ALACKÝ UNIVERSITY IN OLOMOUC FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY OF THE

LIFE FATE OF THE REPORT OFFICER AND MILITARY DIPLOMATE OF THE BRIGADE GENERAL OF OLDŘICH SILENT (1898 ̶ 1990) MAGISTERSKÁ DIP

. Radim Staněk Leader: PhDr. Pavel Kreisinger

OLOMOUC 2015

HONORARY STATEMENT: I declare that I have prepared the diploma thesis independently, based on the above sources and literature. Radim Stanek

I would like to thank the supervisor of my diploma thesis PhDr. Pavel Kreisinger for his valuable advice, patience, always helpful approach and willingness to help me. I would also like to thank the experts from all the archives I visited during my research, who always helped me find my way around the studied materials. Last but not least, I also thank my family for their support during my research work.

Contents 1.

Introduction ……………………………………… ………………………………………….. …………………. 5

Sources and literature …………………. ………………………………………….. ……………… 7

Young years ………………………………………… ………………………………………….. …….. 15

3.1.

Childhood …………………………………………. ………………………………………….. …… 15

3.2.

In the Austro-Hungarian Army and Russian Legions (1916–1920) …………………. 16

Interwar career (1920–1939) ……. ………………………………………….. ……….. 24 4.1.https://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/ads?client=ca-pub-2025287964322501&output=html&h=280&adk=3316849697&adf=3263411121&pi=t.aa~a.791033702~i.82~rp.1&w=950&fwrn=4&fwrnh=100&lmt=1637079085&num_ads=1&rafmt=1&armr=3&sem=mc&pwprc=8576066767&psa=1&ad_type=text_image&format=950×280&url=https%3A%2F%2Fadoc.pub%2Fivotni-osudy-zpravodajskeho-dstojnika.html&flash=0&fwr=0&pra=3&rh=200&rw=949&rpe=1&resp_fmts=3&wgl=1&fa=27&uach=WyJXaW5kb3dzIiwiMTAuMC4wIiwieDg2IiwiIiwiOTUuMC40NjM4LjY5IixbXSxudWxsLG51bGwsIjY0Il0.&dt=1637077625575&bpp=159&bdt=1982&idt=159&shv=r20211111&mjsv=m202111100101&ptt=9&saldr=aa&abxe=1&cookie=ID%3Dd5e2e6db92bd5e30-228561f2aacc00cf%3AT%3D1637021895%3ART%3D1637021895%3AS%3DALNI_MZ9Z2P1KZNTBjatFIaEde232V8bBQ&prev_fmts=0x0%2C307x250%2C982x280%2C1349x625%2C950x280&nras=3&correlator=1011245596538&frm=20&pv=1&ga_vid=72963090.1637021896&ga_sid=1637077625&ga_hid=1346907515&ga_fc=1&u_tz=-300&u_his=1&u_h=768&u_w=1366&u_ah=728&u_aw=1366&u_cd=24&dmc=8&adx=368&ady=1984&biw=1349&bih=625&scr_x=0&scr_y=0&eid=31063703%2C21067496&oid=2&psts=AGkb-H9wmss3ftiAgqjAVoA-obK7B6rQT1jMTnxJYUSKE1U1QEvDHlvywBsoJlMkkSKF3I0DucAPknRPwDw%2CAGkb-H8lKMocpz47woc6vETFrkNTlM6YSrlcU3rSvywdKKEAZT3mkWLRrOgNGxfqkVpDWQJGV0DkpHwzRA&pvsid=1616790102313099&pem=11&tmod=1436071561&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&eae=0&fc=1408&brdim=0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C625&vis=1&rsz=%7C%7Cs%7C&abl=NS&fu=128&bc=31&ifi=5&uci=a!5&btvi=2&fsb=1&xpc=KFC7lhqY0b&p=https%3A//adoc.pub&dtd=M

Ordinary and Staff Officer of the Czechoslovak Army (1920–1932) …. 24

4.2.

Officer of the search group of the 2nd Department of the General Staff (1932–1937) ….. 28

4.3.

Military Attaché in Switzerland (1937-1938) …………………………………….. …. 39

World War II (1939–1945) ………………………………. …………………………. 51 5.1.

Moravc’s “eleven” – moving to Great Britain (1939) ……….. 51

5.2.

Beginnings in Great Britain (1939) ……………………………………. ………………… 55

5.3.

In France (1939-1940) ……………………………………. …………………………….. 63

5.4.

Back in the UK and the conflict with Col. Moravcem (1940–1941) …………… 78

5.5.

Liaison Officer of the Dutch Army (1941–1942) ………………………. 82

5.6. Officer of the Staff for the Building of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces (1942–1945) ……………………………….. ………………………………………….. ………………. 85 5.7. Liaison officer with the 3rd US Army and chief of the US military mission in Czechoslovakia (1945) …………………………. ……………………… 91 6.

Post-war years (1945–1990) ……….. ………………………………………….. …………….. 99 6.1.

Senior Officer of the Czechoslovak Army (1945–1949) ……….. 99

6.2.

Retirement and subsequent persecution (1949–1951) ……………………………………. 103

6.3.

Life after release and rehabilitation (1951–1990) ……………………………………. 114

Conclusion …………………………………………. ………………………………………….. …………. 126https://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/ads?client=ca-pub-2025287964322501&output=html&h=280&adk=3316849697&adf=908221301&pi=t.aa~a.791033702~i.178~rp.1&w=950&fwrn=4&fwrnh=100&lmt=1637079094&num_ads=1&rafmt=1&armr=3&sem=mc&pwprc=8576066767&psa=1&ad_type=text_image&format=950×280&url=https%3A%2F%2Fadoc.pub%2Fivotni-osudy-zpravodajskeho-dstojnika.html&flash=0&fwr=0&pra=3&rh=200&rw=949&rpe=1&resp_fmts=3&wgl=1&fa=27&adsid=ChEIgMrNjAYQrducgNSMkZX4ARJIABSZlyZ417jOy6nPb7YmGAzGIM_oBe3F3zHC8OqEaU_i_Wj1M4M9Ze-8t0Zl3WS5xXT8mcJSfDcgy8UDzMZgVOPow5OwkTb1&uach=WyJXaW5kb3dzIiwiMTAuMC4wIiwieDg2IiwiIiwiOTUuMC40NjM4LjY5IixbXSxudWxsLG51bGwsIjY0Il0.&dt=1637077626034&bpp=139&bdt=2441&idt=139&shv=r20211111&mjsv=m202111100101&ptt=9&saldr=aa&abxe=1&cookie=ID%3Dd5e2e6db92bd5e30-228561f2aacc00cf%3AT%3D1637021895%3ART%3D1637021895%3AS%3DALNI_MZ9Z2P1KZNTBjatFIaEde232V8bBQ&prev_fmts=0x0%2C307x250%2C982x280%2C1349x625%2C950x280%2C950x280&nras=4&correlator=1011245596538&frm=20&pv=1&ga_vid=72963090.1637021896&ga_sid=1637077625&ga_hid=1346907515&ga_fc=1&u_tz=-300&u_his=1&u_h=768&u_w=1366&u_ah=728&u_aw=1366&u_cd=24&dmc=8&adx=368&ady=3164&biw=1349&bih=625&scr_x=0&scr_y=781&eid=31063703%2C21067496&oid=2&psts=AGkb-H9wmss3ftiAgqjAVoA-obK7B6rQT1jMTnxJYUSKE1U1QEvDHlvywBsoJlMkkSKF3I0DucAPknRPwDw%2CAGkb-H8lKMocpz47woc6vETFrkNTlM6YSrlcU3rSvywdKKEAZT3mkWLRrOgNGxfqkVpDWQJGV0DkpHwzRA%2CAGkb-H-_8Tb38NzH-gfggpWcG1aRFD5iZblPJEbQNJ4aCcZ4sDH5kMCRL-sqFEGNw8gDmjdYNluAoKY3S1M%2CAGkb-H_h1ldh6UdseeRbPdj8mOIzRh31qs1LBbikUyrWnPYrcedJz-14RXCPoLtkiyc_kbxeKiOEpMoIJLM&pvsid=1616790102313099&pem=11&tmod=1436071561&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&eae=0&fc=1408&brdim=0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C0%2C1366%2C728%2C1366%2C625&vis=1&rsz=%7C%7Cs%7C&abl=NS&fu=128&bc=31&jar=2021-11-16-16&ifi=6&uci=a!6&btvi=3&fsb=1&xpc=3sIf0HBbjV&p=https%3A//adoc.pub&dtd=M

List of sources and literature ………………………………………. …………………………… 128 List of abbreviations used …………. ………………………………………….. …………………. 134 Summary …………………….. ………………………………………….. …………………………………. 136 Annexes …….. ………………………………………….. ………………………………………….. ……… 137 Annotation ………………………………… ………………………………………….. ……………………… 148

Introduction

If we ask someone if they have heard of Brigadier General Oldřich Tichý, we will not get a positive answer in the vast majority of cases. However, no one can blame this ignorance, because Oldřich Tichý is not really a well-known figure in Czech history. One of the aims of the presented work is to contribute at least to alleviating that shortcoming and to help Oldřich Tichý step out of the imaginary shadow of history. Oldřich Tichý is a very interesting personality for research for several reasons. First of all, it is the attraction of the topic itself, which results from the various stages of Tichý’s life, whether it is his service in the Czechoslovak legions in Russia, his work as an intelligence officer or military diplomat or his post-war fate when he reached the position of senior military official. subsequently became a victim of persecution, behind which the communist regime stood. Secondly, the possibility of processing Oldřich Tichý’s destinies is also attractive because no one has systematically dealt with them so far. This opens up a relatively wide field of research and authorship. The third reason is the topicality of the topic, because Oldřich Tichý does not belong to the very distant past. He was the longest living member of the so-called Moravc’s “eleven”, 1 who died in 1990. The aim of this work is to reconstruct the life of Oldřich Tichý and thus create his comprehensive biography. Of course, Tichý’s personality cannot be taken in isolation. It is necessary to place it in the overall context of the time, which will also make the work a probe into certain historical issues, such as the Czechoslovak intelligence service in the interwar period and during World War II, or military diplomacy. After all, it is possible to take an excursion with Oldřich Tichý throughout the twentieth century, which is made possible not only by his biographical data, but also by the fact that he was directly influenced by almost all major events in Czech history dating back to the last century. Of course, the question arose as to whether the current absence of professional interest in the person of Oldřich Tichý had no reason in the lack of a source base.

It was a group of 11 intelligence officers and their commanders, Col. gšt. František Moravec, who flew from Czechoslovakia to Great Britain on March 14, 1939 as part of the so-called “Transfer” operation. See below. 1

However, very soon after the start of the research, it turned out that a relatively large amount of materials are stored in the Czech archives. Given that this work is primarily a biography, it proved to be the best way to proceed in describing the life of Tichý chronologically and not, for example, thematically, which would also be possible, but probably not entirely practical.

Sources and literature

The most important source of information for research work is mainly archival or other sources. Based on their careful analysis, mutual comparison and their comparison with secondary literature, the life destinies of Oldřich Tichý can be reconstructed. Relatively many sources have been preserved to this day in the person of General Tichý. Silent memoirs must be mentioned in the first place.2 However, this is not a classical memory. These are Tichý’s remarks and comments on his activities as an intelligence officer and military diplomat, as well as his comments on the publication of his superior, Gen. František Moravec.3 Other important sources are deposited in various archives. First of all, it is necessary to list the materials stored in the Military Central Archive – the Administrative Archive of the Army of the Czech Republic in Olomouc (hereinafter referred to as the VÚA – SA AČR). This is the fund Personnel Materials of Professional Soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, 4 which provides basic information about Tichý’s military service, but also information about his persecution by the communist authorities or attempts at rehabilitation. Here it is necessary to mention the master sheets, which provide the most basic personnel data. In a brief but very clear form, they document Oldřich Tichý’s military career since 1916, when he enlisted as a one-year volunteer in the Austro-Hungarian army, until he was retired in 1949 and subsequently demoted from brigadier general to reserve soldier in 1950.5 Tribal the sheets also contain an insert that maps Tichý’s career during World War II.6 Another interesting source is the final report from the course for senior commanders, which he graduated from the Military University and in which Tichý is excellently evaluated. Other materials from the VÚA ̶ SA AČR related to the person of Oldřich Tichý were created only after the Second World War. The decree by which Tichý was transferred to retirement on 1 August 1949 dates from June 1949. The Basic Personal Letter is also dated to 1949, containing not only data on Tichý ‘s career, but also valuable 2

TICHÝ, Oldřich: Z pamětí zpravodajce. Notes on the activities of the 2nd Department and to the book gen. Frant. Moravce (hereinafter referred to as the Rapporteur’s Memory). History and Military (hereinafter HaV), 39, 1990, No. 4, pp. 119-131; Same: From the memory of the rapporteur (II.). HaV, 40, 1991, No. 1, pp. 122-140. 3 MORAVEC, František: Spion, whom they did not believe (hereinafter only Spy). Prague 2014. 4 VÚA – SA AČR, fund (hereinafter only f.) Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý. 5 The last entry in the master lists comes from February 1951. VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list. 6 Ibid.

information about Tichý’s family and his relatives. A relatively large amount of material deposited in the VÚA ̶ SA AČR testifies to the persecution of Tichý by the communist regime. In this context, we can mention, for example, the decision of the Ministry of National Defense (hereinafter referred to as the NGO) to withdraw its rank or various opinions. Other materials include attempts to rehabilitate Oldřich Tichý from 1968/69 and 1991.7 The Military Central Archive – Military Historical Archive in Prague (hereinafter VÚA – VHA) contains documents concerning Tichý’s military career as well. In terms of other personnel materials, in contrast to the VÚA – SA AČR, these are mainly the collections of Qualification Documents8 and Legionářský poslužný spis.9 Regarding individual qualification documents, including their originals, clean copies and special inserts, they map Tichý’s military career in great detail. Another valuable source of information is reports and records from military studies and training that Oldřich Tichý completed. Mention may be made, for example, of a course for officers at the Infantry Training School in Milovice, completion of a monthly telegraph course, completion of an army gas course and studies at the Military University in Prague and at the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris. It is also worth mentioning the material of the Regional Military Administration (KVS) Prague, which kept brief records of Oldřich Tichý and various agendas concerning his person from 1949 until his death in 1990. The correspondence provided by Oldřich Tichý also provides useful information. addressed the KVS, in which he reported to him, for example, his medical stays, asked for confirmation of receiving an old-age pension, informed about changes in employment or the death of his wife, etc. Documents from the collection of 37.10, which provide information about the silent activities of the intelligence officer and allow insight into the activities of the entire Czechoslovak intelligence service during the Second World War, are of great importance for the work. In this sense, the documents from the signature concerning the Karel, 11 radio station, which was part of the Paris branch of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, are absolutely crucial.

VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý. Military Central Archive – Military Historical Archive (hereinafter only VÚA – VHA), collection (hereinafter only sb.) Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý. 9 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 10 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37 (Military Intelligence Command). 11 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-153 (Radiostan Karel). 8

Materials from the Military Intelligence collection, 12 which also includes documents concerning the resumption of intelligence cooperation with the French shortly after the arrival of Czechoslovak correspondents in London in March 1939 and the subsequent re-establishment of cooperation with Switzerland, are also of great benefit. It can be pointed out that Oldřich Tichý played an important, in the case of Switzerland even significant, to both. The archives stored in the collection of 20.13, which contain information about Tichý’s further war activities, should not be left out either. There are also interesting materials in the National Archives in Prague (NA). The funds of the Hubert Ripka Archive14 and the Prague II Police Headquarters – population records must be mentioned in particular.15 As for the Hubert Ripka Archive fund, it is worth mentioning the US Army documents – entry into the Czechoslovak Republic. area. 16 These are materials proposing Tichý, then in the rank of colonel, together with JUDr. Ivo Ducháček as a liaison for military and civil affairs at the headquarters of the US 3rd Army, with which Tichý also entered Czechoslovak territory after six years of exile. In the Police Headquarters Prague II – Population Register fund, you can find, for example, a registration for Tichý’s permanent residence, an application for the issuance of new motor vehicle documents, an application for motor vehicle registration, an extract from the criminal record and Tichý’s firearms pass. However, it is important that the application for the issuance of new documents for the motor vehicle and the firearms pass are also included in photographs by Oldřich Tichý. For the period of Tichý’s persecution after 1948, but also for the period of his work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, Materials located in the Archive of the Security Forces in Prague (hereinafter referred to as ABS) are of fundamental importance. Specifically, it is mainly the fund H-34217 containing materials that map the course of the investigation of General Tichý in 1950. Here must be listed interrogation protocols written with Oldřich Tichý, as well as various opinions on him. The interrogation protocol, especially the one from February 23, 1950, could be used as a certain basic skeleton of a large part of the diploma thesis, because Tichý gradually described his 12

VÚA – VHA, sb. Military intelligence. VÚA – VHA, sb. 20 (Ministry of National Defense London). 14 NA, f. Hubert Ripka Archive (AHR). 15 NA, f. Police Headquarters Prague II – population records (hereinafter only PŘPII – EO). 16 NA, f. AHR, kart. 226, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory). 17 Security Forces Archive (hereinafter referred to as ABS), f. H (Historical Fund), a. No. H-342-1; ABS, H, and H-342-2. 13

military career from his arrival in the intelligence department until his retirement.18 The fund also includes files that contain information on the monitoring of Tichý, even after his release from TNP Mírov in 1951. The StB still led the volume a. No. 641123 MV, which was destroyed. In addition, Tichý was also a registered person for the investigation file stored under archive number V-16757 MV. This file was registered with Marie Urbanová and was also destroyed. Materials concerning Oldřich Tichý’s daughter Taťána Cihelková have also been preserved in ABS. It is a volume a. No. 625312 MV maintained under the pseudonym “Klapková” .19 The volume contains very valuable and interesting materials, the first of which is the decision to establish an agency union for her person under the pseudonym. Fund 302 (Military Counterintelligence Administration) and Fund Z (Report Maps prepared by the Study Institute of the Ministry of the Interior) also provide some important information. Oldřich Tichý’s personal prison file, which was supposed to be part of the Corps of Correctional Education Administration fund deposited in the NA, could also contribute to the issue of persecution of Tichý the Communist. Unfortunately, the personal files of the persons included in the Forced Labor Camps (hereinafter referred to as TNP) have not been preserved and it is not clear in what form they were kept. Only the registration cards of persons imprisoned in the TNP with their date of birth since 1911 are stored in the mentioned fund. Archive of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (hereinafter only MÚA AV ČR). In this case, it is the archives that are part of the Edvard Beneš collection.22 Work with materials from this collection was complicated by the incompleteness of signatures and the fact that the relevant signatures relate to collection 38, which was created by removing parts of archives from the original Beneš archive by the Ministry of the Interior. (hereinafter referred to as the MoI) after 1948. In the 1980s, “fond 38” was reunited with the archives of Edvard Beneš, but unfortunately it was diversified. As a result, it was necessary to study ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950. ABS, f. Svazkové agendy, a. 20 NA, statement of PhDr. Alena Šimánková, March 21, 2014. 21 Jiří Bílek also mentions this list in his article Tábor forced labor camp Mírov. BÍLEK, Jiří: Tábor nucené práce Mírov (hereinafter only Tábor). HaV, 47, 1998, No. 4, pp. 91-116. 22 Masaryk Institute and Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, f. Edvard Beneš. 18 19

25 different cartons and rely on a lucky coincidence that they will be able to find beneficial material. Although certain material concerning Tichý was found in the mentioned fund, in most cases it was the same material that contains the above-mentioned funds in ABS, NA, or VÚA – VHA. Therefore, in the end, the materials from the IAA AS CR were not used in the work. The author of each work of a professional nature must deal with current research on the topic and relevant literature. As has already been mentioned, no one has dealt with the personality of General Tichý in detail. However, the absence of a comprehensive personnel study or monograph dealing specifically with Oldřich Tichý does not mean that there are no studies or articles at least partially devoted to General Tichý. Some publications contain his medallions. In the first place is the work of Jiří Šolc entitled Beside the President, 23 which contains two short medallions, the first focusing mainly on the interwar and war period, the second on the postwar period. Next

Oldřich

Tichý

‘s medallion is

part

of the

Zlatice publication

Zudové-Leškové bearing the name Forgotten Elite.24 In this case, it is a comprehensive biographical medallion. The book also provides basic comprehensive knowledge on the topic of Czechoslovak military diplomacy in 1938-1945. Somewhat more briefly than in the previous case, General Tichý discusses a summary of basic information from his life included before the first part of his memoirs in the journal Historie a vojenství, specifically in the fourth issue of 1990. The author of this biographical introduction is historian Jiří Valenta.25 Despite the brevity and presentation of only basic information about General Tichý, for example, the medallion in Jiří Šolc’s work did not go without factual shortcomings. It states, among other things, that Tichý “was retired on August 1, 1948.” The other two mentioned authors, who devoted more space to Silent Life, agree on this. However, there is a discrepancy in the retirement of Oldřich Tichý. While the medallion presented in History and the Military speaks of the spring of 1949.27 23

ŠOLC, Jiří: Beside the President. General František Moravec and his intelligence service in the light of archival documents (hereinafter referred to as The President’s Side). Prague 2007, pp. 110 and 169. 24 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Zlatica: The Forgotten Elite. Czechoslovak military diplomats in the years 1938-1945 (hereinafter referred to as the Forgotten Elite). Prague 2011, pp. 240. 25 TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory, pp. 119-120. 26 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 169. 27 TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory, p. 120.

in Zlatice Zudová-Lešková’s book, we learn that Tichý “was granted leave on 1 June 1949 and transferred to retirement two months later.” 28 General Tichý. It is strange that General Tichý’s medallion is completely missing in the publication Military Personalities of the Czechoslovak Resistance 1939-1945.29 The basic facts about Tichý’s military career can also be found in Alex Maskalík’s extensive encyclopaedic work. 30 A brief biography of Oldřich Tichý, authored by Bernard Panuš, who, however, focuses only on Tichý’s participation in the First World War and his subsequent work in the legions, should not be left out. 31 All other work devoted to a certain space of General Tichý already contains rather specific information related to a certain stage of Tichý’s official activity and serves mainly to complete the overall picture. It is probably not surprising that his work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service is the most represented in this sense. Two publications must be mentioned from the larger works synthesizing the Czechoslovak intelligence service in the interwar period and during the Second World War. On the one hand, it is Šolc’s book Along the President, 32 which describes in great detail the organizational structure and functioning of the Czechoslovak intelligence service under the direction of František Moravec, and then the work signed by the author trio Jan Gebhart, Jaroslav Koutek and Jan Kuklík and which is entitled On the fronts of the secret war.33 It is probably not surprising that his work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service is the most represented in this sense. Two publications must be mentioned from the larger works synthesizing the Czechoslovak intelligence service in the interwar period and during the Second World War. On the one hand, it is Šolc’s book Along the President, 32 which describes in great detail the organizational structure and functioning of the Czechoslovak intelligence service under the direction of František Moravec, and then the work signed by the author trio Jan Gebhart, Jaroslav Koutek and Jan Kuklík and which is entitled On the fronts of the secret war.33 It is probably not surprising that his work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service is the most represented in this sense. Two publications must be mentioned from the larger works synthesizing the Czechoslovak intelligence service in the interwar period and during the Second World War. On the one hand, it is Šolc’s book Along the President, 32 which describes in great detail the organizational structure and functioning of the Czechoslovak intelligence service under the direction of František Moravec, and then the work signed by the author trio Jan Gebhart, Jaroslav Koutek and Jan Kuklík and which is entitled On the fronts of the secret war.33

ZUDOVÁ – LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, s. 241. LÁNÍK, Jaroslav et al .: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939–1945. Prague 2005. 30 MASKALIK, Alex: Elite of the Army. Czechoslovak military general 1918-1992 (hereinafter the Elite Army). Bánská Bystrica 2012, pp. 603. 31 PANUŠ, Bernard: Tichý Oldřich. In: http://www.karelvasatko.cz/zivotopisy-legionaru/ruske-legie/tichy-oldich [cit. October 18, 2014]. 32 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President. Despite its undeniable contribution, this publication must be approached with some caution. Although this is the second, revised and expanded edition, it contains, albeit to a lesser extent than the first edition (ŠOLC, J .: In the Service of the President. General František Moravec in the Light of Archival Documents. Prague 1994), some factual errors and inaccuracies. Stanislav Kokoška pointed out the most serious shortcomings of the first edition in 1994. See KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Moravc’s Intelligence Service without Legends? HaV, 43, 1994, No. 6, pp. 171-178. 33 GEBHART, Jan – KOUTEK, Jaroslav – KUKLIK, Jan: Na frontach tajne valky. Chapters from the struggle of Czechoslovak intelligence against Nazism in the years 1938–1941 (hereinafter referred to as On the Fronts). Prague 1989. 29

The work of Jaroslav and Stanislav Kokošková also represents a great contribution. The Dispute over Agent A ̶ 54.34 a certain space and personality of General Tichý, who, among other things, took part in establishing the very first contact with Agent A-54. . Party interests must not remain or work named Brigadier General Josef Bartik, 36

of which

the author

Paul

Kreisinger.

The

book

also discusses

about the intelligence officer and colleague Oldřich Tichý, General Bartík. Due to the very close professional proximity of both men, we can also find valuable information about General Tichý in Pavel Kreiser’s publication. Leaving aside the above-mentioned publications, there are still partial studies, again mainly on the topic of the Czechoslovak intelligence service. It is necessary to mention the article by Emil Strankmüller Czechoslovak Offensive Intelligence from March 1939.37 further study by Jaroslav Kokoška (Painter) London Intelligence Group Col. Moravce on the eve of World War II38 and Karel Straka’s contribution Renewal of Czechoslovak-French intelligence cooperation between March and August 1939.39 Other works devoted partly to the fate of Oldřich Tichý must mention Pavel Kresinger’s article The Year 1941 in Czechoslovakia. military intelligence.

KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Dispute over Agent A-54. Chapters from the history of the Czechoslovak intelligence service (hereinafter referred to as the Agent Dispute). Prague 1994. 35 See AMORT, Čestmír – JEDLIČKA, Ivan M .: The Secret of the Spy A-54: From Unknown Acts of the Second Department (hereinafter referred to as the Secret of the Spy). Prague 1965; STRÖBINGER, Rudolf: Stopa leads to René: Documentary reportage. Prague 1965. 36 KREISINGER, Pavel: Brigadier General Josef Bartík. Intelligence officer and participant in the first and second Czechoslovak resistance (hereinafter referred to as the Brigadier General). Prague 2011. 37 STRANKMÜLLER, Emil: Czechoslovak Offensive News since March 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Czechoslovak Offensive News). The Resistance and the Revolution of 1970, pp. 189–229. 38 KOKOŠKA (MALÍŘ), Jaroslav: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina plk. Moravce on the eve of World War II (hereinafter referred to as the London Intelligence Group). HaV, 38, 1989, No. 4, pp. 68-89. 39 STRAKA, Karel: Renewal of Czechoslovak-French Intelligence Cooperation between March and August 1939 (hereinafter referred to as Renewal). In: http://www.vhu.cz/obnova-ceskoslovensko-francouzskezpravodajske-kooperace-mezi-breznem-a-srpnem-1939/ [cit. February 14, 2015]. 40 KREISINGER, Pavel: Year 1941 in Czechoslovakia. military intelligence. Personnel crisis in Moravcov’s intelligence “eleven” (hereinafter only Year 1941). In: KUDRNA, Ladislav (ed.): The War Year 1941 in the Czechoslovak Domestic and Foreign Resistance. Proceedings of the international conference. Prague 2012, pp. 11–19. military intelligence. Personnel crisis in Moravcov’s intelligence “eleven” (hereinafter only Year 1941). In: KUDRNA, Ladislav (ed.): The War Year 1941 in the Czechoslovak Domestic and Foreign Resistance. Proceedings of the international conference. Prague 2012, pp. 11–19. military intelligence. Personnel crisis in Moravcov’s intelligence “eleven” (hereinafter only Year 1941). In: KUDRNA, Ladislav (ed.): The War Year 1941 in the Czechoslovak Domestic and Foreign Resistance. Proceedings of the international conference. Prague 2012, pp. 11–19.

and began acting as a liaison officer with the Dutch army in Great Britain. General Tichý’s post-war destinies were practically unaffected by secondary literature. The study of Věra Břachová entitled Destruction of the Czechoslovak Officers Corps can only be used marginally in this sense. army in February 194841 or Jiří Bílek’s article Tábor forced labor Mírov.42 While in the case of Jiří Bílek Oldřich Tichý is mentioned only in the list of senior officers who were interned in the camp, in the study of Věra Břachová Tichý’s name does not figure at all and its contribution a summary of the issue of the liquidation of the officer corps of the Czechoslovak army by the communist regime after 1948. This is how Oldřich Tichý’s military career ended.

BŘACHOVÁ, Věra: Destrukce officnického sboru čs. Army after February 1948 (hereinafter Destruction). HaV, 41, 1992, No. 3, pp. 109-127. 42 BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, pp. 91–116.

Young years

3.1.

Childhood

Oldřich Tichý was born on January 30, 1898 in the East Bohemian village of Nechanice to Mr. and Mrs. Hynek Tichý, the owner of an inn in Sadová, 43, and Františka Tichá, née Matějovská. Oldřich still had three siblings, but from archival sources it seems that only he and his sister Božena survived adulthood.44 Both parents were of Czech nationality and most likely also Catholics, because

Oldřich

Tichý’s personal materials

also

appear

in the relevant

column of

religion.

Roman Catholic. June 1915 graduation exam. The Czech language was also taught here, but Oldřich Tichý also studied German and French, and, as evidenced by his later staffing materials, French did better.48 In the future, however, there was a lack of knowledge of the German language due to his intelligence work. of course, he caught up, as evidenced by post-war records.49 After high school, this 164-cm-tall young man with auburn hair, black eyebrows, brown eyes, and an eagle nose50 began studying mechanical engineering 43

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 10. 1. 1950, p. 1; VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal letter I. 44 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 10. 1. 1950; In the personal insert of an unnumbered master certificate from the period of the Second World War, the name and address of Tichý’s sister Božena Tichá are given in the column “closest relative”. VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Personal insert to the Tribal Certificate, March 12, 1940; In 1949, his sister was most likely after his death, because the column in the Basic Personal Letter, where Tichý was to state the nationalities of his blood relatives, did not contain any record. VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic Personal Letter, May 26, 1949, p. 23. 45 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. 46 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Application for professional officers and sergeants, 11 May 1946. 47 II. Czech state real school in Brno. At present, the name of the school is Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36. Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36: History of the school. In: http://www.gymkren.cz/o-gymnaziu-krenovabrno/historie-skoly/ [cit. October 18, 2014]. 48 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 49 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal sheet, 26. 5. 1949, p. 5. 50 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. Oldřich Tichý, Application for professional officers and sergeants by profession, 11 May 1946. 47 II. Czech state real school in Brno. At present, the name of the school is Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36. Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36: History of the school. In: http://www.gymkren.cz/o-gymnaziu-krenovabrno/historie-skoly/ [cit. October 18, 2014]. 48 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 49 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal sheet, 26. 5. 1949, p. 5. 50 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. Oldřich Tichý, Application for professional officers and sergeants by profession, 11 May 1946. 47 II. Czech state real school in Brno. At present, the name of the school is Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36. Gymnázium, Brno, Křenová 36: History of the school. In: http://www.gymkren.cz/o-gymnaziu-krenovabrno/historie-skoly/ [cit. October 18, 2014]. 48 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 49 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal sheet, 26. 5. 1949, p. 5. 50 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. cz / o-gymnaziu-krenovabrno / historie-skoly / [cit. October 18, 2014]. 48 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 49 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal sheet, 26. 5. 1949, p. 5. 50 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. cz / o-gymnaziu-krenovabrno / historie-skoly / [cit. October 18, 2014]. 48 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 49 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal sheet, 26. 5. 1949, p. 5. 50 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I.

at the C. and K. Czech Technical University in Prague.51 However, he interrupted his studies after two semesters in May 1915, because his life was affected by the First World War.52

3.2.

In the Austro-Hungarian Army and Russian Legions (1916–1920)

Oldřich Tichý enlisted in the Austro-Hungarian army during a voluntary conscription on May 10, 1916 as a so-called one-year volunteer. In practice, this meant that he was to serve 12 months of active service and then be placed in reserve for 11 years.53 “One-year-olds” differed from other soldiers by a characteristic patch on the uniform in the form of a yellow ribbon with a black stripe. Students or more educated young men became one-year volunteers, as this type of military service initially required at least a successful completion of a real grammar school, later it was sufficient to achieve secondary education in general.54 the service counted as reserve officers, which was matched by their training. From a research point of view, Tichý’s military affiliation in the Austro-Hungarian army seems to be problematic. While a number of materials show that Oldřich Tichý was assigned to the 78.55 Infantry Regiment, according to one of the documents, it could be the 18.56 Infantry Regiment. Due to the not entirely unambiguous implementation of the number 18, it may have happened that the number 78 was confused with copying the data in other documents. near Tichý’s native Nechanice, and it is therefore obvious that Oldřich Tichý would probably enlist a military body 55 according to one of the documents could be the Infantry Regiment No. 18.56 None of the variants can be accepted with absolute certainty. Due to the not entirely unambiguous implementation of the number 18, it may have happened that the number 78 was confused with copying the data in other documents. near Tichý’s native Nechanice, and it is therefore obvious that Oldřich Tichý would probably enlist a military body 55 according to one of the documents could be the Infantry Regiment No. 18.56 None of the variants can be accepted with absolute certainty. Due to the not entirely unambiguous implementation of the number 18, it may have happened that the number 78 was confused with copying the data in other documents. near Tichý’s native Nechanice, and it is therefore obvious that Oldřich Tichý would probably enlist a military body

Contemporary Czech Technical University. CTU in Prague: History. In: http://www.cvut.cz/historie [cit. October 18, 2014]. 52 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Kmenový list I; VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý. 53 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Kmenový list I. 54 PERNES, Jiří et al. Under the imperial banner. History of the Habsburg Army 1526 ̶ 1918 (hereinafter referred to as the Imperial Battalion). Prague 2003, p. 308. 55 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list; VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, First edition of qualification document, 1922. 56 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý, No. 1110f. 57 PERNES, J. et al. Under the Imperial Battalion, p. 330.

to Hradec. On the other hand, although the No. 78 Infantry Regiment was stationed in Osijek, Hungary, Tichý’s classification with him cannot be completely ruled out, although this regiment is not one of the regiments supplemented from Bohemia.58 Regiment No. 78 also supports the fact that Tichý course at the officer’s school of the 13th Army Corps in Rijeka, which is about 330 kilometers from Osijek. The course ran from the beginning of June to the end of October 1916.59 Tichý completed it with success and was promoted to the rank of corporal.60 Here he most likely fell into Russian captivity on August 4, 1917, and subsequently ended up in a prison camp in Darnice on the outskirts of Kiev.61 This is where Tichý’s legionary career began. Oldřich Tichý spent three months in the prisoner of war camp, and on November 20, 1917, he still enlisted in the Czechoslovak army in Darnice. This was followed by a transfer to Zhytomyr, where Tichý was assigned to the rank of 10th Company of the 1st Czechoslovak Reserve Regiment, which was part of the 1st Czechoslovak Hussite Rifle Division, on November 25, 1917. The entry into the Czechoslovak army for Tichý did not represent such a complicated matter. After the success of the Czechoslovaks in the battle of Zborov, the Russians finally allowed unlimited recruitment of prisoners, even directly in the front zone. Thanks to this, the prisoners were no longer transported from the central camp in Darnice to distant prison camps deep inside Russia.63 Among other things, Tichý Garrigu Masaryk’s visit to the prison camp could motivate Tichý to join the Czechoslovak army,

PERNES, J. et al. Under the Imperial Battalion, p. 330. VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Prvopis kvalifikační listiny, 1922; VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 60 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Original qualification document, 1922. 61 According to some documents, Tichý fell into Russian captivity “at Orange”. VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Personal statement, 1920. 62 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Prvopis kvalifikační listiny, 1922; VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 63 KLÍPA, Bohumír ̶ PICHLÍK, Karel ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, Jitka: Czechoslovak Legionnaires (1914 ̶ 1920) (hereinafter referred to as Czechoslovak Legionnaires). Prague 1996, pp. 105 ̶ 106. 64 Ibid., Pp. 107. 65 Ibid., Pp. 107 ̶ 108. 59

Relatively soon after his enlistment in the 1st Czechoslovak Reserve Regiment, on December 14, 1917, Tichý was assigned to the regimental non-commissioned officer school. He completed a two-month non-commissioned officer course, and on April 29, 1918, he was promoted to the rank of corporal.66 The time lag can be easily explained, as Tichý, of course, underwent combat operations with his unit. He first took part in the departure of the 1st Czechoslovak Reserve Regiment from Zhytomyr to Tambov and the subsequent fighting at Bachmač with the Germans.67 The Reserve Regiment began preparing for its departure on February 20, 1918, following reports of advancing German troops. German troops began to re-launch the initiative and began occupying Ukraine with the intention of getting the Bolsheviks to sign peace. On February 23, 1918, the 1st Czechoslovak Reserve Regiment withdrew from Zhytomyr. The regiment headed for Borispol, where he had to stay for a few days and wait for further orders. Since the regiment did not receive any orders, it was decided to leave Borispol. The regiment finally arrived in Jagotín on March 7, where two trains were waiting for it.68 Given that part of the regiment traveling on the second of the trains joined the battle of Bachmač on March 10, which took place from March 8 to 13, it can be concluded that Tichý also rode with his unit in the second train, as his helpful legionary file proves his participation in the fighting at Bachmač. Although neither train was to join the fight, the commander of the other train decided pkpt. He twisted help at the request of the 6th Czechoslovak Rifle “Hanácký” Regiment, whose weak left wing in the village Peski threatened that the Germans would bypass it and thus directly endanger the railway line. Thanks to the frontal attack of the 6th Regiment, which was also supported by the III. battalion 1. reserve regiment, finally managed to force the Germans to retreat. Of the units of the 1st Reserve Regiment, only III. battalion commanded by Lt. Col. Obrovec. From the 1st Reserve Regiment, 12 men were wounded near Bachmač, one of whom later succumbed to his injuries.69 After the Battle of Bachmač, Czechoslovak troops wanted to move to the Pacific port of Vladivostok and from there to France, where they were to take part in the fighting against the Germans in the west. queue. However, this was initially assumed by 66 69 After the Battle of Bachmač, Czechoslovak troops wanted to move to the Pacific port of Vladivostok and from there to France, where they were to take part in the fighting against the Germans on the Western Front. However, this was initially assumed by 66 69 After the Battle of Bachmač, Czechoslovak troops wanted to move to the Pacific port of Vladivostok and from there to France, where they were to take part in the fighting against the Germans on the Western Front. However, this was initially assumed by 66

VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. Ibid. 68 KRAUTSTENGL, Gustav: Lift from the History of the 9th Infantry Regiment of Karel Havlíček Borovský. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Battle of Buzuluk and the jubilee festivities on 5 and 6 July 1928 (hereinafter referred to as the Excerpt from History). Bridge 1928, p. 5. 69 Ibid. 67

to travel thousands of kilometers along the Trans-Siberian Highway, now also a country in which a civil war broke out.70 Again, both parts of the 1st Reserve Regiment met in Platonovka, which was a small station not far from Tambov, the destination of the transfer from Zhytomyr. Not far from Platonovka, in the town of Razskazov, the regiment was reorganized and replenished. The trains in which the Tichý Regiment was transported set off again on April 22, 1918.71 Unfortunately, this time it is no longer possible to determine from which of which trains Oldřich Tichý traveled. The situation of Czechoslovak troops in Russia became more and more complicated. Already on March 3, 1918, the Soviet government, under the influence of the German ultimatum, had to sign a very unfavorable and disgraceful Brestlitev peace for Russia, which ratified the Soviet Congress on March 17. As Lenin’s expectations of the revolution in Germany still did not materialize, some members of the government, such as Lev Trotsky, began to think of a possible alliance with the Treaty, based on renewed hostility with Germany. However, the situation of the Soviet government was not easy at all. By the Peace of Brestlitev, she pledged to disarm the army and exchange prisoners. However, an armed army corps moved on Soviet territory, which also claimed to be part of the French army and which was composed of Austro-Hungarian prisoners.72 On March 23 and 24, 1918, the situation was discussed by the presidium of the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council. Members who lacked Masaryk’s leadership, as he was already traveling through the Far East and Japan to the United States at the time, tried to find a solution. Some have suggested that the Czechoslovak soldiers forced their way east to Vladivostok by force, which, however, was resolutely refused by Chief of Staff Gen. Michail Diterichs. Instead, negotiations continued with the Soviet authorities, and an agreement was finally reached in Penza with the Soviet chairman of the Kuraev pension area on the partial disarmament of the Czechoslovak corps.73 A telegram from one of the members of the Soviet government, Joseph Stalin, approved the agreement. The Soviet government thus recognized the Czechoslovak demands for the immediate movement of train transports east to Vladivostok and guaranteed free passage through Russia and the whole of Siberia, and promised 70 Instead, negotiations continued with the Soviet authorities, and an agreement was finally reached in Penza with the Soviet chairman of the Kuraev pension area on the partial disarmament of the Czechoslovak corps.73 A telegram from one of the members of the Soviet government, Joseph Stalin, approved the agreement. The Soviet government thus recognized the Czechoslovak demands for the immediate movement of train transports east to Vladivostok and guaranteed free passage through Russia and the whole of Siberia, and promised 70 Instead, negotiations continued with the Soviet authorities, and an agreement was finally reached in Penza with the Soviet chairman of the Kuraev pension area on the partial disarmament of the Czechoslovak corps.73 A telegram from one of the members of the Soviet government, Joseph Stalin, approved the agreement. The Soviet government thus recognized the Czechoslovak demands for the immediate movement of train transports east to Vladivostok and guaranteed free passage through Russia and the whole of Siberia, and promised 70

KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, p. 170. KRAUTSTENGL, G .: Elevator from History, p. 5 ̶ 6. 72 KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, pp. 143. 73 FIC, Victor M .: Czechoslovak Legions in Russia and the Struggle for the Establishment of Czechoslovakia 1914 ̶ 1918. II. part. The Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legions, the beginning of their armed conflict, March ̶ May 1918 (hereinafter referred to as the Czechoslovak Legions. Part II). Brno 2007, pp. 35 and 53; KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, pp. 143-144. 71

that the organization and unity of the church will be preserved. It was also emphasized that the Czechoslovak Corps did not move as a fighting force, and that it would retain only a small amount of weapons in order to protect its trains from bandits.74 However, the agreement practically dealt only with the passage of Penza itself. Moreover, after the first Japanese troops, ie the soldiers of the Agreement, landed in Vladivostok, Siberian Soviet leaders became even more concerned about the transfer of not fully disarmed Czechoslovak train transports, and on April 21, the Siberian Soviets received instructions that Czechoslovak troops were not allowed to travel east. 75 Various provocations by the Soviets also began to arise, and various incidents complicating the already difficult situation of the Czechoslovak army also increased. An example is the well-known Chelyabinsk incident. In addition to the train of Czechoslovak troops, a train with Russian refugees stood at the Chelyabinsk railway station for some time, in the last three carriages of which there were also Hungarian prisoners. It was quiet all the time, but when a train with refugees began to leave the station on May 14, one of the Hungarian prisoners threw a piece of iron from the car, which struck a Czechoslovak soldier standing nearby. He suffered a severe injury, fainted, and lacked little to keep rolling under the wheels of a passing train. His comrades-in-arms immediately stopped the train, found the culprit among the detained Hungarians and began to lynch him. The general battle that broke out had to be directed by the summoned Czechoslovak guard. The Bolshevik guard did not intervene and the whole incident would eventually end immediately after the Hungarians left, however, a part of the local internationalist company was also a Hungarian unit, which, on behalf of its representative on the Chelyabinsk Soviet committee, demanded an investigation into the whole matter and action against the Czechoslovaks. When the commission of inquiry ordered the detention of the intervening Czechoslovak guard and one of the delegates sent by the Czechoslovak command to intervene in favor of the guard members, it occupied 3,000 Czechoslovak soldiers in Chelyabinsk, disarmed several Bolsheviks and seized weapons in the military commissariat. However, the Czechoslovaks proclaimed that their entire action was not directed against the Soviet government, but aimed to force the Soviets to release detained Czechoslovak soldiers. In addition, the command promised to punish the soldiers When the commission of inquiry ordered the detention of the intervening Czechoslovak guard and one of the delegates sent by the Czechoslovak command to intervene in favor of the guard members, it occupied 3,000 Czechoslovak soldiers in Chelyabinsk, disarmed several Bolsheviks and seized weapons in the military commissariat. However, the Czechoslovaks proclaimed that their entire action was not directed against the Soviet government, but aimed to force the Soviets to release detained Czechoslovak soldiers. In addition, the command promised to punish the soldiers When the commission of inquiry ordered the detention of the intervening Czechoslovak guard and one of the delegates sent by the Czechoslovak command to intervene in favor of the guard members, it occupied 3,000 Czechoslovak soldiers in Chelyabinsk, disarmed several Bolsheviks and seized weapons in the military commissariat. However, the Czechoslovaks proclaimed that their entire action was not directed against the Soviet government, but aimed to force the Soviets to release detained Czechoslovak soldiers. In addition, the command promised to punish the soldiers However, the Czechoslovaks proclaimed that their entire action was not directed against the Soviet government, but aimed to force the Soviets to release detained Czechoslovak soldiers. In addition, the command promised to punish the soldiers However, the Czechoslovaks proclaimed that their entire action was not directed against the Soviet government, but aimed to force the Soviets to release detained Czechoslovak soldiers. In addition, the command promised to punish the soldiers

74 75

FIC, VM: Czechoslovak Legions. II. part, p. 52. KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, p. 170.

responsible for the lynching of the Hungarian. The Soviets then, aware that the Czechoslovaks had control of the entire city, retreated and released the detained soldiers.76 In particular, officers and soldiers in transports rapidly lost confidence in the Soviet government, which was caused, among other things, by the desperately slow course of the movement. On May 20, in Chelyabinsk, representatives of both Czechoslovak divisions agreed with the present members of the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council and the commanders of the individual echelons who stood at Chelyabinsk railway station to establish an Interim Executive Committee, whose task will be to clear the way east. The committee consisted of four members of the branch, four representatives of the team and commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 7th Regiment, who gained all command authority over the Czechoslovak units located in the area between Penza and Irkutsk.77 that negotiations with the Soviet government no longer make sense was definitively confirmed on May 23, when a telegram was intercepted in Chelyabinsk calling on the Soviets “to detain, disarm and dismantle all the echelons and parts of the Czechoslovak Republic. Army Corps. ”78 The first military clashes with the Soviets then took place on May 24, 1918 in the Chelyabinsk section of Lt. Col. Sergei Vojcechovsky.79 Probably the most difficult situation got into a pension group of troops under the command of Lt. Col. Stanislav Čeček, forming the rear guard of the entire corps. Oldřich Tichý also took part in the battles of this group in the rank of corporal. On May 28, 1918.80 1st Reserve Regiment and 1st Artillery Brigade. Their opponent was the Soviet garrison in Penza, a mixture of Latvians, Czech and German internationalists and Russians, numbering about 3,800 men. The Soviets were much better armed, especially with the weapons handed over to them by Czechoslovak troops, and the Penza, which was located near the main centers of military power, was approaching Soviet reinforcements. During the 28th and 29th of May, Czechoslovak soldiers, including members of the 1st Reserve Regiment, occupied Penz. The Czechoslovak losses amounted to 30 dead and about a hundred wounded. In contrast, on the Soviet side, losses 76 which was located near the main centers of military power, in addition, Soviet reinforcements approached. During the 28th and 29th of May, Czechoslovak soldiers, including members of the 1st Reserve Regiment, occupied Penz. The Czechoslovak losses amounted to 30 dead and about a hundred wounded. In contrast, on the Soviet side, losses 76 which was located near the main centers of military power, in addition, Soviet reinforcements approached. During the 28th and 29th of May, Czechoslovak soldiers, including members of the 1st Reserve Regiment, occupied Penz. The Czechoslovak losses amounted to 30 dead and about a hundred wounded. In contrast, on the Soviet side, losses 76

FIC, VM: Czechoslovak Legion. II. vol., pp. 261-262. Irkutsk was an imaginary frontier, as troops already east of Irkutsk could reach Vladivostok safely. Ibid., P. 252; KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, pp. 174. 78 FIC, VM: Czechoslovak Legions. II. part, p. 294. 79 KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, p. 176. 80 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 77

climbed to 200 dead and 2,000 captured, the rest dispersed. Subsequently, the vanguard of the Čeček group managed to seize the bridge over the Volga, and by June 3, 1918, the entire group was transported to the left east bank of the river.81 the Volga front from June 6 to November 3, 1918.83 During these military actions, there were several changes in the Silent Legionary’s career. On July 5, Tichý was promoted to sergeant. In July, as a result of the formation of four new companies within the 1st Reserve Regiment, the 10th Company, in which Tichý was assigned, was renamed the 13th Company. During August, however, the designation of the 13th Company changed again to the original 10th, and the entire regiment underwent changes. The current 1st Reserve Regiment was merged with the 1st. the Kurgan marching battalion and the Independent Davlekan half-battalion, which created a new combat body, which was given the designation of the 9th Czechoslovak Rifle Regiment Karel Havlíček Borovský.84 In 1918, Tichý underwent further service. In October, as an officer-waiting, he became commander of one of the platoon 10th Company with retroactive effect from June 1, 1918.85 In November, Tichý was transferred to the same office, but to the 1st Company. 86 The beginning of 1919 meant another promotion for Oldřich Tichý. On January 6, he was appointed ensign, gaining his first rank as an officer. He completed a business trip to Omsk in March and another to Krasnoyarsk at the turn of June and July.87 Unfortunately, it is not known in what matter he made both business trips. In addition, between April 15 and June 23, he took part in a campaign on the so-called Manx Front, which were battles around the highway, which were to allow the passage of transports of Czechoslovak legionaries to Vladivostok. Soon after his return from Krasnoyarsk, Tichý acquired the rank of lieutenant on July 7, 1919.88 This time, however, it was not a matter of promotion, but of renaming, because Tichý’s current

KLÍPA, B. ̶ PICHLÍK, K. ̶ ZABLOUDILOVÁ, J .: Czechoslovak Legionnaires, p. 177; KRAUTSTENGL, G .: Lift from history, p. 7. 82 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 83 The period from 6 June to 31 October 1918 is sometimes indicated. Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 The Legionnaire’s Service File admits two dates when Tichý was appointed platoon leader, on October 9 or 10, 1918. Ibid. In contrast, only the date 9 October 1918 is given in the Tribal Letters. Compare VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý; Tribal list I. and II. 86 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid.

the rank of ensign was previously abolished in the Czechoslovak army and gradually replaced by the rank of lieutenant.89 By order of 23 July 1919, Oldřich Tichý received his first decoration, the Order of St. George IV degree.90 Unfortunately, it is not possible to read from any documents what specifically he received this award for. In August, Tichý was appointed commander of the half company, ie two platoons, in the 1st Company.91 Between January 15 and February 7, 1920, Tichý again participated in combat operations against Soviet troops during the departure of III. Rifle Division from Kanska to Cheremchov. On April 16, he was promoted again, gaining the rank of lieutenant with retroactive effect from April 1. He fell ill at the beginning of June, but recovered very soon, and finally the way home followed.92 On June 8, 1920, Tichý traveled to Czechoslovakia. On that June day, he boarded the ship Protesilaus and sailed from Vladivostok to Vancouver, Canada, along with the 29th transport of Czechoslovak legionnaires. From there, the legionnaires moved by rail to the Valcartier military camp and then to Halifax, where they boarded the Minecahda, where they sailed for Germany on June 18, 93 from where they continued by train to their homeland. After a two-month journey, they finally arrived in Czechoslovakia on August 4, 1920.94

PANUŠ, B .: Military education in Czechoslovakia. legions. In: http://www.karelvasatko.cz/historieceskoslovenskych-legii/odborne-clanky/vseobecne-k-cs-legiim/vojenske-kolstvi-v-slegiich [cit. 19/11/2014]. 90 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 94 VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionary Service File, Oldřich Tichý.

Interwar career (1920–1939)

4.1.

Ordinary and Staff Officer of the Czechoslovak Army (1920–1932)

After returning to his homeland, Oldřich Tichý decided to remain in the army. His service in the legions was counted from November 25, 1917 to August 31, 1920.95 After his activation, he was included on September 5, 1920 in the rank of lieutenant in the tribal number of Infantry Regiment No. 9, to the 1st Reserve Company.96 Regiment No. 9 was created on October 11, 1920 from the 9th Czechoslovak Rifle Regiment Karel Havlíček Borovský within the unification of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces, while also taking over the predecessor of the honorary

name

“Karel

Havlíček

Borovský”.

