Ales Binar et al.
ARMED FORCES AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATE Part II

 November 15, 2021  xavierjamesproductions

CZECHOSLOVAK MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGAINST GERMANY IN THE YEARS 1932 TO 1938. STRATEGY, RESOURCES AND RESULTS
The onset of the general crisis in international relations caused the growing importance of the information component of government decision-making processes and the highest military command structures in the early 1930s. The importance of information increased both in the so-called revisionist states, ie those that sought to reverse the general order after the First World War, as well as in countries that did not want changes in this area, because they affected their basic existential interests. In addition to the standard sources of civilian diplomacy, the findings of military intelligence agencies occupied an essential place here. They were especially important in terms of their ability to predict future developments and decide accordingly on the overall concept of foreign policy and, in its spirit, on the necessary measures of a military nature. Thus, military intelligence formed one of the fundamental components of the creation of military strategy.
In the specific case of Czechoslovakia, military intelligence played a direct initiating role in a number of events. This is especially true in the case of extraordinary military measures from May to June 1938 and in the events that immediately preceded the occupation of the Czech lands on March 15, 1939. in relation to the defense of the state. Among other things, the very factual acceptance of the first so-called British-French plan and shortly afterwards the results of the Munich Conference by the Czechoslovak president and government in September 1938 included responsible respect for the military intelligence picture of the overall strategic situation in which Czechoslovakia was at the time .2
1 The extraordinary importance of military intelligence in the conditions of escalation of international tensions in the 1930s is very comprehensively reflected in a study published on March 3, 1938 within the 2nd (Intelligence) Department of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces as a summary of modernized intelligence doctrine for the operational apparatus. See: VÚA-VHA, Military Funds of the Study Institute of the Ministry of the Interior (FMSÚMV), archival collection (as) No. 37 – Military Intelligence Headquarters, sign. 37-153-42, News report, sheet number (No. 1) 8-41. The system of progressive methods to minimize the risk of sudden attack is contained in the Armed Forces Service Book, G-XI-1 Border Security, published in 1937 (effective February 15, 1938).
2 It was precisely this fundamental aspect that was significantly touched upon by Ferdinand Peroutka, a highly dedicated commentator of contemporary political events, in his remarkable reflection on the autumn crisis of 1938. With only
54
Definition of the topic, methodology and results of previous research
The aim of this chapter is to present a generalized and overlooked balance of the results of the work of Czechoslovak military intelligence against Germany from 1932 to 1938. This approach, which is not limited to the dramatic finale of the time period, allows you to deal in more detail with the 1932 to 1934. in the fact that a groundbreaking regime change took place in Germany during this period, which, given its fundamental influence on the military potential of the Empire, forms a very remarkable section in terms of the history of military intelligence. An analysis of this type has not yet been carried out in historiography.
In the context of this article, the phrase “military intelligence” primarily expresses its offensive sector and analytical component. In a specific organizational sense, they were represented at the top level of the army hierarchy by the B-search group and especially its offensive section P-1, which were key operational units of the 2nd (Intelligence) Department of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. For the analysis and evaluation of reports, the competent group A – the study and planning department of the same department, which with the specialized German and later also the aviation section formed the analytical section of the top intelligence apparatus for working with information about Germany. Reports from all available sources were accumulated in the mentioned workplaces and they were further worked on. Offensive resources were also used in a very significant way, especially in the years 1932 to 1934 2.
The research of military intelligence of the interwar period can be carried out in three consecutive stages. The first and basic stage form a necessary prerequisite for any further conceptual research work. Its goal is to know the internal structures, functions and methods of operation of the military intelligence system. Considerable work has been done in this field so far.3
At a minimal distance from that time, he was able to maintain an unprecedentedly objective view on January 4, 1939, which, however, respected both the tense emotional component of the events that had only briefly subsided and the relentless rational point of view. He reflected on the immense responsibility of the president, the government and also the military command in a situation where Czechoslovakia was denied allied support. Understanding the substance of the matter, he wrote: “Czech leaders were determined to lead the nation into a war more difficult. But they backed away from leading him to suicide. When our feelings calm down, it will not serve them to shame. At such moments, those who have more information must undoubtedly decide, even against the emotional and aroused voice of the nation, which rises from the square – in the interests of that very nation [underlined by K. Straka]. It is up to them to decide even if they set up a tombstone over their reputation for a while, even if they were misunderstood and insulted. ” Cited by: Ferdinand PEROUTKA, Had a war broke out… Presence 1939, No. 1, p. 1.
3 The first results of scientific research in Czechoslovak intelligence from the interwar twenties were published in the second half of the 1980s. At that time, valuable foundations were laid for a thorough knowledge, especially of the organizational development of the intelligence apparatus of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. See: Jan GEBHART – Jan KUKLIK, The struggle for Czechoslovakia in the field of intelligence in the second half of the 1930s. HaV 1988, No. 1, pp. 88-112; TITÍŽ, The struggle for Czechoslovakia in the field of intelligence in the second half of the 1930s (II). HaV 1988, No. 3, pp. 41-66. He concretized the knowledge and moved it further: Jaroslav KOKOŠKA-MALÍŘ, Czechoslovak Organization. military offensive intelligence in the years 1934-1939 (I.) Hav 1989, No. 6, pp. 51-65; TÝŽ, Organizace čs. military offensive intelligence in the years 1934-1939 (II.) Hav 1990, No. 1, pp. 34-48. The work was also important for the mentioned initial stage: Jaroslav KOKOŠKA – Stanislav KOKOŠKA, Dispute about Agent A-54. Capitols
55 The
aim of the second research phase is to evaluate the reports obtained mainly by secret agency means, which were mostly the only ones to allow access to key
from the history of the Czechoslovak intelligence service. Naše vojsko, Prague 1994. These pioneering outcomes were suitably followed by: Zdeněk TITL, Reconstruction of the Development of the Organizational Structure and Personnel of Czechoslovak Intelligence (until March 15, 1939). Study aid. General Staff, Inspectorate of the Military Intelligence Service of the Army of the Czech Republic, Prague 1995. Special focus is: S. KOKOŠKA, Czechoslovak Military Intelligence in 1938. Proceedings of the Military Academy in Brno 1999, No. 2, pp. 97-100. A more recent generally conceived presentation of the issue is provided by: Miloslav ČAPLOVIČ, Organization and Activities of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service in the Years 1919-1939. In: Bohumila FERENČUHOVÁ et al., Slovakia and the World in the 20th Century. Chapters on the 70th birthday of PhDr. Valerián Bystrický, DrSc. Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences – Prodama, Bratislava 2006, pp. 80-97. Further clarification is provided by: Milan VYHLÍDAL, Czechoslovak military intelligence after the events of Munich in 1938. Search Center for Subcarpathian Russia. In: Securitas imperii (SI) 34/1. ÚSTR, Prague 2019, pp. 46-61. With extensive use of previously unknown sources, the following contributions were made: Karel STRAKA, Czechoslovak Agency Network. armies in Bohemia and Germany (1937-1938). HaV 2012, No. 4, pp. 46-66; TÝŽ, Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Agency Network from 1933-1939. Intelligence headquarters. Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic – Military Historical Institute Prague, Prague 2017. Another part of the current production has also begun to pay more attention to cooperation with foreign partners and special activities of the Czechoslovak military intelligence authorities abroad. See: S. KOKOŠKA, Czechoslovak-Soviet intelligence cooperation in the years 1936-1941. HaV 1997, No. 5, pp. 37-52; ALSO, In neutral territory. Czechoslovak Intelligence Branch in The Hague 1936-1940. History and the Present (DaS) 2008, No. 9, pp. 41-43; K. STRAKA, Czechoslovak and French military intelligence in the years 1933-1938. HaV 2009, No. 2, pp. 32-65; TÝŽ, Czechoslovak and Polish Military Intelligence in the Context of Alliance with France in the 1930s. In: Zbigniew NAWROCKI (ed.), Secret War. II From the events of the II. Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2015, pp. 729-744; M. VYHLÍDAL, Forgotten Mission Maj. Karel Vosátka, contribution to the functioning of Czechoslovak intelligence before World War II. In: Proceedings of the Faculty of Education, Masaryk University – Social Sciences Series (SPPFMU-SV) 2017, No. 1, pp. 41-50; Matej MEDVECKÝ – M. VYHLÍDAL, Czech Office. military attaché in Berlin in the crisis of 1938 in the light of an unknown document. Military History (VH) 2018, No. 4, pp. 132-159. Most recently: K. STRAKA, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance. Czechoslovak-French Cooperation in Military Intelligence in the Years 1932-1938. In: SI 35/2. ÚSTR, Prague 2019, pp. 12-49. The results so far, especially in the structural field, are also accompanied by mostly valuable findings in numerous biographies of important personalities of Czechoslovak military intelligence. See: Jiří ŠOLC, In the Service of the President. General František Moravec in the light of archival documents. Vyšehrad, Prague 1994. In the reissue, see: TÝŽ, Po boku předsedaa. General František Moravec and his intelligence service in the light of archival documents. Our Army, Prague 2007; ALSO, General Paratroopers. HaV 1996, No. 4, pp. 156-177; Pavel KREISINGER, Brigadier General Josef Bartík. Intelligence officer and participant in the first and second Czechoslovak resistance. Prague 2011. For Bartík’s person, see also: TÝŽ, Intelligence Officer from Šumava. Brigadier General Josef Bartík (1897-1968). In: Šumava in the changes of time. Revue Jungbauerova Šumavského vlastivědného spolek 2014, No. 1, pp. 102-127; TÝŽ – M. VYHLÍDAL, The Life Fates of General Josef Zuzka (1902-1978). From an artillery officer through the intelligence department of the General Staff and the Nazi Prison to Egypt (Part I). HaV 2015, No. 1, pp. 64-76; TIEŽŽ, From an artillery officer through the intelligence department of the General Staff and the Nazi Prison to Egypt (Part II). HaV 2015, No. 2, pp. 90-99. Further: P. KREISINGER, Colonel of the General Staff Jan Krček (1901-1961). The long journey of a participant in the foreign resistance (commanders Gabčík and Kubiš) to rehabilitation. HaV 2017, No. 4, pp. 70-83; M. VYHLÍDAL, The first of three councilors. Intelligence Officer Staff Captain František Fárek (1894-1973). VH 2019, No. 1, pp. 123-145; TÝŽ, General Jan Reindl (1902-1981). Aviator, reporter, participant in the anti-Nazi resistance and commander of aviation instructors in Egypt. Svět křídel, Cheb 2018; TÝŽ, Intelligence Officer Col. gšt. František Havel (1896-1977), contribution to the functioning of military intelligence in the second half of the 1930s. HaV 2019, No. 2, pp. 45-65. century. HaV 2019, No. 2, pp. 45-65. century. HaV 2019, No. 2, pp. 45-65.
56
classified information of the States of interest. This mainly includes a comparison of the content of preserved reports with objectively documented historical reality. The news image is compared here with the results of modern research, based on the principles of critical scientific work. However, a specific aspect of the whole issue also belongs to this stage, and thus there is an unintentional or rather unconscious shift in the interpretation of the content of the reports. However, the factor of conscious, and thus deliberate, interpretation of reports, based on a certain pre-existing need and interest of those subjects who had the opportunity to influence their nature before further use, also plays an important role here. It is therefore a study of a specific interpretive aspect of information matter. At a given stage, this specific aspect concerns the processors of the relevant material, ie the military intelligence community, defined by the organizational and service framework of the 2nd Department of the General Staff and its subordinate units. Recent research has already indicated and convincingly demonstrated relatively severe symptoms in this regard. Significantly, they do not only concern the period until the break-up of the republic and the occupation of the Czech lands in March 1939. They were significantly reflected in the exile military intelligence during the Second World War.4
The third, peak stage can then be characterized as the study of the use of information outputs of the military intelligence apparatus by the highest military command and then, above all, decisive, and therefore determining, political and governmental places. The aim of the research in this stage is to answer the most important question, ie how, to what extent and with what consequences the military information system influenced the results of its work decision-making processes at the level of the highest executive of the Czechoslovak state.
This article summarizes the knowledge from the level of the second of the outlined stages. It was possible to make progress on it, especially after the recent refinement and detailed reconstruction of the organization and composition of the agency network, working in the 1930s mainly against Germany and also Austria. Now, the size and composition of its most valuable core, consisting of a secret agency, managed directly by the operational bodies of the P-1 offensive group of the B-search Group 2 of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces, has been substantially reconstructed and evaluated.5
In connection with interwar Czechoslovakia, military intelligence research finds itself in very specific heuristic conditions. The documents of the 2nd Department of the General Staff were exposed to extremely severe shredding interventions. The spring base, preserved in the Czech Republic, therefore suffers from considerable torsion. Under these unfavorable conditions, it is therefore necessary to look elsewhere. The materials that Czechoslovak military intelligence shared with allies or allied countries proved to be a key source that has considerable potential to replace lost sources. The method of systematic search for alternative sources was confirmed in the case of the Czechoslovak-French intelligence cooperation from the interwar period. This article is also based on reflections on the activities of Czechoslovak military intelligence, as recorded
4 For more details see: K. STRAKA, Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Agency Network, pp. 261-277.
5 The most important findings are contained in the following works: J. KOKOŠKA – S. KOKOŠKA, Dispute over Agent A-54; S. KOKOŠKA, Some Notes on the Czechoslovak Partial Mobilization in May 1938. In: Tribute to Professor Jan Kuklík. Karolinum, Prague 1998, pp. 99-114; ALSO Before the war broke out. Germans in the service of Czechoslovakia. intelligence services in the years 1935-1939, DaS 2007, No. 4, pp. 37-40; K. STRAKA, Czechoslovak Agency Network armies in the Czech Republic and Germany; TÝŽ, Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Agency Network; M. VYHLÍDAL, Franz Dobianer’s intelligence tipping event. An example of the work of Czechoslovak intelligence before World War II. SPPFMU-SV 2018, No. 2, pp. 76-83.
57
cooperating units of the Polish army from the period of relatively intensive professional military contacts of both countries from the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s.
German military potential in the most important findings of Czechoslovak military intelligence
The activities of military intelligence were based on the Czechoslovak military strategy of the interwar period. Until the mid-1920s, Czechoslovakia’s military strategy was determined by a close connection to the then sharply anti-German strategy of France. With the weakening of French influence in Central Europe after 1925, the Czechoslovak military strategy gradually emancipated itself from its original anti-German orientation. A truly purely Czechoslovak military strategy was increasingly being profiled against Hungary’s efforts to revise the post-war order.6 During the 1920s, Czechoslovak military intelligence became more and more oriented towards Hungary. Work against Germany has not developed and stagnated in this context. The supply of essential information was provided between 1919 and 1926 by the General Staff of the French Army through the French Military Mission in the Czechoslovak Republic.7 Other important information came from the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission. Until 1927, it oversaw compliance with and compliance with the military, naval and aviation clauses of Part V of the Versailles Peace Treaty of June 28, 1919.8 The relatively low-intensity Czechoslovak information interest in Germany conditioned the political priorities of Czechoslovak foreign policy. In the late 1920s, she sought a completely conflict-free neighborhood, which was to be confirmed by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.9 part of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919.8 Relatively low-intensity own Czechoslovak information interest in Germany conditioned the political priorities of Czechoslovak foreign policy. In the late 1920s, she sought a completely conflict-free neighborhood, which was to be confirmed by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.9 part of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919.8 Relatively low-intensity own Czechoslovak information interest in Germany conditioned the political priorities of Czechoslovak foreign policy. In the late 1920s, she sought a completely conflict-free neighborhood, which was to be confirmed by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.9
At this point, it is necessary to ask the question when and under what circumstances Czechoslovak military intelligence began to escalate and expand attention also in relation to Germany. The first truly significant security threat in Czechoslovakia was the attempt to close the German-Austrian customs union, averted in the summer of 1931.10 In response to these events, the first initiatives in the field of modernization of the intelligence apparatus became apparent. At the initiative of Col. rammer. Mojmír Soukup, head of the B-search group of the 2nd Division of the General Staff, was soon after the establishment of the first so-called agency search center focusing on Germany. Soukup applied the method in Czechoslovak conditions
6 A summary of the development of the Czechoslovak military strategy is contained in the study: K. STRAKA, Minister of National Defense František Udržal and the Defense Strategy of the Czechoslovak Republic from 1921-1929. In: Jaroslav ROKOSKÝ – Jiří URBAN et al., František Udržal. Peasant and statesman. Vyšehrad, Prague 2016, pp. 103-126.
7 An early document of this fact is provided by: VÚA-VHA, f. Francouzská vojenská mise, karton (kart.) 10 – Note au sujet des militaires de l’Allemagne at the date of 30 July 1919.
8 The primary sources of Czechoslovak provenance for this period are absent. Due to this, the references of the representatives of the Polish military intelligence on the findings of the 2nd Department of the Czechoslovak General Staff at the time of the mutual exchange of information about Germany from 1927-1934 are of significant substitution importance. See: Polish-Czechoslovak military contacts 1921-1938 in the documents of the declaration and division II Rzeczypospolitej. Ed. Piotr KOŁAKOWSKI. Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, Warsaw 2018, doc. 67, p. 177.
9 On this issue, see in particular: Dagmar MORAVCOVÁ, Czechoslovakia, Germany and European movements 1929-1932. Institute for Central European Culture and Politics, Prague 2001, pp. 68-78. And more recently: Jindřich DEJMEK, Edvard Beneš. Political biography of a Czech democrat. Part One Revolutionary and Diplomat (1884-1935). Karolinum, Prague 2006, pp. 450-452.
10 This issue is very aptly discussed in particular by: Jiří KOVTUN, The Republic in a Dangerous World. The era of President Masaryk 1918-1933. Torst, Prague 2005, pp. 663-677.
58
decentralization of the management of the operational activities of the offensive intelligence apparatus, which he became acquainted with in the framework of the then Czechoslovak-Polish intelligence cooperation.11 The effectiveness of these progressive measures was confirmed in many respects in the following years. During them, the entire offensive apparatus expanded towards all states of interest. In the most developed phase before Munich, it consisted of three agency search centers. Each of them managed a network of advanced agency exchanges. The construction of foreign advanced agency exchanges was also started, which was later supplemented by the offices of military attachés with special tasks in the field of offensive intelligence.12
The need to increase intelligence interest in Germany was confirmed in the context of the Geneva Arms Reduction and Reduction Conference, which took place in February 1932. The German demand for arms equality, the so-called Gleichberechtigung, was considered particularly risky in the future. Although interest in Germany increased, the priority of Czechoslovak military intelligence at the time was still Hungary. The current focus and results of the work against Germany also corresponded to this fact. In connection with it, Czechoslovak military intelligence showed interest primarily in industry with the already established or potentially possible production of military weapons and material. It focused on the covert development of new combat technology. It obtained some important information about German-Soviet military-technical cooperation, including data on events in one of the test facilities in the Soviet Union. The constant of information interest was the issue of covert development and production of chemical warfare toxic substances, the means for their deployment and defense against them. Czechoslovak military intelligence also had relatively good information on Germany’s transport and infrastructure systems, which were of military importance or were remarkable in terms of technical innovations. He was also interested in the doctrine of the Reichswehr, German military thinking and new trends in the training of senior staffs. She monitored the practical application of theoretical innovations relatively systematically during regular and larger military exercises in Germany. Preference, consisting mainly in military-technical issues, were related to relatively good conditions for providing information in this area due to the developed Czechoslovak industry, which had numerous commercial and other ties to Germany. In comparison, however, the then Czechoslovak military intelligence showed certain shortcomings in the precise knowledge of the organization and deployment of the Reichswehr, including the newly established elements. Reserves of this type persisted due to a certain inertia from the times when the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus relied somewhat on the information provided by the aforementioned Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.13 It was not until the early 1930s that the Czechoslovak offensive intelligence apparatus began to monitor the military situation more closely. related to relatively good conditions for providing information in this area due to the developed Czechoslovak industry, which had numerous commercial and other ties to Germany. In comparison, however, the then Czechoslovak military intelligence showed certain shortcomings in the precise knowledge of the organization and deployment of the Reichswehr, including the newly established elements. Reserves of this type persisted due to a certain inertia from the times when the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus relied somewhat on the information provided by the aforementioned Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.13 It was not until the early 1930s that the Czechoslovak offensive intelligence apparatus began to monitor the military situation more closely. related to relatively good conditions for providing information in this area due to the developed Czechoslovak industry, which had numerous commercial and other ties to Germany. In comparison, however, the then Czechoslovak military intelligence showed certain shortcomings in the precise knowledge of the organization and deployment of the Reichswehr, including the newly established elements. Reserves of this type persisted due to a certain inertia from the times when the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus relied somewhat on the information provided by the aforementioned Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.13 It was not until the early 1930s that the Czechoslovak offensive intelligence apparatus began to monitor the military situation more closely. In comparison, however, the then Czechoslovak military intelligence showed certain shortcomings in the precise knowledge of the organization and deployment of the Reichswehr, including the newly established elements. Reserves of this type persisted due to a certain inertia from the times when the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus relied somewhat on the information provided by the aforementioned Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.13 It was not until the early 1930s that the Czechoslovak offensive intelligence apparatus began to monitor the military situation more closely. In comparison, however, the then Czechoslovak military intelligence showed certain shortcomings in the precise knowledge of the organization and deployment of the Reichswehr, including the newly established elements. Reserves of this type persisted due to a certain inertia from the times when the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus relied somewhat on the information provided by the aforementioned Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.13 It was not until the early 1930s that the Czechoslovak offensive intelligence apparatus began to monitor the military situation more closely.
11 P. KOŁAKOWSKI, Między Warsaw and Prague. Polish-Czechoslovak military-political relations 1918-1939. Bellona, ​​Warszawa 2007, p. 338. Polish-Czechoslovak intelligence cooperation lasted in its active form from 1927 to 1934 and was mutually beneficial. It ended due to the different views of the foreign policies of both countries on the development of international relations and the solution of related security problems. The best about this intelligence cooperation so far: Ibid., Pp. 327-355.
12 The most detailed information system of the 1930s on its own territory: Z. TITL, Reconstruction of the development of organizational structure and personnel. On foreign fulcrums most recently and comprehensively: K. STRAKA, Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Agency Network, pp. 305-377.
13 See: Polish-Czechoslovak Military Contacts, doc. 67, pp. 166-167, doc. 85, pp. 219-223 and doc. 93, pp. 248-252.
59
in the near and far border of Germany.14 He gradually adapted to the new demands. Nevertheless, in 1932 he was able to obtain credible information about Germany’s violations of the aforementioned military restrictions enshrined in the Treaty of Versailles. These findings were made available to Czechoslovak diplomacy as an information base for participation in the Geneva Conference on Arms Reduction and Limitation.15
The beginnings of systematic intelligence work against Germany from the pre-Hitler era were characterized primarily by a significant overestimation of the mobilization potential and the overall material readiness of the Reichswehr. The intelligence forecast at the time was that the first operations of the future war would be aimed at the elimination of Czechoslovakia by German troops. Hungary and Austria were expected to support them with their intervention. A coalition of anti-revisionist states led by France would lose a strategically important component by defeating Czechoslovakia. It was assumed that Germany would build 21 divisions and three to six cavalry brigades during the first to sixth weeks of mobilization before or during the attacks against Czechoslovakia. The total number of Reichswehr thus mobilized was estimated at 600,000 men. In the sixth to twelfth weeks, the Reichswehr would build another 42 divisions and in the 12th to 16th weeks 63 divisions. In the case of Austria, it was expected to deploy three divisions and during the 14th to 16th days of mobilization three mountain and three motorized brigades. Hungary’s share was estimated at the beginning of the event at seven divisions and in 1933 at 10 divisions. Around the 14th day of mobilization, three to four incomplete divisions could probably be deployed. Seven divisions and one cavalry brigade could be deployed in anti-Czechoslovak actions with limited objectives.16 Compared to the objectively documented reality, these were highly exaggerated assumptions. It was the result of estimates that lacked a real documentary basis.17 Hungary’s share was estimated at the beginning of the event at seven divisions and in 1933 at 10 divisions. Around the 14th day of mobilization, three to four incomplete divisions could probably be deployed. Seven divisions and one cavalry brigade could be deployed in anti-Czechoslovak actions with limited objectives.16 Compared to the objectively documented reality, these were highly exaggerated assumptions. It was the result of estimates that lacked a real documentary basis.17 Hungary’s share was estimated at the beginning of the event at seven divisions and in 1933 at 10 divisions. Around the 14th day of mobilization, three to four incomplete divisions could probably be deployed. Seven divisions and one cavalry brigade could be deployed in anti-Czechoslovak actions with limited objectives.16 Compared to the objectively documented reality, these were highly exaggerated assumptions. It was the result of estimates that lacked a real documentary basis.17
In 1932, Germany was not perceived by Czechoslovak military intelligence only through the prism of a revisionist effort to remove the burden of the Treaty of Versailles. In terms of international comparison, it was already very early and noticeably confronted
14 In connection with this, the witness statement of František Moravec, in the years 1929 to 1934, the head of the 2nd Staff Department of the Provincial Military Headquarters (ZVV) in Prague, can be accepted as an essential source. This part of his memory seems credible after a confrontation with archival sources from the provenance of the 2nd Department of the ZVV staff. See: František MORAVEC, A Spy They Didn’t Believe. Sixty-Eight Publishers, Toronto 1977, pp. 22-24. Intelligence officers Karel Paleček and František Hieke also criticized the lack of operational penetration into Germany at the time in their retrospectives. Cf .: Security Forces Archive (ABS), f. 302 (Main Administration of Military Counterintelligence), sign. 302-57-2 – Protocol written to the MNO – General Staff with Brig. gene. K. Paleček November 23, 1949, No. 34-37. Furthermore, a written record of the memories of Col. rammer. F.
