers from Poland arrived in England.390
5.4.
Back in the UK and the conflict with Col. Moravcem (1940–1941)
The evacuation of the Czechoslovak army from France resulted in the concentration of the political and military components of the Czechoslovak foreign resistance in Great Britain. From a political as well as a military point of view, we can talk about greater consolidation in the context of this time. Opposition forces against President Edvard Beneš, represented in particular by dr. Štefan Osuský and gen. After the defeats of Poland and France, Lev Prchala lost their territorial bases and no longer had such a significant influence on the territory of Great Britain. In addition, the government of Winston Churchill was much more open to Beneš’s concept of leading the resistance and the entire foreign operation. This was, moreover, confirmed when, on July 21, 1940, the British government gave its consent to the establishment of a provisional Czechoslovak government.391 The Czechoslovak foreign army also underwent a certain reorganization. From the autumn of 1940, it began to fall under the newly formed NGOs organized into four departments: I. military-political, II. intelligence, III. aviation, IV. material. The other parts consisted of an auxiliary office and study groups. Those who were to continue to effectively manage the new NGOs became genes. Ingr as Minister of Defense and Secretary of State Gen. Rudolf Viest.392 After returning to Great Britain, Lt. Col. Oldřich Tichý from the order of gen. Ingra assigned to II. the intelligence department of the newly formed NGO. At the head of 389 Oldřich Tichý from the order of gen. Ingra assigned to II. the intelligence department of the newly formed NGO. At the head of 389 Oldřich Tichý from the order of gen. Ingra assigned to II. the intelligence department of the newly formed NGO. At the head of 389https://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/ads?client=ca-pub-2025287964322501&output=html&h=280&adk=3316849697&adf=4053119497&pi=t.aa~a.791033702~i.1954~rp.1&w=950&fwrn=4&fwrnh=100&lmt=1637083002&num_ads=1&rafmt=1&armr=3&sem=mc&pwprc=8576066767&psa=1&ad_type=text_image&format=950×280&url=https%3A%2F%2Fadoc.pub%2Fivotni-osudy-zpravodajskeho-dstojnika.html&flash=0&fwr=0&pra=3&rh=200&rw=949&rpe=1&resp_fmts=3&wgl=1&fa=27&adsid=ChEIgMrNjAYQrducgNSMkZX4ARJIABSZlybLCB4uRHjRhCwtP4BrKnOU8lklMh7_DZzuMJ7UozYMDd3DUXtzbxkHBNpfvMmB4gwYdRZMY6AWOWpgHBGMDVfxVu27&uach=WyJXaW5kb3dzIiwiMTAuMC4wIiwieDg2IiwiIiwiOTUuMC40NjM4LjY5IixbXSxudWxsLG51bGwsIjY0Il0.&dt=1637077626751&bpp=90&bdt=3157&idt=90&shv=r20211111&mjsv=m202111100101&ptt=9&saldr=aa&abxe=1&cookie=ID%3Dd5e2e6db92bd5e30-228561f2aacc00cf%3AT%3D1637021895%3ART%3D1637021895%3AS%3DALNI_MZ9Z2P1KZNTBjatFIaEde232V8bBQ&prev_fmts=0x0%2C307x250%2C982x280%2C1349x625%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280&nras=6&correlator=1011245596538&frm=20&pv=1&ga_vid=72963090.1637021896&ga_sid=1637077625&ga_hid=1346907515&ga_fc=1&u_tz=-300&u_his=1&u_h=768&u_w=1366&u_ah=728&u_aw=1366&u_cd=24&dmc=8&adx=368&ady=47284&biw=1349&bih=625&scr_x=0&scr_y=44784&eid=31063703%2C21067496&oid=2&psts=AGkb-H9wmss3ftiAgqjAVoA-obK7B6rQT1jMTnxJYUSKE1U1QEvDHlvywBsoJlMkkSKF3I0DucAPknRPwDw%2CAGkb-H8lKMocpz47woc6vETFrkNTlM6YSrlcU3rSvywdKKEAZT3mkWLRrOgNGxfqkVpDWQJGV0DkpHwzRA%2CAGkb-H-_8Tb38NzH-gfggpWcG1aRFD5iZblPJEbQNJ4aCcZ4sDH5kMCRL-sqFEGNw8gDmjdYNluAoKY3S1M%2CAGkb-H_h1ldh6UdseeRbPdj8mOIzRh31qs1LBbikUyrWnPYrcedJz-14RXCPoLtkiyc_kbxeKiOEpMoIJLM%2CAGkb-H8Ip938LqXdwfC0nH8qlUq8VoeFb9PJc-snEcr71YB7sSyXRAfZz_HHfASP3a4X7k3DQWF8V-ZusfM%2CAGkb-H8MmZDydkmC34tFij5_jH5Ju1osrmN7ySq76UJpG1D-v0x_93oQYoWNfbLh3Wi9vEM_fMqwLCNe5T48&pvsid=1616790102313099&pem=11&tmod=1436071561&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&eae=0&fc=1408&brdim=0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C0%2C1366%2C728%2C1366%2C625&vis=1&rsz=%7C%7Cs%7C&abl=NS&fu=128&bc=31&jar=2021-11-16-16&ifi=8&uci=a!8&btvi=5&fsb=1&xpc=ATYQKVe4SA&p=https%3A//adoc.pub&dtd=M
TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), P. 138. Ibid. 391 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 161. For details on the anti-Benešov opposition forces, see eg KUKLÍK, Jan – NĚMEČEK, Jan: Against Beneš! Czech and Slovak anti-Benešov opposition in London 1939−1945. Prague 2004. 392 PLACHÝ, Jiří: How the Ministry of Defense worked in London (hereinafter referred to as How the NGO worked). In: http://www.vhu.cz/jak-fungovalo-ministerstvo-obrany-v-londyne/ [cit. March 9, 2015]. 390
78
second division stood Col. Moravec.393 Together with Tichý, Maj. Paleček, Capt. Fryč and Hugo Weyrich, now in the rank of lieutenant. Intelligence officers were given about a month’s leave before joining the second ward, and their decision was made at the turn of August and September 1940.394 by joining II. union but Lt. Col. Tichý paid a visit to Gen. Charles de Guulla. The visit took place on July 24, 1940. The main purpose of the visit was to find out about the situation in France and its consequences for further intelligence
cooperation.
In this
sense , it
is no
coincidence
that
visit
in gen. de Gaulle executed Lt. Col. Tichý, because he, as the former head of the Paris branch, was in terms of Czechoslovak-French cooperation, in fact, the most professional Czechoslovak officer and, moreover, until June 22, 1940, he was in contact with Col. Rivet and the Fifth Division of the French General Staff. The main purpose of the visit was to find out to what extent further potential cooperation with the French was safe. London Intelligence Group Col. Moravce was well aware that a complete interruption of cooperation could mean significant damage in the effort to achieve common goals. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak correspondents also knew that continuing cooperation without receiving information and guarantees that such cooperation was safe could mean, for example, that the messages sent would fall into the wrong hands of Germany. Gen de Gaulle understood Czechoslovak concerns and, according to Tichý, replied as follows: “5 Bureau, if he is informed, is in France. 396 De Gaull’s view of further Czechoslovak cooperation was that “perhaps it would not be good to cut off contact with them altogether, but for a transitional period before everything crystallizes,” give nothing important and have more good words for them than news ”.397
393
ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, pp. 161. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 49; ABS, 302, sign. 302-73-1, Protocol written with Col. vv František Fryč, 3. 1. 1950, p. 6. 395 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 173. 396 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-241 (First information visit of a member of Col. Moravec’s group to Gen. de Gaulle), Oldřich Tichý’s record of the visit, July 24, 1940, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 397 Ibid., P. 2. 394
79
For the sake of completeness, it is necessary to add that the further concretization of Czechoslovak-French cooperation was agreed at the meeting of Lt. Col. Tichý with the head of the second department of the staff gen. de Gaulla Capt. Possym, which took place on September 12, 1940. The meeting addressed, among other things, the concept of building a new agency network in France. In this sense, the French asked the Czechoslovak correspondents for advice, as they considered them “masters of networking” 398, rich in experience. Tichý responded: “Sending agents, as we did on the continent against Germany and as is generally done, may not be enough in this case. It must be a large organization that has its roots in France itself and with which there is a reliable connection. A well-organized and well-functioning apparatus in such a large and well-founded country as France can bring an extraordinarily large share of our common victory. ”399 There was also talk of the need to build certain centers of the network in France, both in the occupied and unoccupied parts. . In terms of connection, then Col. Tichý recommended radio communication as the most reliable radio, and specific names of French officers were also addressed, with whom it would be useful to establish contact. During the discussion, Tichý also noted that he considered it unnecessary to inform third parties, including the English, about such negotiations. He did not want to get the English out of the game, so to speak, because both the Czechoslovak and French sides are in constant contact with them.400 Tichý’s word can be interpreted more as his belief that it is essential to share the results of the work, which will help to achieve common goals, but it is not necessary to share all negotiations and planning of events and cooperation. Within II. Lt. Col. joined the MNO. Silent to the position of Deputy Col. Moravce. It must be said that Oldřich Tichý was very dissatisfied with his inclusion from the beginning. It was mainly about Tichý’s old disputes and disagreements with Col. Moravec, for whom Tichý did not have a vain desire to work directly with Moravec again. Nevertheless, as a soldier he obeyed the order and II. union joined. As it turned out, the function of Moravc’s deputy was performed by Lt. Col. Silent only formally and in fact the work looked completely different. Oldřich Tichý himself described his work in the second department of London as follows: “Throughout my assignment, I, like most Lt. Col. joined the MNO. Silent to the position of Deputy Col. Moravce. It must be said that Oldřich Tichý was very dissatisfied with his inclusion from the beginning. It was mainly about Tichý’s old disputes and disagreements with Col. Moravec, for whom Tichý did not have a vain desire to work directly with Moravec again. Nevertheless, as a soldier he obeyed the order and II. union joined. As it turned out, the function of Moravc’s deputy was performed by Lt. Col. Silent only formally and in fact the work looked completely different. Oldřich Tichý himself described his work in the second department of London as follows: “Throughout my assignment, I, like most Lt. Col. joined the MNO. Silent to the position of Deputy Col. Moravce. It must be said that Oldřich Tichý was very dissatisfied with his inclusion from the beginning. It was mainly about Tichý’s old disputes and disagreements with Col. Moravec, for whom Tichý did not have a vain desire to work directly with Moravec again. Nevertheless, as a soldier he obeyed the order and II. union joined. As it turned out, the function of Moravc’s deputy was performed by Lt. Col. Silent only formally and in fact the work looked completely different. Oldřich Tichý himself described his work in the second department of London as follows: “Throughout my assignment, I, like most for which Tichý did not have a vain desire to work directly with Moravec again. Nevertheless, as a soldier he obeyed the order and II. union joined. As it turned out, the function of Moravc’s deputy was performed by Lt. Col. Silent only formally and in fact the work looked completely different. Oldřich Tichý himself described his work in the second department of London as follows: “Throughout my assignment, I, like most for which Tichý did not have a vain desire to work directly with Moravec again. Nevertheless, as a soldier he obeyed the order and II. union joined. As it turned out, the function of Moravc’s deputy was performed by Lt. Col. Silent only formally and in fact the work looked completely different. Oldřich Tichý himself described his work in the second department of London as follows: “Throughout my assignment, I, like most
398
VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-241 (First information visit of a member of Col. Moravec’s group to Gen. de Gaulle), Oldřich Tichý’s record of a meeting with Capt. Possym, 12. 9. 1940, p. 1. 399 Ibid. 400 Ibid., P. 4.
80
the others were designed to decrypt messages, and for a time I was working on a study of the fuel situation in Germany. ”401 Work at Col. Moravec really did not testify to Tichý at all. In his own words, she also affected his health, to the point that he had to see a doctor very often and began to feel some apathy. In 1990, he characterized these feelings: “Despite Moravec’s words about my indispensability, I soon felt me on Bayswater Road [here a group of Col. Moravce worked, note. author] are considered excessive. ”402 In addition, disputes with Col. The Moravians did not stop and there was still tension between the two men. After the war, Oldřich Tichý gave a very concise statement, in which he described the strong position that Moravec had built up and which he also showed with gusto: “To Col. I observed Moravec’s dominion and his sovereignty and that he was probably aware of the strength of his position, through extremely frequent contact with President Beneš. He reported to President Beneš himself, Gen. In fact, he gave Ingr messages or orders from the president instead of Ingr keeping contact with the president himself [as was the case in the very title of Ingr’s position as Minister of National Defense, note. author]. This situation was commented by others that it is surprising that Ingr in negotiations with the president is actually dependent on Moravec. ”403 Lt. Col. In his post-war statement, Tichý also stated that Moravec called himself “Gray Eminence” 404 and did not publicly hide the opinion that “it must be known when and how to report” .405 Col. Tichý announced his presumption. Bohumil Boček, head of the 1st Military-Political Department of the Ministry of Culture, 406 and also Lt. Col. Bartík. Josef Bartík told Tichý that that the whole matter is known and a commission will be set up to investigate the whole matter.407 Bartík himself had with Col. Moravcem also had disputes before, and Tichý most likely knew about them. Perhaps Tichý was trying to create a certain opposition force against the person and the influence of Col. Moravce. However, nothing is known about the fact that a commission would actually be set up, and given that gradually, like Oldřich
401
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 49. Oral statement by vv Oldřich Tichý from March 17, 1990. Cited by KOKOŠKA, J – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 227. 403 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 50. 404 Ibid. . 405 Ibid. 406 Col. Boček headed the 1st Department of MNO in the period from July 1940 to April 1944. After that he moved to the Czechoslovak army in the Soviet Union. MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, pp. 112. 407 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 50. 402
81
Tichý, so Josef Bartík also left the second department, it can be assumed that no commission was ever established.408 Tensions between Lt. Col. Silent and Col. Moravec did not stop and eventually resulted in Tichý’s departure from II. department as well as from the intelligence service as such. On March 14, 1941, Tichý took two months on sick leave. After returning from vacation, Col. Moravec that his health condition does not allow him to remain in his group. He then asked for a gene. Ingra for another assignment.409 Historians Kokošek very rightly noted that the departure of Lt. Col. Tichý meant a significant loss for Czechoslovak intelligence. Tichý would undoubtedly make very good use of many years of experience as an intelligence officer or military diplomat, for example at the head of a foreign branch, especially the Swedish or Swiss ones.
5.5.
Liaison officer in the Dutch army (1941-1942)
New classification for Lt. Col. Tichého with gen. She didn’t want to give Ingra much. He tried to persuade Tichý to stay in Col.’s group. Moravce. In addition to the benefits that Tichý could still bring to the intelligence service, they led the gen. Ingra for
reluctance
also
purely
practical
reasons.
Above all
, the
fact that
that the Czechoslovak Brigade in England already had a number of unclassified officers and it was not advisable to further expand these ranks. In addition, if he tried to replace Tichý in one of his commanding positions in exchange for another officer, it could work, as Tichý himself remarked, that “the lords of London are taking their places” .411 In the end, however, a solution was acceptable. for both sides. He became a liaison officer with the Dutch army in England. Oldřich Tichý took his place on June 1, 1941,412, when he replaced his predecessor, Col. gšt. Josef Vrzáček, 413 who had to be removed from office. The reason 408
KREISINGER, P .: Year 1941, p. 14. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 51. 410 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 228. 411 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 51. 412 VÚA – VHA , sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Questionnaire addressed to the 4th dept. Hl. Staff, 26.4.1946, p. 1 .; You can also meet other dates of Tichý’s accession to the position of liaison officer in the Dutch army, eg June 16 (VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal List), or in general July 1941 (VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to the War Tribal Letter). 409
82
Tichý remarked, “Vrzáček had an incident there, he got drunk at a party and, as I heard, he jumped on the chandelier and swayed on it.” 414 When gen. Ingr told Tichý what position he would take, noting that this activity would allow Tichý to recover medically.415 He was right. The truth remains that the new position did not require a man of Silent qualities. Pavel Kreisinger described it in his contribution to the personnel crisis of Czechoslovak intelligence in 1941 as a “warm place” 416 and we can only agree with it, because it was really a purely representative function. Tichý himself stated in his statement of resignation: “The function did not require any work, it was basically a formal measure, between the two armies, and after the introduction, the contact with the Dutch depended on that I met the Dutch liaison officer several times for lunch. I was looking for a job myself. ”417 Undoubtedly, thanks to the new position, Lt. Col. was able to. Quiet health recovery. A man of his format, who was accustomed to systematic and relatively demanding work, but the position of liaison officer could not fulfill by far, certainly not in the long run. With his predecessor Col. Tichý remained in contact with Vrzáček, as Vrzáček was appointed head of the MNO418 Study Group a month after his dismissal from the position of liaison officer, and Tichý represented a consultant “in a number of small things” .419 In addition, Tichý also recalled how he was a discussion of the state and shortcomings of military education and a proposal for its reorganization. He compiled a treatise on the Czechoslovak Republic for his Dutch counterpart and wrote an article for the magazine Vojenské rozhledy dedicated to Indonesia. He obtained the data for it from Dutch brochures.420 The fact that Tichý did not really have much to do, is also evidenced by how few reports he handed over during his tenure to the First Department of the Ministry of National Defense. We can mention a treatise on the situation in Australia from the beginning of 1942, which Tichý submitted at the beginning of May 1942,421, as well as a report on the military situation in Burma and the Persian army, which Tichý handed over to the First Department 413
Josef Vrzáček worked as a liaison officer with the Dutch army, resp. at the Dutch government in exile, in England from September 27, 1940 to May 15, 1941, when he was transferred to the Replacement Body. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 135. 414 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 51. 415 Ibid. 416 KREISINGER, P .: Year 1941, p. 13. 417 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 51. 418 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ , Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 136. 419 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 52. 420 Ibid., P. 51 ̶ 52. 421 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-211 (Netherlands), Reports on the situation in Australia, 2 May 1942.