The

headquarters were located

in Most

and hierarchically the regiment fell under the command of the Second Infantry Brigade.97 Oldřich Tichý also served initially in Most and in December 1920 he was accepted into the category of professional officers. Already during the autumn of 1920, he completed an instructor course at the Provincial Military School in Chomutov. This course, which ran from September 14 to October 9, 1920, was completed by Tichý with very good results.98 During 1921, there were several important moments in Tichý’s military career. In the spring of 1921, Tichý received two more honors, namely the Czechoslovak War Cross in March and in April the Order of MR Štefánik “Falcon with Swords”, for bravery in battle and for special merits in Siberia. For him, the summer of 1921 meant, on the one hand, a reassignment within the 9th Infantry Regiment from the 1st Reserve Company to the 5th Half-Company, and, on the other hand, the third award in a row, as on 14. July 1921 Tichý received the Italian War Merit Cross. On November 1, 1921, Tichý was promoted to the rank of captain.99 From November 15, 1921 to August 26, 1922, Capt. Quiet at the École Spéciale Militaire, a special military school for infantry, in Saint-

Oldřich Tichý’s personal statement, which is a part of his service file, states as the date of the end of the legionary service September 1, 1920. VÚA – VHA, sb. Legionářský poslužný spis, Oldřich Tichý, Personal statement. Confirmation from a later period, however, states August 31, 1920. VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Confirmation for personal department of MNO, appendix to the personal benefit statement, 31 July 1924. 96 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet I. 97 FIEDLER, Jiří – SLUKA, Václav: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces of the Czechoslovak Republic 1920–1938 (hereinafter referred to as the Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces). Prague 2006, p. 488. 98 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list, copy for subdivision; VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý,

Cyru.100 Officers from a number of countries came here, and so the composition of the individual companies formed from the students was truly international. Undoubtedly, this was a demanding study, in which great emphasis was placed on expanding theoretical knowledge, but also on physical training and practical activities. The normal school day began with an alarm at a quarter to six, and at six o’clock in the morning the students sat deeply immersed in books in the study. During the day, students were forced to run between different rooms and at different times of the day they also had to undergo various physical activities, starting with fairly common physical exercise, running with obstacles through ditches, horseback riding, digging trenches and ending with shooting or fencing. In addition to studying military theory, tactical training, geography or topography, students also learned foreign languages here. The difficulty of school days was alleviated at least by the fact that foreign students could live in the city outside the barracks. The atmosphere of the study can be helped by the memory of Ladislav Preininger, who, like Tichý, went through the school in Saint-Cyr: “We spend almost a whole day in the study. In the afternoon horseback riding in the riding hall. Trot, gallop. Then night or rather evening exercises. 101 Shortly after returning from France, on October 1, 1922, Tichý was assigned as an instructor and assistant commander of the information courses to the Military Infantry Training School. in Milovice.102 In Milovice, he also met for the first time his future collaborator in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, František Fryč, who also worked as an instructor in Milovice. 103 Here Tichý used his experience from France, as he cooperated with the French military mission in Milovice for four years.104 In 1923 there was a fundamental change in Oldřich Tichý’s personal life, as he married Karel Cucová in December of that year.105 Tichý’s wife came from the family of Antonín and Karla Cucov. Her father owned a staple shop in Lysá nad Labem, in which the young Karla also worked.106 Two years later,

100

VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualifying documents, Oldřich Tichý, Prvopis kvalifikační listiny, 1922. PREININGER, Ladislav: Přísaha. Diaries of a French Legionnaire 1913 ̶ 1940. Prague 2001, p. 316. 102 At about the same time, Tichý was described as surplus. It was abolished by Tichý in 1926. VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal Letter I. 103 ABS, f. 302, a. No. 302-57-2, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Karel Paleček, 25 November 1949, p. 57. 104 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), P. 132. 105 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Original qualification document, 1922, supplemented in 1933. 106 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal certificate, 26. 5. 1949. 101

on January 2, 1925, their only daughter Taťána was born, with the full name of Taťána Marie Božena Tichá.107 in 1927, on July 2, Tichý joined the 1st year of the War School109 and on July 9 he was promoted to the rank of staff captain. As a student at the War School, he gained theoretical and practical experience in various training schools and in various weapons.110 On October 30, he entered a self – course in Prague, which ended with excellent results on December 15, 1927. Tichý also completed an army gas course in Olomouc with excellent results (3. January ̶ January 21, 1928) and the telegraphic course in Kutná Hora (May 2 června June 2, 1928) .111 Based on the Decree of the MNO of September 1928, Capt. Tichý went to France for the second time for study reasons. From October 1, 1928, he became a first-year student at the École Supérieure de Guerre. years at the École Supérieure de Guerre with an overall rating of “very good”, Tichý returned to his homeland. Due to his high military education, he was destined to perform the highest staff or command positions in the army. In addition, he could 107 Tichý went to France for the second time for study reasons. From October 1, 1928, he became a first-year student at the École Supérieure de Guerre. years at the École Supérieure de Guerre with an overall rating of “very good”, Tichý returned to his homeland. Due to his high military education, he was destined to perform the highest staff or command positions in the army. In addition, he could 107 Tichý went to France for the second time for study reasons. From October 1, 1928, he became a first-year student at the École Supérieure de Guerre. years at the École Supérieure de Guerre with an overall rating of “very good”, Tichý returned to his homeland. Due to his high military education, he was destined to perform the highest staff or command positions in the army. In addition, he could 107 for only two to four Czechoslovak officers were admitted to the school each year.113 After successfully completing two years at the École Supérieure de Guerre with an overall grade of “very good”, Tichý returned to his homeland. Due to his high military education, he was destined to perform the highest staff or command positions in the army. In addition, he could 107 for only two to four Czechoslovak officers were admitted to the school each year.113 After successfully completing two years at the École Supérieure de Guerre with an overall grade of “very good”, Tichý returned to his homeland. Due to his high military education, he was destined to perform the highest staff or command positions in the army. In addition, he could 107

VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list I. VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Original qualification document, 1922, supplemented in 1933. 109 The War School was established on the basis of a decree of the Ministry of National Defense on 1 November 1921 by renaming the Courts for the Education of General Staff Officers. The school was based in Prague and was directly subordinate to the Chief of the Armed Forces. By decree of the President of the Republic published by the NGO, the school was renamed the University of War on October 1, 1934. During its existence, the school was attended by a total of 361 domestic and 23 foreign students, who thus obtained the title of officer of the General Staff. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, pp. 667 ̶ 668. 110 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Original qualification document, 1922, added in 1933; VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for cleanpoint Qualification documents, part I, 1927. 111 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for cleanpoint Qualification documents, part I, 1927. 112 Ibid .; The École Supérieure de Guerre was a military training institute of the French army for the training of general staff officers. The school was founded in 1879 and was located in Versailles and was under the command of the État-Major Général of the French army. This institute became a model for the above-mentioned War School in Prague. By the autumn of 1938, 45 Czechoslovak officers and generals had graduated from the French Institute. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, p. 205. 113 Ibid. 108 Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for cleanpoint Qualification documents, part I, 1927. 112 Ibid .; The École Supérieure de Guerre was a military training institute of the French army for the training of general staff officers. The school was founded in 1879 and was located in Versailles and was under the command of the État-Major Général of the French army. This institute became a model for the above-mentioned War School in Prague. By the autumn of 1938, 45 Czechoslovak officers and generals had graduated from the French Institute. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, p. 205. 113 Ibid. 108 Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for cleanpoint Qualification documents, part I, 1927. 112 Ibid .; The École Supérieure de Guerre was a military training institute of the French army for the training of general staff officers. The school was founded in 1879 and was located in Versailles and was under the command of the État-Major Général of the French army. This institute became a model for the above-mentioned War School in Prague. By the autumn of 1938, 45 Czechoslovak officers and generals had graduated from the French Institute. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, p. 205. 113 Ibid. 108 it was located in Versailles and was under the command of the État-Major Général of the French army. This institute became a model for the above-mentioned War School in Prague. By the autumn of 1938, 45 Czechoslovak officers and generals had graduated from the French Institute. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, p. 205. 113 Ibid. 108 it was located in Versailles and was under the command of the État-Major Général of the French army. This institute became a model for the above-mentioned War School in Prague. By the autumn of 1938, 45 Czechoslovak officers and generals had graduated from the French Institute. FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, p. 205. 113 Ibid. 108

to use the abbreviation gšt., Ie “General Staff” after the abbreviation of his rank. 114

Tichý was officially assigned

to the

group of officers of the

General

Staff

with effect

from 31 July 1930115 and in order from 1 April 1930.116 Oldřich Tichý did not return to the military school in Milovice. On September 30, 1930, he was incorporated into the tribal count of the Provincial Military Headquarters in Bratislava and spent the next two years in Slovakia. On the day exactly one year after his enlistment in Bratislava, Tichý was enlisted in another infantry unit, this time with the Infantry Regiment No. 17.117. Within the regiment, Tichý was embodied in the 7th Company. He spent one year here. The Slovak office became the last stop before Oldřich Tichý’s accession to the second department of the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense, in other words to the then Czechoslovak military intelligence service. Throughout his military service as a rank-and-file officer, Tichý’s personnel materials contain excellent ratings and praise words from his commanders. He always performed his duties by example, his degree of qualification was described as excellent and his personality bore the following characteristics: “Calm, steady nature, very gentle and sensitive, healthy ambitious and proactive. He has an extremely sharp observation and clear judgment, especially on tactical issues, he gets into situations very quickly and he makes decisions quickly and correctly. Very diligent, tireless and extremely conscientious. ”119 It is worth noting that in 1932 his superiors Tichý recommended a possible further assignment to the third, ie the operational department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.120 However, this never happened. He always performed his duties by example, his degree of qualification was described as excellent and his personality bore the following characteristics: “Calm, steady nature, very gentle and sensitive, healthy ambitious and proactive. He has an extremely sharp observation and clear judgment, especially on tactical issues, he gets into situations very quickly and he makes decisions quickly and correctly. Very diligent, tireless and extremely conscientious. ”119 It is worth noting that in 1932 his superiors Tichý recommended a possible further assignment to the third, ie the operational department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.120 However, this never happened. He always performed his duties by example, his degree of qualification was described as excellent and his personality bore the following characteristics: “Calm, steady nature, very gentle and sensitive, healthy ambitious and proactive. He has an extremely sharp observation and clear judgment, especially on tactical issues, he gets into situations very quickly and he makes decisions quickly and correctly. Very diligent, tireless and extremely conscientious. ”119 It is worth noting that in 1932 his superiors Tichý recommended a possible further assignment to the third, ie the operational department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.120 However, this never happened. He has an extremely sharp observation and clear judgment, especially on tactical issues, he gets into situations very quickly and he makes decisions quickly and correctly. Very diligent, tireless and extremely conscientious. ”119 It is worth noting that in 1932 his superiors Tichý recommended a possible further assignment to the third, ie the operational department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.120 However, this never happened. He has an extremely sharp observation and clear judgment, especially on tactical issues, he gets into situations very quickly and he makes decisions quickly and correctly. Very diligent, tireless and extremely conscientious. ”119 It is worth noting that in 1932 his superiors Tichý recommended a possible further assignment to the third, ie the operational department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.120 However, this never happened.

HANZLIK, Frantisek: Vojak. The example of Oscar Dogs. In: FASORA, Lukáš – HANUŠ, Jiří – MALÍŘ, Jiří – VYKOUPIL, Libor (ed.): Man in Moravia in the First Half of the 20th Century. Brno 2011, p. 292. 115 On the same date, it was also deleted from the records of the Infantry Regiment No. 9. VÚA – SA ACR, f. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to the clean document Qualification documents, part I, 1930. 117 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet II. 118 FIEDLER, J. – SLUKA, V .: Encyclopedia of the Armed Forces, pp. 491 ̶ 492. 119 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to the clean document Qualification documents, part II, 1932. 120 Ibid. 114

4.2.

Officer of the search unit of the 2nd Department of the General Staff (1932–1937)

Tichý was assigned to the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense in June 1932. On the basis of a telegram arrived at the Provincial Military Headquarters in Bratislava, Tichý was to report to the Second Department of the General Staff on June 20, 1932, which was the Intelligence Department.121 at that time they formed groups of study, search, foreign, general and auxiliary office. The department has been headed by a brig since 1927. gene. JUDr. Vladimir Chalupa. The second division lasted in this organizational division until 1933, when the search party was divided into a reconnaissance section (P ̶ 1) headed by Lt. Col. gšt. František Dastych and the defensive section (P ̶ 2), led by Maj. František Jandera.122 Maj. Jandera was a very problematic personality, especially because of his positive attitude towards alcohol. Oldřich Tichý characterized him as follows: “If I knew him, I was impressed by the bohemian, he liked to drink, he got drunk, so [it] was sometimes seen in the office that he was not sober. He committed malversace123 at the box office and was removed from the department. ”124 Oldřich Tichý was assigned to the search party. At the time he joined the second department of the General Staff, Col. Mojmír Soukup, head of the search group, that the department’s activities are already well developed towards Hungary and Austria, but for the time being the intelligence activities are lagging behind Germany.125

embed

intelligence

activities

directed

against

Germany

was characterized in 1934, mainly efforts to obtain agents. The Czechoslovak intelligence service considered men and women who had shown resistance to the regime in their own country to be suitable agency workers. This resistance could be conditioned by political, national, religious and social reasons, it was also accompanied by sympathy for Czechoslovakia and a willingness to cooperate with intelligence. There were very few people who offered Czechoslovak intelligence themselves cooperation. A much larger group consisted of people who had a relevant presumption that, due to their unfavorable living conditions, or due to their nature, they would be able to raise money for agency activities.126 121

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 2; VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for the original of the qualification document, 1932. 122 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 27. 123 Embezzlement. 124 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 8. 125 Ibid., P. 16. 126 ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 30.

The “Throat Cutter” action must be mentioned in this context. This project for recruiting agents was implemented through a brokerage office, the so-called “Bankhaus D”, 127 located in Podmokle in Děčín. One of the brokers, Franz Dobianer, 128, who worked in Berlin and had worked for the Czechoslovak intelligence service since 1931, provided financial loans to people who found themselves in the field of Czechoslovak intelligence as potentially selected collaborators. Everything took place on a legal basis, but the broker provided the loans to the relevant persons so that they would get into financial trouble over time. The intention was subsequently to take advantage of their situation and to persuade them, through their difficulties, to cooperate, ie to take action in favor of Czechoslovakia.129 Although the course of the whole event was far from smooth, as one lieutenant in Flensburg reported the matter and the German authorities subsequently began restricting and banning advertisements for loan offers, 130 it could not be considered a failure. During the four years of operation of the office, about 25 members of the German army were obtained for cooperation, three of whom had the rank of officer, two members of the Reich passport and customs control, five police officers and five gendarmes. In addition, the office gained about a hundred people from the civil sector, and a private detective agency worked for the Czechoslovak correspondents in Berlin thanks to “Bankhaus D “.131 The” Hrdlořez “event is interesting from another point of view. The villa in which Dobianer132 lived was located in close proximity to the railway line leading across the German border to Podmokel. Agents who arrived on this route

127

FÁREK, František: Footprints disappear in the archive (hereinafter only Footprints disappear). Prague 1975, p. 115. KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Before the war broke out. Germans in the service of Czechoslovakia. intelligence services in 1935 1̶ 939 (hereinafter referred to as Before the war broke out). In: http://dejinyasoucasnost.cz/archiv/2007/4/nez-vypuklavalka-/ [cit. January 30, 2015]. 129 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 16. 130 Ibid. 131 FÁREK, F. Footprints Disappear, p. 116. 132 František Fárek mentions it under the name František Daubner. Ibid., Pp. 110. 133 ABS, f. Z, a. No. Z-6-314-1, Report for Minister Rudolf Barák on the activities of the Czechoslovak intelligence service in the years 1920 ̶ 1945 prepared by the First Special Department of the Ministry of the Interior, 22. 12. 1957, p. 3. 134 FÁREK, F .: Footprints disappear, p. 115. 128

Other options for recruiting cooperation have also considered the use of cocaine. Oldřich Tichý himself, in his opinion, had at least two meetings with the man to whom his superior, Col. Soukupa pointed out a lady. She knew of one of her acquaintances that he was smuggling cocaine, and it was Col. who alerted him. A group with whether it could not be used. Tichý met the “acquaintance” in question twice at the Fénix café in Prague, where he confirmed that he was in contact with acquaintances in Germany and was actually smuggling cocaine. He explained to Tichý how the psychology of a cocaine addict works, that he, if he lacks the drug, will do everything in his power to get it. He responded positively to Tichý’s question as to whether he could recruit cocaine workers in Germany for the purposes of the Czechoslovak intelligence service. But in the end, the whole plan came together, for the person in question never attended another meeting.135 Of course, a number of agents worked for the second department. For example, at least a few of them, which Oldřich Tichý explicitly mentioned after the war, will be mentioned. Agent Spiess, for example, worked for the second headquarters. It was an agent, Col. Soukupa, who worked at the Ministry of Aviation in Berlin and naturally supplied news from the field of aviation. Among other things, he provided the second department with information on the basis of which Czechoslovak correspondents could for the first time get an idea of the organization of the German Air Force and the existence of dive bombers. Col. dealt directly with Spiess. Soukup, while Tichý often took part in these negotiations and once also brought Spiess money to Zurich, Switzerland. However, Agent Spiess fell silent in 1934/1935. According to Col. Soukup was discovered by the Germans and sentenced to death.136 In the same spirit, Tichý’s colleague from the second department, František Fryč, also commented on the end of Agent Speisse.137 It is not clear which agent it was. Jaroslav Koutek stated in one of his works that a kind of Spies was an agent with the designation A ̶ 51.138. He provided valuable information on, among other things, the construction of defense bunkers in Bavaria, as well as information from the western borders. Thanks to some data that 135 that a certain Spies was an agent named A-51.138 Agent A-51 was discussed in more detail by the publicist Karel Pacner.139 According to him, it was a German officer who offered his services to the second department in the mid-1930s. He provided valuable information on, among other things, the construction of defense bunkers in Bavaria, as well as information from the western borders. Thanks to some data that 135 that a certain Spies was an agent named A-51.138 Agent A-51 was discussed in more detail by the publicist Karel Pacner.139 According to him, it was a German officer who offered his services to the second department in the mid-1930s. He provided valuable information on, among other things, the construction of defense bunkers in Bavaria, as well as information from the western borders. Thanks to some data that 135

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 16. Ibid., p. 17. 137 ABS, f. 302, a. No. 302-73-1, Protocol written with Col. vv František Fryč, 3. 1. 1950, p. 27. 138 KOUTEK, Jaroslav: Tichá fronta. Prague 1985, pp. 18. 139 PACNER, Karel: Czechoslovakia in Special Services: Views into the History of Czechoslovak Intelligence Services 1914 ̶ 1989. Part I. 1914 ̶ 1939. Prague 2002, pp. 343. 136

As he added, the French could detect and intercept many German agents who were interested in their fortification system on the so-called Maginot Line. He also drew Prague’s attention to several important agents, but the Czechoslovak correspondents never managed to find out who actually did them such good services. They assumed it was an anti-Nazi from the German military intelligence, the Abwehr. The way Karel Pacner portrayed Agent A-51 evokes an attempt to put this agent on the level of the much more famous agent A-54 and to glorify A-51, just as Čestmír Amort and Ivan Jedlička did in A-54.140 Jaroslav and Stanislav Kokošek they stated that at the beginning of the search operation against Edmund Kalmar141 was “an Abwehr officer report from the Engineer Staff No. 16 in Weiden.” 142 This officer first worked for Lt. Col. gšt. Václav Kopačka and later for Maj. gšt. Emil Strankmüller.143 Although the authors themselves did not mark the agent with the code A-51, it is most likely the same person mentioned by Jiří Plachý when he stated that on February 2, 1938, Edmund Kalmár was arrested, to whose arrest he contributed. most probably agent’s report A ̶ 51.144 For the sake of completeness, it can be added that Zlatica Zudová-Lešková mentioned the name Ing. Andrej Engel, and this name was changed to Andrej Sokol in 1946.145 Among the other agents that Oldřich Tichý remembered after the war, Maj. František Pokorný. Due to the fact that he married the German Reich, Countess von Arnim146 and had contacts with German industrial circles, he was deployed in Germany as an industrial spy. 147 At the time of Tichý’s arrival in the second department, however, he was already retiring from an agency point of view.148 According to František Fryč, he also supplied false reports, which resulted in his detection and then the release of services for the second department. In addition, Pokorný also traded in weapons, and Fryč commented on him in the sense that he was more of a “chaser than an agent” and only 140

AMORT, No. ̶ JEDLIČKA, IM: The secret of the spy. Cpt. gšt. Edmund Kalmár was a Czechoslovak officer of Hungarian nationality who worked for the Third Reich. In detail on his case, eg KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, pp. 47 ̶ 51; KOKOŠKA, J. ̶ KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, pp. 103 ̶ 104; PLACHÝ, Jiří: Throat Trials at the Prague Divisional Court in the Years 1937 – 1938 (hereinafter referred to as Throat Trials). In: Historica Pragensia: historický sborník Muzea hlavní města Prahy, 2, 2005, pp. 170 ̶ 175. 142 KOKOŠKA, J. ̶ KOKOŠKA, S .: Spor o agenta, p. 104. 143 Ibid. 144 PLACHÝ, Jiří: Hrdelní procesy, s. 170. 145 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 279. 146 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, p. 125. 147 ABS, f. 302, a. No. 302-73-1, Protocol written with Col. vv František Fryč, 3. 1. 1950, pp. 27 ̶ 28. 148 His activity definitively ceased with the departure of Col. Soukupa. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 17. 141

the benefit of his agency work can be considered the acquisition of the above-mentioned Spiesse for cooperation with the second department.149 Ing. Karel Staller, 150 director of Zbrojovka Brno, who provided information on the activities of the Habsburgs. The Habsburgs were not among the main interests of the second department, but, as Oldřich Tichý noted, reports of them were a kind of “hobby” Col. Soukupa.151 We can also mention Mrs. Hrdílková, the wife of an industrialist and also Miss Rývová, the editor of Lidové noviny, whom Col. Soukup called the “Madonna of Sleeping Cars” .152 A certain Mrs. Riv is also mentioned in the official record of the HSOBZ, 153 as the secretary of Col. Soukupa.154 The question remains whether Miss Rývová and Mrs. Rivová are one and the same person. The mentioned Mrs. Rivová was detained and interrogated by the Germans after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. In her testimony, she tried to protect Col. Soukupa and aroused suspicion that she had an affair with him.155 Given Miss Rývová’s above-mentioned designation as “Madonna of Sleeping Cars”, Miss Rývová and Mrs. Rivová could indeed be one person. Otto Strasser is also worth mentioning. The nominee was to be the police chief in Opole and was one of those people who was adamant that Hitler’s regime in Germany would last only a few months.156 In the case of Otto Strasser, the question is whether it is a coincidence or perhaps inaccurate information Tichý said. Otto Strasser was also the name of the leader of the so-called Black Front. He was a former supporter of Hitler within the NSDAP, but he broke up with Hitler before 1933, emigrated to Czechoslovakia and founded an opposition movement in Prague called the Black Front. Black Front Intelligence Reconnaissance Network, that she had an affair with him. Otto Strasser is also worth mentioning. The nominee was to be the police chief in Opole and was one of those people who was adamant that Hitler’s regime in Germany would last only a few months.156 In the case of Otto Strasser, the question is whether it is a coincidence or perhaps inaccurate information Tichý said. Otto Strasser was also the name of the leader of the so-called Black Front. He was a former supporter of Hitler within the NSDAP, but he broke up with Hitler before 1933, emigrated to Czechoslovakia and founded an opposition movement in Prague called the Black Front. Black Front Intelligence Reconnaissance Network, that she had an affair with him. Otto Strasser is also worth mentioning. The nominee was to be the police chief in Opole and was one of those people who was adamant that Hitler’s regime in Germany would last only a few months.156 In the case of Otto Strasser, the question is whether it is a coincidence or perhaps inaccurate information Tichý said. Otto Strasser was also the name of the leader of the so-called Black Front. He was a former supporter of Hitler within the NSDAP, but he broke up with Hitler before 1933, emigrated to Czechoslovakia and founded an opposition movement in Prague called the Black Front. Black Front Intelligence Reconnaissance Network, 155 In view of Miss Rývová’s abovementioned designation as the ‘Madonna of Sleeping Cars’, both Ms Rývová and Ms Rivová could indeed be one person. Otto Strasser is also worth mentioning. The nominee was to be the police chief in Opole and was one of those people who was adamant that Hitler’s regime in Germany would last only a few months.156 In the case of Otto Strasser, the question is whether it is a coincidence or perhaps inaccurate information Tichý said. Otto Strasser was also the name of the leader of the so-called Black Front. He was a former supporter of Hitler within the NSDAP, but he broke up with Hitler before 1933, emigrated to Czechoslovakia and founded an opposition movement in Prague called the Black Front. Black Front Intelligence Reconnaissance Network, 155 In view of Miss Rývová’s abovementioned designation as the ‘Madonna of Sleeping Cars’, both Ms Rývová and Ms Rivová could indeed be one person. Otto Strasser is also worth mentioning. The nominee was to be the police chief in Opole and was one of those people who was adamant that Hitler’s regime in Germany would last only a few months.156 In the case of Otto Strasser, the question is whether it is a coincidence or perhaps inaccurate information Tichý said. Otto Strasser was also the name of the leader of the so-called Black Front. He was a former supporter of Hitler within the NSDAP, but he broke up with Hitler before 1933, emigrated to Czechoslovakia and founded an opposition movement in Prague called the Black Front. Black Front Intelligence Reconnaissance Network,

149

ABS, No. 302, No. 302-73-1, Protocol written with Col. vv František Fryč, 3 January 1950, pp. 27 ̶ 28. Before Ing. Karel Staller, director of Brno’s Zbrojovka, participated in the construction of the famous Czechoslovak light machine gun Bren. In the interwar period, he cooperated with the Czechoslovak intelligence service. During World War II, he remained in command of the company and, despite great danger, began cooperating with the military resistance in the Protectorate. After February 1948, he had to secretly leave Czechoslovakia to escape communist persecution. Martin Krčál discussed the fate of Karel Staller in detail. See KRČÁL, Martin: Karel Staller. Life with a double face. Activities of the General Directorate of Zbrojovka Brno during the occupation. Prague 2012. 151 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, pp. 124. 152 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 18. 153 Main Administration of Defense Intelligence. It was a military intelligence service, which was originally established at the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Soviet Union and later also operated as part of the Czechoslovak Army. For more details on this issue, eg KUDRNA, Ladislav: Military Defense Intelligence (1945 ̶ 1950). Development, organizational structures, staffing. Paměť a dějiny, 3, 2008, No. 1, pp. 76 ̶ 89. 154 ABS, f. 302, a. 6. 4. 1946, p. 6. 155 Ibid. 156 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 18. 150 of the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Soviet Union and later also served as part of the Czechoslovak Army. For more details on this issue, eg KUDRNA, Ladislav: Military Defense Intelligence (1945 ̶ 1950). Development, organizational structures, staffing. Paměť a dějiny, 3, 2008, No. 1, pp. 76 ̶ 89. 154 ABS, f. 302, a. 6. 4. 1946, p. 6. 155 Ibid. 156 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 18. 150 of the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Soviet Union and later also served as part of the Czechoslovak Army. For more details on this issue, eg KUDRNA, Ladislav: Military Defense Intelligence (1945 ̶ 1950). Development, organizational structures, staffing. Paměť a dějiny, 3, 2008, No. 1, pp. 76 ̶ 89. 154 ABS, f. 302, a. 6. 4. 1946, p. 6. 155 Ibid. 156 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 18. 150 Official record of the HSOBZ – extract from the report of the agent 54 (from the 2nd section of the capital), 4 April 1946, p. 6. 155 Ibid. 156 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 18. 150 Official record of the HSOBZ – extract from the report of the agent 54 (from the 2nd section of the capital), 4 April 1946, p. 6. 155 Ibid. 156 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 18. 150

who, on the instructions of Otto Strasser, worked for the Czechoslovak intelligence service, was then liquidated in Berlin in August 1937.157 The main Hungarian agent, with whom the Czechoslovak military attaché in Budapest, Major. gšt. Jan Heřman158 and later Maj. gšt. Bohumil Klein, 159 was “Zoltán”. According to the department, it was he who in the past provided the complete material for the reports on Hungary. He delivered news of both military and political nature. In addition, the second department had several smaller agents who delivered regular messages.160 Important military messages were supplied to the second department by Maj.

Adi

from Innsbruck. Tichý met this agent in person in the presence of Capt. František Fryč, in Switzerland. The main purpose of the meeting was to draw Adi’s attention to his rather reckless behavior with regard to women and drinking and, above all, to persuade him to report even more intensively on the Austrian army as such and on the penetration of Nazism into it and into Austria in general.161 The year 1934 marked a time of change for the intelligence department. At the turn of 1933 and 1934, after the departure of the second department, gen. Retirement cottages Col. gšt. Šimon Drgač, in whose person the department gained for the first time the head, who had a military university education. Although he did not remain in the position of head, he was at the birth of the modern functional and organizational form of the second department, which did not undergo fundamental changes, except for personnel, practically until the second half of the 1930s.162 Another important personnel change took place in the autumn of 1934. On September 30, Lt. Col. joined the intelligence department. gšt. František Moravec.163 Around the circumstances of the appointment of Lt. Col. Moravec, the head of the search party has a number of ambiguities. His qualification record is too brief in this respect and does not provide any details. On the other hand, Moravec himself stated that he had joined the second division that “the assignment was not without intrigue and delay.” 164 It is possible that political pressures played a role in terms of protection and promotion of the interests of the agrarian party. Although such effects are not documented, they cannot be 157 163 Around the circumstances of the appointment of Lt. Col. Moravec, the head of the search party has a number of ambiguities. His qualification record is too brief in this respect and does not provide any details. On the other hand, Moravec himself stated that he had joined the second division that “the assignment was not without intrigue and delay.” 164 It is possible that political pressures played a role in terms of protection and promotion of the interests of the agrarian party. Although such effects are not documented, they cannot be 157 163 Around the circumstances of the appointment of Lt. Col. Moravec, the head of the search party has a number of ambiguities. His qualification record is too brief in this respect and does not provide any details. On the other hand, Moravec himself stated that he had joined the second division that “the assignment was not without intrigue and delay.” 164 It is possible that political pressures played a role in terms of protection and promotion of the interests of the agrarian party. Although such effects are not documented, they cannot be 157 that political pressures in the sense of protection and promotion of the interests of the agrarian party played a role. Although such effects are not documented, they cannot be 157 that political pressures in the sense of protection and promotion of the interests of the agrarian party played a role. Although such effects are not documented, they cannot be 157

KOKOŠKA, S .: Before the war broke out. He held the office from January 1932 to September 1937. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Forgotten Elite, p. 31. 159 He held the office from September 1937 until the end of April 1939. Ibid. 160 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 19. 161 Ibid. 162 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 27. 163 KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 36. 164 MORAVEC, František: Spion, whom he did not believe. Prague 1990, pp. 21. 158

clearly refuted and could be hidden, for example, in the decisions of the Chief of General Staff, or other generals with greater influence.165 According to Oldřich Tichý, Moravec was helped to get to the second department by the Gen. Lva Prchaly. Moravec reported to the head of the second department, Col. Drgac’s suspicion that gen. Fugitive, then Deputy Chief of Staff, is an agent who works for Germany. Due to the high function of the gene. The fugitive caused such a serious accusation. In order for the whole matter to be investigated as secretly as possible and in the greatest possible silence, Lt. Col. Moravec transferred to the General Staff. It soon became clear that the agent was not a gene. She fled, but a certain carpenter. Lt. Col. However, Moravec already stayed with the General Staff.166 It can be said that relations between Tichý and Moravec did not have very good relations from the very beginning. This needs to be kept in mind, as their differences of opinion and character culminated in 1941 with the departure of Oldřich Tichý from Czechoslovak correspondents. Until that moment, however, in 1934, there was still relatively much time left. Oldřich Tichý evaluated František Moravec as follows: “Educated, intelligent, excellent organizer, excellent intelligence, extremely hardworking and capable, talented, smart. However, he was morbidly vain, the prestigious questions surpassed everything else, arrogant, often rude, native intrigue. He once said in his presence that he was a gray eminence. ”167 The coexistence with Moravec in the second ward can be demonstrated on a concrete example. Tichý described her as follows: “He didn’t like me. We lived side by side like a dog and a cat. Lt. Col. gšt. He told Havel when he arrived at headquarters that he would try to get me out of the department. […] Each General Staff officer had to take command of the unit. Moravec was to go to the battalion. Drgač called me directly in person and told me the above fact, stating that he was counting on me in his (Moravc’s) place. In a few days, Moravec reprimanded me very uncomfortably for being with the head of the department and not reporting it to him. I told him I had nothing to say about the head of the department calling me in person and talking to me in confidence. ”169 Moravec’s somewhat exaggerated reaction can be understood, for 165

In more detail on this issue ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, pp. 46 ̶ 48. TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory, pp. 119 ̶ 120. 167 Ibid., P. group A (study) intelligence department of the General Staff. Especially in the post-war period, he was one of František Moravec’s staunch opponents and critics. MASKALÍK, A .: Army Elite, pp. 216; ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 49. 169 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, p. 122. 166

he really lacked the military practice mentioned. Experience in the command of an infantry battalion or artillery division, or cavalry banners was one of the conditions for promoting a candidate to the rank of colonel. The highest military unit that fell under Moravc’s command was the infantry company or non-commissioned officer school, which, however, stood at the same level.170 It is worth noting that the successor of Col. Drgače Col. gšt. František Hájek made a great effort and used his connections to ensure that Moravec met this condition at least formally. Hájek personally discussed the whole matter with the commander of the 3rd Division II. choir gen. František Melichar 171, who gave his consent for Moravec to commute twice a week to the unit in Litoměřice and command the battalion there. However, Moravec never fulfilled the condition.172 In 1934, the filling of the leading positions of both sections also changed, which formed a search party. Oldřich Tichý became the head of the intelligence section (P ̶ 1) and the position of head of the defense section (P ̶ 2) was taken by Capt. Josef Bartík.173 Unfortunately, the exact dates of his appointment to the position of head of the intelligence section are missing from Oldřich Tichý’s qualification documents. He took up this position in the rank of Major General, to which he was promoted on February 10, 1933.174 Since 1933, in connection with the ever-increasing threat it began to pose

Nazi

Germany,

began

to develop

and

deepen

Czechoslovak-French intelligence cooperation, which was directly related to air cooperation, in which air cooperation was also planned in the event of an outbreak of war. The fact that very little intelligence work against him until the early 1930s can be attributed to the general consideration of intelligence work against Weimar Germany as a very delicate problem, as Czechoslovakia sought to curb military activity at the borders while maintaining correct Czechoslovak-German relations. , and there was also the opinion of the General Staff, which relied on the presence of the Allied Control Commission in Germany.175 Alone 170

ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 51. MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, p. 413. 172 ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 51. 173 KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 37. 174 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Kmenový list; TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, pp. 119. 175 STRAKA, KAREL: Czechoslovak and French Military Intelligence 1933 ̶ 1938. HaV, 58, 2009, No. 2, p. 44. 171

After the war, Tichý recalled that he had performed the task concerning Poland practically only once, in 1935 or 1936. Tichý then received a direct personal order from Col. Drgač, according to whom he was to go to the area of Moravian Ostrava and find out whether the reports according to which the Poles were supposed to prepare for the invasion of Czechoslovak territory in the period around 28 October are based on the truth. Tichý had to summarize the results in a report that was to be submitted to the Czechoslovak government. At the same time as Tichý, Major was instructed in the whole matter. Procházka, then head of the second department of the Provincial Military Department in Brno, to arrive in Moravian Ostrava. Oldřich Tichý, on the basis of reports provided by the agents of the Brno Regional Military Headquarters and the Police Headquarters in Moravská Ostrava, found out

possible

deeper

cooperation

with Poles

in the

field of

military

The news was not surprising, as Czechoslovak-Polish relations were marked at all levels in the second half of the 1930s by still smoldering reminiscences from the Polish side over the dispute over the Těšín region. In addition, the author of the Polish foreign and domestic policy concept, Józef Piłsudski, was opposed to Czechoslovakia, and a different attitude towards Russia certainly did not benefit from mutual relations, because while Poland wanted to push it out of Europe in the spirit of the Piłsudski concept, Czechoslovakia stabilizing element.177 Nevertheless, with the growing ambitions of the Third Reich, some cooperation was finally realized, mainly in the exchange of information about the German armed forces and the military potential of Germany in general. For this purpose, several conferences were held. However, the mutual Czech-Slovak conditions gradually worsened again and the Poles began to carry out diversionary activities in the Těšín region, Spiš, Orava or Subcarpathian Russia. This led to the Czechoslovak party launching a search intelligence operation against Poland in 1938. Nevertheless, it is necessary to add that at the turn of 1938 and 1939, Czechoslovak correspondents still left a relatively large space for the operation of Polish intelligence in Czechoslovak territory, which worked here against the Third Reich.178

176

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 20. GEBHART, Jan ̶ KUKLÍK, Jan: Czechoslovak-Polish military intelligence relations in the spring and summer of 1939. HaV, 41, 1992, No. 3, p. 66. 178 Ibid., Pp. 74 ̶ 75. 177

For the sake of completeness, it should be added that since May 1936, cooperation with the Soviet Union

has also been taking place at the intelligence level , as a joint

Czechoslovak-Soviet agency exchange with the code name “Vonapo 20”, whose commander became Capt. Karel Paleček.179 However, we cannot talk about any greater cooperation with the British. The role of British liaison officer in Czechoslovakia was performed by Maj. Harold Gibson. However, he joined the cooperation at the turn of 1938 and 1939. On the other hand, it then played a decisive role in the departure of Moravc’s intelligence group to London on the eve of the German invasion.180 As the danger from Nazi Germany grew, so did the need for the second materials, which of course required agents. Apart from the above-mentioned sample, Paul Thümmel, an agent with the code number ̶ 54, was undoubtedly the most famous agent who worked for the second department, and Tichý could not ignore him in his statement: “In the next period, there was no large agent until A-54 was obtained. He was an agent of the largest format that the Second General Staff Department ever had.” 181 It makes no sense to describe in detail all the circumstances and activities of A-54 for the Czechoslovak intelligence service. Jaroslav and Stanislav Kokošek have already critically discussed this, 182 therefore only a few basic facts will be mentioned. Unfortunately, the mentioned pair of authors failed to use the commentary of Oldřich Tichý in their work, who directly participated in the first contact with agent A-54. Pavel Kreisinger drew attention to this shortcoming in his work. 184 Head of the Intelligence Section Oldřich Tichý said of the acceptance of the anonymous letter: He then conducted the letter to the correct addressee (for example, service offers, patent offers, notices, statements, etc.). 179

KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 42. ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 59. 181 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, pp. 18 ̶ 19. 182 See KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent. 183 See KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 43. 184 Ibid. 185 The general address in this case is the Ministry of National Defense, Nachrichten Abtlg., Prague. Ibid. 180

The offer also concerned defense intelligence. Bartík handed it over to Moravec and they immediately discussed it. Both were apparently in favor of her immediate adoption. Then I got it for comment and Capt. Fryč independently of each other. ”186 Tichý and Fryč expressed the opinion that the offer should not be answered immediately. Unfortunately, František Moravec later twisted this conclusion somewhat in the sense that Tichý was against sending a reply. However, Tichý states in his remarks that his “answer was not absolutely negative, so that it never, never reacted” 187 because “it contradicts the basic law of intelligence.” 188 The first meeting with the future agent A-54 took place on April 6, 1936. and Vejprty. The group that met with the new agent was led by Lt. Col. Moravec, it also consisted of Maj. Bartík and Maj. Quiet as the two main experts, Capt. Fryč and škpt. Josef Fořt, as specialists in matters of the German secret service and several other officers of the intelligence department in the position of technicians and assistants.189 The second department of the General Staff attached considerable importance to the meeting, as evidenced by the representative composition of the group.190 It is not necessary to further develop the course of further cooperation with A-54, as it has been sufficiently affected by the already mentioned literature and it will be discussed in some places. In conclusion, however, Oldřich Tichý personally evaluated Agent A-54 in his memoirs: “It is indisputable that the paid, professional Agent A-54 provided us with important messages that were highly valued by the Allies as well. He was probably the best and most important agent of our intelligence in terms of the news he supplied us. It is also self-evident that in terms of his service he worked for the Germans. An objective evaluation of the methods and results of Agent A-54’s work belongs only to our historians, who have access to the necessary documents. However, A-54 was not the only source of news for our intelligence. ”191 From the last sentence, it can be concluded that Oldřich Tichý did not agree with the post-war glorification of agent A-54, even at a time when the critical work of Kokošek’s historians was not yet available. Another turning point in Tichý’s career and life in general was 1937. In the summer of that year, Tichý was already in the position of head of the intelligence section for some time in the intelligence department at the top of the service rankings. Hierarchically above it 186 However, A-54 was not the only source of news for our intelligence. ”191 From the last sentence, it can be concluded that Oldřich Tichý did not agree with the post-war glorification of agent A-54, even at a time when the critical work of Kokošek’s historians was not yet available. Another turning point in Tichý’s career and life in general was 1937. In the summer of that year, Tichý was already in the position of head of the intelligence section for some time in the intelligence department at the top of the service rankings. Hierarchically above it 186 However, A-54 was not the only source of news for our intelligence. ”191 From the last sentence, it can be concluded that Oldřich Tichý did not agree with the post-war glorification of agent A-54, even at a time when the critical work of Kokošek’s historians was not yet available. Another turning point in Tichý’s career and life in general was 1937. In the summer of that year, Tichý was already in the position of head of the intelligence section for some time in the intelligence department at the top of the service rankings. Hierarchically above it 186 In the summer of that year, Tichý, in the position of head of the intelligence section, worked for some time within the intelligence department at the top of the service rankings. Hierarchically above it 186 In the summer of that year, Tichý, in the position of head of the intelligence section, worked for some time within the intelligence department at the top of the service rankings. Hierarchically above it 186

TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur, p. 126. Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 21. 190 KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 43. 191 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, p. 128. 187

stood the successor of Col. Drgače as the head of the second department, Col. gšt. František Hájek and also Lt. Col. Moravec, who during the partial reorganization of the second department replaced from 1 July 1937 to the position of head of the search group Col. Soukup. František Fryč (agent records, specialist in photographic work and secret inks), Capt. Karel Doležal (records of files concerning Germany and Austria, photographic work, secret inks), Maj. Alois Frank (records of special files concerning Austria), Maj. Antonín Longa (records of special files concerning Hungary, documentation of a general nature) and Maj. Karel Paleček (agenda of the VONAPO 20 exchange) .193 On 10. On July 1, Tichý was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel-General, with effect from 1 July.194. His next career stop was to become the office of a military attaché in Switzerland.

4.3. Offices of the

Military Attaché in Switzerland (1937–1938) of the Military

Attaché,

resp.

Offices of

military

attachés of the

Republic

Czechoslovaks began to emerge soon after the founding of Czechoslovakia. Their original purpose was primarily to organize the return of legionnaires to their homeland. When this task was fulfilled and after the unification of the Czechoslovak army, military diplomatic missions at the Czechoslovak embassies functioned mainly in the countries of close allies, but not only in them. Between 1919 and 1924, military attaché offices were established in Poland (June 1919), Yugoslavia (September 1919), Austria (January 1920), Italy (May 1920), Romania (November 1920), Germany (March 1921), France (after reorganization in December 1921), Hungary (February 1922) and Great Britain (November 1924) .195 From the mid-1930s, the number of military attachés operating at Czechoslovak embassies began to increase. Czechoslovakia thus

192

ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 46. KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, p. 57. 194 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list II. 195 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 19. 193

responded to the deteriorating political situation in Europe, which led to a growing need for more information, especially of a military nature. From 1936, the potential possibility of transferring the Czechoslovak resistance abroad in the event of war was reflected in the establishment of offices abroad. After all, this was also the reason why relatively large sums of money began to be deposited abroad, specifically in France, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands.196 Intelligence officers were sent to the Netherlands and also to Switzerland before the establishment of military secondment offices, as evidenced by that the offices of military attachés were to serve largely to legalize the activities of the intelligence service. The intelligence officer based in the Netherlands was Capt. Rudolf Šiman, who successfully started building an advanced agency exchange here, which bore the code designation “Libuše”. Major was sent to Switzerland. Karel Sedláček, who was to build an agency network against Germany here according to the plan of the Czechoslovak intelligence service from 1936. Sedláček also acted deftly and, using the cover provided by the “official” position of correspondent of the telegraph company Radio de la Europe Centrale, he succeeded in building the advanced agency exchange “Kazi” .197 In both countries mentioned above, the office of military attaché was officially established on October 15, 1937. In the case of Switzerland, the office was established in Bern, and the first and only pre-war Czechoslovak military attaché operating directly in Switzerland became Lt. Col. on the same date. gšt. Oldrich Tichy. Tichý stated about his nomination for the position of military attaché: “It was decided to send a military attaché to Switzerland in July 1937 while I was on vacation. At the end of the holiday, Capt. Fryč with the mission of Col. Moravec to indicate whether I would go to the position of military attaché. I replied that I would change my mind, and upon my return from vacation I would report. ”198 Silent upon his return, Col. He gave Moravec a positive answer. In addition to the usual representative duties of the military attaché, Oldřich Tichý was, of course, to play an especially important intelligence role in Switzerland. One of the main tasks was to prepare suitable conditions in Switzerland for conducting intelligence work in the event of a military conflict with Germany. This in practice 196 that I will change my mind, and I will report upon my return from vacation. ”198 Silent upon his return, Col. He gave Moravec a positive answer. In addition to the usual representative duties of the military attaché, Oldřich Tichý was, of course, to play an especially important intelligence role in Switzerland. One of the main tasks was to prepare suitable conditions in Switzerland for conducting intelligence work in the event of a military conflict with Germany. This in practice 196 that I will change my mind, and I will report upon my return from vacation. ”198 Silent upon his return, Col. He gave Moravec a positive answer. In addition to the usual representative duties of the military attaché, Oldřich Tichý was, of course, to play an especially important intelligence role in Switzerland. One of the main tasks was to prepare suitable conditions in Switzerland for conducting intelligence work in the event of a military conflict with Germany. This in practice 196

KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, p. 60. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 19; ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 2021. 198 Ibid., Pp. 22. 197

involved mainly in cooperation with Capt. Sedláček created a network of mailboxes to which the agents of the second department could turn, further ensured a functional radio connection with the General Staff and passed on the obtained intelligence information. Tichý traveled to Switzerland in early November 1937. He traveled alone, carrying in his courier’s luggage “cryptographic items, stamps, some money and a cash register.” Roger Masson, Chief of Intelligence of the Swiss Army’s General Staff.201 This officer was Silent’s most important ally on the Swiss side. Moreover, Tichý and Masson were not only united by a working relationship but also by a deep friendship.202 The first meeting of the two men took place at the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris, where they both studied in the same way between 1928 and 1930. At that time, the major of the Swiss army was still characterized by Tichý as an elegant, modest, intelligent and highly cultural officer. Tichý remarked at his address: “He was the man to whom I gave my highest rating to man – he was Cyrano. That says it all. ”203 Before Tichý left for Switzerland, Lt. Col. arrived. Masson to Prague for a social visit in order to create favorable conditions for the Silent Reception in Switzerland.204 According to František Fryč, this visit took place either on the initiative of Maj.

gšt

Rudolf

Kučera, the

then

Czechoslovak

military

attaché

in Austria, 205 who himself took part in the aforementioned Masson’s visit, or at the instigation of Col. Moravce.206 Masson himself often remembered his visit to Prague. Oldřich Tichý took it around Prague, a gala lunch and dinner were organized, and issues related to the equipment of the Prague Second Department were also discussed. Tichý remembered for the rest of his life what he had said to Masson during a tour of Prague at the time: “Masson, we were and will be.” 207 According to Tichý, Lt. Col. Masson made a lot of remarks, especially given how devotedly during Silent 199

His family has so far remained in Prague and arrived in Switzerland to find Tichý only in January 1938. TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), Pp. 124. 200 ABS, f. H, a. Č. H-342-1 , Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 23. 201 Ibid. 202 TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), P. 122. 203 Ibid. 204 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. During his time in the office of military attaché, he was also accredited for Switzerland. ZUDOVÁLEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, pp. 27. 206 ABS, f. 302, a. Č. 302-73-1, Protokol sepsaný s plk. vv František Fryč, 3. 1. 1950, p. 5. 207 TICHÝ, O .:

operations in Switzerland and subsequently during the war, and cooperated proactively with the Czechoslovak intelligence service.208 When Tichý arrived in Bern, he was immediately told by Lt. Col. Masson said that he had a room in the Bahnhotel opposite the station and was a guest of the Swiss Army’s General Staff until he found his own accommodation.209 Since Tichý did not want to abuse Swiss hospitality for too long, he immediately began to find out about the apartment and office facilities. At first he considered the possibility of serving directly at the embassy, but due to the cramped circumstances, he preferred to look for an office elsewhere on the ambassador’s advice. On the same day that he stayed at the Bahnhotel, he found a suitable boarding house that served as his temporary residence.210 Then Tichý could begin to perform his duties, make the first official visits and introductions to other representatives of the Swiss army, various ambassadors and other military attachés. Lt. Col. was very helpful in Tichý in this procedure. Masson. Diplomatically, Tichý was subject to Ambassador Rudolf KünzluJizerský.211 After Tichý became acquainted with the military attachés of France, Germany, Italy and the United States of America, he also visited the Czechoslovak Consul Jan Laška212 in Zurich, during which the Capt. Sedláček, who, moreover, maintained a very close contact with Laška due to his intelligence work.213 Tichý’s own diplomatic activity in Switzerland was not as important as his intelligence activity. Nevertheless, even diplomatic activity cannot be described as uninteresting, and Oldřich Tichý did not avoid some “diplomatic faux pas”, especially during the first official visits. For the purpose of these visits, Tichý’s secretary Künzl-Jizerský prepared business cards for Tichý, which were to be distributed to all embassies. When Tichý visited the French 208

TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), P. 123. Ibid., P. 124. 210 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. DEJMEK, Jindřich ̶ MICHÁLEK, Slavomír ̶ NĚMEČEK, Jan: Diplomacie Československa (hereinafter Diplomacie). II. part. Biographical Dictionary of Czechoslovak Diplomats (1918 ̶ 1992). Prague 2013, p. 134. 212 He was appointed consul in Switzerland in August 1933. In May 1938, his office was promoted to consulate general. Jan Laška worked in Zurich until the end of the republic. In March 1939, following the position of the envoy in Bern, Bohdan Štrér, he handed over his office to the Germans and returned to the protectorate. Ibid., Pp. 140. 213 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 23; TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), Pp. 124. 209

military attaché, his French counterpart at a social party found that Tichý was alone for the time being and invited him to a ball in the evening to the Portuguese envoy and his wife, the daughter of Portuguese President António Óscar de Fragos Carmona.214 This visit took place and what followed Tichý recalls the memory: “The second or third day afterwards, the envoy [Künzl-Jizerský] called me and told me with some surprise that I also had business cards ready for the Portuguese embassy. This was reported to him by his secretary, who took care of many things for me. The envoy told me to kindly note that diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Portugal had been interrupted (the machine gun affair) and that I could not hand in my business cards there. As a sinner, I confessed that the first people I came in contact with were the Portuguese. The ambassador understood me as a human being, but business cards were not allowed to be handed over. ”215 So-called The “machine gun affair” really stood in the face of a very serious diplomatic conflict between Czechoslovakia and Portugal. At that time, Portugal ordered a larger number of machine guns in Czechoslovakia. However, the Czechoslovak government, especially fearing that the weapons would not be delivered to the Francoist insurgents fighting the Republican government in the Spanish Civil War, suspended the entire supply. The reaction of the Portuguese side was not long in coming, and all diplomatic relations were interrupted by Portugal at the beginning of August 1937, for almost forty long years.216 In his activities in Switzerland, Tichý had one significant advantage, as this country was not unknown to him. environment. During his service with the Second Department of the General Staff, he had the opportunity to visit Switzerland quite many times, either during trips directly behind the capt. Sedláček or behind šktp. Shiman to the Netherlands, or at meetings with some agents.217

Capt. Sedláček, who successfully

built the “Kazi” headquarters before the establishment of the Czechoslovak military attaché’s office, prepared the ground for Tichý very well for his position as military attaché. intelligence with them so far

214

Klima, Jan: History of Portugal. Prague 2007, p. 364. TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), P. 124. 216 Diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Portugal were not resumed until the mid-1970s. DEJMEK, Jindrich: Diplomacie Ceskoslovenska. Part I. Outline of the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy (1918 ̶ 1992). Prague 2012, p. 60. 217 TICHÝ, O .: From the memory of the rapporteur (II.), P. 124. 215

He did not act, and as a result, after the Silent Arrival, the construction of a network of mailboxes that could be used for the transmission of intelligence information could begin.218 However, the preparation of the background for intelligence activities could not be completely kept secret. The Czechoslovak consulate, in one room of which was a walkie-talkie, currently used for training purposes, was originally housed in a small house on the outskirts of Zurich. Later, the consulate moved to a much larger building, which officially belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter the MFA), to which the consulate was subject, but in fact belonged to the MNO building. Oldřich Tichý also took part in the transaction through which the building was purchased. It was nothing more than the technical preparation of Czechoslovak intelligence in Switzerland for the war. It is not entirely clear what even surfaced in Prague, however, the Law of the People published an article in Czechoslovakia in the sense that “military attaché Lt. Col. gšt. Tichý buys a large villa for President Beneš in Switzerland ”.219 Despite this inconvenience, however, it was possible to build a network of individual mailboxes. Tichý found his own housing in January 1938 in a house belonging to a Swiss bank, which, before he moved in, restored it and painted one of the local apartments. It was an apartment, or rather a residence, which in all respects provided a very solid background for diplomatic and intelligence activities. The apartment with seven rooms, a kitchen, a covered veranda and a garden was sufficiently representative and also provided a convenient place to set up an office that Tichý could not and did not want to have at the embassy, for on the one hand, he needed to receive certain people at any time, and on the other hand, he also needed to broadcast from his own radio, which was operated by rtm. Karel Broukal, 220, who also took care of Tichý’s administrative agenda.221 The connection with Czechoslovakia was realized in three basic ways, namely encrypted telegrams sent from the post office, courier connection and after the commissioning of the above-mentioned radio also added a radio connection. 222 For the purposes of intelligence activities, the office of the Czechoslovak military attaché also had considerable financial resources, of which CZK 8 million was available to Tichý at his cash desk.223 Other funds were deposited in the bank, amounting to approximately 200,000 Swiss francs. 221 The connection with Czechoslovakia was thus realized in three basic ways, namely by encrypted telegrams sent from the post offices, by courier connection, and after the above-mentioned radio was put into operation, a radio connection was also added. 222 For the purposes of intelligence activities, the office of the Czechoslovak military attaché also had considerable financial resources, of which CZK 8 million was available to Tichý at his cash desk.223 Other funds were deposited in the bank, amounting to approximately 200,000 Swiss francs. 221 The connection with Czechoslovakia was thus realized in three basic ways, namely by encrypted telegrams sent from the post offices, by courier connection, and after the above-mentioned radio was put into operation, a radio connection was also added. 222 For the purposes of intelligence activities, the office of the Czechoslovak military attaché also had considerable financial resources, of which CZK 8 million was available to Tichý at his cash desk.223 Other funds were deposited in the bank, amounting to approximately 200,000 Swiss francs.

218

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichým, 23. 2. 1950, p. 24. TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), s. The Forgotten Elite, p. 22. 222 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), P. 126. 223 He later sent one million CZK back to Prague. Ibid., Pp. 127. 219

in cash and 180,000 in the savings book.224 The military attaché and the Czechoslovak envoy had the right to dispose of these funds, but only in agreement with the military attaché.225 Tichý gradually became acquainted with the people selected by the capt. Sedláček and intelligence with them in order to get them for cooperation.226 How such meetings took place can be evidenced by a specific example: “According to the prepared list of people, I chose the easiest case for the first time. The lightest is because he was a proven fighter who was a clutch and a mailbox for our foreign action in the First World War. We visited Mrs. Jurzová. Sedláček reacted well to the situation I was creating. After a pleasant conversation at the coffee shop, we went to see the farm. Sedláček with Mrs. Jurzová, me and Mr. Jurza and we got into a situation when we were alone and I could tell what was going on. I gave Mr. Jurz the code name “Funeral” because he told me he was born after his father’s death. He accepted the task with enthusiasm, and his address was given to Agent A-54. It is known that he received messages of great importance. ‘ Sedláčka, or after an introductory acquaintance mediated by Sedláček himself, Tichý completed a number. A total of 14 mailboxes were obtained in the event of war.228 Tichý used only persons of Czech origin and never the original Swiss citizens.229 Among the persons obtained by Tichý for cooperation who passed on valuable intelligence, Ms. Feldscherová must be mentioned in the first place. . She was the wife of a senior official in the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech origin born in České Budějovice and daughter of a colonel of the Austro-Hungarian army. Mrs. Feldscher passed on various messages, including political or military ones.230 Her maid was an Reich German, and when she returned from a visit to her homeland, she passed on information to her mistress about the situation in Germany. To illustrate, we can mention, for example, the message Tichý received from Mrs. Fletscherová and which he sent to Prague. The report warned Prague that the efforts of Stefan Osusky, Czechoslovak

224

ABS, No. 302, No. 302-96-2, Protocol written with Col. vv Karel Sedláček, 21 November 1949, p. 7. TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), p. 127. 226 ABS, f. H, a. s brig. gene. vv Oldřichem Tichým, 23. 2. 1950, p. 24. 227 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), p. written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 24. 229 Ibid., p. 25. 230 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), p. 125. 225

ambassador in Paris, it is useless and that France is not going to go to war for Czechoslovakia.231 JUDr. Millieta, a well-known lawyer who had an office in Vienna and also worked in Belgrade, and his wife, Mrs. Millieta, née Kopecká, who was a former singer of the National Theater. Tichý also received a number of interesting observations from them. In addition, Tichý gained contacts thanks to the previous activities of the Capt. Sedláčka also, for example, in St. St. Gallen. Specifically, it was the owner of the fur plant Alfons Stavavek, who passed on news from the Vorarlberg area.233 Furthermore, news came from co-workers also from Geneva or Basel. 234 The list of collaborators of the Czechoslovak intelligence service in Switzerland is not exhaustive, but it is sufficient for illustration. Most of these people subsequently played a relatively important role during the war. Tichý did not cooperate much with other intelligence services, except for the Swiss. However, the cooperation with her took place mainly on the basis of a good friendship between Tichý and Lt. Col. Massonem. He reported on Germany and, as Tichý remarked, “did not ask for any counter-services.” 235 The two men met in Bern for information, and Masson never visited Tichý in his office. or apartment. During one of the meetings, Tichý, for example, learned how a German military attaché told Masson that Tichý was enjoying some of Masson’s special favors. Masson, of course, tried to seduce the old acquaintance with Tichý from the time of his military studies in Paris.236 The question remains as to how much the friendship between the two men could have aroused or intensified the German interest in Tichý. Sure, the interest of German correspondents could increase, but no doubt the Germans would be interested in Tichý even without his friendship with Lt. Col. Masson, as, given Switzerland’s excellent geographical position for intelligence work against Germany, it was in their interest to have some

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 24. Ibid., p. 25. 233 ABS, f. 302, sign. 302-96-2, Protocol written with Col. vv Karel Sedláček, 21. 11. 1949, p. 3. 234 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 25. 235 Ibid. 236 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), Pp. 126. 232

the Germans could not doubt the suspect in this regard. After all, Tichý convinced himself that the Germans were watching him closely several times, for example during some of his trips to or from Prague, when he safely noticed that one and the same man was traveling with him in both directions and watching him.237 Tichý on he even stumbled upon him once again at the beginning of the war during his trip to Lausanne. After all, traveling intelligence officers always carried considerable risks, let alone at the turbulent end of the 1930s. Oldřich Tichý, of course, did not escape the various deceptions of German customs officers, however, like other intelligence officers, Tichý mostly knew how to deal with such situations. He himself remembered very well one such incident: “I once went to Prague and there is a customs and passport inspection at the border station (either Feldkirch or Buchs). They took my diplomatic passport; I’m waiting for him to give it back to me. I see the dispatcher coming to the train to signal his departure. I got off the train and made a fuss that my passport had not been returned. They brought me a passport after this scene. These passports were not unknown. The passport did not return, the passenger without the passport was detained, interrogated or arrested during another search or on the other side of the border. ”238 But back to Tichý’s own intelligence activities. Oldřich Tichý always praised the very smooth cooperation with the embassy and consulate, especially with Consul Laška, to whom he had no problem, even if he had to notify Škpt during the deep night. Sedláčka about the next day’s meeting.239 But not everything was so ideal. Can’t say that Tichý would directly complain about it, but from the context of his statement there is a certain dissatisfaction. The point is that Tichý never received any major instructions or assignments from the second department during his stay.240 This fact is rather contrasted by the rebuke of his superior, Col. Moravec during the partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1938. Moravec then addressed Tichý the question of whether he was asleep in Switzerland, that he had not noticed the movements of the army in Germany towards the Czechoslovak border. However, neither Tichý nor Sedláček had absolutely no news about it. Naturally, Tichý also verified the whole matter with Lt. Col. 240 This fact is rather contrasted by the rebuke of his superior, Col. Moravec during the partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1938. Moravec then addressed Tichý the question of whether he was asleep in Switzerland, that he had not noticed the movements of the army in Germany towards the Czechoslovak border. However, neither Tichý nor Sedláček had absolutely no news about it. Naturally, Tichý also verified the whole matter with Lt. Col. 240 This fact is rather contrasted by the rebuke of his superior, Col. Moravec during the partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1938. Moravec then addressed Tichý the question of whether he was asleep in Switzerland, that he had not noticed the movements of the army in Germany towards the Czechoslovak border. However, neither Tichý nor Sedláček had absolutely no news about it. Naturally, Tichý also verified the whole matter with Lt. Col.