15 Archive of the Academy of Sciences, f. Edvard Beneš, card. 124, sign. R 216/1 – Disarmament Conference January to June 1933, Czechoslovak delegation to the disarmament conference. Military part. No. 44 development. OK 1932 – Violation of peace treaties by Hungary and Germany – reports, Geneva, 13 March 1933.
16 Service historique de la Défense (SHD) / Departement de l’Armee de Terre (DAT), 7 N (État-major de l’Armée et military attachments) 3109, dossier (d.) Hypotheses of European Conflicts 1932, No 2177 / Cab. French Military Mission (November 15, 1932), Meeting between Foreign Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the National Defense and the State Major General, the annual review of the operation plan.
17 According to Maj. gšt. Josef Bulandr, clerk of the German section of the Group A-Study and Planning Department of the General Staff, representatives of Polish military intelligence on the occasion of a joint conference held in Prague from 7 to 11 January 1932. Referring to primary archival sources from the Polish military The report states the following: P. KOŁAKOWSKI, Między Warsawą and Pragą, p. 340.
60
with Nazism and its ever-increasing influence. During 1932, the case of the mass paramilitary organization Volkssport culminated in Czechoslovakia.18 The Czechoslovak authorities proved by extensive investigation that it had direct ties not only to the German National Socialist Workers’ Party (DNSAP) in Czechoslovakia, although it declared itself a non-political, but also a non-political the Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei; NSDAP) in Germany, and in particular its strike forces Sturmabteilung – SA. Volkssport was built on their model as a paramilitary entity with a vertical command structure and a regular army-type organization and military training. Its components were directly linked to the structure of the SA and the leading circles of the NSDAP in Germany. The goals of the union were anti-state,
Czechoslovak military intelligence played a decisive role in the convincing of the leaders of Volkssport. As part of the criminal prosecution in this matter, it prepared an expert opinion, which is remarkable for objectively accurate and correct naming of the essence and goals of Nazi ideology. The greetings of military experts20 were based on both open sources and knowledge that was kept in a private regime and did not become part of the criminal record. They relied on the information of the agency network, especially on the entities that managed the bodies of the 2nd Department of the Staff of the Provincial Military Headquarters in Prague under the command of Maj. gšt. František Moravec, Head of Department.21 The military correspondents clearly stated, on the basis of an analysis of the NSDAP program, that this political entity was fighting for the annulment of the Treaty of Versailles, promotes freedom of armaments in order to build a large army and seeks the gradual unification of all Germans, regardless of their current nationality, in a special culturally, economically and socially independent Third Reich. To this end, the NSDAP pursues progressive goals that will be achieved in stages. The first consists in taking complete state power in Germany, the second in establishing a new state and economic order within the country, and the third in the so-called liberation of all Germans and the creation of the Third Reich. According to military correspondents, the party’s program was directed against the integrity of Czechoslovakia, as it provided for the forcible annexation of most of the border areas of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia with German settlement to the future Third Reich. The DNSAP program and Volkssport activities were then assessed by the military report as consistent with the goals of the German-German NSDAP and supportive in their favor. He relied on the separatist goals of the DNSAP, which were aimed at creating and recognizing a closed German settlement, on which the leadership principle would be applied in the spirit of Nazi ideology. Military intelligence emphasized that the de facto state thus created in the state would only be a prelude to the break-up of Czechoslovakia and the incorporation of
18 Full official name of the Volkssport organization (Nationalsozialistischer Verband für Wandern, Radfahren, Spiel und Sport aller Art – National Socialist Association for Wandering, Cycling, Games and Sports of All Kinds). VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Prague, card. 1043, sign. 68-1 / 3-27, OJ II No. 13002 / report. 1932 – Military expert opinion in the criminal case Volkssport – Brno 1932, Satzungen des Verbandes „Volkssport”, Sitz Fulnek.
19 About the whole Volkssport case so far in the most detailed and relevant context: Michal BURIAN, the Sudeten German Nationalist Physical Education Organization and the Czechoslovak State in the years 1918-1938. Karolinum, Prague 2012, pp. 139-170.
20 Maj. gšt. Václav Kopačka, 2nd Department of the ZVV Prague Staff, and Maj. gšt. Jaroslav Hrabovský, 2nd Department of ZVV Brno Staff. See: VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Prague, card. 1043, sign. 68-1 / 3-96, No. 5163 – Ref. hl. no. 2nd dept. 1932 of August 4, 1932.
21 Ibid., Card. 1043, sign. 68-1 / 3-102, OJ II No. 12599 – Report. 1932 of August 12, 1932 – Volkssport – documents.
61
separated territory into the Third Reich. From the point of view of the security situation in Czechoslovakia, the position was very warning in relation to SA.22 Military correspondents clearly stated: ). ”23
After the accession of Adolf Hitler to the position of Reich Chancellor, the year 1933 and almost the whole of 1934, from the point of view of Czechoslovak military intelligence, was marked by the primary and literally fundamental question of what the future German defense system would look like. Although he knew the goals of Nazism, at first he was not sure of the true meaning of the first steps of the newly established regime in the military sphere. One of the first significant reactions of military intelligence to major changes in power dates from March 22, 1933. Brig. gene. Vladimír Chalupa, head of the 2nd Department of the General Staff, then gave the intelligence units of the provincial military headquarters the first assessment of recent events. He wrote: “News from Germany after the establishment of the Hitler regime seem to indicate that the military preparations, which have so far been carried out with due regard for foreign opinion, they gain a faster decline due to the personality of Hitler. As of April 1, more changes have been reported from Germany, both in the defense system and in the detailed organization of the army. ”24 Elsewhere, he added:“ Material preparations can be part of the action. 25 He also noted that “We have a report that German industry has received a number of orders from the military administration, which are said to be camouflaged to the public under the pretext of orders for foreign states.” 26 Czechoslovak intelligence analysts admitted that the said preparations may relate to everything that had been banned by the Reichswehr so ​​far, ie accompanying infantry weapons (anti-tank artillery weapons and mortars), armament for field, rough and anti-aircraft artillery, tanks and armored cars, special equipment, especially for anti-aircraft artillery and aviation material.27 Group A-Study and Planning 2nd Division of the General Staff completed highly detailed intelligence questionnaires on the same date. According to them, the offensive units of all levels of command proceeded in removing the mentioned ambiguities.28 It did not take long for the first significant clues to appear. The Group A report of September 4, 1933, already stated: “Germany is on the threshold of war preparations for a new world struggle. The ideal of Great Germany, otherwise called III. Empire, is currently in statu nascendi [in the state of birth, note. author]. ”29 The General Staff Department completed highly detailed intelligence questionnaires by the same date. According to them, the offensive units of all levels of command proceeded in removing the mentioned ambiguities.28 It did not take long for the first significant clues to appear. The Group A report of September 4, 1933, already stated: “Germany is on the threshold of war preparations for a new world struggle. The ideal of Great Germany, otherwise called III. Empire, is currently in statu nascendi [in the state of birth, note. author]. ”29 The General Staff Department completed highly detailed intelligence questionnaires by the same date. According to them, the offensive units of all levels of command proceeded in removing the mentioned ambiguities.28 It did not take long for the first significant clues to appear. The Group A report of September 4, 1933, already stated: “Germany is on the threshold of war preparations for a new world struggle. The ideal of Great Germany, otherwise called III. Empire, is currently in statu nascendi [in the state of birth, note. author]. ”29 The ideal of Great Germany, otherwise called III. Empire, is currently in statu nascendi [in the state of birth, note. author]. ”29 The ideal of Great Germany, otherwise called III. Empire, is currently in statu nascendi [in the state of birth, note. author]. ”29
Although intelligence analysts gradually gained somewhat firmer ground, uncertainty persisted as to whether the original Reichswehr would become the basis
. Details contains: Ibid., Kart. 1043, sign. 68-1 / 3-27, OJ II No. 13002 / report. 1932 – Military expert opinion in the criminal case Volkssport – Brno 1932.
23 Ibid., P. 2.
24 Ibid., Card. 1067, sign. 95-5 / 15-42, No. 3403 – Ref. hl. no. 2nd dept. 1933 of March 22, 1933 – Development of armaments in Germany – questionnaire, p. 1.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
, P. 2. 28 Ibid., Annexes 1-4 to File No. 3403 hl. no. 2nd dept. 1933 of March 22, 1933 – Development of armaments in Germany – questionnaire.
29 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 20 – Ministry of National Defense London, sign. 20-29-44, No. 13 214 taj. hl. No. / 2nd department – of 16 November 1938, Nos. 14-15.
62
expanded and unified armies on the basis of universal conscription, or the Nazi regime will follow the path of the mixed army model, formed basically by the original professional Reichswehr, substantially expanded into a militia army. SA was a key factor in considering the second of these models. In connection with this second direction, Czechoslovak analysts said in the spring of 1934: “With German thoroughness, ‘Hitler’s’ brown army is of great military importance and must therefore be considered a serious factor.” 30 These considerations went in the right direction already that while the number of the Reichswehr in June 1934 was two hundred and fifty thousand men, the 31 numbers of SA culminated in the summer of the same year at the level of two million nine hundred thousand men.32 In this situation, it is understandable that Directive 3.
The assumptions in this direction were also supported by the first extremely serious agency gain in the field of offensive work against Germany. It was a comprehensive plan of the Reich Ministry of Defense to reorganize the peacekeeping ground of 1932. However, the agency matter also concerned a number of measures of a mobilization nature. The set of these documents was probably obtained in the first trimester of 1934. It was handed over by an agency body to which the identification data were not preserved. The document stated that the war field army was to consist of 21 divisions of the Reichswehr and Grenzschutz-Ost, 35 which was to include 34 divisions. However, they were to have a different composition from the divisions of the Reichswehr. The document also contained information on the time schedule of the overall umbrella armaments program. It was to take place within five years, specifically from April 1, 1933 to March 31, 1938.
Czechoslovak military intelligence penetrated the essence of the so-called second armament program of the Reichswehr from 1932. In summary, it can be stated that there were
30 VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Prague, kart. 1094, sign. 68-1 / 3-520 – Elaborate Headquarters 1st Division No. 6419 / news. The reason. 34 of 30 March 1934 – Summary Report on Hitler’s Brown Army for the 1st Quarter of 1934, p. 21.
31 Willhelm DEIST – Manfred MESSERSCHMIDT – Hans-Erich VOLKMANN – Wolfram WETTE, The German Reich and the Second World War. Bd. 1 (Ursachen and Prerequisites of the German War Policy). Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt – Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1979, p. 411.
32 For more details on the SA issue, for example: Heinrich BENNECKE, Hitler und die SA. Günter Olzog Verlag, Munich – Vienna 1962.
33 VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Prague, card. 1090, No. 826 / report. Taj. hl. No. / 3. odd. 1934 of 23 April 1934 – Exercise 1934/1935 – personal and secret directive, p. 1.
34 More on this issue: K. STRAKA, Czechoslovak and French military intelligence, p. 45-46. More Recently: TÝŽ, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance, pp. 19-20.
35 Grenzschutz-Ost – a paramilitary armed organization that has existed in Germany since the early 1920s. It was designed to defend the state borders with Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Prussia. In 1936 it was replaced by the Grenzwacht, subordinate to the armed forces, which covered all the borders of Germany.
36 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2682, No. 2, No. 903 Taj. hl. No. / 2. department 1934 of 15 October 1934 – German Army Armament Program (document analysis); Ibid., d. 3, Evolution of the Preparations of the German War, 6 February 1935.
63
objectively correctly informed about all crucial goals of the program. Czechoslovak analysts agreed with reality on the date of the first measures on April 1, 1933. A key moment in the process of building the Reichswehr occurred shortly before the end of 1933. At that time, the so-called December program was established. until 1935. In the spring of 1934, Reich Chancellor A. Hitler stepped up the pressure to speed up the program as much as possible. Czechoslovak analysts gradually became convinced that 21 peacekeeping divisions would be built much earlier than the program had anticipated. In their opinion, it could have been the first quarter of 1936.37 at the latest
It is indisputable that the declaration of universal conscription in March 1935 marked a major turning point in the development of the military potential of the Third Reich. Under these circumstances, it was no coincidence that in June 1935, Germany was definitively designated as the state of main interest in Czechoslovak military intelligence.38 The stage of development of the Third Reich from 1935 to 1938 corresponds to the period of its maximized performance in terms of Czechoslovak military intelligence. The existing findings show that the Czechoslovak military intelligence was able to systematically monitor the progress of peace construction, deployment and the organizational composition of the German ground forces, as well as infrastructure components important for the war, through the systematic deployment of agency resources in particular. In connection with this, it was able to reveal the existence of newly established command levels and also specific types of troops, relatively soon after their creation. A good example here is the corps of command, identified before its existence was publicly announced in Germany, or the highly classified chemical forces. For some time, it also had detailed reports on the organization and armament of the main combat components of tank divisions up to platoon level.39
The question arises as to how the Czechoslovak military intelligence coped with the massive increase in the German armed forces from 1935 to 1938. The main indicators that indicate the size and strength of the German armed forces are important here. The primary issue was peaceful numbers. In the spring of 1938, Czechoslovak analysts reached a total of 945,000 men (705,000 ground troops, 200,000 air forces, 40,000 navies). The number of German armed forces was expected to increase to 1,070,000 men after the October training of civilians and the recruitment of newcomers.40 Historiographic findings to date basically confirm this analytical output. The figures for the period under review, ie around the middle of 1938, range from 600,000 to 750,000 men.41 A general conclusion was reached in June and July.
37 The above findings result from the comparison of the data in the cited report with the generally accepted findings of previous historiography. The following works were used for comparison: Burkhart MUELLER-HILLEBRAND, Das Heer 1933-1945. Bd. 1 (Das Heer bis zum Kriegsbeginn), ES Mittler und Sohn, Darmstadt 1954, pp. 13-20; Georg TESSIN, Deutsche Verbände und Truppen 1918-1939. Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück 1974, pp. 215-216. More recently and in the most detailed way, he analyzes the planning measures of 1932: W. DEIST – M. MESSERSCHMIDT – H.-E. VOLKMANN – W. WETTE, The German Reich and the Second World War. Bd. 1, pp. 387 – 415.
38 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 37, sign. 37-153-59 / no. 104-108 – Thesis on the reorganization and tasks of intelligence, signed Col. gšt. Šimon Drgáč, Head of the 2nd Department Hl. staff, dated June 18, 1935. Document without reference number.
39 For details on the origin and nature of reports in objectified processing, see: K. STRAKA, Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Agency Network, pp. 96-109, 209-227, 240-261. See also: TÝŽ, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance, pp. 12-49.
40 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2682, d. 6, Liaison à Prague du 17 au 21 Mai 1938.
41 W. DEIST – M. MESSERSCHMIDT – H.-E. VOLKMANN – W. WETTE, The German Reich and the Second World War. Bd. 1, pp. 437-456.
64
that the mobilization potential of Nazi Germany would be 96 divisions by the end of 1938, ie 46 peacekeeping divisions, including five tank and five motorized divisions, and 50 mobilization divisions (30 reserve and 20 Landwehr) .42 A comparison with objective data shows that the peace numbers of the divisions were undersized, while the estimate of mobilization options far exceeded the real possibilities. In 1938, the German Armed Forces built a total of 51 peacekeeping divisions (38 infantry, four motorized, four light and five tank). However, if forced to mobilize, it would be able to build only 27 reserve divisions and divisions of the Landwehr. The main reason was the lack of necessary equipment and materials.43
Czechoslovak military intelligence had extremely valuable knowledge about the construction of the German Air Force. The essence and core of this exceptional knowledge was the key data on the comprehensive program of organizational construction of the German Air Force for the years 1934 to 1936. It was provided by Hauptmann (E) Albrecht Spiess, Reichswehr officer, highly exposed employee of the Reich Ministry of Aviation. Czechoslovak military intelligence was objectively able, after obtaining the data communicated by it, to predict the development and expected strategic importance of a completely new German air weapon with such a degree of accuracy as the application of operational and analytical methods of working with agency information allowed. Based on the comparison of data from this material with verified and credible data on real historical facts, it is possible to conclude that that the source agency material was based on the most important programming documents of the Reich Ministry of Aviation. Based on intelligence information, the target was to be 93 squadrons (excluding naval air force) on October 1, 1936, the date of completion of the initial stages of construction.44 In fact, the Luftwaffe was 108 squadrons on that date. The difference between intelligence and reality stemmed from the increase in the number of reconnaissance and observation squadrons. In the case of fighter, bomber and dive bombers, the intelligence exactly coincided not only with the actual program of the Reich Ministry of Aviation, but also with the achieved reality.45 thus, on the date of completion of the initial stages of construction, to be 93 squadrons (excluding naval air force) .44 In fact, the Luftwaffe had that state in the state of 108 squadrons. The difference between intelligence and reality stemmed from the increase in the number of reconnaissance and observation squadrons. In the case of fighter, bomber and dive bombers, the intelligence exactly coincided not only with the actual program of the Reich Ministry of Aviation, but also with the achieved reality.45 thus, on the date of completion of the initial stages of construction, to be 93 squadrons (excluding naval air force) .44 In fact, the Luftwaffe had that state in the state of 108 squadrons. The difference between intelligence and reality stemmed from the increase in the number of reconnaissance and observation squadrons. In the case of fighter, bomber and dive bombers, the intelligence exactly coincided not only with the actual program of the Reich Ministry of Aviation, but also with the achieved reality.45
The German Air Force and everything connected with it was, of course, one of the most important subjects of Czechoslovak intelligence in the years to come. In this context, the original program data from 1933 to 1934 can be evaluated as the basis to which all other intelligence findings about the aviation potential of the Third Reich applied. From the point of view of the needs of information analysis, this was undoubtedly a great advantage. The agent was lost in the spring of 1935. The 2nd Division of the General Staff never had a similarly full-fledged source of news in the aviation sector after that. Nevertheless, it was able to predict the growth of German aviation potential with a relatively good degree of qualified estimation. However, many other intelligence tools were used to develop the necessary information and documents. Group A of the 2nd Department stated in its conclusions of 10 November 1938,
42 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 20, sign. 20-29-44, No. 13 214 – Taj. hl. No. / 2. department of 16 November 1938, Nos. 19-20.
43 B. MUELLER-HILLEBRAND, Das Heer 1933-1945. Bd. 1, pp. 25, 68; Williamson MURRAY, The Change in the European Balance of Power 1938-1939. The Path to Ruin. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984, p. 219.
44 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2682, d. 3, Liaison à Paris February 1935, Plan for building the German Air Force 1934-1936 (original material from the provenance of the 2nd Department of the Czechoslovak General Staff) .
45 Cf .: Documents and documentary photographs of the history of the German Air Force. Ed. Karl-Heinz VÖLKER. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt – Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1968, doc. 84, pp. 201-204.
65
that the Luftwaffe has an operational army of one hundred squadrons. According to the 2nd Division, this total number consisted of nine observation squadrons, seven reconnaissance squadrons, 57 bombing squadrons of all purposes, 19 fighter squadrons and eight naval squadrons.46 The real situation, relative to almost the same reference date, was different in each item. The Luftwaffe had 85 squadrons at the time. The almost complete agreement of the intelligence image with reality is clear in the case of the scout and observation squadrons. Indeed, there were 14 of them at the time. There were 43 of them (including one battle squadron). The number of fighter squadrons, on the other hand, was undersized, as the Luftwaffe had 24 at the time. The Naval Air Force had four squadrons.47
As for the number of aircraft, the 2nd Department, based on the analysis of the collected indicators, concluded that the Luftwaffe is able to deploy over 3800 combat machines of various purposes. According to the situation at the end of September 1938, the German Air Force actually had at least three thousand aircraft (1128 bombers, 226 dive bombers, 773 fighters, 513 observation and reconnaissance, 195 combat and 164 naval missions) .48 The exaggeration that characterizes the Czechoslovak intelligence image was partly affected by the application of certain indicators other than those which characterize the documented fact. Above all, however, this difference reflects all the complexities of operational and analytical work in the field of military intelligence.
Strategic intentions of Nazi Germany in the findings of Czechoslovak military intelligence
It has already been documented in this chapter that the Czechoslovak military intelligence very early and objectively correctly understood the basic goals of Nazi ideology. Although it lacked concrete and credible reports from key political and military circles in Nazi Germany, its ability to predict future developments in major international relations was at an objectively good level. Above all, it correctly predicted the turning points of the 1930s. But he lacked more accurate information about when they would actually occur. It was demonstrably that from the beginning of 1933, Germany expected to try to restore a full military presence in the then still demilitarized Rhineland. However, it can rightly be assumed that this was expected from the end of 1932. In connection with this, Czechoslovak intelligence analysts did not question whether this would happen,
46 See: VÚA-VHA, f. VKPR, kart. 179, No. 783 1938, ref. 33663 hl. Thu / 2. odd. 1938 of November 10, 1938 – Reorganization of the German Air Force.
47 G. TESSIN, Deutsche Verbände und Truppen 1918-1939, pp. 292-295.
48 The following figures refer to the relevant prey archival material of German origin: W. MURRAY, German Air Power and the Munich Crisis. War and Society 1977, No. 2, pp. 112. Cf .: Horst BOOG, Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung 1935-1942. Guidance problems, top edging, general training. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1982, pp. 137-140.
49 SHD / DAT, 7 N 3446, d. 2, Conversations Franco-Czechoslovak January 1933. Entrances of 28, 30, 31 January.
50 Robert KVAČEK, Over Europe overcast. Czechoslovakia and Europe 1933-1937. Svoboda, Prague 1966, p. 224.
66 The
forecast for future development was based, among other things, on an analysis of the aforementioned Reichswehr armament program of 1932. It was a remarkably correct prediction of a fact that actually occurred in March 1935.51
Czechoslovak intelligence analysts had no illusions about the fate of Austria as an independent state. If the unsuccessful attempt at the German-Austrian customs union of 1931 led to an increase in the interest of Czechoslovak military intelligence in Germany and its intentions towards Vienna, then the failed coup of the Austrian Nazis of July 25, 1934 and especially the German-Austrian treaty of July 11, 1936 analysts in the belief that the Anschluss of Austria must be considered as a future reality.52 The General Staff of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces was certainly not surprised when the Anschluss actually took place on March 12, 1938. Although he did not know the set date for the start of the event in advance, he used his means of modern radio interception to find out at least exactly the moment when German troops crossed the Austrian state border and quickly headed for Vienna.53
Czechoslovak military intelligence interpreted the goals of National Socialism as incompatible with the existence of the Versailles system, and thus of the Czechoslovak state. For this reason, it expected that the armed actions against Czechoslovakia would become the subject of strategic planning by the German Supreme Command. Interest in them was the top priority of the offensive intelligence apparatus of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. At the same time, however, it was the most difficult to reach news target. In May 1936, Group A of the 2nd Study and Planning Department proceeded to a general balance of what it really knows and what it can build on. The results were not satisfactory at all. Strategically important information from agency sources, which was drawn from 1932 to 1935, has mostly become obsolete. Substantial residues increased all the more, especially in the basic aspects of mobilization,
The German counterintelligence barrier was broken at the end of 1936, ie objectively only about a year and a half after the first binding concepts of violent action in Central Europe began to emerge under the highest command of the German Armed Forces. At that time, Czechoslovak military intelligence obtained substantial evidence through the agency that the command of the German Armed Forces had already played a staff game in the spring with the theme of a preventive war against Czechoslovakia. The surviving sources do not specify the identity of the agency source. The outlined intelligence gain impressed in Czechoslovakia as one of the most significant
51 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2682, d. 3, Evolution of the Preparations of the German War, 6 February 1935.
52 SHD / DAT, 7 N 3115, Note from Commander Loriot concerning his interview with Colonel Hájek, head of the 2nd office of the Czechoslovak General Staff (November 28, 1936).