83
at the beginning of August 1942422 and finally a report on the development of the military situation in China until the beginning of July 1942. This report was submitted by Tichý in September 1942.423. . At the end of the discussion on Silent Work as a liaison officer, the question might arise as to why Lt. Col. Tichý became a “mere” liaison officer and not a military attaché to the Dutch government in exile. He definitely had all the prerequisites for this, because he had previously worked as a military attaché and the post of military attaché to the Dutch government was not filled by anyone. Moreover, on August 25, 1941, the Dutch government-in-exile recognized the Czechoslovak government-in-exile as legitimate.424 In view of these circumstances, and that the office of the Czechoslovak military attaché worked for a number of other friendly governments, it seems strange at first sight that Oldřich Tichý did not become one. The answer to the question must be sought in the attitudes of the Dutch Government. At the instigation of the Ministry of National Defense, Karel Erban, Chargé D´affaires of the Dutch Government, by the way, in connection with Oldřich Tichý’s military-diplomatic function, showed that the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not even considered assigning a Czechoslovak military office in December 1942. attachés.425 As an official reason, the Dutch stated that “the Dutch army consists of only less than one brigade and does not have enough officers at its disposal.” 426
The real
reason
,
however
, was the fact
that the
Dutch
government
simply did not care about the Czechoslovak military attaché and wanted to maintain diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovaks only during the war to a minimal extent.427 Lt. Col. Tichý officially resigned as a liaison officer with the Dutch army in July 1942.428 It is also worth noting that at the end of June 1942, consideration was given to the possible deployment of Lt. Tichý to the Middle East, specifically to Cairo, Egypt. Commander of the Czechoslovak Military Mission for the Balkans, Middle East and Middle East
422
VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-211 (Netherlands), Report on the Persian Army and the Situation in Burma, 6 August 1942. 423 VÚA – VHA, p. 20, sign. 20-6-13 (News from the Netherlands), Report of the Chief of the Dutch Military Mission in China on the situation in China, September 10, 1942. 424 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, p. 134. 425 Ibid., P. 136 426 VÚA – VHA, sb. 20, sign. 20-3-40 (Netherlands), Lt. Col. gšt. Oldřich Tichý ̶ appointment by a military attaché at the Dutch government. 427 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, s. 136. 428 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Questionnaire addressed to the 4th dept. Hl. Staff, 26 April 1946, p. 1.
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in Jerusalem gen. Ondřej Mézl [pseudonym Andrej Gak, note. author] 429 at that time reorganized his staff. As his deputy and chief of the mission, he intended to replace Major. Rudolf Šiman for Col. gšt. Prokop Kumpošta430 and Lt. Col. Tichý was considered a possible liaison officer in Cairo.431 But Oldřich Tichý did not become one. In conclusion, it can be added that the position of the Dutch government in exile regarding the office of the Czechoslovak military attaché did not change until September 1943. Karel Erban informed the NGO, which nominated Maj. gšt. Jaroslav Kašpar432 [in archival materials he often performs under his pseudonym Otokar Pátý, note. author]. For the sake of completeness, it can be added that Jaroslav Kašpar was appointed military attaché to the Dutch government on October 1, 1943,433
5.6. Officer of the Staff for the Building of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces (1942–1945)https://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/ads?client=ca-pub-2025287964322501&output=html&h=280&adk=3316849697&adf=3931083606&pi=t.aa~a.791033702~i.2174~rp.1&w=950&fwrn=4&fwrnh=100&lmt=1637083004&num_ads=1&rafmt=1&armr=3&sem=mc&pwprc=8576066767&psa=1&ad_type=text_image&format=950×280&url=https%3A%2F%2Fadoc.pub%2Fivotni-osudy-zpravodajskeho-dstojnika.html&flash=0&fwr=0&pra=3&rh=200&rw=949&rpe=1&resp_fmts=3&wgl=1&fa=27&adsid=ChEIgMrNjAYQrducgNSMkZX4ARJIABSZlybLCB4uRHjRhCwtP4BrKnOU8lklMh7_DZzuMJ7UozYMDd3DUXtzbxkHBNpfvMmB4gwYdRZMY6AWOWpgHBGMDVfxVu27&uach=WyJXaW5kb3dzIiwiMTAuMC4wIiwieDg2IiwiIiwiOTUuMC40NjM4LjY5IixbXSxudWxsLG51bGwsIjY0Il0.&dt=1637077627010&bpp=63&bdt=3417&idt=63&shv=r20211111&mjsv=m202111100101&ptt=9&saldr=aa&abxe=1&cookie=ID%3Dd5e2e6db92bd5e30-228561f2aacc00cf%3AT%3D1637021895%3ART%3D1637021895%3AS%3DALNI_MZ9Z2P1KZNTBjatFIaEde232V8bBQ&prev_fmts=0x0%2C307x250%2C982x280%2C1349x625%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280&nras=7&correlator=1011245596538&frm=20&pv=1&ga_vid=72963090.1637021896&ga_sid=1637077625&ga_hid=1346907515&ga_fc=1&u_tz=-300&u_his=1&u_h=768&u_w=1366&u_ah=728&u_aw=1366&u_cd=24&dmc=8&adx=368&ady=51758&biw=1349&bih=625&scr_x=0&scr_y=49284&eid=31063703%2C21067496&oid=2&psts=AGkb-H9wmss3ftiAgqjAVoA-obK7B6rQT1jMTnxJYUSKE1U1QEvDHlvywBsoJlMkkSKF3I0DucAPknRPwDw%2CAGkb-H8lKMocpz47woc6vETFrkNTlM6YSrlcU3rSvywdKKEAZT3mkWLRrOgNGxfqkVpDWQJGV0DkpHwzRA%2CAGkb-H-_8Tb38NzH-gfggpWcG1aRFD5iZblPJEbQNJ4aCcZ4sDH5kMCRL-sqFEGNw8gDmjdYNluAoKY3S1M%2CAGkb-H_h1ldh6UdseeRbPdj8mOIzRh31qs1LBbikUyrWnPYrcedJz-14RXCPoLtkiyc_kbxeKiOEpMoIJLM%2CAGkb-H8Ip938LqXdwfC0nH8qlUq8VoeFb9PJc-snEcr71YB7sSyXRAfZz_HHfASP3a4X7k3DQWF8V-ZusfM%2CAGkb-H8MmZDydkmC34tFij5_jH5Ju1osrmN7ySq76UJpG1D-v0x_93oQYoWNfbLh3Wi9vEM_fMqwLCNe5T48%2CAGkb-H9tdzWpE43CMTY8nLeHl7qMxACFg59p0z23n0reUMaf3tIrLrMT72Ti50hke8CWNILouVGWB4xgMhJv&pvsid=1616790102313099&pem=11&tmod=1436071561&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&eae=0&fc=1408&brdim=0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C0%2C1366%2C728%2C1366%2C625&vis=1&rsz=%7C%7Cs%7C&abl=NS&fu=128&bc=31&jar=2021-11-16-16&ifi=9&uci=a!9&btvi=6&fsb=1&xpc=5UQ6DgEbcp&p=https%3A//adoc.pub&dtd=M
The Armed Forces Building Staff (hereinafter referred to as the SVBM) originated from the original MNO Study Group. It began to function officially on January 15, 1943.434 The purpose of the MNO Study Group was mainly to carry out preparatory work for the peace conference envisaged after the war from a military and geographical point of view, ie its task was to formulate and set Czechoslovak post-war territorial requirements. In addition, it was also to study the activities of the Czechoslovak army abroad for promotional and historical purposes, to study and evaluate the experience of combat
429
He served as commander of the Czechoslovak military mission for the Balkans, the Middle East in Jerusalem from August 1940 to the end of November 1943. He was then transferred to London to the 1st Department of the MNO. On April 1, he became commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in the 21st Army Group (or in the Czechoslovak military mission at the High Command of the Allied Expeditionary Forces). ZUDOVÁLEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 158. 430 The exchange took place on October 12, 1942. Ibid., 431 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-26-29 (Netherlands), Reports of June 24, 1942. 432 VÚA – VHA, sb. 20, sign. 20-6-13 (Netherlands), Netherlands ̶ change in person voj. attaché, Příloha 1, 9. 9. 1943. 433 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, s. 136. 434 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Zlatica: Československá armáda 1939 ̶ 1945 (hereinafter referred to as the Czechoslovak Army). Plans and reality. In: ZUDOVA-LESKOVA, Zlatica (ed.): Czechoslovak Army 1939 ̶ 1945 (Plans and Reality). Papers from the International Conference October 22-23, 2002. Prague 2003, p. 30.
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to explore the possibilities of using new weapons and inventions behind Czechoslovak citizens, as well as to publish professional military publications and periodicals.435 The study group’s agenda was subsequently taken over by the newly formed SVBM, whose activities aimed to meet one of the basic goals internal security of the restoration of the Czechoslovak state. 436 On the basis of official documentation, the basic tasks of the SEBM can be quoted as follows: b) preparation of military requirements for ceasefire and peace negotiations, c) preparation of organization and building of armed forces in the homeland, (d) military requirements for training in other departments of the Administration. ‘437 Although Lt. Col. ended up as a liaison officer with the Dutch army. Tichý only in July 1942, he was assigned to the forming ŠVBM as early as February of that year.438 He himself remarked about his assignment to the ŠVBM: “In January or February 1942, Col. called me. Boček and said that a Czechoslovak military institution was being set up, which would be called the staff for building the Czechoslovak Armed Forces, where various military issues were to be studied and proposals for various solutions were made to prepare something, as they would certainly come up with some proposals and that it is a place for General [Bedřich] Neumann, 439 who, by his actions, by not being able to treat people, would disperse the entire brigade. ”440 Not a completely positive allusion to the abilities of gen. Neumanna wasn’t completely pointless, as will follow from the following text. It can be assumed that Oldřich Tichý probably knew from Col. Bočka that he is counting on him within the ŠVBM for the post of head of one of his departments. However, the final selection of persons and, above all, their official designation fell within the competences of gen. Neumanna. Lt. Col. Tichý was appointed by Neumann as the head of the first, otherwise also organizational, department.441
435
PLACHÝ, J .: How the MNO Worked. ZUDOVA-LESKOVA, Z .: Cs. army, p. 30. 437 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-4-1 (Organization II. Department of NGOs), Armed Forces Building Staff ̶ tasks. 438 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Questionnaire addressed to the 4th dept. Hl. Staff, 26 April 1946, pp. 1. 439 Brig. gene. From February to June 1940, Bedřich Neumann held the post of Chief of the Czechoslovak Military Administration in Paris. Then he joined as commander of the 1st Czechoslovak Division (or since August 1940 mixed brigade). From January 1943 to April 1945 he served as Chief of the SWBM (or from September 1940 Headquarters). MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, pp. 431. 440 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 52. 441 Ibid., P. 52. 436
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Lt. Col. Tichý and his SEBM department will be best demonstrated on specific examples that Tichý spoke about after the war. One of the basic tasks given to the first department was to study and, based on that, make suggestions for the possibility of organizing the army. Specifically, the possibilities and ways of building the foundations of the army in the homeland were to be studied, as well as the possibility of building units only on the basis of local replenishment. In connection with this, for example, calculations of the probable strength of the youngest years, which could potentially be used for building military bodies, should also be made. The big problem in this case, however, was the way in which the use was evaluated. The first department had to carry out the possibility of placing new soldiers in the existing barracks, which the Czechoslovak army had at its disposal, only on the basis of estimates, subjective judgments and probabilities. On the other hand, tables and states for individual units, from battalions to companies of accompanying weapons, were to be created from such inaccurately obtained data, with all the details, even up to the role of grooms and officers. Of course, something like this was completely unrealistic in practice and Lt. Col. Silent on it together with his colleague Lt. Col. gšt. Václav Koutník repeatedly drew attention.442 An important task was also the work on the reform of the Armed Forces Act itself. Above all, it was necessary to treat the military service of the Germans and Hungarians with the Czechoslovak army. It was thought that men of German and Hungarian nationality who would remain in Czechoslovakia after the war would serve in the new army without weapons. Gen. Neumann referred to the constitutional charter and the rights and obligations of all citizens, and insisted that the Germans and Hungarians will also have to live up to their responsibilities. In connection with the planned reorganization of the post-war army, the question of how to unify the differences arising from the different promotions of members of the army abroad, the Slovak army and resistance fighters who worked in the Protectorate during the war was also addressed.443 Lt. Col. The silent and thus the entire first ward was somewhat complicated by the gene. Neumann. It cannot be said that Tichý had similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 that the Germans and Hungarians will also have to live up to their responsibilities. In connection with the planned reorganization of the post-war army, the question of how to unify the differences arising from the different promotions of members of the army abroad, the Slovak army and resistance fighters who worked in the Protectorate during the war was also addressed.443 Lt. Col. The silent and thus the entire first ward was somewhat complicated by the gene. Neumann. It cannot be said that Tichý had similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 that the Germans and Hungarians will also have to live up to their responsibilities. In connection with the planned reorganization of the post-war army, the question of how to unify the differences arising from the different promotions of members of the army abroad, the Slovak army and resistance fighters who worked in the Protectorate during the war was also addressed.443 Lt. Col. The silent and thus the entire first ward was somewhat complicated by the gene. Neumann. It cannot be said that Tichý had similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 how to unite the differences arising from the different promotions of members of the army abroad, the Slovak army and resistance fighters who worked in the Protectorate during the war.443 Lt. Col. The silent and thus the entire first ward was somewhat complicated by the gene. Neumann. It cannot be said that Tichý had similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 how to unite the differences arising from the different promotions of members of the army abroad, the Slovak army and resistance fighters who worked in the Protectorate during the war.443 Lt. Col. The silent and thus the entire first ward was somewhat complicated by the gene. Neumann. It cannot be said that Tichý had similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 that Tichý would have similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 that Tichý would have similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 52 ̶ 53. Ibid., Pp. 53.
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inaccessible to other opinions and proposals than he had, an extremely unpleasant, nicely crafted table with exact sums of inaccurate conjectures and assumptions was his hobby. From the statement of Col. Bočka, who, as I said, told me that gen. Neumann has to leave the brigade, because everything would be there, I think he did not prove himself as a brigade commander and therefore he was dismissed. As a commander of a higher unit in combat, I can hardly imagine him. Not to cooperate with the staff at all, and I imagine that he would probably look in the official regulations for what he should do in decisive situations. ” , namely the awarding of medals. Gen’s application once went through the first department. Ludvík Svoboda, 445 who asked the NGO for permission, so that he could award honors for bravery in combat as soon as possible.446 He had, of course, relevant reasons for this, since the soldiers at the front were in direct danger of death. However, gen. Ingr did not comply with the request. For the sake of completeness, it can be added that even the gene did not agree with the request. Heliodor Pika.447 Lt. Col. Tichý noted that gen. Freedom is right in this, he understands his motives and also “that it certainly happens in other armies”, 448 ie that the award for bravery is not subject to a lengthy administrative process. Reaction gen. Neumann can be quoted: “Neumann answered in the sense that I do not know the laws of the Czechoslovak Republic.” 449 During 1943, the department of Lt. Col. cooperated. Tichý for the implementation of the so-called “district governors’ course” .450 This course was to help solve the future administration of the liberated territory. In 1943, the NGO found that it does not have enough civilian workers who could be used for civil administration of the liberated territory of Czechoslovakia. Gene. Neumann was therefore asked to lend the SVBM officers for this purpose for the necessary period, until a sufficient number of civilians were found. In fact, the course was from the beginning under the patronage of the Ministry of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the Ministry of the Interior) and was led by Consul Vladimír Znojemský. However, since it was a training of soldiers and in addition, the lecturers had to travel to a spare 444
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 53. Ludvík Svoboda worked from June to September 1939 as commander of the Czechoslovak military group in Polish, where he also fell into Soviet captivity. Later, from July 1942, he gradually commanded Czechoslovak troops in the USSR. In April 1945, the commander of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps became Minister of National Defense. MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, pp. 562. 446 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 54. 447 Heliodor Píka worked from April 1941 to June 1945 as Chief of the Czechoslovak Military Mission in the Soviet Union. MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, pp. 469. 448 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 54. 449 Ibid. 450 Ibid., Pp. 55. 445
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For a military body stationed in a “restricted circulation” area, 451 the course had to be formally taken by the military administration. Among the main trainers in the course can be mentioned Dr. She stumbled or Lt. Col. Bartík. The name of the course was derived from the fact that the main substance discussed in the courses were mainly legal regulations, paragraphs and various restrictions, regulations or permits, which previously formed the basis for the work of district governors.452 Lt. Col. Tichý played a dual role in this matter. He did not interfere in the management of the course, but through his department he provided the course materially. This involved, in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior, finding suitable rooms in London for the course. The point was that the course had to be moved from a replacement body to London at the urging of the British, for the English did not want the operation of civilians in the military area. In addition, he issued a colonel. Silent also the relevant orders for the replacement body and travel orders for course participants. Outside
material
ensure
quiet
also
odpřednášel
one
lecture,
through which he trained students on some specifics of the implementation of the mobilization law of the President of the Republic with regard to Subcarpathian Russia and local territorial specifics regarding geography, demography, climate or infrastructure and the need to adapt all official deadlines to local conditions.453 In September 1944 It first became part of ŠVBM II on September 1. Department of MNO, which created a second, intelligence, department within the Staff. Soon after, on September 19, the SVBM was abolished and its complete personnel moved to the newly created Central Command of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces.454 1944 was another promotion for Oldřich Tichý – only during the war – in his military career. On December 15, Lt. Col. Tichý “by the decision of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic of 10.