237

TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), P. 126. Ibid. 239 Ibid., Pp. 127. 240 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, pp. 24,238

Masson and also with the French military attaché. But neither of them knew anything.241 The last stage of the Silent operation in Switzerland began in the autumn of 1938. During the mobilization of the Czechoslovak army, it was necessary to bring as many conscripts from abroad as well. Oldřich Tichý thus cooperated very closely with the Czechoslovak embassy in Switzerland and sent branka to Czechoslovakia via Italy, Yugoslavia and Romania.242 After the Munich Agreement, however, it became more than clear that all offensive activities of military diplomats and reporters would have to be largely muted or even abolished altogether.243 Around mid-October 1938, Tichý received an order from Prague to liquidate the office of military attaché and return to Prague within a week. Very soon, the order was amended to the effect that that Tichý immediately arrives in person in Prague. Here he received detailed instructions, according to which he was to liquidate the office of military attaché, agency materials, cash and a savings book with the money deposited by the second department he had to hand over to the administration of the depot. Sedláčka and state furniture to send to Paris to the local Czechoslovak military attaché244 Col. gšt. Václav Kalin.245 Even before Tichý went back to Switzerland to solve the newly assigned tasks, he sent an encrypted one from Prague.

telegram to

his

wife,

have already

started to

prepare

departure

to Czechoslovakia. In his memoirs, he paid an imaginary tribute to her for preparing herself for their departure.246 In his remarks on the activities of the Second Department, Tichý did not state exactly that he had to be removed from office in the autumn of 1938 as the only Czechoslovak military attaché. .247 Undoubtedly, his appeal was a response to German pressure to end offensive intelligence activities against them, but Tichý was not the only one affected by that pressure. Lt. Col. also experienced a similar fate. Josef Svoboda, 248 who held the office of Czechoslovak Military Attaché 241

TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory (II.), Pp. 127 ̶ 128. Ibid., Pp. 128. 243 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 22. 244 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 73. 246 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), S. 128. 247 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, p. 121. 248 Josef Svoboda was appointed military attaché in the Netherlands in November 1937, and was also accredited for Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 23. 242

in the Netherlands.249 Initiation to terminate Lt. Col. Freedoms were officially financial reasons. But in reality they only camouflaged the proclamation of the end of intelligence intelligence against Nazi Germany.250 Lt. Col. Tichý, of course, as a military officer, accepted the order and fully complied. Although he understood his appeal rationally, leaving Switzerland had a very bitter taste for him. He remarked: “Be that as it may, I had the impression that I was leaving my post as a maid who was given immediate notice. I am aware that nothing could be done. ”251 Given the need for Tichý to leave quickly, there was not enough time for an official diplomatic farewell. The only farewell at the official level was prepared by Lt. Col. Masson in the form of lunch with the staff of the Swiss army. On this occasion, Silent Massona asked that in the event that that Czechoslovakia would need it, he could turn around. Masson, of course, immediately promised him any help.252 As will be seen, Masson kept his promise. When leaving Switzerland, Tichý was also very impressed by the actions of the French military attaché. According to Tichý, the French attaché said at the farewell in response to the turbulent events and consequences of the Munich agreement “he threw the saber on the table and said that he was ashamed to be French and that he asked for retirement immediately.” left.254 On November 1, 1938, Tichý and his family traveled by plane to Prague. After returning to his homeland, Lt. Col. Tichý did not return to the intelligence department of the General Staff, at least not professionally. Immediately upon arrival, Tichý handed over intelligence materials and things he had brought from Switzerland, to the second ward and immediately learned of his inclusion in the delimitation commission.255 Shortly after his arrival, he himself remarked: . I was aware, as I was told, that I had been revoked at the behest of the Germans. ”256

249

KOKOŠKA (MALÍŘ), J .: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina, s. 69. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, s. 23. 251 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), S. 128. 252 Ibid., Pp. 128 ̶ 129. 253 Ibid., Pp. 128. 254 Ibid. 255 Ibid. 256 Ibid., Pp. 129. 250

He was assigned to the commission on November 1, 1938, temporarily.257 Unfortunately, Tichý mentioned his work in the delimitation commission only briefly and devoted more space only to the characteristics of his co-workers in the commission.258 The head of the commission, resp. The head of the General Staff’s border management department with Germany was Gen. Otakar Zahalka, 259 his deputy then Col. Libor Vítěz. Silent also mentioned Col. Studlara, Lt. Col. Kadainku and Maj. Ressela. In addition, the commission also met with the former head of the intelligence section, now Col. gšt. František Dastych. In the case of Col. It is necessary to add Studlar that he was not assigned to the delimitation commission, but to the Directorate of Fortification Works, and he came to the commission at the invitation of Col. Kadainky for English lessons.260 Own commission

activities and atmosphere

The time

which

Tichý

joined the delimitation commission can be depicted on the basis of Tichý’s memories: “It was a sad job in the delimitation commission, and by the time I joined it, it was not much. In our free time we learned English. It was useful to me after arriving in England. We did not receive any more specific messages. It was just very serious about the Germans’ strange behavior in delimitation issues and their lack of interest in resolving them. Then news began to spread of some troop movements, etc. ”261

257

VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert for the clearing Qualification documents, part I, 1938. 258 See ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 27. 259 MASKALÍK, A: Elite armády, p. 670. 260 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Ulrich Pacific, 23. 2. 1950, p. 27. 261 SILENT, O .: From memory rapporteur (II.), p. 129.

5th

World War II (1939-1945)

1.5

Moravc’s “Eleven” – Moving to Great Britain (1939)

News of the German aggression, which was to bring about the end of the Second Republic, was available to the Czechoslovak military intelligence service from several different sources. The French intelligence service Service de Renseignement (hereinafter referred to as the SR) first submitted to the Czechoslovak counterparts a report of a general nature, which it subsequently specified on 11 March in the sense that it would be a violent action and which would take place on 14 or 15 March.262 information also from own sources. Some reports indicated the movement of German troops from their peacekeepers closer to the borders of Czechoslovakia, and valuable clues were also provided by the military attaché in Berlin, Col. Anthony Hron, 263 who reported on the requisition of civilian freight

cars

and

particularly

the intended

German

intervention

in Czechoslovakia in the near future, provided that the Czechoslovak government does not restore order.264 Czechoslovak reporters could only get a more comprehensive idea of the next developments after meeting with Agent A-54, which took place on 11 March. SA ̶ 54 met Capt. František Fryč in a restaurant at Turnov railway station. This was followed by a transfer to Prague, to the apartment of Maj. Bohumil Dítěte, where his own meeting took place under the leadership of Maj. Emil Strankmüller.265 Suffice it to say that A-54 described the details of the planned German invasion and, above all, confirmed that it would take place on March 15, 2666. On March 12, 1939, Colonel Moravec, together with his deputy Maj. Strankmüller met with the Prague exponent of the British military intelligence service, Military Intelligence, Maj. Harold Gibson.267 The purpose of the sudden meeting was to discuss the instructions given by Maj.

262

KREISINGER, P .: Brigádní generál, p. 57. Antonín Jan Hron held the office of Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Germany from October 1937 to the end of June 1939. Until mid-October 1937 he also had accreditation for the Netherlands and until May 1938 for Denmark. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, p. 29. 264 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, p. 118. 265 Details of proceedings in KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute agent, pp. 118 ̶ 121. 266 KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, pp. 57. 267 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 123 ̶ 124. 263

allowed the intelligence to the activities even after the occupation of the republic, and the British are ready to provide the Czechoslovak intelligence with appropriate facilities.268 The offer of Major Gibson Col. Moravec took advantage. Moravec’s original intention was for eleven other intelligence officers to go to London with him, but Maj. Bohumil Dítě, a member of the defense section, who was hastily recalled from Slovakia, did not make it. The final list formed together with Col. gšt. František Moravec the following officers: Lt. Col. gšt. Oldrich Tichy, Maj. gšt. Emil Strankmüller, Maj. conc. Josef Bartík, Maj. rammer. Karel Paleček, Maj. ride. Alois Frank, Capt. rammer. František Fryč, Capt. rammer. Vladimir Cigna, Capt. Infantryman Václav Sláma, Capt. rammer. Josef Fořt, šktp. ride. Jaroslav Tauer.269 It has long been speculated which factors influenced Colonel Moravec the most when making decisions, whom to take with you. For a long time, it was believed that the requirement that none of the intelligence officers who had the opportunity to meet Agent A-54 would remain in Prague played a decisive role. Today, this view is already obsolete. The demand for the greatest possible expertise seems to be much more probable, especially with a focus on offensive and defensive intelligence against Germany, the effort not to expose the most engaged officers to German city and, last but not least, personal sympathy.270 In the case of Oldřich Tichý, however, Moravec’s sympathies with success. The name of Oldřich Tichý was last on Moravc’s list only on the evening of March 13. Interestingly, at this time Tichý no longer fell under military intelligence, since since November 1938, when he ended up as a military attaché in Bern, Switzerland, he served on the delimitation commission MNO.271 Tichý himself recalled the circumstances of becoming part of the group heading to London as follows: „13. Mrs. Mill [i] etová, who has just visited Prague (she is a former singer of the National Theater in Prague, Mrs. Kopecká), was at our dinner for March. We were just finishing our soup when the phone rang ̶ škpt. Fryč told me that I should come to the colonel immediately. Moravec in important matters. I didn’t delay and went to headquarters. Moravec explained the situation to me. He said on the orders of gen. Fialy is leaving the intelligence group on a business trip to England to continue working against Germany. He’s counting on me to work with France. That I know what would come of me if I stayed. 268 asked me Mrs. Mill [i] etová, who has just visited Prague (she is a former singer of the National Theater in Prague, Mrs. Kopecká), was at our dinner for March. We were just finishing our soup when the phone rang ̶ škpt. Fryč told me that I should come to the colonel immediately. Moravec in important matters. I didn’t delay and went to headquarters. Moravec explained the situation to me. He said on the orders of gen. Fialy is leaving the intelligence group on a business trip to England to continue working against Germany. He’s counting on me to work with France. That I know what would come of me if I stayed. 268 asked me Mrs. Mill [i] etová, who has just visited Prague (she is a former singer of the National Theater in Prague, Mrs. Kopecká), was at our dinner for March. We were just finishing our soup when the phone rang ̶ škpt. Fryč told me that I should come to the colonel immediately. Moravec in important matters. I didn’t delay and went to headquarters. Moravec explained the situation to me. He said on the orders of gen. Fialy is leaving the intelligence group on a business trip to England to continue working against Germany. He’s counting on me to work with France. That I know what would come of me if I stayed. 268 asked me I didn’t delay and went to headquarters. Moravec explained the situation to me. He said on the orders of gen. Fialy is leaving the intelligence group on a business trip to England to continue working against Germany. He’s counting on me to work with France. That I know what would come of me if I stayed. 268 asked me I didn’t delay and went to headquarters. Moravec explained the situation to me. He said on the orders of gen. Fialy is leaving the intelligence group on a business trip to England to continue working against Germany. He’s counting on me to work with France. That I know what would come of me if I stayed. 268 asked me

KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 124. KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 58. 270 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, p. 126. 271 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to the clean document Qualification documents, 1937. 269

obligatory whether I will go with him. Otherwise, he would take another place on my plane. I replied in a binding manner that I would go. He told me to come to his office the next day around noon with my luggage going as he was on a business trip. At home, I have to say that I am going on a business trip to Slovakia for three or four days. ” They were to be expelled from Czechoslovakia only subsequently. On March 14 at 5:45 pm, Oldřich Tichý flew out of Prague together with other members of the “Moravc’s Eleven”. Pilot Cpt. Virula, who flew the plane, received precise instructions, that his task is to take twelve men on board in Prague and immediately transport them to London.274 Oldřich Tichý recalled the course of the flight as follows: “Shortly after departure, I realized that these civilian pilots, on a civilian flight, in an extraordinary flight, were situation, they would land if ordered from the country. Why not? That’s why I got up from my seat on the flight over Germany, stood behind the pilot and watched the altimeter. We flew in a heavy snowstorm. All the way over Germany to about Düsseldorf (according to the flight attendant), we flew in such a blizzard that the position lights on the wings of the plane were not visible. Maybe that was our luck. My intention was, if they were ordered by radio to land, to force them, under the threat of two pistols, to continue flying. It’s clear. They would have an alibi, they were forced to continue flying (in case of implementation, I could have been perhaps the first hijacker or the first terrorist). Good thing I didn’t become one, of course. ”275 Of course, it can’t be assumed that the Germans didn’t know about the whole operation. In fact, it can be said with certainty that, given that the Nazi intelligence command had been operating in Prague since the morning of 14 March, the German aggressors had undoubtedly noticed preparations for the launch of a special Dutch flight. Nevertheless, the Germans already had their informant in Ruzyně, who most likely betrayed them.276 272 Undoubtedly, the German aggressors noticed the preparations for the launch of a special Dutch flight. Nevertheless, the Germans already had their informant in Ruzyně, who most likely betrayed them.276 272 Undoubtedly, the German aggressors noticed the preparations for the launch of a special Dutch flight. Nevertheless, the Germans already had their informant in Ruzyně, who most likely betrayed them.276 272

TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, pp. 129 ̶ 130. VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Personal insert to the master certificate. 274 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 129; KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 58. 275 TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory, p. 130. 276 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an Agent, p. 130. As one of the examples of physical The presence of Major Abwehr Heinz Schmalschläger, who had the following tasks during the Nazi occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March during the Nazi March occupation of Bohemia and Moravia: there in II. seize the department and secure all intelligence. In particular, he had the task of 273

On the route Prague

London there was one stopover in Rotterdam

and at 10.40 pm the plane landed at London’s Croydon Airport. British journalists were already waiting for the Czechoslovak correspondent at the airport. Oldřich Tichý remembered that when the flight attendant opened the plane’s door, someone from the outside immediately slammed it on. Tichý remarked about the whole situation: “No one was allowed out, not even the crew. We understood the reason only after maybe ten, maybe fifteen men could be clearly identified from the window, mostly with cameras in their hands, who trotted closer to our plane. At first glance, it was clear to me that they were reporters. Only later did we learn that they had received the echo from Holland. That if they hurry, they’ll catch a unique solo carp for their newsroom. ”277 Indeed. Early in the morning 15. On March 1, readers could see prominent headlines highlighting the landing of the mysterious plane in almost every London newspaper, and the next day the information appeared in the press in other countries.278 At the airport, Col. joined the Czechoslovak intelligence officers. Beaumont, a former British military attaché in Prague, accompanied by reporters to central London. Intelligence officers were accommodated at the Van Dyke Hotel, not far from Hyde Park.279 A new stage of intelligence work began for Czechoslovak officers in the new post. First of all, there had to be a study of the imported intelligence material, the use of defense and intelligence material for the British intelligence service, as well as the consolidation of the existing information network and its expansion. In addition, the new position required the establishment of the most reliable connection possible with the homeland, or more precisely with the emerging domestic resistance. The issue of the removal of the wives and children of the Czechoslovak correspondents also remained very sensitive. Of course, their families were in danger after March 15

pay attention to the file of those agents who worked against the empire [however, the file was already on the soil of Great Britain, where it was taken by a group of Col. Moravce]. Schmalschläger decided not to leave anything to chance and demanded “permission to go to Prague beforehand to be on time in time. He went as a film director (director) one or two days before to Prague, where he was waiting for the arrival of German troops. ”ABS Prague, f. 52, sign. 52-87-4, German Military Intelligence Service, Defense ̶ Abwehr, AST Prague – ANEST Brno, book – typescript, p. 39. 277 Oral statement gen vv Oldřich Tichý of March 17, 1990. Cited by KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA , S .: Dispute over an Agent, p. 131. 278 Ibid., P. 131. 279 The British prepared accommodation for Moravc’s group first in the Victoria Hotel, but due to the presence of several relentless journalists in the hotel lobby, it was decided that in the morning the Czechoslovak correspondents would move to another location, the Van Dyke Hotel. Ibid., Pp. 131-132.

detention by the Germans and thus a potential threat of possible blackmail arose for intelligence officers in London.280

5.2.

Beginnings in Great Britain (1939)

The initial phase of the intelligence activities of Moravc’s eleven-member group was not easy at all. The very legal position of the group vis-à-vis the British authorities was very problematic, as there was considerable uncertainty in this regard. Immediately upon arrival, the members of the group lived in Britain illegally under false names, and contact with the British intelligence service, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), was essentially at a conspiratorial level.281 Col. Moravec assumed that the whole situation would be clarified at the first meeting with the head of the SIS military section, Col. Stewart Menzies, which took place on March 17. However, the meeting did not resolve much as a result. Menzies condemned Moravec to the mournful fate of Czechoslovakia and expressed his feelings in the sense that he was looking forward to future cooperation.282 Embarrassed

impressed

at the

head of the

“Eleven”

also

the first

visit to

the Czechoslovak embassy, where it was instead of Jan Masaryk, who was at that time outside London, welcomed the legation councilor Karel Lisický that Masaryk represented and managed the embassy, and Czechoslovak military attache in Britain, Colonel. gšt. Josef Kalla.283 The atmosphere at the embassy seemed very chaotic, helpless, and the local officials were not very clear about the purpose of the stay of Czechoslovak correspondents in London.284 At least a dinner at Lt. Col. Kally, in whose apartment the Czechoslovak correspondents met very often, which took place on March 16,

280

KREISINGER, P .: Brigádní generál, p. 60. KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Spor o agenta, s. 133. 282 STRANKMÜLLER, E .: Čs. offensive intelligence, p. 191. 283 The Czechoslovak Military Attaché was appointed in October 1936, and in November 1938 he also received accreditation for the Netherlands. He remained in office in March 1939 and refused to return to the protectorate, for which the MNO in liquidation fired him in September 1939 and the Nazis recruited him. However, he remained in the position of military attaché until March 1945, when he became deputy commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in Great Britain. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 36 ̶ 37. 284 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, pp. 133; STRANKMÜLLER, E .: Čs. offensive intelligence, pp. 191. 281

and which was also attended by gen. Chorny, then a Soviet military attaché in London. The evening resulted in an informal agreement on certain intelligence cooperation.285 The specific features of intelligence cooperation did not begin to be negotiated until the beginning of April, when Major returned to London permanently. Gibson. He also became a liaison officer between MI-6, ie the military component of the SIS, and a group of Czechoslovak correspondents. Practically throughout April, regular meetings took place in conspiratorial apartments between Moravec’s group and Maj. Gibson, who provided the Czechoslovaks with everything they needed, such as accommodation, issuing documents, setting up post offices, etc. 286 However, the conditions of the Czechoslovak correspondents remained difficult. Group

trying to

firmly

anchor

in the British

environment

as well as

in the environment

Czechoslovak emigrants. The families of the intelligence officers remained in the Protectorate for the time being and their fate was uncertain. In addition, another fundamental issue has arisen, namely the question of finance. On March 17, Col. arrived in London. František Hájek, who has worked in The Hague so far. In addition to offering Col. Moravec’s mediation of contacts with other diplomats, especially from the Balkan states, also brought with him money that had been deposited in the Netherlands for intelligence purposes until then. There were now 109,000 Dutch guilders immediately available, and another £ 20,000 lay in the private account of an English bank. These funds became the basis of the fund, thanks to which the intelligence group Col. Moravce to function as a financially independent organization.287 Very soon afterwards, Czechoslovak correspondents obtained additional funding, this time from Switzerland. It is certain that the money was provided by Capt. Sedláček, who was still working in Switzerland at the time. However, there are discrepancies in how intelligence money got from Switzerland to London. In the literature, the most common version is that the money was transported to London in person by škpt. Sedláček, similar to Col. Hájek.288 However, according to Sedláček himself, the money went to London by post. According to Sedláček, he obeyed the call in the letter 288 However, according to Sedláček himself, the money went to London by post. According to Sedláček, he obeyed the call in the letter 288 However, according to Sedláček himself, the money went to London by post. According to Sedláček, he obeyed the call in the letter

285

KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 133; ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 73. ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 73. 287 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an Agent, p. 133. 288 Compare STRANKMÜLLER, E .: Cs. offensive intelligence, p. 192; ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, pp. 73. 286

signed by Mr. Fischer, which was the code name of Lt. Col. Tichý, 289 to hand over the funds deposited in Switzerland in an envelope to Tichý, the designated British consul.290 Sedláček did so, according to his statement, and when in the second half of March, at the request of Lt. Col. Tichý arrived in London and in the apartment Lt. Col. Kally met with other intelligence officers, allegedly making sure the money arrived in London in

order.291 Sedláček plays a vital role in thathttps://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/ads?client=ca-pub-2025287964322501&output=html&h=280&adk=3316849697&adf=3684329264&pi=t.aa~a.791033702~i.1554~rp.1&w=950&fwrn=4&fwrnh=100&lmt=1637082998&num_ads=1&rafmt=1&armr=3&sem=mc&pwprc=8576066767&psa=1&ad_type=text_image&format=950×280&url=https%3A%2F%2Fadoc.pub%2Fivotni-osudy-zpravodajskeho-dstojnika.html&flash=0&fwr=0&pra=3&rh=200&rw=949&rpe=1&resp_fmts=3&wgl=1&fa=27&uach=WyJXaW5kb3dzIiwiMTAuMC4wIiwieDg2IiwiIiwiOTUuMC40NjM4LjY5IixbXSxudWxsLG51bGwsIjY0Il0.&dt=1637077626418&bpp=139&bdt=2824&idt=139&shv=r20211111&mjsv=m202111100101&ptt=9&saldr=aa&abxe=1&cookie=ID%3Dd5e2e6db92bd5e30-228561f2aacc00cf%3AT%3D1637021895%3ART%3D1637021895%3AS%3DALNI_MZ9Z2P1KZNTBjatFIaEde232V8bBQ&prev_fmts=0x0%2C307x250%2C982x280%2C1349x625%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280&nras=5&correlator=1011245596538&frm=20&pv=1&ga_vid=72963090.1637021896&ga_sid=1637077625&ga_hid=1346907515&ga_fc=1&u_tz=-300&u_his=1&u_h=768&u_w=1366&u_ah=728&u_aw=1366&u_cd=24&dmc=8&adx=368&ady=34368&biw=1349&bih=625&scr_x=0&scr_y=31884&eid=31063703%2C21067496&oid=2&psts=AGkb-H9wmss3ftiAgqjAVoA-obK7B6rQT1jMTnxJYUSKE1U1QEvDHlvywBsoJlMkkSKF3I0DucAPknRPwDw%2CAGkb-H8lKMocpz47woc6vETFrkNTlM6YSrlcU3rSvywdKKEAZT3mkWLRrOgNGxfqkVpDWQJGV0DkpHwzRA%2CAGkb-H-_8Tb38NzH-gfggpWcG1aRFD5iZblPJEbQNJ4aCcZ4sDH5kMCRL-sqFEGNw8gDmjdYNluAoKY3S1M%2CAGkb-H_h1ldh6UdseeRbPdj8mOIzRh31qs1LBbikUyrWnPYrcedJz-14RXCPoLtkiyc_kbxeKiOEpMoIJLM%2CAGkb-H8Ip938LqXdwfC0nH8qlUq8VoeFb9PJc-snEcr71YB7sSyXRAfZz_HHfASP3a4X7k3DQWF8V-ZusfM&pvsid=1616790102313099&pem=11&tmod=1436071561&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&eae=0&fc=1408&brdim=0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C0%2C1366%2C728%2C1366%2C625&vis=1&rsz=%7C%7Cs%7C&abl=NS&fu=128&bc=31&ifi=7&uci=a!7&btvi=4&fsb=1&xpc=HWQmNplxQU&p=https%3A//adoc.pub&dtd=M

the intelligence money got to London at all. When Sedláček decided to go to Bern on his own initiative to collect intelligence money on March 15, he encountered opposition from Ambassador Bohdan Štrér, according to whom everything, including the deposited money, was to be handed over to the Germans. Only after diligent negotiations did he manage to persuade Štrér to at least agree to deposit the funds in the safe of the Bern Cantonal Bank, from where they could only be exempted against a double signature, ie the signing of Štrér and Sedláček at the same time. Exactly in this way, following the notification from London and further diligent persuasion, Štrér škpt. Sedláček won.292 According to Jan Němeček, Bohdan Štrér proceeded as follows. On 16 March, at the invitation of the German Legation Council, even before receiving the order from the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs and without contacting the Swiss authorities, the Czechoslovak embassy in German hands, while handing over to the Germans the file material as well as the office equipment and cash. The truth remains that at least before March 15, they destroyed the embassy’s confidential files. Štrér then defended the quick issue of the embassy to the Germans in an effort to save funds in the amount of three and a half million crowns originally deposited in the treasury of the military attaché, which could then serve the group of Col. Moravce v Londýn.293 For the sake of completeness, it should be added that the question of the usability of the funds supplied from Switzerland was probably complicated by the fact that part of the money was deposited in a book, but the intelligence group and Sedláček himself did not know the password. Oldřich Tichý remarked: “Furthermore, Capt. Sedlacek, who stayed for several days; Col. dealt with him. Moravec and Maj. Strankmüller, I’m 289

Zlatica Zudová-Lešková states that this pseudonym belonged to Karel Tichý. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, p. 281. But this is most likely a mistake, because rt. Karel Tichý did not work in such a position as to contact škpt regarding finances. Saddlery. 290 In the minutes, Sedláček stated that he had already forgotten the name of the said consul. ABS, 302, sign. 302-962, Protocol written with Col. vv Karel Sedláček, 21 November 1949, p. 8. 291 Ibid., p. 11. 292 Ibid., p. 7; KOKOŠKA (MALÍŘ), J: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina, pp. 70 ̶ 71. 293 NĚMEČEK, Jan: Twilight and the Dawn of Czechoslovak Diplomacy. March 15, 1939 and Czechoslovak embassies. Prague 2008, pp. 212.

he was only asked for an opinion on how the money deposited in the book in Switzerland could be withdrawn, since the password was unknown. ”294 However, this Silent Statement raises some doubts. In a service record made in London on April 11, 1939, which describes Sedláček’s efforts to obtain money from Ambassador Štrér, it can be read that the Swiss did not want to pay the money stored on the book for several reasons. On the one hand, there was to be a lack of cash, as the bank had recently been rehabilitated by the state, and as another reason they stated that “the slogan’s password is known to Lt. Col. Tichý “.295 Very soon after the arrival of Col. Moravec and his team in London also raised the issue of further cooperation with the French. Lt. Col. found out that he was counted on to cooperate with the French correspondents as part of the continuation of intelligence activities against Germany. Quiet practically before leaving for London from Col. Moravce.296 After all, Oldřich Tichý was more than suitable for such a task. Due to his stays in France, first at the École Special Militaire in St. Cyrus and then at the École Supériuere de Guerre, Tichý spoke very good French and knew the local environment. Moreover, during his time with the Second Department of the General Staff, especially in 1934-1937,297, he naturally worked with the French intelligence service. However, the new cooperation first had to be mutually agreed. After Munich, there was a significant slowdown in cooperation, but contacts were not completely interrupted. The role of the connecting link in this direction was played by Col. Kalina, Czechoslovak military attaché in Paris. František Moravec was very well aware of Kalin’s position in Paris, and therefore committed him to a state of subordination in the second half of March, which Kalina himself confirmed in writing at the end of April. Kalina came to the headquarters of the French Slovak Republic practically every day and it was confirmed that not only Moravc’s group but also the French were interested in further cooperation.298 Despite mutual interest in cooperation, joint activities in the pre-Munich form could not be resumed. At that time, on the one hand, the “deuxième bureau [second department, note. aut.], ie the analytical component of the French General Staff of National Defense ”299 and further professional 294 298 Despite the mutual interest in cooperation, joint activities in the form of pre-Munich could not be resumed. At that time, on the one hand, the “deuxième bureau [second department, note. aut.], ie the analytical component of the French General Staff of National Defense ”299 and further professional 294 298 Despite the mutual interest in cooperation, joint activities in the form of pre-Munich could not be resumed. At that time, on the one hand, the “deuxième bureau [second department, note. aut.], ie the analytical component of the French General Staff of National Defense ”299 and further professional 294

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Action „GENERAL“, Protocol written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 30. 295 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-150-24 (Various official records), Service record, 11. 4. 1939. 296 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), P. 132. 297 Ibid. 298 STRAKA, K .: Restoration, p. 2. 299 Ibid.

the base of Moravc’s “eleven” was much narrower than the complete pre-war second division, as the group de facto consisted only of selected representatives of the intelligence and defense section of Group B (search) of the second division. Many reporters that would be needed to perform the new tasks remained in Prague. The radio designer Ing. Jan Budík, head of the eavesdropping service, Capt. Alois Čáslavka, Maj. František Fárek, who organized the first advanced agency exchange, as well as the head of the German section of the study group, Lt. Col. Tomáš Houška, head of the agency search headquarters against Germany, Lt. Col. Václav Kopačka, his close collaborator Capt. Antonín Kukula, an expert on the Hungarian army, Capt. Antonín Longa, a representative of the foreign group Lt. Col. Alois Moravec, head of the cipher and liaison group Lt. Col. Josef Růžka and an expert of the intelligence section of Capt. Josef Rybář. All mentioned were, at the instigation of Col. Moravce included in the list of 59 people who were to leave the Protectorate for the West with the help of several embassies.300 However, the newly mentioned officers had to do without the above-mentioned officers, at least for the time being. Many reporters who remained in Czechoslovakia, however, almost immediately joined the resistance and began either on their own, or within the emerging underground organizations, building the basic parts of the domestic intelligence apparatus.301 Gradually, Col. Moravec and the other members of his team could be relieved, at least in the sense that they could count on the help of a number of Czechoslovak reporters at a distance from the Protectorate or other countries. A shining example is Maj. Fárka, škpt. Čáslavka and škpt. Long. Immediately after the occupation, these three officers began illegal activities as the so-called “Councils” group 302, and gradually other individuals and organizations began to cooperate with them. It is important, however, that the “Councils” contacted the French Consulate General, Col. at the beginning of April, on their own initiative. Moravce in the matter of direct cooperation. Similarly, for example, Maj. Alexander Fritscher, who had been a correspondent for the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Warsaw, Poland, since January.303 The British initially had little hope of successful “eleven” intelligence, but gradually their attitudes began to change.304 In contrast, 300 that the “Councilors” had already contacted the French Consulate General, Col. Moravce in the matter of direct cooperation. Similarly, for example, Maj. Alexander Fritscher, who had been a correspondent for the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Warsaw, Poland, since January.303 The British initially had little hope of successful “eleven” intelligence, but gradually their attitudes began to change.304 In contrast, 300 that the “Councilors” had already contacted the French Consulate General, Col. Moravce in the matter of direct cooperation. Similarly, for example, Maj. Alexander Fritscher, who had been a correspondent for the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Warsaw, Poland, since January.303 The British initially had little hope of successful “eleven” intelligence, but gradually their attitudes began to change.304 In contrast, 300

KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 134 ̶ 135. Ibid., P. 135. 302 GEBHART, J. – KOUTEK, J. – KUKLÍK, J .: On the fronts, p. 95. 303 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over agent, p. 135. 304 ŠOLC, J .: Po boku prezidenta, p. 73. 301

From the beginning, the French were much more optimistic about the Czechoslovaks. This stemmed not only from previous cooperation, but also from growing tensions throughout Europe and the potential of Czechoslovak correspondents to monitor those parts of Germany where the French could “see” only with great difficulty or rather not at all, ie not only to the German western regions but also to parts of the Third Reich lying further to the east.305 A personal meeting of Czechoslovak and French intelligence officers for a cooperation agreement took place very early on 17 April in Calais due to the difficult situation following the arrival of Moravc’s group in London.306 . The Moravian was represented by Oldřich Tichý, the French side was represented by Maj. Henri Gouyou, former Permanent Representative of the Slovak Republic in Prague, and Maj. Henri Navarre, who has headed the German section at the Slovak headquarters since 1937. How much the French cared about the agreement on mutual cooperation is evidenced, among other things, by the request of Col. Louise Riveta, commander of the deuxième bureau of the French General Staff, to begin cooperation as soon as possible, which Gouya and Navarre interpreted Lt. Col. Silent. It must be said that the French had already prepared a more precise concept and from the beginning they were counting on the location of an unspecified intelligence unit on French territory. Lt. Col. However, Tichý responded to these details with the words: “I replied that these details would be agreed upon by the bosses [Moravec and Rivet, note. 307 the Czechoslovak demands for the most conspiratorial features of cooperation possible, both in France and in relation to the British, were also willing to meet Tichý’s interpretation. Although they managed to break the British resistance, who were not originally in favor of Czechoslovak-French cooperation, the British still closely monitored the ongoing negotiations. This fact is by no means illogical, because the English naturally did not want to, so to speak, “let go” of the source of intelligence, which the Moravian group, despite British pessimism, could become.308 Lt. Col. Tichý did not fail to emphasize during the meeting that, despite the great interest of Czechoslovak correspondents in cooperating with the French, it will not be possible for members of Moravc’s group to fully engage until their families get out of the Protectorate. what Moravc’s group could, despite British pessimism, become.308 Lt. Col. Tichý did not fail to emphasize during the meeting that, despite the great interest of Czechoslovak correspondents in cooperating with the French, it will not be possible for members of Moravc’s group to fully engage until their families get out of the Protectorate. what Moravc’s group could, despite British pessimism, become.308 Lt. Col. Tichý did not fail to emphasize during the meeting that, despite the great interest of Czechoslovak correspondents in cooperating with the French, it will not be possible for members of Moravc’s group to fully engage until their families get out of the Protectorate.

305

STRAKA, Karel: Obnova, p. 2. VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Oldřich Tichý’s Report on the Meeting with the Smurfs, April 20, 1939; ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, pp. 106. 307 VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Oldřich Tichý’s Report on the Meeting with the Smurfs, April 20, 1939. 308 ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, p. 106. 306

rapporteurs. Both Gouyou and Navarre fully understood this argument. They only demanded that the final cooperation agreement be concluded as soon as possible.309 The final agreement on the establishment of an intelligence center on French territory was finally negotiated at the end of April, Col. Moravec with his French counterpart Col. Rivetem. Thanks to this agreement, Major was able to travel to Paris on April 30. Thumb along with Capt. Fryč, as representatives of the newly established Czechoslovak intelligence branch in Paris with the code name “Karel” .310 Tichý, however, remained in London for the time being. He had three months to go to the Paris branch. During this period, several, to Tichý’s other destinies, relatively important events took place. After March 1939, most Czechoslovak exiles and emigrants went to Poland, where one of the important foreign centers of the Czechoslovak resistance began to form.311 Col. Moravec was aware of its importance and therefore decided to send one of his men to Poland, who was primarily to act as a mediator between London, Paris and the resistance in his homeland and to discuss urgent issues and any requests from home that they had, to the direct connection between home and Warsaw, a much more specific form than would be the case in London, for example. In addition, the seconded officer was to cooperate with the Polish intelligence service against Germany and, last but not least, to ensure that the families of Moravc’s “eleven” reporters, whose illegal passage to Poland had in the meantime organized a skpt. Čáslavka, 312 safely got to London.313 For this task originally Col. Moravec counted on Lt. Col. Quiet, however, circumstances did not allow it. Oldřich Tichý remarked: “I should have been sent to Warsaw to help the families after the transition, to transport them to England, but because I had a severe flu, Major was sent instead. Bartík and then Maj. Frank. ”314

309

VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Oldřich Tichý’s Report on the Meeting with the Smurfs, April 20, 1939. 310 KOKOŠKA (PAINTER), Jaroslav: London Intelligence Group, pp. 72. 311 GEBHART, Jan ̶ KUKLÍK , Jan: Velké dějiny země Koruny české (hereinafter referred to as Velké dějiny). Volume XV a. 1938 ̶ 1945. Prague ̶ Litomyšl 2006, pp. 288 ̶ 289. 312 Klára Procházková discussed the evacuation of the families of members of Moravcov’s “eleven”. See PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Klára: The Life Fates of a Intelligence Officer and Military Diplomat of Colonel Alois Čáslavka (1899–1963). Olomouc 2015 (unpublished diploma thesis), pp. 60 ̶ 70. 313 KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, pp. 61 and 64. 314 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with brig . gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 31.

The silent indisposition really prevented him from being sent to Poland. But it is worth noting that not all of his intelligence colleagues saw his flu illness so clearly. Maj. Paleček described Tichý as follows: “He was neither brave nor cowardly. He appeared to be a type of sick officer. He was prone to colds and was anxiously careful. Still, he had enough physical strength. Nevertheless, he often sinned when he needed it. At the time of our arrival in England, it was necessary to send an officer to Poland to settle the situation there. Moravec wanted to send Tichý. Tichý collapsed completely and immediately fell ill. Despite the fact that we agreed that it was not a dangerous journey, he remained ill with the fixed idea that Moravec sent him on this journey to get rid of him in some way. Bartík then flew to Poland instead. It wasn’t a pleasant situation for Tichý either, but he came to terms with it, making excuses for his illness only when he stayed put. . It dates back to the time of the First Republic. According to his statement, he once gave Col. Moravec for Tichý’s task of directing Paleček somewhat in the negotiations, allegedly because he “smelled the group” and in general because he is “peculiar” .316 re-establishment of Silent Intelligence in Switzerland. On July 8, 1939, during a visit to Col. Kally learned from Mrs. Kall that a Swiss man who had introduced himself as Captain Hausmann had come and was looking for a colonel. Quiet. In addition to Tichý, Col. also took part in the meeting in the Kallov apartment. Moravec.318 After disclosing his identity, Hausmann said that “he is in direct contact with official circles and as far as the intelligence service is in direct contact with Lt. Col. Masson, head of the 2nd dept. hl. Staff of the Swiss Army “.319 Cpt. Hans Hausmann, a member of the Swiss intelligence section, offered the rapporteurs mutual assistance and cooperation between the two services. Although this was the first contact with Moravec’s group, Hausmann certainly did not lose he offered the rapporteurs mutual assistance and cooperation between the two services. Although this was the first contact with Moravec’s group, Hausmann certainly did not lose he offered the rapporteurs mutual assistance and cooperation between the two services. Although this was the first contact with Moravec’s group, Hausmann certainly did not lose

315

ABS, 302, sign. 302-57-2, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Karel Paleček, 25 November 1949, pp. 57 ̶ 58. 316 ABS, f. 302, sign. 302-57-2, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Karel Paleček, November 29, 1949, pp. 106. 317 Ibid. 318 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce, s. 131. 319 VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Business Record of the Meeting with H. Hausmann, 8 July 1939, p. 1.

time, he spoke very concretely and, as a result, further cooperation could be immediately agreed and clearly defined. Above all, the conditions of security of the agents of the Czechoslovak intelligence service were agreed upon. For example, in the event of detention by the Swiss security authorities, the agents were to declare that they were working for Switzerland, then contact the agreed address by telephone, then report with the password “Kälin 846” and indicate where they were. Capt. Was to be notified immediately. Hausmann, who was already supposed to take care of everything he needed. During a face-to-face meeting with Hausmann, the detained agent was to report the password “Kälin 846” again for inspection.320 A messaging procedure was also agreed. This was to be done by letters, telephone or telegrams. From London to Switzerland, letters were to be sent in any name to “St. St. Gallen, PO Box 846 ”. The messages were to be transmitted by telephone to the given number, while both parties were to report the password “Rütli”. If it is necessary to send a telegram, these should be sent directly to Capt. Hausmann. In the opposite direction, the messages were to be sent either by post, in this case to a London address, to the name “Josef Fischer”, or the messages were to be delivered by telephone. For this purpose, two telephone numbers were to operate, both in the name “Fiedler”. In addition, Capt. Hausmann promised that he would be willing to attend, after being invited to a control meeting, that he would provide possible shelter for the agents and, if necessary, mediate the meeting between them and the Czechoslovak correspondents.321 Cooperation was thus agreed. In the opposite direction, the messages were to be sent either by post, in this case to a London address, to the name “Josef Fischer”, or the messages were to be delivered by telephone. For this purpose, two telephone numbers were to operate, both in the name “Fiedler”. In addition, Capt. Hausmann promised that he would be willing to attend, after being invited to a control meeting, that he would provide possible shelter for the agents and, if necessary, mediate the meeting between them and the Czechoslovak correspondents.321 Cooperation was thus agreed. In the opposite direction, the messages were to be sent either by post, in this case to a London address, to the name “Josef Fischer”, or the messages were to be delivered by telephone. For this purpose, two telephone numbers were to operate, both in the name “Fiedler”. In addition, Capt. Hausmann promised that he would be willing to attend, after being invited to a control meeting, that he would provide possible shelter for the agents and, if necessary, mediate the meeting between them and the Czechoslovak correspondents.321 Cooperation was thus agreed.

5.3.

In France (1939-1940)

Lt. Col. Oldřich Tichý was assigned to the Paris branch office on July 29, 1939,322, but in fact he did not start working as its head until the beginning of August, 323 when the branch office was renamed from “Karla” to “Karla” .324 Tichý was already accompanied to France by his wife and daughter, who like the family

320

VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Business Record of the Meeting with H. Hausmann, 8 July 1939, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 321 Ibid., P. 2 ̶ 3. 322 VÚA – VHA, p. Qualification documents, Personal insert to the Master Certificate. 323 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 30. 324 KOKOŠKA (MALÍŘ), Jaroslav: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina, p. 75.

the other members of the “eleven” arrived in London at the end of July.325 Along with Tichý and his family, the family of Maj. Palečka and škpt. Fryč who were already there and worked in the Pacific expozituře.326 position in an agency involved the following: “I am the head of a managed work was in charge of relations with other French departments, the military administration, I have led two intelligence maps with relevant

notes, I

helped with encryption and decryption

327 For the sake of completeness, it should be added that Tichý was officially enlisted in the Czechoslovak army in France on the basis of a chord dated October 2, 1939 and was embodied in the Military Administration of the Czechoslovak National Committee.328 After Oldřich Tichý, other staff, namely Capt. in the bay. Jaroslav Krátký, lieutenant colonel flight. in the bay. Hugo Weyrich and former foreign legionnaire Viktor Falta.329 In addition, there were a total of four radio operators in the branch, namely rt. Karel Barva (recalled to London in autumn 1939), rt. František Malý (recalled in the spring of 1940), rt. Vilém Marek and rt. Vaclav Rettich. The last two nominees remained at the Paris branch until the end of its operation.330 The branch was housed in a rented Parisian villa on 13th Avenue Victor Hugo, near where the Czechoslovak National Committee and its Military Administration were located.

Under the administration of the

National

Committee

, the “Karel”

branch came into regular contact, it was not subject to any of the mentioned institutions and functioned as essentially a separate part of the London intelligence group, Col. Moravec, who could control it from London and to whom all intelligence information obtained by the branch was also sent. The basic tasks of the branch included mediating the connection of Moravcov’s group with the correspondents who remained in Prague, as well as establishing and maintaining a radio connection with the radio stations of the domestic resistance and with the stations of other Czechoslovak exchanges abroad, providing a courier connection.

to the countries concerned, with the help of the French intelligence service and French legions, the management of the intelligence network against Germany and ensuring the timely transmission of reports

325

KREISINGER, P .: Brigadier General, p. 67. ABS, f. H, a. -342-1, Protocol written with brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 32. 327 Ibid., p. 33. 328 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list II. 329 ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, pp. 106. 330 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Brig. gene. vv Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, pp. 39. 326

from the Kazi headquarters in Switzerland to London and in Paris, cooperating with the French intelligence service on the exchange of information concerning Germany.331 they had enough space for offices and a radio station. Then Tichý reported to gen. Sergei Ingra332 and Col. Václav Kalina. He subsequently visited Col. Rivet, who welcomed Tichý, reaffirmed his optimistic expectations for cooperation and confirmed Maj. Gouyou as a liaison officer to whom Czechoslovak correspondents are to turn with anything necessary. Tichý applied on that occasion for the possibility of using French courier mail and for issuing a French passport for his person.333 Both of his requests were granted, and the passport was issued to Tichý in the name of Oscar Tabbot.334 Shortly afterwards, Tichý needed a new passport. From the spring until the fateful September 1, 1939, Czechoslovak correspondents worked in Paris, but of course not only them, especially to uncover German plans to start a war in Europe, respectively. primarily against Poland. According to Col. The Czechoslovak intelligence correspondents obtained the first accurate information about the military aggression against Poland through Agent A-54. Col. Moravec wrote in his memoirs: “Then A ̶ 54 turned to service matters. He announced that the White Plan (Fall Weiss), ie the plan to attack Poland, was complete. He had no details, but he would get them for us soon. Now that he can only say that the main idea of the plan ̶ as before the Green plan ̶ is a lightning and devastating strike against Poland, to be phased out as soon as possible. Only waiting action is expected from the West. The interim date for the attack on Poland is September 1. ”335 However, this was not true. The first more comprehensive information about the planned invasion of Poland was provided by the branch of “Charles”, which received it on May 15, 1939 from Maj. Gouyou. The seventh point of his report reads: “Him. heads. the staff is studying a plan to attack Poland. 70 divisions, divided into 8 armies, are to be deployed. The attack is to have the main one

331

ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, pp. 106 ̶ 107. From the end of July 1939 he worked in France, where he established a military office at the Czechoslovak embassy. In November, after the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Committee, the office was transformed into the Czechoslovak military administration, and Ingr served as its chief until June 1940. He participated in the evacuation of Czechoslovak soldiers from France, and in Britain, after the formation of the Czechoslovak interim government, he became Minister of National Defense in July 1940. LÁNÍK, Jaroslav et al .: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939 ̶ 1940. Praha 2005, s. 113. 333 ABS, f. H, a. Č. H-342-1, Protokol sepsaný s brig. gene. vv Oldrich Pacific, 23. 2. 1950, p. 32. 334 TICHÝ, O .: from memory rapporteur (II.), p. 129. 335 MORAVEC, F .: Spy, pp. 332 300.

efforts in the north across the corridor and is said to be supported by demonstration efforts from Prussian Silesia. If this plan succeeds, it counts. the staff with the occupation of Warsaw within 8 days. ”336 The meeting with Agent A-54 did not take place until July 8 in The Hague, and the meeting actually dealt with the German campaign in Poland. The answer to the question of exactly when the attack will take place, but the agent did not say, not even outright for a simple reason. He didn’t know her. The report, which was handed over to London by the Paris branch on July 22 and spoke of a well-informed Viennese source, Rafael Melichar, could have suggested. According to his statement, “at the end of August, Germany is expected to start a war action in informed circles.” Czechoslovak reporters had the opportunity to more accurately estimate the specific date of the start of German war operations from the information on the schedule of work in progress in order to adjust the strategic roads leading to the Polish border. A relatively large number of them were obtained during July 1939, and it must be said that they essentially agreed with Agent A-54’s claims that the situation would begin to escalate from 15 August. There was also a large amount of data on concentration, strength and the composition of troops in Moravia and Slovakia. Most likely, due to their seemingly marginal nature and the absence of qualified analysts in London, who would draw the appropriate conclusions from the data, Col. Moravec paid no attention.338 At the beginning of August 1939, at a time when Oldřich Tichý was already working at the head of the “Karel” branch, another meeting with Agent A-54 took place in The Hague. Although the results of the meeting were later significantly distorted and glorified, A ̶ 54 practically only confirmed in terms of date that, unless the deadline is changed, military action by Germany can be expected from 15 August.339 During his first month in the branch, he worked Silent on the full resumption of his Swiss contacts, the strengthening of further cooperation with the Swiss intelligence service, the concept of cooperation with the French was also completed, and the need to know the exact date of the beginning of the German invasion of Poland became more and more urgent. Relatively important for further intelligence cooperation 336 that, unless the deadline is changed, military action by Germany can be expected from 15 August.339 During the first month of his tenure at the branch, Tichý worked to fully restore his Swiss contacts, strengthen further cooperation with the Swiss intelligence service, and complete the concept of cooperation with the French, and the need to know the exact date of the beginning of the German invasion of Poland became more and more urgent. Relatively important for further intelligence cooperation 336 that, unless the deadline is changed, military action by Germany can be expected from 15 August.339 During the first month of his tenure at the branch, Tichý worked to fully restore his Swiss contacts, strengthen further cooperation with the Swiss intelligence service, and complete the concept of cooperation with the French, and the need to know the exact date of the beginning of the German invasion of Poland became more and more urgent. Relatively important for further intelligence cooperation 336 the concept of cooperation with the French was also being finalized, and the need to know the exact date of the beginning of the German invasion of Poland became more and more urgent. Relatively important for further intelligence cooperation 336 the concept of cooperation with the French was also being finalized, and the need to know the exact date of the beginning of the German invasion of Poland became more and more urgent. Relatively important for further intelligence cooperation 336

VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-1 (Radiostanice Karel), Report „Šmidry“, 15. 5. 1939. VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-1 (Radiostanice Karel), Zpráva „Medák hlásí“, s. 22. 7. 1939. 338 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Spor o agenta, s. 145 ̶ 146. 339 Ibid., P. 146 ̶ 147. 337

Negotiations with the French, but even more so with the Swiss allies, took place at the Paris branch on August 23 and 24, 1939. However, this negotiation was preceded by the Silent Journey to Switzerland and the rapidly accelerating course of events. On August 19, just before noon, Lt. Col. called. Silent from Paris to London to pass on the latest knowledge he gained from the French intelligence allies. His phone call was very worrying: “The situation is getting serious, the midfielders who were to be released remain, other midfielders are being called; eastward movements of troops. A rapid decline in events is expected, leading to a similar period as in September 1938. There is permanence. Until now there has been peace – but now there is a great ripple and it is estimated that further measures will be taken in the coming days. I myself am in contact with the relevant officials and I will report any new situation. ”340 For the sake of completeness, it should be added that Col. received the same day. Moravec from the British liaison officer information about German plans to launch military operations against Poland, which is expected in the period from 20 to 30 August. In addition, pedestrian agents working for the Czechoslovak foreign branches, especially the Dutch “Libuše”, managed to penetrate the interior of the Third Reich and obtain during the end of June and August a lot of information about the strength and state of preparedness of German troops for the Polish campaign. Only the intelligence “ace”, Agent A-54, did not report.341 At the time, he was working for the German Abwehr, which ultimately resulted in a large-scale crackdown by the Reich security forces on the resistance in the Protectorate.342 It is not known exactly when , but between August 19 and 23, Lt. Col. Tichý went to Lausanne, Switzerland. Not far from here, in Vevey, Lt. Col. had his house and family. Masson. Immediately after arriving in Lausanne, Tichý called his Bernese office and asked for an appointment. The two men met that afternoon at a train station restaurant. Although a form of cooperation with the Swiss had already been agreed in London in July, but very specifically, Tichý still wanted to ask Masson for help. Of course, he came to his aid and promised to send a man to Paris whom Tichý could trust absolutely. Lt. Col. Masson is with Silent The two men met that afternoon at a train station restaurant. Although a form of cooperation with the Swiss had already been agreed in London in July, but very specifically, Tichý still wanted to ask Masson for help. Of course, he came to his aid and promised to send a man to Paris whom Tichý could trust absolutely. Lt. Col. Masson is with Silent The two men met that afternoon at a train station restaurant. Although a form of cooperation with the Swiss had already been agreed in London in July, but very specifically, Tichý still wanted to ask Masson for help. Of course, he came to his aid and promised to send a man to Paris whom Tichý could trust absolutely. Lt. Col. Masson is with Silent

340

VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official call record Lt. Col. Tichého, 19. 8. 1939. 341 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over agent, p. 148. 342 Detailed information about this event KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about agent, p. 149 ̶ 151.