53 Blíže: S. KOKOŠKA, Československé vojenské zpravodajství, s. 97-98.
54 The basic data on the cited balance are based on a source entitled: List of reporting requirements, resulting from the incompleteness of existing assumptions about the possibilities of neighboring states. He had a secret character. He was signed by Col. gšt. F. Havel, Head of Group A, Study and Planning Department, 2nd General Staff. The substantive critical passage in the introduction reads as follows: substantiated by credible reports. // From the point of view of intelligence, no reliable indication has been obtained so far that would allow us to make reel assumptions of reliable value, respectively to test our current assumptions. ” Cited by: VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 37, sign. 37-153-29 – List of reporting requirements, No. 1-5 (citation from No. 1).
67
factors since the beginning of modernization of the state’s defense in 1933 and 1934. The analysis of the acquired material confirmed the highest command in the correct choice of the Czechoslovak military strategy with a focus on the Third Reich.55
Another important aspect was that the knowledge about the mentioned staff game far exceeded the meaning of the Czechoslovak dimension only. In the first days of January 1937, a copy of the evaluated agency record traveled to Paris.57 There, too, the report seemed an extremely important moment. Lt. Col. gšt. Louis Rivet, chief of the French Intelligence Service, personally reported on her gen. Maurice Gamelin, Chief of the General Staff of the French Army, on January 5, 1937 in a summary report. The communication from Czechoslovakia formed its most important part. The Chief of the Intelligence Service subsequently recorded in his diary: “Gen. Gamelin ordered to speed up training in all areas. ”58
The most important thing that emerged from the analysis of the war game was to answer the basic question posed in the already mentioned balance of intelligence about Germany in May 1936. In connection with the operational capabilities of the German Armed Forces, it was questioning: “We must count on the main initial operation against us? In which directions? With what forces? How will it manifest itself initially? ”59 The main theme of the game indicated the fact that it would be Czechoslovakia that would probably be exposed to the first pre-emptive strike in the war, which the German command thought was a conflict on two fronts. The defeat of Czechoslovakia would relieve Germany of the need to cover its strategic rear in the southeast in a decisive clash with France.
The obtained document divided the ground forces of the German Armed Forces into the Army Group West and the Army Group East. The border between them was formed by the city lines Ulm – Kassel – Lübeck, which operationally divided the Empire in two in a north-south direction. The group of armies east against Czechoslovakia consisted of three armies. Among which would be divided nine army corps, 21 active infantry divisions, four reserve divisions, four Landwehr divisions and a tank corps with three tank divisions. The West Army Group, against France, also with three armies, had a total of 19 active and reserve divisions, 13 Landwehr divisions and three tank brigades. The Reserve High Command consisted of two reserve army corps. One was stationed in East Prussia. The Landwehr’s five divisions developed in a wide area from Wrocław to the Baltic Sea as a strategic cover against Poland.60
55 In this sense, in January 1937, Col. gšt. Vaclav Kalina, Czechoslovak military attaché in Paris, head of the 2nd (intelligence) department of the General Staff of the French Army, which was Lt. Col. gšt. Maurice Gauché. SHD / DAT, 7 N 3115, Account, 22 January 1937.
56 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 20, sign. 20-29-44, No. 13 214 taj. hl. No. / 2. department of 16 November 1938, No. 16.
57 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2701, d. Kriegsspiel 1936, Poste de Liaison no 22, 22 janvier 1937.
58 See: Louis RIVET, Carnets of the Head of Services of the Secretaries of the Front popular in Vichy. Edd. Olivier FORCADE – Sébastien LAURENT. Nouveau Monde edition, Paris 2010, p. 96.
59 Cited by: VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 37, sign. 37-153-29 – List of reporting requirements, No. 1.
60 Uvedené poznatky plynou ze syntézy následujících pramenů. Jsou to: SHD / DAT, 7 N 2701, d. Kriegsspiel 1936, Liaison Post no 22, January 22, 1937; SHD / DAT, 7 N 3450, d. 1, Study of a French offensive operation in the Rhineland. Exhibit N ° 1 Hypothesis on the situation and possibilities of the enemy. Hypothetical initial distribution of the resources of Heeresgruppe West; VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as č. 20, sign. 20-29-44, č. j. 13 214 taj. hl. št. / 2. odděl. z 16. listopadu 1938, č. the. 15-16.
68
From the point of view of objectification, it is important to state that the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus penetrated to the very essence of the then valid concept of Germany’s strategic defense on two fronts, which, however, provided for a preventive attack on Czechoslovakia. This intention was first specified by the Schulung Directive of 1935.61 Research to date has convincingly shown that the further development of German strategic plans from 1937 to 1938 remained completely secret from Czechoslovak military intelligence. Little did he know, then, that Germany’s original conception of defense had fundamentally changed during 1938. The strategic defense with active elements was replaced by a purely aggressive plan with the aim of defeating the Czechoslovak army as quickly as possible and taking control of the Czech-Moravian area from further far-reaching conquests. The strategic plans of the German Armed Forces thus fully reflected the objectives expressed by the Reich Chancellor A. Hitler at a meeting with the highest political and military officials on November 5, 1937. On this basis, a document of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht; OKW) was created. . Hitler approved it on May 30, 1938. The action was expected to begin on October 1 of the same year.62
At this point, it is appropriate to find out whether the Czechoslovak military intelligence at least noticed certain phenomena and tendencies that could indirectly and rather partially testify to the planned German strategy against Czechoslovakia. This question is of primary importance in connection with the assumptions of the enemy’s intentions from the time when, from 23 to 25 September 1938, ie after the announcement of mobilization, a decision was made in Czechoslovakia on the choice of a specific method of defense. Arm. gene. Ludvík Krejčí, the commander-in-chief of the field army, ordered a defensive formation to be taken in accordance with the partially amended variant XIII of Plan VII (see the Chapter on Plan of the Czechoslovak Army in September 1938). He made this decision on September 25, 1938. He expected that the enemy will try to strike from the north from the area of ​​Zittau – Bautzen via Liberec to Pardubice and from the area between the Vltava and Znojmo in the direction Zwettl – Havlíčkův Brod. The purpose of such an attack was estimated in an attempt to cut off and destroy most of the defender’s forces in the Czech Republic, and thus thwart his retreat to the east.63 The key question is what the commander in command based on his decision. The primary sources provide a clear answer in this regard. L. Krejčí based his decisions of September 25, 1938 on the content of the report of Col. gšt. František Hájek, Head of the 2nd (Intelligence) Department of the Main Headquarters.64 However, the intelligence picture of the arrival of German troops around the Czech lands did not correspond to the real intentions of the aggressor. This fact conditioned the nature of the decision of the commander-in-chief. He emphasized the Liberec and South Bohemian directions, which did not objectively coincide with the main and most endangered directions of the planned German attack. The erroneous assumptions were based on the belief that the German armed forces were creating three groups of troops. The strongest was considered to be the southern group, which the General Headquarters believed was forming between Linz and Vienna in order to strike the land border of Bohemia and Moravia.
61 Cf .: International Military Tribunal (IMT). Volume XXXIV. Secretariat of the International Military Tribunal (SIMT), Nuremberg 1949, pp. 485-486.
62 Act on German Foreign Policy (ADAP). Serie D. Bd. II. Imprimerie Nationale, Baden-Baden 1950, doc. 221, pp. 281-285, doc. 448, pp. 579-582. See also: IMT, Volume XXV. SIMT, Nuremberg 1947, pp. 433-439, 464-469.
63 VÚA-VHA, f. Sdružený fond Headquarters of the State Armed Forces (SFVÚBPS) – Headquarters (size) Palacký, kart. 6, inventory No. 232, No. 104 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 of September 25, 1938, change of variant XIII; Ibid., Inventory No. 236, No. 119 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 of 25 September 1938, Personal and Secret Directive No. 1.
64 Ibid., Inventory No. 232, No. 104 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 of September 25, 1938, change of variant XIII.
69
Analysts put the Western group in the Plauen – Chemnitz area. The northern ones then guessed over the Šluknov and Frýdlant outcrops. Certain other possible concentrations were also indicated in Silesia. In terms of objectification, however, the fatal message has a seemingly insignificant mention, contained in the Commander-in-Chief’s directive to the commanders of all four armies of September 25, that “something is on the Bavarian border” .65 ground forces. The actual starting line-up of the German Armed Forces for the planned invasion of Czechoslovakia was based on a certain compromise solution. In it, the original intention of Grün’s entry was to make counterattacks from Silesia to the south and in the opposite direction from Lower Austria, with the proviso that the actual center of aggression was considered to be the direction Pilsen – Prague. The converging attacks were promoted by the General Staff of the Ground Forces through General Franz Halder. They had a professional and rational justification. Through them, the main goal of Grün’s accession was to be achieved. It consisted of preventing the retreat of Czechoslovak forces to Slovakia and their destruction in the Czech lands. According to the German strategy, this would complete the military defeat of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Chancellor A. Hitler pushed the strike in the direction of Pilsen into the whole concept. He did so definitively at meetings with military leaders on September 3 and 9, 1938. His reasons were based on political motives. He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 Through them, the main goal of Grün’s accession was to be achieved. It consisted of preventing the retreat of Czechoslovak forces to Slovakia and their destruction in the Czech lands. According to the German strategy, this would complete the military defeat of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Chancellor A. Hitler pushed the strike in the direction of Pilsen into the whole concept. He did so definitively at meetings with military leaders on September 3 and 9, 1938. His reasons were based on political motives. He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 Through them, the main goal of Grün’s accession was to be achieved. It consisted of preventing the retreat of Czechoslovak forces to Slovakia and their destruction in the Czech lands. According to the German strategy, this would complete the military defeat of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Chancellor A. Hitler pushed the strike in the direction of Pilsen into the whole concept. He did so definitively at meetings with military leaders on September 3 and 9, 1938. His reasons were based on political motives. He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 According to the German strategy, this would complete the military defeat of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Chancellor A. Hitler pushed the strike in the direction of Pilsen into the whole concept. He did so definitively at meetings with military leaders on September 3 and 9, 1938. His reasons were based on political motives. He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 According to the German strategy, this would complete the military defeat of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Chancellor A. Hitler pushed the strike in the direction of Pilsen into the whole concept. He did so definitively at meetings with military leaders on September 3 and 9, 1938. His reasons were based on political motives. He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66
The reasons for the misconceptions about hostile intentions were mainly that the intelligence picture was based on very incomplete and distorted sources. The conditions for the supply of fresh reports of the military situation in Germany deteriorated dramatically in about mid-September 1938 after the outbreak of violence on the Czech border. The information permeability of state borders has become dramatically more complicated in these circumstances.67
Impressed by the above facts, it is also possible to ask whether the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus could have received valuable information about the planned German aggression from other sources as well. In this regard, it must be emphasized that the impending international crisis has not led to Allied cooperation with French military intelligence. This was despite the fact that the 1924 Alliance and Friendship Treaty stipulated that the parties would provide information on the impending danger. Hans-Thilo Schmidt, brother of Major General. Rudolf Schmidt, commander of the 1st Tank Division of the German Armed Forces since 1936 and one of the best dedicated agency resources of the French Intelligence Service, announced in late August and early September 1938 the planned date of the planned German action against Czechoslovakia. It was to take place on September 25, 1938.68 A comparison with the key documentation of OKW shows that the time around 25.
65 Ibid., Inventory No. 236, No. 119 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 of 25 September 1938, Personal and Secret Directive No. 1.
66 ADAP, Serie D, Bd. II, doc. No. 448, p. 580. See also: IMT, Volume XXV, p. 465.
67 The causes have been analyzed in detail so far: S. KOKOŠKA, Czechoslovak Military Intelligence, pp. 99-101.
68 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2523, d. 2, Source Z, 23, 25 août, 5 septembre 1938. The gain of these reports is also significantly reflected by: Maurice GAUCHÉ, Le Deuxième bureau au travail 1935-1940. Amiot-Dumont, Paris 1953, p. 70; L. RIVET, Carnets of the Head of Services, pp. 230.
69 IMT, Volume XXV, pp. 451-454.
70 Ibid., Pp. 445-446.
70
operations cannot occur a little earlier.71 The same source also provided information on the planned deployment of the 1st Tank Division and the 1st Light Division of the German Land Forces on the main offensive direction Pilsen – Prague. H.-T. Schmidt provided a number of specific temporal and spatial data on the planned entry of these higher units to the Czechoslovak state borders. The content of these reports corresponded to the real planning measures of OKW. At this point, it is necessary to ask why the French side concealed its findings from the Czechoslovak partners. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the then allied relations in the field of military intelligence were already fundamentally conditioned by French foreign policy. In September 1938, it complied with Germany’s decisive policy of reconciliation, which the British government pursued at virtually all costs. To send a burning report to Prague, which proved the true essence of Hitler’s intentions, would mean, above all, seriously undermining the West’s policy towards the Third Reich. The Czechoslovak president and government would thus have a strong argument for their intransigence against the escalating Nazi demands. Under these circumstances, the French government would have a much harder time leaving the Allied commitments. This was the decisive reason for the non-fulfillment of allied cooperation in the field of military intelligence in the most critical period.72 Under these circumstances, the French government would have a much harder time leaving the Allied commitments. This was the decisive reason for the non-fulfillment of allied cooperation in the field of military intelligence in the most critical period.72 Under these circumstances, the French government would have a much harder time leaving the Allied commitments. This was the decisive reason for the non-fulfillment of allied cooperation in the field of military intelligence in the most critical period.72
Partial conclusion
Due to its geopolitical dispositions, economic and population power, and superpower aspirations, albeit limited in time, Germany formed the main potential source of threat to interwar Czechoslovakia. However, the conceptual and concentrated efforts of Czechoslovak military intelligence were directed against him, but only in the last four years before Munich. This fact reflected a number of political-diplomatic considerations, perspectives, economic interests, as well as an indispensable factor of warming in international relations, typical of the second half of the 1920s. The beginnings of change began to manifest themselves only with the escalation of German revisionism, which was one of the main symptoms of the general economic and political crisis of the early 1930s. It is important that Czechoslovak military intelligence objectively correctly identified Nazism at that time as an absolutely fundamental threat to the security of the state. An important aspect was that it did so objectively and without prejudice in the evaluation conclusions. In terms of international comparison, such an approach was not at all common and self-evident. The intelligence apparatus also dealt relatively quickly with the urgent need to reorient the main effort from the previously preferred Hungary to Germany. He was also well aware that after January 1933, Nazi ideology had become not only the main idea of ​​German domestic and foreign policy, but that all the armed forces were becoming more and more subordinate to it. Until 1938, Czechoslovak military intelligence was relatively successful in monitoring the general strengthening of the German Armed Forces as a whole and in many respects in considerable detail. Until 1936, it also had important clues that testified to the overall German military strategy. In 1937 and 1938, however, his results in this area stagnated. This had a limiting effect, among other things, on estimates of the overall mobilization capabilities of the German Armed Forces and the specific intentions of the German command. Reserves in this area are very
71 Ibid., P. 450.
72 On the findings of French military intelligence on the preparations of the German Armed Forces for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see: K. STRAKA, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance, pp. 36-42.
71
badly manifested in connection with the adoption of specific defensive measures in September 1938, when the then entry plan of the field army of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces objectively diverged from the German concept of war invasion of Czechoslovakia.
72
73
Boarding PLAN Czechoslovak Army in September 1938
In the Czechoslovak interwar army, the plan of grouping individual units after the mobilization was called the start plan. This plan contained all the necessary information to lead the fight in the first days of the war and was marked with Roman numerals. In the autumn of 1938, the Czechoslovak army had prepared an entry plan VII, according to which it was deployed after the announcement of the mobilization on September 23, 1938. And I would like to try to reconstruct this plan in this chapter.
It should be noted at the outset that the entry plans of the Czechoslovak army from the 1930s have not been preserved. The old entry plans were liquidated when replaced by new ones, and any parts left to them were destroyed no later than the night of March 14-15, 1939, before the arrival of the German occupiers. At the same time, the last entry plan VII was apparently liquidated. Thus, all the basic materials on which it was possible to rely disappeared irretrievably. This may also explain that in the numerous literature on the military aspects of the Munich crisis, we find only brief general information on the entry plans of the Czechoslovak army in 1938, but no details.
Despite the destruction of the basic documents, I think it is possible to reconstruct the Czechoslovak Start Plan VII at least partially, based on the following sources:
1) Staff Regulations “Entry Plans” issued in 1938 and preserved, albeit in incomplete form, in VÚA-VHA.1
2) Orders and telegrams by which the entry plan and its variant were announced on September 25, 1938, which were also preserved in VÚA -VHA.2
3) Files of the General Headquarters of the Mobilized Army of September 1938, in which there are mentions of the original concentration areas of selected units of the mobilized army, which are again preserved in the VÚA-VHA.3
4) Memorial work of former officers of the operational department of the Czechoslovak General Staff interwar armies, especially Col. gšt. Josef Fetky.4
1 VÚA-VHA, f. Collection of service books of the Armed Forces – regulation Sm XXI from 1938.
2 VÚA-VHA, f. Palacký Headquarters, card. 1, inventory Nos. 47 and 48.
3 Ibid., Kart. 1, inventory No. 20; ibid., map. 6, inventory No. 232 and 234 – Tulle Headquarters; ibid., map. 2, inventory no. 52.
4 These are two Fetka manuscripts entitled “Czechoslovak Army in 1938 in Munich” and “Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939”. The first of them is stored in the VÚA-VHA, the second remained in the possession of the family, was published in books (Josef FETKA, Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939. Mladá fronta, Prague 2015) and references in the following notes are to this book edition.
74
It is from the memories of Col. J. Fetka comes from general information about the entry plan VII and its predecessors, which appear in the literature. From February 15, 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was given the entry plan VI, which paid the main attention to the defense against the German attack, smaller forces were set aside against the Hungarian attack. In the case of Austria, it was not ruled out that the German army could use its territory against Czechoslovakia. And it was the occupation of Austria in March 1938 that forced changes to the entry plan, which was designated VI-A, from April. The group of units securing the borders was modified and a larger number of reserve units in South Moravia was concentrated. From July 15, 1938, a new entry plan VII came into force. He already counted on a temporary defense on the Vltava line and the adjoining Elbe. Longer-term defense was planned in the Bohemian-Moravian Highlands, and if the enemy could not be detained, the Czechoslovak forces should retreat to Moravia and lean on the Carpathians or Javorníky. Here a tenacious defense was envisaged until the reversal of the war situation and the counter-offensive within the Allied forces.5
In August 1938, the entry plan VII was supplemented by a variant, which consisted of concentrating selected reserve units closer to the main defensive position in Bohemia and should be a reaction to the possibility of Germany deciding only to occupy the border areas of Bohemia and Moravia. The variant complemented the entry plan and joined it as a separate annex. It was from the serial number of Annex XIII that the designation “variant XIII” was created, which was also included in the official documents.6
The boarding plan and its variants were announced on the morning of September 25, 1938 with the slogans “Issue the boarding plan in green packaging” and “Carry out the variant according to Annex XIII”. variant XIII of the entry plan has been implemented with these changes ”.8 And further orders followed. Thus, the Czechoslovak army did not carry out the entry according to the original entry plan VII, nor according to the original variant of this plan, but according to the modified variant. The reconstruction thus breaks down into three different parts: the original start plan, its original variant and the modified variant carried out.
What remained the same in all three cases was the distribution of units defending the main defensive position, ie the border, as well as the division into four separate armies. The first army in Bohemia was to detain the enemy and retreat to the east under pressure. The Second Army in North Moravia and the Fourth Army in South Moravia were to defend the border at least until the First Army managed to retreat. The remaining third army in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Russia was to keep this territory and further contact with the Allies in the east. Part of the divisions, as well as two corps headquarters, formed the reserve of the commander in chief, spread mainly in the Bohemian-Moravian Highlands, southeastern Moravia and western Slovakia (see Map No. 1) .9
And it was mainly the divisions from the reserve of the commander in chief that concerned the changes related to the variant of the entry plan. Thanks to the preserved orders ordering its execution
5 J. FETKA, Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939, pp. 75, 78, 90; TÝŽ, Czechoslovak Army in 1938 to Munich, p. 93.
6 Ibid., P. 46; TÝŽ, Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939, pp. 95, 122-123. It follows from the regulation “Entry plans” that in the guidelines for armies there was a variant as Annex XIII, in the guidelines for corps as Annex X and in the guidelines for divisions as Annex VII.
7 VÚA-VHA, f. Palacký Headquarters, card. 1, inventory Nos. 47 and 48.
8 Ibid., Kart. 6, inventory No. 232. Published in: Documents of the Czechoslovak Army from the autumn of 1938. Orders of the main headquarters from 24 to 28 September. Edd. Pavel MINARIK – Pavel SRAMEK. HaV 1996, No. 5, pp. 83-110, here pp. 87-92.
9 J. FETKA, Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939, pp. 121-122; TÝŽ, Czechoslovak Army in 1938 to Munich, pp. 93-95.
75
we know which volumes it concerned. There were two army headquarters, three corps headquarters and seven divisions.10 While in the army headquarters and corps the variant in my opinion meant only changes in the list of subordinate units, in the divisions it was a change in their deployment (see Table 1). Since we are able to determine at least approximately the originally planned areas for most of them from the sources mentioned in the introduction, we see that there has been a shift closer to the border, especially to the west (see map no. 2).
However, the Czechoslovak army, as already mentioned, further modified its start-up after the announcement of the mobilization. Many divisions thus took up different spaces than originally planned. It all started after the outbreak of the Henlein uprising on the border on September 13, 1938, with the concentration of three fast divisions in western and southern Bohemia and northern Moravia. At the same time, only a part of one Rapid Division (1st Rapid Division) was in the area envisaged by the entry plan.11 was identical to the entry plan. However, the other two (14th and 17th divisions) differed and the divisions were ordered to stay in new positions, which were further west than the original ones, after the announcement of the entry plan (see Table 2) .12
Already after the mobilization, the concentration of another four divisions (infantry) was changed by an order issued on September 25, 1938, together with an order to implement variant XIII. Three (3rd, 5th and 19th divisions) again moved more to the west, the last division (16th Division) in Slovakia remained at the border with Poland instead of moving to the south of Slovakia (see Table 3) .13
On September 27, 1938, the commander-in-chief of the mobilized army decided to move VI. Corps from the advance in Moravia to southern Bohemia.14 A day later, there was an order to move two rapid and one division (infantry) in order to strengthen the defense of southern Bohemia and southwestern Moravia. According to him, the 2nd Rapid Division moved west to the area of ​​Jaroměřice, the 1st Rapid Division, on the contrary, moved east to the area of ​​Pacov. Finally, the 13th Division was to move south to Humpolec after concentrating in the boarding area (see Table 4) .15 These were the last major changes before the adoption of the Munich Agreement on September 30, 1938 (see Map 3) .16
We do not know the further details that the individual unions and unions received, although the start plan undoubtedly included them. We know only the tasks of individual armies, but only indirectly from the commemorative work. Nevertheless, it is possible to get an idea of ​​how the Czechoslovak command estimated the possible course of the war, based on sources from the autumn of 1938, specifically the dislocation of the headquarters of the stage districts. There were a total of sixty of them and they were in the so-called stage, which followed the operational zone, where war operations were to take place.17 Because we know the locations of almost all these headquarters,
10 VUA-VHA, f. Palacky Headquarters, kart. 1, inventory No. 48.
11 Ibid., Card. 1, inventory No. 3, 4, 16.
12 Ibid., Card. 1, inventory No. 20 and card. 6, inventory No. 232.
13 Ibid., Card. 6, inventory No. 232.
14 Ibid., Kart. 6, inventory No. 240. The corps headquarters was to be in Valašské Meziříčí. Published in: Dokumenty československé armády z podzimu 1938, pp. 101-104.
15 VUA-VHA, f. Palacký Headquarters, card. 1, inventory No. 62. Published in: Dokumenty československé armády z podzimu 1938, pp. 104-106.
16 There were still a few minor local adjustments, when, for example, the 14th Division moved from Jihlava to the area of ​​Třešť – Telč – Stonařov.
17 VUA-VHA, f. General Staff, 1st Department, card. 159, sign. 32-22 / 33-2 and cards. 239, sign. 32-22 / 2-15.
76
we can create a line where the Czechoslovak army expected the stabilization of the front (see map no. 4).
It can be seen that no stage districts were planned to the west of the Vltava, ie not even a longer defense of this area. Stage districts in Central Bohemia show that the defense of Prague was expected while maintaining at least part of northeastern Bohemia and southwestern Moravia. The location of stage districts in northern and southern Moravia, as well as in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Russia, shows that no retreat was allowed here.
After the adoption of the Munich Agreement, the entry continued according to earlier orders, but on October 3 and 4, 1938, the first orders were issued in response to the new situation. So far, they concerned only the units in southeastern Moravia and southwestern Slovakia, and the commander in them ordered a move in the southeastern and southern direction to strengthen Slovakia’s defense. On October 6, an order was established establishing a new grouping of forces, consisting in a general retreat of the unions in the Czech lands inland.18 The Accession Plan VII thus lost its meaning.