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 55. Ibid., P. 56. 453 Ibid. 454 STEHLÍK, Eduard: Srdce armády. General Staff 1919 ̶ 2014 (hereinafter the Heart of the Army). Prague 2014, p. 47. 455 VÚA – VHA, p. 22, sign. 22-15-9 (Proceedings of Confidential Decrees and MNO Orders), Promotion of Senior Officers, 15 December 1944. 456 VÚA – SA ACR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list. 457 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to Qualification document, part II, 1946. 452
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At the beginning of 1945, it was already clear that World War II was entering not only its sixth year, but also its final phase, at least in Europe. The London Center of the Czechoslovak Foreign Resistance understood the signals of the approaching end of the war and began preparations for the transfer of part of the administration and political representation to Czechoslovak liberated territory. However, this was to be preceded by the transfer of Headquarters to the Eastern Front, with Generals Ingr, Moravec and Neumann at the head of the transferred headquarters.458 it was useless and ineffective for this work.459 It should be emphasized, however, that along with the General Headquarters, as the head of the first division, Col. was to move to the Eastern Front. Silent. From the beginning, his name appeared in the planned relocation sequences and Tichý also, due to the position of head of the organizational department, of course participated in one of the first meetings on the transfer of Headquarters, which took place on December 12, 1944.460. He did not stay quiet in the First Department in London. Although Tichý’s name can also be found in the list of selected personnel of the General Headquarters, whose inclusion in the second ship transport to the liberated territory was requested by Gen. Neumann on April 12, 1945,461, about two weeks later, it was clear that Col. Tichý returns to his homeland in another way, as a liaison officer with the 3rd US Army. Of course, he participated in one of the first meetings on the transfer of the Headquarters, which took place on December 12, 1944.460 The transfer of the Headquarters, therefore, finally ended, but Col. He did not stay quiet in the First Department in London. Although Tichý’s name can also be found in the list of selected personnel of the General Headquarters, whose inclusion in the second ship transport to the liberated territory was requested by Gen. Neumann on April 12, 1945,461, about two weeks later, it was clear that Col. Tichý returns to his homeland in another way, as a liaison officer with the 3rd US Army. Of course, he participated in one of the first meetings on the transfer of the Headquarters, which took place on December 12, 1944.460 The transfer of the Headquarters, therefore, finally ended, but Col. He did not stay quiet in the First Department in London. Although Tichý’s name can also be found in the list of selected personnel of the General Headquarters, whose inclusion in the second ship transport to the liberated territory was requested by Gen. Neumann on April 12, 1945,461, about two weeks later, it was clear that Col. Tichý returns to his homeland in another way, as a liaison officer with the 3rd US Army. whose inclusion in the second shipment to the liberated territory was requested by gen. Neumann on April 12, 1945,461, about two weeks later, it was clear that Col. Tichý returns to his homeland in another way, as a liaison officer with the 3rd US Army. whose inclusion in the second shipment to the liberated territory was requested by gen. Neumann on April 12, 1945,461, about two weeks later, it was clear that Col. Tichý returns to his homeland in another way, as a liaison officer with the 3rd US Army.
458
ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 293. Jiří Šolc, for example, discussed in detail the failure of the whole event and its reasons in the cited work, specifically in the chapter The Last Month in London. ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, pp. 293 ̶ 309. 460 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-4-6 (Information reports), Record of the meeting on the transfer of HV, 12 December 1944. 461 VÚA – VHA, sb. 20, sign. 20-32-39 (ŠVBM), Request gen. Neumann inclusion of HV persons in the second ship transport, April 12, 1945. 459
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5.7. Liaison officer with the 3rd US Army and chief of the US military mission in Czechoslovakia (1945)
On April 20, 1945, the Chief of Staff of the English Special Operation Executive (SOE), Col. gšt. Keswich together with the head of the European section of SOE Col. Perkins gen. František Moravc requested the US Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), which was responsible for the situation in Western Europe. SHAEF asked the SOE, cooperating with the relevant Czechoslovak authorities, to supply the headquarters of the 3rd US Army under the command of Gen. George S. Patton as much military information as possible to ensure that the Czechoslovak troops received support from the Czechoslovak resistance movement on Czechoslovak territory. One of the points of a specific proposal was also the requirement to send a group of officers consisting of representatives of the SOE, the US OSS462 and one Czechoslovak officer to headquarters 3. army. Furthermore, the Americans demanded the establishment of a connection with the Czechoslovak underground organizations in Western Bohemia, and for this purpose also requested the deployment of military personnel to the 3rd Army, which would cross the front, and the said connection was established.463 Most likely Col. Tichý learned of his appointment as a liaison officer with the 3rd Army on April 20, 1945. Although he himself stated in the post-war interrogation report that his appointment was announced “one day around April 25, 1945”, 464, but on April 21 he was The Czechoslovak Prime Minister in Košice, Zdeněk Fierlinger, was informed about Tichý’s posting.465 Oldřich Tichý testified about his departure from London: “I went to Col. Sklenovský466 [at this time Bruno Sklenovský already had the rank of division general, note. author], I reported to him, asked what he was, he told me he didn’t know anything important,
It was basically the forerunner of the US CIA. ROEWER, Helmut – SCHÄFER, Stefan – UHL, Mathias: Encyclopedia of Secret Services in the 20th Century (hereinafter the Encyclopedia of Secret Services). Prague 2006, pp. 73. 463 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Official record, 20. 4. 1945. 464 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, pp. 61. 465 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Telegram for Zdeněk Fierlinger regarding the entry of US armies into Czechoslovak territory. territory, April 21, 1945. 466 Bruno Sklednovský served from the end of August 1940 in the position of Deputy Chief of Staff of the MNO. On January 13, 1941, he became Chief of Staff of the MNO. He remained in this position until April 1945. From about mid-April to mid-December 1945, he served as commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in Great Britain. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ,
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officers to the units in case it is possible that it would penetrate all the way to our territory. I took care of the necessary things in the accounting office, and when I returned, I was told that it would not fly that day, and at the same time I learned that Ivo Ducháček would be assigned to me.467 We stayed in London for about two or two and a half days, [ …]. We were to be received by Minister [Hubert] Ripka, 468 but this did not happen because of his busy schedule. ”469 It is not without interest that Col. Silent by gen. Sklenovského learned of the original intention to appoint a liaison officer in the 3rd Army, Col. gšt. Václav Vlček. However, he had to reject the position, saying that it “does not correspond to his political convictions.” Vlčka to the offered post could most likely stand behind the relatively hasty appointment of Col. Silent. Oldřich Tichý was to function as a liaison for military affairs and dr. Ducháček then for civil matters. Although he was not a soldier, he had to be equipped with a military uniform and received the rank, respectively. “Chief Officer”. This is how liaison officers, such as repatriation commissioners, assigned to Allied armies in the West. During the negotiations, Dr. Ducháček should also be referred to as a second officer and should not be stressed unnecessarily
his
mediation
civilian
contact
zaměstnání.471
between
the US
Both
were
military,
ensuring
above all
Czechoslovak
authorities
and the population, so as to avoid unnecessary maximum possible nedorozuměním.472 In terms of the military hierarchy is needed even noted that Col. Tichý was entrusted with its command within the Czechoslovak Military Mission to the 3rd US Army.473
467
The graduate lawyer Ivo Ducháček worked mainly as a journalist and publicist. From 1936 to 1939 he was a Paris correspondent for Lidové noviny and in 1939 he became part of the Czechoslovak foreign resistance in Paris and then in London, where he became a close collaborator of Jan Šrámek. TOMEŠ, Josef: Czech Biographical Dictionary XX. century (hereinafter referred to as the Czech Biographical Dictionary). Part I. A − J. Prague 1999, p. 265. 468 Hubert Ripka, historian, journalist and politician, worked from 1930 to 1938 as a foreign policy editor and commentator for Lidové noviny. As a staunch National Socialist and opponent of the Munich surrender, he went abroad in October 1938, where he became one of the first organizers of the Czechoslovak foreign resistance. He served as a member of the Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris, then in the United Kingdom as Secretary of State, Minister of Exile MFA, directed the Czechoslovak government broadcast of the BBC and still developed extensive publishing and lecturing activities. In the spring of 1945, he was commissioned to liquidate the Czechoslovak state-in-exile in London. TOMEŠ, J .: Czech Biographical Dictionary. III. part. Q − Ž, pp. 42–43. 469 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 61. 470 Ibid. 471 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Report for the Embassy in Paris, April 23, 1945, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 472 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, pp. 62. 473 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 241. Czech biographical dictionary. III. part. Q − Ž, pp. 42–43. 469 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 61. 470 Ibid. 471 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Report for the Embassy in Paris, April 23, 1945, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 472 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, pp. 62. 473 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 241. Czech biographical dictionary. III. part. Q − Ž, pp. 42–43. 469 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 61. 470 Ibid. 471 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Report for the Embassy in Paris, April 23, 1945, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 472 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, pp. 62. 473 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 241.
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From London, Tichý and Ducháček first headed to Versailles, where the rear of the Gen. staff was located. Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.474 The two men stayed here for about ten days. While waiting to be sent to the 3rd Army, they attended a courtesy meeting with the Czechoslovak envoy in Paris, Jindřich Nosk475 and also with Petr Zenkl.476 These days, Tichý and Ducháček also flew to Reims for the first sequence of Headquarters. Here they learned that the delays with their actual entry into office had a reason in the 3rd Army. It still did not directly call on the Main Headquarters, which is why neither Tichý nor Ducháček could be sent.477 The official documentation shows the efforts of the Czechoslovak Western national team to speed up the sending of Tichý and Ducháček to the American army as soon as possible. Across the American 3. the army, both liaison officers could potentially get as far as Prague. Especially after the outbreak of the Prague Uprising on May 5, 1945478, requests from the British and American governments, as well as SHAEF for help from Prague, as well as the attempt to get to Col. Tichý and dr. Ducháčka. It can be quoted from Josef Korbel’s report for envoy Jindřich Nosk: “If you can, talk to [Anthony] Biddle again immediately.479 Also ask Biddle on my behalf to help send Ducháček and Tichý to Bohemia. I have the impression that the situation in Prague and at home is developing well. ”480 On May 10, 1945, Col. finally flew away. Tichý with dr. Ducháček to Nuremberg, from where they continued to the Regensburg area, where the staff of the 3rd US Army was located. From there, they continued according to the staff’s instructions to Pilsen, to the headquarters of the 5th Corps.481 Practically immediately after arriving in Pilsen, Tichý and Ducháček sought out a national committee,
474
SHAW, Antony: Druhá světová válka, s. 130. Jindřich Nosek worked from the summer of 1940 to September 1944 as a chief official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the London government in exile. From October 1944 he first held the post of ambassador in Paris, later ambassador. DEJMEK, J. ̶ MICHÁLEK, S. ̶ NĚMEČEK, J .: Diplomacy, p. 172. 476 National Socialist politician Petr Zenkl worked in the years 1937−1939 (again 1945−1946) as the mayor of Prague. Between 1939 and 1945, he was imprisoned by the Nazis in the Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps, from where he and other prisoners were liberated in April 1945 by US 3rd Army units. NEKOLA, Martin: Petr Zenkl. Politician and man. Prague 2014, p. 135; TOMEŠ, J .: Czech Biographical Dictionary. III. part. Q − Ž, pp. 562. 477 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 62. 478 KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Prague in May 1945 The history of one uprising. Prague 2005, p. 128. 479 Anthony Joseph Drexel Biddle jr. Served from October 28, 1941 as an American ambassador to the Czechoslovak government. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 141. 480 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Report dr. Korbela for dr. Noska, 6 May 1945. 481 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 63. 475
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and asked for information from the parties to the situation in the city.482 Here both men could finally begin to act as intermediaries. Shortly after the liberation, Pilsen had the status of an occupied city, which brought with it a number of restrictions, such as a ban on newspapers, restrictions on citizens in the evening and circulation of citizens in general, restrictions on trains, etc. Of course, the city also suffered war damage that disrupted its infrastructure. 483 Therefore, the very next day, May 11, during the official performance with the commander of the V Corps, Gen. Clarence Huebner, whose troops had been in Pilsen since May 6, 484 interpreted to him, Col. Tichý with dr. Ducháček complains of the National Committee that “Czechoslovakia is not an occupied country, that we are a warring allied state, and we demand that such restrictions, which can be applied in a hostile country, was repealed with immediate effect. ”.485 Gen. Huebner found the complaints justified and lifted all restrictions on the same day.486 Two days later, Col. Tichý and dr. Ducháček to Prague. At that time, Czechoslovak government and military officials were accommodated in the Alcron Hotel. At that time, there was confusion in Alcron over the amount of work and the overall chaos characteristic of the first days of the liberation of liberated Czechoslovakia. Oldřich Tichý commented: “I reported to the gen. Bočka, filed a report on the situation in Pilsen, which he heard intermittently, because the hotel was very busy and busy, running away, etc., I was introduced to the gene. To Svoboda, whom I did not know before, and I waited all afternoon if I received any further instructions or the like. ”487 But Tichý received no special orders, should continue the routine work of the liaison officer and support the work of the national committees. With this, Tichý and Ducháček returned to Pilsen. In order to streamline cooperation with national committees, the division and assignment of Czechoslovak liaison officers to the headquarters of higher units was agreed with the Fifth Division of the 5th Corps. Col. Silent, dr. Ducháček and together with them Maj. Řezáč remained within this classification in Pilsen.488
482
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 63. Ibid .; MARTINOVSKÝ, Ivan et al .: History of Pilsen in Data from the First Traces of Settlement to the Present (hereinafter referred to as History of Pilsen). Plzeň 2004, p. 370. 484 On June 25, 1945, the troops of the V Corps left the area of southwestern Bohemia. Their place was subsequently taken by XXII. Corps also under the 3rd Army, commanded by Major General. Ernest Harmon. BROOKS, Thomas F .: Hello Boys! Journey of the 5th US Army Corps from Louisiana to Pilsen. Prague 1996, pp. 186, 189 and 208. 485 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 63. 486 Ibid., P. 64 487 Ibid. 488 Ibid. 483
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The mentioned
chaotic
conditions
at the
Prague
NGO,
insufficient
information, also the ongoing struggle for the position and overall orientation of the Czechoslovak army in the future, but especially the independent military missionary representation in the 3rd Army, all caused negative attitudes of representatives of the Czechoslovak military mission at the United States Formations of European Theater (USFET), 489 who thought that in western Bohemia, especially in the operational area of the 3rd Army, quite a number of our [Czechoslovak, note. author.] officers. During his visit to Prachatice, Tichý learned from representatives of the local national committee that a property belonging to Rudolf Beran, the former Second Republican and Protectorate Prime Minister, but later also to a man who supported the Czechoslovak resistance, was located nearby. Given the negative response from the representatives of the National Committee to Tichý’s question as to whether any steps had already been taken by Rudolf Beran, Col. ordered. Tichý immediately detained Beran and personally waited at the Prachatice National Committee until the relevant gendarme announced the operation. The gendarme allegedly remarked in the sense that “the situation was not pleasant because Aries had just visited the American commander where the arrest had taken place.” In fact, Rudolf Beran was visited by two of the commanders of the US Army, Gen. Hammond along with Gen. Roberts, who offered him protection. The irony remains that Rudolf Beran, even in his arrest, rejected the help offered, believing that he had not committed any acts of confession, and that he still remained a mere misunderstanding that would certainly be explained.493 Tichý’s arrest was subsequently notified to the General Staff.