343 In Lausanne, too, he again encountered a man who, as mentioned above, had followed him during one of his missions while working in Switzerland as a military attaché. But Tichý’s journey had other goals. One of them was a meeting with Capt. Farmer. Tichý wanted to introduce him to the overall situation and told Sedláček that after meeting with a Swiss officer, who would be sent by Lt. Col. Masson, will send to Switzerland Maj. Fryč to inform Sedláček about the details of further cooperation with the Swiss. Such a procedure was logical, as Sedláček did not know either Masson or Hausmann.344 Sedláček did not make the best impression on Tichý during the meeting, and his subsequent activities contributed to Tichý’s embarrassment, as is clear from the minutes of the 23rd and 24th meetings in Paris. Lt. Col. Tichý, a summoner from London, also took part in Tichý. Bartík. Lt. Col. During his trip to Switzerland, Tichý also revised the mailboxes. Based on this revision, it was subsequently revealed that one of the mailboxes will need to be completely abolished. On August 23, Capt. Hausmann and announced that he was being sent by Lt. Col. Masson. Tichý learned that Massmann’s promised officer, whom he could trust completely, was Hausmann. During the negotiations, the conditions of intelligence cooperation with the Swiss agreed in June were specified and supplemented. Cpt. Hausmann confirmed that he would make his entire apparatus available to the Czechoslovak correspondents, and the Swiss side would pass on to the Czechoslovaks all news of an offensive nature as well as all military-political material concerning Germany, which it would send either directly to London or to the Paris branch. He also stressed the readiness to provide protection to agents on Swiss soil. In return, Hausmann also demanded that military and political reports concerning Germany be sent to the Czechoslovak correspondents, and stressed that if information on the preparations for the German accession against Switzerland was intercepted, these reports would be sent as quickly as possible. He also requested a similar approach in the case of information about the German accession to the Allies.345 However, several important innovations were also addressed during the negotiations. Cpt. Hausmann offered the possibility of securing entry visas through the Swiss Embassy in London for any passport for a person of any nationality, which would 343 In return, Hausmann also demanded that military and political reports concerning Germany be sent to the Czechoslovak correspondents, and stressed that if information on the preparations for the German accession against Switzerland was intercepted, these reports would be sent as quickly as possible. He also requested a similar approach in the case of information about the German accession to the Allies.345 However, several important innovations were also addressed during the negotiations. Cpt. Hausmann offered the possibility of securing entry visas through the Swiss Embassy in London for any passport for a person of any nationality, which would 343 In return, Hausmann also demanded that military and political reports concerning Germany be sent to the Czechoslovak correspondents, and stressed that if information on the preparations for the German accession against Switzerland was intercepted, these messages would be sent as quickly as possible. He also requested a similar approach in the case of information about the German accession to the Allies.345 However, several important innovations were also addressed during the negotiations. Cpt. Hausmann offered the possibility of securing entry visas through the Swiss Embassy in London for any passport for a person of any nationality, which would 343 He also requested a similar approach in the case of information about the German accession to the Allies.345 However, several important innovations were also addressed during the negotiations. Cpt. Hausmann offered the possibility of securing entry visas through the Swiss Embassy in London for any passport for a person of any nationality, which would 343 He also requested a similar approach in the case of information about the German accession to the Allies.345 However, several important innovations were also addressed during the negotiations. Cpt. Hausmann offered the possibility of securing entry visas through the Swiss Embassy in London for any passport for a person of any nationality, which would 343

TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), Pp. 129. Ibid., Pp. 129 ̶ 130. 345 VÚA – VHA, p. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Business Record of the Meeting with H. Hausmann, August 25, 1939, pp. 1 ̶ 3. 344

the Czechoslovak correspondents needed to send to Switzerland and similarly that he was able to arrange a residence permit for all the relevant persons staying in Switzerland. Furthermore, Capt. Hausmann with the possible arrival of couriers from the protectorate. In this matter, he reassured Tichý and Bartík that he was willing and able to provide everything necessary to ensure that potential couriers avoided difficulties with the Swiss authorities and that they were sent safely to London, Paris, or another designated place. The couriers were to be notified in order to contact the number in St. Petersburg upon arrival in Switzerland. Gallen and announced the slogan “London 333”. This will notify Hausmann, who will then arrange everything necessary. Couriers were also to request the same call if they were detained. In the event that, for any reason, it is not possible to contact the number, Hausmann had prepared an alternative variant in the form of a Bern number, at which the person concerned was to ask Dr. Balsigera. This, as well as the aforementioned slogan “London 333”, was to be received by only a few absolutely reliable persons and only in exceptional cases. Cpt. Hausmann also stated that, in case of urgency, it would be possible to contact him through the Swiss military attaché in Paris, and the person in question was to report as early as June under the agreed motto “Kälin 846” .346 Cpt. Hausmann also stated at the meeting that he was ready to provide everything necessary for a Czechoslovak officer to settle permanently in Switzerland and work directly with him. The Swiss willingness even went so far as to require Hausmann to, in the event of consent from the Czechoslovak side, be informed in advance whether the officer in question was married or single, so that he could prepare his accommodation accordingly.347 The officer who established close cooperation with Hausmann in Switzerland became a captain. Farmer. However, this happened rather despite the reservations of Lt. Col. Silent. During the negotiations, the issue of further activities of the CCTV was also addressed. Saddlery. Part of the official record of the meeting, made by Major. Bartík, is the opinion of Lt. Col. Tichý in Sedláčková’s affair, which states: Sedláček could apply as today’s time requires. Capt. Sedláček succumbs to psychosis, fears his surroundings, declares himself that he cannot stay anywhere with an English passport, because he is being talked about everywhere in boarding houses and hotels Silent. During the negotiations, the issue of further activities of the CCTV was also addressed. Saddlery. Part of the official record of the meeting, made by Major. Bartík, is the opinion of Lt. Col. Tichý in Sedláčková’s affair, which states: Sedláček could apply as today’s time requires. Capt. Sedláček succumbs to psychosis, fears his surroundings, declares himself that he cannot stay anywhere with an English passport, because he is being talked about everywhere in boarding houses and hotels Silent. During the negotiations, the issue of further activities of the CCTV was also addressed. Saddlery. Part of the official record of the meeting, made by Major. Bartík, is the opinion of Lt. Col. Tichý in Sedláčková’s affair, which states: Sedláček could apply as today’s time requires. Capt. Sedláček succumbs to psychosis, fears his surroundings, declares himself that he cannot stay anywhere with an English passport, because he is being talked about everywhere in boarding houses and hotels

346

VÚA – VHA, sb. Military intelligence, intelligence contact with Switzerland London – 1939, service record of the meeting H. Hausmann, 25. 8. 1939, p. 3 ̶ fourth 347 Ibid, p. 2.

in English, and when he answers German there is distrust of him. Lt. Col. Tichý states that Sedláček impresses the sufferer and decays mentally and physically in a foreign environment. Lt. Col. Tichý proposes to move Sedláček to France, for example to Besançon, from where he could, according to the provisions of the reports. Paris branch and news. headquarters in London to manage the news. 348 Sedláček’s appeal from Switzerland had, moreover, been considered before, but for different reasons. Already in the planning phase of sending Czechoslovak correspondents to Paris, the possibility of withdrawing skpt was considered. Peasants from Zurich for a transitional period and make him along with his Swiss network available Maj. Paleček.349 However, this did not materialize. Even in connection with Tichý’s report, Sedláček was not withdrawn from Switzerland and, on the contrary, his subsequent close cooperation with Capt. Hausmann. The last crucial point which was discussed at the meeting was cooperation with the French. Maj. Navarre assured Tichý that he would give him all the messages Col. had asked for. Moravec, and will also supply press reviews. Navarre only demanded that everything be kept secret and not even passed on to British correspondents in the transcripts. Maj. Navarre also expressed the wish that when transmitting reports from the Czechoslovak side, the degrees of credibility should be indicated and the sources from which the reports came to be specified.350 However, the Czechoslovaks could not fully fulfill this, at least not in the case of reports obtained from Switzerland. Hausmann, on the other hand, demanded that the sources of where the messages came from should not be specified in the Czechoslovak-Swiss transmission of messages, so that mutual cooperation could be kept as secret as possible. 351 Based on the results of the negotiations in Paris, further intelligence activities were carried out. Czechoslovak correspondents praised the cooperation with the Swiss. After all, the Czechoslovak-Swiss intelligence cooperation can basically be considered the most fundamental success of the Paris branch. Cpt. Hausmann accommodated Capt. Peas in a villa in St. Gallen, 352 where Sedláček also had a walkie-talkie at his disposal. Without interruption until the end of the war, Sedláček then passed on through the 348

VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official record of proceedings at Czechoslovakia. military branch in Paris on 23 and 24 August 1939, p. 1. 349 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over agent, pp. 132 ̶ 133. 350 VÚA – VHA, p. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official record of proceedings at Czechoslovakia. military branch in Paris on 23 and 24 August 1939, p. 2. 351 VÚA – VHA, sb. Military Intelligence, London Intelligence with Switzerland – 1939, Service Record of the Meeting with H. Hausmann, August 25, 1939, pp. 1 ̶ 3 352 Both officers were in such close daily contact that Hausmann’s family considered Sedláček practically a member his family and his children called him “Uncle Tom.” MORAVEC, F .: Spy, pp. 305.

news and instructions to Sedláček from the West flowed through the same stations or through mailboxes, or through the French embassy in Bern. Tichý remarked about this mechanism: “It was a great contribution to our intelligence and also a contribution to our intelligence to the Allies.” 353 Unfortunately, despite initial considerable optimism and prospects for smooth and effective cooperation, time has shown that different. However, this did not become fully apparent until later, although the first indications can already be read in the official record of the above-mentioned Paris meeting: “Lt. Col. Tichý believes that Šmidra [pseudonym Maj. Gouyou, note. author] was in many cases sabotaged by two officers of the 2nd Department, who are not in favor of us and who have always expressed doubts about the importance of the messages we have sent them. Lt. Col. Tichý hopes to be in direct contact with Maj. Navarre-m will bring everything in order. ”354 On the other hand, for example, Maj. Paleček blamed great blame for the problematic cooperation with the French at the expense of Maj. Gouyou. He characterized him as an inefficient, slow man who put things off, and had “a kind of light, sloppy French relationship.” 355 As mentioned above, Agent A-54 had not made himself known since the second meeting in The Hague in early August. Since several times he received Col. On August 25, Lt. Col. Tichý to Paris to check with the relevant mailbox in Switzerland to see if there was a telegram from A ̶ 54. Tichý immediately ruled it out, because in the case that he would actually arrive in the mailbox by telegram, it would be Lt. Col. Silent notified, and in addition the mailbox had an order to send a possible letter or telegram immediately. Nevertheless, Tichý promised to convince himself.356 Nevertheless, a number of findings were again available, which necessarily had to keep the Czechoslovak correspondents and their allies boiling. On the same day, Col. Moravec asked Lt. Col. Tichý about checking the mailbox in Switzerland, there was a list of reports: “Německu there is a lot of traffic and movement in Germany, so no one knows about it at the moment. Šmidra arrived in the morning, intercepting a telephone conversation between their high-ranking political dignitaries, in which it was said that 353 that he would be convinced.356 Nevertheless, there was again a wealth of knowledge that had necessarily kept the Czechoslovak correspondents and their allies boiling. On the same day, Col. Moravec asked Lt. Col. Tichý about checking the mailbox in Switzerland, there was a list of reports: “Německu there is a lot of traffic and movement in Germany, so no one knows about it at the moment. Šmidra arrived in the morning, intercepting a telephone conversation between their high-ranking political dignitaries, in which it was said that 353 that he would be convinced.356 Nevertheless, there was again a wealth of knowledge that had necessarily kept the Czechoslovak correspondents and their allies boiling. On the same day, Col. Moravec asked Lt. Col. Tichý about checking the mailbox in Switzerland, there was a list of reports: “Německu there is a lot of traffic and movement in Germany, so no one knows about it at the moment. Šmidra arrived in the morning, intercepting a telephone conversation between their high-ranking political dignitaries, in which it was said that 353

TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), P. 131. VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official record of proceedings at Czechoslovakia. military branch in Paris on 23 and 24 August 1939, p. 2. 355 ABS, f. 302, sign. 302-57-2, Protocol written with Brig. gene. Karel Paleček, 25 November 1949, pp. 183. 356 VÚA – VHA, p. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Service record, 25. 8. 1939. 354

357 On the same day at a quarter to eleven o’clock in the evening, the Paris branch forwarded to London a report on the distribution of German troops, the occupation of the western border along its entire length, although the borders had not yet been closed, and In the last two days, the rapidly more intensive operation of German radio stations.358 On 27 August, Lt. Col. again. Tichý to London and said that a war timetable had been introduced in the Protectorate on the night of August 26-27, and that midfielders up to the age of 55 could be seen in the transports, and that rail links with Poland had already been cut off on August 25. .359 On August 30, Lt. Col. Tichý passed on to London very specific information about the movements of German artillery and armor that had taken place two days earlier. At the same time, he expressed a very contrasting opinion of the French political representation on the whole situation: There are reports in the same circles that Hitler has invited the Polish ambassador today and told him that Germany is willing to negotiate with Poland if the Gdańsk and Corridor issue, which must be resolved in favor of Germany without negotiation, does not arise. ”360 Although Czechoslovak, French and British reporters had a number of clues and suspected that the war between Germany and Poland was approaching, they could not find out the exact date of the beginning of combat operations until the last moment. Today, the completely overestimated contribution of Agent A-54, which was especially credited to Col., is also surpassed. Moravec. When Third Reich troops invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, short diplomatic attempts were made to persuade Germany to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. But these efforts soon proved in vain, and Britain and France declared hostility to Germany.361 It was now vital for the intelligence services to find out when the Germans would also attack France and Great Britain westward. Although the Czechoslovaks and their allies did not know when this would happen, they had no doubt that it would happen. The first general information was received by the Paris branch office from a cover agent 361 Now it was vital for the intelligence services to find out when the Germans would also attack France and Great Britain westward. Although the Czechoslovaks and their allies did not know when this would happen, they had no doubt that it would happen. The first general information was received by the Paris branch office from a cover agent 361 Now it was vital for the intelligence services to find out when the Germans would also attack France and Great Britain westward. Although the Czechoslovaks and their allies did not know when this would happen, they had no doubt that it would happen. The first general information was received by the Paris branch office from a cover agent

357

VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Service record, 25. 8. 1939. VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Telephone message from the branch from Paris, 25. 8. 1939. 359 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official call record Lt. Col. Tichého, 27 August 1939. 360 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-10 (Radiostanice Karel), Official call record Lt. Col. Tichého, 30. 8. 1939. 361 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 152. 358

362 According to his report, a meeting of Hitler’s headquarters took place at Heidebreck Castle in Silesia on September 20, 1939. with a violation of Belgian neutrality.363 A month later, a telegram from the Green arrived in Paris [code name doc. Vladimíra Krajiny364, note author], which contained a statement that a campaign to the West was being decided in Germany. However, the German General Staff opposed this, considering such a war to be politically lost. A possible attack, if it had already taken place, was then to be led through the Netherlands with armored divisions at the head and a supporting attack of 1,500 aircraft on Great Britain.365 Already 2. On November, the “Havelsky” report was given from Paris to London [code name Cpt. Hans Hausmann, note author], which discussed the change in attitudes of the German generality. Col. However, Moravec did not pay much attention to the report.366 According to French sources, military operations were to take place on November 6 and 7, while reports from the Protectorate spoke about half a month. Although time has shown that all predictions were wrong, the Czechoslovak correspondents had no idea that Hitler himself had already begun to postpone the start of the attack on the West on November 7, in the end by several months. They assumed only that their greatest “star”, Agent A-54, did not warn of any danger.367 At the beginning of 1940, a completely different form of cooperation with the French correspondents began to show more than how optimistic and hopeful she appeared during the cooperation negotiations and shortly afterwards. He took care of contact with his French colleagues in Paris

362

It was the pseudonym of the political emigrant Georg Leonhard, who had originally collaborated with the “Vonapo 20” exchange since June 1938. By the end of the First Republic, it had the code A ̶ 1102. This agent had contacts at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of War in Berlin. Ibid., P. 153. 363 VÚA – VHA, p. 37, sign. 37-144-2 (Radiostan Karel), Situation Report No. 64, September 27, 1939. 364 Doc. Vladimír Krajina worked as a member of the PU since November 1939. Since 1940, he has been significantly involved in the activities of the resistance organization INTRODUCTION, the top body of Czech resistance. His close associates also included the well-known “Three Kings”. Thanks to his domestic intelligence network, he was one of the best-informed men in the Protectorate and delivered over 20,000 telegrams to London via radio stations. He was not discovered by the Nazis during the Heydrichiad, however, he had to hide in the Bohemian Paradise, which meant isolation for him. The Gestapo finally caught up with him at the end of January 1943. The landscape underwent a number of interrogations, but he was spared because KH Frank counted on him as a key element in forming a Czech government that would span the period from the fall of the Protectorate to the re-establishment. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-18. 365 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. The Gestapo finally caught up with him at the end of January 1943. The landscape underwent a number of interrogations, but he was spared because KH Frank counted on him as a key element in forming a Czech government that would span the period from the fall of the Protectorate to the re-establishment. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-18. 365 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. The Gestapo finally caught up with him at the end of January 1943. The landscape underwent a number of interrogations, but he was spared because KH Frank counted on him as a key element in forming a Czech government that would span the period from the fall of the Protectorate to the re-establishment. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-18. 365 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. Frank counted as a key article for the formation of a Czech government that would span the period from the fall of the Protectorate to the restoration of the republic. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-18. 365 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. Frank counted as a key article for the formation of a Czech government that would span the period from the fall of the Protectorate to the restoration of the republic. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-18. 365 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159. 37, sign. 37-144-4 (Radio station Karel), Radiodepeše z Prahy, 27. 10. 1939. 366 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-144-3 (Radiostanice Karel), Report on Offensive Plans of Germany, November 2, 1939; Compare KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, pp. 158. 367 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, pp. 158 ̶ 159.

Lt. Col. Silent. Despite initial guarantees, the French side approached cooperation slowly and not exactly willingly. The French practically tried to get the entire Czechoslovak intelligence service under their control, and especially the Paris branch, which logically could never do without French news. In connection with the French approach, one can quote Jiří Šolc: “They paid more attention to the attempts to fully subordinate the intelligence service, control all connections and activities of the “Karel” exchange, routes and operations and penetrate into conspiratorial contexts, which resulted in mutual misunderstandings. The implementation of the plans thus dragged on and was tied to administrative obstacles, often intentionally created by the French side. ”368 This can be demonstrated by a concrete example. At the beginning of February 1940, gen. Faucher, head of the French military mission under the Czechoslovak government, 369 complained Col. Moravec on the activities of the intelligence branch in Paris and especially on the activities of Lt. Col. Silent. Gene. Faucher blamed Tichý for his lack of loyalty to the French Slovak Republic, as well as his political exposure and constant contact with Czechoslovak political leaders in Paris. In addition, Faucher was also annoyed by the fact that Tichý passed on to some members of the Czechoslovak National Committee reports which, according to French intelligence, were to remain only in the hands of competent professional intelligence services, and also criticized Lt. Col.’s efforts. Silent aid for the rescue of Czechoslovak refugees from Hungary, which, according to Faucher, could lead to the compromise of the French intelligence authorities. It must be said that Col. Moravec defended Tichý against Faucher and, according to Faucher, fully approved all the problematic points of Tichý’s activities.370 In connection with the expected military actions against France, Lt. Col. Tichý also tried to propose an organizational change to London headquarters, based on the experience of intelligence officers at the Paris branch. The organization should for the next time be such that it is sufficient and satisfying in any case, ie that it is not paralyzed even in the event of a total war. Tichý argued that the courier connection, which is already quite slow, would be even longer and more irregular in this case. From an agency point of view, Tichý opposed the adoption of the principle of reserving the ownership of an agent. Agent working for the Czechoslovak 368 370 In connection with the expected military actions against France, Lt. Col. Tichý also tried to propose an organizational change to London headquarters, based on the experience of intelligence officers at the Paris branch. The organization should for the next time be such that it is sufficient and satisfying in any case, ie that it is not paralyzed even in the event of a total war. Tichý argued that the courier connection, which is already quite slow, would be even longer and more irregular in this case. From an agency point of view, Tichý opposed the adoption of the principle of reserving the ownership of an agent. Agent working for the Czechoslovak 368 370 In connection with the expected military actions against France, Lt. Col. Tichý also tried to propose an organizational change to London headquarters, based on the experience of intelligence officers at the Paris branch. The organization should for the next time be such that it is sufficient and satisfying in any case, ie that it is not paralyzed even in the event of a total war. Tichý argued that the courier connection, which is already quite slow, would be even longer and more irregular in this case. From an agency point of view, Tichý opposed the adoption of the principle of reserving the ownership of an agent. Agent working for the Czechoslovak 368 to suffice and satisfy in any case, ie not to be paralyzed even in the case of total war. Tichý argued that the courier connection, which is already quite slow, would be even longer and more irregular in this case. From an agency point of view, Tichý opposed the adoption of the principle of reserving the ownership of an agent. Agent working for the Czechoslovak 368 to suffice and satisfy in any case, ie not to be paralyzed even in the case of total war. Tichý argued that the courier connection, which is already quite slow, would be even longer and more irregular in this case. From an agency point of view, Tichý opposed the adoption of the principle of reserving the ownership of an agent. Agent working for the Czechoslovak 368

ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 110. VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-112-1 (Telegrams for Dr. Beneš and answers to them), Answer of Dr. Beneš for a telephone message to Gen. Ingra, September 7, 1939. 370 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Letter to the Chief of Czechoslovakia. military administration in the case of the French SR, 5 February 1940, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 369

interests as a whole should be led and guided by an intelligence group that could “immediately, under the best conditions and in the shortest possible time, ie effectively influence them in time” .371 However, it still needs to return to the end of January 1940, when Agent A provided a relatively extensive list of information concerning German preparations for an air strike against England as well as preparations for a ground strike in the direction of the Franco-Belgian border. But the elaboration did not contain any specific date. On the morning of April 9, the Czechoslovak correspondents received an officially confirmed report that the troops of the Third Reich had invaded Denmark and Norway, ie that the action had previously been signaled by information from the “Libuše” and “Kazi” branches, as well as reports from “Arno” and “Havel”. However, it was still not possible to determine when an attack on France could be expected. Agent A-54’s letter, which arrived in Paris at the very end of April and in which the agent only confirmed the information already known.3772 Although a telegram arrived in Paris on May 1 and a letter on May 3, there was nothing at all about the start of the German attack.374 On May 10, the Germans launched a strike against the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the first troops invaded also to France.375 Lt. Col. Tichý, like other representatives of the Paris branch, thus began to rapidly reduce the time they still had to spend in France. France’s military situation deteriorated rapidly in June 1940, when France also declared war on Italy, and the attackers managed to break through the defensive lines. 376 Thus arose the need to evacuate the Paris branch. Maj. Gouyou had previously mentioned this possibility of evacuation to Tichý, after which Lt. Col. Tichý notified Gen. in this matter. Ingra. However, Gouyou later denied his mention of the evacuation and, on the contrary, declared that Paris would never be evacuated.377

371

VÚA – VHA, sb. 20, sign. 20-21-13 (Supplement to News Diaries), Explanatory Memorandum Lt. Col. Tichého, 21. 2. 1940. 372 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, 164. 373 This issue is discussed in great detail and comprehensively in KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute about an agent, s 165 ̶ 167. 374 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over Agent, pp. 166 ̶ 167. 375 SHAW, Antony: The Second World War Day by Day (hereinafter referred to as the Second World War). Prague 2004, pp. 20. 376 Encyclopedic Dictionary of Czech History 1938 ̶ 1945. Keyword: Czechoslovak ground forces in France. In: http://www.usd.cas.cz/UserFiles/File/Publikace/Slovnik38_45.pdf [cit. March 1, 2015]. 377 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 47.

its agency network connected to the German emigration, which was well informed in this matter and encouraged evacuation.378 Oldřich Tichý learned that French preparations for the evacuation were in full swing: “Gen. Ingr called me to the military administration to report to him on the situation at the front. I went there, and since I no longer spoke to Gouya that day, I called him by phone and asked him to come to the gene. Ingrovi. He replied that he had absolutely no time, after which I told him that I had to talk to him and that I was leaving for him. As I entered the search party’s yard, I saw a row of cars loading and fires where file material was being burned. I asked Gouya what was going on, that he didn’t tell me anything. He replied, to keep calm, that it was a preparation for evacuation. When asked what would happen to us, he replied that he would arrange the matter. I went to Col. To Rivet, who was just around, and I told him what would happen to us, that we had no cars. He replied that he had not received as many cars as he had requested and needed, and that he had to burn the material. ”379 Following this finding, Tichý hurried to the Military Administration for a gene. Ingrem, reported the whole situation to him and asked him to remember the reporter in the “Karel” branch, despite the lack of cars. In the meantime, he also managed to contact Maj. Thumb up to immediately start preparing all the material for moving. In the end, the Czechoslovak correspondents received the cars and, as Tichý later stated, they carefully guarded them after the assignment.380 The next day, they traveled with all the equipment and intelligence materials from Paris. Despite some ignorance on the part of the French, it cannot be said that Lt. Col. Tichý did not expect an evacuation as a relatively probable eventuality. This is evidenced by the fact that he apparently decided in March to move his family from Paris and the families of other officers. He therefore asked Lt. Weyrich to rent two villas in Souillac for that purpose. Tichý knew the city very well, as he and his family spent their holidays here after the first year at the École Supérieure de Guerre.381 Souillac was also a convenient place for families because it was only about 90 kilometers east of Bordeaux, where after the situation escalated in June the gene also targeted. Ingr and the French High Command.382 In Souillac, they found temporary refuge because he and his family spent their holidays here after the first year at the École Supérieure de Guerre.381 Souillac was also a convenient place to house families because it was only about 90 kilometers east of Bordeaux, where the gene also headed after the situation escalated in June. Ingr and the French High Command.382 In Souillac, they found temporary refuge because he and his family spent their holidays here after the first year at the École Supérieure de Guerre.381 Souillac was also a convenient place to house families because it was only about 90 kilometers east of Bordeaux, where the gene also headed after the situation escalated in June. Ingr and the French High Command.382 In Souillac, they found temporary refuge

378

ŠOLC, J .: Alongside the President, pp. 110 ̶ 111. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 47. 380 SILENT , O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), S. 136. 381 Ibid., Pp. 136 ̶ 137. 382 GEBHART, J. ̶ KUKLÍK, J .: Velké dějiny, p. 460. 379

wives and children gen. Ingra, Col. gšt. Čeňka Kudláčka, 383 Col. gšt. Jaroslava Vedrala, 384 Maj. Palečka, škpt. Fryče, Lt. Weyrich and, of course, Lt. Col. Silent. A total of 16 people stayed in Souillac, including three small children. Tichý later added: “Only by this measure were [families] saved or at least saved from the experience of the retreat.” During the retreat, at one of the stops in the city of Uzerche, probably on June 18, the group learned Lt. Col. Tichý from the radio about the armistice. In response, Tichý ordered the burning of most of the material, with the exception of the cash register and cipher keys, which were too important and one of the things the reporters had until “self-destruction.” 387 From there, the members of the group set out on two trips to Bordeaux, where Tichý immediately contacted the French headquarters and Maj. Gouyou. He then left with Col. Kudláček to warn families about leaving France. To the families of Lt. Col. Tichý, Maj. Palečka and škpt. Fryče offered gen. Inger the next day the opportunity to travel by boat to Casablanca. But all three wives denied it. Very soon a report arrived from London for Tichý and his colleagues from the branch to report to Arcachon, where the cruiser Gallate was to take them on board by order of the British Admiralty. Lt. Col. Quiet so on the orders of gen. Ingra handed over the agenda to Col. Kudláček, he connected with all the married members of the Paris branch and went with them to the port of Arcachon.388 As it might seem that the trip to London must have taken place without complications, this was not the case. Even in Arcachon, an unpleasant situation arose when the motor ship, which had a colonel. Tichý and the others were transported to the cruiser, ran aground, and the embarkation lasted another two days. Especially for three small 383

Čeněk Kudláček co-founded the Defense of the Nation in March 1939 and until his departure from the Protectorate in November 1939 he was the head of its headquarters. From mid-December, he served as Deputy Chief of the Military Administration of the Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris, and from February to July 1940 he headed the 1st Department of the NGO. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 165. 384 Jaroslav Vedral worked in the military resistance from March 1939, in which he held the position of head of the intelligence department and chief of staff of the Central Command of the Defense of the Nation until the end of 1939. After being forced to leave the Protectorate, in February 1940 he enlisted in the Military Administration of the Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris, where he became the head of the 2nd Department. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, s. 165. 385 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), S. 137. 386 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign.

The 77

children the group had with them had to be very uncomfortable, as the commander of the local field hospital refused Tichý’s request to allow the children to sleep in the hospital and all had to wait until the final boarding “on the beach, where especially in the morning winter ”.389 During the trip to England they still had to change at the port of St. Jean de Luz on another ship, but they finally got to Plymouth, England. A nostalgic event took place here, as the group saw the ocean liner Bathory moored in the port, where the wives and children of intelligence officers from Poland arrived in England.390

5.4.

Back in the UK and the conflict with Col. Moravcem (1940–1941)

The evacuation of the Czechoslovak army from France resulted in the concentration of the political and military components of the Czechoslovak foreign resistance in Great Britain. From a political as well as a military point of view, we can talk about greater consolidation in the context of this time. Opposition forces against President Edvard Beneš, represented in particular by dr. Štefan Osuský and gen. After the defeats of Poland and France, Lev Prchala lost their territorial bases and no longer had such a significant influence on the territory of Great Britain. In addition, the government of Winston Churchill was much more open to Beneš’s concept of leading the resistance and the entire foreign operation. This was, moreover, confirmed when, on July 21, 1940, the British government gave its consent to the establishment of a provisional Czechoslovak government.391 The Czechoslovak foreign army also underwent a certain reorganization. From the autumn of 1940, it began to fall under the newly formed NGOs organized into four departments: I. military-political, II. intelligence, III. aviation, IV. material. The other parts consisted of an auxiliary office and study groups. Those who were to continue to effectively manage the new NGOs became genes. Ingr as Minister of Defense and Secretary of State Gen. Rudolf Viest.392 After returning to Great Britain, Lt. Col. Oldřich Tichý from the order of gen. Ingra assigned to II. the intelligence department of the newly formed NGO. At the head of 389 Oldřich Tichý from the order of gen. Ingra assigned to II. the intelligence department of the newly formed NGO. At the head of 389 Oldřich Tichý from the order of gen. Ingra assigned to II. the intelligence department of the newly formed NGO. At the head of 389https://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/ads?client=ca-pub-2025287964322501&output=html&h=280&adk=3316849697&adf=4053119497&pi=t.aa~a.791033702~i.1954~rp.1&w=950&fwrn=4&fwrnh=100&lmt=1637083002&num_ads=1&rafmt=1&armr=3&sem=mc&pwprc=8576066767&psa=1&ad_type=text_image&format=950×280&url=https%3A%2F%2Fadoc.pub%2Fivotni-osudy-zpravodajskeho-dstojnika.html&flash=0&fwr=0&pra=3&rh=200&rw=949&rpe=1&resp_fmts=3&wgl=1&fa=27&adsid=ChEIgMrNjAYQrducgNSMkZX4ARJIABSZlybLCB4uRHjRhCwtP4BrKnOU8lklMh7_DZzuMJ7UozYMDd3DUXtzbxkHBNpfvMmB4gwYdRZMY6AWOWpgHBGMDVfxVu27&uach=WyJXaW5kb3dzIiwiMTAuMC4wIiwieDg2IiwiIiwiOTUuMC40NjM4LjY5IixbXSxudWxsLG51bGwsIjY0Il0.&dt=1637077626751&bpp=90&bdt=3157&idt=90&shv=r20211111&mjsv=m202111100101&ptt=9&saldr=aa&abxe=1&cookie=ID%3Dd5e2e6db92bd5e30-228561f2aacc00cf%3AT%3D1637021895%3ART%3D1637021895%3AS%3DALNI_MZ9Z2P1KZNTBjatFIaEde232V8bBQ&prev_fmts=0x0%2C307x250%2C982x280%2C1349x625%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280&nras=6&correlator=1011245596538&frm=20&pv=1&ga_vid=72963090.1637021896&ga_sid=1637077625&ga_hid=1346907515&ga_fc=1&u_tz=-300&u_his=1&u_h=768&u_w=1366&u_ah=728&u_aw=1366&u_cd=24&dmc=8&adx=368&ady=47284&biw=1349&bih=625&scr_x=0&scr_y=44784&eid=31063703%2C21067496&oid=2&psts=AGkb-H9wmss3ftiAgqjAVoA-obK7B6rQT1jMTnxJYUSKE1U1QEvDHlvywBsoJlMkkSKF3I0DucAPknRPwDw%2CAGkb-H8lKMocpz47woc6vETFrkNTlM6YSrlcU3rSvywdKKEAZT3mkWLRrOgNGxfqkVpDWQJGV0DkpHwzRA%2CAGkb-H-_8Tb38NzH-gfggpWcG1aRFD5iZblPJEbQNJ4aCcZ4sDH5kMCRL-sqFEGNw8gDmjdYNluAoKY3S1M%2CAGkb-H_h1ldh6UdseeRbPdj8mOIzRh31qs1LBbikUyrWnPYrcedJz-14RXCPoLtkiyc_kbxeKiOEpMoIJLM%2CAGkb-H8Ip938LqXdwfC0nH8qlUq8VoeFb9PJc-snEcr71YB7sSyXRAfZz_HHfASP3a4X7k3DQWF8V-ZusfM%2CAGkb-H8MmZDydkmC34tFij5_jH5Ju1osrmN7ySq76UJpG1D-v0x_93oQYoWNfbLh3Wi9vEM_fMqwLCNe5T48&pvsid=1616790102313099&pem=11&tmod=1436071561&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&eae=0&fc=1408&brdim=0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C0%2C1366%2C728%2C1366%2C625&vis=1&rsz=%7C%7Cs%7C&abl=NS&fu=128&bc=31&jar=2021-11-16-16&ifi=8&uci=a!8&btvi=5&fsb=1&xpc=ATYQKVe4SA&p=https%3A//adoc.pub&dtd=M

TICHÝ, O .: From the Memory of the Rapporteur (II.), P. 138. Ibid. 391 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 161. For details on the anti-Benešov opposition forces, see eg KUKLÍK, Jan – NĚMEČEK, Jan: Against Beneš! Czech and Slovak anti-Benešov opposition in London 1939−1945. Prague 2004. 392 PLACHÝ, Jiří: How the Ministry of Defense worked in London (hereinafter referred to as How the NGO worked). In: http://www.vhu.cz/jak-fungovalo-ministerstvo-obrany-v-londyne/ [cit. March 9, 2015]. 390

second division stood Col. Moravec.393 Together with Tichý, Maj. Paleček, Capt. Fryč and Hugo Weyrich, now in the rank of lieutenant. Intelligence officers were given about a month’s leave before joining the second ward, and their decision was made at the turn of August and September 1940.394 by joining II. union but Lt. Col. Tichý paid a visit to Gen. Charles de Guulla. The visit took place on July 24, 1940. The main purpose of the visit was to find out about the situation in France and its consequences for further intelligence

cooperation.

In this

sense , it

is no

coincidence

that

visit

in gen. de Gaulle executed Lt. Col. Tichý, because he, as the former head of the Paris branch, was in terms of Czechoslovak-French cooperation, in fact, the most professional Czechoslovak officer and, moreover, until June 22, 1940, he was in contact with Col. Rivet and the Fifth Division of the French General Staff. The main purpose of the visit was to find out to what extent further potential cooperation with the French was safe. London Intelligence Group Col. Moravce was well aware that a complete interruption of cooperation could mean significant damage in the effort to achieve common goals. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak correspondents also knew that continuing cooperation without receiving information and guarantees that such cooperation was safe could mean, for example, that the messages sent would fall into the wrong hands of Germany. Gen de Gaulle understood Czechoslovak concerns and, according to Tichý, replied as follows: “5 Bureau, if he is informed, is in France. 396 De Gaull’s view of further Czechoslovak cooperation was that “perhaps it would not be good to cut off contact with them altogether, but for a transitional period before everything crystallizes,” give nothing important and have more good words for them than news ”.397

393

ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, pp. 161. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 49; ABS, 302, sign. 302-73-1, Protocol written with Col. vv František Fryč, 3. 1. 1950, p. 6. 395 ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 173. 396 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-241 (First information visit of a member of Col. Moravec’s group to Gen. de Gaulle), Oldřich Tichý’s record of the visit, July 24, 1940, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 397 Ibid., P. 2. 394

For the sake of completeness, it is necessary to add that the further concretization of Czechoslovak-French cooperation was agreed at the meeting of Lt. Col. Tichý with the head of the second department of the staff gen. de Gaulla Capt. Possym, which took place on September 12, 1940. The meeting addressed, among other things, the concept of building a new agency network in France. In this sense, the French asked the Czechoslovak correspondents for advice, as they considered them “masters of networking” 398, rich in experience. Tichý responded: “Sending agents, as we did on the continent against Germany and as is generally done, may not be enough in this case. It must be a large organization that has its roots in France itself and with which there is a reliable connection. A well-organized and well-functioning apparatus in such a large and well-founded country as France can bring an extraordinarily large share of our common victory. ”399 There was also talk of the need to build certain centers of the network in France, both in the occupied and unoccupied parts. . In terms of connection, then Col. Tichý recommended radio communication as the most reliable radio, and specific names of French officers were also addressed, with whom it would be useful to establish contact. During the discussion, Tichý also noted that he considered it unnecessary to inform third parties, including the English, about such negotiations. He did not want to get the English out of the game, so to speak, because both the Czechoslovak and French sides are in constant contact with them.400 Tichý’s word can be interpreted more as his belief that it is essential to share the results of the work, which will help to achieve common goals, but it is not necessary to share all negotiations and planning of events and cooperation. Within II. Lt. Col. joined the MNO. Silent to the position of Deputy Col. Moravce. It must be said that Oldřich Tichý was very dissatisfied with his inclusion from the beginning. It was mainly about Tichý’s old disputes and disagreements with Col. Moravec, for whom Tichý did not have a vain desire to work directly with Moravec again. Nevertheless, as a soldier he obeyed the order and II. union joined. As it turned out, the function of Moravc’s deputy was performed by Lt. Col. Silent only formally and in fact the work looked completely different. Oldřich Tichý himself described his work in the second department of London as follows: “Throughout my assignment, I, like most Lt. Col. joined the MNO. Silent to the position of Deputy Col. Moravce. It must be said that Oldřich Tichý was very dissatisfied with his inclusion from the beginning. It was mainly about Tichý’s old disputes and disagreements with Col. Moravec, for whom Tichý did not have a vain desire to work directly with Moravec again. Nevertheless, as a soldier he obeyed the order and II. union joined. As it turned out, the function of Moravc’s deputy was performed by Lt. Col. Silent only formally and in fact the work looked completely different. Oldřich Tichý himself described his work in the second department of London as follows: “Throughout my assignment, I, like most Lt. Col. joined the MNO. Silent to the position of Deputy Col. Moravce. It must be said that Oldřich Tichý was very dissatisfied with his inclusion from the beginning. It was mainly about Tichý’s old disputes and disagreements with Col. Moravec, for whom Tichý did not have a vain desire to work directly with Moravec again. Nevertheless, as a soldier he obeyed the order and II. union joined. As it turned out, the function of Moravc’s deputy was performed by Lt. Col. Silent only formally and in fact the work looked completely different. Oldřich Tichý himself described his work in the second department of London as follows: “Throughout my assignment, I, like most for which Tichý did not have a vain desire to work directly with Moravec again. Nevertheless, as a soldier he obeyed the order and II. union joined. As it turned out, the function of Moravc’s deputy was performed by Lt. Col. Silent only formally and in fact the work looked completely different. Oldřich Tichý himself described his work in the second department of London as follows: “Throughout my assignment, I, like most for which Tichý did not have a vain desire to work directly with Moravec again. Nevertheless, as a soldier he obeyed the order and II. union joined. As it turned out, the function of Moravc’s deputy was performed by Lt. Col. Silent only formally and in fact the work looked completely different. Oldřich Tichý himself described his work in the second department of London as follows: “Throughout my assignment, I, like most

398

VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-241 (First information visit of a member of Col. Moravec’s group to Gen. de Gaulle), Oldřich Tichý’s record of a meeting with Capt. Possym, 12. 9. 1940, p. 1. 399 Ibid. 400 Ibid., P. 4.

the others were designed to decrypt messages, and for a time I was working on a study of the fuel situation in Germany. ”401 Work at Col. Moravec really did not testify to Tichý at all. In his own words, she also affected his health, to the point that he had to see a doctor very often and began to feel some apathy. In 1990, he characterized these feelings: “Despite Moravec’s words about my indispensability, I soon felt me on Bayswater Road [here a group of Col. Moravce worked, note. author] are considered excessive. ”402 In addition, disputes with Col. The Moravians did not stop and there was still tension between the two men. After the war, Oldřich Tichý gave a very concise statement, in which he described the strong position that Moravec had built up and which he also showed with gusto: “To Col. I observed Moravec’s dominion and his sovereignty and that he was probably aware of the strength of his position, through extremely frequent contact with President Beneš. He reported to President Beneš himself, Gen. In fact, he gave Ingr messages or orders from the president instead of Ingr keeping contact with the president himself [as was the case in the very title of Ingr’s position as Minister of National Defense, note. author]. This situation was commented by others that it is surprising that Ingr in negotiations with the president is actually dependent on Moravec. ”403 Lt. Col. In his post-war statement, Tichý also stated that Moravec called himself “Gray Eminence” 404 and did not publicly hide the opinion that “it must be known when and how to report” .405 Col. Tichý announced his presumption. Bohumil Boček, head of the 1st Military-Political Department of the Ministry of Culture, 406 and also Lt. Col. Bartík. Josef Bartík told Tichý that that the whole matter is known and a commission will be set up to investigate the whole matter.407 Bartík himself had with Col. Moravcem also had disputes before, and Tichý most likely knew about them. Perhaps Tichý was trying to create a certain opposition force against the person and the influence of Col. Moravce. However, nothing is known about the fact that a commission would actually be set up, and given that gradually, like Oldřich

401

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 49. Oral statement by vv Oldřich Tichý from March 17, 1990. Cited by KOKOŠKA, J – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 227. 403 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 50. 404 Ibid. . 405 Ibid. 406 Col. Boček headed the 1st Department of MNO in the period from July 1940 to April 1944. After that he moved to the Czechoslovak army in the Soviet Union. MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, pp. 112. 407 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 50. 402

Tichý, so Josef Bartík also left the second department, it can be assumed that no commission was ever established.408 Tensions between Lt. Col. Silent and Col. Moravec did not stop and eventually resulted in Tichý’s departure from II. department as well as from the intelligence service as such. On March 14, 1941, Tichý took two months on sick leave. After returning from vacation, Col. Moravec that his health condition does not allow him to remain in his group. He then asked for a gene. Ingra for another assignment.409 Historians Kokošek very rightly noted that the departure of Lt. Col. Tichý meant a significant loss for Czechoslovak intelligence. Tichý would undoubtedly make very good use of many years of experience as an intelligence officer or military diplomat, for example at the head of a foreign branch, especially the Swedish or Swiss ones.

5.5.

Liaison officer in the Dutch army (1941-1942)

New classification for Lt. Col. Tichého with gen. She didn’t want to give Ingra much. He tried to persuade Tichý to stay in Col.’s group. Moravce. In addition to the benefits that Tichý could still bring to the intelligence service, they led the gen. Ingra for

reluctance

also

purely

practical

reasons.

Above all

, the

fact that

that the Czechoslovak Brigade in England already had a number of unclassified officers and it was not advisable to further expand these ranks. In addition, if he tried to replace Tichý in one of his commanding positions in exchange for another officer, it could work, as Tichý himself remarked, that “the lords of London are taking their places” .411 In the end, however, a solution was acceptable. for both sides. He became a liaison officer with the Dutch army in England. Oldřich Tichý took his place on June 1, 1941,412, when he replaced his predecessor, Col. gšt. Josef Vrzáček, 413 who had to be removed from office. The reason 408

KREISINGER, P .: Year 1941, p. 14. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 51. 410 KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over an agent, p. 228. 411 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 51. 412 VÚA – VHA , sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Questionnaire addressed to the 4th dept. Hl. Staff, 26.4.1946, p. 1 .; You can also meet other dates of Tichý’s accession to the position of liaison officer in the Dutch army, eg June 16 (VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal List), or in general July 1941 (VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to the War Tribal Letter). 409

Tichý remarked, “Vrzáček had an incident there, he got drunk at a party and, as I heard, he jumped on the chandelier and swayed on it.” 414 When gen. Ingr told Tichý what position he would take, noting that this activity would allow Tichý to recover medically.415 He was right. The truth remains that the new position did not require a man of Silent qualities. Pavel Kreisinger described it in his contribution to the personnel crisis of Czechoslovak intelligence in 1941 as a “warm place” 416 and we can only agree with it, because it was really a purely representative function. Tichý himself stated in his statement of resignation: “The function did not require any work, it was basically a formal measure, between the two armies, and after the introduction, the contact with the Dutch depended on that I met the Dutch liaison officer several times for lunch. I was looking for a job myself. ”417 Undoubtedly, thanks to the new position, Lt. Col. was able to. Quiet health recovery. A man of his format, who was accustomed to systematic and relatively demanding work, but the position of liaison officer could not fulfill by far, certainly not in the long run. With his predecessor Col. Tichý remained in contact with Vrzáček, as Vrzáček was appointed head of the MNO418 Study Group a month after his dismissal from the position of liaison officer, and Tichý represented a consultant “in a number of small things” .419 In addition, Tichý also recalled how he was a discussion of the state and shortcomings of military education and a proposal for its reorganization. He compiled a treatise on the Czechoslovak Republic for his Dutch counterpart and wrote an article for the magazine Vojenské rozhledy dedicated to Indonesia. He obtained the data for it from Dutch brochures.420 The fact that Tichý did not really have much to do, is also evidenced by how few reports he handed over during his tenure to the First Department of the Ministry of National Defense. We can mention a treatise on the situation in Australia from the beginning of 1942, which Tichý submitted at the beginning of May 1942,421, as well as a report on the military situation in Burma and the Persian army, which Tichý handed over to the First Department 413

Josef Vrzáček worked as a liaison officer with the Dutch army, resp. at the Dutch government in exile, in England from September 27, 1940 to May 15, 1941, when he was transferred to the Replacement Body. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 135. 414 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 51. 415 Ibid. 416 KREISINGER, P .: Year 1941, p. 13. 417 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 51. 418 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ , Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 136. 419 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 52. 420 Ibid., P. 51 ̶ 52. 421 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-211 (Netherlands), Reports on the situation in Australia, 2 May 1942.

at the beginning of August 1942422 and finally a report on the development of the military situation in China until the beginning of July 1942. This report was submitted by Tichý in September 1942.423. . At the end of the discussion on Silent Work as a liaison officer, the question might arise as to why Lt. Col. Tichý became a “mere” liaison officer and not a military attaché to the Dutch government in exile. He definitely had all the prerequisites for this, because he had previously worked as a military attaché and the post of military attaché to the Dutch government was not filled by anyone. Moreover, on August 25, 1941, the Dutch government-in-exile recognized the Czechoslovak government-in-exile as legitimate.424 In view of these circumstances, and that the office of the Czechoslovak military attaché worked for a number of other friendly governments, it seems strange at first sight that Oldřich Tichý did not become one. The answer to the question must be sought in the attitudes of the Dutch Government. At the instigation of the Ministry of National Defense, Karel Erban, Chargé D´affaires of the Dutch Government, by the way, in connection with Oldřich Tichý’s military-diplomatic function, showed that the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not even considered assigning a Czechoslovak military office in December 1942. attachés.425 As an official reason, the Dutch stated that “the Dutch army consists of only less than one brigade and does not have enough officers at its disposal.” 426

The real

reason

however

, was the fact

that the

Dutch

government

simply did not care about the Czechoslovak military attaché and wanted to maintain diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovaks only during the war to a minimal extent.427 Lt. Col. Tichý officially resigned as a liaison officer with the Dutch army in July 1942.428 It is also worth noting that at the end of June 1942, consideration was given to the possible deployment of Lt. Tichý to the Middle East, specifically to Cairo, Egypt. Commander of the Czechoslovak Military Mission for the Balkans, Middle East and Middle East

422

VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-211 (Netherlands), Report on the Persian Army and the Situation in Burma, 6 August 1942. 423 VÚA – VHA, p. 20, sign. 20-6-13 (News from the Netherlands), Report of the Chief of the Dutch Military Mission in China on the situation in China, September 10, 1942. 424 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, p. 134. 425 Ibid., P. 136 426 VÚA – VHA, sb. 20, sign. 20-3-40 (Netherlands), Lt. Col. gšt. Oldřich Tichý ̶ appointment by a military attaché at the Dutch government. 427 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, s. 136. 428 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Questionnaire addressed to the 4th dept. Hl. Staff, 26 April 1946, p. 1.

in Jerusalem gen. Ondřej Mézl [pseudonym Andrej Gak, note. author] 429 at that time reorganized his staff. As his deputy and chief of the mission, he intended to replace Major. Rudolf Šiman for Col. gšt. Prokop Kumpošta430 and Lt. Col. Tichý was considered a possible liaison officer in Cairo.431 But Oldřich Tichý did not become one. In conclusion, it can be added that the position of the Dutch government in exile regarding the office of the Czechoslovak military attaché did not change until September 1943. Karel Erban informed the NGO, which nominated Maj. gšt. Jaroslav Kašpar432 [in archival materials he often performs under his pseudonym Otokar Pátý, note. author]. For the sake of completeness, it can be added that Jaroslav Kašpar was appointed military attaché to the Dutch government on October 1, 1943,433

5.6. Officer of the Staff for the Building of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces (1942–1945)https://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/ads?client=ca-pub-2025287964322501&output=html&h=280&adk=3316849697&adf=3931083606&pi=t.aa~a.791033702~i.2174~rp.1&w=950&fwrn=4&fwrnh=100&lmt=1637083004&num_ads=1&rafmt=1&armr=3&sem=mc&pwprc=8576066767&psa=1&ad_type=text_image&format=950×280&url=https%3A%2F%2Fadoc.pub%2Fivotni-osudy-zpravodajskeho-dstojnika.html&flash=0&fwr=0&pra=3&rh=200&rw=949&rpe=1&resp_fmts=3&wgl=1&fa=27&adsid=ChEIgMrNjAYQrducgNSMkZX4ARJIABSZlybLCB4uRHjRhCwtP4BrKnOU8lklMh7_DZzuMJ7UozYMDd3DUXtzbxkHBNpfvMmB4gwYdRZMY6AWOWpgHBGMDVfxVu27&uach=WyJXaW5kb3dzIiwiMTAuMC4wIiwieDg2IiwiIiwiOTUuMC40NjM4LjY5IixbXSxudWxsLG51bGwsIjY0Il0.&dt=1637077627010&bpp=63&bdt=3417&idt=63&shv=r20211111&mjsv=m202111100101&ptt=9&saldr=aa&abxe=1&cookie=ID%3Dd5e2e6db92bd5e30-228561f2aacc00cf%3AT%3D1637021895%3ART%3D1637021895%3AS%3DALNI_MZ9Z2P1KZNTBjatFIaEde232V8bBQ&prev_fmts=0x0%2C307x250%2C982x280%2C1349x625%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280%2C950x280&nras=7&correlator=1011245596538&frm=20&pv=1&ga_vid=72963090.1637021896&ga_sid=1637077625&ga_hid=1346907515&ga_fc=1&u_tz=-300&u_his=1&u_h=768&u_w=1366&u_ah=728&u_aw=1366&u_cd=24&dmc=8&adx=368&ady=51758&biw=1349&bih=625&scr_x=0&scr_y=49284&eid=31063703%2C21067496&oid=2&psts=AGkb-H9wmss3ftiAgqjAVoA-obK7B6rQT1jMTnxJYUSKE1U1QEvDHlvywBsoJlMkkSKF3I0DucAPknRPwDw%2CAGkb-H8lKMocpz47woc6vETFrkNTlM6YSrlcU3rSvywdKKEAZT3mkWLRrOgNGxfqkVpDWQJGV0DkpHwzRA%2CAGkb-H-_8Tb38NzH-gfggpWcG1aRFD5iZblPJEbQNJ4aCcZ4sDH5kMCRL-sqFEGNw8gDmjdYNluAoKY3S1M%2CAGkb-H_h1ldh6UdseeRbPdj8mOIzRh31qs1LBbikUyrWnPYrcedJz-14RXCPoLtkiyc_kbxeKiOEpMoIJLM%2CAGkb-H8Ip938LqXdwfC0nH8qlUq8VoeFb9PJc-snEcr71YB7sSyXRAfZz_HHfASP3a4X7k3DQWF8V-ZusfM%2CAGkb-H8MmZDydkmC34tFij5_jH5Ju1osrmN7ySq76UJpG1D-v0x_93oQYoWNfbLh3Wi9vEM_fMqwLCNe5T48%2CAGkb-H9tdzWpE43CMTY8nLeHl7qMxACFg59p0z23n0reUMaf3tIrLrMT72Ti50hke8CWNILouVGWB4xgMhJv&pvsid=1616790102313099&pem=11&tmod=1436071561&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&eae=0&fc=1408&brdim=0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1366%2C0%2C1366%2C728%2C1366%2C625&vis=1&rsz=%7C%7Cs%7C&abl=NS&fu=128&bc=31&jar=2021-11-16-16&ifi=9&uci=a!9&btvi=6&fsb=1&xpc=5UQ6DgEbcp&p=https%3A//adoc.pub&dtd=M

The Armed Forces Building Staff (hereinafter referred to as the SVBM) originated from the original MNO Study Group. It began to function officially on January 15, 1943.434 The purpose of the MNO Study Group was mainly to carry out preparatory work for the peace conference envisaged after the war from a military and geographical point of view, ie its task was to formulate and set Czechoslovak post-war territorial requirements. In addition, it was also to study the activities of the Czechoslovak army abroad for promotional and historical purposes, to study and evaluate the experience of combat

429

He served as commander of the Czechoslovak military mission for the Balkans, the Middle East in Jerusalem from August 1940 to the end of November 1943. He was then transferred to London to the 1st Department of the MNO. On April 1, he became commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in the 21st Army Group (or in the Czechoslovak military mission at the High Command of the Allied Expeditionary Forces). ZUDOVÁLEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 158. 430 The exchange took place on October 12, 1942. Ibid., 431 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-26-29 (Netherlands), Reports of June 24, 1942. 432 VÚA – VHA, sb. 20, sign. 20-6-13 (Netherlands), Netherlands ̶ change in person voj. attaché, Příloha 1, 9. 9. 1943. 433 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, s. 136. 434 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Zlatica: Československá armáda 1939 ̶ 1945 (hereinafter referred to as the Czechoslovak Army). Plans and reality. In: ZUDOVA-LESKOVA, Zlatica (ed.): Czechoslovak Army 1939 ̶ 1945 (Plans and Reality). Papers from the International Conference October 22-23, 2002. Prague 2003, p. 30.

to explore the possibilities of using new weapons and inventions behind Czechoslovak citizens, as well as to publish professional military publications and periodicals.435 The study group’s agenda was subsequently taken over by the newly formed SVBM, whose activities aimed to meet one of the basic goals internal security of the restoration of the Czechoslovak state. 436 On the basis of official documentation, the basic tasks of the SEBM can be quoted as follows: b) preparation of military requirements for ceasefire and peace negotiations, c) preparation of organization and building of armed forces in the homeland, (d) military requirements for training in other departments of the Administration. ‘437 Although Lt. Col. ended up as a liaison officer with the Dutch army. Tichý only in July 1942, he was assigned to the forming ŠVBM as early as February of that year.438 He himself remarked about his assignment to the ŠVBM: “In January or February 1942, Col. called me. Boček and said that a Czechoslovak military institution was being set up, which would be called the staff for building the Czechoslovak Armed Forces, where various military issues were to be studied and proposals for various solutions were made to prepare something, as they would certainly come up with some proposals and that it is a place for General [Bedřich] Neumann, 439 who, by his actions, by not being able to treat people, would disperse the entire brigade. ”440 Not a completely positive allusion to the abilities of gen. Neumanna wasn’t completely pointless, as will follow from the following text. It can be assumed that Oldřich Tichý probably knew from Col. Bočka that he is counting on him within the ŠVBM for the post of head of one of his departments. However, the final selection of persons and, above all, their official designation fell within the competences of gen. Neumanna. Lt. Col. Tichý was appointed by Neumann as the head of the first, otherwise also organizational, department.441

435

PLACHÝ, J .: How the MNO Worked. ZUDOVA-LESKOVA, Z .: Cs. army, p. 30. 437 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-4-1 (Organization II. Department of NGOs), Armed Forces Building Staff ̶ tasks. 438 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Questionnaire addressed to the 4th dept. Hl. Staff, 26 April 1946, pp. 1. 439 Brig. gene. From February to June 1940, Bedřich Neumann held the post of Chief of the Czechoslovak Military Administration in Paris. Then he joined as commander of the 1st Czechoslovak Division (or since August 1940 mixed brigade). From January 1943 to April 1945 he served as Chief of the SWBM (or from September 1940 Headquarters). MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, pp. 431. 440 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 52. 441 Ibid., P. 52. 436

Lt. Col. Tichý and his SEBM department will be best demonstrated on specific examples that Tichý spoke about after the war. One of the basic tasks given to the first department was to study and, based on that, make suggestions for the possibility of organizing the army. Specifically, the possibilities and ways of building the foundations of the army in the homeland were to be studied, as well as the possibility of building units only on the basis of local replenishment. In connection with this, for example, calculations of the probable strength of the youngest years, which could potentially be used for building military bodies, should also be made. The big problem in this case, however, was the way in which the use was evaluated. The first department had to carry out the possibility of placing new soldiers in the existing barracks, which the Czechoslovak army had at its disposal, only on the basis of estimates, subjective judgments and probabilities. On the other hand, tables and states for individual units, from battalions to companies of accompanying weapons, were to be created from such inaccurately obtained data, with all the details, even up to the role of grooms and officers. Of course, something like this was completely unrealistic in practice and Lt. Col. Silent on it together with his colleague Lt. Col. gšt. Václav Koutník repeatedly drew attention.442 An important task was also the work on the reform of the Armed Forces Act itself. Above all, it was necessary to treat the military service of the Germans and Hungarians with the Czechoslovak army. It was thought that men of German and Hungarian nationality who would remain in Czechoslovakia after the war would serve in the new army without weapons. Gen. Neumann referred to the constitutional charter and the rights and obligations of all citizens, and insisted that the Germans and Hungarians will also have to live up to their responsibilities. In connection with the planned reorganization of the post-war army, the question of how to unify the differences arising from the different promotions of members of the army abroad, the Slovak army and resistance fighters who worked in the Protectorate during the war was also addressed.443 Lt. Col. The silent and thus the entire first ward was somewhat complicated by the gene. Neumann. It cannot be said that Tichý had similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 that the Germans and Hungarians will also have to live up to their responsibilities. In connection with the planned reorganization of the post-war army, the question of how to unify the differences arising from the different promotions of members of the army abroad, the Slovak army and resistance fighters who worked in the Protectorate during the war was also addressed.443 Lt. Col. The silent and thus the entire first ward was somewhat complicated by the gene. Neumann. It cannot be said that Tichý had similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 that the Germans and Hungarians will also have to live up to their responsibilities. In connection with the planned reorganization of the post-war army, the question of how to unify the differences arising from the different promotions of members of the army abroad, the Slovak army and resistance fighters who worked in the Protectorate during the war was also addressed.443 Lt. Col. The silent and thus the entire first ward was somewhat complicated by the gene. Neumann. It cannot be said that Tichý had similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 how to unite the differences arising from the different promotions of members of the army abroad, the Slovak army and resistance fighters who worked in the Protectorate during the war.443 Lt. Col. The silent and thus the entire first ward was somewhat complicated by the gene. Neumann. It cannot be said that Tichý had similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 how to unite the differences arising from the different promotions of members of the army abroad, the Slovak army and resistance fighters who worked in the Protectorate during the war.443 Lt. Col. The silent and thus the entire first ward was somewhat complicated by the gene. Neumann. It cannot be said that Tichý had similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 that Tichý would have similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443 that Tichý would have similar personal disputes with him as with Col. Moravcem. In this case, it was more Neumann’s way of working that his subordinates might have a problem with. Oldřich Tichý characterized him with the words: “Gen. Neumann did not have the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He lived in captivity of paragraphs and regulations, he was absolutely 442 443

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 52 ̶ 53. Ibid., Pp. 53.

inaccessible to other opinions and proposals than he had, an extremely unpleasant, nicely crafted table with exact sums of inaccurate conjectures and assumptions was his hobby. From the statement of Col. Bočka, who, as I said, told me that gen. Neumann has to leave the brigade, because everything would be there, I think he did not prove himself as a brigade commander and therefore he was dismissed. As a commander of a higher unit in combat, I can hardly imagine him. Not to cooperate with the staff at all, and I imagine that he would probably look in the official regulations for what he should do in decisive situations. ” , namely the awarding of medals. Gen’s application once went through the first department. Ludvík Svoboda, 445 who asked the NGO for permission, so that he could award honors for bravery in combat as soon as possible.446 He had, of course, relevant reasons for this, since the soldiers at the front were in direct danger of death. However, gen. Ingr did not comply with the request. For the sake of completeness, it can be added that even the gene did not agree with the request. Heliodor Pika.447 Lt. Col. Tichý noted that gen. Freedom is right in this, he understands his motives and also “that it certainly happens in other armies”, 448 ie that the award for bravery is not subject to a lengthy administrative process. Reaction gen. Neumann can be quoted: “Neumann answered in the sense that I do not know the laws of the Czechoslovak Republic.” 449 During 1943, the department of Lt. Col. cooperated. Tichý for the implementation of the so-called “district governors’ course” .450 This course was to help solve the future administration of the liberated territory. In 1943, the NGO found that it does not have enough civilian workers who could be used for civil administration of the liberated territory of Czechoslovakia. Gene. Neumann was therefore asked to lend the SVBM officers for this purpose for the necessary period, until a sufficient number of civilians were found. In fact, the course was from the beginning under the patronage of the Ministry of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the Ministry of the Interior) and was led by Consul Vladimír Znojemský. However, since it was a training of soldiers and in addition, the lecturers had to travel to a spare 444

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 53. Ludvík Svoboda worked from June to September 1939 as commander of the Czechoslovak military group in Polish, where he also fell into Soviet captivity. Later, from July 1942, he gradually commanded Czechoslovak troops in the USSR. In April 1945, the commander of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps became Minister of National Defense. MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, pp. 562. 446 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 54. 447 Heliodor Píka worked from April 1941 to June 1945 as Chief of the Czechoslovak Military Mission in the Soviet Union. MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, pp. 469. 448 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 54. 449 Ibid. 450 Ibid., Pp. 55. 445

For a military body stationed in a “restricted circulation” area, 451 the course had to be formally taken by the military administration. Among the main trainers in the course can be mentioned Dr. She stumbled or Lt. Col. Bartík. The name of the course was derived from the fact that the main substance discussed in the courses were mainly legal regulations, paragraphs and various restrictions, regulations or permits, which previously formed the basis for the work of district governors.452 Lt. Col. Tichý played a dual role in this matter. He did not interfere in the management of the course, but through his department he provided the course materially. This involved, in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior, finding suitable rooms in London for the course. The point was that the course had to be moved from a replacement body to London at the urging of the British, for the English did not want the operation of civilians in the military area. In addition, he issued a colonel. Silent also the relevant orders for the replacement body and travel orders for course participants. Outside

material

ensure

quiet

also

odpřednášel

one

lecture,

through which he trained students on some specifics of the implementation of the mobilization law of the President of the Republic with regard to Subcarpathian Russia and local territorial specifics regarding geography, demography, climate or infrastructure and the need to adapt all official deadlines to local conditions.453 In September 1944 It first became part of ŠVBM II on September 1. Department of MNO, which created a second, intelligence, department within the Staff. Soon after, on September 19, the SVBM was abolished and its complete personnel moved to the newly created Central Command of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces.454 1944 was another promotion for Oldřich Tichý – only during the war – in his military career. On December 15, Lt. Col. Tichý “by the decision of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic of 10.