From the above it is clear that the entry of the Czechoslovak army at the end of September 1938 differed from the entry plan VII and also from its variant. If we compare it with the original variant XIII, we see that five of the 21 divisions (infantry), three of the four fast divisions and one corps changed their boarding areas. If we compare it with the original boarding plan VII, a total of twelve of the 21 divisions (infantry), three of the four fast divisions and one corps changed their boarding areas. It was mainly a shift to the west and it can be said that the center of gravity of the defense has shifted to the west. If, according to the entry plan VII, there were to be only two other divisions west of the Vltava, apart from the units defending the border, and according to variant XIII, there were three divisions, in the end there were four divisions. On the contrary, the advance from divisions in the Bohemian-Moravian Highlands ceased to exist.
In this context, the question arises as to whether it is possible to conclude from the described changes that the Czechoslovak army was only preparing to occupy the border, based on the variant of the entry plan that was created for this purpose. However, there is no evidence of this. All surviving documents clearly show that the Czechoslovak army was preparing for a war clash with Germany and Hungary, not just a limited clash at the border. The variant therefore served only as a basis for a modified entry.19
In conclusion, I would like to try to think about how the entry of the Czechoslovak army in a possible war in the autumn of 1938 would work, if it really broke out, and whether it would not be more advantageous to follow the original entry plan VII. The Czechoslovak command got into the enemy’s tow with all the changes to the original entry plan and completely gave it the initiative. He thus forced his will and gave up the opportunity to stick to his prepared plans.20
In seeking an answer, we can build on the experience of the Polish army in September 1939, whose situation was in many ways similar. At that time, it turned out, among other things, that the fate of the whole war was decided already in the battles for the main defensive position on the border, when the German attack was gradually faced by individual Polish unions. Advances concentrated inland already
18 VÚA-VHA, f. Palacký Headquarters, card. 2, inventory No. 160 and 174 and cards. 6, inventory no. 250.
19 According to Josef Fetka, it could not be ruled out that even an effort to occupy the border could bring about a general war. See: J. FETKA, Czechoslovak Army in Munich in 1938, pp. 87-88.
20 Zdenko MARŠÁLEK, from the viewpoint of a skier or from the perspective of the “big” strategy? A polemic view of the problems of the military development of Czechoslovakia in September 1938. In: The Munich Agreement of 1938 in a European perspective. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2013, pp. 141-142.
77
they failed to stop or slow down the enemy invasion.21 From this point of view, the decision to move part of the reserve divisions closer to the main defensive position and the units that defended it seem justified, even if it meant resigning to the prepared plans. However, Czechoslovakia would almost certainly succumb to the fact that in a lone war with Germany, that would probably not change anything.
21 Piotr M. MAJEWSKI, Fighting or Retreating? Possibilities of the defense of Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1938. Conditio humana – Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk, Brno 2018, pp. 300-303, 308-309.
78
Annex
Table 1 Volume Plan VII Variant

2. division
   near Beroun
   near Pilsen
3. division
   ?
   in Sobotka
4. 
   Bohemian-Moravian Highlands division
   near Hradec Králové
5. division
   ?
   near Zábřeh
6. division
   Bohemian-Moravian Highlands
   Zásmuky – Kouřim
7. division
   Bohemian-Moravian Highlands
   near Prague
8. division
   ?
   u Mutěnic
   Table No. 2 Volume Plan VII Change
9. fast division
   near Slaný,
   part of Karlovy Vary, part near Slaný
10. fast division
    near Slavkov
    Olomouc – Litovel
11. fast division
    ?
    Tábor – Pacov, then Soběslav – Mezimostí
12. division
    near Kojetín
    near Jihlava
13. divided

in Senice

17. division
    Hranice – Lipník
    Turnov – Sobotka
    Table No. 3 Volume Original Change
18. division
    at Sobotka
    Mšeno – Bělá pod Bezdězem – Sovínky
19. division
    near Horní Cerekev
    Písek – Strakonice – Protivín
20. Division
    among Pozba
    Ruzomberok – Zilina – Dolny Kubin
21. division
    u Hustopečí
    Třebíč – Náměšť – Valeč
    79
    Table No. 4 Volume Change
22. fast division
    Pacov – Nová Cerekev – Černovice
23. fast division
    Želetava – Jaroměřice – Moravské Budějovice
24. 
    Pelhřimov – Humpolec – Opatov division
    80
    Maps No. 1 to 3 were prepared by the author using maps from the book: Josef FETKA, Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939. Mladá fronta, Prague 2015. Map No. 4 was prepared by Ivo Vondrovský.
    81
    TERRITORIAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION DEFENSE NATION IN MORAVIA IN 1939 AND 1940
    The Czechoslovak military resistance during World War II is an issue that has enjoyed increased interest in recent years from both experts and the educated public. However, published book monographs or journal studies primarily focus on foreign resistance, whether it is Czechoslovak pilots operating in France and Great Britain, or ground troops participating in the fighting at Tobruk, Sokolov, Dukla or the siege of Dunkirk. The domestic military resistance has so far remained somewhat behind, although its importance has been undeniable.
    The presented chapter is devoted to the resistance organization Defense of the Nation (ON), specifically to its provincial headquarters in Moravia operating in 1939 and 1940. The topic has been more or less addressed in the past by several authors, especially František Vašek and Zdeněk Štěpánek in their two-part study published 1998 in the Moravian National Journal.1 However, its authors did not have at their disposal some important archival materials stored today, especially in the Moravian Provincial Archive in Brno and the Archive of the Security Forces in Prague and Kanice. Also important is the monograph by Petr Kopečný from 2006, which, however, ends with the arrest of the Brig. gene. Bohuslav Všetička in Brno at the end of February 1940 and the subsequent interrogations of the arrested resistance fighters and court trials.2 The aim of this study is therefore to analyze the activities of the provincial headquarters of the ON in Moravia,
    The establishment of the Defense of the Nation in Moravia
    In the first days after the Nazi occupation of the Czech lands on March 15, 1939, it was clear that a hard regime would be established in the newly established protectorate to carry out national, political and social persecution of the Czech population. From the very beginning, this situation was assessed extremely negatively, especially by those groups of the population who stood at the birth of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. These were mainly generals and senior officers of the Czechoslovak army, who were united by the legionary past. Not
    1 Francis VAŠEK – Zdenek ŠTĚPÁNEK, lifted his head among the first. Contribution to the History of the Defense of the Nation in Moravia, Part 1 and 2, Vlastivědný časopis moravský 1998, No. 1, pp. 14-25, No. 2, pp. 113-130.
    2 Petr KOPEČNÝ, Defense of the Nation in the Brno Region 15. 3. 1939-29. 2. 1940. Archive of the City of Brno, Brno 2006.
    82 a
    random phenomenon that the most important domestic resistance organization in the initial phase of the occupation was established in military circles. Accepting the terms of the Munich Agreement was a heavy blow to the Czechoslovak Army Command Corps, and many professional soldiers saw the situation as a loss of life. For them, the March occupation was only the culmination of the negative development brought about by the events of the autumn of 1938. The gradual liquidation of the army and the surrender of weapons and other military material to Nazi Germany evoked an understandable desire for retaliation.
    The social issue also played an important role. The dissolution of the Czech-Slovak army after the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia brought existential problems to tens of thousands of people. Generals and officers were forced – often after many years of active military service – to look for a new job, which was very difficult for many of them. Only a small part could join the ranks of the government, which emerged as a protectorate armed force designed to “maintain internal security and order.” 3 At that time, active members of the army split into two mainstream. The part, consisting mainly of younger years, went abroad, especially to Poland and later to France, where Czechoslovak troops were gradually formed. However, most professional soldiers remained in the Czech lands, and it was from their ranks that he gradually became the ON.
    This resistance organization began to emerge in Moravia in the first days after the March occupation. The first meeting of Czechoslovak army officers concerning the newly created situation and the need to respond to it in some way took place in Brno on March 19, 1939. Negotiations then continued in Prague on March 22 and 23. The initiators of these meetings were the Arad generals Josef Bílý4 and Sergej Vojcechovský5 together with the div. gene. Jan Sergei Ingr (see also the chapter Legionary Past of Army General Jan Sergei Ingr)
    . Patriots or traitors? Libri, Prague 2002; Jindřich MAREK, Hách’s melody boys. Chronicle of the Czech government army in Italy 1944-1945. World of Wings, Cheb 2003.
    4 Josef Bílý (1872 to 1941) served in the Czechoslovak Army from 1892 and fought on the Russian and Italian fronts during the First World War. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, he continued his military career and from 1928 to 1935 he held the position of provincial military commander in Prague. He gained the rank of army general on June 26, 1931. After the occupation, Bílý joined the resistance and later took over the position of commander-in-chief of the ON. He was arrested by the Gestapo on November 14, 1940, and after being imprisoned in the Pankrác prison, he was sentenced to death by a court court and executed on September 28, 1941 by shooting in the riding hall of the artillery barracks in Prague-Ruzyně. The most detailed personality of Josef Bílý is: Michaela STROJILOVÁ, Army General Josef Bílý. Bachelor’s thesis, FF MU, Brno 2018. Thesis supervisor Vladimír Černý.
    5 Sergei Vojcechovsky (1883 to 1951) came from a Russian aristocratic family and served in the Tsarist army during the First World War. In September 1917 he became chief of staff of the Czechoslovak Rifle Division, then took part in the Battle of Bachmach and remained one of the few Russian officers in the legions during the fighting with the Bolsheviks. In 1921 he settled permanently in Czechoslovakia and held a number of important positions in his army. He received the rank of army general in 1929. After the occupation, he joined the activities of the ON, but later retreated to the background, as he was under the constant supervision of the Gestapo. On May 12, 1945, the NKVD commando arrested Vojcechovsky in Prague, even though he was a Czechoslovak citizen. He was abducted to the Soviet Union and imprisoned. Sergei Vojcechovsky died on April 7, 1951 in the central hospital of the Ozerlag gulag in the Taishet district. See: Vladimir BYSTROV, The Fate of the General. Commentary on some documents about the life and tragic end of Sergei Vojcechovsky. Academia, Prague 2007.
    6 Jan Sergey Ingr (1894 to 1956) fought during the First World War on the Russian front and in September 1915 he was captured there. He later enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions and fought first in Russia, then in France and Italy. After the founding of Czechoslovakia, Ingr fought with the Poles for the Těšín region and also with the Hungarians
    83
    about the possibilities of establishing an illegal resistance organization. In Brno, the meeting at the branch office of the Autoclub at the end of March 1939, which was chaired by Div. gene. Antonín Hasal.7 This meeting was already attended by several officers, who subsequently played an important role in the formation of the Moravian Land Headquarters ON. It was mainly a Capt. Čestmír Jelínek, whom A. Hasal introduced to those present as one of the leading figures of the emerging resistance organization in Brno.8 Czechoslovak officers at that time were still working under Hasal’s leadership at Headquarters III. church in liquidation, but later they had to look for new jobs. Č. Jelínek joined as an official at the Cadastral Measuring Office in Brno, and at the same time he actively worked on the organization of resistance activities.
    The soldiers first called the emerging resistance organization the Military Headquarters, and the name National Resistance also appeared. The term Defense of the Nation began to be used in July 1939, and it was under it that the organization went down in history. Officers III. Corps led by A. Hasal and JS Ingr began to create an organizational structure and at that time was very active Colonel Vaclav Lysak.9 Gradually gathered around him a group of collaborators who
    in Slovakia. He then remained in the army and held a number of different positions. From 1936 to 1939 he was Deputy Commander III. church in Brno. After the occupation, he joined the resistance in the ranks of ON, but in June 1939 he went abroad and joined the organization of the Czechoslovak foreign resistance. From 1940 to 1944, he held the position of Minister of National Defense in the Czechoslovak government in exile, and then he was the commander-in-chief of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces for several months. In post-war Czechoslovakia, however, JS Ingr was subjected to various persecutions and in March 1948 he went into exile for the second time. He then became involved in the management of intelligence activities within the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. See: G. SVOBODA, Army General Sergey Jan Ingr.
    7 Antonín Hasal (1893 to 1960) joined the Czech retinue in Russia in August 1914 and then took part in many battles with the Bolsheviks within the Czechoslovak legions. After returning to his homeland, he served in the Czechoslovak army and from October 1934 commanded III. church in Brno. He received the rank of divisional general on January 1, 1934. After the occupation, he actively participated in the resistance in the ranks of the ON, but in March 1940 he went into exile and in France he became chief of staff of the Czechoslovak military administration. In Britain, President Edvard Beneš entrusted him with the management of the Military Office of the President of the Republic. From 1945 to 1946 he held the position of Minister of Transport and on October 26, 1945 he was promoted to the rank of Army General. After the communist coup in 1948, A. Hasal went into exile for the second time and died on April 22, 1960 in Washington. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 91-92.
    8 Čestmír Jelínek (1902 to 1942) was born in Košíře. After graduating from the Czech high school in Pilsen, he joined the Military Academy in Hranice na Moravě in October 1922 as a student. After graduating, he was appointed lieutenant of artillery on August 15, 1924 and at the same time transferred to the Artillery Regiment 152 in Olomouc. From July 1925 he served in the 6th Artillery Regiment in Brno in various positions. From July 1933 he began his studies at the University of War in Prague and after its successful completion he was assigned from August 1936 to the staff of the 6th Division in Brno, where he worked until the end of September. Then he joined the 3rd Department of Headquarters III. choir. He worked here until the occupation, and on July 31, 1937 he was transferred to the rank of staff captain to a group of officers of the General Staff. After the war, he was promoted in memoriam to the rank of lieutenant colonel. See: VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification files of military persons – Qualification file of Č. Jelínek. Jelínek’s biography prepared after the war by his widow Maria Jelínková and dated in Brno on November 7, 1945, see: Brno City Museum (MMB), f. Resistance documentation, inventory no. 152 705.
    9 Václav Lysák (1895 to 1942) came from the village of Trnava near Třebíč. During the First World War, he fought in the c. And k. Armies on the Eastern Front, and in June 1916 he defected to the Russians. After that, he served in the ranks of the Czechoslovak legions and took part not only in the Battle of Zborov, but also in the retreat by Ukraine, the subsequent battles with the Bolsheviks and the guarding of the Trans-Siberian Highway. After returning to his homeland, he continued his military career, graduated from the University of War in Prague and then served in the staff of the Provincial
    84
    later they held command posts within the ON structure in Moravia. According to later recollections of some surviving members of the ON, V. Lysák was at that time a “de facto ideological leader of the movement”. gene. B. Všetička, who later became the Moravian provincial commander ON. B. Všetička had personally known himself since the beginning of the 1930s. Č. Jelínek, who at that time taught at the artillery school in Olomouc, which was commanded by B. Všetička.
    The personality of Brigadier General Bohuslav Všetička
    B. Všetička already had a remarkable military career in 1939. He came from Náchod, where he was born on September 25, 1893. In 1904 he joined the lower military school in Hranice and after its successful graduation he was accepted to the Military Technical Academy in Mödling. Here he completed his studies with honors and on August 1, 1914 he was appointed lieutenant of the army and army. He was assigned as a junior officer at Divisional Ammunition Park No. 13. His superiors then sent him to the Eastern Front, where he was captured on September 11 of the same year.11 He was placed in a prison camp in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia, and later enlisted in the emerging Czechoslovak army. in Russia. In August 1916, B. Všetička became the gunner of the 1st Rifle Regiment in Kiev and Belgorod, and thus began his successful work among the legionnaires. A year later, he received the rank of lieutenant and subsequently changed several positions, before he became a senior officer in the 5th Artillery Battery. In this position he also took part in the first battles with the Bolsheviks near Mariinsky on May 25, 1918
    After the fighting in Central Siberia and other successful clashes of legionnaires with Bolshevik troops in the area of ​​Lake Baikal, B. Všetička was appointed on August 22, 1918 captain and commander of the 2nd Artillery Division, assigned to the staff of the Eastern Front. He received the rank of major on September 25 and was associated with the transfer to the staff of the Yekaterinburg Group (later the North Rally Front), where he first held the position of chief accommodation officer and later deputy chief of staff. In these positions, he participated in all major battles of the group, including the Battle of Perm in December 1918, which became a great success for Czechoslovak troops. On January 15, 1919, B. Všetička was appointed lieutenant colonel and chief of staff of the Czechoslovak army in Russia, while participating in combat operations in the area from Chelyabinsk to Vladivostok. Finally received on 1. January 1920 colonel rank and commanded the 18th transport of Russian legionnaires from Vladivostok to his homeland. This transport sailed on the ship President Grant on April 27, 1920 and arrived in Trieste on June 14. This was followed by a train departure to Czechoslovakia, and on June 17, 1920, a ceremonial welcome took place in Prague.13
    military headquarters in Brno. He then replaced several other positions, until December 31, 1936 he was appointed Chief of Staff of Headquarters III. choir. He performed this function until the end of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. In 1946 he was promoted in memoriam to the rank of brigadier general. See: VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification lists of military persons, qualification file of V. Lysák.
    10 Moravian Museum Brno (MZM), Historical Department (HO), f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 9220 – Typescript of the former member of the ON škpt. Václav Kratochvíl entitled Activities of the Regional Command of the Defense of the Moravia – West Nation, p. 1.
    11 VÚA-VHA, f.
    12 Richard ŠVANDA, Three Fates, Two Wars, One City. At own expense, Náchod 2016, pp. 48.
    13 Ibid., Pp. 50-58.
    85
    The young republic needed experienced officers and B. Všetička therefore remained in the army. He first commanded the 25th Light Artillery Brigade and then on February 15, 1925 he was appointed commander of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade in Hradec Králové, where he served with a break until September 1930. He gained the rank of brigadier general on May 1, 1928. From 1930 to 1932 he was the commander of the artillery school in Olomouc and from December 15, 1932 he took command of the artillery at the Provincial Military Headquarters in Brno. He worked here until October 15, 1937, when he became the interim commander of the newly formed 15th Division in Trenčín, and from January 1, 1938, he took over its command definitively. In this capacity, he was also caught by the state’s military armed forces in September.
    As for Všetiček’s commanding abilities, his superiors generally evaluated him positively in the preserved official materials. General A. Hasal, for example, used the words “very capable, independent, conscientious, very hardworking, diligent, diligent, precise, thorough” in the evaluation dated November 22, 1937. Extremely proactive with a highly developed sense of duty and responsibility. ”14 He further stated that B. Všetička is“ […] of considerable talent, a very good memory. Mentally fresh, very flexible, thoughtful, practical. Judiciary, imagination and talent make it easier for him to solve every problem and situation. ”15 During his military service, he was also a gen. B. Všetička decorated with a variety of decorations. We can name, for example, the Russian Order of St. Anne II. degree awarded in 1918, the following year it was the War Cross of the Order of MR Stefanik and also the British Distinguished Service Order. In 1920, the French War Cross followed by a palm tree and a revolutionary medal, which he took over from the then Minister of National Defense, František Udržal. In 1921, B. Všetička received the War Cross, two years later the Cross of the Knights of the Legion of Honor and the Czechoslovak Victory Medal, which was personally presented to him by President TG Masaryk.16
    Only Všetiček’s family relationships were critically evaluated for a certain period of time. He brought his companion Klaudia née Lysecká from Russia, whom he married in June 1921. However, the marriage was not happy and mentions of it appeared in the evaluation of superiors. Provincial Military Commander in Brno div. gene. Eduard Kadlec, for example, described the situation on December 29, 1936 as follows: “His [Všetičkovy, note. author] private relationships in puncto marriage are wrong. He does not have a common household with the woman on the basis of a mutual agreement caused by the woman’s inconduence; this feeds a reputation very offensive to General Všetička moving in the direction that his wife can be sustained by third parties, with the knowledge of General Všetička. General Všetička, who intervened with me on his part, expressed himself in the sense that that his wife does not provide him with weapons to initiate the divorce proceedings to the extent that he would have wished; in fact, he supports his wife decently, which makes his financial situation quite precarious. ”17 The marriage finally ended in divorce in 1937, and the following year B. Všetička married Milada née Mala, whom he met in Brno at the time he commanded the artillery at ZVV.18
    14 VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification documents of military persons, qualification file of B. Všetička, part II, insert for qualification year 1937.
    15 Ibid.
    16 Private Archive of Vladimír Černý, photocopy of the typescript of Milada Všetičková entitled Div. General Ing. Bohuslav Všetička. Dated in Brno on August 19, 1995.
    17 VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification lists of military persons, qualification file B. Všetičky, part II, insert for qualification year 1938.
    18 Milada Všetičková (1916 to 2008), née Malá, was born in Brno and has lived practically her whole life in this city. Her father Cyril Malý (1880 to 1947) worked for the state railway
    86
    Gen. selection B. All for the function of earth commander ON was not accidental. Before the occupation, he worked in Brno for several years as commander of the ZVV artillery, thanks to which he was well acquainted with the local situation and knew most of the officers at the birth of the ON personally. He also gained considerable respect during the mobilization period as commander of the 15th Division. After the occupation, he lived again in Brno, where he completed an agricultural course for the retraining of officers at the University of Agriculture and from July 1939 he worked as the chief administrative councilor in the Provincial Law Enforcement Office.
    Building the structure of the provincial headquarters
    The first meeting of Generals B. Všetička and JS Ingra took place on April 6, 1939.19 Both at that time criticized the decision of Czechoslovak politicians to accept the terms of the Munich Agreement, and from this point of view they were also critical of some army leaders. In their plans, they anticipated that a war would break out in the near future, in which Germany would eventually be defeated by the predominance of the Allied coalition. Therefore, they considered it necessary to create an organization that would take over power in the Czech lands in the final phase of this war. This organization would also eventually prevent the communist revolution, which at that time the representatives of the military resistance circles reckoned with its possible future development. JS Ingr therefore informed B.
    B. Všetička undertook this task and with the help of Col. V. Lysák and Capt. Č. The proposal was based on the then administrative division of Moravia, so there were to be a total of six regions. JS Ingr agreed with the content of this proposal and B. Všetička was invited to immediately start preparations for its gradual implementation.21 V. Lysák and Č. Jelínek began to involve other officers in the preparatory activities, mostly members of the liquidation commission
    and from 1929 to 1935 he was a member of the National Assembly for the National Socialist Party. From the marriage of Bohuslav and Milada Všetiček, two children were born whose fate was tragic. Zlata’s daughter (born on April 20, 1939) died at the age of 19 of a malignant disease, her son Aleš (born on October 17, 1940) died at the age of five of pneumonia at the Brno Regional Hospital. After the death of both of her children, Mrs. Všetičková devoted her entire life to caring for the memory of her husband and his co-workers from the ranks of ON. Inheritance gen. B. All correspondence (correspondence, military jacket with insignia in the rank of brigadier general, war decorations, etc.) was donated to the collections of the Brno City Museum at the end of her life and she was always willing to help researchers who were interested in the fate of resistance fighters from ON. One of them was the author of this study, who had the opportunity to visit Mrs. M. Všetičková several times in 2000 and 2001 in her apartment on Bieblova Street in Brno. See: Internet encyclopedia of the history of Brno, password Milada Všetičková (available electronically: https://encyklopedie.brna.cz/home-mmb/?acc=profil_osobnosti&load=442 [cited on 20 September 2019]).
    19 This information is also contained in the indictment prepared by the Chief Public Prosecutor at the People’s Court in Berlin No. 12 J 68/40 g against Všetiček’s group, see: ABS, f. 141 (German courts in the empire), sign. 141-237-6, pp. 13-14.
    20 P. KOPEČNÝ, Defense of the Nation in the Brno Region, p. 25.
    21 The content of the conversation between JS Ingr and B. Všetička is discussed in detail in the indictment of the Chief Public Prosecutor at the People’s Court, see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-237-6, pp. 27-33.
    87
    III. Corps in Brno, of which was of great importance for the activities of the provincial headquarters, especially Capt. gšt. Jaroslav Gardavský.22
    Meanwhile, during April and May 1939, the main central military headquarters of the ON in Prague, led by the arm. gene. J. Bílý. At the same time, officers working within the liquidation group of the former Ministry of National Defense stood at the birth of ON. The former commander of the artillery of the 3rd Army, Div. gene. Hugo Vojta.23 Gradually, a large resistance organization was created to cover the entire territory of the protectorate. At the same time, the Prague leadership of the ON worked closely with the Moravian leadership, and all significant steps were mutually consulted at many joint meetings and conferences.