489
This is, loosely translated, the US Army on the European battlefield. This organization replaced the former SHAEF after the end of the fighting, specifically with effect from July 1, 1945. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 237. 490 Ibid., S. 240. 491 Ibid. 492 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 66. 493 After his arrest, Rudolf Beran remained in custody until 1947. In a contrived trial, which was to sentence him to the highest sentence, he managed to disprove the prosecution’s arguments. He was eventually tested for 20 years in a heavy prison. In Leopoldov Prison, where he was serving his sentence, he became seriously ill and died in 1954. He elaborated the destinies of Rudolf Beran
95
494 From June 1945 he held Col. Tichý as the head of the Czechoslovak military mission to the US troops in Czechoslovakia.495 During July 1945, a collaborator, dr. Ducháček, and was replaced by ktp. in the bay. dr. Steiner, who remained in Pilsen even after the Silent Departure to Prague.496 Col. recalled the management of individual liaison officers. Silent as follows: “When sending liaison officers to their posts, I told them the essence of their task, ie contact between US military command posts and relevant national committees, to support local national committees as much as possible, and I commented on this from Knock out as many Americans as possible. As an illustration of this activity, I gave them the conditions we found in Pilsen, a number of limitations […] and the need for similar defects to be eliminated. As for the report, 497 Tichý maintained a correct professional relationship with the American officers with whom he acted in his capacity, which was characterized by a willingness to reciprocate. assistance and which in some places have outgrown the purely professional framework. One example is how the Americans helped speed up the transfer of Tichý’s wife and daughter from Britain to Czechoslovakia. It can be said that the transport of the Silent Family to Czechoslovakia One example is how the Americans helped speed up the transfer of Tichý’s wife and daughter from Britain to Czechoslovakia. It can be said that the transport of the Silent Family to Czechoslovakia One example is how the Americans helped speed up the transfer of Tichý’s wife and daughter from Britain to Czechoslovakia. It can be said that the transport of the Silent Family to Czechoslovakia
Jaroslav Rokoský. See ROKOSKÝ, Jaroslav: Rudolf Beran and his time. The rise and fall of the agrarian party. Prague 2011. 494 ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 65. 495 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Forgotten Elite, p. 241 496 ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 66. 497 Ibid., P. 74.
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several complications were encountered, even though at first everything looked very promising. In the first half of August 1945, during one of the interviews, the Chief of Staff of the XXII Col. Col. Williams Oldřich Tichý, where his family is located. The further course of the interview can be evidenced by a quote: “To my answer that in England, where he is waiting for an evacuation, he replied that I could have said it a long time ago, that they would take care of her transfer to Pilsen. He negotiated with General Harmon, who made the plane available for me to fly to England for the family. ” Tichý’s main concern is securing the necessary documents for his wife and daughter, but rather his fear that his wife will embark on the flight at all, because, as Tichý remarked, his wife “hates flight at all”. 499 For this reason, Tichý also sent a telegram to his wife in advance asking if she was willing to fly, to which he received a positive answer to his joy, thanks to which Tichý was able to leave Pilsen for London in mid-August. However, due to bad weather over Belgium, the plane had to turn around and land in Nuremberg, where Tichý was forced to spend two days due to persistent bad weather conditions and then had to return to Pilsen. He arrived in London the following week. However, even the return journey did not go without problems. At first, Tichý’s plane was to be sent to Paris, regardless of his business purpose. This was prevented thanks to the intervention of a certain CIC500 captain. However, the plane still did not reach Pilsen, as it landed in Wiesbaden, where the flight was stopped. The wait for the settlement and the decision whether to continue the flight to Pilsen was dragged on. The next day, Tichý was instructed to turn to Frankfurt am Main to negotiate further action. Tichý therefore traveled to Frankfurt, where he contacted Lt. Col. Ferdinand Miksche, 501 commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in the United States
498
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 75. Ibid. 500 It was an American military counterintelligence established during World War II. ROEWER, H. – SCHÄFER, S. – UHL, M .: Encyclopedia of Secret Services, p. 74. 501 Ferdinand Otto Miksche served in 1940 in France. After her surrender, he arrived in Great Britain, where he changed several short-term assignments, and from April 1941, with the permission of President Beneš, he was assigned to the Free French Forces for the duration of the war. From mid-May 1945, he served within the SHAEF as commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in the 21st Army Group, then as commander of the Czechoslovak military mission at USFET and then in the American occupation zone. ZUDOVALESKOVA, Z .:
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occupation zone, 502 and explained the whole situation to him. Lt. Col. Miksch While trying to Tichy and his family to negotiate an air transfer from Frankfurt to Plzen, but he eventually Pacific convey that he would have to Pilsen to travel alone and only here provide some transportation for his wife and daughter, as they
apply
“a ban on
the transportation
of civilian
persons
by military
aircraft ”.503
Tichý flew to Pilsen the next morning and discussed the whole matter again, this time with Col. Williams. They both agreed that the only option left was to send cars to Karl and Tatiana, who were still waiting in Wiesbaden. Genmjr. Harmon agreed, but thanks to the intervention at the embassy in Prague, he finally managed to secure a plane for Tichý. On the same day, Tichý flew from Wiesbaden and immediately brought his family to Czechoslovakia.504
502
The original Czechoslovak military mission at USFET was transformed into this form in the summer of 1945, after the individual Allied occupation zones were established. The mission was based in Frankfurt am Main. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 238. 503 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 76. 504 Ibid., pp. 76 ̶ 77.
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6.
Post-war years (1945–1990)
6.1. Senior Officer of the Czechoslovak Army (1945–1949)
On June 16, 1945, Oldřich Tichý received the American “Legion of Merit” award.505 In the autumn of 1945, Col. and left for the 1st District Headquarters in Prague. Before he left, the Americans helped him a second time as far as his family was concerned. Even during the operation of Pilsen, there were reports from various quarters in the sense that the Americans employed citizens of German nationality as interpreters and they were interpreting to the detriment of the Czechoslovak people. By virtue of his position, Col. Tichý dealt with these complaints and therefore interpreted them with the XXII Corps. However, the Americans opposed the fact that they did not find enough Czechoslovaks who would have a sufficient command of the English language and basically expressed themselves in the sense that if they did not like the situation, the representatives of the Czechoslovak army themselves would take care of the solution. Col. Tichý informed his superiors, but at the same time asked the Americans to place advertisements and calls in the newspapers for the search for interpreters, and he offered them the services of his daughter, who naturally spoke fluent English during her stay in England. Taťána Tichá obviously proved very useful as an interpreter and translator, because when Tichý left for Prague in the autumn of 1945, Col. Williams was again interested in his family, this time in his daughter Tatiana, and he wondered where he would work in Prague. The rest of the conversation can be quoted: “I replied that I did not know, but in any case he must have a job, because it is ordered. Col. Williams told me he would ask if the embassy needed a translator. I agreed to the proposal and later told me that my daughter would be accepted to the embassy in Prague, where she joined in December 1945. ‘506 It is not entirely clear when exactly Tichý left for Prague. He himself states in the statement of resignation: “Sometime in mid-November, I received an order signed by General Boček to start his service in Prague on December 1. I left for Prague on December 1, 1945, where I reported the same day. ”507 On the other hand
505
VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to Qualification document, part II, 1946. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 81. 507 Ibid. , pp. 67. 506
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The Tribal List and the Qualification Documents state as the date of Tichý’s transfer to Prague as November 1, 1945.508 It is certain, however, that the new assignment of Oldřich Tichý was the interim Chief of Staff of the 1st District it began in May 1945, when the provisional organization of the army came into force, followed in September of the same year by the so-called improved organization of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. According to this organization, the Czechoslovak ground forces were divided into four military areas, whose headquarters were located in Prague (1st area), Tábor (2nd area), Brno (3rd area) and Bratislava (4th area) .510 The year 1946 meant for Tichý a certain, at least as circumstances allow, the end of the post-war provisional. This is evident from the fact that that Tichý had to start dealing with practical issues necessary for everyday life. An example is Tichý’s request from January 1946 to issue new documents for the Praga-Lady passenger car. This car, which Tichý had owned since 1937, remained hidden from relatives after his departure to Britain in March 1939, and to protect him from the Gestapo, all documents about the car were destroyed. In addition to his own documents for the Tichý car, he also needed to change the leadership certificate and assign a Prague license plate, because although he started using the car soon after his return to Czechoslovakia, he drove the number of the Pilsen Police Headquarters for the time being. His request was granted 511 and in February Tichý duly registered his car.512 During 1946, there were also two events that it would be a mistake not to mention. The first was a silent meeting with several former intelligence colleagues. The meeting took place with František Fryč, and in addition to him and Oldřich Tichý, Karel Paleček, Josef Bartík and even Hans Hausmann, who came to visit from Switzerland, also took part. During the visit, the officers drank tea, recalling wartime times and Hausmann’s visits to London and Paris.513 Needless to say, this was the last such meeting. Tichý came across some of his former colleagues, but only by chance. 508 513 It must be said that this was the last such meeting. Tichý came across some of his former colleagues, but only by chance. 508 513 It must be said that this was the last such meeting. Tichý came across some of his former colleagues, but only by chance. 508
VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Kmenový list; VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Changes and supplements of the qualification document part I, 1946. 509 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list. 510 STEHLÍK, E .: Srdce armády, p. 62. 511 NA, f. PŘPII – EO, Directorate of National Security in Prague ̶ application, 17 January 1946. 512 NA, f. PŘPII – EO, Application for registration of motor and towing vehicles, 14 February 1946. 513 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 80.
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The second event, which acted as a harbinger of future conditions, was the visit of his relatively recent colleague Ivo Ducháček. At the end of November 1946, he visited Tichý and told him his concerns about the matter he was talking about with Gen. Boček, 514 who had been Chief of Staff since April 1945.515
On
that
occasion, Ducháček
told
Tichý
that
from a previous
interview
s gen. The general’s astonishment at the fact that Tichý, although he must undoubtedly be aware of the changing attitude towards the Americans caused by his increasingly strong orientation towards the Soviet Union, lets his daughter work at the American embassy. For this reason, gen. Boček, through Ivo Ducháček, told Tichý to arrange for Taťána Tichá to leave the embassy.516 It must be said that Tichý was aware of the legitimacy of Boček and Ducháček’s fears and no doubt realized that his daughter’s work for the American embassy could cause considerable problems in the future. The fact that the Czechoslovak counterintelligence was very interested in Tánia Tichá in terms of its possible agency cooperation and that by November 1946 she already had a very detailed map of her activities at the American embassy and beyond. In a report to her person dated 18. November states: “The nominee has no relationship with embassies with any [officers] or employees. He avoids all meetings, visits to nightclubs, where employees go from the embassy. She personally said she had no interest in getting married in America, and in her opinion, Americans were dull men. He avoids saying where he goes for fun and makes excuses for the strict regime that is said to rule in their family. She is not a member of any social or foreign club. […] A very pleasant young girl, she is very careful in her intercourse, she still asks why she was found and very distrustful ̶ she was found by an agent’s confidante ̶. In the case of accurate data on contacts sl. Tichý, there is a possibility of obtaining it, by directly seeking acquaintance with her pX ”517 Tichý’s daughter herself understood the imminent danger.
514
ABS, f. H, No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 82. STEHLÍK, E .: Heart of the Army, p. 61. 516 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 82. 517 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report: Daughter of Col. gšt. Tichý ̶ employed at US embassies, November 18, 1946. 515
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Ivo Ducháček helped Tánia Tichá to a new place. On January 1, 1947, the daughter of Col. Tichý to the company Inex, which was the “export company of Jablonec goods” .519 Even this daughter’s job, but Tichý’s family and especially himself, as will be apparent from the following text, did not do him any good. Oldřich Tichý, meanwhile, continued to work at the 1st Area Command. He was undoubtedly suitable for the position of the local chief of staff. This is evidenced, moreover, by his qualification deed from 1947, in which Tichý is evaluated very positively as an officer of excellent command abilities, gifted, sharp and flexible, with excellent logic of reasoning, with extensive theoretical knowledge and also accessible by new lessons. The fact that he had all the prerequisites for the excellent performance of the function of Chief of Staff of the area can be demonstrated by a direct quote: “He has very successfully completed the consolidation of an extensive staff, contributed to the improvement and increase of his performance. 520 On February 20, 1947, Tichý reached the rank of general, as he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. For the time being, however, Tichý still held the position of Chief of Staff of the 1st Area Command and received positive evaluations. In the future, the events of February 1948, during which the Communist Party came under the leadership of the Communist Party under the leadership of Klement Gottwald, ended the stage of a pluralistic political system. socialist orientation and launched a new phase, which Czechoslovakia entered as a communist state. 523 Oldřich Tichý did not become politically active until 1948, but on April 7, 1947 he became a member of the Union of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship. At the beginning of May 1948, gen. Tichý to the Communist Party, within the 96th local organization Prague VII and with a two-year candidacy for membership. He gradually became a tithe trustee in this organization524 and was also “recruited to conduct training” .525 At least 518
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 82. Ibid., P. 83. 520 VÚA ̶ VHA, p. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Qualification document, 1946. 521 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list. 522 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Qualification document, 1947. 523 BROWN, Archie: The Rise and Fall of Communism. Brno 2011, p. 200. 524 The tithe confidant was in charge of a group of 8 to 10 members of the organization. He should keep records of the meetings of these members and also monitor how the members fulfill their party duties, eg whether they attend meetings, whether they subscribe to the party press, what is their level of performance in employment 519
102
Initially, everything indicated that Tichý would continue the very promising career of the high representative of the Czechoslovak army, which is also evidenced by his qualification deed from 1948, which states: “He has a positive attitude towards the people’s democratic establishment, to friendship and alliance with the USSR and to the events of February. ”526 During 1948, Tichý’s daughter changed her job again. Inex, where she worked, was nationalized and, as part of the liquidation, its employees were advised to look for new jobs as soon as possible. That is why Taťána Tichá joined Czechoslovak Airlines in November. Her father helped her with this place. The brig asked for help in this matter. gene. Vilém Stanovský, Chief of the Aviation Department of the Ministry of Transport, 527 who addressed Brig. gene. Alois Antonín Kubit,
6.2.
Retirement and subsequent persecution (1949–1951)
The political struggle for the Czechoslovak army, together with the efforts for the greatest possible influence that the Communist Party wanted to have in it, were already evident during the Second World War. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia, the efforts of the communists intensified. In this context, it is necessary to mention that the activities of the Communists in the Czechoslovak army were in fact governed by the Central Armed Forces of the Communist Party, whose members were several members of the Constituent National Assembly, but also the then wonder. gene. Jaroslav Procházka, Chief of HSVO, 530 head of OBZ Col. Bedřich Reicin and also Minister of the Interior Václav Nosek. The members of the commission maintained contact with the leadership of the Communist Party almost continuously and consulted with it on the current situation and plans for the future. In order to achieve their goals, they used, etc. KAŠKA, Václav: Unruly and non-engaged. Disciplination of members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the years 1948 – 1952. Prague 2014, pp. 80. 525 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal letter, 26. 5. 1949. 526 VÚA ̶ VHA, p. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Qualification document, 1948. 527 MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, p. 548. 528 Ibid., P. 351. 529 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 84. 530 MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, p. 487.
103
communists of all the possibilities at their disposal, namely, for example, interpellations in parliament, special-purpose service regulations, purpose-oriented party press, but also party confidants and often military officials. The latter method, although from the perspective of specific actors contradicted the then applicable legislation and military regulations, but there was němu.531 Although very deep political crisis escalating in early 1948 directly
not reflected
in the Czechoslovak
Army, 532
started
with
immediately
after the so-called “victorious February” with the first purges in the army, which aimed to help the Communist Party to its final control.533 Led by Reicin’s Fifth Department of the General Staff.534 Soon, however, the purges spread to other members of the Czechoslovak army and the original political-motivated “cleansing” of the officer corps became a process leading eventually to the total destruction of the Czechoslovak command corps.535 military service and subsequent persecution gen. Tichý can be found with two accompanying features, which can of course also be attributed to the fates of many other Czechoslovak officers. The first of these two aspects is the absence of a legal basis for such conduct. The legislative framework for dismissal from the Czechoslovak army was originally created by Act No. 72/1946 Coll., The validity of which was later extended by Act No. 134/1948 Coll. At the beginning of 1949, even the second mentioned law was no longer valid. However, this stopped deciding on dismissal from the army on the basis of valid laws, and the whole process, which was to remove the so-called “unreliable” persons from the army, became a de facto purely administrative matter.536 This is exactly what Oldřich Tichý met. At the beginning of 1949, the collection and submission of documents against unwanted persons passed from the competences of the fifth department of the General Staff to the newly created X. Department of MNO, within which 531 At the beginning of 1949, even the second mentioned law was no longer valid. However, this stopped deciding on dismissal from the army on the basis of valid laws, and the whole process, which was to remove the so-called “unreliable” persons from the army, became a de facto purely administrative matter.536 This is exactly what Oldřich Tichý met. At the beginning of 1949, the collection and submission of documents against unwanted persons passed from the competences of the fifth department of the General Staff to the newly created X. Department of MNO, within which 531 At the beginning of 1949, even the second mentioned law was no longer valid. However, this stopped deciding on dismissal from the army on the basis of valid laws, and the whole process, which was to remove the so-called “unreliable” persons from the army, became a de facto purely administrative matter.536 This is exactly what Oldřich Tichý met. At the beginning of 1949, the collection and submission of documents against unwanted persons passed from the competences of the fifth department of the General Staff to the newly created X. Department of MNO, within which 531
HANZLÍK, František ̶ VONDRÁŠEK, Václav: Army in the Struggle for Political Power in the Years 1945 ̶ 1948. Prague 2006, p. 342. 532 Ibid. 533 BÍLEK, Jiří ̶ LÁNÍK, Jaroslav ̶ ŠACH, Jan: Československá armáda v první poválečném desetiletí. May 1945 ̶ May 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Czechoslovak Army). Prague 2006, p. 104. 534 The second (intelligence) department of the General Staff was divided into two parts in 1945 – the second (offensive) and the fifth (defense) department. ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, pp. 317. 535 BÍLEK, J. ̶ LÁNÍK, J. ̶ ŠACH, J .: Československá armáda, p. 104. 536 Ibid.