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 55. Ibid., P. 56. 453 Ibid. 454 STEHLÍK, Eduard: Srdce armády. General Staff 1919 ̶ 2014 (hereinafter the Heart of the Army). Prague 2014, p. 47. 455 VÚA – VHA, p. 22, sign. 22-15-9 (Proceedings of Confidential Decrees and MNO Orders), Promotion of Senior Officers, 15 December 1944. 456 VÚA – SA ACR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list. 457 VÚA – VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to Qualification document, part II, 1946. 452

At the beginning of 1945, it was already clear that World War II was entering not only its sixth year, but also its final phase, at least in Europe. The London Center of the Czechoslovak Foreign Resistance understood the signals of the approaching end of the war and began preparations for the transfer of part of the administration and political representation to Czechoslovak liberated territory. However, this was to be preceded by the transfer of Headquarters to the Eastern Front, with Generals Ingr, Moravec and Neumann at the head of the transferred headquarters.458 it was useless and ineffective for this work.459 It should be emphasized, however, that along with the General Headquarters, as the head of the first division, Col. was to move to the Eastern Front. Silent. From the beginning, his name appeared in the planned relocation sequences and Tichý also, due to the position of head of the organizational department, of course participated in one of the first meetings on the transfer of Headquarters, which took place on December 12, 1944.460. He did not stay quiet in the First Department in London. Although Tichý’s name can also be found in the list of selected personnel of the General Headquarters, whose inclusion in the second ship transport to the liberated territory was requested by Gen. Neumann on April 12, 1945,461, about two weeks later, it was clear that Col. Tichý returns to his homeland in another way, as a liaison officer with the 3rd US Army. Of course, he participated in one of the first meetings on the transfer of the Headquarters, which took place on December 12, 1944.460 The transfer of the Headquarters, therefore, finally ended, but Col. He did not stay quiet in the First Department in London. Although Tichý’s name can also be found in the list of selected personnel of the General Headquarters, whose inclusion in the second ship transport to the liberated territory was requested by Gen. Neumann on April 12, 1945,461, about two weeks later, it was clear that Col. Tichý returns to his homeland in another way, as a liaison officer with the 3rd US Army. Of course, he participated in one of the first meetings on the transfer of the Headquarters, which took place on December 12, 1944.460 The transfer of the Headquarters, therefore, finally ended, but Col. He did not stay quiet in the First Department in London. Although Tichý’s name can also be found in the list of selected personnel of the General Headquarters, whose inclusion in the second ship transport to the liberated territory was requested by Gen. Neumann on April 12, 1945,461, about two weeks later, it was clear that Col. Tichý returns to his homeland in another way, as a liaison officer with the 3rd US Army. whose inclusion in the second shipment to the liberated territory was requested by gen. Neumann on April 12, 1945,461, about two weeks later, it was clear that Col. Tichý returns to his homeland in another way, as a liaison officer with the 3rd US Army. whose inclusion in the second shipment to the liberated territory was requested by gen. Neumann on April 12, 1945,461, about two weeks later, it was clear that Col. Tichý returns to his homeland in another way, as a liaison officer with the 3rd US Army.

458

ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, p. 293. Jiří Šolc, for example, discussed in detail the failure of the whole event and its reasons in the cited work, specifically in the chapter The Last Month in London. ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, pp. 293 ̶ 309. 460 VÚA – VHA, sb. 37, sign. 37-4-6 (Information reports), Record of the meeting on the transfer of HV, 12 December 1944. 461 VÚA – VHA, sb. 20, sign. 20-32-39 (ŠVBM), Request gen. Neumann inclusion of HV persons in the second ship transport, April 12, 1945. 459

5.7. Liaison officer with the 3rd US Army and chief of the US military mission in Czechoslovakia (1945)

On April 20, 1945, the Chief of Staff of the English Special Operation Executive (SOE), Col. gšt. Keswich together with the head of the European section of SOE Col. Perkins gen. František Moravc requested the US Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), which was responsible for the situation in Western Europe. SHAEF asked the SOE, cooperating with the relevant Czechoslovak authorities, to supply the headquarters of the 3rd US Army under the command of Gen. George S. Patton as much military information as possible to ensure that the Czechoslovak troops received support from the Czechoslovak resistance movement on Czechoslovak territory. One of the points of a specific proposal was also the requirement to send a group of officers consisting of representatives of the SOE, the US OSS462 and one Czechoslovak officer to headquarters 3. army. Furthermore, the Americans demanded the establishment of a connection with the Czechoslovak underground organizations in Western Bohemia, and for this purpose also requested the deployment of military personnel to the 3rd Army, which would cross the front, and the said connection was established.463 Most likely Col. Tichý learned of his appointment as a liaison officer with the 3rd Army on April 20, 1945. Although he himself stated in the post-war interrogation report that his appointment was announced “one day around April 25, 1945”, 464, but on April 21 he was The Czechoslovak Prime Minister in Košice, Zdeněk Fierlinger, was informed about Tichý’s posting.465 Oldřich Tichý testified about his departure from London: “I went to Col. Sklenovský466 [at this time Bruno Sklenovský already had the rank of division general, note. author], I reported to him, asked what he was, he told me he didn’t know anything important,

It was basically the forerunner of the US CIA. ROEWER, Helmut – SCHÄFER, Stefan – UHL, Mathias: Encyclopedia of Secret Services in the 20th Century (hereinafter the Encyclopedia of Secret Services). Prague 2006, pp. 73. 463 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Official record, 20. 4. 1945. 464 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, pp. 61. 465 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Telegram for Zdeněk Fierlinger regarding the entry of US armies into Czechoslovak territory. territory, April 21, 1945. 466 Bruno Sklednovský served from the end of August 1940 in the position of Deputy Chief of Staff of the MNO. On January 13, 1941, he became Chief of Staff of the MNO. He remained in this position until April 1945. From about mid-April to mid-December 1945, he served as commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in Great Britain. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ,

officers to the units in case it is possible that it would penetrate all the way to our territory. I took care of the necessary things in the accounting office, and when I returned, I was told that it would not fly that day, and at the same time I learned that Ivo Ducháček would be assigned to me.467 We stayed in London for about two or two and a half days, [ …]. We were to be received by Minister [Hubert] Ripka, 468 but this did not happen because of his busy schedule. ”469 It is not without interest that Col. Silent by gen. Sklenovského learned of the original intention to appoint a liaison officer in the 3rd Army, Col. gšt. Václav Vlček. However, he had to reject the position, saying that it “does not correspond to his political convictions.” Vlčka to the offered post could most likely stand behind the relatively hasty appointment of Col. Silent. Oldřich Tichý was to function as a liaison for military affairs and dr. Ducháček then for civil matters. Although he was not a soldier, he had to be equipped with a military uniform and received the rank, respectively. “Chief Officer”. This is how liaison officers, such as repatriation commissioners, assigned to Allied armies in the West. During the negotiations, Dr. Ducháček should also be referred to as a second officer and should not be stressed unnecessarily

his

mediation

civilian

contact

zaměstnání.471

between

the US

Both

were

military,

ensuring

above all

Czechoslovak

authorities

and the population, so as to avoid unnecessary maximum possible nedorozuměním.472 In terms of the military hierarchy is needed even noted that Col. Tichý was entrusted with its command within the Czechoslovak Military Mission to the 3rd US Army.473

467

The graduate lawyer Ivo Ducháček worked mainly as a journalist and publicist. From 1936 to 1939 he was a Paris correspondent for Lidové noviny and in 1939 he became part of the Czechoslovak foreign resistance in Paris and then in London, where he became a close collaborator of Jan Šrámek. TOMEŠ, Josef: Czech Biographical Dictionary XX. century (hereinafter referred to as the Czech Biographical Dictionary). Part I. A − J. Prague 1999, p. 265. 468 Hubert Ripka, historian, journalist and politician, worked from 1930 to 1938 as a foreign policy editor and commentator for Lidové noviny. As a staunch National Socialist and opponent of the Munich surrender, he went abroad in October 1938, where he became one of the first organizers of the Czechoslovak foreign resistance. He served as a member of the Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris, then in the United Kingdom as Secretary of State, Minister of Exile MFA, directed the Czechoslovak government broadcast of the BBC and still developed extensive publishing and lecturing activities. In the spring of 1945, he was commissioned to liquidate the Czechoslovak state-in-exile in London. TOMEŠ, J .: Czech Biographical Dictionary. III. part. Q − Ž, pp. 42–43. 469 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 61. 470 Ibid. 471 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Report for the Embassy in Paris, April 23, 1945, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 472 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, pp. 62. 473 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 241. Czech biographical dictionary. III. part. Q − Ž, pp. 42–43. 469 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 61. 470 Ibid. 471 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Report for the Embassy in Paris, April 23, 1945, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 472 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, pp. 62. 473 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 241. Czech biographical dictionary. III. part. Q − Ž, pp. 42–43. 469 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 61. 470 Ibid. 471 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Report for the Embassy in Paris, April 23, 1945, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 472 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, pp. 62. 473 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Zapomenutá elita, p. 241.

From London, Tichý and Ducháček first headed to Versailles, where the rear of the Gen. staff was located. Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.474 The two men stayed here for about ten days. While waiting to be sent to the 3rd Army, they attended a courtesy meeting with the Czechoslovak envoy in Paris, Jindřich Nosk475 and also with Petr Zenkl.476 These days, Tichý and Ducháček also flew to Reims for the first sequence of Headquarters. Here they learned that the delays with their actual entry into office had a reason in the 3rd Army. It still did not directly call on the Main Headquarters, which is why neither Tichý nor Ducháček could be sent.477 The official documentation shows the efforts of the Czechoslovak Western national team to speed up the sending of Tichý and Ducháček to the American army as soon as possible. Across the American 3. the army, both liaison officers could potentially get as far as Prague. Especially after the outbreak of the Prague Uprising on May 5, 1945478, requests from the British and American governments, as well as SHAEF for help from Prague, as well as the attempt to get to Col. Tichý and dr. Ducháčka. It can be quoted from Josef Korbel’s report for envoy Jindřich Nosk: “If you can, talk to [Anthony] Biddle again immediately.479 Also ask Biddle on my behalf to help send Ducháček and Tichý to Bohemia. I have the impression that the situation in Prague and at home is developing well. ”480 On May 10, 1945, Col. finally flew away. Tichý with dr. Ducháček to Nuremberg, from where they continued to the Regensburg area, where the staff of the 3rd US Army was located. From there, they continued according to the staff’s instructions to Pilsen, to the headquarters of the 5th Corps.481 Practically immediately after arriving in Pilsen, Tichý and Ducháček sought out a national committee,

474

SHAW, Antony: Druhá světová válka, s. 130. Jindřich Nosek worked from the summer of 1940 to September 1944 as a chief official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the London government in exile. From October 1944 he first held the post of ambassador in Paris, later ambassador. DEJMEK, J. ̶ MICHÁLEK, S. ̶ NĚMEČEK, J .: Diplomacy, p. 172. 476 National Socialist politician Petr Zenkl worked in the years 1937−1939 (again 1945−1946) as the mayor of Prague. Between 1939 and 1945, he was imprisoned by the Nazis in the Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps, from where he and other prisoners were liberated in April 1945 by US 3rd Army units. NEKOLA, Martin: Petr Zenkl. Politician and man. Prague 2014, p. 135; TOMEŠ, J .: Czech Biographical Dictionary. III. part. Q − Ž, pp. 562. 477 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 62. 478 KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Prague in May 1945 The history of one uprising. Prague 2005, p. 128. 479 Anthony Joseph Drexel Biddle jr. Served from October 28, 1941 as an American ambassador to the Czechoslovak government. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 141. 480 NA, f. AHR, sign. 1-144 (US Army ̶ entry into Czechoslovak territory), Report dr. Korbela for dr. Noska, 6 May 1945. 481 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 63. 475

and asked for information from the parties to the situation in the city.482 Here both men could finally begin to act as intermediaries. Shortly after the liberation, Pilsen had the status of an occupied city, which brought with it a number of restrictions, such as a ban on newspapers, restrictions on citizens in the evening and circulation of citizens in general, restrictions on trains, etc. Of course, the city also suffered war damage that disrupted its infrastructure. 483 Therefore, the very next day, May 11, during the official performance with the commander of the V Corps, Gen. Clarence Huebner, whose troops had been in Pilsen since May 6, 484 interpreted to him, Col. Tichý with dr. Ducháček complains of the National Committee that “Czechoslovakia is not an occupied country, that we are a warring allied state, and we demand that such restrictions, which can be applied in a hostile country, was repealed with immediate effect. ”.485 Gen. Huebner found the complaints justified and lifted all restrictions on the same day.486 Two days later, Col. Tichý and dr. Ducháček to Prague. At that time, Czechoslovak government and military officials were accommodated in the Alcron Hotel. At that time, there was confusion in Alcron over the amount of work and the overall chaos characteristic of the first days of the liberation of liberated Czechoslovakia. Oldřich Tichý commented: “I reported to the gen. Bočka, filed a report on the situation in Pilsen, which he heard intermittently, because the hotel was very busy and busy, running away, etc., I was introduced to the gene. To Svoboda, whom I did not know before, and I waited all afternoon if I received any further instructions or the like. ”487 But Tichý received no special orders, should continue the routine work of the liaison officer and support the work of the national committees. With this, Tichý and Ducháček returned to Pilsen. In order to streamline cooperation with national committees, the division and assignment of Czechoslovak liaison officers to the headquarters of higher units was agreed with the Fifth Division of the 5th Corps. Col. Silent, dr. Ducháček and together with them Maj. Řezáč remained within this classification in Pilsen.488

482

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 63. Ibid .; MARTINOVSKÝ, Ivan et al .: History of Pilsen in Data from the First Traces of Settlement to the Present (hereinafter referred to as History of Pilsen). Plzeň 2004, p. 370. 484 On June 25, 1945, the troops of the V Corps left the area of southwestern Bohemia. Their place was subsequently taken by XXII. Corps also under the 3rd Army, commanded by Major General. Ernest Harmon. BROOKS, Thomas F .: Hello Boys! Journey of the 5th US Army Corps from Louisiana to Pilsen. Prague 1996, pp. 186, 189 and 208. 485 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 63. 486 Ibid., P. 64 487 Ibid. 488 Ibid. 483

The mentioned

chaotic

conditions

at the

Prague

NGO,

insufficient

information, also the ongoing struggle for the position and overall orientation of the Czechoslovak army in the future, but especially the independent military missionary representation in the 3rd Army, all caused negative attitudes of representatives of the Czechoslovak military mission at the United States Formations of European Theater (USFET), 489 who thought that in western Bohemia, especially in the operational area of the 3rd Army, quite a number of our [Czechoslovak, note. author.] officers. During his visit to Prachatice, Tichý learned from representatives of the local national committee that a property belonging to Rudolf Beran, the former Second Republican and Protectorate Prime Minister, but later also to a man who supported the Czechoslovak resistance, was located nearby. Given the negative response from the representatives of the National Committee to Tichý’s question as to whether any steps had already been taken by Rudolf Beran, Col. ordered. Tichý immediately detained Beran and personally waited at the Prachatice National Committee until the relevant gendarme announced the operation. The gendarme allegedly remarked in the sense that “the situation was not pleasant because Aries had just visited the American commander where the arrest had taken place.” In fact, Rudolf Beran was visited by two of the commanders of the US Army, Gen. Hammond along with Gen. Roberts, who offered him protection. The irony remains that Rudolf Beran, even in his arrest, rejected the help offered, believing that he had not committed any acts of confession, and that he still remained a mere misunderstanding that would certainly be explained.493 Tichý’s arrest was subsequently notified to the General Staff.

489

This is, loosely translated, the US Army on the European battlefield. This organization replaced the former SHAEF after the end of the fighting, specifically with effect from July 1, 1945. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 237. 490 Ibid., S. 240. 491 Ibid. 492 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 66. 493 After his arrest, Rudolf Beran remained in custody until 1947. In a contrived trial, which was to sentence him to the highest sentence, he managed to disprove the prosecution’s arguments. He was eventually tested for 20 years in a heavy prison. In Leopoldov Prison, where he was serving his sentence, he became seriously ill and died in 1954. He elaborated the destinies of Rudolf Beran

494 From June 1945 he held Col. Tichý as the head of the Czechoslovak military mission to the US troops in Czechoslovakia.495 During July 1945, a collaborator, dr. Ducháček, and was replaced by ktp. in the bay. dr. Steiner, who remained in Pilsen even after the Silent Departure to Prague.496 Col. recalled the management of individual liaison officers. Silent as follows: “When sending liaison officers to their posts, I told them the essence of their task, ie contact between US military command posts and relevant national committees, to support local national committees as much as possible, and I commented on this from Knock out as many Americans as possible. As an illustration of this activity, I gave them the conditions we found in Pilsen, a number of limitations […] and the need for similar defects to be eliminated. As for the report, 497 Tichý maintained a correct professional relationship with the American officers with whom he acted in his capacity, which was characterized by a willingness to reciprocate. assistance and which in some places have outgrown the purely professional framework. One example is how the Americans helped speed up the transfer of Tichý’s wife and daughter from Britain to Czechoslovakia. It can be said that the transport of the Silent Family to Czechoslovakia One example is how the Americans helped speed up the transfer of Tichý’s wife and daughter from Britain to Czechoslovakia. It can be said that the transport of the Silent Family to Czechoslovakia One example is how the Americans helped speed up the transfer of Tichý’s wife and daughter from Britain to Czechoslovakia. It can be said that the transport of the Silent Family to Czechoslovakia

Jaroslav Rokoský. See ROKOSKÝ, Jaroslav: Rudolf Beran and his time. The rise and fall of the agrarian party. Prague 2011. 494 ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 65. 495 ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: Forgotten Elite, p. 241 496 ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 66. 497 Ibid., P. 74.

several complications were encountered, even though at first everything looked very promising. In the first half of August 1945, during one of the interviews, the Chief of Staff of the XXII Col. Col. Williams Oldřich Tichý, where his family is located. The further course of the interview can be evidenced by a quote: “To my answer that in England, where he is waiting for an evacuation, he replied that I could have said it a long time ago, that they would take care of her transfer to Pilsen. He negotiated with General Harmon, who made the plane available for me to fly to England for the family. ” Tichý’s main concern is securing the necessary documents for his wife and daughter, but rather his fear that his wife will embark on the flight at all, because, as Tichý remarked, his wife “hates flight at all”. 499 For this reason, Tichý also sent a telegram to his wife in advance asking if she was willing to fly, to which he received a positive answer to his joy, thanks to which Tichý was able to leave Pilsen for London in mid-August. However, due to bad weather over Belgium, the plane had to turn around and land in Nuremberg, where Tichý was forced to spend two days due to persistent bad weather conditions and then had to return to Pilsen. He arrived in London the following week. However, even the return journey did not go without problems. At first, Tichý’s plane was to be sent to Paris, regardless of his business purpose. This was prevented thanks to the intervention of a certain CIC500 captain. However, the plane still did not reach Pilsen, as it landed in Wiesbaden, where the flight was stopped. The wait for the settlement and the decision whether to continue the flight to Pilsen was dragged on. The next day, Tichý was instructed to turn to Frankfurt am Main to negotiate further action. Tichý therefore traveled to Frankfurt, where he contacted Lt. Col. Ferdinand Miksche, 501 commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in the United States

498

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 75. Ibid. 500 It was an American military counterintelligence established during World War II. ROEWER, H. – SCHÄFER, S. – UHL, M .: Encyclopedia of Secret Services, p. 74. 501 Ferdinand Otto Miksche served in 1940 in France. After her surrender, he arrived in Great Britain, where he changed several short-term assignments, and from April 1941, with the permission of President Beneš, he was assigned to the Free French Forces for the duration of the war. From mid-May 1945, he served within the SHAEF as commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in the 21st Army Group, then as commander of the Czechoslovak military mission at USFET and then in the American occupation zone. ZUDOVALESKOVA, Z .:

occupation zone, 502 and explained the whole situation to him. Lt. Col. Miksch While trying to Tichy and his family to negotiate an air transfer from Frankfurt to Plzen, but he eventually Pacific convey that he would have to Pilsen to travel alone and only here provide some transportation for his wife and daughter, as they

apply

“a ban on

the transportation

of civilian

persons

by military

aircraft ”.503

Tichý flew to Pilsen the next morning and discussed the whole matter again, this time with Col. Williams. They both agreed that the only option left was to send cars to Karl and Tatiana, who were still waiting in Wiesbaden. Genmjr. Harmon agreed, but thanks to the intervention at the embassy in Prague, he finally managed to secure a plane for Tichý. On the same day, Tichý flew from Wiesbaden and immediately brought his family to Czechoslovakia.504

502

The original Czechoslovak military mission at USFET was transformed into this form in the summer of 1945, after the individual Allied occupation zones were established. The mission was based in Frankfurt am Main. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z .: The Forgotten Elite, pp. 238. 503 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 76. 504 Ibid., pp. 76 ̶ 77.

Post-war years (1945–1990)

6.1. Senior Officer of the Czechoslovak Army (1945–1949)

On June 16, 1945, Oldřich Tichý received the American “Legion of Merit” award.505 In the autumn of 1945, Col. and left for the 1st District Headquarters in Prague. Before he left, the Americans helped him a second time as far as his family was concerned. Even during the operation of Pilsen, there were reports from various quarters in the sense that the Americans employed citizens of German nationality as interpreters and they were interpreting to the detriment of the Czechoslovak people. By virtue of his position, Col. Tichý dealt with these complaints and therefore interpreted them with the XXII Corps. However, the Americans opposed the fact that they did not find enough Czechoslovaks who would have a sufficient command of the English language and basically expressed themselves in the sense that if they did not like the situation, the representatives of the Czechoslovak army themselves would take care of the solution. Col. Tichý informed his superiors, but at the same time asked the Americans to place advertisements and calls in the newspapers for the search for interpreters, and he offered them the services of his daughter, who naturally spoke fluent English during her stay in England. Taťána Tichá obviously proved very useful as an interpreter and translator, because when Tichý left for Prague in the autumn of 1945, Col. Williams was again interested in his family, this time in his daughter Tatiana, and he wondered where he would work in Prague. The rest of the conversation can be quoted: “I replied that I did not know, but in any case he must have a job, because it is ordered. Col. Williams told me he would ask if the embassy needed a translator. I agreed to the proposal and later told me that my daughter would be accepted to the embassy in Prague, where she joined in December 1945. ‘506 It is not entirely clear when exactly Tichý left for Prague. He himself states in the statement of resignation: “Sometime in mid-November, I received an order signed by General Boček to start his service in Prague on December 1. I left for Prague on December 1, 1945, where I reported the same day. ”507 On the other hand

505

VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Insert to Qualification document, part II, 1946. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 81. 507 Ibid. , pp. 67. 506

The Tribal List and the Qualification Documents state as the date of Tichý’s transfer to Prague as November 1, 1945.508 It is certain, however, that the new assignment of Oldřich Tichý was the interim Chief of Staff of the 1st District it began in May 1945, when the provisional organization of the army came into force, followed in September of the same year by the so-called improved organization of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. According to this organization, the Czechoslovak ground forces were divided into four military areas, whose headquarters were located in Prague (1st area), Tábor (2nd area), Brno (3rd area) and Bratislava (4th area) .510 The year 1946 meant for Tichý a certain, at least as circumstances allow, the end of the post-war provisional. This is evident from the fact that that Tichý had to start dealing with practical issues necessary for everyday life. An example is Tichý’s request from January 1946 to issue new documents for the Praga-Lady passenger car. This car, which Tichý had owned since 1937, remained hidden from relatives after his departure to Britain in March 1939, and to protect him from the Gestapo, all documents about the car were destroyed. In addition to his own documents for the Tichý car, he also needed to change the leadership certificate and assign a Prague license plate, because although he started using the car soon after his return to Czechoslovakia, he drove the number of the Pilsen Police Headquarters for the time being. His request was granted 511 and in February Tichý duly registered his car.512 During 1946, there were also two events that it would be a mistake not to mention. The first was a silent meeting with several former intelligence colleagues. The meeting took place with František Fryč, and in addition to him and Oldřich Tichý, Karel Paleček, Josef Bartík and even Hans Hausmann, who came to visit from Switzerland, also took part. During the visit, the officers drank tea, recalling wartime times and Hausmann’s visits to London and Paris.513 Needless to say, this was the last such meeting. Tichý came across some of his former colleagues, but only by chance. 508 513 It must be said that this was the last such meeting. Tichý came across some of his former colleagues, but only by chance. 508 513 It must be said that this was the last such meeting. Tichý came across some of his former colleagues, but only by chance. 508

VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Kmenový list; VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Changes and supplements of the qualification document part I, 1946. 509 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list. 510 STEHLÍK, E .: Srdce armády, p. 62. 511 NA, f. PŘPII – EO, Directorate of National Security in Prague ̶ application, 17 January 1946. 512 NA, f. PŘPII – EO, Application for registration of motor and towing vehicles, 14 February 1946. 513 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 80.

100

The second event, which acted as a harbinger of future conditions, was the visit of his relatively recent colleague Ivo Ducháček. At the end of November 1946, he visited Tichý and told him his concerns about the matter he was talking about with Gen. Boček, 514 who had been Chief of Staff since April 1945.515

that

occasion, Ducháček

told

Tichý

that

from a previous

interview

s gen. The general’s astonishment at the fact that Tichý, although he must undoubtedly be aware of the changing attitude towards the Americans caused by his increasingly strong orientation towards the Soviet Union, lets his daughter work at the American embassy. For this reason, gen. Boček, through Ivo Ducháček, told Tichý to arrange for Taťána Tichá to leave the embassy.516 It must be said that Tichý was aware of the legitimacy of Boček and Ducháček’s fears and no doubt realized that his daughter’s work for the American embassy could cause considerable problems in the future. The fact that the Czechoslovak counterintelligence was very interested in Tánia Tichá in terms of its possible agency cooperation and that by November 1946 she already had a very detailed map of her activities at the American embassy and beyond. In a report to her person dated 18. November states: “The nominee has no relationship with embassies with any [officers] or employees. He avoids all meetings, visits to nightclubs, where employees go from the embassy. She personally said she had no interest in getting married in America, and in her opinion, Americans were dull men. He avoids saying where he goes for fun and makes excuses for the strict regime that is said to rule in their family. She is not a member of any social or foreign club. […] A very pleasant young girl, she is very careful in her intercourse, she still asks why she was found and very distrustful ̶ she was found by an agent’s confidante ̶. In the case of accurate data on contacts sl. Tichý, there is a possibility of obtaining it, by directly seeking acquaintance with her pX ”517 Tichý’s daughter herself understood the imminent danger.

514

ABS, f. H, No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 82. STEHLÍK, E .: Heart of the Army, p. 61. 516 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, p. 82. 517 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report: Daughter of Col. gšt. Tichý ̶ employed at US embassies, November 18, 1946. 515

101

Ivo Ducháček helped Tánia Tichá to a new place. On January 1, 1947, the daughter of Col. Tichý to the company Inex, which was the “export company of Jablonec goods” .519 Even this daughter’s job, but Tichý’s family and especially himself, as will be apparent from the following text, did not do him any good. Oldřich Tichý, meanwhile, continued to work at the 1st Area Command. He was undoubtedly suitable for the position of the local chief of staff. This is evidenced, moreover, by his qualification deed from 1947, in which Tichý is evaluated very positively as an officer of excellent command abilities, gifted, sharp and flexible, with excellent logic of reasoning, with extensive theoretical knowledge and also accessible by new lessons. The fact that he had all the prerequisites for the excellent performance of the function of Chief of Staff of the area can be demonstrated by a direct quote: “He has very successfully completed the consolidation of an extensive staff, contributed to the improvement and increase of his performance. 520 On February 20, 1947, Tichý reached the rank of general, as he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. For the time being, however, Tichý still held the position of Chief of Staff of the 1st Area Command and received positive evaluations. In the future, the events of February 1948, during which the Communist Party came under the leadership of the Communist Party under the leadership of Klement Gottwald, ended the stage of a pluralistic political system. socialist orientation and launched a new phase, which Czechoslovakia entered as a communist state. 523 Oldřich Tichý did not become politically active until 1948, but on April 7, 1947 he became a member of the Union of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship. At the beginning of May 1948, gen. Tichý to the Communist Party, within the 96th local organization Prague VII and with a two-year candidacy for membership. He gradually became a tithe trustee in this organization524 and was also “recruited to conduct training” .525 At least 518

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23 February 1950, p. 82. Ibid., P. 83. 520 VÚA ̶ VHA, p. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Qualification document, 1946. 521 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal list. 522 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Qualification document, 1947. 523 BROWN, Archie: The Rise and Fall of Communism. Brno 2011, p. 200. 524 The tithe confidant was in charge of a group of 8 to 10 members of the organization. He should keep records of the meetings of these members and also monitor how the members fulfill their party duties, eg whether they attend meetings, whether they subscribe to the party press, what is their level of performance in employment 519

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Initially, everything indicated that Tichý would continue the very promising career of the high representative of the Czechoslovak army, which is also evidenced by his qualification deed from 1948, which states: “He has a positive attitude towards the people’s democratic establishment, to friendship and alliance with the USSR and to the events of February. ”526 During 1948, Tichý’s daughter changed her job again. Inex, where she worked, was nationalized and, as part of the liquidation, its employees were advised to look for new jobs as soon as possible. That is why Taťána Tichá joined Czechoslovak Airlines in November. Her father helped her with this place. The brig asked for help in this matter. gene. Vilém Stanovský, Chief of the Aviation Department of the Ministry of Transport, 527 who addressed Brig. gene. Alois Antonín Kubit,

6.2.

Retirement and subsequent persecution (1949–1951)

The political struggle for the Czechoslovak army, together with the efforts for the greatest possible influence that the Communist Party wanted to have in it, were already evident during the Second World War. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia, the efforts of the communists intensified. In this context, it is necessary to mention that the activities of the Communists in the Czechoslovak army were in fact governed by the Central Armed Forces of the Communist Party, whose members were several members of the Constituent National Assembly, but also the then wonder. gene. Jaroslav Procházka, Chief of HSVO, 530 head of OBZ Col. Bedřich Reicin and also Minister of the Interior Václav Nosek. The members of the commission maintained contact with the leadership of the Communist Party almost continuously and consulted with it on the current situation and plans for the future. In order to achieve their goals, they used, etc. KAŠKA, Václav: Unruly and non-engaged. Disciplination of members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the years 1948 – 1952. Prague 2014, pp. 80. 525 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Basic personal letter, 26. 5. 1949. 526 VÚA ̶ VHA, p. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Qualification document, 1948. 527 MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, p. 548. 528 Ibid., P. 351. 529 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 84. 530 MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, p. 487.

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communists of all the possibilities at their disposal, namely, for example, interpellations in parliament, special-purpose service regulations, purpose-oriented party press, but also party confidants and often military officials. The latter method, although from the perspective of specific actors contradicted the then applicable legislation and military regulations, but there was němu.531 Although very deep political crisis escalating in early 1948 directly

not reflected

in the Czechoslovak

Army, 532

started

with

immediately

after the so-called “victorious February” with the first purges in the army, which aimed to help the Communist Party to its final control.533 Led by Reicin’s Fifth Department of the General Staff.534 Soon, however, the purges spread to other members of the Czechoslovak army and the original political-motivated “cleansing” of the officer corps became a process leading eventually to the total destruction of the Czechoslovak command corps.535 military service and subsequent persecution gen. Tichý can be found with two accompanying features, which can of course also be attributed to the fates of many other Czechoslovak officers. The first of these two aspects is the absence of a legal basis for such conduct. The legislative framework for dismissal from the Czechoslovak army was originally created by Act No. 72/1946 Coll., The validity of which was later extended by Act No. 134/1948 Coll. At the beginning of 1949, even the second mentioned law was no longer valid. However, this stopped deciding on dismissal from the army on the basis of valid laws, and the whole process, which was to remove the so-called “unreliable” persons from the army, became a de facto purely administrative matter.536 This is exactly what Oldřich Tichý met. At the beginning of 1949, the collection and submission of documents against unwanted persons passed from the competences of the fifth department of the General Staff to the newly created X. Department of MNO, within which 531 At the beginning of 1949, even the second mentioned law was no longer valid. However, this stopped deciding on dismissal from the army on the basis of valid laws, and the whole process, which was to remove the so-called “unreliable” persons from the army, became a de facto purely administrative matter.536 This is exactly what Oldřich Tichý met. At the beginning of 1949, the collection and submission of documents against unwanted persons passed from the competences of the fifth department of the General Staff to the newly created X. Department of MNO, within which 531 At the beginning of 1949, even the second mentioned law was no longer valid. However, this stopped deciding on dismissal from the army on the basis of valid laws, and the whole process, which was to remove the so-called “unreliable” persons from the army, became a de facto purely administrative matter.536 This is exactly what Oldřich Tichý met. At the beginning of 1949, the collection and submission of documents against unwanted persons passed from the competences of the fifth department of the General Staff to the newly created X. Department of MNO, within which 531

HANZLÍK, František ̶ VONDRÁŠEK, Václav: Army in the Struggle for Political Power in the Years 1945 ̶ 1948. Prague 2006, p. 342. 532 Ibid. 533 BÍLEK, Jiří ̶ LÁNÍK, Jaroslav ̶ ŠACH, Jan: Československá armáda v první poválečném desetiletí. May 1945 ̶ May 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Czechoslovak Army). Prague 2006, p. 104. 534 The second (intelligence) department of the General Staff was divided into two parts in 1945 – the second (offensive) and the fifth (defense) department. ŠOLC, J .: Beside the President, pp. 317. 535 BÍLEK, J. ̶ LÁNÍK, J. ̶ ŠACH, J .: Československá armáda, p. 104. 536 Ibid.

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many members of the former OBZ worked. This new body was in fact controlled by the above-mentioned Col. Reicin s div. gene. A walk.537 The above-mentioned administrative method of removing selected army officials took place mainly in the form of various inspections, which were prepared by the 10th Department. For these purposes, he also developed criteria for determining whether an officer is “reliable” or not. However, the criteria were so general and ambiguous that virtually everyone could be described as “politically unreliable,” and the typical points considered were, for example, “the relationship to the people’s democracy, the acquisition of the Soviet experience, etc.” 538 Exactly in that spirit. the additional information given in the Silent Qualification List of 1949 is carried out: “Brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý did not find a completely positive attitude towards the People’s Democratic Order of the Republic. Therefore, according to the output [axis] MNO ref. 10153 Dův.-4. odd. 1949 given on June 1, 1949 on leave with full salaries until retirement. ”539 For the sake of completeness, it can be added that Oldřich Tichý most at least partially envisaged the possibility of prosecution by the communist regime. This can be evidenced in his own words: “In the 1950s, there was a strange stuffy atmosphere in which breathing was difficult. Everyone was just on

a little

exposed

place,

was

automatically

suspected,

tracked

and intercepted. Everything, even secondary things, was meaninglessly kept secret. I remember coming home once and telling my wife that I had the impression that if I said my name and rank somewhere, Reicin would lock me up to reveal a military secret. ”540 The NGO transferred the brig to retirement. gene. Oldřich Tichý on August 1, 1949. Officially, his reassignment was justified by the fact that Tichý fulfilled the conditions for retirement as of July 31, 1949, which were stipulated by Act No. 76/1922 Coll. also known as the Military Provision Act. Although Tichý did not reach the age of 55 by the mentioned date, he had served “41 countable and 33 real years.541 Of course, this was not a peaceful reassignment.

537

The influence of both men excelled after the so-called Narrower Advisory Board of the MNO began operating in February 1949. It was a newly established body, which was to be gradually replaced by the Army Advisory Council, which discussed all aspects of the construction and operation of the army and which was gradually relegated to the background, as it was assessed as staffing and cumbersome. BÍLEK, J. ̶ LÁNÍK, J. ̶ ŠACH, J .: Czechoslovak Army, pp. 99 and 104. 538 Ibid., Pp. 104. 539 VÚA ̶ VHA, p. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Qualification document, 1949. 540 TICHÝ, O .: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.), P. 130. 541 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, MNO, X. odbor, Subject: Tichý Oldřich, brig. gen., retired, April 21, 1949.

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Immediately after leaving active military service,

Tichý began to strive

finding a new job as soon as possible. He enrolled in gen. Josef Malec, who at the time was the head of the MNO’s placement commission for military gasmen, ie soldiers who were retired.542 He promised Tichý that he would contact him as soon as a position became available. But then gen. Malec took a vacation and Tichý’s new job remained in sight. In this situation, Tichý was assisted by a friend and future husband of his daughter, Tánia Tichá, Dalibor Cihelka, who provided him with contact and later a personal meeting with a certain Prague “builder Štěpka” .543 After an interview with him, he recommended gramophone plant, the national company Ultrafon. Although it seemed at first that Tichý would be able to start working at Ultrafon as early as mid-August, there were delays and Tichý thus started a new job, completely different from his current one, only on September 14, 1949.544 As follows from the previous text, Oldřich Tichý was not affected by the initial waves of persecution. The turning point came only in the second half of 1949. Following the arrival of Soviet advisers in Czechoslovakia and also the trial of one of the leading leaders of the Hungarian Communists, László Rajk, a new system was introduced to monitor and prosecute people uncomfortable with the communist regime. On October 10, 1949, the Deputy Commander of the StB, Karel Šváb, signed a decree according to which the attention of the security authorities was to focus on defined categories of citizens who threatened to reverse the socialist construction of Czechoslovakia if conditions were favorable. This laid the foundations for the large-scale security campaign “Lux”, which was to be smeared by unwanted persons. 545 The so-called “D” actions also took place practically in parallel with the “Lux” action. These were basically illegal actions, resp. more precisely, raids carried out by the OBZ in cooperation with the StB against retired Czechoslovak officers.546 A total of six such actions took place from April 1949 to September 1950.547 It should be emphasized that 542

MASKALÍK, A .: Elite of the Army, p. 393. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 2. 544 Ibid. 545 BŘACHOVÁ, V .: Destrukce, pp. 121̶ 122. 546 The designation “D” was sometimes interpreted as a derivative of the name Dejvice, because in Prague Dejvice there were apartments that most retired officers lived in and which the representatives of the communist regime wanted to obtain after the internment of officers. However, this interpretation was not based on truth. In fact, “D” meant “officers.” BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, p. 98. 547 The third raid was specific, which, compared to the others, bore the designation “d”. Its peculiarity lay in the fact that it was a targeted raid against former representatives of the Czechoslovak military intelligence service. BŘACHOVÁ, V .: Destruction, 123. 543

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it was through these raids that most people got to the infamous Forced Labor Camp (hereinafter referred to as TNP) Mírov, where Oldřich Tichý also ended up. In total, about 270 officers of the Czechoslovak army were enrolled in TNP Mírov.548 Specifically, Oldřich Tichý was detained during the so-called “D-3” operation, 549 which took place on January 10, 1950.550. to TNP Mírov received more than a hundred new “inmates” .551 The mechanism of assigning people to TNP seemed monstrously simple from a procedural point of view. Already at the end of October 1948, the National Assembly adopted Act No. 247/1948 Coll. on forced labor camps. It was the first and basic norm that enacted punishment for all opponents of the communist regime, both real and perceived. The mentioned law was also reflected in other regulations, especially to Act No. 231/1948 Coll. for the protection of the People’s Democratic Republic and also until the later amendment of criminal law, which took place during 1950. In addition, many directives of the Ministry of the Interior gradually came into force, which further regulated and specified the conditions of compliance with Act No. 247/1948 Coll.552. create a legal framework for the extrajudicial persecution of citizens uncomfortable with the communist regime. In addition to the TNP itself, the basic components of this persecution were also the governing bodies, which were gradually subject to the MoI, MNB and the MS, and also 16 three-member, so-called command commissions, 553 which served on regional national committees and decided on assigning persons to the TNP. In practice, these commissions only approved and confirmed the lists of relevant persons, which the StB most often proposed for inclusion in the TNP, possibly also the action committees of the National Front or the Communist Party bodies.554 Of course, the actual inclusion in the TNP Mírov was preceded by a detailed interrogation. In Tichý’s case, it took place immediately after his arrest, ie on January 10, 1950. A report was also prepared on his interrogation, according to which Tichý described the activities of the pre-war Second Division of the General Staff, his activities as a military attaché

548

BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, p. 100. Ibid., P. 99. 550 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report of the commission on the investigation of the former case. brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, 9 May 1951. 551 BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, pp. 99. 552 Ibid., Pp. 91 ̶ 92. 553 The Commission originally had 19, but in February 1949 their number was reduced to 16. Within Czechoslovakia there was a certain asymmetry in the distribution of commissions across the state territory, as there was only one commission in Slovakia, namely in Bratislava. Ibid., Pp. 92. 554 Ibid. 549

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in Switzerland, the operation of the intelligence branch in Paris, the operation of the SVBM and the US Army, but its interrogation was particularly followed the line of Czechoslovak defense intelligence and its operation before and during World War II. However, according to the interrogators, Tichý did not satisfactorily clarify this issue. For the sake of clarity, the last paragraph of the report reads: It is characteristic of this whole group that none of its members wants to know that they are more familiar with the defense and its people. ”555 Several factors most likely decided its silent inclusion in TNP Mírov. Of course, the main argument of the investigators was his affiliation with the intelligence department, the group of Col. Moravec and the circle of people around President Beneš in general. But it would be a mistake to think that only these “transgressions” remained. Individual arguments, resp. more precisely, the constructs that were supposed to prove Tichý’s “unreliability” and “subversiveness” were formulated into his review probably during 1949. It is appropriate to quote the report in full: “Clearly right-wing focus, formerly. intelligence officer, right hand gen. Moravce. His daughter was employed at the US Embassy, and he himself initially maintained contact with embassies, who nowadays have ceased publicly, as he is an extraordinarily mature and cautious intelligence person who can master his intentions. Gene. Tichý took a daughter from the services of the American embassy some time ago and put her in the service of f [irm] y. Inex, Prague II., Platýz, which deals with import and export to the west. It was found that the director of this company is a certain accessory. of the US Army, who was a member of the CIC during the war and who was in very good proportion with Gen. Quiet. The whole company is very suspicious of intelligence. On the military side, gen. A quiet, very agile worker, sometimes running into the trifles in which he drowns. Characteristic is his amazing willingness to OZ authorities [defense intelligence, note. author], which gives the impression of being appointed in advance who was a member of the CIC during the war and who was in a very good relationship with gen. Quiet. The whole company is very suspicious of intelligence. On the military side, gen. A quiet, very agile worker, sometimes running into the trifles in which he drowns. Characteristic is his amazing willingness to OZ authorities [defense intelligence, note. author], which gives the impression of being appointed in advance who was a member of the CIC during the war and who was in a very good relationship with gen. Quiet. The whole company is very suspicious of intelligence. On the military side, gen. A quiet, very agile worker, sometimes running into the trifles in which he drowns. Characteristic is his amazing willingness to OZ authorities [defense intelligence, note. author], which gives the impression of being appointed in advance

555

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report of interrogation gen. vv Oldřich Tichý, 10. 1. 1950, p. 3.

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protects any unpleasant contact with these authorities so that the things they cover do not appear. His willingness is striking in his exaggeration. One specific case was found when the authorities zd. department in 1946 on the request of Maj. Swiss Army answered Hasuman a few questions, saying he didn’t know more about him. Later, in 1948, on one occasion, it turned out that he had to know all the details about him, because he still received packages from him in 1946 ̶ 1947, along with Gen. Bartík. I do not recommend promotion. 556 Ratings as “right-wingers” are not too surprised, as the usual proof of the “unreliability” of former intelligence officers, but not only of them, is not a surprise. was their participation in the foreign resistance in the West or ties to the circle of President Beneš’s collaborators. The designation “right hand gene. Moravce “in the context of the tense relations that prevailed between the two men. With regard to the above-mentioned contacts with representatives of the American embassy or the director of Inex, Tichý himself did not confirm during the interrogation that he would ever maintain contacts with members of the American embassy.557 In the case of a “very good ratio” Tichý was practically a fictional construct. Tichý did meet the director, but by chance, when he and his wife visited Inex to choose a wedding gift for their nephews. During the brief courtesy interview, only the director’s surprise emerged that he had not met Tichý, as he worked in Prague as a member of the CIC. 558 Thus, not only was Tichý and the director of Inex not very good, but there was no relationship. It should also be noted in Tichý’s defense that he himself urged his daughter to

at the

American

embassy,

someone

questioned

the

situation

in Czechoslovakia, or something similar, immediately told him such a fact. During his interrogation, Tichý emphasized that his daughter had never given him any clues so that he could report any anti-state interest on the part of the Americans.559 such 556

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Tichý Oldřich, brig. gen., Chief of Staff VO ̶ 1, undated. ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 23. 2. 1950, p. 82. 558 Ibid., P. 83. 559 ABS, f. H, a. H-342-2, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, 10. 1. 1950, pp. 3. 557

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he always denied.560 The fact is that even without packages, ties to Hans Hausmann Tichý necessarily had to cause problems. Hausmann was monitored by OBZ, because from his travels and contacts in Czechoslovakia he decided that he planned to try first in Prague and then in the rest of the republic to build an agency network.561 It is necessary to mention another event that they could use and also used against Tichý communist security authorities. In mid-June 1948, Oldřich Tichý received an anti-communist leaflet entitled “Free Bohemia” issued on June 13, 1948. The leaflet was, of course, completely unacceptable to the Communists. Among other things, the leading representatives of the Communist Party Klement Gottwald, Antonín Zápotocký and others were described as “clowns” and “political monsters”. For the sake of clarity, we can also mention the introductory proclamation of the leaflet: “The wheels of the Soviet communist expansion went far, despite the resistance of foreign aid, because there are many businessmen in the ranks of our nation who still want in the last phase of this international struggle for a better tomorrow to benefit from the ignorance of the working people, we all call indiscriminately to the fight against oppression and terror !!! Help us secure a better future rather than discouraging thinking and acting. ”562 The important fact remains that this leaflet was used as an argument against Tichý, even though Tichý handed it over to the competent authorities almost immediately upon receipt.563 Tichý, of course, defended himself during the interrogation. . In addition to the above, Tichý also defended himself against the persons he had in contact with at the time of his arrest. Tichý said: “As for my contacts, I did not have any contacts with anyone, I lived in a family, I have an 83-year-old sick, blind mother, where distance does not allow us both. My life away from home was devoted only to the needs of the party. [And] once a week in committee meetings, monthly meetings and trainings. My brother-in-law, the customs secretary, did not visit me with his wife. A student [Dalibor] Cihelka, who has an acquaintance with my daughter, also came to the apartment, and about three times we visited his father, a retired financial board, Vinařská Street. I had no other contact. ”Tichý was also struck by the fact that investigators did not believe much in his leftist political beliefs and people’s democratic thinking. This was already evident in his 560 A student [Dalibor] Cihelka, who has an acquaintance with my daughter, also came to the apartment, and about three times we visited his father, a retired financial board, Vinařská Street. I had no other contact. ”Tichý was also struck by the fact that investigators did not believe much in his leftist political beliefs and people’s democratic thinking. This was already evident in his 560 A student [Dalibor] Cihelka, who has an acquaintance with my daughter, also came to the apartment, and about three times we visited his father, a retired financial board, Vinařská Street. I also had no other contact. ”Tichý was also annoyed that the investigators did not believe much in his leftist political beliefs and people’s democratic thinking. This was already evident in his 560

TICHÝ, O .: From the Reporter’s Memory (II.), P. 130. ABS, f. 302, sign. 302-69-5, Report from the 1st OBZ area, undated, pp. 7 ̶ 8. 562 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Svobodná Čechie, 13. 6. 1948, p. 1 563 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report, Subject: Illegal leaflet “Free Bohemia”, undated. 564 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Protocol written with Oldřich Tichý, February 23, 1950, pp. 81. 561

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joining the party in May 1948. His review states: “As for why he joined the party, he said out of conviction. He named a mass of Marxist literature that he read and almost asked the comrades from the commission to ask about his political education. He answered various questions promptly, but even here he was pressed against the wall and convicted of ignorance. He answered superficially verbally and, in the end, incorrectly. He tried to be quick, but he spoke so as not to say anything and overwhelmed him. He concealed that his daughter was employed at the US Embassy, only saying that D [c] era was a member of the April 1948 party. Brig. gene. Tichý gives the impression of a very sophisticated former member of the 2nd Division, who could certainly have performed very valid services in the former army. Even though he joined the party he is not a good and honest member. 565 Although the result of the examination would undoubtedly be enough for the investigators, they unfortunately had in their hands the statement of Karel Paleček from 1949. Although from archival materials it follows that Tichý practically did not get involved in politics until May 1948, nor did he express himself in any way on the outside. I once cursed at dinner and Munich. I said that the masses of workers would arrange it after the war, because every war ultimately brings great social change. So that he will also be with us. His wife agreed with me. Perhaps more because she saw that I was still having a fight with Tichý. Silent, who was otherwise very angry and violent, jumped up and forbade her in front of everyone, never to speak like that again. I cannot even be convinced of his founding that he was a Marx-Leninist. If he went to the party and acts as a passionate communist, I am convinced that there is fear at the heart of his turn. ”566 All of the above facts were ample enough for Oldřich Tichý to be included in the TNP. Tichý joined Mírov on the basis of the order of the Commission No. 1 in Prague on 12 January 1950, and the relevant notice of his classification was published on 16 January.567 Tichý was to spend 12 months in Mírov. TNP Mírov, which has earned the reputation of one of the worst camps of this type in Czechoslovakia, was established as a facility for heavier, ie dangerous “inmates” on April 22, 1949 in the area 565 I am convinced that there is fear in the foundations of his turnaround. ”566 All of the above facts were ample enough for Oldřich Tichý to be included in the TNP. Tichý joined Mírov on the basis of the order of the Commission No. 1 in Prague on 12 January 1950, and the relevant notice of his classification was published on 16 January.567 Tichý was to spend 12 months in Mírov. TNP Mírov, which has earned the reputation of one of the worst camps of this type in Czechoslovakia, was established as a facility for heavier, ie dangerous “inmates” on April 22, 1949 in the area 565 I am convinced that there is fear in the foundations of his turnaround. ”566 All of the above facts were ample enough for Oldřich Tichý to be included in the TNP. Tichý joined Mírov on the basis of the order of the Commission No. 1 in Prague on 12 January 1950, and the relevant notice of his classification was published on 16 January.567 Tichý was to spend 12 months in Mírov. TNP Mírov, which has earned the reputation of one of the worst camps of this type in Czechoslovakia, was established as a facility for heavier, ie dangerous “inmates” on April 22, 1949 in the area 565 567 Tichý was to spend 12 months in Mírov. TNP Mírov, which has earned the reputation of one of the worst camps of this type in Czechoslovakia, was established as a facility for heavier, ie dangerous “inmates” on April 22, 1949 in the area 565 567 Tichý was to spend 12 months in Mírov. TNP Mírov, which has earned the reputation of one of the worst camps of this type in Czechoslovakia, was established as a facility for heavier, ie dangerous “inmates” on April 22, 1949 in the area 565

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Result of inspection brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, undated. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Excerpt from the protocol written with brig. gene. vv Karel Paleček, undated. 567 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Proof of transfer to TNP Mírov, 12 January 1950; ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report of the commission on the investigation of the case formerly brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, pp. 9. 5. 1951. 566

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of the original medieval castle, which was rebuilt into a Baroque fortress in the 17th century. After its creation, it remained empty for only two weeks, as the first prisoners detained during the first action “D” of April 20, 1949, were added to it. Unfortunately, it is impossible to rely on Tichý’s personal memories of his stay in the camp. Nevertheless, the atmosphere and conditions in this terrible facility can be quite well imagined according to the following description by Jiří Bílek: Underground dungeons with up to seven meters thick stone walls, which were cold and damp, were intended for prisoners. Ventilation through small barred windows was insufficient. The cold was particularly noticeable in autumn and winter, as most of the rooms could not be heated. The interior was similarly inhospitable, consisting of a few simple couches, a table and seats. Hygienic conditions were also catastrophic ̶ washroom with only cold water, unsuitable toilets. Prisoners were placed in cells of ten or more people, which exceeded their capacity. The food was very poor and inadequate. ”569 Medical care was also catastrophic, or more precisely, it was not provided to prisoners. If the fact that Act No. 241/1948 Coll. “She did not undergo any medical examination on arrival. The medical care in TNP Mírov itself was in charge of a lifelong convict MUDr. Sekanina, a member of the SS, who did not show much interest in the health of other prisoners, and if so, then his hands were bound by a lack of drugs and essentially any medical material.570 Such conditions naturally had to affect the health of the prisoners. For those who have already come to the camp with health problems, these have worsened here, the “health” have acquired more serious or less serious health ailments. Specifically, Oldřich Tichý suffered a myocardial infarction and a duodenal ulcer from TNP Mírov. Silent’s stay in the communist dungeons had a negative effect not only on his health, but also on the health of his family. Oldřich Tichý’s mother collapsed nervously after his arrest and Tichý’s wife Karla also suffered. then his hands were bound by a lack of drugs and essentially any medical material.570 Such conditions naturally had to affect the health of the prisoners. For those who have already come to the camp with health problems, these have worsened here, the “health” have acquired more serious or less serious health ailments. Specifically, Oldřich Tichý suffered a myocardial infarction and a duodenal ulcer from TNP Mírov. Silent’s stay in the communist dungeons had a negative effect not only on his health, but also on the health of his family. Oldřich Tichý’s mother collapsed nervously after his arrest and Tichý’s wife Karla also suffered. then his hands were bound by a lack of drugs and essentially any medical material.570 Such conditions naturally had to affect the health of the prisoners. For those who have already come to the camp with health problems, these have worsened here, the “health” have acquired more serious or less serious health ailments. Specifically, Oldřich Tichý suffered a myocardial infarction and a duodenal ulcer from TNP Mírov. Silent’s stay in the communist dungeons had a negative effect not only on his health, but also on the health of his family. Oldřich Tichý’s mother collapsed nervously after his arrest and Tichý’s wife Karla also suffered. the “health” here gained more or less serious ailments. Specifically, Oldřich Tichý suffered a myocardial infarction and a duodenal ulcer from TNP Mírov. Silent’s stay in the communist dungeons had a negative effect not only on his health, but also on the health of his family. Oldřich Tichý’s mother collapsed nervously after his arrest and Tichý’s wife Karla also suffered. the “health” here gained more or less serious ailments. Specifically, Oldřich Tichý suffered a myocardial infarction and a duodenal ulcer from TNP Mírov. Silent’s stay in the communist dungeons had a negative effect not only on his health, but also on the health of his family. Oldřich Tichý’s mother collapsed nervously after his arrest and Tichý’s wife Karla also suffered.