    In Moravia, the construction of the basic command structure of the ON took place until July 1939. An important event in this context was the departure of Gen. JS Ingra abroad. The general lived in Brno in the building of the Provincial Headquarters and after the March occupation he was occasionally monitored by the police. Nevertheless, he managed to cover his resistance activities and take an active part in creating the basic resistance network.24 On the instructions of Edvard Beneš, JS Ingr went abroad on June 20, 1939, which, according to surviving reports, caused a stir among the protectorate police forces. A report dated July 20, 1939, stated that “the search for the missing General Sergei Ingra was in vain. General Ingr is still reported to the police in Brno, Kounicova No. 73. This house is a former military headquarters, former tenants are evicted from it. Therefore, it could not be established when or where General Ingr moved. It was also not possible to find any person who could give information about his current stay. ”25 Moravian Provincial President JUDr. Jaroslav Caha then closed the case a week later, saying that “searching for from above
    22 Jaroslav Gardavský (1906 to 1942) came from Holešov. After graduating from a real grammar school in Brno, he began his studies at the Military Academy in Hranice, where he was ceremoniously decommissioned in July 1928 as an artillery lieutenant. From October of the same year he joined the applied artillery school in Olomouc, where he successfully completed his studies in July 1929. He then joined the artillery regiment 6 in Brno and worked there until November 1935. He followed his studies at the University of War in Prague and after his termination was J. Gardavský from 19 April 1938 assigned to Headquarters III. Corps in Brno, where he first held the position of head of the material group of the 4th department and after Munich the position of head of the training group of the 3rd staff department. After the March occupation, until the end of September 1939 he participated in the liquidation work at the former headquarters III. Corps and in the meantime became involved in resistance activities. After the war, he was promoted in memoriam to the rank of lieutenant colonel. See: VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification documents of military persons, qualification file of J. Gardavský.
    23 Hugo Vojta (1885 to 1941) was born in Tábor. After graduating from the Czech high school in České Budějovice, he studied three semesters at the Czech Technical University, but terminated his studies prematurely. He then worked as an official at the Provincial Finance Directorate in Prague and fought on the Italian and Russian fronts during the First World War, where he defected to the Russians in June 1916. He then served in the Czechoslovak legions and took part in many battles with the Bolsheviks. He remained in the army even after returning to his homeland and then held many positions, receiving the rank of division general on January 1, 1934. From 1930 to 1939, Vojta was commander of the artillery at the ZVV in Bratislava. After the occupation, he became involved in organizing the military resistance. He was arrested by the Gestapo in Prague on February 13, 1940, and after being imprisoned in the Pankrác prison, a martial court sentenced him to death on September 28, 1941. He was shot the same day along with the arm. gene. J. Bílý in the courtyard of the Ruzyně barracks. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, p. 324.
    24 G. SVOBODA, Army General Sergey Jan Ingr, pp. 32-36.
    25 Moravian Regional Archive Brno (MZA), f. B 26 (Police Headquarters Brno), card. 545 – Report of dr. Polácha the presidium of the Provincial Office in Brno No. 18 858 / V of 20 July 1939.
    88 the
    nominee did not have a positive effect in the local district. His successor in ON was to be a wonder. gene. Ondřej Mézl, who settled in Tovačov after the end of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces.27 B. Všetička and V. Lysák also made their first contacts here. O. Mézl subsequently moved to the Bystrc district of Brno and after the emigration of General JS Ingr he became the new representative of Moravia in the Prague Central Headquarters ON.
    The organizational structure of the ON was gradually created during meetings both in the private apartments of its leaders and in restaurants, parks, etc. The most important such places in Brno were the Muzeum café, the U Kozáků restaurant in Žabovřesky, the Besední dům in Králové Pole and the People’s House in Husovice. In addition to V. Lysák or Č. Jelínek, Col. was especially active in organizing these meetings. Ladislav Kotík, who became another important figure of the Moravian Provincial Headquarters ON.28 Gradually, in this way, all important functions were deployed. HE in Moravia, therefore, controlled the provincial headquarters headed by Brig. gene. B. Všetička, whose chief of staff was first Col. V. Lysák and from the end of May 1939 Col. L. Kotík. The change in this function took place in connection with the too “predatory” nature of Col. V. Lysák, however, after his dismissal, he continued to work within the ON as the deputy commander of the Brno-West area.29 At the head of the intelligence department became Capt. Č. Jelínek, took over the organizational department
    26 Ibid. – Report of JUDr. Cahy dated July 27, 1939.
    27 Ondřej Mézl (1887 to 1968) came from Klopotovice in the Prostějov district. After graduating from the Czech high school in Kroměříž, he studied at the Czech Technical University in Brno, but finished his studies after six semesters. After the outbreak of World War I, he fought on the Russian front and in April 1915 he was captured there. In the ranks of the 1st Serbian Volunteer Division, he took part in the fighting in Dobrogea and from December 1916 he served in the Czechoslovak legions, with which he took part in many battles with the Germans and Bolsheviks. After returning to his homeland, he remained in the army and held various positions. From 1925 to 1929, O. Mézl was a Czechoslovak military attaché in Belgrade. He received the rank of divisional general on March 7, 1936 and then became commander of VI. church in Košice. During the state’s military readiness in September 1938, O. Mézl served as commander of the XVI border zone. After the occupation, he became involved in resistance activities, but due to the impending arrest, he left the protectorate in France in January 1940. He then became commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in the Middle East. From April 1944 he was commander of the Czechoslovak military mission at SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force). However, after the end of World War II, he did not receive recognition and in the autumn of 1945 he was retired. After February 1948, gen. O. Mézl into exile, first in Britain and then in the USA. He died on September 6, 1968 in Norh Hollywood, California. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 195-196. However, after the end of World War II, he did not receive recognition and in the autumn of 1945 he was retired. After February 1948, gen. O. Mézl into exile, first in Britain and then in the USA. He died on September 6, 1968 in Norh Hollywood, California. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 195-196. However, after the end of World War II, he did not receive recognition and in the autumn of 1945 he was retired. After February 1948, gen. O. Mézl into exile, first in Britain and then in the USA. He died on September 6, 1968 in Norh Hollywood, California. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 195-196.
    28 Ladislav Kotík (1896 to 1942) came from Lipník nad Bečvou. In 1912 he went to France with his brother Cyril and began studying business school there. However, his studies were interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War, and on August 28, 1914, L. Kotík joined the Foreign Legion as a volunteer, in whose ranks he fought on the Western Front, as well as during the battles for the Dardanelles and the Thessaloniki Front. In April 1918 he was transferred back to France and in June he began service with the 21st Rifle Regiment of the Czechoslovak legions. After returning to his homeland, he continued his military career. After studying at the University of War in Prague, he began working there first as an assistant teacher and from October 1, 1924 as a full professor. L. Kotík received the rank of colonel of the General Staff on January 1, 1931. He also received recognition as the author of professional military writings. From September 1934 he commanded 30. Infantry Regiment in Michalovce in eastern Slovakia and after the declaration of Slovak independence on March 14, 1939, he briefly participated in repelling the Hungarian aggression in the conflict called the “Little War”. At the end of March, L. Kotík arrived in Brno, where he worked as an officer to liquidate Headquarters III. choir. In 1946 he was promoted in memoriam to the rank of brigadier general. See: VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification lists of military persons, qualification file of L. Kotík.
    29 Vladimír ČERNÝ, Genesis of the Introductory Phase of the Anti-Nazi Resistance in the Brno Region (March 1939-September 1941). Advanced Master’s thesis, Institute of History, Faculty of Arts, Masaryk University, Brno 2003, pp. 23.
    89
    kpt. J. Gardavský. Other officers worked with various tasks within the provincial headquarters and the medical service was headed by MUDr. Jan Vignati.30
    In the course of May 1939, the headquarters of individual subordinate regions were gradually built, the provincial command originally designating a total of six (Brno-město, Brno-venkov, Olomouc, Jihlava, Uherské Hradiště and Moravská Ostrava). However, such a division was somewhat cumbersome, for example in the field of transport, and the contacts between the center and the individual regions were also complicated. Therefore, Moravia was eventually divided according to the shape of the territory within the protectorate borders into two areas, namely Moravia-West and Moravia-East. For tactical reasons, there was a minor change of names to the western area with headquarters in Brno and the eastern area with the center in Olomouc. This division reflected the original location of the headquarters within the corps of the Czechoslovak army.31
    Until the exact determination of command functions, the commander of the area of ​​Moravia-West Col. V. Lysák. Then the brig took over the position. gene. František Slunečko32 and V. Lysák
    30 MUDr. Jan Vignati (1899 to 1942) came from Přerov. He also graduated from the first five classes of the grammar school and studied in Valašské Meziříčí for the last three years. In the autumn of 1917, he passed his high school diploma, when he had been performing military service with artillery on the Russian front since March of this year. He also fought in Italy and in 1919 he took part in battles with the Hungarian Bolsheviks in Slovakia. From 1919 to 1924 he studied at the Medical Faculty of Masaryk University in Brno and after graduation he worked from December 1924 at the Institute of Microbiology prof. J. Kabelík in Olomouc. On March 1, 1930, MUDr. Vignati appointed proctor of the Provincial Hospital in Uherské Hradiště, where he worked until his arrest by the Gestapo on March 1, 1940. He was the author of a total of 35 scientific papers in the fields of chemotherapy, bacteriology, serology and colloid chemistry published in Czech, British, French and German professional journals. After the arrest, the Nazis imprisoned MUDr. J. Vignati in several prisons in Brno and Germany, and on November 18, 1941, he was sentenced to death by the People’s Court. The execution was carried out in Berlin-Plötzensee on August 26, 1942. See: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 638 – Typescript by L. Boček entitled MUDr. Jan Vignati in a German prison. Xerocopy of typewritten transcripts of skeins and letters MUDr. J. Vignati from prison see: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. No. S 553. Xerocopy of typewritten transcripts of skeins and letters MUDr. J. Vignati from prison see: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. No. S 553. Xerocopy of typewritten transcripts of skeins and letters MUDr. J. Vignati from prison see: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. No. S 553.
    31 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 9220 – Typescript of a former member of ON škpt. Václav Kratochvíl entitled Activities of the Regional Command of the Defense of the Nation of Moravia – West, pp. 2-3.
    32 František Slunečko (1886 to 1963) was born in Mladá Vožice, Tábor district. After graduating from the Czech High School in České Budějovice, he completed six semesters at the Czech Technical University in Prague, but later dropped out of studies. After the outbreak of World War I, he fought on the Russian front, where he was captured on December 21, 1914. From December 1916 he served in the Czechoslovak legions, taking part in a series of fighting with the Germans and later the Bolsheviks. After returning to his homeland, he remained in the army and in November 1922 he was appointed commander of the 8th Infantry Regiment in Český Těšín. He served in this position until the second half of January 1929, after which he took command of the 16th Infantry Brigade in Místek. He received the rank of brigadier general on July 16, 1929. In the first half of the 1930s, F. Slunečko held the position of deputy commander of the ZVV in Košice, then commanded the 12th Infantry Brigade in Znojmo. After episodic work as the deputy commander of the 6th Division, from the beginning of May 1938 he headed the 2nd Group in Jihlava and performed this function even under the armed state. After Munich, he joined the headquarters of III. church in Brno. F. Slunečko was the only commander of the first set of ON, who did not fall into the hands of the Gestapo or go abroad. He worked illegally from December 2, 1939 until the outbreak of the Prague Uprising. In 1944, he became the head of the ALEX military headquarters and, among other things, cooperated with the BARIUM pargroup. As the leader of the Central National Committee, he tried to unite the resistance currents under his command, but this plan did not work. After the liberation, F. Slunečko received the rank of division general on August 1, 1945, but due to his age, he was retired at the beginning of June 1946. The communist regime persecuted him, and at the turn of 1948 and 1949, F. Slunečko spent several months in custody without trial. He died in Prague on December 10, 1963. See: Military figures of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, p. 262.
    90
    became his deputy. Brig. gene. Václav Ždímal.33 The regional headquarters included the regional headquarters, which was organizationally built at the level of divisions. The regional headquarters in Brno consisted of the Brno-město, Brno-venkov and Jihlava regions; the Olomouc, Moravská Ostrava and Uherské Hradiště regions were then subject to the regional headquarters in Olomouc. Suitable officers for command functions in these regions began to be sought during April 1939 and gradually the command positions were filled. This was mostly done on the basis of the knowledge of individual officers and the selection of commanders was made by B. Všetička with the assistance of V. Lysák and Č. Jelínek. The regional headquarters then included the district headquarters and at the lowest level stood the local headquarters.34
    Its provincial political department also played an important role in shaping the ON. The beginnings of its establishment date back to the period of the mentioned meeting in the office of the Moravian branch of the Autoclub at the end of March 1939. An illegal group was founded here, headed by PhMr. Vítězslav Mečíř, 35 who was the co-founder and first chairman of this branch. At the end of May 1939, Mečíř’s organization established contact with another resistance
    33 Václav Ždímal (1890 to 1942) came from Heřmanov in the district of Žďár nad Sázavou. After graduating from the Czech high school in Velké Meziříčí, he studied at the Czech Technical University in Brno, but later interrupted his studies and began working as a surveyor. During the First World War, he fought on the Russian front, where at the end of September 1915 he was taken prisoner. He later enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions, took part in the Battle of Zborov and completed the Siberian anabasis. After returning to his homeland, he remained in the army and served in various command positions. Among other things, he worked from 1923 to 1925 at the Military Academy in Hranice as an instructor and commander of the artillery division. From November 1926 to the end of September 1931 and then again from September 1932 to September 1933 he commanded the 7th Artillery Regiment in Olomouc. Then a year he commanded the 331 Artillery Regiment in Jince and from September 30, 1934 10. field artillery brigade in Banská Bystrica. V. Ždímal received the rank of brigadier general on July 1, 1936. From mid-October 1937 until the occupation, he held the position of artillery commander IV. Corps in Olomouc and under the armed forces of the state commanded the artillery of Border Zone XIII in Hranice. After joining the resistance, V. Ždímal managed to build an effectively functioning headquarters in Olomouc, but on December 11, 1939, he was arrested by the Gestapo. He was sentenced to death on April 13, 1942 by the People’s Court in Berlin. The guillotine execution took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on September 2 of the same year. After liberation, he received the rank of division general in memoriam in 1946. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 338-339. From mid-October 1937 until the occupation, he held the position of artillery commander IV. Corps in Olomouc and under the armed forces of the state commanded the artillery of Border Zone XIII in Hranice. After joining the resistance, V. Ždímal managed to build an effectively functioning headquarters in Olomouc, but on December 11, 1939, he was arrested by the Gestapo. He was sentenced to death on April 13, 1942 by the People’s Court in Berlin. The guillotine execution took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on September 2 of the same year. After liberation, he received the rank of division general in memoriam in 1946. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 338-339. From mid-October 1937 until the occupation, he held the position of artillery commander IV. Corps in Olomouc and under the armed forces of the state commanded the artillery of Border Zone XIII in Hranice. After joining the resistance, V. Ždímal managed to build an effectively functioning headquarters in Olomouc, but on December 11, 1939, he was arrested by the Gestapo. He was sentenced to death on April 13, 1942 by the People’s Court in Berlin. The guillotine execution took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on September 2 of the same year. After liberation, he received the rank of division general in memoriam in 1946. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 338-339. Ždímal managed to build an effectively functioning ON headquarters in Olomouc, but on December 11, 1939, he was arrested by the Gestapo. He was sentenced to death on April 13, 1942 by the People’s Court in Berlin. The guillotine execution took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on September 2 of the same year. After liberation, he received the rank of division general in memoriam in 1946. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 338-339. Ždímal managed to build an effectively functioning ON headquarters in Olomouc, but on December 11, 1939, he was arrested by the Gestapo. He was sentenced to death on April 13, 1942 by the People’s Court in Berlin. The guillotine execution took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on September 2 of the same year. After liberation, he received the rank of division general in memoriam in 1946. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 338-339.
    34 A detailed scheme of the ON land command in Moravia and subordinate units was prepared by the former commander of the strike units of the Moravia-West headquarters, Col. Otto Francl (1895 to 1950), who, as one of the few senior officers of the First ON, managed to survive the occupation, even though he fell into the hands of the Gestapo on March 19, 1940 and was imprisoned until the end of the war. See: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. No.
    35 Vítězslav Mečíř (1887 to 1942) was born in Mladá Boleslav. After studying at Charles University, he practiced medicine in Rožmitál and Prachatice. He has lived in Brno since 1911 and worked there as a pharmacist and scientific representative for Medica. After participating in resistance activities, he participated in the preparation of bacteriological means against the Nazis. He was arrested together with MUDr. J. Vignatim, March 1, 1940. The People’s Court in Berlin sentenced him to death on November 18, 1941, and on August 26, 1942, Mečíř was executed in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison. See: Internet encyclopedia of the history of Brno, password Vítězslav Mečíř (available electronically: https://encyklopedie.brna.cz/home-mmb/?acc=profil_osobnosti&load=3997 [cited on 20 September 2019]).
    91
    a group around Masaryk University professor Jan Uhr36 and both became the basis for the creation of the provincial political department.37
    The structure of ON was therefore quite extensive, fragmented and sophisticated. However, it is necessary to take into account that the outlined organizational scheme was built differently in practice in different places and in some parts of Moravia only the framework of these secret military units was created, which was then to be completed quickly in the event of a planned general uprising. The generals at the head of the ON assumed that already at the turn of 1939 and 1940 there would be a coalition of Western powers with the Soviet Union and the subsequent early defeat of Germany. In the final phase of this military conflict, a large-scale uprising was to break out in the Protectorate, in which the ON’s military units would play a key role. It would also belong to them in the first phase of post-war development. However, it was not a military dictatorship, but a
    The basic tasks of organizational construction and formation of the ON structure were completed in July 1939. The organization had a large number of members throughout the protectorate, so there were representatives of all walks of life. In addition to former professional soldiers, legionnaires, police officers, members of Sokol or Orla, teachers, doctors, officials, clergy, postal and railway employees and members of various manual occupations also worked in the ON. However, the rapidly built and too large structure also posed a considerable danger, as the involvement of a large number of people in the resistance activity increased the likelihood of its disclosure. The division of the ON was clear, schematic and hierarchically organized, which later made it easier for the Gestapo to proceed with its liquidation.
    36 Prof. PhDr. Jan Uher (1891 to 1942) came from Prostějov. He studied philosophy-Czech language at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University and, after obtaining his doctorate, obtained a habilitation at Masaryk University in Brno in 1925 as The Problem of Discipline. He dealt mainly with the psychology and upbringing of a preschool child. From 1935 he worked as an extraordinary professor of pedagogy at the Faculty of Arts of Masaryk University in Brno and in 1937 he became a full professor at Comenius University in Bratislava, from where he returned to Brno in the autumn of 1938. At the beginning of the following year, his major scientific work entitled Secondary School Student was published. He was also the chairman of the Czech Sokol Community and the founder of the Free Pedagogical Association. Prof. J. Uher was arrested on November 20, 1939 and after a long imprisonment in Špilberk, in Kounic’s dormitories, Wrocław, Diezu an der Lahn and Alt Moabit sentenced him to death on June 9, 1942. The execution took place in Berlin-Plötzensee on October 26 of that year. See for example: Boris UHER – Jana UHLÍŘOVÁ, Jan Uher (1891-1942). Institute for Information in Education, Prague 1993.
    37 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory no.
    38 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 17/1 – Typescript prof. Robert Konečný New Republic. Nation Defense Political Program.
    39 Detlef BRANDES, Czechs under the German Protectorate. Occupation policy, collaboration and resistance 1939-1945. Prostor, Prague 1999, p. 72.
    92
    Resistance activities of the Defense of the Nation
    For the further development of the situation of the Moravian ON, the meeting held in the Prague apartment of the arm. gene. J. Bílý in July 1939, which was attended by Moravian representatives Generals B. Všetička, O. Mézl and Col. L. Kotík. B. Všetička reported on the development of resistance activities in Moravia, after which his words were criticized by the brig. gene. Bedřich Neumann, who pointed out the disparity in comparison with the situation in the Czech Republic.40 The resistance fighters were primarily to try to obtain as many weapons as possible, because their lack seemed to be the most significant problem of domestic resistance. The participants of the meeting then agreed on the expected early outbreak of war, which, as has already been said, should not have been too long according to the ideas of the ON commanders.
    The resistance activities of the provincial headquarters of the ON and its subordinate units in Moravia manifested themselves in practice in various ways. On the one hand, there were attempts to acquire weapons and ammunition for the planned uprising, which was to break out in the Czech lands in the final phase of the expected war. These weapons could be obtained from four sources, namely by dismantling weapons stocks from military warehouses, purchase, theft or own production.42 In attempts to obtain more weapons and ammunition, the attention of Moravian ON members was focused mainly on the Brno Zbrojovka Group, which It was one of the leading arms races in Europe at the time.43 The local shooters Josef Kulka (former Russian legionnaire) and Karel Bauer joined the resistance, who came up with a plan to keep the ammunition saved from shooting at the company’s shooting range. They also included other employees, Josef Gottwald and Jaroslav Lukášek. In the period up to August 1939, about 45,000 pieces of ammunition were obtained in this way, which were then walled up in the walls of one of the dungeons on the shooting range. However, their activities were revealed and on September 5, 1939, members of the Gestapo arrested J. Kulka and his collaborators. The German court-martial sentenced J. Kulka and K. Bauer to death on December 19, 1939, and J. Lukášek and J. Gottwald received each
    40 Bedřich Neumann (1891 to 1964) came from Třebichovice in the Kladno district. During the First World War, he was captured in March 1915 on the Russian front. After staying in prison camps, he enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions and later took part in the fighting with the Germans during the retreat by Ukraine and the subsequent fighting with the Bolsheviks. After returning to his homeland, he remained in the army, studied at the War College in Prague and held various command positions. In the years 1931 to 1935 was II. Deputy Chief of Staff, and on July 1, 1933, he received the rank of brigadier general. From the end of September 1935 to April 1939, B. Neumann worked for the 5th Division in České Budějovice, which he later took command of. During the state’s military readiness in the autumn of 1938, he was the commander of the 31st Border Area. gene. J. Bílý and at the same time a representative of this organization in the Political Headquarters. In January 1940, B. Neumann left the protectorate abroad and in France became chief of staff of the Czechoslovak military administration. From June 13, 1940 he was commander of the 1st Czechoslovak Division in France. After the evacuation to Britain, the division was reorganized into the 1st Czechoslovak Mixed Brigade and B. Neumann was appointed its commander. In January 1943, he took over as Chief of Staff for building the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in London. After the war he worked as an austerity commissioner of the MNO and after February 1948 he went into exile. He died on July 16, 1964 in London. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 206-207. After the evacuation to Britain, the division was reorganized into the 1st Czechoslovak Mixed Brigade and B. Neumann was appointed its commander. In January 1943, he took over as Chief of Staff for building the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in London. After the war he worked as an austerity commissioner of the MNO and after February 1948 he went into exile. He died on July 16, 1964 in London. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 206-207. After the evacuation to Britain, the division was reorganized into the 1st Czechoslovak Mixed Brigade and B. Neumann was appointed its commander. In January 1943, he took over as Chief of Staff for building the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in London. After the war he worked as an austerity commissioner of the MNO and after February 1948 he went into exile. He died on July 16, 1964 in London. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 206-207.
    41 The general early assumption of the end of the war on the part of the ON leadership is also evidenced by the content of the above-mentioned recollections of the Capt. V. Kratochvíla and prof. R. Konečný.
    42 V. ČERNÝ, The Genesis of the Introductory Phase of the Anti-Nazi Resistance in the Brno Region, p. 56.
    43 Part three. History of the Brno Zbrojovka concern. Blok, Brno 1973.
    93
    in the amount of two years in prison. Both convicts were then executed at Špilberk Castle on January 31, 1940, and these were the first executions of members of the domestic resistance carried out by the occupation apparatus in Brno.44 Despite all efforts to obtain more weapons, the situation was not favorable in the autumn of 1939. He had only about 30 or 40 machine guns, several thousand rifles and not a large amount of suitable ammunition in the whole of Moravia.
    Furthermore, minor sabotages were carried out, the scope of which should not have been greater due to the threat of premature disclosure of the existence of ON. However, a somewhat problematic element was the attempts to use bacteriological means in the fight against the occupying power. MUDr. J. Vignati, who in May 1939 during a meeting of resistance fighters in the apartment of prof. František Nábělek in Brno-Králové Pole in the presence of B. Všetička, Č. Jelínek and V. Mečíř proposed the use of botulinum toxin (so-called sausage poison, one of the most effective natural poisons) and typhoid bacteria. These funds were to be expanded by means of sprinklers.45 B. Všetička informed about the proposal of O. Mézl, who did not speak out against him in principle. However, he stated that the possible use of these funds must be approved by the central headquarters in Prague, which was also to finance further attempts in this direction.
    The tests took place in the Vignati laboratory in Uherské Hradiště, as well as in Brno, Modřice, Olomouc, Jihlava and Moravská Ostrava.46 where they were to be sprayed on mailboxes and cranks at inns, cinemas, etc. The members of the ON understood this activity as a kind of preventive measure, as they expected the German army to use chemical weapons in the coming conflict, as was the case during the First World War. The Provincial Headquarters of ON entrusted the production of sprayers Ing. Jiří Elgr and Ing. Konstantin Raclavský, whose workplace at the Sochor company in Blansko seemed to be suitable for the preparation of the whole event. The actual assembly of the sprayers took place in Elgr’s factory in Brno-Černovice. 47 About 50 or 60 pieces were made. Practical use then occurred in the infestation of horse rail transports in Stuttgart and Freiburg, killing more animals.48 According to the post-war testimony of the Gestapo criminal assistant Willi Braun, 49 who was investigating a number of arrested members of the ON, further experiments took place in June 1939.