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many members of the former OBZ worked. This new body was in fact controlled by the above-mentioned Col. Reicin s div. gene. A walk.537 The above-mentioned administrative method of removing selected army officials took place mainly in the form of various inspections, which were prepared by the 10th Department. For these purposes, he also developed criteria for determining whether an officer is “reliable” or not. However, the criteria were so general and ambiguous that virtually everyone could be described as “politically unreliable,” and the typical points considered were, for example, “the relationship to the people’s democracy, the acquisition of the Soviet experience, etc.” 538 Exactly in that spirit. the additional information given in the Silent Qualification List of 1949 is carried out: “Brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý did not find a completely positive attitude towards the People’s Democratic Order of the Republic. Therefore, according to the output [axis] MNO ref. 10153 Dův.-4. odd. 1949 given on June 1, 1949 on leave with full salaries until retirement. ”539 For the sake of completeness, it can be added that Oldřich Tichý most at least partially envisaged the possibility of prosecution by the communist regime. This can be evidenced in his own words: “In the 1950s, there was a strange stuffy atmosphere in which breathing was difficult. Everyone was just on
a little
exposed
place,
was
automatically
suspected,
tracked
and intercepted. Everything, even secondary things, was meaninglessly kept secret. I remember coming home once and telling my wife that I had the impression that if I said my name and rank somewhere, Reicin would lock me up to reveal a military secret. ”540 The NGO transferred the brig to retirement. gene. Oldřich Tichý on August 1, 1949. Officially, his reassignment was justified by the fact that Tichý fulfilled the conditions for retirement as of July 31, 1949, which were stipulated by Act No. 76/1922 Coll. also known as the Military Provision Act. Although Tichý did not reach the age of 55 by the mentioned date, he had served “41 countable and 33 real years.541 Of course, this was not a peaceful reassignment.
537
The influence of both men excelled after the so-called Narrower Advisory Board of the MNO began operating in February 1949. It was a newly established body, which was to be gradually replaced by the Army Advisory Council, which discussed all aspects of the construction and operation of the army and which was gradually relegated to the background, as it was assessed as staffing and cumbersome. BÍLEK, J. ̶ LÁNÍK, J. ̶ ŠACH, J .: Czechoslovak Army, pp. 99 and 104. 538 Ibid., Pp. 104. 539 VÚA ̶ VHA, p. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Qualification document, 1949. 540 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), P. 130. 541 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, MNO, X. odbor, Subject: Tichý Oldřich, brig. gen., retired, April 21, 1949.
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Immediately after leaving active military service,
Tichý began to strive
finding a new job as soon as possible. He enrolled in gen. Josef Malec, who at the time was the head of the MNO’s placement commission for military gasmen, ie soldiers who were retired.542 He promised Tichý that he would contact him as soon as a position became available. But then gen. Malec took a vacation and Tichý’s new job remained in sight. In this situation, Tichý was assisted by a friend and future husband of his daughter, Tánia Tichá, Dalibor Cihelka, who provided him with contact and later a personal meeting with a certain Prague “builder Štěpka” .543 After an interview with him, he recommended gramophone plant, the national company Ultrafon. Although it seemed at first that Tichý would be able to start working at Ultrafon as early as mid-August, there were delays and Tichý thus started a new job, completely different from his current one, only on September 14, 1949.544 As follows from the previous text, Oldřich Tichý was not affected by the initial waves of persecution. The turning point came only in the second half of 1949. Following the arrival of Soviet advisers in Czechoslovakia and also the trial of one of the leading leaders of the Hungarian Communists, László Rajk, a new system was introduced to monitor and prosecute people uncomfortable with the communist regime. On October 10, 1949, the Deputy Commander of the StB, Karel Šváb, signed a decree according to which the attention of the security authorities was to focus on defined categories of citizens who threatened to reverse the socialist construction of Czechoslovakia if conditions were favorable. This laid the foundations for the large-scale security campaign “Lux”, which was to be smeared by unwanted persons. 545 The so-called “D” actions also took place practically in parallel with the “Lux” action. These were basically illegal actions, resp. more precisely, raids carried out by the OBZ in cooperation with the StB against retired Czechoslovak officers.546 A total of six such actions took place from April 1949 to September 1950.547 It should be emphasized that 542
MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, p. 393. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 2. 544 Ibid. 545 BŘACHOVÁ, V .: Destrukce, pp. 121̶ 122. 546 The designation “D” was sometimes interpreted as a derivative of the name Dejvice, because in Prague Dejvice there were apartments that most retired officers lived in and which the representatives of the communist regime wanted to obtain after the internment of officers. However, this interpretation was not based on truth. In fact, “D” meant “officers.” BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, p. 98. 547 The third raid was specific, which, compared to the others, bore the designation “d”. Its peculiarity lay in the fact that it was a targeted raid against former representatives of the Czechoslovak military intelligence service. BŘACHOVÁ, V .: Destruction, 123. 543
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it was through these raids that most people got to the infamous Forced Labor Camp (hereinafter referred to as TNP) Mírov, where Oldřich Tichý also ended up. In total, about 270 officers of the Czechoslovak army were enrolled in TNP Mírov.548 Specifically, Oldřich Tichý was detained during the so-called “D-3” operation, 549 which took place on January 10, 1950.550. to TNP Mírov received more than a hundred new “inmates” .551 The mechanism of assigning people to TNP seemed monstrously simple from a procedural point of view. Already at the end of October 1948, the National Assembly adopted Act No. 247/1948 Coll. on forced labor camps. It was the first and basic norm that enacted punishment for all opponents of the communist regime, both real and perceived. The mentioned law was also reflected in other regulations, especially to Act No. 231/1948 Coll. for the protection of the People’s Democratic Republic and also until the later amendment of criminal law, which took place during 1950. In addition, many directives of the Ministry of the Interior gradually came into force, which further regulated and specified the conditions of compliance with Act No. 247/1948 Coll.552. create a legal framework for the extrajudicial persecution of citizens uncomfortable with the communist regime. In addition to the TNP itself, the basic components of this persecution were also the governing bodies, which were gradually subject to the MoI, MNB and the MS, and also 16 three-member, so-called command commissions, 553 which served on regional national committees and decided on assigning persons to the TNP. In practice, these commissions only approved and confirmed the lists of relevant persons, which the StB most often proposed for inclusion in the TNP, possibly also the action committees of the National Front or the Communist Party bodies.554 Of course, the actual inclusion in the TNP Mírov was preceded by a detailed interrogation. In Tichý’s case, it took place immediately after his arrest, ie on January 10, 1950. A report was also prepared on his interrogation, according to which Tichý described the activities of the pre-war Second Division of the General Staff, his activities as a military attaché
548
BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, p. 100. Ibid., P. 99. 550 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report of the commission on the investigation of the former case. brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, 9 May 1951. 551 BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, pp. 99. 552 Ibid., Pp. 91 ̶ 92. 553 The Commission originally had 19, but in February 1949 their number was reduced to 16. Within Czechoslovakia there was a certain asymmetry in the distribution of commissions across the state territory, as there was only one commission in Slovakia, namely in Bratislava. Ibid., Pp. 92. 554 Ibid. 549
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in Switzerland, the operation of the intelligence branch in Paris, the operation of the SVBM and the US Army, but its interrogation was particularly followed the line of Czechoslovak defense intelligence and its operation before and during World War II. However, according to the interrogators, Tichý did not satisfactorily clarify this issue. For the sake of clarity, the last paragraph of the report reads: It is characteristic of this whole group that none of its members wants to know that they are more familiar with the defense and its people. ”555 Several factors most likely decided its silent inclusion in TNP Mírov. Of course, the main argument of the investigators was his affiliation with the intelligence department, the group of Col. Moravec and the circle of people around President Beneš in general. But it would be a mistake to think that only these “transgressions” remained. Individual arguments, resp. more precisely, the constructs that were supposed to prove Tichý’s “unreliability” and “subversiveness” were formulated into his review probably during 1949. It is appropriate to quote the report in full: “Clearly right-wing focus, formerly. intelligence officer, right hand gen. Moravce. His daughter was employed at the US Embassy, and he himself initially maintained contact with embassies, who nowadays have ceased publicly, as he is an extraordinarily mature and cautious intelligence person who can master his intentions. Gene. Tichý took a daughter from the services of the American embassy some time ago and put her in the service of f [irm] y. Inex, Prague II., Platýz, which deals with import and export to the west. It was found that the director of this company is a certain accessory. of the US Army, who was a member of the CIC during the war and who was in very good proportion with Gen. Quiet. The whole company is very suspicious of intelligence. On the military side, gen. A quiet, very agile worker, sometimes running into the trifles in which he drowns. Characteristic is his amazing willingness to OZ authorities [defense intelligence, note. author], which gives the impression of being appointed in advance who was a member of the CIC during the war and who was in a very good relationship with gen. Quiet. The whole company is very suspicious of intelligence. On the military side, gen. A quiet, very agile worker, sometimes running into the trifles in which he drowns. Characteristic is his amazing willingness to OZ authorities [defense intelligence, note. author], which gives the impression of being appointed in advance who was a member of the CIC during the war and who was in a very good relationship with gen. Quiet. The whole company is very suspicious of intelligence. On the military side, gen. A quiet, very agile worker, sometimes running into the trifles in which he drowns. Characteristic is his amazing willingness to OZ authorities [defense intelligence, note. author], which gives the impression of being appointed in advance
555
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report of interrogation gen. vv Oldřich Tichý, 10. 1. 1950, p. 3.
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protects any unpleasant contact with these authorities so that the things they cover do not appear. His willingness is striking in his exaggeration. One specific case was found when the authorities zd. department in 1946 on the request of Maj. Swiss Army answered Hasuman a few questions, saying he didn’t know more about him. Later, in 1948, on one occasion, it turned out that he had to know all the details about him, because he still received packages from him in 1946 ̶ 1947, along with Gen. Bartík. I do not recommend promotion. 556 Ratings as “right-wingers” are not too surprised, as the usual proof of the “unreliability” of former intelligence officers, but not only of them, is not a surprise. was their participation in the foreign resistance in the West or ties to the circle of President Beneš’s collaborators. The designation “right hand gene. Moravce “in the context of the tense relations that prevailed between the two men. With regard to the above-mentioned contacts with representatives of the American embassy or the director of Inex, Tichý himself did not confirm during the interrogation that he would ever maintain contacts with members of the American embassy.557 In the case of a “very good ratio” Tichý was practically a fictional construct. Tichý did meet the director, but by chance, when he and his wife visited Inex to choose a wedding gift for their nephews. During the brief courtesy interview, only the director’s surprise emerged that he had not met Tichý, as he worked in Prague as a member of the CIC. 558 Thus, not only was Tichý and the director of Inex not very good, but there was no relationship. It should also be noted in Tichý’s defense that he himself urged his daughter to
at the
American
embassy,
someone
questioned
the
situation
in Czechoslovakia, or something similar, immediately told him such a fact. During his interrogation, Tichý emphasized that his daughter had never given him any clues so that he could report any anti-state interest on the part of the Americans.559 such 556
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Tichý Oldřich, brig. gen., Chief of Staff VO ̶ 1, undated. ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 82. 558 Ibid., P. 83. 559 ABS, f. H, a. H-342-2, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 10. 1. 1950, pp. 3. 557
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he always denied.560 The fact is that even without packages, ties to Hans Hausmann Tichý necessarily had to cause problems. Hausmann was monitored by OBZ, because from his travels and contacts in Czechoslovakia he decided that he planned to try first in Prague and then in the rest of the republic to build an agency network.561 It is necessary to mention another event that they could use and also used against Tichý communist security authorities. In mid-June 1948, Oldřich Tichý received an anti-communist leaflet entitled “Free Bohemia” issued on June 13, 1948. The leaflet was, of course, completely unacceptable to the Communists. Among other things, the leading representatives of the Communist Party Klement Gottwald, Antonín Zápotocký and others were described as “clowns” and “political monsters”. For the sake of clarity, we can also mention the introductory proclamation of the leaflet: “The wheels of the Soviet communist expansion went far, despite the resistance of foreign aid, because there are many businessmen in the ranks of our nation who still want in the last phase of this international struggle for a better tomorrow to benefit from the ignorance of the working people, we all call indiscriminately to the fight against oppression and terror !!! Help us secure a better future rather than discouraging thinking and acting. ”562 The important fact remains that this leaflet was used as an argument against Tichý, even though Tichý handed it over to the competent authorities almost immediately upon receipt.563 Tichý, of course, defended himself during the interrogation. . In addition to the above, Tichý also defended himself against the persons he had in contact with at the time of his arrest. Tichý said: “As for my contacts, I did not have any contacts with anyone, I lived in a family, I have an 83-year-old sick, blind mother, where distance does not allow us both. My life away from home was devoted only to the needs of the party. [And] once a week in committee meetings, monthly meetings and trainings. My brother-in-law, the customs secretary, did not visit me with his wife. A student [Dalibor] Cihelka, who has an acquaintance with my daughter, also came to the apartment, and about three times we visited his father, a retired financial board, Vinařská Street. I had no other contact. ”Tichý was also struck by the fact that investigators did not believe much in his leftist political beliefs and people’s democratic thinking. This was already evident in his 560 A student [Dalibor] Cihelka, who has an acquaintance with my daughter, also came to the apartment, and about three times we visited his father, a retired financial board, Vinařská Street. I had no other contact. ”Tichý was also struck by the fact that investigators did not believe much in his leftist political beliefs and people’s democratic thinking. This was already evident in his 560 A student [Dalibor] Cihelka, who has an acquaintance with my daughter, also came to the apartment, and about three times we visited his father, a retired financial board, Vinařská Street. I also had no other contact. ”Tichý was also annoyed that the investigators did not believe much in his leftist political beliefs and people’s democratic thinking. This was already evident in his 560
TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory (II.), P. 130. ABS, f. 302, sign. 302-69-5, Report from the 1st OBZ area, undated, pp. 7 ̶ 8. 562 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Svobodná Čechie, 13. 6. 1948, p. 1 563 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report, Subject: Illegal leaflet “Free Bohemia”, undated. 564 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 81. 561
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joining the party in May 1948. His review states: “As for why he joined the party, he said out of conviction. He named a mass of Marxist literature that he read and almost asked the comrades from the commission to ask about his political education. He answered various questions promptly, but even here he was pressed against the wall and convicted of ignorance. He answered superficially verbally and, in the end, incorrectly. He tried to be quick, but he spoke so as not to say anything and overwhelmed him. He concealed that his daughter was employed at the US Embassy, only saying that D [c] era was a member of the April 1948 party. Brig. gene. Tichý gives the impression of a very sophisticated former member of the 2nd Division, who could certainly have performed very valid services in the former army. Even though he joined the party he is not a good and honest member. 565 Although the result of the examination would undoubtedly be enough for the investigators, they unfortunately had in their hands the statement of Karel Paleček from 1949. Although from archival materials it follows that Tichý practically did not get involved in politics until May 1948, nor did he express himself in any way on the outside. I once cursed at dinner and Munich. I said that the masses of workers would arrange it after the war, because every war ultimately brings great social change. So that he will also be with us. His wife agreed with me. Perhaps more because she saw that I was still having a fight with Tichý. Silent, who was otherwise very angry and violent, jumped up and forbade her in front of everyone, never to speak like that again. I cannot even be convinced of his founding that he was a Marx-Leninist. If he went to the party and acts as a passionate communist, I am convinced that there is fear at the heart of his turn. ”566 All of the above facts were ample enough for Oldřich Tichý to be included in the TNP. Tichý joined Mírov on the basis of the order of the Commission No. 1 in Prague on 12 January 1950, and the relevant notice of his classification was published on 16 January.567 Tichý was to spend 12 months in Mírov. TNP Mírov, which has earned the reputation of one of the worst camps of this type in Czechoslovakia, was established as a facility for heavier, ie dangerous “inmates” on April 22, 1949 in the area 565 I am convinced that there is fear in the foundations of his turnaround. ”566 All of the above facts were ample enough for Oldřich Tichý to be included in the TNP. Tichý joined Mírov on the basis of the order of the Commission No. 1 in Prague on 12 January 1950, and the relevant notice of his classification was published on 16 January.567 Tichý was to spend 12 months in Mírov. TNP Mírov, which has earned the reputation of one of the worst camps of this type in Czechoslovakia, was established as a facility for heavier, ie dangerous “inmates” on April 22, 1949 in the area 565 I am convinced that there is fear in the foundations of his turnaround. ”566 All of the above facts were ample enough for Oldřich Tichý to be included in the TNP. Tichý joined Mírov on the basis of the order of the Commission No. 1 in Prague on 12 January 1950, and the relevant notice of his classification was published on 16 January.567 Tichý was to spend 12 months in Mírov. TNP Mírov, which has earned the reputation of one of the worst camps of this type in Czechoslovakia, was established as a facility for heavier, ie dangerous “inmates” on April 22, 1949 in the area 565 567 Tichý was to spend 12 months in Mírov. TNP Mírov, which has earned the reputation of one of the worst camps of this type in Czechoslovakia, was established as a facility for heavier, ie dangerous “inmates” on April 22, 1949 in the area 565 567 Tichý was to spend 12 months in Mírov. TNP Mírov, which has earned the reputation of one of the worst camps of this type in Czechoslovakia, was established as a facility for heavier, ie dangerous “inmates” on April 22, 1949 in the area 565
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Result of inspection brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, undated. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Excerpt from the protocol written with brig. gene. vv Karel Paleček, undated. 567 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Proof of transfer to TNP Mírov, 12 January 1950; ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report of the commission on the investigation of the case formerly brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, pp. 9. 5. 1951. 566
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of the original medieval castle, which was rebuilt into a Baroque fortress in the 17th century. After its creation, it remained empty for only two weeks, as the first prisoners detained during the first action “D” of April 20, 1949, were added to it. Unfortunately, it is impossible to rely on Tichý’s personal memories of his stay in the camp. Nevertheless, the atmosphere and conditions in this terrible facility can be quite well imagined according to the following description by Jiří Bílek: Underground dungeons with up to seven meters thick stone walls, which were cold and damp, were intended for prisoners. Ventilation through small barred windows was insufficient. The cold was particularly noticeable in autumn and winter, as most of the rooms could not be heated. The interior was similarly inhospitable, consisting of a few simple couches, a table and seats. Hygienic conditions were also catastrophic ̶ washroom with only cold water, unsuitable toilets. Prisoners were placed in cells of ten or more people, which exceeded their capacity. The food was very poor and inadequate. ”569 Medical care was also catastrophic, or more precisely, it was not provided to prisoners. If the fact that Act No. 241/1948 Coll. “She did not undergo any medical examination on arrival. The medical care in TNP Mírov itself was in charge of a lifelong convict MUDr. Sekanina, a member of the SS, who did not show much interest in the health of other prisoners, and if so, then his hands were bound by a lack of drugs and essentially any medical material.570 Such conditions naturally had to affect the health of the prisoners. For those who have already come to the camp with health problems, these have worsened here, the “health” have acquired more serious or less serious health ailments. Specifically, Oldřich Tichý suffered a myocardial infarction and a duodenal ulcer from TNP Mírov. Silent’s stay in the communist dungeons had a negative effect not only on his health, but also on the health of his family. Oldřich Tichý’s mother collapsed nervously after his arrest and Tichý’s wife Karla also suffered. then his hands were bound by a lack of drugs and essentially any medical material.570 Such conditions naturally had to affect the health of the prisoners. For those who have already come to the camp with health problems, these have worsened here, the “health” have acquired more serious or less serious health ailments. Specifically, Oldřich Tichý suffered a myocardial infarction and a duodenal ulcer from TNP Mírov. Silent’s stay in the communist dungeons had a negative effect not only on his health, but also on the health of his family. Oldřich Tichý’s mother collapsed nervously after his arrest and Tichý’s wife Karla also suffered. then his hands were bound by a lack of drugs and essentially any medical material.570 Such conditions naturally had to affect the health of the prisoners. For those who have already come to the camp with health problems, these have worsened here, the “health” have acquired more serious or less serious health ailments. Specifically, Oldřich Tichý suffered a myocardial infarction and a duodenal ulcer from TNP Mírov. Silent’s stay in the communist dungeons had a negative effect not only on his health, but also on the health of his family. Oldřich Tichý’s mother collapsed nervously after his arrest and Tichý’s wife Karla also suffered. the “health” here gained more or less serious ailments. Specifically, Oldřich Tichý suffered a myocardial infarction and a duodenal ulcer from TNP Mírov. Silent’s stay in the communist dungeons had a negative effect not only on his health, but also on the health of his family. Oldřich Tichý’s mother collapsed nervously after his arrest and Tichý’s wife Karla also suffered. the “health” here gained more or less serious ailments. Specifically, Oldřich Tichý suffered a myocardial infarction and a duodenal ulcer from TNP Mírov. Silent’s stay in the communist dungeons had a negative effect not only on his health, but also on the health of his family. Oldřich Tichý’s mother collapsed nervously after his arrest and Tichý’s wife Karla also suffered.