568

BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, pp. 94 ̶ 95; BŘACHOVÁ, V .: Destrukce, 123. BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, s. 107. 570 Ibid. 569

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Tichý tried to appeal against the sentence of 12 months, but his appeal was rejected on July 17, 1950, 571 on the grounds that: “During World War II, [Tichý] was in the foreign army in the West, where he worked with the former . gene. Moravec in the spirit of capitalist breadwinners and against the interests of the USSR. After returning to the Czechoslovak Republic in 1945, he was a public supporter of the West, he was in intimate contact with the fugitive traitors of the nation, Moravec, Hasal, Ingr, and the traitors Pika and Bartík. His daughter was employed at the US Embassy and later at the company. Inex, an American trading company whose head during the Second World War was the head of the CIC’s espionage service and which was in a very good relationship with Tichý. In February [1948] he took a wait-and-see attitude and waited for the conditions to take shape. After his release from active duty, he made no effort to participate in the building efforts of the working people. 572 On September 27, 1950, Oldřich Tichý was also deprived of his military rank, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 59/1949 Coll. on the withdrawal of military rank to certain officers, sergeants and non-commissioned officers of the army out of active service.573 From a brigadier general he became a soldier in the reserve.574 After Tichý’s internment at TNP Mírov, his wife had to solve a very fundamental problem from a practical point of view pensions. She needed it all the more because she and her wife and daughter were shared by Tichý’s eighty-three-year-old seriously ill mother, who was already completely blind at this time. Therefore, at the beginning of May 1950, Karel Tichá addressed a request to the MNO for mediation of the granting of a power of attorney, which Oldřich Tichý would transfer to his wife the right to receive his pension instead.575 Tichý, of course, immediately authorized his wife, but the NGO needed confirmation to settle the matter that Tichý was still alive and that he had not yet been convicted because in that case, he would lose all entitlements to the payment of the military pension. However, the MNO received the confirmation on June 7, 1950, and Karel Tichá’s request could be complied with after about a month.576 Although the deadline for inclusion in TNP Mírov expired in Tichý’s case on January 11, 1951, the commission 571 that he has not yet been convicted, because in that case he would lose all claims for the payment of a military pension. However, the MNO received the confirmation on June 7, 1950, and Karel Tichá’s request could be complied with after about a month.576 Although the deadline for inclusion in TNP Mírov expired in Tichý’s case on January 11, 1951, the commission 571 that he has not yet been convicted, because in that case he would lose all claims for the payment of a military pension. However, the MNO received the confirmation on June 7, 1950, and Karel Tichá’s request could be complied with after about a month.576 Although the deadline for inclusion in TNP Mírov expired in Tichý’s case on January 11, 1951, the commission 571

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report of the commission on the investigation of the case formerly brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, 9. 5. 1951, p. 1. 572 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, MV: Tichý Oldřich ̶ appeal, undated. 573 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Record of withdrawal of military rank, 27 September 1950. 574 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Tribal sheet II. 575 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Registered letter, Subject: Oldřich Tichý, gen. vv ̶ confirmation of power of attorney, May 10, 1950. 576 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Confirmation, June 7, 1950.

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release until May 9, 1951. The commission’s report concludes: As a class enemy, he tried to get into the Communist Party after February, due to the lack of revolutionary vigilance and vigilance of the Central Office [departmental organization, note. author] and its guarantors were given a two-year term. After his release from the army, he showed a bad relationship with his work, because he did not work for a long time and then, through protection, he got a good job. His inclusion in the TNP was entirely justified. The Commission proposes his release from TNP because he has expired and recommends that he be placed in manual labor and given attention. It is necessary to state that he was not an “inmate” of TNP Mírov during his entire imprisonment. In addition to Mírov, he was also imprisoned for some time in a prison in Prague’s Ruzyně and also in Mladá Boleslav.578 .579

6.3.

Life after release and rehabilitation (1951–1990)

After his release from TNP Mírov, Oldřich Tichý did not return to his apartment in Prague VII, as he moved with his family to Lysá nad Labem. Tichý’s family found a new residence in a house that belonged to the parents of his wife Karla. They originally ran a shop with cut goods here, and it was the original business room that the Military Administration converted into an apartment, where Oldřich Tichý’s family moved in. Bedřich Koleška’s brother-in-law also lived in the same house.580 Tichý also had to take up a new job. In this case, his new workplace became the carpentry cooperative Kmen in Lysá nad Labem, from where very

577

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, Report of the commission on the investigation of the case formerly brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, p. 9. 5. 1951, p. 2. 578 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Verbal expression including disability of direct family members, 1. 2. 1990. 579 ABS, f H, a. No. H-342-2, Official record written in the prison of the District Court in Mladá Boleslav, 11 May 1950. 580 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Inquiry into the former Czechoslovak General Army, Tichý Oldřich, undated.

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he soon moved to Nymburk, but still worked for the cooperative as an auxiliary force.581 Although he was released, Tichý remained under the supervision of the StB and the communist authorities, while Tichý’s personal as well as professional life was monitored. This situation should not have changed for many years. From 1951 to 1953, opinions on Tichý were preserved, which were more general in nature and reported that Tichý did not have much contact with anyone, lived in a closed manner, did not participate in public events and did not show a positive attitude towards the people’s democratic establishment.582 for Tichý at this time there was at least a successful appeal against the reduction of the pension on the basis of Government Decree No. 22/1953 Coll. The Board of Appeal annulled the original verdict on the grounds that it had failed to show Tichý’s expressions of hostility to the people’s democratic order, and therefore Tichý’s activities did not establish the facts of the original measure.583 A certain larger surveillance campaign against Oldřich Tichý can be expected in 1954 and 1955 on the basis of preserved archival documents. In addition to the negative evaluation of Tichý’s work ethic ̶ “he works only 4 hours a day” 585 ̶ or the list of character traits, such as domination, arrogance, the analysis of Tichý’s family relations and contacts deserves special attention. The following can be read about the family relations in the provision: “The nominee has family relations arranged. The wife must listen to him for every word. He abuses and humiliates her with his orders. His brother-in-law Koleška Bedřich, who lives with the named in the same house, says this, that he was accustomed to commanding war, and now he is doing all this to his wife, and he wants to do so, because he has complained to Tichý several times before MNV. ”586 The question remains whether these claims are based, at least in part, on the truth. Quiet, of course, given his military career

581

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Inquiry into the former Czechoslovak general. Army, Tichý Oldřich, undated. E.g. VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, MNV in Lysá nad Labem, Posudek, 7 May 1953. 583 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Pension Appeals Committee at the Ministry of Agriculture, Nález, October 23, 1953. 584 This is a report on a person of interest, prepared by the StB. In terms of information, these reports focused on political views, public behavior, but also the family or property of the person concerned. 585 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Section StB in Nymburk, Ustanovka, 11. 5. 1954, p. 2. 586 Ibid. 582

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and also the time spent in the communist dungeons could have a certain disposition to the above-mentioned actions. On the other hand, like other things, these could have been designed to portray Tichý in a bad light, justifying his persecution and surveillance. As far as Tichý’s contacts are concerned, it should be noted that Tichý sided with the company of other people, apart from his family, relatively long after moving to Lysá nad Labem. However, the situation most likely changed during the first half of 1954. Tichý then began to associate with people outside the circle of those closest to him, at least to a lesser extent, which obviously aroused the interest of the StB. According to surviving records, Tichý did not have much of a reputation with people at the time. Ustanovka from May 1954 talks about Karel Pekárek, whose daughter had an acquaintance with a man, who fled abroad after 1948, and Pekárek himself allegedly had an excellent opportunity to monitor the movement of jets at Boží Dar Airport due to his job as an inspector at the Nymburk Jednota in the Straky center, where he also traveled to Zbožíček, Čilka, Milovice and Boží Dar. 587 The operational plan to uncover Oldřich Tichý’s hostile activities from May 1954 also mentions Alois Chundelák, Josef Hodbod and Miroslav Pastrňák. All three men were members of the People’s Party, while Chundelák was also characterized as a “staunch clerical” 588, and Hodbod and Pastrňák considered the communist authorities to be enemies of the people’s democratic establishment. In addition to these three men, the operational plan also includes the name of Leopold Hrbata, an evangelical priest who was to have “great contacts with the former kulaks of Lysá n / L. and surroundings ’. 589 In the above-mentioned provision, it is still possible to find a man who wore a military uniform, commuted to Tichý’s apartment and he and his wife then escorted him to the station.590 The StB identified this man as Tichý’s brother-in-law, Lt. Col. Shoemaker. On the basis of Tichý’s work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, his position as the head of Czechoslovak intelligence in France and the reasoning that “he is bound to cooperate with IS and that he reports to them, which he obtains in an undetected manner,” the decision was made to expose his hostility by : implementation of provisions on the above – mentioned persons with whom Tichý came into contact, 587 590 StB identified this man as the Silent brother-in-law Lt. Col. Shoemaker. On the basis of Tichý’s work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, his position as the head of Czechoslovak intelligence in France and the reasoning that “he is bound to cooperate with IS and that he reports to them, which he obtains in an undetected manner,” the decision was made to expose his hostility by : implementation of provisions on the above – mentioned persons with whom Tichý came into contact, 587 590 StB identified this man as the Silent brother-in-law Lt. Col. Shoemaker. On the basis of Tichý’s work in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, his position as the head of Czechoslovak intelligence in France and the reasoning that “he is bound to cooperate with IS and that he reports to them, which he obtains in an undetected manner,” the decision was made to expose his hostility by : implementation of provisions on the above – mentioned persons with whom Tichý came into contact, 587

ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, StB section in Nymburk, Ustanovka, 11. 5. 1954, p. 3. ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, Okresní Department of the Ministry of the Interior in Nymburk, Operational Plan for the Detection of Tichý Oldřich’s Hostile Activities, 10 June 1954, p. 1. 589 Ibid., p. 2. 590 ABS, f. H, a. in Nymburk, Ustanovka, 11 May 1954, pp. 3. 588

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monitoring Tichý, investigating Karel Pekárek regarding his commuting to military facilities and his contacts, deepening knowledge about Tichý’s daughter Tán, conducting in-depth development of Kmen cooperative employees, filling Tichý with a suitable confidant and developing and acquiring Alois Chundelák as a potential confidant for Josef Hodboda, which was to help determine the specific activities of Tichý.591 In January 1955, from the point of view of the communist authorities, another problem arose in the matter of Oldřich Tichý. On January 14, Maj. František Novák, Deputy Chief of the District Military Administration (hereinafter OVS) Nymburk, Chief of the District Department of the Ministry of the Interior in Nymburk Lt. Václav Chalup acquainted with the contacts of the elder Václav Prosický, one of the employees of OVS Nymburk, and the porter and night watchman of OVS Kadeřábek with Oldřich Tichý. It, which attracted the attention of Lt. Chalupy, was the fact that Václav Prosický came into contact with “all the secret files by which the higher authorities give guidelines for the performance of various tasks from a military point of view.” 592 Although Major. Novák considered the contacts between Tichý and Prosický to be accidental, as both men were seen during Prosický’s trips to the post office, but above all they both knew each other from the carpenter’s cooperative, where Prosický also worked for some time, Lt. The cottage also admitted the possibility that this was a well-thought-out event by Oldřich Tichý to gain access to secret files through Václav Prosický. Similarly, por. Chalupa also considered the case of the doorman Kadeřábek, as he also worked in the Kmen cooperative before joining the OVS, where he met Oldřich Tichý, and Lt. The cottage did not rule out that the meeting with Tichý during Kadeřábek’s day off after night services when buying snacks may be aimed by Tichý to obtain an overview of the situation at OVS.593 On January 18, 1955, he was on Oldřich Tichý following previous findings and A record volume was established in the history of intelligence.594 The surviving materials also show that a confidant was deployed to Oldřich Tichý, who reported on it during 1955. The identity of this person with the pseudonym “Jarka” remains unknown. Of the reports passed by “Jarka”, Tichý’s views are most interesting on the political situation in Europe. For the sake of clarity, his opinion of the parties of the Cold War can be stated. The confidant who was on him 591 On January 1, 1955, following a previous finding and due to his military and intelligence history, a record volume was established for Oldřich Tichý.594 The surviving materials also show that a confidant was deployed to Oldřich Tichý, who reported on it during 1955. The identity of this person with the pseudonym “Jarka” remains unknown. Of the reports passed by “Jarka”, Tichý’s views are most interesting on the political situation in Europe. For the sake of clarity, his opinion of the parties of the Cold War can be stated. The confidant who was on him 591 On January 1, 1955, following a previous finding and due to his military and intelligence history, a record volume was established for Oldřich Tichý.594 The surviving materials also show that a confidant was deployed to Oldřich Tichý, who reported on it during 1955. The identity of this person with the pseudonym “Jarka” remains unknown. Of the reports passed by “Jarka”, Tichý’s views are most interesting on the political situation in Europe. For the sake of clarity, his opinion of the parties of the Cold War can be stated. The confidant who was on him 591 Of the reports passed by “Jarka”, Tichý’s views are most interesting on the political situation in Europe. For the sake of clarity, his opinion of the parties of the Cold War can be stated. The confidant who was on him 591 Of the reports passed by “Jarka”, Tichý’s views are most interesting on the political situation in Europe. For the sake of clarity, his opinion of the parties of the Cold War can be stated. The confidant who was on him 591

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, District Department of the Ministry of the Interior in Nymburk, Operational plan to expose the hostile activities of Tichý Oldřich, June 10, 1954, p. 2. 592 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, District Department of the Ministry of the Interior Nymburk, Record, 14 January 1955, pp. 1. 593 Ibid., pp. 1 ̶ 2. 594 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1 , District Department of the Ministry of the Interior Nymburk, Final Explanatory Memorandum to the proposed registration volume No. 746 to the deposit, 3 January 1956.

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“Overall, his views on world events can be summed up in such a way that he personally believes that European [collective] security must sooner or later take place, because neither side wants a war, and of course understandable 595 In addition to the confidant “Jarka”, the aforementioned Václav Prosický also reported on Tichý. The intention to use Prosický for this purpose is evidenced by the plan of agency and operational elaboration of the case of Oldřich Tichý from July 4, 1955.596 It was planned to deploy a certain collaborator, Janula, given that Tichý and Janula’s house were adjacent to the gardens. However, Janula’s collaborator failed to be deployed, as Tichý still maintained a certain distance from people, at least from those he did not know very well, and Janula’s young age also played a role in the difficulty of connecting Janula to Oldřich Tichý.597 Although there was no tangible evidence of activity , from which Tichý was suspected and all suspicions had the character of pure conjectures and constructs, his follow-up was still continued. Pore. Chalupa commented: “The fact that so far, in addition to several detected suspicious contacts gen. Silent, like with a pastor evang. The church of Hrbata z Lysá, Pekárek z Lysá, Hodbodě and Chundelák did not reveal any other suspicious circumstances around Tichý. Cottage with a reserve, partly because Prosický spoke very positively about Tichý. Other reasons then cf. Chalupa summed up the following note: mu toto. Even the circumstance if the daughter is employed in Czechoslovakia. airlines and if the son-in-law is an officer, he may have built one he recommended this to him. Even the circumstance if the daughter is employed in Czechoslovakia. airlines and if the son-in-law is an officer, he may have built one he recommended this to him. Even the circumstance if the daughter is employed in Czechoslovakia. airlines and if the son-in-law is an officer, he may have built one

595

ABS, f. H, no. H-342-1, Report from „Jarka“, 9.11.1955, p. 2. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Okresní Department of the Ministry of the Interior Nymburk, Top Secret, 4 July 1955, p. 2,597 ABS, f. H, No. H-342-1 f. H and. no. H-342-1, District MV department Nymburk, confidential, 4. 7. 1955, p. 1. 596

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by airline staff daughters through

connection with foreign

599 The latest records of the campaign against Oldřich Tichý in 1954 and 1955 date from December 1955. Mention may be made of the other two persons with whom Tichý came into contact.600 No anti-state activities but Oldřich Tichý never managed to prove it, but he remained a suspect. The last two paragraphs of the final explanatory memorandum to the volume kept on Oldřich Tichý, prepared by Lt. Col. The cottage speaks for itself: “It is assumed that Tichý may form such an opinion around himself that he is not interested in anything just to conspire his hostile activity even deeper, which has not yet been revealed during the investigation. I therefore propose a record file for storage, even if the agency that was connected to it will continue to be extracted to its person after the bass of former people. I propose the volume to be stored permanently, as it is a former intelligence officer who held senior positions in the 2nd Department of Intelligence. gene. 601 Oldřich Tichý remained in the search engine of the competent authorities. As early as January 1956, the Regional Administration of the Ministry of the Interior of Pilsen addressed a request to the District Office of Nymburk to arrange for the interrogation of Tichý.602 In 1957, directly to the Ministry of the Interior in Prague.603 Although both requests were granted by the District Department of the Ministry of the Interior Nymburk, it is not known whether the interrogations took place. Another change in Silent Life came in the form of a new job. From January 28, 1957, Tichý began working as a storekeeper in the national company Fruta, 604 more precisely in his branch in Lysá nad Labem. Towards the end of the 1950s, Silent Verification and Surveillance finally eased, although it continued. However, at the end of 1959 the proposal fell and on 599

ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Unmarked report por. Václav Chalupa, 8 November 1955. ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, Record of Lt. Col. Tesaříka, 1 December 1955. 601 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-1, District Department of the Ministry of the Interior Nymburk, Final Explanatory Memorandum to the proposed registration volume no. ABS, f. H, no. H-342-2, Regional Administration of the Ministry of the Interior Pilsen, Tichý Oldřich ̶ Application for permission to interrogate, 9 January 1956. 603 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342- 2, MV, Subject: Tichý Oldřich, býv. gene. ̶ request, 5 March 1957. 604 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Regional Military Administration Prague, Adjustment of pension benefits, June 22, 1964. However, you can also meet the date of Tichý’s entry into the national company Ula on January 28, 1957. VÚA – SA AČR, f. z profession, Oldřich Tichý, Manuscript notes on the person of Oldřich Tichý, 21. 1. 1966. 600

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On 15 January 1960 the decision to establish an agency union for Tichý’s daughter Táňa, at that time already Cihelková.605 In this case, however, the StB was not interested in Taťána Cihelková

because of

her

father.

Cihelková

had

changed

jobs

and Czechoslovak Airlines December 15, 1959 was transferred to the position on Iraqi translator vyslanectví.606 for cooperation Tanya Cihelková won StB 14 January 1960 and the volume within the agency had assigned the code name “Klapková” .607 Given that Tania Cihelková perfectly dominated the English, French, German and partly Russian, not too surprising that she wanted StB used for obtaining and

submission

of reports

from the Iraqi

embassy.

Paradoxically,

Tatiana

Cihelka

with the operational staff of the StB, who arranged cooperation with her, Capt. Alois Semelka, acquainted a certain Mr. Kolouch, who originally wanted to offer Cihelková a position with an Indian airline and whose Cihelková knew as a representative of the Ministry of the Interior, introduced to her by Oldřich Tichý, who knew Koloucha from his time in the army.608 Taťána Cihelková from the Iraqi embassy. Cihelková’s cooperation with the StB continued after 1962, when she terminated her employment at the embassy. Afterwards, Táňa Cihelková started working as an interpreter for the Prague Information Service, in fact interpreting mainly for the Ministry of Education and the Polytechnic. However, Cihelková managed to refute the accusation and her deconspiracy did not occur.610 Cihelková’s evaluation as a collaborator sounded quite positive, but the lower level of her own initiative in establishing contacts, obtaining information or requesting meetings was criticized. On April 11, 1968, Cihelková requested the waiver of regular cooperation, which she justified on the grounds that she was very busy and did not have the necessary qualities to remain in cooperation.

605

The date when Táňa Tichá got married is not known. What is certain, however, is that Cihelková married Dalibor Cihelka, who helped her father get a job at Ultrafon as a student. 606 ABS, f. Volume Agenda, a. No. 625312 MV, Proposal for acquisition for cooperation, December 28, 1959, p. 1. 607 ABS, f. volume on Taťána Cihelková, 15 January 1960. 608 ABS, f. Svazkové agenda, no. agenda, a. No. 625312 MV, Regional Administration of the SNB Prague, II / M Department ̶ 3rd Department, Proposal to impose a personal agent. volume A ̶ Klapková, No. 11686 to the archives of the Ministry of the Interior, 2 May 1968, p. 1. 610 ABS, f. , Evaluation of a collaborator, p. 3.

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At her request, it was proposed that the cooperation with “Klapková” be terminated.611

But back to Oldřich Tichý. Experiments date back to the 1960s

on the rehabilitation of Oldřich Tichý. The first surviving overview of Tichý’s activities, together with a proposal for a solution to possible rehabilitation prepared by the KVS Prague Rehabilitation Commission on its own initiative, dates from May 22, 1964.612 The commission could an opinion of the MNV in Lysá nad Labem and an opinion prepared by the head of operations at Tichý workplace. It must be said that, in contrast to the opinion of the MNV, the evaluation from the workplace sounded very positive for Tichý. Tichý was characterized as a man “open, direct, non-negotiable, energetic, intelligent,” who performs his tasks “responsibly and conscientiously.” 613 Tichý’s activities within the ROH also received a positive comment, in which he worked “on the initiative of the security commission as well as in the audit commission, “His relationship with the establishment was considered positive and overall Tichý’s work was considered very beneficial for the company.614 However, the commission’s conclusion was as follows:” army and the withdrawal of rank was justified. Appointed to this day has no good relationship with the soc. establishment. According to the chairman of the MNV and the secretary, the return of the rank would have a bad response among the public. As for the positive evaluation from the workplace, they note that it is necessary to see the composition of workers in Fruta, which is similar in comparison with it. 615 On September 4, 1964, a similar conclusion was made in the official proposal for the eighteenth meeting of the rehabilitation commission.616 “After studying the personnel materials and conducting an interview with the chairman and secretary of the MNV Lysá nad Labem, it can be judged that the dismissal from the army and the removal of the rank was justified. Appointed to this day has no good relationship with the soc. establishment. According to the chairman of the MNV and the secretary, the return of the rank would have a bad response among the public. As for the positive evaluation from the workplace, they note that it is necessary to see the composition of workers in Fruta, which is similar in comparison with it. 615 On September 4, 1964, a similar conclusion was made in the official proposal for the eighteenth meeting of the rehabilitation commission.616 “After studying the personnel materials and conducting an interview with the chairman and secretary of the MNV Lysá nad Labem, it can be judged that the dismissal from the army and the removal of the rank was justified. Appointed to this day has no good relationship with the soc. establishment. According to the chairman of the MNV and the secretary, the return of the rank would have a bad response among the public. As for the positive evaluation from the workplace, they note that it is necessary to see the composition of workers in Fruta, which is similar in comparison with it. 615 On September 4, 1964, a similar conclusion was made in the official proposal for the eighteenth meeting of the rehabilitation commission.616 According to the chairman of the MNV and the secretary, the return of the rank would have a bad response among the public. As for the positive evaluation from the workplace, they note that it is necessary to see the composition of workers in Fruta, which is similar in comparison with it. 615 On September 4, 1964, a similar conclusion was made in the official proposal for the eighteenth meeting of the rehabilitation commission.616 According to the chairman of the MNV and the secretary, the return of the rank would have a bad response among the public. As for the positive evaluation from the workplace, they note that it is necessary to see the composition of workers in Fruta, which is similar in comparison with it. 615 On September 4, 1964, a similar conclusion was made in the official proposal for the eighteenth meeting of the rehabilitation commission.616

611

ABS, f. Svazkové agendy, no. volume A ̶ Klapková, No. 11686 to the archives of the Ministry of the Interior, May 2, 1968, pp. 1 ̶ 2. 612 return of military rank as early as 1962. However, neither the application nor any documents on the settlement of the application from this period are not available. 613 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Subject: Osobní posudek, 6. 5. 1964. 614 Ibid. 615 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, KVS Prague, Overview of activities and proposed solution, May 22, 1964, p. 2. 616 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, f. , Oldřich Tichý, KVS Prague, Proposal for the 18th meeting reh. Commission, 4.9.1964, p. 2.

121

On October 4, 1965, Tichý himself sent a request for the return of military rank. In a letter addressed to the Main Personnel Administration of MNO Tichý, he asked for a review of his activities and for him to receive full rehabilitation, as well as for other military officials illegally imprisoned in the Mírov penitentiary. Tichý argued that his relationship with the people’s democratic and socialist establishment was always positive and never worked against him. He also referred to his former job in Fruta, where he was always considered a “good worker-official who always stood up for the development of the socialist establishment” .617 strength and as an activist. Together with him, Svazarm also accepted Tichý’s wife into employment. It must be emphasized that Tichý could also prove very positive evaluations from the new employer.618 Tichý’s request was finally processed by the MNO in June 1966. On 13 June 1966 the MNO reached the same conclusion as in 1964, namely that in the case of Oldřich Tichý it was not a rehabilitation in meaning of the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and thus it was neither possible to revise the original decision of the MNO on the transfer of Tichý to retirement or the withdrawal of military rank, which also made it impossible to return the military rank. The MNO added that: “After a new evaluation of the whole and thus it was neither possible to revise the original decision of the NGO to transfer Tichý to retirement or to withdraw his military rank, which also made it impossible for the military rank to be restored. The MNO added that: “After a new evaluation of the whole and thus it was neither possible to revise the original decision of the NGO to transfer Tichý to retirement or to withdraw his military rank, which also made it impossible for the military rank to be restored. The MNO added that: “After a new evaluation of the whole

In this case, the

Ministry of

National

Defense

asks his

question

[Silent, note. author] military service in the army for closed. Due to his development so far, he has no reservations or objections to his person. The NGO is of the opinion that the nominee is not judged by the relevant territorial authorities in terms of his service in the army, but in terms of his attitude and behavior in civic life. ”619 have a theoretical chance of succeeding with their demand this time. In 1968, it seemed that the whole truth about the situation and matters concerning TNP Mírov would finally come to light, and in connection with this, the former Peace Prisoners also felt that they would finally get rid of the mark of unwanted persons. Several articles about Mírov were even published in the press at the time. All hopes 617

VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Application for recognition of rank, 4. 10. 1956, p. 1. 618 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Svazarm, Opinion of Oldřich Tichý, 30 September 1965. 619 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, MNO Personnel Administration, Subject: Tichý Oldřich – explanatory letter, 27 June 1966.

122

however, he was thwarted by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent period of normalization.620 On February 14, 1969, the Prague-West District Court ruled in favor of revising the Silent Inclusion in TNP Mírov. The court thus annulled the decision of the commission that sent Tichý to Mírov and declared them invalid by law on the grounds that “in the given case it was not a person with shielding or dangerous foreign property” .621 However, the Regional Military Administration of NGOs Silent only in March 1971, and again came to a negative conclusion. This can be evidenced by the quote: “The opinion of the NGO on this request has always been negative. Even at present, the law does not allow the implementation of the named request. Due to his physical age – because he is not in the records of the military administration is not to return the rank of military support in law. With this interview, MNO KS considers the request of June 1968 to be closed. […] “622 As far as Tichý’s later life is concerned, unfortunately no more coherent materials are available so far, except perhaps for documents concerning Tichý’s rehabilitation from 1990. However, at least briefly, At the very end of 1967, Tichý and his wife moved to the village of Trnová, located in the district of Prague-West.623 Podebrady. Tichý worked here for the last season here from May 2 to August 28, 1972.624 On May 3, 1982, Oldřich Tichý was hit by a personal tragedy in the form of the death of his sick wife. 625 Karla Tichá,

620

BÍLEK, J .: Tábor, p. 113. VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, District Court Prague, Decision in the case of Oldřich Tichý, 14. 2. 1969. 622 VÚA – SA AČR, f Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Minutes of the interview with former General Oldřich Tichý, March 24, 1971. 623 ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2, StB Nymburk Department, Tichý Oldřich – handover materials, January 12, 1971. According to Mrs. Nina Jindřichová, who met Oldřich Tichý in Trnová several times, Oldřich Tichý’s family moved into the local chateau, which was bought by Tichý’s son-in-law Dalibor Cihelka. The chateau was later lost by the Cihelka family in restitution. Statement of Mrs. Nina Jindřichová, April 26, 2015. 624 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualification documents, Oldřich Tichý, Technical Services of the City of Poděbrady, August 29, 1972. 625 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb.

123 of the

sixth infarction. Oldřich Tichý attributed her illness to his imprisonment, which was a huge psychological burden for his wife.626 The fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia in November 1989 finally provided an opportunity to clear the name of Oldřich Tichý. Post-November President Václav Havel was also very interested in the rehabilitation proceedings. He emphasized this in Pilsen on May 6, 1990, on the occasion of the end of World War II: “Living and until recently forgotten fighters will be promoted and honored, the memory of the dead will be honored.” when rehabilitation took place is no longer so clear. On March 2, 1990, Oldřich Tichý was granted through the

Federal

Ministry

of Defense

Medal

For

Merit

Jaroslav Valenta, who helped prepare part of Tichý’s memoirs for publication, stated that Tichý had received full rehabilitation on May 3, 1990, while at the same time he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general.629 In the book Elite armády rank of lieutenant general in the case of Oldřich Tichý no mention, however, his rehabilitation is dated to 1990.630 The problem, however, is that these data do not fully correspond to archival documents. According to them, the Regional Rehabilitation Commission decided on rehabilitation only in January 1991. However, the truth remains that in a letter dated 12 June 1990, in which Taťána Cihelková informed KVS about the death of her father, who died after a long illness on 5 June 1990. speaks as “Lieutenant General vv” 631 Either way, Oldřich Tichý’s name was finally cleared. The text of the decision on rehabilitation sent to Tichý’s daughter Taťána on 22 January 1991 should be quoted in full at the end of the thesis: “Dear Madam, on the basis of a request for rehabilitation of your deceased father, Mr. Brig. General Oldřich Tichý, born 3 [0]. 1. 1898, the Regional Rehabilitation Commission informs you the following. After studying the personal files, it was found that your father was discharged from the army for his crucial 626

VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Verbal expression including disability of direct family members, 1. 2. 1991. 627 ZELENKA, Jan (ed.): Václav Havel. Volume VI. Speeches from 1990 ̶ 1992. Summer reflection. Prague 1999, p. 131. 628 VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Minutes of the rehabilitation meeting of the Regional Rehabilitation Commission at KVS Prague, January 22, 1991. 629 TICHÝ, O .: , pp. 120. 630 MASKALÍK, A: Elite of the Army, pp. 603. 631 VÚA ̶ VHA, sb. Qualifications, Oldřich Tichý, Subject: Death Report, 12 June 1990.

124

political attitudes and contrary to moral principles. Due to the incorrect release from the army, your family has been morally and materially damaged, and therefore consider your father and your family to be fully rehabilitated. The Federal Minister of Defense instructed the Regional Rehabilitation Commission by FMO Personnel Order No. 7/90 to accept an apology for all the hardships caused to you during the years of the totalitarian regime and the full moral rehabilitation of your deceased father. Yours sincerely, Chairman of the Regional Rehabilitation Commission, Colonel Milan Mudra. ”632

632

VÚA – SA AČR, f. Personnel materials of professional soldiers, Oldřich Tichý, Regional Rehabilitation Commission at KVS Prague

125

Conclusion

The main goal of this diploma thesis was to develop, mainly on the basis of the study of archival materials, a comprehensive biography reconstructing undoubtedly very interesting and sometimes very difficult life destinies of Oldřich Tichý. This effort was motivated mainly by the fact that Oldřich Tichý has not yet received any professional monographs

studies devoted

directly to

his person within the historiography . With respect

on the availability, quantity and content of materials that could be used for the work, it is clear that some episodes from the life of Oldřich Tichý did not receive as detailed processing as they might deserve. Such is the case, for example, of Tichý’s life in the period from 1968 until his death. However, it cannot be ruled out that in the future, if new sources are found, it will not be possible to extend the reconstruction of the Silent Life in certain respects. The potential in this sense can be seen, for example, in the possible discovery of the Silent Legacy, which has not yet succeeded. Similarly, attempts to locate living relatives have so far been unsuccessful, although several attempts have been made during the research. The presented work can be perceived not only as a “mere” biography, but also as a probe into a certain issue, especially Czechoslovak military intelligence or military diplomacy. For a total of 33 years, Oldřich Tichý connected his life with the army, which for the first time significantly affected his life during the First World War. After a short stint in the Austro-Hungarian army, he joined the Czechoslovak legions in Russia. This military participation probably predestined him to remain in the army also in the service of an independent Czechoslovakia, within which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence team of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. which first significantly affected his life during the First World War. After a short stint in the Austro-Hungarian army, he joined the Czechoslovak legions in Russia. This military participation probably predestined him to remain in the army also in the service of an independent Czechoslovakia, within which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence team of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. which first significantly affected his life during the First World War. After a short stint in the Austro-Hungarian army, he joined the Czechoslovak legions in Russia. This military participation probably predestined him to remain in the army also in the service of an independent Czechoslovakia, within which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence team of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. After a short stint in the Austro-Hungarian army, he joined the Czechoslovak legions in Russia. This military participation probably predestined him to remain in the army also in the service of an independent Czechoslovakia, within which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence team of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. After a short stint in the Austro-Hungarian army, he joined the Czechoslovak legions in Russia. This military participation probably predestined him to remain in the army also in the service of an independent Czechoslovakia, within which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence team of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. in which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence group of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938. in which, during the First Republic, he worked his way up to the head of the search section of the intelligence group of the General Staff Intelligence Department. He also took part in the fight against Nazi Germany in the military intelligence service long before the Second World War. Thanks to his military higher education, intelligence experience and knowledge of foreign languages, he was also entrusted with the office of the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Switzerland for the period 1937–1938.

hasty

departure

from Czechoslovakia

, along

with other

members

Moravec

intelligence “Eleven” on the eve of the German invasion in 1939, he served as an active participant in second resistance, under which played a very important role on the news battlefield and without whose contribution the Czechoslovak intelligence abroad hardly reached the results they have achieved. Even after leaving the service 126

Czechoslovak military intelligence continued to perform by example all the functions and tasks he received, both in the foreign resistance and after his return to Czechoslovakia. The culmination of his military career was the achievement of a general rank. Like many other participants in the Second Resistance, she did not avoid the silent persecution by the communist regime, which was not limited to more than a year in one of the worst communist dungeons, TNP Mírov, but which also included many years of supervision by the communist security authorities. and, of course, enormous moral damage. Oldřich Tichý did not receive any satisfaction until the very end of his life, when he was awarded the Medal of Merit for the Czechoslovak Army three months before his death. However, his name was not completely cleared until 1991. We can only hope

127

List of sources and literature

Unpublished sources Archive of Security Forces Prague fond 52 (Statements of Gestapo and SD employees) fond 302 (Main Administration of Military Counterintelligence) fond H (Historical fund; a. No. H-342-1; a. No. H-342-1) fond Union agendas, a. No.625312 MV fond Z (Maps of reports prepared by the MV Studý ústav Institute of Jaroslav Čvančara Archive Private documentation Masaryk Institute and Archiv Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic fond Edvard Beneš Národní archiv Praha fond Archiv Hubert Ripka fond Police Headquarters Prague II – population records Military Central Archive ̶ Administrative archive Czech Republic Olomouc fond Personnel materials of professional soldiers Military Central Archive ̶ Military Historical Archive Prague collection 20 (Ministry of National Defense London) collection 22 (Czechoslovak military units in the USSR) collection 37 (Military Intelligence Command) collection Qualification documents collection Legionary Service file collection Military intelligence

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Expert studies and articles: BÍLEK, Jiří: Tábor nucené práce Mírov. Historie a vojenství, 47, 1998, No. 4, pp. 91̶ 116. BŘACHOVÁ, Věra: Destrukcestojnického sboru čs. army after February 1948. History and Military, 41, 1992, No. 1, pp. 109 ̶ 127. GEBHART, Jan ̶ KUKLÍK, Jan: Czechoslovak-Polish military intelligence in the spring and summer of 1939. History and Military, 41 , 1992, No. 3, pp. 66 ̶ 94.

131

HANZLIK, Frantisek: Vojak. The example of Oscar Dogs. In: FASORA, Lukáš – HANUŠ, Jiří – MALÍŘ, Jiří – VYKOUPIL, Libor (ed.): Man in Moravia in the First Half of the 20th Century. Brno 2011, pp. 287-298. KOKOŠKA (MALÍŘ), Jaroslav: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina plk. Moravce on the eve of World War II. Historie a vojenství, 38, 1989, No. 4, pp. 68 ̶ 89. KREISINGER, Pavel: Rok 1941 v československém vojenském zpravodajství. Personnel crisis in Moravec’s intelligence “eleven”. In: KUDRNA, Ladislav (ed.): The War Year 1941 in the Czechoslovak Domestic and Foreign Resistance. Proceedings of the international conference. Prague 2012. KUDRNA, Ladislav: Military Defense Intelligence (1945 ̶1950). Development, organizational structures, staffing. Paměť a dějiny, 3, 2008, No. 1, pp. 76 ̶ 89. In: Historica Pragensia: Historical Proceedings of the Museum of the Capital City of Prague, 2, 2005, pp. 163 ̶ 182. PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Klára: The Life Fates of a Intelligence Officer and Military Diplomat of Colonel Alois Čáslavka (1899−1963). Olomouc 2015 (unpublished diploma thesis). STRAKA, Karel: Czechoslovak and French Military Intelligence 1933 ̶1938. Historie a vojenství, 58, 2009, No. 2, pp. 32 ̶ 65. STRANKMÜLLER, Emil: Czechoslovak Offensive News since March 1939. Resistance and Revolution 1970, pp. 189–229. UHLÍŘ, Jan B .: Vladimír J. Krajina – researcher and politician. On his late 90th birthday. Historical Horizon, 6, 1995, No. 1, pp. 16-20. ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Zlatica: Czechoslovak Army 1939 ̶1945. Plans and reality. In: ZUDOVÁ-LEŠKOVÁ, Z. (ed.): Czechoslovak Army 1939 ̶1945 (Plans and Reality). Papers from the International Conference October 22-23, 2002.

132

CTU Internet Resources in Prague: History. In: http://www.cvut.cz/historie [cit. October 18, 2014]. Dobromysl Foundation: Photogallery. In: http://www.indiannet.eu/home_resistance/fotky/part2/cz001.html [cit. April 25, 2015]. Encyclopedic Dictionary of Czech History 1938 ̶ 1945. Keyword: Czechoslovak ground forces in France. In: http://www.usd.cas.cz/UserFiles/File/Publikace/Slovnik38_45.pdf [cit. March 1, 2015]. Gymnasium, Brno, Křenová 36: History of the school. In: http://www.gymkren.cz/ogymnaziu-krenova-brno/historie-skoly/ [cit. October 18, 2014]. KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Before the war broke out. Germans in the service of Czechoslovakia. intelligence services in 1935 ̶1939. In: http://dejinyasoucasnost.cz/archiv/2007/4/nez-vypukla-valka/ [cit. January 30, 2015]. Nina Jindřichová ̶ Sculpture and Stucco Studio: Portrait of General Oldřich Tichý. In: http: //www.jindrichova. com / portfolio / volna-tvorba / portrety [cit. April 26, 2015]. PANUŠ,

Bernard:

Silent

Oldrich.

In:

http://www.karelvasatko.cz/zivotopisy-

legionaru / ruske-legie- / tichy-oldich [cit. October 18, 2014]. PANUŠ, Bernard: Military Education in Czechoslovakia. legions. In: http://www.karelvasatko.cz/historie-ceskoslovenskych-legii/odborneclanky/vseobecne-k-cs-legiim/vojenske-kolstvi-v-slegiich [cit. 19/11/2014]. PAVLÍK, Jiří ̶ POKORNÝ, Radek: They fought for us. Legionnaires from Hradec Králové. In: http://g.denik.cz/17/81/legionari_00003.jpg [cit. February 25, 2015]. PLACHÝ,

Jiří:

How the Ministry of Defense

worked in London.

In: http://www.vhu.cz/jak-fungovalo-ministerstvo-obrany-v-londyne/ [cit. March 9, 2015]. STRAKA, Karel: Renewal of the Czechoslovak-French Intelligence Cooperation between March and August 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Renewal). In: http://www.vhu.cz/obnovaceskoslovensko-francouzske-zpravodajske-kooperace-mezi-breznem-a-srpnem-1939/ [cit. February 14, 2015].

133

List of used abbreviations ABS ̶ Archive of security forces AHR ̶ Archive of Hubert Ripka brig. gene. ̶ Brigadier General CIA – Central Intelligence Agency CIC – Counter Intelligence Corps CTU ̶ Czech Technical University div. gene. ̶ Divisional General doc. ̶ associate professor dr. ̶ doctor gen. Gen General Maj. Gen. ̶ Major General of the Gestapo ̶ Geheime Staatspolizei gšt. ̶ General Staff of the HaV ̶ History and Military of the HSOBZ ̶ Main Report of the Defense Intelligence of the HSVO ̶ Main Administration of Education Ing. ̶ engineer JD ̶ one-year volunteer ride. ̶ cavalry JUDr. ̶ Doctor of Laws conc. ̶ conceptual Cpt. ̶ Captain of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia ̶ Communist Party of Czechoslovakia KVS – Regional Military Administration Maj.

NA ̶ NSDAP National Archive ̶ Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei OBZ OS OSS Defense Office – Office of Strategic Services OVS ̶ Okresní vojenská správa pěch. ̶ infantry pkpt. ̶ subchapter Col. ̶ Colonel Lt. Col. ̶ Lieutenant Colonel PŘII – EO ̶ Police Headquarters Prague II ̶ Population Register ̶ Political Headquarters ROH ̶ Revolutionary Trade Union Movement rt. ̶ company rtm. ̶ Sergeant SHAEF ̶ Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces SIS – Secret Intelligence Service SNB ̶ National Security Corps SOE ̶ Special Operation Executive SR ̶ Service de Renseignement USSR ̶ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics StB ̶ State Security Svazarm – Union for Cooperation with the Army Capt. ̶ Staff Captain of the SWBM ̶ TNP Armed Forces Staff ̶ Forced Labor Camp ̶ USFET organizace United States Formations of the European Theater of the Republic VÚA ̶ VHA ̶ Military Central Archive ̶ Military Historical Archive Prague vv ̶ retired ̶ in reserve 135

Resumé The main research purpose of this thesis is to create the first biographical study about the life story of intelligence officer and military diplomat brigadier general Oldřich Tichý in the context of 20th century. The main reason for this research is the absence of any professional work about this very interesting and important officer of Czechoslovakian army. The thesis is divided into four chapters, each of them dealing with one specific period of his life. The first chapter is introductory and it focuses on the childhood, youth of Oldřich Tichý and his career in the Austro-Hungarian army and Czechoslovakian legions in Russia. Chapter two concerns service of Oldřich Tichý in Czechoslovakian army as ordinary officer, intelligence officer and military diplomat. The third chapter examines military service of Oldřich Tichý during the Second World War. It focuses on his intelligence work, his service as liaison officer at the Dutch army in Great Britain, officer at the Czechoslovakian military headquarters and liaison officer at the third American army. The last chapter of this thesis deals with career and life of Oldřich Tichý after the war, especially with his persecution by communists and his rehabilitation.

136

Attachments Officer’s rank of Oldřich Tichý Ensign

6 January 1919

Lieutenant

7 July 1919

Lieutenant

5 September 1920

Captain

1 November 1921

Staff Captain

9 July 1927

Major

10 February 1933

Lieutenant Colonel

10 July 1937 ( with effect from 1 July 1937)

Colonel

15 December 1944 (with effect from 28 October 1944)

Brigadier General

20 February 1947

Selection of orders and decorations that Oldřich Tichý received633 Order of St. George IV degree (1919) Czechoslovak War Cross 1918 (1921) Order of MR Štefánik “Falcon with Swords” (1921) Italian War Merit Cross (1921) Czechoslovak Revolutionary Medal Czechoslovak War Cross 1939 Polish Order “Polonia Restituta” Knight’s Order of the Legion of Honor French Order “Nishan Iftikar “Czechoslovak Commemorative Medal (1944) Czechoslovak Military Medal of Merit I. degree (1944) American award” Legion of Merit “(1945)

633

In parentheses the year of award, if known.

137

Photo

fig. 1: Group photograph of Czechoslovak army officers from the 1920s. Oldřich Tichý, probably here in the rank of captain (with a boat on his head sitting under President TG Masaryk) Source:

PAVLÍK,

Jiří ̶

POKORNÝ,

Radek:

They fought

for

us.

Legionnaires

from Hradec Králové. In: http://g.denik.cz/17/81/legionari_00003.jpg [cit. February 25, 2015].

138

fig. 2: Intelligence officers of the Second Department of the General Staff: from left Vladimír Cigna (hat). Bohumil Dítě, Antonín Longa (hat), unknown, Oldřich Tichý, František Moravec (hat, stick), František Fryč, František Hájek (hat), Alois Frank (hat), Josef Bartík (hat, long coat), Alexander Fritscher (hat) ), Josef Fořt, Václav Sláma (hat), František Fárek (hat), two unknown uniformed officers Source: KREISINGER, P. Brigadier General, p. 45

139

Giant. 3: Moravc’s “eleven” in Great Britain: from left Václav Sláma, Karel Paleček, Oldřich Tichý, Vladimír Cigna, Josef Fořt, Emil Strankmüller, František Moravec, František Fryč, Josef Bartík, Alois Frank and Jaroslav Tauer Source: Dobromysl Foundation: Photogallery. In: http://www.indiannet.eu/home_resistance/fotky/part2/cz001.html [cit. April 25, 2015].

140

fig. 4: Families of intelligence officers in Warsaw, Poland Source: Jaroslav Čvančara Archive, Private Documentation

141

Giant. 5: Władysław Rackiewicz, President of the Republic of Poland in exile, honors Czechoslovak intelligence officers with the “Polonia Restituta” order. Josef Bartík is decorated. Oldřich Tichý is standing next to Bartík. František Moravec can be seen in the background, and to the left of the president stands the Polish Prime Minister in exile, Gen. Władysław Sikorski (1941) Source: KREISINGER, P. Brigadier General, p. 95.

142

Obr. Fig. 6: Post-war photograph of Oldřich Tichý Source: ABS, f. H, a. No. H-342-2

143 Fig.

7: Photographs of Oldřich Tichý from the post – war application for the issuance of a new driving license Source: NA, f. PŘPII – EO

144

8: Photographs of Oldřich Tichý from the firearms pass from 1949 Source: NA, f. PŘPII – EO

145

Giant. 9: Oldřich Tichý in 1990 Source: KOKOŠKA, J. – KOKOŠKA, S .: Dispute over agent A-54, p. 306

146

Obr. 10: Portrait of Oldřich Tichý Source: Nina Jindřichová ̶ Sculpture and Stucco Studio: Portrait of General Oldřich Tichý. In: http://www.jindrichova.com/portfolio/volna-tvorba/portrety [cit. 26. 4. 2015]

147

Annotation Name and surname:

Radim Staněk

Faculty:

Faculty of Arts

Department:

History

Leader:

PhDr. Pavel Kreisinger

Year of defense

2015

Title:

Life destinies of intelligence officer and military diplomat brig. gene. Ulrich Pacific (1898-1990)

Title in English:

The Life Story of Intelligence Officer and Military

Diplomat

Brigadier

General

Oldřich Tichý (1898 ̶ 1990) Abstract:

The thesis is the first comprehensive biographical study reconstructing the life destinies of a prominent Czechoslovak

intelligence

officer and military diplomat brig. gene. Oldřich Tichý, in the context of the entire 20th century. The work is also a probe into the issues of military intelligence and military diplomacy. Keywords:

Czechoslovakia,

legion,

Czechoslovak

army, military intelligence, military diplomacy, First Republic, World War II, Communist Party, persecution by the communist regime, rehabilitation Annotation in English:

The thesis is the first complete biographical study reconstructing the life story of imporatnt intelligence officer and military diplomat brigadier general Oldřich Tichý in 148

the context of whole 20th century. The thesis i also the probe into problems of military intelligence and military diplomacy. English keywords:

Czechoslovakia, legions, Czechoslovakian army,

military

intelligence,

military

diplomacy, first Czechoslovak republic, Second World War, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, persecution by communist regime, rehabilitation Attachments bound in work: Důstojnické hodnosti Oldřicha Tichého

; Selection of orders and decorations; Fotografie

Scope of work:

149 pages

Language of work:

Czech

149

brigádního generála Josefa Bartíka | Masarykova univerzita
Filozofická fakulta
Historický ústav

Masarykova univerzita
Filozofická fakulta
Historický ústav
Životní osudy zpravodajského důstojníka
brigádního generála Josefa Bartíka
(magisterská diplomová práce)
Bc. Pavel Kreisinger
Vedoucí práce: doc. PhDr. František Hanzlík, CSc. Brno 2011
Prohlašuji, že jsem magisterskou diplomovou práci vypracoval samostatně a uvedl
všechnu použitou literaturu a prameny.
datum vlastnoruční podpis
Zde bych chtěl poděkovat vedoucímu práce doc. PhDr. Františku Hanzlíkovi, CSc. za
jeho odborné vedení, cenné rady a připomínky, bez nichž by tato práce nevznikla. Rovněž mu
patří poděkování za pomoc se sháněním archivních pramenů a některé hůře dostupné
literatury. Můj velký dík patří rovněž vnukovi generála Josefa Bartíka Milanu Jirkovi, a to za
ochotu, s jakou se mi vždy věnoval a s jakou mi zapůjčil všechny materiály z generálovy
pozůstalosti. Za cenné rady a počáteční podněty vděčím též plk. v. z. MUDr. Zdeňku
Voldřichovi, DrSc. Za ochotné poskytnutí některých vzácných fotografií Josefa Bartíka patří
moje poděkování také Jaroslavu Čvančarovi.

5
Obsah
ÚVOD …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 6
STAV ZKOUMANÉ PROBLEMATIKY ………………………………………………………….. 8

LÉTA MLÁDÍ (1897-1918) …………………………………………………………………… 14
1.1 Dětství a rodinné poměry (1897-1915) ………………………………………………………………. 14
1.2 Italským legionářem ve Velké válce (1915-1918) …………………………………………….. 15
LÉTA MEZIVÁLEČNÁ (1919-1939)……………………………………………………… 21
2.1 Důstojníkem zpravodajského oddělení Hlavního štábu (1919-1924) …………… 21
2.2 Ve studijní a pátrací skupině zpravodajského oddělení (1925-1935) …………… 24
2.3 Přednostou obranné sekce pátrací skupiny (1935-1939) ……………………………….. 30
LÉTA VÁLEČNÁ (1939-1945) ………………………………………………………………. 43
3.1 Velká Británie a Polsko (1939) ……………………………………………………………………………… 43
3.2 Francie (1939-1940) ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 52
3.3 Zpátky ve Velké Británii (1940-1945) …………………………………………………………………. 61
LÉTA POVÁLEČNÁ (1945-1968) …………………………………………………………. 72
4.1 Poválečná kariéra na MV a na MNO (1945-1948) ……………………………………………… 72
4.2 Perzekuce a věznění (1948-1953) ……………………………………………………………………….. 80
4.3 Nový život: práce v civilním sektoru, rehabilitace (1953-1968) …………………….. 94
ZÁVĚR ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 99
PŘEHLED POUŽITÝCH PRAMENŮ A LITERATURY ……………………………… 101
SEZNAM POUŽITÝCH ZKRATEK ……………………………………………………………. 107
PŘÍLOHY ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 109
6
Úvod
S osobností významného českého zpravodajského důstojníka a pozdějšího generála
Josefa Bartíka se autor poprvé seznámil během psaní bakalářské diplomové práce, v níž se
zabýval životními osudy zpravodajského důstojníka plk. gšt. Jana Krčka.1
Z vojenských
osobností čs. zahraničního odboje, se kterými přišel Jan Krček ve Velké Británii do užšího
služebního kontaktu, autora zaujala právě osobnost Josefa Bartíka. Ten byl v letech 1942-
1945 Krčkovým bezprostředním nadřízeným. Oba důstojníci spolu, ale spolupracovali již
před rokem 1942. Například se podíleli na přípravě operace Anthropoid.2
V té době autor zjistil, že o Josefu Bartíkovi nebyla doposud napsána žádná odborná
biografická studie. Přestože se Bartíkovo jméno objevilo i ve velké syntéze k dějinám čs.
zemí ve 20. století,3
základní informace o jeho osobě se daly dohledat pouze v několika
medailoncích. Autor nejpodrobnějšího medailonku, historik Karel Richter, charakterizoval
Bartíka následující větou: „Muž, o kterém se skoro nic neví. A přece by se o něm daly napsat
celé knihy.“4 V podobném duchu se o svém otci vyjádřila i Bartíkova dcera Draga: „Taťka
vždy říkal, že je škoda, že toho tolik zemře s ním.“5

Na první pohled by se mohlo zdát, že o Josefu Bartíkovi neexistuje žádná studie právě
proto, že pro podrobnější vylíčení jeho životních osudů není dostatek informací. Zároveň
s tím se ale nabízela zásadní badatelská otázka: Skutečně neexistují v žádném z českých
archivů relevantní prameny, na základě kterých by se daly podrobně rekonstruovat složité
životní osudy takové výrazné osobnosti,6
jakou Josef Bartík bezpochyby byl? Po předběžném
archivním průzkumu v Archivu bezpečnostních složek a ve Vojenském historickém archivu
se ukázalo, že tomu tak není. Následoval důkladný archivní výzkum, v jehož průběhu se
ukazovalo, že archivních materiálů k osobnosti Josefa Bartíka bude v České republice
nakonec poměrně mnoho, poněvadž relevantní fondy se nacházejí také v Národním archivu a
ve Správním archivu Armády České republiky.7
Dále se autorovi podařilo, za pomoci
plk. v. z. MUDr. Zdeňka Voldřicha, DrSc., vypátrat Bartíkova vnuka Milana Jirku. Ten
autorovi ochotně zapůjčil ke studiu rozsáhlou pozůstalost po svém dědečkovi Josefu
Bartíkovi, kterou vlastní.