    44 Ibid., Pp. 172-173.
    45 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 15 – Typescript of Miloš Mečíř entitled Report on Activities in the Underground Resistance Organization Defense of the Nation, p. 3.
    46 Ibid.
    47 P. KOPEČNÝ, Defense of the Nation in the Brno Region, p. 64.
    48 F. VAŠEK – Z. ŠTĚPÁNEK, They raised their heads among the first, Part 2, p. 120.
    49 Willi Braun (1916 to 1947) was a German from Brno who began working as an interpreter for the Brno Gestapo in April 1939. As part of Report II, BM / So was promoted to an independent investigator and was notorious for the brutality with which he approached those under investigation. Another of Braun’s work was the IV N intelligence unit, in which he carried out a number of actions against paratroopers sent to the protectorate from Great Britain and the Soviet Union. At the beginning of April 1945, W. Braun fatally shot a criminal Gestapo inspector, Alexander Schober, who cooperated with the Czech resistance in Velké Meziříčí. The Extraordinary People’s Court in Brno sentenced Braun to death on January 10, 1947, and was executed on the same day. See: MZA, f. C 141 (Extraordinary People’s Court Brno), inventory No. 2870, card. 246, file number Lsp 1999/46.
    94
    in German villages in the Jihlava and Vyškov regions. However, there was no success in this case because “typhus cultures were destroyed by not maintaining a certain temperature” .50
    An important part of the activities of the ON was also the provision of illegal crossings of protectorate borders. In Brno, Capt. J. Gardavský, and the main goal was Poland until the outbreak of World War II. People who wanted to leave the territory of the protectorate were concentrated in Přerov and Valašské Meziříčí. The most important transitional route in the direction Solanec – Bílá – Jablunkov operated until the end of August 1939 and was used by several dozen soldiers. In June 1939, a brig stayed at Solance. gene. Zdeněk Novák, who then managed the crossings from there personally.51 However, when German troops concentrated in this area at the end of August of the same year to attack Poland, it was no longer possible to use the route.52 After the war broke out, the route through Slovakia and Hungary gained importance. to Yugoslavia.
    Another manifestation of ON’s activities was intelligence activities, which were managed in Brno by Capt. Č. Jelínek in close cooperation with Col. L. Kotík and Capt. J. Gardavský. An illegal radio connection between Brno and Prague was achieved, in which the lieutenant of the telegraph service Karel Štolc actively participated.53 The radio connection continued to operate between some units of the
    50 MZA, f. C 141, inventory no. 2870, kart. 246, file number Lsp 1999/46 – Protocol written with Willi Braun at the Regional Office of the StB in Brno and dated June 14, 1946, pp. 4-5.
    51 Zdeněk Novák (1891 to 1988) came from Paskov in the Místek district. During the First World War, he fought on the Serbian and Russian fronts, where he was captured in June 1916. He then enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions and as an artillery officer took part in retreating battles with the German army in Ukraine and then many clashes with the Bolsheviks. After returning to his homeland, he remained in the army and from November 1920 to the end of February 1929 he commanded the 11th Field Artillery Brigade in Košice. He received the rank of brigadier general on May 1, 1928. From February 1929 to October 1935 he commanded the 8th Field Artillery Brigade in Opava and later in Hranice na Moravě. Subsequently, he took command of Artillery IV. Corps in Olomouc and at the end of December 1937 he was appointed commander of the artillery at ZVV Brno. In the autumn of 1938, during the military readiness of the state, he commanded the artillery of the 2nd Army in Olomouc. After the German occupation, he retired and became involved in resistance activities. A series of Gestapo arrests at the turn of 1939 and 1940 were avoided by Z. Novák, so in the autumn of 1941 he became the commander of the ON in Bohemia, and after his arrest, Gen. On 31 December 1941, Bedřich Homola took over his position as commander-in-chief. The Gestapo came to Novák’s footsteps with the help of confidants, and on June 22, 1944, he was arrested in Prague. He was imprisoned by the Nazis in Pankrác, from where he was transported for interrogation to the headquarters of the Prague Gestapo headquarters in Petschkov Palace. After the outbreak of the Prague Uprising on May 5, 1945, Z. Novák was liberated and immediately joined the activities of the ALEX military headquarters. At the beginning of August 1945 he received the rank of divisional and April 1, 1946 army general. Novák was arrested in January 1951 and awaited trial until April 8, 1954, when he was sentenced in a fabricated trial to 18 years in prison for military treason and high treason. He was prematurely released by presidential pardon in September 1956 and in 1963 he underwent complete rehabilitation, including the restoration of the rank of army general. He died at the age of 97 in Zadní Třebán, Prague-West District. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 209-210.
    52 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 4186 – Zdeněk Novák’s typescript entitled Defense of the Nation – part one, p. 2.
    53 Karel Štolc (1916 to 1942) came from Kralupy nad Vltavou. He graduated from the Military Academy in Hranice and after his dismissal was assigned to the rank of lieutenant to Telegraph Battalion No. 4 in Prešov, where he served until the Nazi occupation of the Czech lands in March 1939. After joining the resistance which, after the first failure, managed to establish a connection with the Prague resistance in October 1939. After his arrest on November 3, 1939, K. Štolc was imprisoned in several places in Brno and Germany. On March 31, 1942, the People’s Court convicted him together with Maj. Petr Kaman to death. The execution took place on August 7, 1942 in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison. In memoriam he was promoted to the rank of staff captain in 1946. See: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-268-13 – Indictment of the Chief Public Prosecutor at the People’s Court
    95
    HE in Moravia, while it was led by Maj. Petr Kaman. Attention was also paid to the situation at Brno Airport. The train staff then delivered reports on the rail transports of the German troops. It was also important to monitor and register all arrests of resistance workers and to try to find out their causes. There were also analytical comments on the situation in the factories and reports on the level of supply and overall conditions in individual cities. It goes without saying that this intelligence activity was an extremely dangerous matter from the point of view of the occupying power, and its organizers in Brno, including K. Štolc and P.
    Among the individual areas of activity of the Moravian Provincial Headquarters ON were also promotional events in the form of production of various leaflets and illegal printed matter. This was supposed to be a kind of counterpoint to Nazi propaganda affecting the Czech population of the protectorate. The leaflets were distributed in Brno by all higher headquarters, ie both the provincial and the headquarters of the Brno-město region and the regional headquarters. Their greatest occurrence was recorded in the period around the anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic on October 28, 1939.55
    Finally, the last important area of ​​activity of the ON was cooperation with other resistance organizations of the Czech population of the protectorate. Sometimes there was close cooperation and intertwining, so the position of some groups is unclear for this reason. There was a close connection mainly with the group called the “civilian component of the ON” .56 It was a group of intelligence representatives, including several professors of Masaryk University, who actively cooperated with officers from the ON probably since June 1939. The National Movement of Working Youth (NHPM), which was active in the Brno region.57 Contacts were gradually established with other civic resistance organizations, but also with the communist resistance.
    to Petr Kaman and Karel Štolc dated 23 December 1941. Next: Internet encyclopedia of the history of Brno, password Karel Štolc (available electronically: https://encyklopedie.brna.cz/home-mmb/?acc=profil_osobnosti&load=3236 [cited on 20 September 2019]).
    54 Petr Kaman (1895 to 1942) came from Brno. During the First World War, he fought on the Italian front, where he fell into captivity at the end of the war on October 25, 1918, and then enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions. After returning to his homeland, in 1919 he took part in battles with the Hungarian Bolsheviks in Slovakia. From October 1920, P. Kaman served in the 2nd Telegraph Battalion in Brno, where in December 1926 he took over the commander of the 8th Telegraph Company. In 1933 he became a full professor at the Military Telegraph School in Turnov. He received the rank of major on July 1, 1937. After the occupation, he worked at the building telegraph office in Brno, where he established cooperation with other officers. He was arrested by the Gestapo on December 3, 1939, and after a long imprisonment, he and K. Štolc were sentenced to death on March 31, 1942, and executed in Berlin-Plötzensee on August 7 of that year. In memoriam he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1946. Investigative materials of the German People’s Court to P. Kaman see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-268-16.
    55 Gendarmerie reports on the findings of individual leaflets in the period of October and November 1939 in Moravia see: MZA, f. B 72 (Zemské četnické velitelství Brno), card. 60.
    56 Historian Jan Boris Uhlíř describes this group as an independent organization and calls it the Provincial National Committee. See: Jan Boris UHLÍŘ, Provincial National Committee. His place in the first resistance set. DaS, 2000, No. 1, pp. 26-30. For its history, see: Milada ŠIMSOVÁ, Resistance fighters from the Defense of the Nation judged as “Helfert Intelligenz – Gruppe”. Matice moravské 1998, pp. 107-127.
    57 See: V. ČERNÝ, Left-wing Youth Organizations in Moravia in the Anti-Nazi Resistance. In: Jiří KOCIAN – Jaroslav PAŽOUT – Jakub RÁKOSNÍK (edd.), Bolshevism, Communism and the Radical
    96
    Gestapo arrests and breaking up the structure
    Its members managed to keep the activities of ON quite successful for several months. However, the turning point came in the autumn of 1939, when a large number of leaflets were found in the streets of Brno during the anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic on 28 October. Eighteen-year-old Anna Žáčková then applied to the local Gestapo office with the information that František Šmíd from the village of Chrlice is expanding them. Criminal Commissioner Otto Koslowski, who arrested F. Šmíd in Chrlice, was commissioned to investigate the case. During the house search, the leaflets were actually found.58 Šmíd was a member of the NHPM and acted as a liaison to other resistance organizations, so he had considerable knowledge of resistance activities in Moravia. During the so-called “sharpened interrogations”, the Gestapo investigators revealed a lot of information that Nazi investigators used in further interventions. In addition, the Gestapo already had some additional information gathered during interrogations of detainees in attempts to cross the protectorate’s borders illegally. On the same day as F. Šmíd, one of the leading Brno resistance fighters, prof. PhDr. Vladimír Helfert, for whom it is not clear how the Gestapo revealed his resistance activities.59 After the war, the already mentioned criminal assistant of the Brno Gestapo Willi Braun stated in the protocol to break up the ON that “this organization was found on the basis of a leaflet from the communist tendency” .60
    However, Šmíd’s arrest and subsequent extensive statements became undoubtedly a significant cause of the breakdown of the ON structure in Moravia. There is an opinion in the literature that the organization’s own command, which underestimated the Nazi security authorities, was largely to blame for this situation. Such criticism contained mainly books published before 1989, with the ON operation was poorly kept secret and underground principles grossly porušovány.61 leadership, however, was rather an attempt to defame ON because its leaders were among the command
    socialism in Czechoslovakia, Vol. VIII. Institute for Contemporary History (ÚSD) AS CR, Prague 2011, pp. 52-80.
    58 V. ČERNÝ, Brno Gestapo 1939-1945 and post-war court proceedings with its members. Brno City Archive – Moravian Museum, Brno 2018, pp. 97-98.
    59 Prof. PhDr. Vladimír Helfert (1886 to 1945) was born in Plánice near Klatovy. After graduating from the Smíchov grammar school, he began studying music aesthetics, geography and history at Charles University. After graduating, he worked as a professor of history and geography at the Czech Business Academy in Prague. In 1919 he transferred to the First Czech State Real Grammar School, where he taught until 1921. In that year he became a private associate professor in the field of musicology at the Faculty of Arts of Masaryk University. Here he became an extraordinary professor here in 1926 and a full professor five years later, from 1935 to 1936 he held the position of dean of this faculty and in the following period 1936 and 1937 he was vice-dean. He is considered the founder of the Brno School of Musicology and since his arrival in this city he has also worked in the Moravian Museum, where he stood at the birth of the music archive. After his arrest 14. November 1939 and his gradual imprisonment at Špilberk, Kounice dormitories and Wrocław, he was imprisoned from July 1940 to June 1942 in the Wohlau prison, from where he was released due to very poor health and placed in the Vinohrady hospital in Prague. After hiding in various places, the Gestapo arrested him again on June 23, 1944 in Miřetice u Vlašimi. This was followed by imprisonment in Pankrác and at the end of April 1945 transport to Terezín, where prof. V. Helfert was liberated. However, his health was already critical and he died on May 18, 1945 in Prague. Interrogation protocols written with prof. V. Helfert after his arrest, see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. in Kounice dormitories and Wrocław he was imprisoned in the Wohlau prison from July 1940 to June 1942, from where he was released due to very poor health and placed in the Vinohrady hospital in Prague. After hiding in various places, the Gestapo arrested him again on June 23, 1944 in Miřetice u Vlašimi. This was followed by imprisonment in Pankrác and at the end of April 1945 transport to Terezín, where prof. V. Helfert was liberated. However, his health was already critical and he died on May 18, 1945 in Prague. Interrogation protocols written with prof. V. Helfert after his arrest, see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. in Kounice dormitories and Wrocław he was imprisoned in the Wohlau prison from July 1940 to June 1942, from where he was released due to very poor health and placed in the Vinohrady hospital in Prague. After hiding in various places, the Gestapo arrested him again on June 23, 1944 in Miřetice u Vlašimi. This was followed by imprisonment in Pankrác and at the end of April 1945 transport to Terezín, where prof. V. Helfert was liberated. However, his health was already critical and he died on May 18, 1945 in Prague. Interrogation protocols written with prof. V. Helfert after his arrest, see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. After hiding in various places, the Gestapo arrested him again on June 23, 1944 in Miřetice u Vlašimi. This was followed by imprisonment in Pankrác and at the end of April 1945 transport to Terezín, where prof. V. Helfert was liberated. However, his health was already critical and he died on May 18, 1945 in Prague. Interrogation protocols written with prof. V. Helfert after his arrest, see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. After hiding in various places, the Gestapo arrested him again on June 23, 1944 in Miřetice u Vlašimi. This was followed by imprisonment in Pankrác and at the end of April 1945 transport to Terezín, where prof. V. Helfert was liberated. However, his health was already critical and he died on May 18, 1945 in Prague. Interrogation protocols written with prof. V. Helfert after arrest see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003.
    60 MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2870, card. 246, file number Lsp 1999/46 – Protocol written with Willi Braun at the Regional Office of the StB in Brno and dated 14 June 1946, p. 1.
    61 František ZŘÍDKAVESELÝ – Jiří ADÁMEK – Milan KROUTIL, Brno citizens in the fight against fascism. Blok, Brno 1981, pp. 32.
    97
    cadres of the First Republic “bourgeois” army and did not hide their negative attitude towards communist ideology. It is a fact that some criticisms of poorly conducted illegal activities (handwritten lists of ON members, notes on details of resistance actions found by the Gestapo during house searches) were occasionally made by a few members of the first Brno resistance who survived the war.62 However, this fact is related to the fact that the management of the ON did not anticipate the occupation of the Czech lands in the longer term. As already mentioned, the generals and officers assumed that an uprising of the Czech population and a parallel war of the Allies against Germany would take place in the near future and that the war would not last long. For this reason, the principles of illegal work have also been violated in some cases. The representatives of the domestic resistance did not expect that the Nazi security apparatus could have room for major repressive actions associated with detailed house searches. Although this assumption turned out to be a tragic mistake, in 1939 none of the leading representatives of the Czech domestic resistance could have guessed.
    The first large-scale arrest operation took place in Brno on November 20, 1939. At that time, it fell into the hands of the Gestapo and Capt. Č. arrest, B. Všetička met with L. Kotík and J. Gardavský to discuss the new situation. The general proposed to suspend the activities of the provincial headquarters, whose members were to go underground. However, L. Kotík rejected the proposal. At the next meeting in the presence of gen. O. Mézla was further discussed about the problem. O. Mézl and L. Kotík intended to continue their resistance activities, but for reasons of greater security, they decided not to sleep in their apartments in the future. J. Gardavský, on the other hand, intended to remain in his residence, but with an interruption of resistance activities. However, Kotík’s arrest in his apartment at 50 Sirotkova Street took place during another Gestapo raid on November 23, and J. Gardavský was arrested seven days later. During the last decade of November and December 1939, a number of other officers were arrested and arrested in Olomouc, Moravian Ostrava and Uherský Hradiště.65 He states: “He arrested and investigated many dozens of Czech people for his executive services with the Gestapo in Brno. Richard Schetke was assigned to the so-called ‘Festnahme-Kommando’ when the illegal organization Defense of the Nation was discovered. He arrested mainly officials of the provincial movement ON in Moravia, who were mostly officers of the former Czechoslovakia. armies of which
    62 See in particular the memoirs cited above. V. Kratochvíla.
    63 The dates of arrests of individual resistance fighters were always listed on the front page of the indictments. In this case, see Note 19.
    64 MMB, f.
    65 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. No.
    66 Richard Schetke (1906 to 1947) came from Hodonín. He took an active part in the occupation of some important buildings in Brno by the local Nazis on the night of March 14-15, 1939. He also entered the Gestapo this month and worked as a criminal employee at the Brno management office for the II BM departments throughout the occupation. , II BM / So and N. He was involved in the arrest of a large number of people involved in resistance operations, including the commander of the landing ZINC lieutenant. Oldřich Pechal in June 1942. The Extraordinary People’s Court in Brno sentenced him to death on January 13, 1947, and R. Schetke was executed on the same day. See: MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2895, card. 250, file number Lsp 2031/46.
    98
    most were sentenced to death by the occupiers and executed […]. According to Eiselt’s Gestapo, Schetke arrested about 500 people during his tenure at Department II BM / So. ”67
    Among the officers wanted by the Gestapo was also Col. V. Lysák, who initially managed to escape. He changed his hiding places in Brno many times, but he refused the opportunity to go abroad and join the emerging Czechoslovak troops on the grounds that he should keep the orders to the extreme. He was arrested by a command under the leadership of R. Schetke on December 23, 1939, shortly after leaving the shelter in the Dědák family’s house in Brno-Maloměřice and telephoning his wife from the Koliště wine bar.68 After the war, R. Schetke described the situation in the minutes: I arrested Major Ptašinský69 and Colonel Lysák, and after they were presented to the Gestapo office, I handed them over to custody in Sušil’s dormitories. The arrests were handed over to Sušil’s dormitory because the investigation revealed that the ON organization was large and that further arrests would have to be made. For this reason, other co-participants of the ON organization were delivered to custody in Sušilovy dormitories and later also to Kounic dormitories […]. Colonel Lysák and Major Ptašinský were interrogated by the head of department, Commissioner Taudt, and I interpreted for him. Colonel Lysák confessed to us that he was a member of the ON organization and that he was the Chief of General Staff for the West. ”70
    B. Všetiček, who stayed in Prague with his mother in the critical days of the end of November 1939, managed to escape from the circle of leading representatives of the Moravian Land Headquarters. During the Christmas holidays, his wife Milada arrived in Prague, who was then sent back to Brno with a request to find out information about the fate of Col. V. Lysák and gen. O. Mézla. After finding out that V. Lysák was arrested and O. Mézl managed to escape from the protectorate, she subsequently returned to Prague and in vain persuaded her husband to leave the border.71 During her stay in Prague, B. Všetička met with Gen. J. Bílý, who, after getting acquainted with the crisis situation of the ON in Brno, decided to suspend the activities of the Moravian Provincial Headquarters. B. He offered Všetička the opportunity to leave
    67 MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2895, card. 250, file number Lsp 2031/46 – Final report of the Regional Office of the StB in Brno on the investigation of the activities of Richard Schetke dated 11 November 1946, p. 2.
    68 Jiří MIKULKA, Portraits of the Brave. The fates of prominent Moravian representatives of the national resistance from 1939-1945, which were to be forgotten. Masaryk University, Brno 1995, p. 18.
    69 František Ptašinský (1897 to 1942) came from Hranice na Moravě. During the First World War, he fought on the Russian front, where he was captured on July 6, 1916. He later enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions and was sent to France, where he was assigned to the 21st Rifle Regiment. After returning to his homeland, he took part in battles with the Hungarian Bolsheviks in Slovakia and then served in various positions in the Czechoslovak army. F. Ptašinský was known primarily as a theater and literary critic, writer and translator of Russian literature. As an enlightenment officer for the 304 Artillery Regiment in Brno, he wrote many contributions to the Theater List of the National Theater in Brno and also to the Center for Arts and Culture. He was also the author of several poetry collections, a collection of short stories People from the Circus, and in 1932 Ptašinský’s book Zlomky Anabase was published, in which he described the experiences of legionnaires from Russia. After being involved in resistance activities in the ranks of the ON, he was arrested in Brno on November 20, 1939. The People’s Court sentenced him to death on July 24, 1942, and was executed on November 16 of that year in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison. The fact that he devoted the time between the sentencing and the execution to studying Spanish from a textbook he managed to get in prison testifies to the unbreakable character of F. Ptašinský. He studied this textbook for several hours before the execution and it has been preserved in the collections of the Brno City Museum under inventory number 152 794. For F. Ptašinský, see below: VÚA-VHA, f. He was executed in Berlin-Plötzensee in November of the same year. The fact that he devoted the time between the sentencing and the execution to studying Spanish from a textbook he managed to get in prison testifies to the unbreakable character of F. Ptašinský. He studied this textbook for several hours before the execution and it has been preserved in the collections of the Brno City Museum under inventory number 152 794. For F. Ptašinský, see below: VÚA-VHA, f. He was executed in Berlin-Plötzensee in November of the same year. The fact that he devoted the time between the sentencing and the execution to studying Spanish from a textbook he managed to get in prison testifies to the unbreakable character of F. Ptašinský. He studied this textbook for several hours before the execution and it has been preserved in the collections of the Brno City Museum under inventory number 152 794. For F. Ptašinský, see below: VÚA-VHA, f.
    70 MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2895, card. 250, file number Lsp 2031/46 – Protocol written with Richard Schetka at the Regional Office of the StB in Brno and dated 7 September 1946, p. 7.
    71 According to an interview by M. Všetičková with the author of this study in Brno on 15 May 2000.
    99
    to France, with the proviso that he could hold the position of commander of the artillery of Czechoslovak troops. However, B. Všetička refused the offer. J. Bílý also went underground, while B. Všetička returned to Brno at the end of January 1940, where he mostly stayed away from home. However, the Gestapo obtained information about his stay and was finally arrested on February 29, 1940 in the Slavia café in Brno, where he had a meeting with his wife. The arrest was again made by R. Schetke, who entered only one sentence in the minutes after the war: “At the beginning of February 1940, I also arrested General Všetička, in the Slavia café in Brno.” 72 HE, because the general was the last of the representatives of the provincial headquarters to escape the Gestapo.
    Investigation of arrested members of the Nation’s Defense
    The scope of the ON’s activities in Brno and its surroundings was a shock to the Nazi security apparatus. The Brno Gestapo headquarters therefore created a special report under the leadership of Criminal Commissioner Ewald Taudt.73 The report was later designated II BM / So (short for Sonderreferat) and its task was to investigate only the activities of members of the ON. It was located in the Nazi-confiscated Sušilov student dormitory building at Klácelova Street No. 2, where the Gestapo also set up an improvised prison for some of those arrested.74 B. Všetička, L. Kotík, V. Lysák, Č. Jelínek, J. Gardavský and next. The first interrogations also took place in Sušil’s dormitories. At first, the focus was mainly on Col. V. Lysák and Capt. No. Jelínek, who was interrogated by criminal assistant Braun. The post-war investigation report on Braun’s activities during the occupation states: “Braun interrogated the arrested captain during this operation. Čestmír Jelínek, who was an intelligence officer in the Defense of the Nation. It is well known that Capt. During the first interrogations, Jelínek denied any activity in the ON organization and did not want to admit anything. He was therefore cruelly abused by Braun during interrogations, and when his forces were over, Braun threatened to use other means of torture at his disposal at his disposal and to dismiss him. This will force Jelínek to confess and reveal her co-workers. Capt. Jelínek could not withstand the long-term torment and therefore made Braun a full confession in order to prevent further torment. ”75 Preserved interrogation protocols During the first interrogations, Jelínek denied any activity in the ON organization and did not want to admit anything. He was therefore cruelly abused by Braun during interrogations, and when his forces were over, Braun threatened to use other means of torture at his disposal at his disposal and to dismiss him. This will force Jelínek to confess and reveal her co-workers. Capt. Jelínek could not withstand the long-term torment and therefore made Braun a full confession in order to prevent further torment. ”75 Preserved interrogation protocols During the first interrogations, Jelínek denied any activity in the ON organization and did not want to admit anything. He was therefore cruelly abused by Braun during interrogations, and when his forces were over, Braun threatened to use other means of torture at his disposal at his disposal and to dismiss him. This will force Jelínek to confess and reveal her co-workers. Capt. Jelínek could not withstand the long-term torment and therefore made Braun a full confession in order to prevent further torment. ”75 Preserved interrogation protocols
    72 MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2895, card. 250, file number Lsp 2031/46 – Protocol written with Richard Schetka at the Regional Office of the StB in Brno and dated 7 September 1946, p. 9.