568
BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, pp. 94 ̶ 95; BŘACHOVÁ, V .: Destrukce, 123. BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, s. 107. 570 Ibid. 569
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Tichý tried to appeal against the sentence of 12 months, but his appeal was rejected on July 17, 1950, 571 on the grounds that: “During World War II, [Tichý] was in the foreign army in the West, where he worked with the former . gene. Moravec in the spirit of capitalist breadwinners and against the interests of the USSR. After returning to the Czechoslovak Republic in 1945, he was a public supporter of the West, he was in intimate contact with the fugitive traitors of the nation, Moravec, Hasal, Ingr, and the traitors Pika and Bartík. His daughter was employed at the US Embassy and later at the company. Inex, an American trading company whose head during the Second World War was the head of the CIC’s espionage service and which was in a very good relationship with Tichý. In February [1948] he took a wait-and-see attitude and waited for the conditions to take shape. After his release from active duty, he made no effort to participate in the building efforts of the working people. 572 On September 27, 1950, Oldřich Tichý was also deprived of his military rank, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 59/1949 Coll. on the withdrawal of military rank to certain officers, sergeants and non-commissioned officers of the army out of active service.573 From a brigadier general he became a soldier in the reserve.574 After Tichý’s internment at TNP Mírov, his wife had to solve a very fundamental problem from a practical point of view pensions. She needed it all the more because she and her wife and daughter were shared by Tichý’s eighty-three-year-old seriously ill mother, who was already completely blind at this time. Therefore, at the beginning of May 1950, Karel Tichá addressed a request to the MNO for mediation of the granting of a power of attorney, which Oldřich Tichý would transfer to his wife the right to receive his pension instead.575 Tichý, of course, immediately authorized his wife, but the NGO needed confirmation to settle the matter that Tichý was still alive and that he had not yet been convicted because in that case, he would lose all entitlements to the payment of the military pension. However, the MNO received the confirmation on June 7, 1950, and Karel Tichá’s request could be complied with after about a month.576 Although the deadline for inclusion in TNP Mírov expired in Tichý’s case on January 11, 1951, the commission 571 that he has not yet been convicted, because in that case he would lose all claims for the payment of a military pension. However, the MNO received the confirmation on June 7, 1950, and Karel Tichá’s request could be complied with after about a month.576 Although the deadline for inclusion in TNP Mírov expired in Tichý’s case on January 11, 1951, the commission 571 that he has not yet been convicted, because in that case he would lose all claims for the payment of a military pension. However, the MNO received the confirmation on June 7, 1950, and Karel Tichá’s request could be complied with after about a month.576 Although the deadline for inclusion in TNP Mírov expired in Tichý’s case on January 11, 1951, the commission 571
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report of the commission on the investigation of the case formerly brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, 9. 5. 1951, p. 1. 572 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, MV: Tichý Oldřich ̶ appeal, undated. 573 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Record of withdrawal of military rank, 27 September 1950. 574 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet II. 575 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Registered letter, Subject: Oldřich Tichý, gen. vv ̶ confirmation of power of attorney, May 10, 1950. 576 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Confirmation, June 7, 1950.
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release until May 9, 1951. The commission’s report concludes: As a class enemy, he tried to get into the Communist Party after February, due to the lack of revolutionary vigilance and vigilance of the Central Office [departmental organization, note. author] and its guarantors were given a two-year term. After his release from the army, he showed a bad relationship with his work, because he did not work for a long time and then, through protection, he got a good job. His inclusion in the TNP was entirely justified. The Commission proposes his release from TNP because he has expired and recommends that he be placed in manual labor and given attention. It is necessary to state that he was not an “inmate” of TNP Mírov during his entire imprisonment. In addition to Mírov, he was also imprisoned for some time in a prison in Prague’s Ruzyně and also in Mladá Boleslav.578 .579
6.3.
Life after release and rehabilitation (1951–1990)
After his release from TNP Mírov, Oldřich Tichý did not return to his apartment in Prague VII, as he moved with his family to Lysá nad Labem. Tichý’s family found a new residence in a house that belonged to the parents of his wife Karla. They originally ran a shop with cut goods here, and it was the original business room that the Military Administration converted into an apartment, where Oldřich Tichý’s family moved in. Bedřich Koleška’s brother-in-law also lived in the same house.580 Tichý also had to take up a new job. In this case, his new workplace became the carpentry cooperative Kmen in Lysá nad Labem, from where very
577
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report of the commission on the investigation of the case formerly brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, p. 9. 5. 1951, p. 2. 578 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Verbal expression including disability of direct family members, 1. 2. 1990. 579 ABS, f H, a. No. H-342-2, Official record written in the prison of the District Court in Mladá Boleslav, 11 May 1950. 580 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Inquiry into the former Czechoslovak General Army, Tichý Oldřich, undated.
114
he soon moved to Nymburk, but still worked for the cooperative as an auxiliary force.581 Although he was released, Tichý remained under the supervision of the StB and the communist authorities, while Tichý’s personal as well as professional life was monitored. This situation should not have changed for many years. From 1951 to 1953, opinions on Tichý were preserved, which were more general in nature and reported that Tichý did not have much contact with anyone, lived in a closed manner, did not participate in public events and did not show a positive attitude towards the people’s democratic establishment.582 for Tichý at this time there was at least a successful appeal against the reduction of the pension on the basis of Government Decree No. 22/1953 Coll. The Board of Appeal annulled the original verdict on the grounds that it had failed to show Tichý’s expressions of hostility to the people’s democratic order, and therefore Tichý’s activities did not establish the facts of the original measure.583 A certain larger surveillance campaign against Oldřich Tichý can be expected in 1954 and 1955 on the basis of preserved archival documents. In addition to the negative evaluation of Tichý’s work ethic ̶ “he works only 4 hours a day” 585 ̶ or the list of character traits, such as domination, arrogance, the analysis of Tichý’s family relations and contacts deserves special attention. The following can be read about the family relations in the provision: “The nominee has family relations arranged. The wife must listen to him for every word. He abuses and humiliates her with his orders. His brother-in-law Koleška Bedřich, who lives with the named in the same house, says this, that he was accustomed to commanding war, and now he is doing all this to his wife, and he wants to do so, because he has complained to Tichý several times before MNV. ”586 The question remains whether these claims are based, at least in part, on the truth. Quiet, of course, given his military career
581
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Inquiry into the former Czechoslovak general. Army, Tichý Oldřich, undated. E.g. VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, MNV in Lysá nad Labem, Posudek, 7 May 1953. 583 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Pension Appeals Committee at the Ministry of Agriculture, Nález, October 23, 1953. 584 This is a report on a person of interest, prepared by the StB. In terms of information, these reports focused on political views, public behavior, but also the family or property of the person concerned. 585 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Section StB in Nymburk, Ustanovka, 11. 5. 1954, p. 2. 586 Ibid. 582
115
and also the time spent in the communist dungeons could have a certain disposition to the above-mentioned actions. On the other hand, like other things, these could have been designed to portray Tichý in a bad light, justifying his persecution and surveillance. As far as Tichý’s contacts are concerned, it should be noted that Tichý sided with the company of other people, apart from his family, relatively long after moving to Lysá nad Labem. However, the situation most likely changed during the first half of 1954. Tichý then began to associate with people outside the circle of those closest to him, at least to a lesser extent, which obviously aroused the interest of the StB. According to surviving records, Tichý did not have much of a reputation with people at the time. Ustanovka from May 1954 talks about Karel Pekárek, whose daughter had an acquaintance with a man, who fled abroad after 1948, and Pekárek himself allegedly had an excellent opportunity to monitor the movement of jets at Boží Dar Airport due to his job as an inspector at the Nymburk Jednota in the Straky center, where he also traveled to Zbožíček, Čilka, Milovice and Boží Dar. 587 The operational plan to uncover Oldřich Tichý’s hostile activities from May 1954 also mentions Alois Chundelák, Josef Hodbod and Miroslav Pastrňák. All three men were members of the People’s Party, while Chundelák was also characterized as a “staunch clerical” 588, and Hodbod and Pastrňák considered the communist authorities to be enemies of the people’s democratic establishment. In addition to these three men, the operational plan also includes the name of Leopold Hrbata, an evangelical priest who was to have “great contacts with the former kulaks of Lysá n / L. and surroundings ’. 589 In the above-mentioned provision, it is still possible to find a man who wore a military uniform, commuted to Tichý’s apartment and he and his wife then escorted him to the station.590 The StB identified this man as Tichý’s brother-in-law, Lt. Col. Shoemaker. On the basis of Tichý’s work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, his position as the head of Czechoslovak intelligence in France and the reasoning that “he is bound to cooperate with IS and that he reports to them, which he obtains in an undetected manner,” the decision was made to expose his hostility by : implementation of provisions on the above – mentioned persons with whom Tichý came into contact, 587 590 StB identified this man as the Silent brother-in-law Lt. Col. Shoemaker. On the basis of Tichý’s work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, his position as the head of Czechoslovak intelligence in France and the reasoning that “he is bound to cooperate with IS and that he reports to them, which he obtains in an undetected manner,” the decision was made to expose his hostility by : implementation of provisions on the above – mentioned persons with whom Tichý came into contact, 587 590 StB identified this man as the Silent brother-in-law Lt. Col. Shoemaker. On the basis of Tichý’s work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, his position as the head of Czechoslovak intelligence in France and the reasoning that “he is bound to cooperate with IS and that he reports to them, which he obtains in an undetected manner,” the decision was made to expose his hostility by : implementation of provisions on the above – mentioned persons with whom Tichý came into contact, 587
ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, StB section in Nymburk, Ustanovka, 11. 5. 1954, p. 3. ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, Okresní Department of the Ministry of the Interior in Nymburk, Operational Plan for the Detection of Tichý Oldřich’s Hostile Activities, 10 June 1954, p. 1. 589 Ibid., p. 2. 590 ABS, f. H, a. in Nymburk, Ustanovka, 11 May 1954, pp. 3. 588
116
monitoring Tichý, investigating Karel Pekárek regarding his commuting to military facilities and his contacts, deepening knowledge about Tichý’s daughter Tán, conducting in-depth development of Kmen cooperative employees, filling Tichý with a suitable confidant and developing and acquiring Alois Chundelák as a potential confidant for Josef Hodboda, which was to help determine the specific activities of Tichý.591 In January 1955, from the point of view of the communist authorities, another problem arose in the matter of Oldřich Tichý. On January 14, Maj. František Novák, Deputy Chief of the District Military Administration (hereinafter OVS) Nymburk, Chief of the District Department of the Ministry of the Interior in Nymburk Lt. Václav Chalup acquainted with the contacts of the elder Václav Prosický, one of the employees of OVS Nymburk, and the porter and night watchman of OVS Kadeřábek with Oldřich Tichý. It, which attracted the attention of Lt. Chalupy, was the fact that Václav Prosický came into contact with “all the secret files by which the higher authorities give guidelines for the performance of various tasks from a military point of view.” 592 Although Major. Novák considered the contacts between Tichý and Prosický to be accidental, as both men were seen during Prosický’s trips to the post office, but above all they both knew each other from the carpenter’s cooperative, where Prosický also worked for some time, Lt. The cottage also admitted the possibility that this was a well-thought-out event by Oldřich Tichý to gain access to secret files through Václav Prosický. Similarly, por. Chalupa also considered the case of the doorman Kadeřábek, as he also worked in the Kmen cooperative before joining the OVS, where he met Oldřich Tichý, and Lt. The cottage did not rule out that the meeting with Tichý during Kadeřábek’s day off after night services when buying snacks may be aimed by Tichý to obtain an overview of the situation at OVS.593 On January 18, 1955, he was on Oldřich Tichý following previous findings and A record volume was established in the history of intelligence.594 The surviving materials also show that a confidant was deployed to Oldřich Tichý, who reported on it during 1955. The identity of this person with the pseudonym “Jarka” remains unknown. Of the reports passed by “Jarka”, Tichý’s views are most interesting on the political situation in Europe. For the sake of clarity, his opinion of the parties of the Cold War can be stated. The confidant who was on him 591 On January 1, 1955, following a previous finding and due to his military and intelligence history, a record volume was established for Oldřich Tichý.594 The surviving materials also show that a confidant was deployed to Oldřich Tichý, who reported on it during 1955. The identity of this person with the pseudonym “Jarka” remains unknown. Of the reports passed by “Jarka”, Tichý’s views are most interesting on the political situation in Europe. For the sake of clarity, his opinion of the parties of the Cold War can be stated. The confidant who was on him 591 On January 1, 1955, following a previous finding and due to his military and intelligence history, a record volume was established for Oldřich Tichý.594 The surviving materials also show that a confidant was deployed to Oldřich Tichý, who reported on it during 1955. The identity of this person with the pseudonym “Jarka” remains unknown. Of the reports passed by “Jarka”, Tichý’s views are most interesting on the political situation in Europe. For the sake of clarity, his opinion of the parties of the Cold War can be stated. The confidant who was on him 591 Of the reports passed by “Jarka”, Tichý’s views are most interesting on the political situation in Europe. For the sake of clarity, his opinion of the parties of the Cold War can be stated. The confidant who was on him 591 Of the reports passed by “Jarka”, Tichý’s views are most interesting on the political situation in Europe. For the sake of clarity, his opinion of the parties of the Cold War can be stated. The confidant who was on him 591
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, District Department of the Ministry of the Interior in Nymburk, Operational plan to expose the hostile activities of Tichý Oldřich, June 10, 1954, p. 2. 592 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, District Department of the Ministry of the Interior Nymburk, Record, 14 January 1955, pp. 1. 593 Ibid., pp. 1 ̶ 2. 594 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1 , District Department of the Ministry of the Interior Nymburk, Final Explanatory Memorandum to the proposed registration volume No. 746 to the deposit, 3 January 1956.