1
Viz KREISINGER, Pavel: Životní osudy zpravodajského důstojníka plk. gšt. Jana Krčka. Bakalářská
diplomová práce FF MU. Brno 2009.
2
Podrobněji o tom viz tamtéž, s. 43-44.
3
GEBHART, Jan – KUKLÍK, Jan: Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české. Svazek XV. a 1938-1945. Praha-Litomyšl
2006, s. 290, 292-294.
4
RICHTER, Karel: Generál Josef Bartík. In: Ivanov, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z
historie protišpionážního oddělení generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992
, s. 214.
5
Soukromá dokumentace Milana Jirky (dále SDMJ), pozůstalost Josefa Bartíka, dopis Dragy S. Kellick (rozené
Bartíkové) vnučce Lucii.
6
V roce 1998 propůjčil prezident republiky Václav Havel, Josefu Bartíkovi in memoriam nejvyšší státní
vyznamenání – Řád bílého lva.
7
Jednotlivé prameny budou podrobně rozebrány společně s literaturou v následující kapitole.
7
Dané téma se nabízelo zpracovat jako biografickou studii, která by zároveň byla i
mikrohistorickou sondou do života československého zpravodajského důstojníka. Autor
předkládané práce si vytyčil tento hlavní cíl:
Na základě studia archivních pramenů a literatury podat obraz životních osudů
významného československého zpravodajského důstojníka.
V rámci naplnění stanoveného cíle bude rovněž důležité zasadit osobnost Josefa
Bartíka do kontextu doby, v níž žil a ve které aktivně působil, aby tak práce posloužila
zároveň jako doklad o této době. Bartíkovu osobnost by autor chtěl využít jako pomyslného
průvodce „krátkým“ 20. stoletím. To lze v českém prostředí vnímat nejen jako století
demokracie, ale také jako století dvou totalitních režimů: nacistického a komunistického.
Právě Josef Bartík (1897-1968) splňuje všechny předpoklady pro to, aby se mohl tímto
pomyslným průvodcem stát, poněvadž se jako „italský“ legionář zúčastnil prvního odboje
a poté byl 20 let aktivním zpravodajským důstojníkem meziválečné československé armády.
Vzápětí se jako takový ocitl na dlouhých šest let v zahraničním odboji podruhé, aby se podílel
na boji proti nacismu, přičemž do Velké Británie odletěl v rámci Moravcovy zpravodajské
„jedenáctky“ již 14. března 1939. Po třech krátkých poválečných letech se však dočkal
perzekuce ze strany komunistického režimu. Po propuštění z vězení se rozhodl Josef Bartík
„bojovat“ za svoji rehabilitaci, které nakonec, několik let před svojí smrtí, skutečně dosáhl.
Popisované události jsou v předkládané práci řazeny chronologicky. Tomu odpovídá i
chronologické pojetí jednotlivých kapitol.
8
Stav zkoumané problematiky
V úvodní části bylo již naznačeno, že o Josefu Bartíkovi nebyla doposud napsána
žádná odborná biografická studie. Základní informace o něm se sice dají dohledat
v početných medailoncích,8
nicméně je třeba upozornit na to, že většina z nich obsahuje
kromě základní faktografie i chybné informace, které neodpovídají skutečnosti. Pro ilustraci
následuje výběr z několika omylů: autorkou dvou medailonků
9
je Zlatice Zudová-Lešková,
která chybně uvádí jména Bartíkových dvou dcer jako Libuše a Marie, ve skutečnosti se
děvčata jmenovala Zora a Draga. Autorka také chybně uvádí odkaz na prameny ve VÚAVHA v Praze, neboť žádná „část pramenné pozůstalosti“, o níž se v textu píše, v daném
archivu neexistuje.10 Další tři medailonky11 pak uvádějí chybně datum Bartíkova úmrtí jako

května 1968. V ten den měl Josef Bartík již pohřeb, zemřel ale dne 18. května 1968.12
Větších nepřesností se většina autorů dopustila zejména v Bartíkově „legionářském“ období;
ty jsou způsobeny pravděpodobně tím, že dotyční nestudovali podrobně Bartíkův legionářský
poslužný spis.
„Medailonkový“ charakter má i 30stránková dvojjazyčná (česko-anglická) biografická
stať Petra Kolárika nazvaná Josef Bartík: Životopis.13 Tuto publikaci vydala vlastním
nákladem generálova dcera Draga někdy po roce 1998. Kniha nemá číslo ISBN, tudíž není
dostupná v žádné knihovně v České republice. V této publikaci je však velké množství
faktografických chyb, a to i přesto, že autor pracoval s některými relevantními prameny.
Kupříkladu jeden z Bartíkových kolegů – zpravodajských důstojníků Karel Paleček je zde
pojmenován jako František Paleček, přičemž podobných případů, zejména co se týče
chronologie, by se dalo uvést mnoho. Přednost této publikace tak spočívá pouze v kvalitních
obrazových přílohách a některých dílčích pasážích, které autor vypracoval na
základě vyprávění Bartíkovy dcery Dragy.

8
TOMEŠ, Josef a kolektiv: Český biografický slovník 20. století. Díl 1. A-J. Praha 1999, s. 48; RICHTER,
Karel: Generál Josef Bartík. In: Ivanov, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z historie
protišpionážního oddělení generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992
, s. 214-221; HAVEL, Petr – HOFMAN, Petr –
KREJČOVÁ, Jana a kolektiv: Českoslovenští legionáři – rodáci a občané okresu Prachatice. Prachatice 2000, s.
57; VOŠAHLÍKOVÁ, Pavla a kolektiv (ed.): Biografický slovník českých zemí. Sešit 2. B-BAŘ. Praha 2005;
LÁNÍK, Jaroslav a kolektiv: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939-1945. Praha 2005, s. 16;
ROEWER, Helmut – SCHÄFER, Stefan – UHL, Matthias: Encyklopedie tajných služeb ve 20. století. Praha
2006, s. 32.
9
VOŠAHLÍKOVÁ, Pavla a kolektiv (ed.): Biografický slovník českých zemí. Sešit 2. B-BAŘ. Praha 2005;
LÁNÍK, Jaroslav a kolektiv: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939-1945. Praha 2005.
10 Podle ústního sdělení autorky autorovi této práce vznikl tento omyl během redakční úpravy encyklopedických
hesel, kdy bylo potřeba text zkrátit a nevypisovat kompletní dlouhé odkazy na relevantní archivní fondy.
Nicméně takovéto „zkrácení“ se jeví jako zavádějící, neboť ve VÚA-VHA v Praze se skutečně nacházejí
pozůstalosti různých vojenských osobností.
11 RICHTER, Karel: Generál Josef Bartík. In: Ivanov, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z
historie protišpionážního oddělení generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992, s. 214-221. HAVEL, Petr – HOFMAN, Petr
– KREJČOVÁ, Jana a kolektiv: Českoslovenští legionáři – rodáci a občané okresu Prachatice. Prachatice 2000,
s. 57 (autorem medailonku je Zdeněk Voldřich); ROEWER, Helmut – SCHÄFER, Stefan – UHL, Matthias:
Encyklopedie tajných služeb ve 20. století. Praha 2006, s. 32.
12 Viz Přílohy, IV. Výběr z dokumentů, dokument č. 17.
13 KOLÁRIK, Peter: Josef Bartík: Životopis. Vydala Draga S. Kellick, bez bližších bibliografických údajů.
9
Během archivního výzkumu se ukázalo, že pramenná základna k osobnosti Josefa
Bartíka bude poměrně obsáhlá. Základní dokumenty k Bartíkově vojenské kariéře se nachází
ve Vojenském ústředním archivu – Vojenském historickém archivu (dále VÚA-VHA) v Praze
na Invalidovně. K legionářskému období je to Osobní karta legionáře a poměrně obsáhlý
legionářský poslužný spis,14 k následnému působení v čs. armádě Kvalifikační listiny.15 Další
dílčí dokumenty, které pomohou dokreslit Bartíkovu činnost v době meziválečné, se nachází
ve fondu Divizního soudu Praha16 (materiály k významným případům vojenské zrady, na
jejichž odhalování se Bartík jako přednosta obranné sekce zpravodajského oddělení Hlavního
štábu podílel). Dílčí zajímavé poznatky k Bartíkově válečné činnosti jsou rovněž ve sbírkách
číslo 20, 24 a 37.17 Pro doplnění obrazových příloh týkajících se zejména legionářského
období a vojenských osobností z Bartíkova okolí byly využity sbírky fotografií, které se
nacházejí ve fotoarchivu VÚA.
Velice cenné a zásadní informace jsou rovněž v Archivu bezpečnostních složek (dále
ABS), a to zejména ve fondu 302 (Hlavní správa vojenské kontrarozvědky). Zde se jedná
zejména o spisy z případu Bartík. Pod archivními čísly 302-89-1 až 302-89-7 a dále 302-90-1
se nachází celkem osm svazků, které se týkají Bartíkovy válečné činnosti v Polsku, Francii
a Velké Británii, ale i jeho činnosti poválečné, kdy byl v roce 1946 odstraněn z Ministerstva
vnitra. Kupříkladu pod archivním číslem 302-89-7 se nachází úplný text přednášky
o nacismu, kterou pplk. Josef Bartík přednesl čs. pozemním jednotkám v Leamingtonu dne

a 7. května 1941. Název přednášky zní „Složky a organizace ve výbojných plánech
německého nacismu.“18 Pod čísly 302-90-2 až 302-90-7 se původně nacházely Bartíkovy
výslechové protokoly z let 1949-1951 a vlastnoručně psané výpovědi a poznámky.
V současné době jsou bohužel jednotlivé složky prázdné, poněvadž každý „svazek byl vyjmut
dle rozkazu RMV 28/63 /Rehabilitace/ a uložen do archivního fondu ,R‘.“19 Pátrání po fondu
„R“ bylo bohužel v ABS neúspěšné, příslušné svazky se podle sdělení archivářů autorovi
nedochovaly a pravděpodobně byly skartovány.20 Pro doplnění informací se však dají použít
další archivní materiály z fondů ABS. Kromě početných relevantních svazků ve fondu 30221
se jedná dále o tyto fondy: fond H (Historický fond), známý též jako fond tzv. „bývalých
lidí“,22 fond Z (Mapy zpráv zpracované Studijním ústavem MV),23 Cenné informace

14 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Osobní karta legionáře, Josef Bartík; Tamtéž, fond Legionářský poslužný spis, Josef
Bartík.
15 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík.
16VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Divizní soud Praha, č. j. Dtr. 476/36 (Josef Krejza); VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Divizní
soud Praha, č. j. Dtr. 71/38 (Edmund Kalmár)
17 VÚA-VHA Praha, sbírka 20 (Ministerstvo národní obrany Londýn); sbírka 24 (Náhradní těleso ve Velké
Británii); sbírka 37 (Velitelství vojenské zpravodajské služby).
18 ABS Praha, fond 302, archivní číslo (dále a. č.) 302-89-7.
19 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-90-2, popis paní Švarcové na prázdných deskách svazku ze srpna 1964.
20 Nakonec byla část těchto svazků objevena v Národním archivu v Praze, podrobněji o tom viz dále.
21 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-2; a. č. 302-57-3; a. č. 302-74-1; a. č. 302-91-1; a. č. 302-289-3; a. č. 302-
290-1.
22 ABS Praha, fond H, a. č. H-664 „generál“, František Moravec.
23 ABS Praha, fond Z, a. č. Z-6-314.
10
k poválečnému období se dají najít také ve zvláštním vyšetřovacím spisu Bedřicha Pokorného
ZV – 4 MV.24
Pro poznání okolností Bartíkova odsouzení, následné perzekuce a rehabilitace se jeví
jako klíčové matriály uložené ve Vojenském ústředním archivu – Správním archivu Armády
České republiky (dále VÚA-SA AČR) v Olomouci. Jedná se o spis Vyššího vojenského
soudu Příbram 1T 15/65. Tento obsáhlý spis má dva svazky. První z nich obsahuje samotný
spis z roku 1965, kdy byl Josef Bartík rehabilitován, ale také původní spis Vrchního
vojenského soudu Praha Ztr 264/48-III, který se od roku 1965 stal trvalou součástí spisu
1T 15/65. Původní spis z roku 1948 obsahuje například: protokol o hlavním přelíčení,
kompletní obsáhlý rozsudek a také obálku, v níž se nacházejí Bartíkovy generálské výložky a
stužky jednotlivých vyznamenání. Celý druhý svazek tvoří přílohy ke spisům. Zde se za
nejcennější dokumenty dají považovat nikdy nedoručené dopisy, adresované Josefu Bartíkovi
do vězení. Autory dopisů jsou Bartíkovi nejbližší – manželka Libuše, dcera Draga a zeť Milan
Jirka starší. Kromě toho se zde nachází i jeden nikdy neodeslaný dopis, který napsal Josef
Bartík své rodině. Tato korespondence má vysokou hodnotu, neboť může podrobně dokreslit
osobní aspekty Bartíkovy perzekuce po roce 1948.
Cenné fondy, ve kterých se nachází zajímavé doklady k Bartíkově činnosti během
druhé světové války, jsou uloženy také v Národním archivu (dále NA) v Praze. Zde je třeba
zmínit zejména fond Ministerstvo vnitra Londýn (číslo 828).25 V tomto fondu nechybí osobní
svazek Josefa Bartíka z doby jeho působení na čs. Ministerstvu vnitra v Londýně (1942-
1945).26 Významný je i fond Archiv Huberta Ripky (číslo 1).27 Důležité dokumenty se
nachází rovněž v tzv. „sbírce“ Františka Moravce, kterou ve svých pracích nepřesně cituje
docent Jan Němeček. Jedná se o xerokopie dokumentů, které z pozůstalosti Moravcovy dcery
Hany Moravcové-Disherové pořídil historik Zdeněk Jelínek na počátku 90. let 20. století.28
Sbírka Františka Moravce se však nedá pod tímto názvem v NA dohledat. Dokumenty jsou
součástí fondu Svazu protifašistických bojovníků – ústřední výbor Praha.29 Jak již bylo
zmíněno, nakonec byly v NA objeveny i některé spisy z případu Bartík, které byly dříve
umístěny v ABS. Materiály se nachází ve složce fondu Archivu ÚV KSČ
30 a za upozornění na
ně vděčí autor vedoucímu diplomové práce docentovi Františku Hanzlíkovi. Jedná se
o zajímavé dokumenty z provenience Státní bezpečnosti, a to zejména o svodky výslechových
protokolů z roku 1950 a několik zápisů o výpovědích Josefa Bartíka k různým osobám
z téhož roku. Z obsahu složky je zřejmé, že se nejedná o všechny chybějící svazky, které byly

24 ABS Praha, zvláštní vyšetřovací spis, a. č. ZV – 4 MV (Bedřich Pokorný, B/4-V-2459), sv. I a II.
25 Národní archiv (dále NA) Praha, fond Ministerstvo vnitra Londýn (dále MV – L), inventární číslo: 774, 796,
818, 887, 1429, 1431, 1432.
26 NA Praha, fond MV – L, karton 77, signatura 2-1-941, inventární číslo 887. V příslušném inventáři tohoto
fondu je tento Bartíkův osobní svazek označen chybnou signaturou jako 2-1-241. Toto číslo však neodpovídá
skutečnosti.
27 NA Praha, fond Archiv Huberta Ripky (dále AHR), inventární číslo: 194, 2670, 4379, 9157.
28 Viz NĚMEČEK, Jan: Soumrak a úsvit československé diplomacie. 15. březen 1939 a československé
zastupitelské úřady. Praha 2008, s. 549.
29 NA Praha, fond Svaz protifašistických bojovníků – ústřední výbor Praha, pozůstalost Františka Moravce,
nezpracovaný materiál.
30 NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123,
nezpracovaný materiál.
11
původně součástí fondu 302 pod čísly 302-90-2 až 302-90-7. Část materiálů, např. Bartíkův
výslechový protokol z roku 1949, byla s největší pravděpodobností skutečně skartována.
V neposlední ředě je třeba zmínit zajímavé materiály, které se nacházejí v pozůstalosti
Josefa Bartíka. Pozůstalost je v osobním držení Bartíkova vnuka Milana Jirky.31 Pozůstalost
obsahuje široké spektrum materiálů od zpravodajských legitimací přes různé úřední
dokumenty až po dokumenty rodinné povahy (zlomky korespondence z vězení apod.) Velkou
část pozůstalosti pak tvoří cenné fotografie z různých období Bartíkova života. Opět nechybí
ani fotografie rodinné, umožňující nahlédnout do důstojníkova soukromého života a jeho
volnočasových aktivit. Většina těchto fotografií je zařazena do obrazové přílohy této práce,
neboť jak poznamenal profesor Zdeněk Kárník „… obraz dokresluje a někdy přímo vysvětluje
to, co nelze vyjádřit psaným slovem.“32
Z odborných monografií a studií je třeba zmínit některé zásadní práce, které se týkají
problematiky československého zpravodajství a dílčím způsobem reflektují i osobnost Josefa
Bartíka. Z monografií se jedná jednak o klíčovou práci Jaroslava a Stanislava Kokoškových
o agentovi A-54 (Paulu Thümmelovi),33 dále pak v pořadí již druhé vydání práce Jiřího Šolce
o Františku Moravcovi.34 V jinak záslužné publikaci vojenského historika Jiřího Šolce se
bohužel vyskytují četné nepřesnosti a chyby, autor kupříkladu uvádí chybně jména některých
důstojníků Moravcovy „jedenáctky“: kupříkladu škpt. pěch. Josefa Fořta „překřtil“ autor na
Františka a škpt. jezd. Jaroslava Tauera na Josefa.35 Také je třeba zmínit přínosné studie, které
se dotýkají Bartíkova zpravodajského působení v roce 1939 v Polsku. Jedná se o studii známé
autorské dvojice Jana Gebharta a Jana Kuklíka.36 Z jiného pohledu se Bartíkovu působení
v Polsku věnuje i Jan Němeček37 a v kontextu působení Moravcovy zpravodajské
„jedenáctky“ i Jaroslav Kokoška.38 Několik autorů reflektovalo ve svých pracích rovněž

31 Milan Jirka mladší se narodil v roce1949 manželům Draze a Milanovi Jirkovým. Matka Draga (rozená
Bartíková) je druhá dcera Josefa Bartíka. Jeho otec, Milan Jirka starší byl synem čs. důstojníka plk. gšt. Josefa
Jirky (* 16. srpna 1896), který se od jara 1939 podílel na budování ilegální odbojové organizace Obrana národa.
Za účast v odboji byl Josef Jirka v roce 1940 zatčen Gestapem. Posléze byl nacisty vězněn na Pankráci a
v terezínské Malé pevnosti, následoval převoz do Německa, kde byl odsouzen k trestu smrti a 12. září 1942
popraven ve věznici v Berlíně-Plötzensee. Podrobněji o Josefu Jirkovi viz STEHLÍK, Eduard – LACH, Ivan:
Vlast a čest jim byly dražší nežli život. Dvůr Králové nad Labem 2000, s. 82-83.
32 KÁRNÍK, Zdeněk: Malé dějiny československé (1867-1939). Praha 2008, s. 13.
33 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994.
34 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007. Jedná se v podstatě o druhé doplněné a rozšířené vydání monografie z roku 1994,
kterou tehdy vydalo nakladatelství Vyšehrad, viz ŠOLC, Jiří: Ve službách prezidenta. Generál František
Moravec ve světle archívních dokumentů. Praha 1994. Tato monografie však nebyla hodnocena zrovna nejlépe,
srovnej KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Moravcova zpravodajská služba bez legend? HaV 43, 1994, č. 6, s. 171-178.
Druhé přepracované vydání z roku 2007 nebylo doposud recenzováno, některé chyby a nepřesnosti se však
vyskytují v obou pracích.
35 Viz tamtéž, s. 63. Rovněž v rejstříku publikace jsou jména těchto dvou osob uvedena chybně.
36 GEBHART, Jan – KUKLÍK, Jan: Československo-polské vojenské zpravodajské styky na jaře a v létě 1939.
HaV 41, 1992, č. 3, s. 66-94.
37 NĚMEČEK, Jan: Československý odboj v Polsku v roce 1939 a arm. Gen. Lev Prchala. In: Hájek, Jan –
Kocian, Jiří – Zítko, Milan (edd.): Fragmenty dějin. Sborník prací k šedesátinám Jana Gebharta. Praha 2006, s.
283-300; Týž: Armádní generál Lev Prchala a čs. odboj v Polsku. HaV 43, 1994, č. 3, s. 107-132.
38 KOKOŠKA-MALÍŘ, Jaroslav: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina plk. Moravce v předvečer druhé světové
války. HaV 38, 1989, č. 4, s. 68-89.
12
Bartíkovo poválečné působení na Ministerstvu vnitra, zejména s ohledem na jeho odstranění
v roce 1946. Na prvním místě je potřeba uvést práci Karla Kaplana Pět kapitol o únoru, kde je
„případu Josefa Bartíka“ věnována samostatná kapitola.39 Stejné záležitosti se dotkla i Jiřina
Dvořáková ve své studii o Bedřichu Pokorném.40 Bedřich Pokorný měl na odstranění generála
Bartíka z MV spolu se Štěpánem Plačkem rozhodující podíl. Plačkovou osobností včetně
reflexe jeho „intriky proti generálu Bartíkovi“ se nejnověji zabýval Jan Kalous.41
Stranou nebyla ponechána ani memoárová literatura. Tu je však třeba posuzovat
s ohledem na to, že byla napsána ve velkém časovém odstupu od událostí, které popisuje.
Takový obraz tudíž může být značně zkreslený a obsahovat různé nepřesnosti. Zde je třeba na
prvním místě uvést předmluvu k práci publicisty Miroslava Ivanova Černý dostal mat.42
Autorem této předmluvy z roku 1965 není nikdo jiný než samotný Josef Bartík.43 Tento
Bartíkův vzpomínkový text je výjimečný zejména kvůli tomu, že Bartík na rozdíl od
některých svých kolegů ze zpravodajské „jedenáctky“ nenapsal paměti ani vzpomínkové statě
do odborných časopisů. Bartíkův známý, literární vědec Václav Černý, to zdůvodnil tím, že
Bartík byl aliterární povahy.44 Ze vzpomínkových prací Bartíkových kolegů zpravodajců je
třeba zmínit články důstojníka výzvědného zpravodajství Emila Strankmüllera.45 Opomenout
nelze ani paměti „šéfa“ čs. zpravodajců ve Velké Británii, Františka Moravce.46 Je však
všeobecně známo, že právě jeho paměti, byť jsou napsány čtivě (František Moravec bývá
obecně považován za výborného stylistu), jsou zároveň bohužel značně nespolehlivé a velké
množství událostí je tam popsáno v rozporu se známými fakty.47 Na některé negativní aspekty
Moravcova díla upozornil ve svých vzpomínkových statích rovněž další z Moravcových
důstojníků, Oldřich Tichý.48

Závěrem je třeba zmínit některé populárně historické práce a tzv. literaturu faktu. Zde
lze opětovně připomenout práci Miroslava Ivanova Černý dostal mat.49 Ta vznikla na základě
rozhovorů, které autor vedl v 60. letech s Josefem Bartíkem, a zabývá se čtyřmi konkrétními

39 KAPLAN, Karel: Pět kapitol o únoru. Brno 1997, s. 82-85.
40 DVOŘÁKOVÁ, Jiřina: Bedřich Pokorný – vzestup a pád. Sborník AMV 2, 2004, s. 233-267.
41 KALOUS, Jan: Štěpán Plaček. Život zpravodajského fanatika ve službách KSČ. Praha 2010; KALOUS, Jan:
Využívání agentů nacistických bezpečnostních složek při vytváření politického zpravodajství MV po 2. světové
válce. In: In: Pejčoch, Ivo – Plachý, Jiří a kolektiv (Edd.): Okupace, kolaborace, retribuce. Praha 2010, s. 199-
209.
42 IVANOV, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z historie protišpionážního oddělení
generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992
.
43 BARTÍK, Josef: Předmluva. In: Ivanov, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z historie
protišpionážního oddělení generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992
, s. 5-14.
44 ČERNÝ, Václav: Paměti III (1945-1972). Brno 1992, s. 327.
45 STRANKMÜLLER, Emil: Československé ofenzivní zpravodajství v letech 1937 do 15. března 1939. Odboj a
revoluce, 1968, č. 2, s. 42–73; Týž: O spolupráci československé a sovětské rozvědky v Praze a Londýně.
Slovanský přehled 1968, s. 72-79; Týž: Československé ofenzivní zpravodajství od března 1939. Odboj a
revoluce 1970, s. 189-229.
46 MORAVEC, František: Špion, jemuž nevěřili. Praha 20022
.
47 Stručně ke kritice Moravcových pamětí viz ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho
zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 13-14.
48 TICHÝ, Oldřich: Z pamětí zpravodajce. Poznámky k činnosti 2. oddělení a ke knize gen. Frant. Moravce.
HaV 39, 1990, č. 4, s. 119-131; Týž: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.). HaV 40, 1991, č. 1, s. 122-140.
49 IVANOV, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z historie protišpionážního oddělení
generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992
.
13
případy, které řešila obranná sekce zpravodajského oddělení hlavního štábu. Kromě
zmíněných rozhovorů čerpal autor také z archivních pramenů, v textu však nejde jednoznačně
odlišit, které pasáže jsou napsány na základě rozhovoru nebo dobových dokumentů a naopak
které části jsou pouze dílem autorovy zdařilé narace „detektivkového“ stylu. Dále je třeba
zmínit práci autorské dvojice historika Čestmíra Amorta a redaktora Ivana Milana Jedličky,
která se zabývá agentem A-54.50 Ačkoliv se ve své době jistě jednalo o průlomovou práci,
které má navíc i jakýsi quasi poznámkový aparát, je tato práce zaneřáděna četnými chybami
a nepřesnostmi, na které kriticky upozornili Jaroslav a Stanislav Kokoškovi.51 Kokoškovi pak
danou knihu trefně charakterizovali jako „špionážní literaturu“. Práce Amorta a Jedličky je
mimo jiné založena i na výpovědích pamětníků, čs. zpravodajských důstojníků. Autoři se
v textu prokazatelně opírají o rozhovory s Josefem Bartíkem, Oldřichem Tichým, Emilem
Strankmüllerem, Aloisem Frankem a dokonce navštívili i vdovu po agentovi A-54 – Elsu
Thümmelovou. Právě v citovaných rozhovorech by mohl být i v současnosti, kdy již nikdo
z dotyčných pamětníků nežije, přínos této práce. Bohužel se nedá potvrdit, že jsou tvrzení
pamětníků zaznamenána přesně. Na jednu takovou nesrovnalost upozornil Oldřich Tichý:
„Po válce, když se chystala kniha Amort-Jedlička o agentu A-54, zeptal se mě dr. Čestmír
Amort na některé detaily, pokud jde o zprávu o ‚rošádovém pohybu‘ Němců. Podal jsem mu
krátkou a střízlivou zprávu o této věci. Když jsem pak četl, co bylo v knize napsáno, byl jsem
úplně konsternován a červenal se. To, co bylo vytištěno, jsem nikdy neřekl a nenapsal.
Vyrazilo mně to dech.“ Závěrem této části je nutné zmínit ještě populárně-historickou trilogii
k tématu čs. zpravodajství z pera publicisty Karla Pacnera.52 Práce rovněž dílčím způsobem
reflektuje některé případy související s činností Josefa Bartíka. K práci samotné je však třeba
podotknout, že se na jedné straně jedná sice vskutku o monumentální dílo, na druhé straně
však obsahuje nepřesnosti a chyby.53 Absence poznámkového aparátu, přestože autor hojně
cituje různé zdroje, pak jen podtrhuje problematičnost tohoto díla.

50 AMORT, Čestmír – JEDLIČKA, Ivan, Milan: Hledá se zrádce X. Praha 1968.
51 Viz KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54. Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994.
52 PACNER, Karel: Československo ve zvláštních službách. Pohledy do historie československých výzvědných
služeb 1914-1989. Díl I. 1914-1939. Praha 2002; Týž: Československo ve zvláštních službách. Pohledy do
historie československých výzvědných služeb 1914-1989. Díl II. 1939-1945. Praha 2002; Týž: Československo
ve zvláštních službách. Pohledy do historie československých výzvědných služeb 1914-1989. Díl III. 1945-1961.
Praha 2002.
53 Namátkový příklad: Čs. generál justice Ečer, který dohodl se spojenci vydání K. H. Franka do ČSR, se
nejmenoval Emil, ale Bohuslav. Srovnej PACNER, Karel: Československo ve zvláštních službách. Pohledy do
historie československých výzvědných služeb 1914-1989. Díl III. 1945-1961. Praha 2002, s. 60; EČER,
Bohuslav: Norimberský soud. Praha 1946.
14

Léta mládí (1897-1918)
1.1 Dětství a rodinné poměry (1897-1915)
Rodným krajem Josefa Bartíka byla Šumava. Narodil se dne 30. června 1897 v obci
Stachy manželům Bartíkovým. Křestní jméno zdědil po svém otci Josefovi. Ten se živil jako
pekař, zemřel však mladý ve věku čtyřiceti let. Matka čtyř dětí Marie Bartíková (rozená
Voldřichová) se po smrti svého manžela dostala do složité finanční situace, kterou musela
nějak vyřešit. V roce 1907 se rozhodla pro odchod do Spojených států, kde se později
podruhé provdala. Záhy na to nechala poslat do Evropy pro své děti, za maminkou do zámoří
však odjely pouze tři dcery. Mladý Josef Bartík projevil přání zůstat na Šumavě u svého
strýce, příslušníka finanční stráže Jana Bartíka v obci Vrbice. Tou dobou bylo Josefovi
jedenáct let. Pravděpodobně již během studia na obecné škole patřil k pozorným žákům, a
proto dospělí lidé z jeho okolí začali uvažovat o tom, že by mohl studovat na nedávno
založené české „reálce“ v Sušici.54 Autor Bartíkova stručného životopisu Peter Kolárik, který
informace o Bartíkově dětství čerpal z vyprávění Bartíkovy dcery Dragy, k tomu uvádí
následující svědectví: „Na přímluvu faráře, jenž viděl, že mladý Bartík je bystrý a inteligentní
a jeho prospěch ve škole vynikající, souhlasil strýc s tím, aby Josef začal studovat na
gymnáziu v Sušici.“55 V roce 1908 tedy Josef Bartík nastoupil ke studiu na sušické české
Vyšší reálné gymnázium. Tam v roce 1915 úspěšně složil maturitní zkoušku, do pracovního
poměru ale mladý absolvent nenastoupil, neboť se rozhodl ve studiu pokračovat, a to na
Vysoké škole technické.56 Studovat na univerzitě nebylo čerstvému abiturientovi dopřáno: již
na podzim roku 1915 zasáhly do jeho života události probíhající Velké války.

54 Sušické české reálné gymnázium bylo zřízeno 7. srpna 1906, prvním ředitelem gymnázia se stal bývalý
okresní školní inspektor z Pardubic Josef Weger. Viz http://www.gymsusice.cz/o_skole/historie.html [15. 1.
2011]
55 KOLÁRIK, Peter: Josef Bartík: Životopis. Vydala Draga S. Kellick, bez bližších bibliografických údajů.
56Viz VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík;Tamtéž, fond Osobní karta legionáře, Josef
Bartík.
15
1.2 Italským legionářem ve Velké válce (1915-1918)57
Válečná situace dolehla na obyvatelstvo „podunajské monarchie“ ještě výrazněji, když
původně neutrální Itálie vyhlásila 23. května 1915 jako spojenec dohodových mocností
Rakousku-Uhersku válku. Bojovně naladěná italská armáda měla zpočátku navrch, neboť
disponovala výhodou početní převahy.58 Rakouská armáda nyní o to více potřebovala nové
brance, a tak došlo i na osmnáctiletého studenta Bartíka, který byl k vojenské službě povolán

října 1915. Josef Bartík nastoupil službu jako tzv. jednoroční dobrovolník u „píseckého“
pěšího pluku, jehož posádka tehdy sídlila v maďarském městě Békes Gyula. Po
absolvování školy pro záložní důstojníky byl v hodnosti kadeta aspiranta v dubnu 1916
odvelen na italskou frontu, kde působil jako velitel čety.59
Na frontě setrval Bartík do 2. listopadu 1916, kdy byl Italy zajat. V zajateckém
důstojnickém táboře na ostrově Asinara patřil mezi hrstku aktivních Čechů, kteří žádali
bezprostředně po zajetí o to, aby mohli být zařazeni do vznikající československé zahraniční
armády. Sám Bartík k tomu v pozdější žádosti udává následující: „Hned po příjezdu do
zajateckého tábora na Asinaře podal jsem se 13 druhy, mezi nimiž se nacházeli: kpt. VLK
Antonín, kpt. KADLÍČEK Josef, kpt. WURM Josef a kpt. KADRNOŽKA Karel, přihlášku do
čs. zahraničního vojska prostřednictvím italského velitelství. Tato přihláška zůstala
nezodpovězena a byla kapitánem Vlkem u italského velitelství několikráte urgována.“60
Bartíkův zájem o účast v československém zahraničním odboji dokládá i písemné prohlášení
kpt. Antonína Vlka, ve kterém stojí: „Potvrzuji, že kapitán Josef Bartík, hlásil se po našem
příjezdu na Asinaru, v prosinci r. 1916 do čs. zahraničního vojska a že od jeho příjezdu na
Asinaru súčastnil se všech akcí, souvisejících, s naším osvobozením.“61
Pozitivní vliv na formování budoucích československých legií v Itálii mělo zejména
založení zajatecké organizace s názvem Český dobrovolnický sbor (dále ČDS) v táboře Santa
Maria Capua Vetere. Organizace byla založena třiceti nadšenci v lednu 1917 a v jejím čele
stál Jan Čapek, který jménem organizace neustále urgoval pomoc Československé národní
rady v Paříži. Cílem organizace bylo zajistit vstup svých členů do čs. dobrovolnické armády.62

57 Dosud publikovaná fakta o legionářském období Bartíkova života obsahují četné chybné údaje. Z největších
„mýtů“, které se v literatuře objevily, uveďme na ukázku dva největší: Vladimír Bystrov uvedl, že Josef Bartík
byl „… zajat ruskou armádou a později vstoupil do československého vojska v Rusku.“ Viz BYSTROV,
Vladimír: Osud generála. Komentář k některým dokumentům o životě a tragickém konci Sergeje
Vojcechovského. Praha 2007, s. 518, pozn. 17.
Peter Kolárik pro změnu uvádí, že Josef Bartík byl dokonce „velitel 39. pluku československých legií…“ Viz
KOLÁRIK, Peter: Josef Bartík: Životopis. Vydala Draga S. Kellick, bez bližších bibliografických údajů, s. 3.
Pokud by byla tato informace pravdivá, jednalo by se o unikátní případ, kdy by důstojnický čekatel velel celému
pluku. Tato fakta se ale neopírají o archivní prameny.
58 Podrobněji o situaci na italské frontě v roce 1915 viz ŠEDIVÝ, Ivan: Češi, české země a Velká válka 1914-

Praha 2001, s. 125-128.
59 Viz VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík.
60 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Legionářský poslužný spis, Josef Bartík, Žádost a započítání služební doby v čs.
zahraničním vojsku, 2. 12. 1922.
61 Tamtéž. V roce 1923 rozhodla příslušná komise přiznat Bartíkovi na základě „legionářského“ zákona ze dne
7. 1919 č. 462. Sb. charakter legionáře právě od podání první přihlášky, tzn. od prosince 1916.
62 PICHLÍK, Karel: Bez legend. Zahraniční odboj 1914-1918. (Zápas o československý program). Praha 1991,
s. 231.
16
V asinarském zajateckém táboře se situace posunula kupředu poté, co do tábora přibyl
Emanuel Ambrož63 – důvěrník nově vzniklé odbočky Československé národní rady v Římě.
64
O jeho činnosti v zajateckých táborech se pochvalně vyjádřil kapitán Josef Logaj, komisař Čs.
národní rady, který o něm později poznamenal: „… organisoval dobrovolnické hnutí mezi
důstojnictvem a mužstvem. Vedl účinnou propagandu v době, kdy nebylo takřka naděje, že
naše vojsko v Italii bude utvořeno.“65 Právě pod vedením E. Ambrože vstoupilo do ČDS
25 asinarských důstojníků.
66 To, že mezi nimi nechyběl ani Josef Bartík, potvrzuje dochované
písemné prohlášení mjr. E. Ambrože, kde stojí: „Prohlašuji, že kapitán Bartík Josef hlásil se
u mne – jsoucího v písemném styku s odbočkou Národní rady čes. v Římě – krátce po mém
příchodu na Asinaru, as. 15. října 1917 jako dobrovolník pro čes. armádu.“67
Své odhodlání potvrdil Josef Bartík pro jistotu ještě jednou, a to písemnou přihláškou
do ČDS, kterou adresoval Československé národní radě v Římě dne 19. prosince 1917.68
V dubnu 1918 vrcholila jednání mezi vedoucími představiteli československého
zahraničního odboje Edvardem Benešem a Milanem Rastislavem Štefánikem a italskou
vládou. Zdlouhavá jednání ve svém konečném důsledku vedla k podpisu smlouvy mezi
Československou národní radou a italskou vládou ze dne 21. dubna 1918. Ve smlouvě mimo
jiné stálo, že „královská italská vláda uznává existenci jednotné a autonomní československé
armády, podléhající ze stanoviska národního, politického a právního Československé národní
radě.“69 Budování československého vojenského sboru v Itálii již mezitím započalo. Ve
smlouvě byl uznán za součást československé armády a na bojišti měl operovat samostatně
pod vrchním italským velením.70

Na základě příkazu italského ministerstva války byl již 11. dubna generál Andrea
Graziani pověřen budováním československého armádního sboru v Itálii. V důsledku toho
bylo 14. dubna 1918 zřízeno československé doplňovací velitelství ve městě Foligno. Do
konce dubna byly potom ustaveny následující čtyři pluky: 31. pluk v Perugii, 32. pluk
v Assisi, 33. pluk ve Foligně a 34. pluk ve Spoletu, které dohromady utvořily první čs. divizi
v Itálii.71

63 Emanuel Ambrož se narodil 27. listopadu 1886 v Čejkovicích, před válkou vykonával učitelské povolání. Dne

prosince 1914 byl jako poručík rakouské armády zajat v Srbsku. Později se dostal do Itálie, kde pomáhal
organizovat české zajatce. V roce 1918 se stal velitel 6 C roty 31. pluku čs. legií. Do vlasti se vrátil 3.
transportem dne 17. prosince 1918 v hodnosti kapitána. Po válce se rozhodl zůstat v nové čs. armádě a 28. února
1919 byl povýšen na majora. Podrobněji o jeho službě v italských legiích viz VÚA-VHA Praha, fond
Legionářský poslužný spis, Emanuel Ambrož; Tamtéž, fond Osobní karta legionáře, Emanuel Ambrož.
64 Italská vláda uznala po složitých jednáních s Edvardem Benešem oficiálně Čs. národní radu a její římskou
kancelář v říjnu 1917. Mezi vedoucí činitele římské kanceláře patřil Ing. Karel Veselý a později zejména bývalý
zajatec, poručík František Hlaváček.
65 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Legionářský poslužný spis, Emanuel Ambrož, přípis kapitána Josefa Logaje.
66 Viz PICHLÍK, Karel: Bez legend. Zahraniční odboj 1914-1918. (Zápas o československý program). Praha
1991, s. 231.
67 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Legionářský poslužný spis, Josef Bartík, Prohlášení mjr. E. Ambrože, 28. 2. 1920.
68 Viz příloha č. 1.
69 Citováno podle PICHLÍK, Karel: Bez legend. Zahraniční odboj 1914-1918. (Zápas o československý
program). Praha 1991, s. 323.
70 Tamtéž.
71 Tamtéž. Čs. divize v Itálii dostala v rámci čs. zahraniční armády pořadové číslo 6, dále je proto v souladu
s literaturou nazývána 6. čs. divizí.
17
Mezi prvními vojáky 31. pluku nechyběl ani Josef Bartík, který byl „3. dubna 1918
zařazen k 6 C rotě výzvědných hlídek 31. pl. v hodnosti provisor. aspiranta (důst. čekatele) při
VIII. ital. armádě.“72 O brzkém povolání Bartíka do vznikajících československých legií
v Itálii nerozhodla náhoda, ale skutečnost, že spolu se svými kolegy v asinarském zajateckém
táboře podal první přihlášku do čs. zahraničního vojska již v roce 1916 a byl proto považován
za spolehlivého muže, oddaného československému zahraničnímu odboji. To potvrzuje
zejména zpráva referenta archivu italské legie, kde se uvádí: „V dopise dobrovolníků
z Asinary ze dne 10. ledna 1918 je [Bartík]uveden v seznamu prvních devíti důstojníků, kteří
mají býti přeloženi do soustř. tábora českého: […], kdež je i poznámka ‚jsou to vesměs lidé,
kteří již dávno rozhodli se pracovati a netrpělivě očekávají okamžik, kdy budou povoláni‘.“73
Samotný Bartík zdůvodnil později své brzké povolání do legií následujícími slovy:
„… v únoru 1918 byli jsme z tábora na Asinaře povoláni do koncentračního tábora pro
československé dobrovolníky v Casagiove; odtud odjeli jsme k výzvědným hlídkám na italskou
frontu. Okolnost, že jedině nás třináct [podtrženo J. Bartíkem] ze 150 zajatců Čechů na
Asinaře – bylo povoláno na intervenci Národní rady do Casagiove, jasně dokazuje, že se to
muselo státi na základě naší dřívější přihlášky – jejíž registrování se dnes ovšem nepodařilo
zjistiti. Uvádím neméně důležitou okolnost, že naše třináctka byla prvním transportem čs.
dobrovolníků, který z tábora na Asinaře odjel ještě před utvořením čs. italských legií
k výzvědným hlídkám.“74
Organizace tzv. výzvědných hlídek (rot), k nimž byl Josef Bartík přidělen, byla svým
způsobem specifická, a proto je třeba ji podrobněji popsat. Výzvědné roty byly formálně
organizovány v rámci 31. pluku 6. československé divize v Itálii, ve skutečnosti však neměly
s tímto plukem nic společného, poněvadž podléhaly přímo velitelům jednotlivých italských
armád. Velitel 6. čs. divize gen. Andrea Graziani sice dostával od čs. výzvědčíků pravidelná
formální hlášení, ale příkazy jim dávat nemohl. Protože všechny výzvědné roty tvořily
dohromady velice silný a početný prapor,75 mělo záhy dojít k reorganizaci všech výzvědných
oddílů.
76
Dne 3. dubna 1918 odjela z Paduly výzvědná rota 6 C, která měla 140 mužů a čtrnáct
důstojníků. Velitelem roty byl por. Adolf Prchlík, vzápětí ho však vystřídal ppor. Emanuel
Ambrož, poněvadž Prchlík byl převelen k divizi do Foligna. Ze čtrnácti důstojníků mělo sedm
mužů hodnost důstojnického aspiranta a jedním z těchto aspirantů byl i Josef Bartík. Dne
dubna již byli čeští vojáci ubytováni na novém místě, a to ve vile Gemma
v městečku Noventa Padovana nedaleko Padovy. Zde měli před svým nasazením na frontu

72 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Osobní karta legionáře, Josef Bartík. V literatuře se dosud chybně tvrdilo, že Josef
Bartík byl přidělen k výzvědným hlídkám 3. italské armády. Viz KOLÁRIK, Peter: Josef Bartík: Životopis.
Vydala Draga S. Kellick, bez bližších bibliografických údajů, s. 3; RICHTER, Karel: Generál Josef Bartík. In:
Ivanov, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z historie protišpionážního oddělení generálního
štábu. Třebíč 19992
, s. 216. Tato informace se však neopírá o dostupné prameny.
73 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Legionářský poslužný spis, Josef Bartík, Č. j. 5420n., 10. 1. 1923.
74 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Legionářský poslužný spis, Josef Bartík, Žádost a započítání služební doby v čs.
zahraničním vojsku, 2. 12. 1922.
75 V létě 1918 bylo organizováno u jednotlivých italských armád zhruba 1600-1800 čs. výzvědčíků.
76 PICHLÍK, Karel – KLÍPA, Bohumír – ZABLOUDILOVÁ, Jitka: Českoslovenští legionáři 1914-1920. Praha
1996, s. 199.
18
podstoupit výcvik.77 O tom, jak výcvik výzvědčíků 6 C roty probíhal, nás podrobně informuje
Vojtěch Hanzal, bývalý velitel 1. výzvědné roty u VII. italské armády, který ve svých
dějinách výzvědných rot uvádí: „Za vedení italských důstojníků k tomu cíli přidělených,
cvičeno házení granátů ručních a bomb, které dotud byly (svými typy) našim hochům
neznámy. Cvičeno také s maskami proti plynům, cvičeno hlídkování, boj nožem (pugnalem) a
nezapomínáno ovšem ani na tužení těla cvičeními prostnými a sokolskými, jakož i sportem.
[…] Pořádány přednášky příležitostné, zřízen kurs italštiny pro vojíny, kteří také skutečně
brzy italštinu, k podivení ovšem nesmírnému jak důstojníků italských, tak vojáků a civilistů,
ovládali více méně podle schopnosti, ale aspoň tak, že ,se nedali prodat‘. Pravidelně konány
sbírky na národní daň, které posílány odbočce Národní rady do Říma.“78
Zde je třeba zmínit, že výsadu používání italského útočného nože pugnalu měly do té
doby pouze italské elitní úderné jednotky tzv. arditů. Samotní Italové proto začali vzápětí čs.
výzvědčíky nazývat červenobílými ardity (biancorossi arditi), a to jednak kvůli zvláštní
výsadě, používání útočných nožů, jednak pro červenobílou barvu výložek, která kontrastovala
s modrým podkladem.79
Dne 23. dubna provedl u roty přehlídku velitel VIII. italské armády generál Penella,
který vojáky za jejich výborné výkony pochválil. Celý výcvik byl symbolicky zakončen
účastí roty na vojenských slavnostech v Montebelluně. Velký dojem učinilo na Italy zejména
vystoupení sokolského a fotbalového družstva roty. Po skončení slavnosti se již část roty
přesouvala na frontu konat hlídky. Z toho důvodu odjel Josef Bartík spolu s dalšími čtyřmi
důstojníky a padesáti muži dne 14. května 1918 do města Villorby. Odtud měli čs. výzvědčíci
konat každou noc hlídky na ostrovech v řece Piavě a přinášet zpátky důležité informace
o nepřátelských pozicích. Jednalo se přitom o zvlášť nebezpečnou činnost, poněvadž fronta
procházela právě řekou Piavou a o mnohých ostrovech se nevědělo, zda jsou v italských
anebo v nepřátelských rukou.80
Vůbec první hlídka byla provedena v noci z 19. na 20. května a veleli jí Josef Bartík
a Josef Nimshaus. Tento pomyslný křest ohněm málem skončil tragédií. Okolnosti nešťastné
události opět zevrubně popsal Vojtěch Hanzal: „Hlídka Bartík – Nimshaus tráví hlídku celou
noc venku. Přebrodí několik proudů Piave a dostane se až na ostrov ,Isola Grande‘, odkud
dobře lze pozorovati nepřátelský zákop. K ránu vrací se zpět. Před samými italskými
překážkami stane se však neštěstí. Italská vedetta [hlídka, pozn. PK ] snad neuvědoměna
řádně, že venku jest naše hlídka a myslíc, že to snad nepřítel, vystřelí na poplach a sama se
bráníc, hodí ruční granát do naší hlídky. Snad tímto granátem, snad granátem rakouského
dělostřelectva, jež začalo z poplachu také střílet, zranění 4 naši, a to: desátník Štroff, střelci
Nováček a Houška lehce, avšak důstoj. čekatel Bartík velmi těžce do nohy. Noha přeražena a
později částečně také špatným léčením (sedmkrát operována) – zůstala chromou.“81

77 HANZAL, Vojtěch: S výzvědčíky od švýcarských ledovců až po moře Adriatické. Praha 1938, s. 280.
78 Tamtéž, s. 280-281.
79 MAREK, Jindřich: Pod císařskou šibenicí. Čeští vojáci na křižovatkách roku 1918. Cheb 2005, s. 138.
80 HANZAL, Vojtěch: S výzvědčíky od švýcarských ledovců až po moře Adriatické. Praha 1938, s. 281.
81 Tamtéž, s. 282.
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Bartíkovo zranění je potvrzeno rovněž v jeho osobní legionářské kartě, kde se uvádí:
„20. května 1918 raněn do pravé nohy střepinou bomby na Isola Grande na Piavě, odešel do
nemoc[nice] č. 47.“82 Ačkoliv se Bartík vrátil ke své rotě z italské nemocnice již 9. června
1918, jeho zranění bylo vážné a muselo být léčeno ještě po návratu do vlasti v roce 1919.
V srpnu 1918 byl Bartík za bojové zásluhy při výzvědné službě u VIII. italské armády
jmenován poručíkem a záhy obdržel Italský válečný kříž za statečnost.83
Pro italské velení byly československé výzvědné hlídky významné a velmi je
oceňovalo pro jejich odvahu. Tu podtrhovala skutečnost, že Rakušané volili proti zajatým
československým průzkumníkům ten nejtvrdší postup. Zajatí legionáři-průzkumníci byli
ihned popravováni, a pokud to bylo možné, tak navíc na dohled od italských zákopů.
84
Kupříkladu v červnu 1918 bylo takto popraveno na pětadvacet příslušníků Bartíkovy roty,
kteří padli do zajetí po rakouské ofenzívě u vrchu Montello.85 Odvaha a úspěchy čs.
výzvědčíků pronikla i do zahraničního tisku. Dopisovatel francouzského listu Echo de Paris
o nich poznamenal: „Jsou zrakem a sluchem italských vyšších velitelství, kterým byli
přiděleni, a vykonávají svůj úkol s obdivuhodnou chladnokrevností a rozhodným zdarem.“86
Josef Bartík měl to štěstí, že do rakouského zajetí nepadl. V září 1918 rozhodlo italské
velení o reorganizaci čs. výzvědných rot, které měly utvořit nový samostatný

československý pluk výzvědný.87 Z původní Bartíkovy roty 6 C 31. pluku se stala po
reorganizaci devátá rota 39. „výzvědného“ pluku.88 Výzvědčíci z „nové“ deváté roty se ještě
na přelomu října a listopadu 1918 zúčastnili závěrečné spojenecké ofenzívy. Několik těžkých
závěrečných bojů připravilo devátou rotu na samém sklonku války o šest mužů, dalších osm
výzvědčíků bylo zraněno těžce a šestnáct lehce.89 Tou dobou se již válka na italské frontě
blížila ke svému definitivnímu konci. Na dvacet tisíc československých legionářů 6. a 7. čs.
divize z Itálie se chystalo na cestu do „osvobozeného“ Československa.90 Vojáci z deváté
výzvědné roty si domů přivezli celkem šest stříbrných a třiadvacet bronzových medailí za

82 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Osobní karta legionáře, Josef Bartík. V životopisné brožuře o Josefu Bartíkovi je
informace o Bartíkově zranění uvedena zcela mylně, když se zde uvádí: „Jako velitel 39. pluku československých
legií byl při bitvě na Piavě v červnu 1918 těžce raněn do nohy.“ Tyto informace se v žádném případě neopírají o
dostupné prameny. Srovnej KOLÁRIK, Peter: Josef Bartík: Životopis. Vydala Draga S. Kellick, bez bližších
bibliografických údajů, s. 3.
83 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Osobní karta legionáře, Josef Bartík.
84 PICHLÍK, Karel: Bez legend. Zahraniční odboj 1914-1918. (Zápas o československý program). Praha 1991, s.
395-396.
85 KRETŠÍ, Jindřich: Vznik a vývoj československé legie v Italii. Praha 1928, s. 215-216; Též HANZAL,
Vojtěch: S výzvědčíky od švýcarských ledovců až po moře Adriatické. Praha 1938, s. 288-294. Zde je také
kompletní seznam popravených včetně identifikačních údajů.
86 Citováno podle PICHLÍK, Karel – KLÍPA, Bohumír – ZABLOUDILOVÁ, Jitka: Českoslovenští legionáři
1914-1920. Praha 1996, s. 199.
87 PICHLÍK, Karel – KLÍPA, Bohumír – ZABLOUDILOVÁ, Jitka: Českoslovenští legionáři 1914-1920. Praha
1996, s. 199.
88 Viz BEDNAŘÍK, František: Vývoj a boje československého vojska v Italii. Praha 1924; VÚA-VHA Praha,
fond Legionářský poslužný spis, Josef Bartík
89 MAREK, Jindřich: Pod císařskou šibenicí. Čeští vojáci na křižovatkách roku 1918. Cheb 2005, s. 241.
90 PICHLÍK, Karel: Bez legend. Zahraniční odboj 1914-1918. (Zápas o československý program). Praha 1991, s.

20
statečnost a dále 117 italských válečných křížů.
91 Mezi vyznamenanými nechyběl ani čerstvě
povýšený zraněný nadporučík Josef Bartík, který se vrátil do vlasti třetím transportem
(vlakem číslo 1288) ještě před Vánocemi dne 17. prosince 1918.92

O zajatých důstojnících české národnosti na italské frontě se obecně tvrdí, že o službu
v legiích neměli zájem.93 Jednou z výjimek byl právě Josef Bartík. Jak bylo uvedeno výše,
o zařazení do vznikajícího čs. zahraničního vojska se hlásil již v prosinci 1916, tedy
bezprostředně poté, co padl do zajetí. Právě tato skutečnost nám může doložit Bartíkovu
odvahu, kladný charakter a jeho vlastenecké cítění.
Úplné znění vojenského slibu, který čs. legionáři v Itálii skládali, je následující: „ Já
nížepsaný […] zavazuji se slavnostně, že sloužiti budu čestně a věrně jako voják
československého národního vojska Československému národu zastoupenému nyní
Československou Národní Radou a slibuji, že čestně a věrně plniti budu všechny povinnosti,
jež plynou z tohoto závazku, jmenovitě, že bezpodmínečně budu poslušen všech rozkazů svých
vojenských velitelů.“94 Závěrem podkapitoly nezbývá než konstatovat, že Josef Bartík během
svého působení v Itálii znění tohoto slibu beze zbytku naplnil.

91 MAREK, Jindřich: Pod císařskou šibenicí. Čeští vojáci na křižovatkách roku 1918. Cheb 2005, s. 241.
92 Viz VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Osobní karta legionáře, Josef Bartík.
93 MICHL, Jan: Legionáři a Československo. Praha 2009, s. 20.
94 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Legionářský poslužný spis, Emanuel Ambrož, Slib Emanuela Ambrože ze dne 24. 6.