    73 Ewald Taudt (born 1909) came from Berlin. In 1938 he was assigned to the Gestapo office in Karlovy Vary and after the construction of the management office in Brno he took over the BM II department in 1939. Due to the extensive activities of the Defense of the Nation in the Brno region, a special department II BM / So, headed by E. Taudt, was subsequently assigned to investigate the activities of this resistance organization. In 1940, E. Taudt obtained the rank of criminal councilor and under both martial rights in 1941 and 1942 he served as an associate of the Brno martial court. He later led the intelligence report IV N. In the spring of 1945, after the retreat of the Nazi security forces from Jihlava, he disappeared and his fate remained unknown. See: MZA, f. C 130 (Public Prosecutor at the Extraordinary People’s Court Brno), card. 17, folder 17, file 153 – Report of the head of the public prosecutor JUDr. Emil Čermák on unidentified war criminals to the Political Intelligence Department of the Ministry of the Interior in Prague. It bears the date of July 31, 1946 and E. Taudt is listed here under number 304. Biographical data see further for example: Vladimír FILIP – Vlastimil SCHILDBERGER – Jan BŘEČKA – Marie KUDĚLKOVÁ, Brno 1939-1945. Years of lack of freedom. Part II. Josef Filip 1938, Brno 2012, p. 193.
    74 V. ČERNÝ, Brno Gestapo 1939-1945, pp. 99-101.
    75 ABS, f. 52 (Statements of Gestapo and SD employees), sign. 52-1-36 – Final investigation report of the StB Regional Office in Brno concerning the activities of the former Gestapo criminal assistant Willi
    100
    Col. V. Lysák are quite extensive and it is clear from the content that he tried to tactical in his statements. Nevertheless, he provided a number of data and named the gene. B. Všetička, who was still at large at that time.76
    Some other members of the ON found themselves at Špilberk Castle after their arrest and here after the establishment of the prison in the building of Kounic’s student dormitories in January 1940. Conditions in Brno prisons were already harsh and prisoners suffered in all respects. Physical violence was used during the interrogations, although to what extent it was not possible to say to the extent of the representatives of the provincial headquarters of the ON due to the lack of credible testimonies. However, there is a suspicion that V. Lysák suffered a broken rib during interrogations at Sušil’s dormitories in May and June 1940, which subsequently caused liver injuries.77 they revealed more than was necessary. This opinion appeared in one of the letters of the imprisoned MUDr. J. Vignati, who was 25. January 1941 transferred from Sušil dormitories to the nearby Kounice dormitories, from there on March 7 of the same year he was transported to the prison in Wohlau in Lower Silesia (now Wołów in Poland) and in July of that year to Diez an der Lahn near Koblenz.78 Vignati’s last suffering the prison in Berlin-Plötzensee became death, from where he wrote in one of the skeins intended for his wife: “Then to the court. General Všetička betrayed me, in fact, he stated, without being forced to do so by the circumstances. Captain Jelínek told the others, you would see how these heroes changed. Only an old pharmacist [meaning Vítězslav Mečíř, note. author] we saved what we could with me. ”79 March of the same year he was transported to the prison in Wohlau in Lower Silesia (now Wołów in Poland) and in July of the same year to Diez an der Lahn near Koblenz.78 addressed to his wife, he wrote: “Then to the court. General Všetička betrayed me, in fact, he stated, without being forced to do so by the circumstances. Captain Jelínek told the others, you would see how these heroes changed. Only an old pharmacist [meaning Vítězslav Mečíř, note. author] we saved what we could with me. ”79 March of the same year he was transported to the prison in Wohlau in Lower Silesia (now Wołów in Poland) and in July of the same year to Diez an der Lahn near Koblenz.78 addressed to his wife, he wrote: “Then to the court. General Všetička betrayed me, in fact, he stated, without being forced to do so by the circumstances. Captain Jelínek told the others, you would see how these heroes changed. Only an old pharmacist [meaning Vítězslav Mečíř, note. author] we saved what we could with me. ”79 without being forced to do so by the circumstances. Captain Jelínek told the others, you would see how these heroes changed. Only an old pharmacist [meaning Vítězslav Mečíř, note. author] we saved what we could with me. ”79 without being forced to do so by the circumstances. Captain Jelínek told the others, you would see how these heroes changed. Only an old pharmacist [meaning Vítězslav Mečíř, note. author] we saved what we could with me. ”79
    Apparently psychological pressure was exerted on B. Všetička by the investigators, and the Gestapo investigators also carried out personal confrontations of the arrested. After the war, Braun described in the protocol a confrontation between B. Všetička and the commander of the ON in the Uherské Hradiště region, Lt. Col. Vladimír Štěrba: “I was present at the confrontation of Lieutenant Colonel Štěrba with the executed General Všetička. This confrontation took place in Sušilov’s dormitories, about March 1940. General Všetička was brought to the room where Lieutenant Colonel Štěrba was. It was in Jahnov’s office80 and they were present if
    Braun, dated October 30, 1946, p. 3. During his investigation, Capt. Č. Jelínek unsuccessfully attempted suicide.
    76 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-225-2 – Interrogation protocols Col. V. Lysák, registered on 27 and 28 December 1939 at the Gestapo management office in Brno, 13 pages. The interrogation was conducted by criminal assistant Wilhelm Trepp.
    77 J. MIKULKA, Portraits of the Brave, pp. 20.
    78 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 638 – Work of L. Boček MUDr. Jan Vignati in a German prison.
    79 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory no. V. Entangled.
    80 Friedrich Jahn (born 1898) was a native of Brno. He has been working at the Gestapo’s headquarters in Brno since 1939, and during his work in the intelligence department N, he became famous for his cruel methods used in the interrogation of those arrested. Due to his rude nature, he was not popular with other Gestapo people, who gave F. Jahn the nickname “Ivan the Terrible”. Outside Brno, he also worked at Gestapo offices in Moravian Ostrava and Uherské Hradiště. In 1944 he was drafted into the German Armed Forces and at the end of the war he apparently fell into American captivity. His other destinies are unknown; allegedly in 1947 he was to move somewhere in the American occupation zone of Germany. See: MZA, f. C 130, folder 17, card. 7, fol. 118-127 – List of war criminals detected in the Brno district prepared by the chief public prosecutor at the Extraordinary People’s Court Brno JUDr. Emil Čermák.
    101
    I remember, Taudt, Jahn, Schetke and I. General Všetička acquitted Lieutenant Colonel Štěrba of secrecy, which Štěrba was supposed to pass to General Ingra. He advised Štěrb to say everything. Štěrba replied: ‘Order, General,’ and he was given a pencil and paper to write in prison what he knew about the Hradiště regional organization ON. The next day I heard, I don’t know from whom and I don’t know from what report, that Lieutenant Colonel Vladimír Štěrba had been hanged in a cell in Špilberk at night. ”81 Štěrba was imprisoned in Špilberk in a solitary confinement on a cell on the first floor and according to the memories of the prison doctor MUDr. Karel Frinta was in very poor health, with frozen fingers and toes. On March 25, 1940, he had to undergo a full-day interrogation in the building of the Brno Gestapo control office on Mozart Street no. 3 and then there was also a confrontation with B. Všetička. The next day, another Strabba interrogation took place, and at that time he also decided to commit suicide on the grounds that, although he had endured seven interrogations so far, he could have spoken the next one.82
    Testimony of similar content concerning gen. V. Ždímala then comes from Capt. Václav Kratochvíl. According to him, “Ždímal urged the officers to admit that it was honest – perhaps he believed in the humanity of the Germans and in the development of events in favor of the Allies. Ždímal’s activities contradicted the principles of secrecy of the organization at all costs, there were embarrassing scenes in the Gestapo and many lives were lost because of them. “83 In connection with these statements, however, it should be noted that General B. Všetička the officers believed in the imminent defeat of Germany and their liberation, so they apparently did not attach much importance to the content of their own statements. The concept of military honor was also an important factor for them. Senior officers in particular acknowledged their defeat after their arrest and considered the denial low and dishonest, which the Gestapo abused to its advantage. K B. Všetička should be noted that he was arrested at the end of February 1940. At that time, most members of the Moravian leadership of the ON were in custody for several weeks and the Gestapo had extensive knowledge about the activities of this organization, so his statement could not be crucial. Lt. Col. V. Štěrba fell into the hands of the Gestapo on November 30, 1939, and at the time of Všetiček’s arrest he was investigated for three months.
    Trials and executions
    Gene. B. Všetička was transferred on June 1, 1940 to the Moabit prison in the western part of Berlin, where he was followed by other members of the Moravian Land Command ON. Here they were to await trial. The indictment against Všetiček’s group was prepared as early as the summer of 1940, and this fact was also stated by the Reich Minister of Justice Franz Gürtner in his report to Adolf Hitler of September 23 of the same year. The trial could begin in the near future, but A. Hitler took a negative view. During a consultation with the Reich Protector Konstantin von Neurath and Secretary of State Karl Hermann Frank, he refused to hold a trial and said that an execution squad would be enough against the “Czech rebels”, as a possible trial would make them martyrs. In addition, the Czechs would consider the convictions handed down to be illegal, so that these issues should be resolved through the courts
    81 MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2870, card. 246, file number Lsp 1999/46 – Protocol written on 18 October 1946 at the Regional Office of the StB in Brno with Willi Braun.
    82 Ludvík BURIÁN, The past is urgently present. District People’s Committee, Uherské Hradiště 1980, p. 56.
    83 MZM, HO, f. Correspondence, inv. No. S 9220 – Typewriting V. Kratochvil Activity Regional Command Defense of the Nation Moravia-West, p. 9.
    102
    until the end of the war. At the same time, only death sentences would be issued, which in exceptional cases could be converted into life imprisonment or deportation.84 This Hitler opinion was the reason for the fact that the preparation of trials with members of the ON was suspended for a year. The change came only after Reinhard Heydrich took over as deputy imperial protector in September 1941. R. Heydrich convinced A. Hitler of the need to hold trials with representatives of the Czech resistance, referring in particular to the planned trial of the former prime minister’s prime minister, General Alois Elias. This trial took place during an external session of the People’s Court in Prague on October 1, 1941 and ended with a death sentence.85
    Since German criminal law was introduced in the Protectorate after March 15, 1939, the resistance fighters were paradoxically tried for “high treason,” even though the Nazis actually occupied the Czech lands in violation of international law. Members of the ON were brought before the so-called People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof; VGH). It was a Nazi “revolutionary” tribunal whose task was to hear crimes against the state.86 This tribunal was established in 1934 as a court competent to try cases of high treason and treason. Gradually, however, its scope expanded to a number of other offenses. He was originally based in Leipzig, but moved to Berlin shortly after its founding. The law of 18 April 1936 then determined that it was not an extraordinary court, but an ordinary court, and the rules for its composition were laid down. This composition fully corresponded to the mission of the VGH as a revolutionary tribunal of National Socialism. The main trials were decided by five-member chambers, whose members consisted of both professional judges and honorary judges, who were mostly convinced Nazis and mostly deserving members of the Nazi NSDAP. They were appointed by A. Hitler on the proposal of the Reich Minister of Justice, first for a term of five years, then from 1936 for life. All VGH members had to be over 35 years old. Honorable judges often included celebrities, such as the Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank Protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 The main trials were decided by five-member chambers, whose members consisted of both professional judges and honorary judges, who were mostly convinced Nazis and mostly deserving members of the Nazi NSDAP. They were appointed by A. Hitler on the proposal of the Reich Minister of Justice, first for a term of five years, then from 1936 for life. All VGH members had to be over 35 years old. Honorable judges often included celebrities, such as the Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank Protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 The main trials were decided by five-member chambers, whose members consisted of both professional judges and honorary judges, who were mostly convinced Nazis and mostly deserving members of the Nazi NSDAP. They were appointed by A. Hitler on the proposal of the Reich Minister of Justice, first for a term of five years, then from 1936 for life. All VGH members had to be over 35 years old. Honorable judges often included celebrities, such as the Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank Protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 which were mostly convinced Nazis and mostly deserving members of the Nazi NSDAP. They were appointed by A. Hitler on the proposal of the Reich Minister of Justice, first for a term of five years, then from 1936 for life. All VGH members had to be over 35 years old. Honorable judges often included celebrities, such as the Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank Protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 which were mostly convinced Nazis and mostly deserving members of the Nazi NSDAP. They were appointed by A. Hitler on the proposal of the Reich Minister of Justice, first for a term of five years, then from 1936 for life. All VGH members had to be over 35 years old. Honorable judges often included celebrities, such as the Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank Protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 for example, Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 for example, Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87
    The body of the lawsuit at the VGH was the Reich High Prosecutor’s Office, whose members also took part in the executions of convicts. The largest number of executions of VGH convicts took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison.88 The indictment itself was based on the results of investigations by the Gestapo and investigating judges. Each of the defendants was identified by a first name and surname, followed by the date and place of birth, occupation and residence. Each was also marked where and when the arrest took place and when the investigating judge decided to detain him. This was followed by the legal qualification of crime
    84 Walter WAGNER, Der Volksgerichtshof im Hitler Nationalsozialistischen Staat. Oldenbourg Verlag, Stuttgart 1974, p. 486.
    85 Robert KVAČEK – Dušan TOMÁŠEK, General Alois Eliáš. One Czech destiny. Epoch, Prague 1996, pp. 85-93. For an excerpt from the judgment on Elijah, see: W. WAGNER, Der Volksgerichtshof, Annex No. 13, pp. 891-895.
    86 For more details see: Lukáš VLČEK, People’s Court in Berlin – Volksgerichtshof – and its history. In: SI 18/1. ÚSTR, Prague 2011, pp. 144-167.
    87 Jaromír TAUCHEN, Development of Criminal Justice in Germany 1933-1945. Dissertation, Faculty of Law MU, Brno 2009, p. 192.
    88 On the tragic history of this prison, see for example: Brigitte OLESCHINSKI, Gedenkstätte Plötzensee. Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, Berlin 1994.
    103
    with reason for the action.89 Finally, proposals for witnesses, further detention and the appointment of a lawyer were made. The lawyer could either be selected (usually by the defendant’s relatives) or compulsorily assigned to the VGH. The presiding judge then had to approve his choice. However, the defense was more or less a formal matter, as the lawyer rarely suggested presenting any evidence. The lawyers also did not usually attend their mandates before the main trial, but there were exceptions for those chosen by the defendant’s family. However, even such advocates could not change the harshness of the verdict, although they often tried to suggest a different classification for the offense of their principals (for example, because instead of preparing for high treason, it was only a failure to report or a serious case).
    Following the verdict, the elected lawyers also usually asked the chairman of the senate to allow the convicted person to have a final interview with family members if they attended the main trial. These main trials used to be public, but in some cases with the exclusion of the public, especially in state secret cases. The verdict was announced by the President of the Senate, whose speech was very short in most cases and in many cases lacking legal qualifications. The President and the Associate Professional Judges also signed the judgment together.90 The judgments were published in the daily press, which was informed of the results of the proceedings through the press service of the High Public Prosecutor’s Office at the VGH. Many such cases can be found on the pages of the Protectorate press from 1941 and 1942. In addition, red posters with Czech and German text were also displayed in public spaces informing about the executions of convicts. These posters were displayed in large numbers, especially in the place of residence of the convict, which was to increase the intimidating effect on the population.
    The first judgment of the VGH over the ON resistance fighters from South Moravia was handed down on November 18, 1941 and concerned the group of MUDr. J. Vignatiho. He and V. Mečíř were sentenced to death, two other doctors received four years and one two and a half years in prison. About the course of the trial, J. Vignati wrote to his wife in one of the skates: “Our trial was a complete comedy. Absolutely no evidence. Advocate of a patient figure. Before the trial, I had a five-minute conversation with him during which he inquired about my affairs. He did not speak at all during the hearing, until he finally said a few sentences. It was just disgusting. ”91 These words clearly illustrate how the processes before VGH went.
    The trial with members of the ON Land Command in Moravia took place in Berlin on 26 and 27 November 1941 before the 1st Senate of the VGH. B. Všetička, L. Kotík, Č. Jelínek and J. Gardavský, who were all placed in Alt Moabit Prison at the time, appeared in court. The five-member tribunal was personally chaired by VGH President Otto Georg Thierack, who did so only in important cases. Všetička’s relatives tried to obtain a lawyer of their choice, but the authorities rejected their proposals and the lawyer was assigned ex officio. The indictment was based on the testimony of the accused and other additional Gestapo investigations. It contained a detailed description of the activities of all four defendants within the provincial headquarters of the ON, including a detailed breakdown and tasks of this organization, as well as staffing of command functions and the share of individual defendants in resistance actions.
    89 A large number of indictments of members of the ON were preserved in the ABS in the already cited fund 141.
    90 František VAŠEK, Czech patriots before the Volksgerichtshof. Journal of Legal Science and Practice 2001, No. 1, pp. 62-70.
    91 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 637 – Description of the report MUDr. Jan Vignati before the execution.
    104
    Headquarters ON. It was clear from the indictment that this was a particularly dangerous organization for the Nazis.92
    During the process itself, the key issue became the possible use of violence by resistance organizations against the occupation regime. B. Všetička stated in his statement before the investigating judge that violence was planned during the liberation of the country within the planned uprising. However, he denied it during the trial. L. Kotík and J. Gardavský also testified in court in the same way, while Č. Jelínek, on the other hand, admitted the use of violence. The tribunal also emphasized in the reasoning of the verdict that the resistance had been preparing violent actions, citing the preparation of a bacteriological war and the hiding of a larger number of weapons. All four members of the provincial headquarters of the ON were therefore found guilty of plotting high treason (Vorbereitung zum Hochverrat) and aiding the enemy (Feindbegünstigung) and sentenced to death.93
    After the verdict, they sentenced the convict to pardon. A. Hitler personally had the power to decide on this matter, who later allowed the Minister of Justice to decide on similar matters. At the same time, the families of the convicts tried to achieve a possible mitigation of the verdict through their contacts with important protectorate officials, including President Emil Hácha. During the first years of the occupation, E. Hácha repeatedly intervened for various imprisoned representatives of the Czech resistance.94 Letters of a similar nature were written by convicted officers themselves, for example Č. Jelínek turned to E. Hácha on February 6, 1942, they watched closely.95 Všetiček’s father-in-law Cyril Malý then tried to achieve some relief for the convicts through the protectorate envoy in Berlin and the former Czechoslovak foreign minister JUDr. František Chvalkovský. This concerned, in particular, the granting of permission to visit relatives in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison, where the convicts were transferred after the sentencing. In his letter of 31 December 1941, F. Chvalkovský informed C. Malý that “[…] in the matter in question, your kind letter of 29 December 1941, I intervened again in the appropriate places. 96 On January 7, 1942, M. Všetičková visited her father F. Chvalkovský in person, and the family tried to find another intercessor in the person of the Protectorate Minister of the Interior, General Gendarmerie Josef Ježek. However, the case of the members of the Moravian Land Command ON was considered so important and serious in Berlin that
    Convicted officials of the ON were forced to wait long months for the death penalty because the appeal proceedings were very lengthy. However, all appeals were eventually rejected and the verdicts confirmed by the Reich Minister of Justice on July 31, 1942.97 Execution gen. B. Všetičky and his three collaborators took place on the morning of August 19, 1942 in the prison in Berlin-Plötzensee by guillotine. A conviction before the execution behaved bravely and B. Všetička in his last letter to his wife on August 18, 1942 wrote: “Tomorrow morning at 5 o’clock to finish your life, knowing that I have served our nation in the last
    92 ABS, f. 141, signed. 141-237-6. The total scope of the indictment is 145 pages.
    93 Ibid. – Judgment of the VGH over the group gen Všetičky of 28 November 1941 with a total length of 59 pages.
    94 For this see: Tomáš PASÁK, Under the Protection of the Empire. Prague, Prague 1998.
    95 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-237-7, pp. 36-37.
    96 MMB, f. Resistance documentation, inventory No. 152 870.
    97 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-237-7, fol. 44 – Description of the decision of the Imperial Minister of Justice in the cases of Bohuslav Všetička, Ladislav Kotík, Čestmír Jelínek and Jaroslav Gardavský.
    105
    breath. It was not pleasant to wait many months in the dungeon for death, yet I am glad that I had reached a time when I could get an idea of ​​the outcome of the war. Death no longer frightens me anymore. ”98 The execution of the death sentences against Všetiček’s group was subsequently reported by the protectorate press, which stated that the“ […] People’s Court had sentenced to death . These convicts performed treacherous activities for the German Empire and against the order established in the Czech-Moravian area at the forefront of the secret organization. ”99
    The Nazis also paid considerable attention to the group of Col. V. Lysák, whose indictment was dated October 15, 1941.100. František Blabolil, Capt. Jaroslav Konopásek, Lt. Col. Otto Francl and Capt. V. Kratochvíl. During the trial, V. Lysák tried to take most of the blame because he was aware of the fact that, given his important position in the ON hierarchy, he had no hope of a sentence other than the death penalty. This tactic came in part because V. Lysák and F. Blabolil were sentenced to death by the tribunal for preparing high treason and aiding the enemy, but the others were sentenced to prison, namely O. Francl for life, V. Kratochvíl for ten, and J. Konopásek for five years.101 The three officers managed to survive imprisonment. Medical condition of Col. IN. However, Lysák was already very bad at the time of the trial and died on July 3, 1942 in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison. The official medical report identified cancer as the cause of death.102 However, it is probable that the real cause was the consequences of unhealed liver injury caused by beatings during interrogations in the spring of 1940. In 1942 and 1943, a number of other trials took place with were carried out not only in Berlin-Plötzensee, but also in prisons in Frankfurt am Main and Wrocław.
    Partial conclusion
    HE was an important domestic resistance organization since the second half of March 1939. Many members of the Czechoslovak army and other citizens participated in anti-Nazi resistance activities. At the turn of 1939 and 1940, this first resistance set fell victim to the Gestapo, but the Nazis did not completely eliminate the domestic military resistance. Attempts were also made in Brno to resume operations, and in 1940 and 1941 the second ON land command was established, albeit in a more modest form. At the head was a brig. gene. Otakar Zahálka executed on June 21, 1942 in Kounice’s dormitories. This second leadership was also broken by the Nazi security apparatus, but scattered groups of resistance fighters who escaped arrest continued to operate. A number of successor organizations have also been set up (Preparatory Revolutionary Committee, Vela). Members of the Czechoslovak army thus clearly showed that the Munich Agreement and the occupation on March 15, 1939 did not break them. Many paid for their participation in the fight against Nazism with their lives, including 16 soldiers with general ranks who ended up in 1941.
    98 Private Archive of Vladimír Černý, photocopy of the letter provided in 2000 by Mrs. Milada Všetičková.
    99 Countryside, No. 197 of 20 August 1942, p. 2.
    100 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-225-1 – Indictment No. 12 J 8/40 g dated October 15, 1941, 42 pages.
    101 Ibid. – Judgment of Col. Lysák from December 3, 1941, 32 pages.
    102 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-225-7 – Official report of the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on the death of Col. V. Lysák dated July 11, 1942. Intended for the Chief Public Prosecutor at the VGH.
    106
    to 1945 on execution sites (Army General J. Bílý, five divisional and ten brigadier generals). Therefore, we should not forget them even today.
    107
    Appendix
    Figure No. 1. Title page of the qualification file of Čestmír Jelínek. From these files it is possible to reconstruct in detail the military careers of all members of the Nation’s Defense. Source: VÚA-VHA.
    108
    Picture No. 2. Brigadier General Bohuslav Všetička, Provincial Commander of the Defense of the Nation in Moravia. Source: MZM, HO.
    109
    Picture No. 3. Colonel Ladislav Kotík, Chief of Staff of the Provincial Defense of the Nation in Moravia. Source: MMB.
    110
    Figure 4. Title page of the judgment of the People’s Court in Berlin over the members of the Provincial Command of the Defense of the Nation in Moravia of 27 November 1941. Source: ABS.
    111
    RESISTANCE GROUP THREE CONSULES. CHAPTER ON THE HISTORY OF DOMESTIC PRONACISTIST RESISTANCE
    In the afternoon of March 14, 1939, a transport plane with special passengers took off from Ruzyně Airport. Eleven intelligence officers of the 2nd Division of the General Staff, under the command of Col. gšt. František Moravec. They left Czechoslovakia with important intelligence material to be one of the first from abroad to start resistance activities against Nazi Germany.