117
“Overall, his views on world events can be summed up in such a way that he personally believes that European [collective] security must sooner or later take place, because neither side wants a war, and of course understandable 595 In addition to the confidant “Jarka”, the aforementioned Václav Prosický also reported on Tichý. The intention to use Prosický for this purpose is evidenced by the plan of agency and operational elaboration of the case of Oldřich Tichý from July 4, 1955.596 It was planned to deploy a certain collaborator, Janula, given that Tichý and Janula’s house were adjacent to the gardens. However, Janula’s collaborator failed to be deployed, as Tichý still maintained a certain distance from people, at least from those he did not know very well, and Janula’s young age also played a role in the difficulty of connecting Janula to Oldřich Tichý.597 Although there was no tangible evidence of activity , from which Tichý was suspected and all suspicions had the character of pure conjectures and constructs, his follow-up was still continued. Pore. Chalupa commented: “The fact that so far, in addition to several detected suspicious contacts gen. Silent, like with a pastor evang. The church of Hrbata z Lysá, Pekárek z Lysá, Hodbodě and Chundelák did not reveal any other suspicious circumstances around Tichý. Cottage with a reserve, partly because Prosický spoke very positively about Tichý. Other reasons then cf. Chalupa summed up the following note: mu toto. Even the circumstance if the daughter is employed in Czechoslovakia. airlines and if the son-in-law is an officer, he may have built one he recommended this to him. Even the circumstance if the daughter is employed in Czechoslovakia. airlines and if the son-in-law is an officer, he may have built one he recommended this to him. Even the circumstance if the daughter is employed in Czechoslovakia. airlines and if the son-in-law is an officer, he may have built one
595
ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, Report from „Jarka“, 9.11.1955, p. 2. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Okresní Department of the Ministry of the Interior Nymburk, Top Secret, 4 July 1955, p. 2,597 ABS, f. H, No. H-342-1 f. H and. no. H-342-1, District MV department Nymburk, confidential, 4. 7. 1955, p. 1. 596
118
by airline staff daughters through
connection with foreign
599 The latest records of the campaign against Oldřich Tichý in 1954 and 1955 date from December 1955. Mention may be made of the other two persons with whom Tichý came into contact.600 No anti-state activities but Oldřich Tichý never managed to prove it, but he remained a suspect. The last two paragraphs of the final explanatory memorandum to the volume kept on Oldřich Tichý, prepared by Lt. Col. The cottage speaks for itself: “It is assumed that Tichý may form such an opinion around himself that he is not interested in anything just to conspire his hostile activity even deeper, which has not yet been revealed during the investigation. I therefore propose a record file for storage, even if the agency that was connected to it will continue to be extracted to its person after the bass of former people. I propose the volume to be stored permanently, as it is a former intelligence officer who held senior positions in the 2nd Department of Intelligence. gene. 601 Oldřich Tichý remained in the search engine of the competent authorities. As early as January 1956, the Regional Administration of the Ministry of the Interior of Pilsen addressed a request to the District Office of Nymburk to arrange for the interrogation of Tichý.602 In 1957, directly to the Ministry of the Interior in Prague.603 Although both requests were granted by the District Department of the Ministry of the Interior Nymburk, it is not known whether the interrogations took place. Another change in Silent Life came in the form of a new job. From January 28, 1957, Tichý began working as a storekeeper in the national company Fruta, 604 more precisely in his branch in Lysá nad Labem. Towards the end of the 1950s, Silent Verification and Surveillance finally eased, although it continued. However, at the end of 1959 the proposal fell and on 599
ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Unmarked report por. Václav Chalupa, 8 November 1955. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Record of Lt. Col. Tesaříka, 1 December 1955. 601 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, District Department of the Ministry of the Interior Nymburk, Final Explanatory Memorandum to the proposed registration volume no. ABS, f. H, no. H-342-2, Regional Administration of the Ministry of the Interior Pilsen, Tichý Oldřich ̶ Application for permission to interrogate, 9 January 1956. 603 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342- 2, MV, Subject: Tichý Oldřich, býv. gene. ̶ request, 5 March 1957. 604 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Regional Military Administration Prague, Adjustment of pension benefits, June 22, 1964. However, you can also meet the date of Tichý’s entry into the national company Ula on January 28, 1957. VÚA – SA AČR, f. z profession, Oldřich Tichý, Manuscript notes on the person of Oldřich Tichý, 21. 1. 1966. 600
119
On 15 January 1960 the decision to establish an agency union for Tichý’s daughter Táňa, at that time already Cihelková.605 In this case, however, the StB was not interested in Taťána Cihelková
because of
her
father.
Cihelková
had
changed
jobs
and Czechoslovak Airlines December 15, 1959 was transferred to the position on Iraqi translator vyslanectví.606 for cooperation Tanya Cihelková won StB 14 January 1960 and the volume within the agency had assigned the code name “Klapková” .607 Given that Tania Cihelková perfectly dominated the English, French, German and partly Russian, not too surprising that she wanted StB used for obtaining and
submission
of reports
from the Iraqi
embassy.
Paradoxically,
Tatiana
Cihelka
with the operational staff of the StB, who arranged cooperation with her, Capt. Alois Semelka, acquainted a certain Mr. Kolouch, who originally wanted to offer Cihelková a position with an Indian airline and whose Cihelková knew as a representative of the Ministry of the Interior, introduced to her by Oldřich Tichý, who knew Koloucha from his time in the army.608 Taťána Cihelková from the Iraqi embassy. Cihelková’s cooperation with the StB continued after 1962, when she terminated her employment at the embassy. Afterwards, Táňa Cihelková started working as an interpreter for the Prague Information Service, in fact interpreting mainly for the Ministry of Education and the Polytechnic. However, Cihelková managed to refute the accusation and her deconspiracy did not occur.610 Cihelková’s evaluation as a collaborator sounded quite positive, but the lower level of her own initiative in establishing contacts, obtaining information or requesting meetings was criticized. On April 11, 1968, Cihelková requested the waiver of regular cooperation, which she justified on the grounds that she was very busy and did not have the necessary qualities to remain in cooperation.
605
The date when Táňa Tichá got married is not known. What is certain, however, is that Cihelková married Dalibor Cihelka, who helped her father get a job at Ultrafon as a student. 606 ABS, f. Volume Agenda, a. No. 625312 MV, Proposal for acquisition for cooperation, December 28, 1959, p. 1. 607 ABS, f. volume on Taťána Cihelková, 15 January 1960. 608 ABS, f. Svazkové agenda, no. agenda, a. No. 625312 MV, Regional Administration of the SNB Prague, II / M Department ̶ 3rd Department, Proposal to impose a personal agent. volume A ̶ Klapková, No. 11686 to the archives of the Ministry of the Interior, 2 May 1968, p. 1. 610 ABS, f. , Evaluation of a collaborator, p. 3.
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At her request, it was proposed that the cooperation with “Klapková” be terminated.611
But back to Oldřich Tichý. Experiments date back to the 1960s
on the rehabilitation of Oldřich Tichý. The first surviving overview of Tichý’s activities, together with a proposal for a solution to possible rehabilitation prepared by the KVS Prague Rehabilitation Commission on its own initiative, dates from May 22, 1964.612 The commission could an opinion of the MNV in Lysá nad Labem and an opinion prepared by the head of operations at Tichý workplace. It must be said that, in contrast to the opinion of the MNV, the evaluation from the workplace sounded very positive for Tichý. Tichý was characterized as a man “open, direct, non-negotiable, energetic, intelligent,” who performs his tasks “responsibly and conscientiously.” 613 Tichý’s activities within the ROH also received a positive comment, in which he worked “on the initiative of the security commission as well as in the audit commission, “His relationship with the establishment was considered positive and overall Tichý’s work was considered very beneficial for the company.614 However, the commission’s conclusion was as follows:” army and the withdrawal of rank was justified. Appointed to this day has no good relationship with the soc. establishment. According to the chairman of the MNV and the secretary, the return of the rank would have a bad response among the public. As for the positive evaluation from the workplace, they note that it is necessary to see the composition of workers in Fruta, which is similar in comparison with it. 615 On September 4, 1964, a similar conclusion was made in the official proposal for the eighteenth meeting of the rehabilitation commission.616 “After studying the personnel materials and conducting an interview with the chairman and secretary of the MNV Lysá nad Labem, it can be judged that the dismissal from the army and the removal of the rank was justified. Appointed to this day has no good relationship with the soc. establishment. According to the chairman of the MNV and the secretary, the return of the rank would have a bad response among the public. As for the positive evaluation from the workplace, they note that it is necessary to see the composition of workers in Fruta, which is similar in comparison with it. 615 On September 4, 1964, a similar conclusion was made in the official proposal for the eighteenth meeting of the rehabilitation commission.616 “After studying the personnel materials and conducting an interview with the chairman and secretary of the MNV Lysá nad Labem, it can be judged that the dismissal from the army and the removal of the rank was justified. Appointed to this day has no good relationship with the soc. establishment. According to the chairman of the MNV and the secretary, the return of the rank would have a bad response among the public. As for the positive evaluation from the workplace, they note that it is necessary to see the composition of workers in Fruta, which is similar in comparison with it. 615 On September 4, 1964, a similar conclusion was made in the official proposal for the eighteenth meeting of the rehabilitation commission.616 According to the chairman of the MNV and the secretary, the return of the rank would have a bad response among the public. As for the positive evaluation from the workplace, they note that it is necessary to see the composition of workers in Fruta, which is similar in comparison with it. 615 On September 4, 1964, a similar conclusion was made in the official proposal for the eighteenth meeting of the rehabilitation commission.616 According to the chairman of the MNV and the secretary, the return of the rank would have a bad response among the public. As for the positive evaluation from the workplace, they note that it is necessary to see the composition of workers in Fruta, which is similar in comparison with it. 615 On September 4, 1964, a similar conclusion was made in the official proposal for the eighteenth meeting of the rehabilitation commission.616
611
ABS, f. Svazkové agendy, no. volume A ̶ Klapková, No. 11686 to the archives of the Ministry of the Interior, May 2, 1968, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 612 return of military rank as early as 1962. However, neither the application nor any documents on the settlement of the application from this period are not available. 613 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Subject: Osobní posudek, 6. 5. 1964. 614 Ibid. 615 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, KVS Prague, Overview of activities and proposed solution, May 22, 1964, p. 2. 616 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, f. , Oldřich Tichý, KVS Prague, Proposal for the 18th meeting reh. Commission, 4.9.1964, p. 2.
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On October 4, 1965, Tichý himself sent a request for the return of military rank. In a letter addressed to the Main Personnel Administration of MNO Tichý, he asked for a review of his activities and for him to receive full rehabilitation, as well as for other military officials illegally imprisoned in the Mírov penitentiary. Tichý argued that his relationship with the people’s democratic and socialist establishment was always positive and never worked against him. He also referred to his former job in Fruta, where he was always considered a “good worker-official who always stood up for the development of the socialist establishment” .617 strength and as an activist. Together with him, Svazarm also accepted Tichý’s wife into employment. It must be emphasized that Tichý could also prove very positive evaluations from the new employer.618 Tichý’s request was finally processed by the MNO in June 1966. On 13 June 1966 the MNO reached the same conclusion as in 1964, namely that in the case of Oldřich Tichý it was not a rehabilitation in meaning of the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and thus it was neither possible to revise the original decision of the MNO on the transfer of Tichý to retirement or the withdrawal of military rank, which also made it impossible to return the military rank. The MNO added that: “After a new evaluation of the whole and thus it was neither possible to revise the original decision of the NGO to transfer Tichý to retirement or to withdraw his military rank, which also made it impossible for the military rank to be restored. The MNO added that: “After a new evaluation of the whole and thus it was neither possible to revise the original decision of the NGO to transfer Tichý to retirement or to withdraw his military rank, which also made it impossible for the military rank to be restored. The MNO added that: “After a new evaluation of the whole
In this case, the
Ministry of
National
Defense
asks his
question
[Silent, note. author] military service in the army for closed. Due to his development so far, he has no reservations or objections to his person. The NGO is of the opinion that the nominee is not judged by the relevant territorial authorities in terms of his service in the army, but in terms of his attitude and behavior in civic life. ”619 have a theoretical chance of succeeding with their demand this time. In 1968, it seemed that the whole truth about the situation and matters concerning TNP Mírov would finally come to light, and in connection with this, the former Peace Prisoners also felt that they would finally get rid of the mark of unwanted persons. Several articles about Mírov were even published in the press at the time. All hopes 617
VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Application for recognition of rank, 4. 10. 1956, p. 1. 618 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Svazarm, Opinion of Oldřich Tichý, 30 September 1965. 619 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, MNO Personnel Administration, Subject: Tichý Oldřich – explanatory letter, 27 June 1966.
122
however, he was thwarted by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent period of normalization.620 On February 14, 1969, the Prague-West District Court ruled in favor of revising the Silent Inclusion in TNP Mírov. The court thus annulled the decision of the commission that sent Tichý to Mírov and declared them invalid by law on the grounds that “in the given case it was not a person with shielding or dangerous foreign property” .621 However, the Regional Military Administration of NGOs Silent only in March 1971, and again came to a negative conclusion. This can be evidenced by the quote: “The opinion of the NGO on this request has always been negative. Even at present, the law does not allow the implementation of the named request. Due to his physical age – because he is not in the records of the military administration is not to return the rank of military support in law. With this interview, MNO KS considers the request of June 1968 to be closed. […] “622 As far as Tichý’s later life is concerned, unfortunately no more coherent materials are available so far, except perhaps for documents concerning Tichý’s rehabilitation from 1990. However, at least briefly, At the very end of 1967, Tichý and his wife moved to the village of Trnová, located in the district of Prague-West.623 Podebrady. Tichý worked here for the last season here from May 2 to August 28, 1972.624 On May 3, 1982, Oldřich Tichý was hit by a personal tragedy in the form of the death of his sick wife. 625 Karla Tichá,
620
BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, p. 113. VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, District Court Prague, Decision in the case of Oldřich Tichý, 14. 2. 1969. 622 VÚA – SA AČR, f Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Minutes of the interview with former General Oldřich Tichý, March 24, 1971. 623 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, StB Nymburk Department, Tichý Oldřich – handover materials, January 12, 1971. According to Mrs. Nina Jindřichová, who met Oldřich Tichý in Trnová several times, Oldřich Tichý’s family moved into the local chateau, which was bought by Tichý’s son-in-law Dalibor Cihelka. The chateau was later lost by the Cihelka family in restitution. Statement of Mrs. Nina Jindřichová, April 26, 2015. 624 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Technical Services of the City of Poděbrady, August 29, 1972. 625 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb.
123 of the
sixth infarction. Oldřich Tichý attributed her illness to his imprisonment, which was a huge psychological burden for his wife.626 The fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia in November 1989 finally provided an opportunity to clear the name of Oldřich Tichý. Post-November President Václav Havel was also very interested in the rehabilitation proceedings. He emphasized this in Pilsen on May 6, 1990, on the occasion of the end of World War II: “Living and until recently forgotten fighters will be promoted and honored, the memory of the dead will be honored.” when rehabilitation took place is no longer so clear. On March 2, 1990, Oldřich Tichý was granted through the
Federal
Ministry
of Defense
Medal
For
Merit
Jaroslav Valenta, who helped prepare part of Tichý’s memoirs for publication, stated that Tichý had received full rehabilitation on May 3, 1990, while at the same time he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general.629 In the book Elite armády rank of lieutenant general in the case of Oldřich Tichý no mention, however, his rehabilitation is dated to 1990.630 The problem, however, is that these data do not fully correspond to archival documents. According to them, the Regional Rehabilitation Commission decided on rehabilitation only in January 1991. However, the truth remains that in a letter dated 12 June 1990, in which Taťána Cihelková informed KVS about the death of her father, who died after a long illness on 5 June 1990. speaks as “Lieutenant General vv” 631 Either way, Oldřich Tichý’s name was finally cleared. The text of the decision on rehabilitation sent to Tichý’s daughter Taťána on 22 January 1991 should be quoted in full at the end of the thesis: “Dear Madam, on the basis of a request for rehabilitation of your deceased father, Mr. Brig. General Oldřich Tichý, born 3 [0]. 1. 1898, the Regional Rehabilitation Commission informs you the following. After studying the personal files, it was found that your father was discharged from the army for his crucial 626
VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Verbal expression including disability of direct family members, 1. 2. 1991. 627 ZELENKA, Jan (ed.): Václav Havel. Volume VI. Speeches from 1990 ̶ 1992. Summer reflection. Prague 1999, p. 131. 628 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Minutes of the rehabilitation meeting of the Regional Rehabilitation Commission at KVS Prague, January 22, 1991. 629 TICHÝ, O .: , pp. 120. 630 MASKALÍK, A: Elite of the Army, pp. 603. 631 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualifications, Oldřich Tichý, Subject: Death Report, 12 June 1990.
124
political attitudes and contrary to moral principles. Due to the incorrect release from the army, your family has been morally and materially damaged, and therefore consider your father and your family to be fully rehabilitated. The Federal Minister of Defense instructed the Regional Rehabilitation Commission by FMO Personnel Order No. 7/90 to accept an apology for all the hardships caused to you during the years of the totalitarian regime and the full moral rehabilitation of your deceased father. Yours sincerely, Chairman of the Regional Rehabilitation Commission, Colonel Milan Mudra. ”632
632
VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Regional Rehabilitation Commission at KVS Prague
125
7.
Conclusion
The main goal of this diploma thesis was to develop, mainly on the basis of the study of archival materials, a comprehensive biography reconstructing undoubtedly very interesting and sometimes very difficult life destinies of Oldřich Tichý. This effort was motivated mainly by the fact that Oldřich Tichý has not yet received any professional monographs
or
studies devoted
directly to
his person within the historiography . With respect
on the availability, quantity and content of materials that could be used for the work, it is clear that some episodes from the life of Oldřich Tichý did not receive as detailed processing as they might deserve. Such is the case, for example, of Tichý’s life in the period from 1968 until his death. However, it cannot be ruled out that in the future, if new sources are found, it will not be possible to extend the reconstruction of the Silent Life in certain respects. The potential in this sense can be seen, for example, in the possible discovery of the Silent Legacy, which has not yet succeeded. Similarly, attempts to locate living relatives have so far been unsuccessful, although several attempts have been made during the research. The presented work can be perceived not only as a “mere” biography, but also as a probe into a certain issue, especially Czechoslovak military intelligence or military diplomacy. For a total of 33 years, Oldřich Tichý connected his life with the army, which for the first time significantly affected his life during the First World War. After a short stint in the Austro-Hungarian army, he joined the Czechoslovak legions in Russia. This military participation probably predestined him to remain in the army also in the service of an independent Czechoslovakia, within which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence team of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. which first significantly affected his life during the First World War. After a short stint in the Austro-Hungarian army, he joined the Czechoslovak legions in Russia. This military participation probably predestined him to remain in the army also in the service of an independent Czechoslovakia, within which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence team of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. which first significantly affected his life during the First World War. After a short stint in the Austro-Hungarian army, he joined the Czechoslovak legions in Russia. This military participation probably predestined him to remain in the army also in the service of an independent Czechoslovakia, within which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence team of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. After a short stint in the Austro-Hungarian army, he joined the Czechoslovak legions in Russia. This military participation probably predestined him to remain in the army also in the service of an independent Czechoslovakia, within which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence team of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. After a short stint in the Austro-Hungarian army, he joined the Czechoslovak legions in Russia. This military participation probably predestined him to remain in the army also in the service of an independent Czechoslovakia, within which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence team of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. in which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence group of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. in which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence group of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938.
hasty
departure
from Czechoslovakia
, along
with other
members
Moravec
intelligence “Eleven” on the eve of the German invasion in 1939, he served as an active participant in second resistance, under which played a very important role on the news battlefield and without whose contribution the Czechoslovak intelligence abroad hardly reached the results they have achieved. Even after leaving the service 126
Czechoslovak military intelligence continued to perform by example all the functions and tasks he received, both in the foreign resistance and after his return to Czechoslovakia. The culmination of his military career was the achievement of a general rank. Like many other participants in the Second Resistance, she did not avoid the silent persecution by the communist regime, which was not limited to more than a year in one of the worst communist dungeons, TNP Mírov, but which also included many years of supervision by the communist security authorities. and, of course, enormous moral damage. Oldřich Tichý did not receive any satisfaction until the very end of his life, when he was awarded the Medal of Merit for the Czechoslovak Army three months before his death. However, his name was not completely cleared until 1991. We can only hope
127
List of sources and literature
Unpublished sources Archive of Security Forces Prague fond 52 (Statements of Gestapo and SD employees) fond 302 (Main Administration of Military Counterintelligence) fond H (Historical fund; a. No. H-342-1; a. No. H-342-1) fond Union agendas, a. No.625312 MV fond Z (Maps of reports prepared by the MV Studý ústav Institute of Jaroslav Čvančara Archive Private documentation Masaryk Institute and Archiv Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic fond Edvard Beneš Národní archiv Praha fond Archiv Hubert Ripka fond Police Headquarters Prague II – population records Military Central Archive ̶ Administrative archive Czech Republic Olomouc fond Personnel materials of professional soldiers Military Central Archive ̶ Military Historical Archive Prague collection 20 (Ministry of National Defense London) collection 22 (Czechoslovak military units in the USSR) collection 37 (Military Intelligence Command) collection Qualification documents collection Legionary Service file collection Military intelligence
128
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HANZLIK, Frantisek: Vojak. The example of Oscar Dogs. In: FASORA, Lukáš – HANUŠ, Jiří – MALÍŘ, Jiří – VYKOUPIL, Libor (ed.): Man in Moravia in the First Half of the 20th Century. Brno 2011, pp. 287-298. KOKOŠKA (MALÍŘ), Jaroslav: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina plk. Moravce on the eve of World War II. Historie a vojenství, 38, 1989, No. 4, pp. 68 ̶ 89. KREISINGER, Pavel: Rok 1941 v československém vojenském zpravodajství. Personnel crisis in Moravec’s intelligence “eleven”. In: KUDRNA, Ladislav (ed.): The War Year 1941 in the Czechoslovak Domestic and Foreign Resistance. Proceedings of the international conference. Prague 2012. KUDRNA, Ladislav: Military Defense Intelligence (1945 ̶1950). Development, organizational structures, staffing. Paměť a dějiny, 3, 2008, No. 1, pp. 76 ̶ 89. In: Historica Pragensia: Historical Proceedings of the Museum of the Capital City of Prague, 2, 2005, pp. 163 ̶ 182. PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Klára: The Life Fates of a Intelligence Officer and Military Diplomat of Colonel Alois Čáslavka (1899−1963). Olomouc 2015 (unpublished diploma thesis). STRAKA, Karel: Czechoslovak and French Military Intelligence 1933 ̶1938. Historie a vojenství, 58, 2009, No. 2, pp. 32 ̶ 65. STRANKMÜLLER, Emil: Czechoslovak Offensive News since March 1939. Resistance and Revolution 1970, pp. 189–229. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-20. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Zlatica: Czechoslovak Army 1939 ̶1945. Plans and reality. In: ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z. (ed.): Czechoslovak Army 1939 ̶1945 (Plans and Reality). Papers from the International Conference October 22-23, 2002.
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CTU Internet Resources in Prague: History. In: http://www.cvut.cz/historie [cit. October 18, 2014]. Dobromysl Foundation: Photogallery. In: http://www.indiannet.eu/home_resistance/fotky/part2/cz001.html [cit. April 25, 2015]. Encyclopedic Dictionary of Czech History 1938 ̶ 1945. Keyword: Czechoslovak ground forces in France. In: http://www.usd.cas.cz/UserFiles/File/Publikace/Slovnik38_45.pdf [cit. March 1, 2015]. Gymnasium, Brno, Křenová 36: History of the school. In: http://www.gymkren.cz/ogymnaziu-krenova-brno/historie-skoly/ [cit. October 18, 2014]. KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Before the war broke out. Germans in the service of Czechoslovakia. intelligence services in 1935 ̶1939. In: http://dejinyasoucasnost.cz/archiv/2007/4/nez-vypukla-valka/ [cit. January 30, 2015]. Nina Jindřichová ̶ Sculpture and Stucco Studio: Portrait of General Oldřich Tichý. In: http: //www.jindrichova. com / portfolio / volna-tvorba / portrety [cit. April 26, 2015]. PANUŠ,
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133
List of used abbreviations ABS ̶ Archive of security forces AHR ̶ Archive of Hubert Ripka brig. gene. ̶ Brigadier General CIA – Central Intelligence Agency CIC – Counter Intelligence Corps CTU ̶ Czech Technical University div. gene. ̶ Divisional General doc. ̶ associate professor dr. ̶ doctor gen. Gen General Maj. Gen. ̶ Major General of the Gestapo ̶ Geheime Staatspolizei gšt. ̶ General Staff of the HaV ̶ History and Military of the HSOBZ ̶ Main Report of the Defense Intelligence of the HSVO ̶ Main Administration of Education Ing. ̶ engineer JD ̶ one-year volunteer ride. ̶ cavalry JUDr. ̶ Doctor of Laws conc. ̶ conceptual Cpt. ̶ Captain of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia ̶ Communist Party of Czechoslovakia KVS – Regional Military Administration Maj.
NA ̶ NSDAP National Archive ̶ Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei OBZ OS OSS Defense Office – Office of Strategic Services OVS ̶ Okresní vojenská správa pěch. ̶ infantry pkpt. ̶ subchapter Col. ̶ Colonel Lt. Col. ̶ Lieutenant Colonel PŘII – EO ̶ Police Headquarters Prague II ̶ Population Register ̶ Political Headquarters ROH ̶ Revolutionary Trade Union Movement rt. ̶ company rtm. ̶ Sergeant SHAEF ̶ Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces SIS – Secret Intelligence Service SNB ̶ National Security Corps SOE ̶ Special Operation Executive SR ̶ Service de Renseignement USSR ̶ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics StB ̶ State Security Svazarm – Union for Cooperation with the Army Capt. ̶ Staff Captain of the SWBM ̶ TNP Armed Forces Staff ̶ Forced Labor Camp ̶ USFET organizace United States Formations of the European Theater of the Republic VÚA ̶ VHA ̶ Military Central Archive ̶ Military Historical Archive Prague vv ̶ retired ̶ in reserve 135
Resumé The main research purpose of this thesis is to create the first biographical study about the life story of intelligence officer and military diplomat brigadier general Oldřich Tichý in the context of 20th century. The main reason for this research is the absence of any professional work about this very interesting and important officer of Czechoslovakian army. The thesis is divided into four chapters, each of them dealing with one specific period of his life. The first chapter is introductory and it focuses on the childhood, youth of Oldřich Tichý and his career in the Austro-Hungarian army and Czechoslovakian legions in Russia. Chapter two concerns service of Oldřich Tichý in Czechoslovakian army as ordinary officer, intelligence officer and military diplomat. The third chapter examines military service of Oldřich Tichý during the Second World War. It focuses on his intelligence work, his service as liaison officer at the Dutch army in Great Britain, officer at the Czechoslovakian military headquarters and liaison officer at the third American army. The last chapter of this thesis deals with career and life of Oldřich Tichý after the war, especially with his persecution by communists and his rehabilitation.
136
Attachments Officer’s rank of Oldřich Tichý Ensign
6 January 1919
Lieutenant
7 July 1919
Lieutenant
5 September 1920
Captain
1 November 1921
Staff Captain
9 July 1927
Major
10 February 1933
Lieutenant Colonel
10 July 1937 ( with effect from 1 July 1937)
Colonel
15 December 1944 (with effect from 28 October 1944)
Brigadier General
20 February 1947
Selection of orders and decorations that Oldřich Tichý received633 Order of St. George IV degree (1919) Czechoslovak War Cross 1918 (1921) Order of MR Štefánik “Falcon with Swords” (1921) Italian War Merit Cross (1921) Czechoslovak Revolutionary Medal Czechoslovak War Cross 1939 Polish Order “Polonia Restituta” Knight’s Order of the Legion of Honor French Order “Nishan Iftikar “Czechoslovak Commemorative Medal (1944) Czechoslovak Military Medal of Merit I. degree (1944) American award” Legion of Merit “(1945)
633
In parentheses the year of award, if known.
137
Photo
fig. 1: Group photograph of Czechoslovak army officers from the 1920s. Oldřich Tichý, probably here in the rank of captain (with a boat on his head sitting under President TG Masaryk) Source:
PAVLÍK,
Jiří ̶
POKORNÝ,
Radek:
They fought
for
us.
Legionnaires
from Hradec Králové. In: http://g.denik.cz/17/81/legionari_00003.jpg [cit. February 25, 2015].
138
fig. 2: Intelligence officers of the Second Department of the General Staff: from left Vladimír Cigna (hat). Bohumil Dítě, Antonín Longa (hat), unknown, Oldřich Tichý, František Moravec (hat, stick), František Fryč, František Hájek (hat), Alois Frank (hat), Josef Bartík (hat, long coat), Alexander Fritscher (hat) ), Josef Fořt, Václav Sláma (hat), František Fárek (hat), two unknown uniformed officers Source: KREISINGER, P. Brigadier General, p. 45
139
Giant. 3: Moravc’s “eleven” in Great Britain: from left Václav Sláma, Karel Paleček, Oldřich Tichý, Vladimír Cigna, Josef Fořt, Emil Strankmüller, František Moravec, František Fryč, Josef Bartík, Alois Frank and Jaroslav Tauer Source: Dobromysl Foundation: Photogallery. In: http://www.indiannet.eu/home_resistance/fotky/part2/cz001.html [cit. April 25, 2015].
140
fig. 4: Families of intelligence officers in Warsaw, Poland Source: Jaroslav Čvančara Archive, Private Documentation
141
Giant. 5: Władysław Rackiewicz, President of the Republic of Poland in exile, honors Czechoslovak intelligence officers with the “Polonia Restituta” order. Josef Bartík is decorated. Oldřich Tichý is standing next to Bartík. František Moravec can be seen in the background, and to the left of the president stands the Polish Prime Minister in exile, Gen. Władysław Sikorski (1941) Source: KREISINGER, P. Brigadier General, p. 95.
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Obr. Fig. 6: Post-war photograph of Oldřich Tichý Source: ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2
143 Fig.
7: Photographs of Oldřich Tichý from the post – war application for the issuance of a new driving license Source: NA, f. PŘPII – EO
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8: Photographs of Oldřich Tichý from the firearms pass from 1949 Source: NA, f. PŘPII – EO
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Giant. 9: Oldřich Tichý in 1990 Source: KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over agent A-54, p. 306
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Obr. 10: Portrait of Oldřich Tichý Source: Nina Jindřichová ̶ Sculpture and Stucco Studio: Portrait of General Oldřich Tichý. In: http://www.jindrichova.com/portfolio/volna-tvorba/portrety [cit. 26. 4. 2015]
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Annotation Name and surname:
Radim Staněk
Faculty:
Faculty of Arts
Department:
History
Leader:
PhDr. Pavel Kreisinger
Year of defense
2015
Title:
Life destinies of intelligence officer and military diplomat brig. gene. Ulrich Pacific (1898-1990)
Title in English:
The Life Story of Intelligence Officer and Military
Diplomat
Brigadier
General
Oldřich Tichý (1898 ̶ 1990) Abstract:
The thesis is the first comprehensive biographical study reconstructing the life destinies of a prominent Czechoslovak
intelligence
officer and military diplomat brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, in the context of the entire 20th century. The work is also a probe into the issues of military intelligence and military diplomacy. Keywords:
Czechoslovakia,
legion,
Czechoslovak
army, military intelligence, military diplomacy, First Republic, World War II, Communist Party, persecution by the communist regime, rehabilitation Annotation in English:
The thesis is the first complete biographical study reconstructing the life story of imporatnt intelligence officer and military diplomat brigadier general Oldřich Tichý in 148
the context of whole 20th century. The thesis i also the probe into problems of military intelligence and military diplomacy. English keywords:
Czechoslovakia, legions, Czechoslovakian army,
military
intelligence,
military
diplomacy, first Czechoslovak republic, Second World War, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, persecution by communist regime, rehabilitation Attachments bound in work: Důstojnické hodnosti Oldřicha Tichého
; Selection of orders and decorations; Fotografie
Scope of work:
149 pages
Language of work:
Czech
149