    Although Col. F. Moravec apparently flew into exile with a certain idea of ​​the fight against the German occupiers, so from the beginning it was an isolated event, which was known only to its direct participants. The aspect of resistance preparation at home was underestimated for several reasons. The frantic formation of the future resistance began only after obtaining initial information about the impending occupation of the Czech lands. Within a few hours, the remaining agency material was destroyed, some of which were destroyed and some of which hid the radio stations, and thought about how to deal with the intelligence effectively. At the same time, several resistance groups from the ranks of professional intelligence officers are beginning to emerge.
    The following lines are intended to acquaint the reader with one such resistance formation called the Three Councilors1 and to describe and evaluate its contribution to the construction of structures of the foreign resistance around the group of Col. F. Moravce.
    Occupation of the Czech lands
    According to the memories of the first German unit, Victory Square in Prague, where the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces was based at that time, arrived at around 10 a.m. on March 15, 1939. At that time, remnants of intelligence were already burning. The next day she caused more commotion
    1 The issue of the resistance group Three Councilors has not yet received a comprehensive elaboration, however, it has already entered the professional literature, at least marginally. For example, let’s mention: Jaroslav KOUTEK, Tichá fronta. Our Army, Prague 1985; J. GEBHART – J. KOUTEK – J. KUKLIK, On the fronts of the secret war. Chapters from the struggle of Czechoslovak intelligence against Nazism in the years 1938-1941. Panorama, Prague 1989; J. KOKOŠKA – S. KOKOŠKA, Dispute over Agent A-54. A memoirs by one of the main actors of František Fárek occupy a very specific position, see: František FÁREK, Footprints Disappear in the Archive… Vyšehrad, Prague 1975.
    112
    visit of the head of the German Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who visited the Abwehrstelle office building being built there. Subsequently, the interim head of the 2nd Department, Col. gšt. He thanked František Havel for providing offices to his officers and then returned to Berlin.2
    Otherwise, there was a seeming calm before the storm in the General Staff building, and as one of Moravec’s subordinate corpses recalled after the war. František Fárek: “In the offices of the 2nd dept. various issues related to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the passing military and police transports and the balls followed various plans for the future. ”3
    The occupation of the Czech lands and the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia became a prerequisite for the emergence of the first resistance movements. The former intelligence officers had certain preconditions due to the nature of their previous profession, and indeed within a few days, the first resistance units began to be constituted within the liquidated 2nd Department of the MNO HŠ.
    On the first day of the occupation, three officers from the former Moravec’s search party met in Prague on their own initiative. The already mentioned Capt. F. Fárka with Antonín Longa and Alois Čáslavka not only had the same job, but also an unwavering friendship. They agreed that their abilities and skills would be much more useful at home and would not follow their colleagues abroad. The oldest of them – F. Fárek – took over the leadership of the formation, which soon received the cover designation Three Councilors, or just the Councilors (see photos no. 1 to 3 in the appendix to the chapter).
    According to surviving reports, contact was established between the Moravec Center Abroad and A. Longa in the Protectorate as early as the beginning of April. It should be noted that with the considerable help of the French. In case the French mediator dropped out, other possible ways were also sought. The first letters sent to Moravec’s people in exile were apparently full of remorse. After all, Moravc’s hasty departure4 from the republic left a considerable dose of bitterness in many members of the 2nd Division. However, at least to A. Long and his colleagues, whose names were hidden in the letters for the time being, he tried to defend his departure. After all, they were the first and for a long time the only ones with which they managed to establish direct and high-quality connections to the protectorate.5
    Among other things, the departure of families that intelligence officers had to leave in the occupied Czech lands began to be addressed. Moravec relied as much as possible on the French side to relocate the families, and Fárek’s people were only to play a supportive role in dealing with small things. From the beginning, the event was at least adequately secured. Couriers from France brought the former Czechoslovak crowns to the protectorate, which were to be used to finance various services. What was not spent on the needs of the resistance was exchanged for the Reichsmark and sent back abroad. Of course, everything took place without the knowledge of the protectorate authorities. Just in late April A. Long over the French
    2 TÝŽ, Situation in 2. odd. after March 15, 1939. – Admiral Canaris in the General Staff. – Colonel Longin. – Capt. Fárek and Maj. A child at the head of the Abwehrstelle. – A member of the Abwehr wants to make a courtesy visit to Capt. Farka. – Visit to Maj. Baby. – Characteristics of members of the Abwehr and German officers. Manuscript, property of prof. Jiří Fárek, pp. 1-2.
    3 Ibid., P. 5.
    4 Col. F. Moravec on March 14, 1939 left Prague with the following collaborators: Lt. Col. gšt. Oldrich Tichy, Maj. gšt. Emil Strankmüller, Maj. conc. Josef Bartík, Maj. rammer. Karel Paleček, Maj. ride. Alois Frank, Capt. rammer. František Fryč, Capt. gšt. Vladimir Cigna, Capt. rammer. Václav Sláma, Capt. rammer. Josef Fořt, Capt. ride. Jaroslav Tauer, while five officers belonged to the defense section of the search group of the 2nd Department of HŠ MNO. P. KREISINGER, Brigadier General Josef Bartík, pp. 57-58.
    5 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-91-19 – Dear Longo (report from April 10, 1939), folio 3.
    113
    news exponent in Prague Maj. Henri Gouyou received CZK 600,000 from the treasury of the former search party.6
    At the beginning of May, there was already a regular and reliable connection. A. Longa also definitively confirmed his determination and made himself fully available to Moravec: “[…] there are three of us here, who on the night of 15/3. We promised ourselves that we would not abandon each other, that we would not abandon the families who were left alone, and that we would do our best to give birth to our III, as we firmly believe, happy and eternal republics. ” In the report of Capt. A. Longa also introduced the cryptonyms of his closest comrades-in-arms – Frant Fousatej and Lojza Diplomat. From now on, our reporters in exile knew who they had contacted and who they had found dedicated collaborators with. They clearly acknowledged this fact in exile, as not all of their former colleagues were willing to cooperate with them for personal reasons.7
    Despite all the complications of the activities of the German security forces, it was possible in a relatively short time to open an information channel between the protectorate and intelligence structures abroad. It should be noted again that the French intelligence exponents, who were still in Prague, helped a lot in this phase. One of the most important of the pre-war years was undoubtedly the aforementioned Major. H. Gouyou. Josef Záruba, the driver of the French embassy, ​​on the other hand, became an important person for his connections with his French colleagues. Due to his profession, he was already making a number of trips to France in the Protectorate at the time of escalating security measures.8
    Under the cover of Three Councilors9, they began sending large-scale news reports abroad through French partners about the occupation of the Czech lands, 10 Nazi security forces, the organization and strength of the German armed forces, and last but not least the economic and political situation in the protectorate. Fárek’s people were greatly assisted by their former colleagues from the analytical group – Lt. Col. gšt. Tomáš Houška and Maj. gšt. Josef Zuska. An extensive network of railway employees also took part in the collection of reports. Otherwise, the group maintained strict isolation from other resistance groups. At the direct command of Col. F. Moravec even refused to merge the Three Councilors with the Defense of the Nation. The group did during so very short
    6 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-91-19 – Dear Longo (report of April 10, 1939), folio 4. and Liquidation record of April 27, 1939, folio 8.
    7 NA, f. Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters – Central Committee Prague (SPB-ÚV (unprocessed) – Dear Chief (Report of May 3, 1939).
    8 NA, f. Police Headquarters Prague – General Registry 1941-1950, sign. Z 483/5 – Police Directorate Supplementary Department of the Corps of Uniformed Security Guards.
    9 The origin of this designation can be found in the request of F. Fárek and his colleagues not to be identified by real names in secret correspondence. From that point on, London headquarters used the code name Three Consuls. It is not entirely clear who exactly invented this designation. F. Fárek stated in his memoirs that the author could be Maj. E. Strankmüller: F. FÁREK, Fárek, Longa and Čáslavka to retire. – First report from London. Gene. Ingr. – Gen. Elijah. – Moving the eleven families beyond the borders. – Dr. Mountain from the middle director in Prague. – Farek and Long “Counselors”. – Caslav’s report from London. – Čáslavek’s biography. – Maj. gšt. Tuscany. Manuscript, property of prof. Jiří Fárek, p. 10.
    10 The most recent topic: Aleš BINAR, Evaluation of the Military Occupation of the Czech Lands in March 1939 in Documents XIII. Army Corps. HaV 2018, No. 1, pp. 4-27.
    114
    times in contact with Col. F. Moravcem gained a specific position and began to be used for a number of tasks.
    Expulsion of intelligence officers’ families
    Basically, immediately after the occupation, the councilors took care of the families that the intelligence officers left in the protectorate. By their very nature, the new guardians had to face a number of pitfalls. Of course, after the secret departure of the husbands, the wives were overcome by a certain nervousness, they misjudged the situation and only dealt with the idea of ​​leaving behind them. Fárek’s people ordered them to limit their contact. With the intervention of Col. F. Moravec was at least well taken care of financially.11
    Random inspections by the German secret police increased their nervousness. For example, the wife of Maj. Karel Paleček, the Gestapo carried out a really detailed inspection of several hours, starting with the powder puff and ending with knocking on the walls. There is nothing to be surprised about. Before the occupation, Paleček’s Střešovice villa was also a secret branch of the offensive unit of the 2nd Department of the HŠ.12
    It was more threatening that at a time when the French were to play a significant role in the evacuation of the intelligence families, cooperation with them began to be dangerously stifled. According to F. Fárek, the French share was generally disproportionate to the Czechoslovak effort. In addition, the three councilors found that their reports for colleagues abroad were read by someone from the French. A major failure occurred during the necessary action in connection with the expulsion of the families of intelligence officers.
    It is necessary to state that F. Moravec did not provide anything for the departure of family members into exile before his departure abroad. In the first months of the occupation, Moravec’s intelligence officers relied on the help of the British and French authorities, which were still operating in the protectorate, to evacuate family members. The long-awaited help, despite constant reassurances, especially from the French side, totally failed due to their lax approach. The lack of time combined with the often naive notions of many members of Moravc’s group about the situation in the protectorate became a great enemy.
    The original French plan provided that the wife of Col. F. Moravce, together with his daughters and Mrs. Tichá, Palečková and Franková, will leave abroad, accompanied by proven Frenchmen with French passports. The rest of the intelligence officers’ wives were to travel to their passports, which would be bribed to pass, the so-called Durchlassscheins. According to the proposal, the ladies with Czech passports were to be divided into two separate groups. Mrs. Fořtová, Tauerová and Cignová were to go to Warsaw in particular, and Mrs. Bartíková, Strankmüllerová and Fryčová were to go to the Italian resort of Villaregia. For this plan, A. Long received from Col. F. Moravce even a power of attorney in the handling of funds.13
    11 NA, f. SPB-ÚV, Families (undated).
    12 Ibid.
    13 Ibid. – Dear Toník (report of 5 June 1939); VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-144-1, PAÚ Karla, ref. 101/39 – Case: Situation Report, Page 4. A. Long had relatively large sums of money at his disposal. His task was also to change the original currency to German marks and send it back abroad. At the end of April 1939, A. Long received CZK 599,680 through French intermediaries. VÚA-VHA, f. Military Intelligence Command (Sb. 37), sign. 37-144-1 – Liquidation record, fol. 8.
    115 An
    undoubted fact is that the relocation of “intelligence” families abroad has also become a personal matter of Col. F. Moravec and his collaborators. At the same time, it was an objectively necessary precondition for our correspondents abroad to gain the necessary peace of mind and to be able to fully develop their activities against Nazi Germany.
    Due to distrust in the French partners, the deteriorating security situation and growing nervousness on the part of the wives, the people around F. Fárek decided to carry out the evacuation with their own inventions and means, as quickly as possible on the way – to Poland. As the original French variants failed, A. Čáslavka14 decided to conduct a survey on the border with Poland. He also crossed it several times at the same time. At the beginning of July 1939, A. Čáslavka transferred the family across the border in several groups. Since his wife was Jewish, he decided to go to Poland as well. After their safe removal, Moravec’s people fully developed their intelligence work against Hitler’s Germany.15
    The circumstances of the expulsion of intelligence families were still reverberated in the reports from the beginning of August, also due to the fact that the original failed plans from the French workshop cost quite a lot of money, especially on bribes to various competent persons. A. Longa believed that part of the money remained with the well-known majors. H. Gouyou, who were extremely involved in the original variants of the removal – specifically his Prague girlfriend Karolína Slapničková and officials of the former Czechoslovak car club Ing. Karel Poláček. However, despite some surprises for Fárek’s people, at least for the families and their property, the Gestapo still did not show much interest.16
    Cooperation with Polish correspondents
    After the successful evacuation of the families, F. Fárek and A. Longa, at the instigation of the exile control center and in an effort to open a new communication channel through Warsaw, began to focus on the Poles. A. Čáslavka, according to a previous agreement in Poland, arranged a meeting with the liaison officer from the Polish consulate in Prague. The Poles did very well in July 1939
    14 After the original plan fell through, A. Čáslavka wrote a rather emotional report for foreigners: “We split up about the ladies (each was in charge of 3 ladies) and we did everything for them that was only in our power and strength. This was the case until the departure of the last Smrdolin [Major. H. Gouyou – note author]. May God forgive him and all the French for all their crimes. We gave him very valuable material all the time he was here, and he shit on us (please excuse my boyish words, but I have to relieve myself of remembering all the French). In truth, we put our lives here for those French degenerate whores, and they wonder didn’t give us to the Gestapo – see camrání fran. leg. clerk in front of a company that franc. the consulate receives messages for Paris and London from the 2nd Department. hl. staff, see also the detention of the letter, etc.… [Čáslavka encounters the detention and opening of mail to the French embassy – note. author] “. VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-91-1, Part I – Diplomat’s Report (The report is devoted purely to the issue of the removal of ladies), fol. 236.
    15 More on the departure of intelligence families abroad, for example: M. VYHLÍDAL, První ze Tří konšelů, pp. 134-135. On the activities of A. Čáslavka in exile and in the immediate post-war period, for example: Matej MEDVECKÝ, Unnecessary diplomat. The activity of the Czechoslovak attaché in Stockholm after the end of the Second World War. VH 2015, No. 1, pp. 60-80.
    16 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-91-1, Part I – our beloved boss (Report of August 10, 1939), fol. 276
    116
    aware of the dangers on the part of National Socialist Germany, and so welcomed the reports on the status and location of the Wehrmacht in the Protectorate. 17
    The primary goal of the Councilors at this time thus became the maximum satisfaction of the Polish side by providing valuable intelligence regarding the threat of the German invasion of Poland. For example, thanks to cooperation with the employees of the Protectorate Railways, they received valuable reports about the movement of troops from the Přerov railway junction, Pilsen, Moravian Ostrava and Česká Třebová. Valuable reports continued to be processed by a former intelligence analyst and expert on the German Armed Forces, Lt. Col. T. Houška. A. Longa was especially active in connection with the Polish consulate in Prague. The connection with Czechoslovak foreign centers took place under the so-called Polish route under the slogan “Pour la patrie” .18
    The councilors praised the cooperation with the Poles and constantly underlined the willingness of the Poles in their dispatches. Due to the shredding interventions on our part, it is not yet possible to reveal the content of the messages going along this northern route, however, the preserved archives show that there were more of
    them.19 Unfortunately, at the end of August The Czechoslovak exile exchange abroad knew about this, but nevertheless considered it important to keep them going. However, if the possible effectiveness did not exceed the security risks, according to the instructions of the headquarters, the decision on further cooperation with the French was entirely up to A. Long. The declining co-operation with the French was at least partially offset by the above-mentioned co-operation with the Polish side, but it also ended forcibly due to imminent events.20
    The Gestapo intervenes The
    councilors worked more or less independently, refused to merge with the resistance group Defense of the Nation, and also tried not to involve more people in their activities than was necessary. However, even these set rules evoked only a deceptive sense of security. In order to be interconnected, the German secret police liquidated one resistance group after another in the first months of the occupation. The noose around F. Fárek and his colleagues slowly began to tighten after the Gestapo raid against the so-called group of Schmoranz press confidants, 21 in which a number of former intelligence officers from the intelligence headquarters worked. The investigative procedures of the German secret police have borne fruit.
    17 Klára PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Life Fates of an Intelligence Officer and Military Diplomat of Colonel Alois Čáslavka. Master’s thesis, Faculty of Arts, Palacký University in Olomouc (UP), Olomouc 2015, p. 71.
    18 F. FÁREK, Cooperation of the resistance group 2nd dept. with the Polish intelligence authorities. Manuscript, property of prof. Jiří Fárek, pp. 5-6; VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-89-56 – Report of Poseidon, page 2.
    19 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-259-6 – Marie, ref. 45, Subject: Tonda material – sending (report of 8 August 1939), fol. 39.
    20 VÚA-VHA, f. Ministry of National Defense London, sign. 20-29-1 – Case: Spojení Alfons (record from August 19, 1939), fol. 72, ibid. – Dear Alfons! (Report of August 21, 1939), fol. 73; F. FÁREK, Cooperation of the resistance group 2nd section, pp. 5-6.
    21 More about the mentioned resistance group, for example: Arnošt BAREŠ – Tomáš PASÁK, Zdeněk Schmoranz’s resistance organization in 1939. HaV 1968, No. 6-7, pp. 1003-1033.
    117 The
    Gestapo skillfully used brutal investigative methods in which the interrogated police brought in more and more people.
    As F. Fárek stated in his memoirs regarding other groups, the control of T. Houška was very difficult. Already in the pre-war years, he was considered an excellent expert on the German army, and so he became indispensable for many resistance figures. In a way, F. Fárek knew about Houšek’s contacts with other former reporters. But he apparently did not know about contacts with specific members of the Schmoranz group.22
    For interconnectedness through certain persons, the Gestapo also intervened against the Councilors. Already in October, Major was arrested in connection with another case. gšt. J. Zuska.23 F. Fárka was seized by the German police on 6 November 1939 and at the beginning of December by A. Long and T. Houška.
    The resistance group Three Councilors was led in the investigation as a “Farek-Gruppe” and included only F. Fárek, A. Long and now also the driver of the French embassy J. Záruba. T. Houšek did not get to court because he committed suicide during difficult interrogations at Petschkov Palace in Prague. Although we already know that the resistance movement began to emerge essentially spontaneously after the Nazi occupation, Gestapo officials from the beginning of the investigation operated with the construct that the germs of the intelligence resistance movement were created before its departure by F. Moravec, and F. Fárek with A. Longou was one of his closest collaborators in the occupied republic.24
    In September 1940, their chief investigator, the infamous Oskar Fleischer, ended a series of long interrogations, and in December 1941, the whole case went to the People’s Court in Berlin. Fortunately, the Court, unlike the Gestapo, saw their own activities as primarily helping the families of fugitive intelligence officers. Also during the interrogations and the actual trial, F. Fárek and A. Longa, for tactical reasons, blamed A. Čáslavka, who was no longer in any real danger. The final sentence, which included a ten-year prison sentence for both of them, was helped by the public prosecutor’s inability to prove an active connection with foreign countries. A. Long and F. Fárek could partially rest because the indictment proposed the death penalty for both of them.25
    The court even acquitted J. Záruba of all charges. But he did not enjoy the acquired freedom for long. At the end of January 1942, he was arrested again by the Prague Gestapo. Subsequently,
    22 F. FÁREK, Letter of Col. gšt. Moravce. – Government army. – Maj. gšt. Salzer. – Capt. Novotný. – Conflict Col. gšt. Hájek contra plk. gšt. Moravec. – Capt. No. – License plates of Gestapo vehicles and him. authorities. – Cooperation with other resistance groups. – Meeting with Col. gšt. Kudláček. – Cover addresses to the Netherlands. – Václav Klabík and his activities. – Press group. – Death of Maj. gšt. Little. – Concerns with Maj. gšt. A bitch. – Courier to London. – Message through Beneš to the homeland. – Letter to Col. Moravce for Maj. Hush. Manuscript, property of prof. Jiří Fárek, p. 4.
    23 More on the person of J. Zuska and his World War II anabasis, for example: P. KREISINGER – M. VYHLÍDAL, The Life Fates of General Josef Zuska (1902-1978). From an artillery officer through the intelligence department of the General Staff and the Nazi Prison to Egypt (Part I). HaV 2015, No. 1, pp. 64-76; TITÍŽ, The Life Fates of General Josef Zuska (1902-1978). From an artillery officer through the intelligence staff of the General Staff and the Nazi Prison to Egypt (Part II). HaV 2015, No. 2, pp. 90-99.
    24 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-63-3 / 95–96 – Conclusion on the Dormitory and Other, page 95-96.
    25 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-63-3 / 196 – In Namen des deutschen Volkes, 4, fol. 196.
    118
    to the Auschwitz concentration camp, where he died on August 24, 1942 under not entirely clear circumstances.26
    The group’s last collaborator, J. Zuska, was sentenced by the Berlin People’s Court in the “Simon Drgac und 11 andere” trial a month earlier, to eight years in prison. The German Gestapo failed to reveal a direct connection to the people around F. Fárek in his case.27
    Both F. Fárek, A. Long, J. Zusek and, of course, A. Čáslavek were granted the desired freedom. At the end of the war, F. Fárka was evacuated from the prison from Ebrach to Straubing in the south of Germany, and from there at the end of April a march in the direction of Dachau began. F. Fárek, along with some other prisoners, broke away from the march and subsequently managed to come into contact with the vanguard of the advancing American army, where everyone received proper care.28
    J. Zuska was transferred from Ebrach to the advancing front, where he was also serving his sentence, but for a change to Freising in Bavaria near Munich, where he was liberated by the American army on April 30, 1945.29
    A. Long was also liberated by the American army at the Bayreuth prison. This also begins the rather vague and unfortunately final chapter of his life. On April 12, 1945, he was still alive. He worked as one of the officials of the concentration camp for prisoners in Kulmbach and sent a positive message to the family at home in Prague. Later, together with another former prisoner, Rudolf Vyleta, he was to make himself available to the American army for intelligence tasks on Czechoslovak territory. At the end of April, they were to be transported to the front in Šumava, somewhere in the area of ​​St. Catherine, and have been missing ever since.30
    Most likely, they were assassinated on the threshold of freedom by retreating German soldiers. Their bodies were never found and also the search for surviving friends – F. Fárek and A. Čáslavka – sounded empty. After two years, ie in April 1947, the lieutenant colonel in memoriam was already pronounced dead in court.31
    Partial conclusion
    The intelligence group called Three Councilors was one of the first resistance groups of former members of the 2nd Department of the Primary School, which was established in the protectorate. Col. played its key role mainly due to its close connection with the exile intelligence headquarters. F. Moravce. It was in their service that its members carried out a number of events for the needs of the emerging Czechoslovak foreign resistance. Important activities included the successful evacuation of intelligence officers’ families abroad, which provided members of the exile intelligence center with the necessary peace to launch an intelligence offensive against Nazi Germany. In addition, members of group
    26 NA, f. Police Headquarters Prague – General Registry 1941-1950, sign. Z 483/5 – Security Dept. Bubeneč – official record.
    27 P. KREISINGER – M. VYHLÍDAL, The Life Fates of General Josef Zuska. Part I, pp. 74-75.
    28 F. FÁREK, Transport to Straubing. – Death march. – Liberation. – Reunion with family. Manuscript, property of prof. Jiří Fárek, pp. 2-7.
    29 Ibid
    ., P. 75. 30 VÚA-VHA, f. Certificate according to Act 255/46 Coll., Personal file of Antonín Longy – Subject: Request for supplementation of the Certificate according to Act 255/46 Coll.
    31 Ibid. – Declaration of the Dead – transcript.
    119
    for the needs of the foreign resistance in the territory of the protectorate carried out intelligence activities, as well as large-scale financial transactions to help finance the foreign resistance.
    However, its importance is limited to the year 1939, ie the key period of the establishment and formation of Czechoslovak foreign resistance centers. With its activity and commitment, it significantly helped to strengthen the position of Moravc’s foreign intelligence center. With the arrest of their indirect collaborators, and especially with the fall of Poland, when all high-quality communication channels with foreign countries were interrupted, their activities lost their intensity. In a very short time, the remaining “Councils” were also exposed to repression by the Nazi security forces. Their activities can in no way be overestimated, and despite their specific tasks and status, they must be evaluated only as an integral part of the Czechoslovak resistance.
    120
    Appendix
    Photo No. 1. The head of the resistance group Three Councilors František Fárek in a post-war film – at the time he started his service at the Ministry of the Interior. Source: Collection of prof. Jiří Fárek.
    121
    Photo No. 2. Škpt. Antonín Longa as the photographer captured him during the Free Republic. It was he who was in charge of the connection with the Moravc Center in exile. Source: Collection of prof. Jiří Fárek.
    122
    Photo No. 3. Alois Čáslavka, an important person in the evacuation of the families of intelligence officers, already in the rank of lieutenant colonel, after his return from abroad. Source: Collection of prof. Jiří Fárek.