21
Léta meziválečná (1919-1939)
2.1 Důstojníkem zpravodajského oddělení Hlavního štábu (1919-1924)
Na počátku roku 1919 o sobě znovu dalo vědět Bartíkovo staré válečné zranění,
roztříštěná a zlomená holenní kost. V únoru proto nastoupil československý legionář Bartík
do záložní nemocnice na Žižkově a v nemocničním ošetřování setrval až do 15. října 1919.
Následky v podobě kulhání si ovšem nesl po celý zbytek života, a to i přesto, že se podrobil
celkem 12 operacím.95 Jeden z jeho pozdějších kolegů, který ho mohl během druhé světové
války ve Velké Británii lépe poznat – Jan Krček – k důsledkům Bartíkova válečného zranění
podotkl: „… Bartík velmi těžce nesl svoji tělesnou vadu, pro kterou nemohl absolvovati
válečnou školu a musel sloužit ve skupině konc[eptních] důstojníků.“96
O italského legionáře a od 1. května 1919 kapitána Josefa Bartíka projevila brzy zájem
vznikající československá armáda. V srpnu 1919 byl od 39. pluku čs. legií přidělen ke
zpravodajskému oddělení Ministerstva národní obrany (dále MNO), kde po propuštění
z nemocnice působil ve funkci konceptního důstojníka. V ministerském výnosu z 25. srpna
1919, který obdržel, je výslovně uvedeno: „Kapitán 39. výzvědného pluku Bartík Josef, t. č.
v nemocnici čs. červ. kříže v Karlíně přiděluje se služebně a zároveň zařazuje do stavu MNO,
zpravodajské odd. na místo kapitána Vlka Antonína. Službu tam nastoupí po propuštění
nemocnice.“97
Počátky vojenské zpravodajské služby v Československu jsou spjaty s budováním
Hlavního štábu čs. branné moci a tudíž i s činností francouzské vojenské mise v ČSR,
konkrétně se jménem vrchního velitele ozbrojených sil ČSR gen. Maurice Pelléa, který nařídil
„sloučit jednotlivá „bureaux“ štábu francouzské mise s odpovídajícími odděleními MNO.
Číslování se přitom ujednotilo podle francouzských zvyklostí.“98 Náčelníkem druhého
oddělení (zpravodajského) Hlavního štábu čs. branné moci se stal francouzský důstojník pplk.
Marcel Ihler a jeho zástupcem československý důstojník mjr. Čeněk Haužvic.99 Čeněk
Haužvic byl jedním z mála zkušených českých zpravodajských důstojníků, kteří působili ve
zpravodajské funkci již za Rakouska-Uherska a během Velké války. Výjimečnost tohoto
stavu byla podle Josefa Bartíka dána zejména tím, že „v čele vojenského zpravodajství
v rakousko-uherské monarchii po dobu prvé světové války byl generálmajor Max Ronge,100

95 Viz VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Osobní karta legionáře, Josef Bartík; VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny,
Josef Bartík.
96 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-72-1-3/547, Protokol sepsaný s plk. Janem Krčkem, 2. 6. 1950, s. 78.
97 SDMJ, pozůstalost Josefa Bartíka, Výnos MNO z 25. 8. 1919.
98 BŘACH, Radko: Generál Maurice Pellé. První náčelník hlavního štábu čs. branné moci. Praha 2007, s. 86.
99 Mjr. gšt Čeněk Haužvic, od listopadu pplk. gšt, působil od října 1920 až do prosince 1923 jako první
československý přednosta 2. oddělení Hl. štábu. Druhým čs. přednostou byl plk. gšt Miloš Žák (prosinec 1923-
duben 1926).
100 Maximilian Ronge (1874-1953) byl za první světové války zástupcem náčelníka zpravodajského oddělení
Evidenčního úřadu. Od roku 1917 byl až do konce války náčelníkem Zpravodajského oddělení a posledním
přednostou Evidenčního úřadu. Bezprostředně po válce byl pověřen zajištěním repatriace válečných zajatců. Po
anšlusu Rakouska v roce 1938 byl nějakou dobu internován v koncentračním táboře jako politicky nespolehlivý.
22
který zásadně odmítal zařazování důstojníků české národnosti na zpravodajská místa u
vyšších velitelství.“101
Ačkoliv byl Josef Bartík původně přidělen ke zpravodajskému oddělení MNO, po
Pelléově reorganizaci se ocitl ve zpravodajském (druhém) oddělení Hlavního štábu. Ve
zpravodajském oddělení měl setrvat po celou dobu trvání První i Druhé republiky.
Skutečnost, že v oddělení působil prakticky od samého začátku, ho nepochybně zvýhodňovala
oproti ostatním kolegům zpravodajcům, kteří do oddělení přišli později. Bartíkův kolega
Karel Paleček, který nastoupil službu na zpravodajské oddělení v hodnosti štábního kapitána
v roce 1931 a působil ve výzvědné sekci pátrací skupiny se zaměřením na Německo,102
k tomu podotkl: „Bartík […] byl v oddělení od prvních jeho začátků ještě z doby jeho
zakládání gen. Haužvicem, který byl snad prvním přednostou 2. oddělení po vybudování naší
armády. […] Jako bystrý člověk znal vývoj celého ministerstva národní obrany od jeho
prvopočátku se všemi aferami a politickým pozadím i osobami. V tomto smyslu měl
obdivuhodnou paměť.“103
Pro počáteční působení Josefa Bartíka ve zpravodajském oddělení v hodnosti
konceptního důstojníka neexistuje dostatek relevantních pramenů. První informace, které se
týkají jeho hodnocení, pochází z roku 1922. Přednosta zpravodajského oddělení Hlavního
štábu, plk. gšt. Čeněk Haužvic, vylíčil Bartíkovu povahu následujícími slovy:
„Dobrosrdečný, inteligentní mladý důstojník, jehož povaha není dosud úplně upevněna. Pilný
ale nevytrvalý. […] Ku povýšení způsobilý.“104

Výrazná změna v Bartíkově životě nastala v roce 1923, když se dne 2. srpna oženil; za
manželku si vzal dvaadvacetiletou Libuši Kuklovou.105 S Bartíkovou svatbou souvisí patrně
také jeho dočasné přeložení do zálohy, kam byl přeložen k 1. srpnu 1923. Mimo službu však
setrval pouze do 30. září téhož roku, neboť k 1. říjnu 1923 byl „přeložen do kategorie
koncep[tních] důst[ojníků] z povolání.“106
V roce 1924 byl Josef Bartík jako referent ve studijní skupině
107 pro Rumunsko a Itálii
hodnocen novým přednostou zpravodajského oddělení plk. gšt. Milošem Žákem následovně:
„Úplně se změnil oproti popisu z roku 1922. Je velmi výkonný, pilný a svědomitý. Má svou

101 BARTÍK, Josef: Předmluva. In: Ivanov, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z historie
protišpionážního oddělení generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992, s. 7.
102 LÁNÍK, Jaroslav a kolektiv: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939-1945. Praha 2005, s. 216.
Podrobněji (ne však vyčerpávajícím způsobem) k životním osudům Karla Palečka viz také ŠOLC, Jiří: Generál
parašutistů. HaV 45, 1996, č. 4, s. 156-177.
103 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-2/39, Protokol sepsaný s brig. gen. Karlem Palečkem, 21. 11. 1949.
104 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka k čistopisu kvalifikační listiny – 1922.
105 Libuše Bartíková (rozená Kuklová) se narodila 22. listopadu 1900, pocházela z učitelské rodiny ze Šumavy,
Po celý život byla svému manželovi pevnou oporou. Zemřela v roce 1988.
106 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka k čistopisu kvalifikační listiny – 1924.
107 Postupem času se ve zpravodajském oddělení vytvořily čtyři skupiny, které se dále členily na různé sekce:
skupina A (studijní), skupina B (pátrací), skupina C (zahraniční), skupina D (všeobecná). Kromě toho byla
součástí zpravodajského oddělení také kancelář přednosty, pomocná kancelář a registratura.
23
zdravou iniciativu.“108 Tento rok musel být pro novomanžele Bartíkovy nepochybně šťastný,
neboť 24. dubna 1924 se jim narodila první dcera Zora.109

108 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka k čistopisu kvalifikační listiny – 1924.
109 Zora Bartíková (24. 4. 1924 – 20. 5. 1940) zemřela za tragických okolností ve Velké Británii. Podrobněji o
tom viz kapitola 2.
24
2.2 Ve studijní a pátrací skupině zpravodajského oddělení (1925-1935)
K prvnímu lednu 1925 byl kpt. Josef Bartík ustanoven „referentem studijní skupiny
pro sledování veškerých hnutí majících vztah k čs. armádě.“110 V pořadí třetí čs. přednosta
zpravodajského oddělení pplk. gšt. František Kamm vylíčil Bartíkovu povahu ve službě
následujícími slovy: „Povaha ustálená, spolehlivý a vytrvalý pracovník. Dřívější výbuchy
temperamentu naučil se ovládati.“111

V roce 1927 se udály v Bartíkově životě dvě zásadní události. Dne 4. února byl
povýšen na „štábního kapitána konceptního […] s účinností a pořadím od 3. prosince
1926.“112 Jednalo se o významné povýšení, při němž se dostal do kategorie tzv. vyšších
důstojníků. Dne 8. května téhož roku se navíc manželům Bartíkovým narodila druhá dcera
Draga.113 Nový přednosta oddělení zpravodajského, plukovník JUDr. Václav Chalupa, popsal
Bartíka takto: „povaha ustálená, pilný spolehlivý a vytrvalý pracovník.“114
Až doposud působil Bartík jako referent ve studijní skupině. V roce 1928 byl přeložen
do pátrací skupiny zpravodajského oddělení, kde měl napříště setrvat až do roku 1939. Pátrací
skupina byla společně se studijní skupinou klíčovými prvky celé organizace zpravodajského
oddělení, přičemž by bylo „nepřesné a věcně nesprávné označovat v tomto případě stupeň
jejich důležitosti, protože obě úzce spolupracovaly pro konečné výsledky – získání co
nejpřesnějšího obrazu o úmyslech nepřátelských států, jejich vojenských přípravách,
prostřednictvím jejich rozmístění a předpokládaném použití v čase, prostoru, organizaci
apod. Pátrací skupina tyto poznatky získávala, studijní je analyzovala a předkládala zpětně
své požadavky.“115
Samotná pátrací skupina měla plnit následující úkoly: „… provádět obranné i
výzvědné zpravodajství s hlediska potřeb armády i státu, podle disposic, které dostával
přednosta 2. oddělení od náčelníka štábu. Pátrací skupina měla styk s druhými státy
prostřednictvím voj. atašé, spolupracovala se spřátelenými zprav. službami a vysílala své
důstojníky do zájmových prostorů. Dále byly v pátrací skupině vedeny evidenční listiny všech
agentů, vyúčtovaní jejich platů a ostatních platů a odměn vyplývajících z titulu
zpravodajských výkonů.“116
Prvním přednostou pátrací skupiny, který byl zároveň zástupcem přednosty celého
oddělení, byl bývalý „italský“ legionář, plukovník Mojmír Soukup. Ten se od roku 1928 stal
Bartíkovým bezprostředním nadřízeným, nebude proto od věci se u jeho osobnosti na chvíli
pozastavit. K tomu účelu může opětovně posloužit svědectví, které po druhé světové válce

110 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka k čistopisu kvalifikační listiny – 1926.
111 Tamtéž.
112 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka k čistopisu kvalifikační listiny – 1928.
113 Tamtéž, Osobní list Josefa Bartíka.
114 Tamtéž, Vložka k čistopisu kvalifikační listiny – 1927.
115 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 29.
116 ABS Praha, fond Z (Mapy zpráv zpracované Studijním ústavem MV), Z-6-314, Československá
zpravodajská služba v letech 1920-1945, s. 12.
25
podal během svého zatčení Karel Paleček; o plk. Soukupovi vypověděl: „… poznal jsem
SOUKUPA velmi dobře. Byl jistým odrazem gen. Chalupy [generál byl přednostou
zpravodajského oddělení v letech 1927-1933, pozn. PK], se kterým dlouho spolupracoval a
měl celkově i jeho zaměření. Sympatisoval se směrem sociálních demokratů. Byl typem
důstojníka pokrokového. Mimo službu a sbírání známek neměl žádných zvláštních sklonů.
K podřízeným byl mírný a laskavý a s kým se blíže seznámil, i otcovský. Ve své dobrotě někdy
přehlížel různé služební nedostatky…“117
V roce 1928 zhodnotil přednosta zpravodajského oddělení brig. gen. Chalupa
Bartíkovu povahu opravdu stručně: v kvalifikační listině je v příslušné kolonce napsáno pouze
jedno slovo, „temperamentní“.118 V poznámce potom gen. Chalupa dodává: „velmi potřebná
síla pro službu zpravodajskou.“119 Zároveň Bartíkovu celkovou kvalifikaci ohodnotil
nejvyšším možným stupněm jako výtečnou.
V roce 1929 se Bartík coby referent pátrací skupiny podílel na vyšetřování většího
špionážního případu. Jednalo se o aféru kapitána Jaroslava Falouta.120 Kapitán kancelářské
služby Jaroslav Falout (*1886) působil od roku 1924 jako přidělenec pomocné kanceláře

oddělení (operačního) Hlavního štábu, přičemž od roku 1928 prováděl špionáž ve prospěch
Německa. Pro jeho odhalení měla rozhodující význam náhoda, a to když Falout zapomněl na
letišti před odletem do Německa aktovku s ukradenými dokumenty.121 Případem se hojně
zabýval tehdejší tisk a dostal se rovněž do jednání poslanecké sněmovny a senátu. Dne
června 1929 referoval v senátu o tomto případu a průběhu vyšetřování ministerský
předseda František Udržal.122 Pro zachycení dobové atmosféry a částečně i pro vylíčení
okolností této špionážní aféry následuje část z jeho obsáhlého projevu:
„ […]Jak dosavadní šetření ukázalo, byl kpt. Falout velmi lehkomyslný, což se jevilo v
dělání dluhů, namnoze úplně zbytečných. Tyto dluhy splácel Falout tím způsobem, že
vytloukal klín klínem. Svoji tísnivou hospodářskou situaci snažil se sice zakrýti před svými
představenými, ale přes to dobře si uvědomoval její vzrůstající neudržitelnost. Pod jejím
tlakem připadl na myšlenku, pomoci si k penězům prodejem vojenských dokumentů cizí moci.
Jestliže se nyní dotknu některých podrobností, musím předem poznamenati, že
spočívají na dosavadních doznáních, jež Falout postupně učinil a jež byla také různými
způsoby ověřena. Aby tedy uskutečnil svůj nekalý úmysl, vyžádal si Falout ještě od přednosty
oddělení hlavního štábu dovolenou na 29. září 1928 k cestě do Brna. Vystavenou a
podepsanou dovolenku Falout zfalšoval a připsal si na ni jako další místo dovolené Vídeň.

117 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-2/50, Protokol sepsaný s brig. gen. Karlem Palečkem, 21. 11. 1949.
118 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka k čistopisu kvalifikační listiny – 1928.
119 Tamtéž.
120 Na základě Bartíkova vyprávění a částečně i archivních pramenů, ale formou tzv. literatury faktu zpracoval
tuto aféru publicista Miroslav Ivanov. Viz IVANOV, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech
z historie protišpionážního oddělení generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992
. Samotná aféra by svým tématem a
časovým rozsahem (1928-1946) po důkladné heuristice vydala jistě na samostatnou studii. V rámci této práce se
však autor omezí pouze na vylíčení nejdůležitějších faktů.
121 KOUTEK, Jaroslav: Tichá fronta. Praha 1985, s. 10.
122 František Udržal (1886-1938), český agrární politik. Stoupenec politické linie Antonína Švehly. V letech
1921-1925 a 1926-1929 byl ministrem národní obrany. Od roku 1929 do r. 1932 byl předseda vlády ČSR. V roce
1937 odešel ze zdravotních důvodů z politiky do ústraní.
26
Poněvadž pro soukromé cesty vojenských gážistů do ciziny je předepsáno, že nejen při vydání,
ale i při prodloužení pasu nutno se u kompetentního policejního nebo politického úřadu
vykázati povolovací klausulí vojenských úřadů, vyzvedl si Falout, jak sám tvrdí, u presidia
MNO. osobně povolovací klausuli. Na základě této klausule byl mu 26. září 1928 u
policejního ředitelství v Praze prodloužen pas, před tím od r. 1924 neplatný a nepoužívaný, k
cestě do zahraničí. S tímto pasem odjel v příštích dnech vlakem do Berlína a nabídl tam svoje
služby. Jeho nabídka byla přijata a podle jeho doznání vyplacena mu záloha 1.000 M (Kč
8.000) a dány instrukce k práci. Vrátil se podle instrukcí a když mu přišel vhodný materiál do
ruky, dojednal si schůzku.
Poněvadž cesty s pasem, znějícím na čsl. důstojníka, byly by vzbudily podezření, byl
mu německou zpravodajskou službou vystaven říšsko-německý pas na jméno Josef
Friedländer. Na tento pas konal pak všecky cesty do Německa. Falout vykonal do Německa
několik cest, a to jak vlakem, tak letadlem a jejich počet se postupně zjišťuje. Podle
dosavadního zjištění opatřoval si Falout materiál pro svou špionážní činnost výhradně v
operačním oddělení hlavního štábu. Podrobné šetření také prokázalo, že spisy, které Falout
prozradil, resp. před svým zatčením měl v úmyslu prozraditi, spadají vesměs do zmíněné
kategorie běžné korespondence, procházející pomocným úřadem 3. oddělení hlavního štábu.
K elaborátům operačního rázu neměl přístupu. To ovšem neznamená, že by Falout neprokázal
cizímu státu dosti platné služby, a nemá to ani zmenšovati jeho vinu, nicméně eminentně
důležité věci zůstaly jeho činností nedotčeny. Spisy, které byly prozrazeny, neustále se zjišťují
a jejich aproximativně úplný výpočet bude možný teprve po skončeném soudním
vyšetřování.“123
Kpt. Jaroslav Falout byl v roce 1929 odsouzen divizním soudem pro zločin vojenské
zrady k trestu odnětí svobody ve výši devatenácti let.124 Jeho případ měl mít v budoucnu ještě
zajímavou dohru. Během nacistické okupace zbylého Československa byl v roce 1940
z vězení propuštěn. V roce 1945 byl však opětovně dopaden a souzen Mimořádným lidovým
soudem (dále MLS) v Praze. Ten ho shledal vinným a 4. října 1946 ho odsoudil za zločin
udavačství k trestu těžkého žaláře na osm let. Trest měl Falout zostřen jedním tvrdým ložem
čtvrtletně. Po odpykání trestu, který mu udělil MLS, měl být Falout převezen do vojenské
věznice v Praze, kdy se měl odpykat zbytek svého devatenáctiletého trestu, tedy cca 9 let.
K tomu již ale nedošlo. Jaroslav Falout zemřel ve vězení v Plzni-Borech ještě v roce 1946.125
Během roku 1929 Bartík rovněž „vykonal zkoušku z jazyka italského na děkan[átě]
fakulty filozofické univerzity Karlovy v Praze s celkovým výsledkem dobrým (vysvědčení z 25.
října 1929.“126
V roce 1933 byla reorganizována pátrací skupina zpravodajského oddělení. Skupina
byla rozdělena na dvě podskupiny (sekce). Jednalo se o výzvědnou (ofenzivní) sekci P-1 a

123 http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1925ns/ps/tisky/t2297_00.htm [15. 2. 2011]
124 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 322, pozn. 4.
125 Podrobněji k Faloutovu odsouzení MLS viz Státní oblastní archiv Praha, fond Mimořádný lidový soud Praha,
Ls 1030/46.
126 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka k čistopisu kvalifikační listiny – 1929.
27
obrannou (defenzivní) sekci P-2. Přednostou „ofenzívy“ byl ustanoven pplk. gšt. František
Dastych, „obrana“ byla svěřena mjr. pěch. Františku Janderovi.127

V té době Bartík působil s největší pravděpodobností v ofenzivní sekci. Informace o
tom bohužel v kvalifikačních listinách nejsou, ale zevrubně o tomto Bartíkově působení, které
souviselo s jeho následným zatčením a odsouzením v Rakousku, vypověděl Karel Paleček:
„V době, kdy jsem do oddělení přišel [jedná se o rozmezí let 1931-1933, pozn. PK]odešel
[Bartík] na svoji žádost k ofensivní výkonné službě […] Velmi o to usiloval, ačkoliv plk.
Soukup mu v tom bránil, protože Bartík byl nápadný tím, že kulhal. Ačkoliv byl agilní a
snaživý, výsledky neměl, protože v ofensivní službě se velmi těžce pracovalo. Za celou dobu co
vím, jak Soukup podtrhoval, když jej [Bartíka]ve Vídni zavřeli, jediný jeho úspěch spočíval
v tom, že obstaral jeden grafikon z jízdního řádu říšskoněmeckých drah, který udává kapacitu
provozu a proto je důvěrný.“128
Karel Paleček se ve své výpovědi dotkl zpravodajské akce z roku 1933, při níž byl
Bartík v Rakousku odhalen. Jelikož se jedná o velice zajímavou epizodu Bartíkova života,
bude zde popsána podrobněji. Nejprve krátké písemné svědectví samotného Josefa Bartíka,
který v roce 1955 k této věci uvedl: „V létech 1933-1934 byl jsem jako aktivní důstojník při
dělnickém povstání ve Vídni zatčen a odsouzen k těžkému žaláři na 18 měsíců. Podle znění
žaloby byl jsem vyslán do Vídně jako exponent československého vojenského zpravodajství,
abych tam poskytoval podporu ozbrojenému dělnickému povstání a zjišťoval součinnost
rakouských vojenských kruhů s nacistickým Německem.“129 Zde je však třeba upozornit na
některé nesrovnalosti a nepřesnosti a pokusit se je porovnat s příslušnou literaturou. Tzv.
dělnické povstání v Rakousku se odehrálo až v únoru 1934. Ozbrojené střetnutí mezi vládními
silami rakouského kancléře Engelberta Dollfusse a sociálně demokratickým Schutzbundem130
začalo 12. února v Linci. Nepokoje se záhy rozšířily do dalších měst včetně Vídně, přičemž
„poslední výstřely třeskly v sobotu 17. února.“131 Bilance střetnutí byla následující: „ Vládní
síly […] ztratily celkem 105 mrtvých a asi 300 zraněných, sociálnědemokratický Schutzbund
měl 137 mrtvých a 400 raněných. […] Sociální demokracie jako celek byla zlikvidována.“132
Z literatury vyplývá, že škpt. Josef Bartík byl zatčen rakouskou policií v létě 1933.133
Československý zpravodajský důstojník se měl stát cílem provokace samotného šéfa
rakouského vojenského zpravodajství generála Maxe von Rongeho, na tom se alespoň

127 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 26.
128 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-2/60, Protokol sepsaný s brig. gen. Karlem Palečkem, 21. 11. 1949.
129 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis Vyšší vojenský soud Příbram (dále jen VVS Příbram) – spis 1T15/65, Žádost a
revizi řízení nebo zahlazení odsouzení adresovaná prezidentu republiky Antonínovi Zápotockému, 6. 6. 1955, s.
4.
130 Republikanischer Schutzbund (Republikánský obranný svaz) byl založen v dubnu 1923 na „obranu“
rakouské sociální demokracie. Jednalo se o stranickou vojenskou ozbrojenou formaci, která čítala až 80 000
mužů.
131 VEBER, Václav a kolektiv: Dějiny Rakouska. Praha 20072
, s. 520.
132 Tamtéž. Podrobněji o pozadí průběhu a důsledcích těchto nepokojů viz tamtéž, s. 517-521.
133 PACNER, Karel: Československo ve zvláštních službách. Pohledy do historie československých výzvědných
služeb 1914-1989. Díl I. 1914-1939. Praha 2002, s. 291. Amort s Jedličkou uvádějí jako datum zatčení léto 1934,
přičemž v zápětí tuto informaci sami negují konstatováním, že do Prahy se Bartík vrátil v březnu 1934. Srovnej
AMORT, Čestmír – JEDLIČKA, Ivan, Milan: Hledá se zrádce X. Praha 1968, s. 256, poznámka 10.
28
shoduje Karel Pacner s Amortem a Jedličkou, zároveň však není ani z jednoho výše
uvedených textů patrné, z jakého zdroje autoři informaci získali. Publicista Karel Pacner se
oproti Amortovi a Jedličkovi zabýval Bartíkovým rakouským případem o něco podrobněji a
věnoval mu samostatnou kapitolu s názvem Rakušané zatkli Bartíka.
134 Pacner uvádí, že
Bartíka do Rakouska vylákal jistý bývalý důstojník rakouské armády mjr. Gapp (uvádí ho bez
křestního jména), který proti němu vypovídal i před soudem. Dále líčí možné pozadí celého
případu, do kterého zapojuje i nejvyšší představitele obou zainteresovaných států, a to včetně
E. Dollfusse. Je však otázkou, nakolik se opírá o relevantní a zdroje a co jsou pouze jeho
konstrukce a fabulace. Pacner totiž mimo jiné uvádí: „Dne 12. února [1934] vypukla ve Vídni
revolta sociálně demokratických dělníků. […] I tento pokus o puč přispěl k prodloužení
Bartíkova pobytu ve vídeňském vězení. Teprve na jaře [1934] Rakušané československé
zpravodajce propustili.“135 Podle Amorta a Jedličky byl však Bartík propuštěn po osmi
měsících v březnu 1934.136 To by znamenalo, že vypuknutí tzv. dělnického povstání
Bartíkovo zatčení nijak neprodloužilo a pokud ano, tak jen o jeden měsíc.
Trochu více světla do této záležitosti může vnést výpověď Bartíkova kolegy ze
zpravodajského oddělení Karla Palečka, který k tomu poznamenal: „Brzy na to byl Bartík na
jedné schůzce ve Vídni zatčen a uvězněn. Nalétl na nějakou provokační akci. Později z toho
obviňoval nynějšího pplk. Václava Nováka v Písku, který byl t. č. přidělen ve Vídni u našeho
voj. attaché [pplk. gšt. Rudolfa Kučery, pozn. PK]. Jak se věci měly v podrobnostech nevím,
ale zákrok o výměnu a propuštění Bartíka byl velmi nákladný. Plk. Soukup [přednosta pátrací
skupiny – Bartíkův nadřízený] z důvodů zásadních se v Bartíkově případě k jeho záchraně
velmi exponoval.“137
Karel Paleček se zmínil o „výměně“ Josefa Bartíka. Tím měl s největší
pravděpodobností na mysli, že Bartíkovu propuštění předcházela složitá jednání mezi čs.
vojenskou zpravodajskou službou a rakouskou stranou. Rakušané propustili zadrženého
Bartíka dříve na základě zmíněné výměny. V podstatě se mohlo jednat o to, že byl vyměněn
za nějakého dopadeného rakouského agenta, kterého měla čs. zpravodajská služba k dispozici.
V případě, že by čs. strana nedisponovala žádným zadrženým rakouským agentem, mohl
v úvahu připadnout i větší finanční obnos nebo poskytnutí tajných zpravodajských informací,
které by mohly rakouskou stranu zajímat. Složitost oné „výměny“ potvrzuje i svědectví
pozdějšího Bartíkova kolegy, důstojníka Jana Krčka, který k tomu poznamenal: „Věděl jsem,
že při nějakém úkolu byl [Bartík] zatčen ve Vídni a dlouho vězněn, než se naším úřadům
podařilo ho vyměniti.“138
Amort s Jedličkou zdůvodnili Bartíkovo propuštění následujícími slovy: „Pro
nedostatek důkazů a pod tlakem rakouské demokratické veřejnosti musel být Josef Bartík […]
propuštěn na svobodu.“139 Toto tvrzení se však ve světle výše zmíněných výpovědí

134 PACNER, Karel: Československo ve zvláštních službách. Pohledy do historie československých výzvědných
služeb 1914-1989. Díl I. 1914-1939. Praha 2002, s. 291-293.
135 Tamtéž, s. 293.
136 AMORT, Čestmír – JEDLIČKA, Ivan, Milan: Hledá se zrádce X. Praha 1968, s. 256, poznámka 10.
137 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-2/60, Protokol sepsaný s brig. gen. Karlem Palečkem, 21. 11. 1949.
138 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-72-1/3/546, Protokol sepsaný s plk. Janem Krčkem, 2. 6. 1950.
139 AMORT, Čestmír – JEDLIČKA, Ivan, Milan: Hledá se zrádce X. Praha 1968, s. 256, poznámka 10.
29
zpravodajských důstojníků Palečka a Krčka jeví jako krajně nedůvěryhodné a lze jej tedy
odmítnout jako tendenční. Do tohoto zajímavého případu by mohly vnést ještě více světla
relevantní archivní prameny, zejména rakouské provenience – pokud se však dochovaly.
Nezbývá než vše uzavřít konstatováním, že během roku 1934 se škpt. Josef Bartík vrátil
zpátky do Československa na své původní místo do zpravodajského oddělení. Tou dobou tam
právě probíhala další reorganizace a personální změny.
Na přelomu roku 1933 a 1934 převzal funkci přednosty zpravodajského oddělení plk.
gšt. Šimon Drgač. Do čela zpravodajského oddělení Hlavního štábu se tak poprvé dostal
vysokoškolsky vzdělaný důstojník, absolvent Válečné školy s kvalifikací důstojníka
generálního štábu (gšt.). Podle vojenského historika Jiřího Šolce to byl právě plukovník
Drgač, který „načrtl moderní organizační a funkční podobu 2. oddělení hl. štábu, která se v
podstatě udržela až do druhé poloviny třicátých let. Vymezil kompetenční vztahy mezi
jednotlivými skupinami a vtiskl celému zpravodajskému oddělení vnitřní dělbu práce,
součinnosti a vysoké pracovní intenzity.“140
Ke dni 30. září 1934 nastoupil ke zpravodajskému oddělení Hlavního štábu další
výrazný zpravodajský důstojník. Jednalo se o pplk. gšt. Františka Moravce, který záhy
vystřídal ve funkci přednosty pátrací skupiny plk. Soukupa.141 Personální změny proběhly
v tomto roce i na vedoucích postech obou sekcí pátrací skupiny. Novým vedoucím výzvědné
sekce (P-1) se stal další důstojník s kvalifikací generálního štábu, Oldřich Tichý.142
A konečně, místo vedoucího obranné sekce (P-2) zaujal od 1. ledna 1935 Josef Bartík.143
Vystřídal tak mjr. Františka Janderu. Své při tom pravděpodobně sehrála i následující fakta,
o nichž vypověděl Karel Paleček: „Jandera […] holdoval alkoholu. Stávalo se velmi často, že
někdy nepřišel do kanceláře 2-3 dny. Soukup, i když mu to vytýkal, přece z toho nevyvozoval
žádných říznějších důsledků. […] Jandera nebyl také příliš opatrný na peníze. Při
odevzdávání pokladny měl v pokladně menší manko. Jeho manželka, původně ukrajinská
zemědělka, byla jak se o ní říkalo úplně negramotná, měla však velké nároky a proto Jandera
stále tonul v dluzích. Jako příklad vím z jeho vyprávění, že jednou si najala nejdražšího
učitele tennisu, který v Praze byl.“144

Oproti tomu hodnotil přednosta oddělení plk. Drgač kvalifikaci škpt. Josefa Bartíka
v roce 1934 nejvyšší známkou jako výtečnou, přičemž k Bartíkově povaze poznamenal:
„Krajně svědomitý a v práci houževnatý, korektní, agilní, iniciativní.“145 V poznámce
přednosta dále uvedl: „Velmi upotřebitelný pro službu zprav[odajskou] – zvláště ve složce
obranné.“146

140 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 27.
141 Tamtéž, s. 46.
142 TICHÝ, Oldřich: Z pamětí zpravodajce. Poznámky k činnosti 2. oddělení a ke knize gen. Frant. Moravce.
HaV 39, 1990, č. 4, s. 119.
143 Viz VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka k čistopisu kvalifikační listiny – 1935.
144 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-2/50,59 Protokol sepsaný s brig. gen. Karlem Palečkem, 21. 11. 1949.
145 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka k čistopisu kvalifikační listiny – 1934.
146 Tamtéž.
30
2.3 Přednostou obranné sekce pátrací skupiny (1935-1939)
2.3.a Bartíkovo působení v obranné sekci v letech 1935-1936
Od 1. ledna 1935 působil Josef Bartík ve zpravodajském oddělení jako vedoucí
obranné sekce pátrací skupiny. Zároveň byl „rozhodnutím vlády ČSR z 1/2 1935, s účinností a
pořadím od 1/1 1935 povýšen na mjr. konc. služby propůjčením služeb[ního] místa 5. plat.
stup. ve služeb[ní] kategorii důstoj[níků] absolventů voj. akademie.“147
Nyní je potřeba alespoň ve stručnosti charakterizovat činnost obranné sekce, kde
Bartík působil jako její vedoucí (přednosta) až do 14. března 1939. K tomu může opětovně
dobře posloužit zasvěcený výklad Karla Palečka: „Úkolem této sekce bylo obranné
zpravodajství uvnitř státu, a pokud bylo třeba a úkoly přesahovaly hranice, i vně státu.
V rámci obranného zpravodajství byly přirozeně i věci politické, a obranné zpravodajství
s hlediska protišpionážní obrany [činnost namířená proti výzvědnému zpravodajství
nepřátelských států tzn. zejména proti Maďarsku a Německu, pozn. PK ]. Dalším úkolem bylo
sledování veškerého tisku domácího a zahraničního, potud, pokud jej vydávaly illegální
skupiny. […]Materie obranného zpravodajství, kterou tato skupina zpracovávala byla velmi
široká a zasahovala i do oboru právního, za tím účelem byly v ní [:] jedna skupina studijní,
která materiál vyhodnocovala a pořizovala příslušné směrnice, jakož i skupina právní která
materiál politický a illegální posuzovala s hlediska právního. […] Tyto 2 skupiny podkládaly
defensivní zpravodajství zákonnou odborností. [Vedle toho pak existovala vlastní, pozn. PK]
Výkonná skupina, [která]měla vedle spolupráce se zpravodajskou ústřednou policejní [i]
svoje vlastní agenty pro šetření a sledování.“148 Vojenský historik Jiří Šolc dále k činnosti
obranné sekce poznamenal, že „za dobu své činnosti odhalila na 2000 případů vojenské zrady
a špionáže, které byla soudně stíhány.“149 Toto číslo se však ve srovnání s čísly, jež uvedl
Josef Bartík, jeví jako podhodnocené. V přednášce o nacismu, kterou Bartík přednesl ve
Velké Británii u jednotek čs. pozemního vojska v Leamingtonu, ve dnech 6. a 7. května 1941
byla uvedena tato čísla: „Jaký nápor vedlo Německo proti Československu osvětlí vám tato
data: v roce 1936 bylo usvědčeno 500 osob v ČSR ze špionáže ve prospěch Německa, v roce
1937 bylo jich již 1.197, v roce 1938 do září to jest do Mnichova, bylo jich zatčeno 982 a ještě
byly další stovky nám známých špionů v jichž zatčení nám mnichovský diktát zabránil.“150 Po
sečtení Bartíkových čísel se jen v letech 1936-1938 jednalo o 2679 případů.
Hlavním protihráčem čs. zpravodajského oddělení byla německá vojenská
zpravodajská služba – tzv. Abwehr. Ta vznikla již v roce 1925, po nástupu nacismu byla od
roku 1935 součástí Wehrmachtu. V čele Abwehru stál od roku 1935 námořní kapitán (později

147 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka k čistopisu kvalifikační listiny – 1935.
148 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-2/45, Protokol sepsaný s brig. gen. Karlem Palečkem, 21. 11. 1949.
149 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 46.
150 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-89-7, Složky a organizace ve výbojných plánech německého nacismu –
přednáška pplk. Josefa Bartíka z roku 1941, s. 9.
31
kontradmirál a admirál) Wilhelm Canaris.151 Rok 1935 lze vskutku považovat za zlomový,
poněvadž zpravodajský nápor Německa proti Československu mohutně vzrostl. Samotný
Josef Bartík k tomu po druhé světové vílce vypověděl toto: „Od roku 1935 jsme zjišťovali, že
Německo zahajuje proti ČSR velký zpravodajský nápor, který již nevede tzv. mírovými
prostředky, ale zjišťovali jsme, že Německo používá zpravodajských prostředků, které
přesahují rámec mírového zpravodajství. To znamenalo, že přikročilo ke zpravodajské
činnosti válečné!“152 Téměř o dvacet let později Bartík k situaci, v jaké se zpravodajské
oddělení ocitlo, dodává: „Ve válce počítalo československé zpravodajství se spoluprací
spojeneckých zpravodajských služeb. A proto již od roku 1935 docházelo k vzájemným
poradám zpravodajských štábů a výměně zpráv o vojenských přípravách nacistického
Německa. Bez této spolupráce by v případě napadení nemohlo československé vojenské
zpravodajství samo situaci zpravodajsky zvládnout.“153
Z doby, kdy Bartík působil jako vedoucí obranné sekce, pochází také zajímavá
humorná příhoda, která se sice netýká žádného špionážního případu, ale může ilustrovat
přátelskou atmosféru, jaká v obranné sekci za Bartíkova přednostování panovala. Jejím
hlavním aktérem byl jeden z Bartíkových podřízených, bývalý „ruský“ legionář a důstojník
jezdectva škpt. Jaroslav Tauer, který působil v rámci obranné sekce jako finanční referent.
Celá historka je zaznamenána ve výpovědi Karla Palečka, který při charakteristice Tauera
uvedl: „V obranné sekci, kde přednostou byl Bartík, sloužil Tauer často za předmět různých
hříček a kratochvílí, kterým vždy naběhl, Z vlastní zkušenosti to neznám, ale vždy se o tom
s vtipem vyprávělo. Tauer projevoval touhu být vyznamenán. Bartík pořídil [fiktivní] spis, že
Tauer tehdy a tehdy má se dostavit tam a tam v uniformě, že mu bude uděleno francouzské
vyznamenání, načež Tauer, poněvadž časové omezení bylo krátké, utíkal domů, kde se
převlékl do uniformy jezdeckého důstojníka a vrátil se v červených jezdeckých kalhotách
s vysokými botami zpět do oddělení. Měl tak trochu extremní uniformu i střihem a ušitím jak ji
s oblibou tehdy důstojníci jezdectva nosili. [Mimo to byl oproti ostatním důstojníkům poměrně
malého vzrůstu, pozn. PK] Přirozeně vysoké lakové boty. Mezitím jej [přednosta pátrací
skupiny] Moravec k něčemu potřeboval. Zda byl již o věci informován nebo ne mi známo není,
ale když se Tauer v uniformě objevil, položil prý mu otázku, zda se zbláznil a proč je v takové
parádě. Tauer na to odpověděl, že si má jít pro francouzské vyznamenání. Jak tato hříčka
potom skončila nevím, ale v oddělení to vzbudilo všeobecnou veselost. Jak to nesl Tauer
známo mi není, ale dovedu si představit, že mu dobře asi nebylo. Dovedl se však vždycky

151 Wilhelm Canaris (1887-1945) byl od ledna 1935 jako námořní kapitán vedoucí představitel tzv. Oddělení
abwehru (něm. Abteilung Abwehr) při říšském ministerstvu války. Od dubna 1935 v hodnosti kontradmirála. Po
reorganizaci této německé zpravodajské služby v roce 1938 stál v čele Sekce Zahraničí/Abwehr (něm. Amt
Ausland/ Abwehr). K 1. lednu 1940 měl Canaris hodnost admirála. Canaris stál v čele této tajné služby do února
1944, kdy byl odvolán. Po atentátu na Hitlera (20. 7. 1944) byl 23. 7. 1944 zatčen a 9. 4. 1945 byl na Hitlerův
příkaz zavražděn v koncentračním táboře Flossenbürg.
Podrobněji k jeho osobnosti viz KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav: Admirál Canaris. Praha 1968; BROŽ, Jiří: Admirál
Canaris a jeho Abwehr. Praha 1995.
152 GAJAN, Koloman a kolektiv (Edd.): Německý imperialismus proti ČSR (1918-1939). Praha 1962, dokument
č. 172, s. 388, poznámka č. 1.
153 BARTÍK, Josef: Předmluva. In: Ivanov, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z historie
protišpionážního oddělení generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992
, s. 9.
32
s věcí smířit. Podobné hříčky se prováděly častěji i u jiných důstojníků dobráckého, nebo
spíše naivního založení.“154
Reorganizace zpravodajského oddělení pokračovala i v roce 1936. Ve funkci
přednosty oddělení vystřídal plukovníka Šimona Drgače další absolvent pražské Válečné
školy, plk. gšt. František Hájek, který poté vykonával svoji funkci od 2. ledna 1936 až do

ledna 1939 a stal se tak posledním meziválečným přednostou zpravodajského oddělení.155
Josef Bartík jej později za druhé světové války charakterizoval následujícími slovy: „Plk. gšt.
Fr. Hájek velmi dobrý šéf zprav. odděl., vynikal ve společenském vystupování, dovedl získat
velmi rozsáhlé styky jak v prostředí domácím tak i v diplomatických kruzích a s cizinou. Jemu
lze děkovat, že naše zprav. mělo skutečně nadmíru dobré posice a z této okolnosti těžíme i
nyní v zahraničí. Měl vadu, že dosti často přes míru požíval alkoholu. To mu z mnoha stran
bylo vytýkáno. Naprosto oddaný státu, loyální ve vykonávání svého úřadu, neměl osobních
aspirací. V úřadování velkorysý. Jeho ideí bylo uložit peníze v zahraničí pro případ válečného
konfliktu a umístit [československé zpravodajské] důstojníky v různých místech
v zahraničí.“156 Později, za války ve Velké Británii, se dostal plk. Hájek do osobního sporu
s plukovníkem Moravcem, který kromě toho, že byl přednostou pátrací skupiny, vykonával
od 1. července 1937 rovněž funkci Hájkova zástupce.157 Celý spor nakonec řešil v roce 1942
zástupce ministra národní obrany generál Rudolf Viest, který za tím účel vyslechl i Josefa
Bartíka.158 Bartík v rozhovoru s gen. Viestem charakterizoval dále i plk. Moravce a rovněž
vztah obou důstojníků: „Plk. gšt. Fr. Moravec velmi dobrý odborník, loyálně plnil příkazy
svého nadřízeného [plk. Hájka], i když před rozhodnutím přednosty [plk. Hájka] měl někdy
námitky. Jelikož plk. gšt. Hájek mu přenechával značnou samostatnost v úřadě, brzy
vypozoroval, že si může vytvořit [samostatnou] posici. Při své ambiciosnosti se o to
[Moravec] snažil. Spolupráce obou byla velmi dobrá a podle toho též výsledky jejich činnosti
byly skvělé hlavně, co se týče v maření německé špionáže a též v ofensivní službě proti
Německu.“159

Reorganizace se týkala zejména výzvědného (ofenzivního) zpravodajství. 27. května
1936 vzniklo specializované výzvědné pracoviště: společná československo-sovětská
agenturní ústředna, která podléhala Moravcově pátrací sekci a měla krycí název VONAPO
20.160 Velitelem této agenturní ústředny se stal škpt. Karel Paleček. Ústředna „operovala

154 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-2/55-56, Protokol sepsaný s brig. gen. Karlem Palečkem, 21. 11. 1949.
155 STEHLÍK, Eduard – LACH, Ivan: Vlast a čest jim byly dražší nežli život. Dvůr Králové nad Labem 2000, s.

Na přelomu let 1937-1938 byl plk. Hájek formálně přidělen k 3. oddělení Hl. štábu a funkci přednosty 2.
oddělení formálně vykonával plk. gšt. Jaroslav Ostřížek. Podrobněji o tom viz níže.
156 VÚA-VHA Praha, sbírka 24 (Náhradní těleso ve Velké Británii), a. č. 24-9-7 (František Hájek), strana 106,
Písemný záznam rozhovoru gen. Rudolfa Viesta s pplk. Josefem Bartíkem ve věci plk. gšt. Fr. Hájek – plk. gšt.
Fr. Moravec, 15. 4. 1942.
157 LÁNÍK, Jaroslav a kolektiv: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939-1945. Praha 2005, s. 198.
158 Z vyšetřování tohoto sporu je VÚA-VHA k dispozici rozsáhlá agenda, celkem 426 stran, viz VÚA-VHA
Praha, sbírka 24, a. č. 24-9-7.
159 Tamtéž, strana 106-107.
160 O významu této zkratky se vedou v literatuře řadu let spory. Jaroslav Koutek ji vysvětlil jako „volající na
poušti“. Jiří Šolc se domníval, že zkratka vyjadřovala princip vzájemného financování „VOba NA POlovinu“.
Jaroslav a Stanislav Kokoškovi se přiklánějí k racionálnímu vysvětlení: „vojennyj nabljudatělnyj post“.[vojenská
dozorčí stanice, pozn. PK]
33
výlučně proti Německu a do jara 1937 do jara 1937 dokázala získat řadu spolehlivých
rezidentů, chodců a kurýrů. Za svůj první velký úspěch mohla považovat ofotografování
služebního předpisu wehrmachtu pro výcvik protitankových jednotek včetně všech
doplňků.“161 Zajímavé svědectví o československo-sovětské ústředně z pohledu obranné
sekce zpravodajského oddělení uvedl ve své práci Jaroslav Koutek, který popsal jednu
kuriózní událost, k níž došlo z počátku roku 1938: „Z popudu mjr. J. Bartíka […] zatkla
pražská policie čtyři podezřelé osoby. Při výslechu se však ukázalo, že šlo o schůzku
sovětského zpravodajského orgánu s jeho agenty z jednoho rakouského ministerstva…“162
Samotná reorganizace zpravodajského oddělení byla oficiálně ukončena dnem 1. října
1936.163
Do roku 1936, tedy do prvního roku přednostování plukovníka Hájka, spadá rovněž
jedna všeobecně známá špionážní záležitost. Jedná se o navázání spolupráce zpravodajského
oddělení s dnes již legendárním agentem A-54, tedy Paulem Thümmelem.164 Jeho osobnost
byla legendarizována v 60. letech 20. století a nemalým dílem k tomu přispěla i kniha
historika Čestmíra Amorta a publicisty Ivana Milana Jedličky.165 Seriózního zpracování se
agent A-54 dočkal až v práci Jaroslava a Stanislava Kokoškových.166 Otec a syn Kokoškovi
popsali činnost tohoto agenta ve své monografii opravdu detailně a zároveň seriózně. Není
proto třeba se zde tímto případem zabývat dopodrobna, postačí shrnout známá fakta a zaměřit
se na podíl Josefa Bartíka.
Dne 10. února 1936 přišla na zpravodajské oddělení obálka s razítkem poštovního
úřadu v Mostě s datem 8. února 1936. V ní nabídl neznámý pisatel (Paul Thümmel) své
služby československé zpravodajské službě. Kokoškovi ve své knize předpokládají, že „už se
asi nepodaří přesně zjistit, kteří důstojníci ‚dvojky‘ nabídku četli a měli se k ní během
osmačtyřiceti hodin vyslovit.“167 Je zbytečné se zde zabývat rozborem situace tak, jak ji
popsal ve svých pamětech František Moravec nebo v podobě reportážní rekonstrukce Amort a

Srovnej KOUTEK, Jaroslav: Tichá fronta. Praha 1985, s. 21; ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František
Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 44; KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav –
KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994,
s. 53.
161 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 53.
162 KOUTEK, Jaroslav: Tichá fronta. Praha 1985, s. 21.
163 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 52.
164 Paul Thümmel (15. 1. 1902 – 20. 4. 1945) pocházel ze saského města Neuhausen, kde pracoval původně jako
pekař a podílel se na založení tamější skupiny NSDAP. Nositel zlatého čestného odznaku NSDAP. Čs.
zpravodajským orgánům se nabídl poprvé již v roce 1932. Jako civilní pracovník a důvěrník Abwehru se podílel
na budování tzv. krátké pohraniční sítě v ČSR. Od roku 1936 veden zpravodajským oddělením hl. štábu jako
agent A-54, spolupracoval s různými přestávkami až do března 1939. Za poskytované informace mu byly
vypláceny značně velké finanční částky. Po březnu 1939 působil v rámci pražské úřadovny Abwehru jako
vedoucí tzv. „domácí kapely“. V roce 1940 agenta A-54 aktivoval na přání plk. Moravce domácí odboj, který mu
opětovně za informaci ale i výmysly vyplácel horentní sumy. V říjnu 1941 byl Thümmel poprvé zajištěn
Gestapem. Druhé zatčení následovalo v únoru 1942, po vyšetřování byl uvězněn v terezínské pevnosti, kde byl
těsně před koncem války popraven.
165 AMORT, Čestmír – JEDLIČKA, Ivan, Milan: Hledá se zrádce X. Praha 1968.
166 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994.
167 Tamtéž, s. 9.
34
Jedlička, neboť to již kriticky učinili Jaroslav a Stanislav Kokoškovi. Oba autoři nicméně
poněkud pominuli zajímavý komentář zpravodajského důstojníka Oldřicha Tichého, který
tehdy působil na zpravodajském oddělení jako vedoucí výzvědné sekce. Ten ve svých
vzpomínkách celou záležitost jasně popsal a navíc ji i argumentačně podložil, nebude tedy od
věci zde příslušnou pasáž citovat: „Ve zpravodajském oddělení dopisy s všeobecnou adresou,
jakou měl tento dopis, [dopis měl skutečně neosobní adresu: Ministerstvo národní obrany,
Nachrichten Abtlg., Praha, pozn. PK] otevíral – správně a logicky – vedoucí sekce obranného
zpravodajství Bartík. Ten pak dirigoval dopis správnému adresátovi (byly to např. nabídky
služeb, nabídka patentů, upozornění, udání atd.) [Tato] Nabídka se týkala také obranného
zpravodajství. Bartík ji předal Moravcovi a hned o ní jednali. Oba byli zřejmě pro její
okamžité přijetí. Pak jsme ji dostali k vyjádření já a škpt. [František] Fryč, nezávisle na
sobě.“168 Historicky první schůzka českých zpravodajců s agentem A-54 se uskutečnila již

dubna 1936 u Vejprt a prokazatelně se jí zúčastnili tito důstojníci: pplk. František Moravec,
jeho dva experti na obranné a výzvědné zpravodajství – mjr. Josef Bartík a mjr. Oldřich Tichý
– a dále dva specialisté na otázky německé tajné služby, škpt. Josef Fořt a škpt. František
Fryč. Reprezentativní složení účastníků zpravodajské schůzky vypovídá o tom, že
zpravodajské oddělení přikládalo této události mimořádný význam.169 Spolupráce čs.
zpravodajců s A-54 byla úspěšně navázána a v letech 1937-1938 se uskutečnilo několik
dalších schůzek, kterých se opět účastnil i Josef Bartík. K informacím, které A-54 za nemalé
finanční obnosy předával čs. straně, je však třeba podotknout, „že některé zprávy o německé
agentuře na území republiky, jež za velký honorář Bartíkově obraně dodal, se nepotvrdily,
nebo byly očividně mylné.“170 Další činnost agenta A-54 bude s odkazem na příslušnou
literaturu171 ponechána stranou. Následující dva oddíly této kapitoly budou věnovány dvěma
významným špionážním případům, které Bartíkova obraná sekce úspěšně odhalila. Tyto
případy zároveň ilustrují aktivity maďarského a německého výzvědného zpravodajství
v Československu na sklonku třicátých let. Nejedná se přitom o případy ledajaké, neboť
českoslovenští občané, kteří v nich sehráli hlavní úlohu, zaplatili nakonec tu nejvyšší cenu –
vlastní život.
2.3.b Případ štábního rotmistra Josefa Krejzy a maďarské výzvědné
zpravodajství
V roce 1936 byl odhalen a zatčen agent maďarské zpravodajské služby,
československý občan a rotmistr z povolání šrtm. Josef Krejza.172 Případ bude zajímavé uvést

168 TICHÝ, Oldřich: Z pamětí zpravodajce. Poznámky k činnosti 2. oddělení a ke knize gen. Frant. Moravce.
HaV 39, 1990, č. 4, s. 125-126.
169 Viz KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994.
170 Tamtéž, s. 71-72.
171 Kromě již citované zásadní práce Kokoškových je třeba upozornit i na přínosnou studii Jiřího Plachého, která
se zabývá osobností pracovnice Abwehru, Lydií Goručkovovou – Langenhaunovou. Autor ji ztotožňuje
s Thümmelovou „agentkou“ Yvonou, o které hovořil A-54 s československými zpravodajci. Studie má ovšem
poněkud zavádějící název; viz PLACHÝ, Jiří: Agent A-54 a StB. Sborník Archivu MV 2/2004, s. 281-291.
172 Případ Josefa Krejzy zpracoval v 60. letech 20. století na základě Bartíkova vyprávění a částečně i na základě
studia archivních pramenů publicista Miroslav Ivanov, jedná se ale o formu tzv. literatury faktu. Viz IVANOV,
35
alespoň základními informacemi o tom, jak maďarské výzvědné zpravodajství proti
Československu fungovalo. K tomu může dobře posloužit zasvěcený výklad Josefa Bartíka
z roku 1965: „Maďarská výzvědná služba vybudovala proti Československu svůj vlastní
systém špionážní činnosti, jehož metody se lišily od metod říšskoněmeckého zpravodajství.
Podél celé hranice Slovenska byla zřízena výzvědná střediska a do výzvědné práce byla
zapojena i říční stráž na Dunaji, […] Maďarská výzvědná služba byla v Československu
budována na systému agentů poštovních schránek a agentů-chodců. Vysílání agentů-chodců
přes maďarsko-slovenské hranice se však brzy ukázalo obtížné a riskantní. Proto byla zřízena
samostatná výzvědná centrála ve Vídni, odkud byl poměrně snadný styk s Československem.
Maďarskou výzvědnou ústřednu ve Vídni řídil podplukovník maďarské armády [Gottfried]
Reichbauer, rodák ze Sedmihrad, kde byla silná německá menšina…“173
Josef Krejza spolupracoval s maďarskou zpravodajskou službou od roku 1926, kdy byl
„zverbován“ neznámým záložním důstojníkem německé národnosti, a vzápětí mu došel
poštou první zpravodajský dotazník, na který odpověděl. Krejza byl vždy úkolován pomocí
dopisů, na něž odpovídal. Za špionáž proti Československu mu maďarské zpravodajství
vyplácelo značné částky peněz, celkově se jednalo asi o 40.000 korun, což byla v té době
značná suma, neboť Krejzův měsíční příjem činil zhruba 1.000 korun a pivo stálo zhruba
1,40 Kčs. Většinu takto vydělených peněz Krejza propil.174 O svém alkoholismu vypovídal
ostatně i později před soudem, kde poznamenal: „Pil jsem hodně piva, jednou jsem vypil od
soboty večer do neděle 70 piv. Často jsem (vy)pil 40 půllitrů.“175
Krejza byl zatčen dne 6. října 1936. Je však otázkou, za jakých okolností k jeho
odhalení došlo. Podle soudního spisu na Krejzovo podezřelé chování upozornili koncem srpna
1936 vojáci a poddůstojníci základní služby u 331. dělostřeleckého pluku, tedy jednotky,
k níž byl Krejza v té době přechodně zařazen. Podle historika Jiřího Plachého se však jako
pravděpodobnější jeví varianta, kterou popsal ve svých pamětech tehdejší přednosta pátrací
sekce pplk. František Moravec, tedy „… že Krejza byl odhalen v důsledku úspěšného případu
‚Maďarské korespondence‘, který v té době realizovala československá vojenská
kontrarozvědka [obranná sekce zpravodajského oddělení, pozn. PK].“176 Po zatčení byl Josef
Krejza osobně vyslýchán v kanceláři zpravodajského oddělení hlavního štábu vedoucím
pátrací skupiny plk. Františkem Moravcem, vedoucím obranné sekce mjr. Josefem Bartíkem a
důstojníkem obranné sekce škpt. Bohumilem Dítětem. Důstojníci započali s výslechem
bezprostředně po jeho zadržení, tedy ještě 6. října, samotný výslech byl několikrát přerušen a

Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z historie protišpionážního oddělení generálního štábu.
Třebíč 19992
. Na základě pečlivého archivního výzkumu zpracoval tento případ v roce 2005 Jiří Plachý, viz jeho
přínosná studie: PLACHÝ, Jiří: Hrdelní procesy u pražského Divisního soudu v letech 1937-1938. Historica
Pragensia 2, 2005, s. 165-169. Plachý rovněž podrobně rozebírá vývoj Krejzovy vojenské kariéry a upozorňuje
na možné příčiny jeho pozdější výzvědné činnosti.
173 BARTÍK, Josef: Předmluva. In: Ivanov, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z historie
protišpionážního oddělení generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992
, s. 11-12.
174 PLACHÝ, Jiří: Hrdelní procesy u pražského Divisního soudu v letech 1937-1938. Historica Pragensia 2,
2005, s. 168.
175 Tamtéž, s. 167.
176 Tamtéž, s. 168.
36
skončil 9. října 1936 v 19 hodin.177 Vyslýchaný Krejza vypovídal již první den o své
špionážní činnosti celkem ochotně, ale některé věci se snažil pravděpodobně úmyslně zkreslit
nebo je zatajit a přiznal je až v průběhu dalších dní. Následující den, 7. října, začal Josef
Krejza svou výpověď těmito slovy: „Odvolávám svou dosavadní výpověď o své vyzvědačské
činnosti a chci nyní vypovídati plnou pravdu. Se svou výzvědnou činností započal jsem již
roku 1926 a nikoliv 1928.“178 Třetí výslechový den, 8. října, doplnil Krejza svou výpověď
o další důležitý bod: „Chci ještě uvésti, že jsem zatajil jednu cestu do zahraničí, kterou jsem
vykonal na počátku své výzvědné činnosti. Tehdy jsem písemně na žádost vídeňských orgánů,
[…] vyjednal, že budu moci se s nimi sejíti v Drážďanech. […] Jako cestovní výlohy dostal
jsem v dopise 1000 korun.“179 Protokol z Krejzova výslechu je poměrně obsáhlý, má 29 stran;
protože z něj Jiří Plachý ve své studii necituje, bude zde uvedena ještě jedna krátká ukázka,
která může zajímavým způsobem ilustrovat Krejzovu vyzvědačskou činnost. K ní vyslýchaný
dále uvedl: „V roce 1927 dostal jsem […] ještě asi 8 dopisů s různými dotazníky na jejichž
podrobné otázky jsem vždy odpověděl. Za zaslané zprávy jsem obdržel v dopisech asi 4000
Kč, takže jsem toho roku dostal celkem 11.000 Kč. […] V uvedeném období 1926-1931 dodal
jsem maďarské výzvědné službě: 1. / Veškeré zprávy o dislokaci a organizaci čs. armády a
změnách, hlavně pokud se týče dělostřelectva 2. / Veškeré zprávy o výzbroji a materiálu
používaném v čs. armádě, hlavně o materiálu nově zavedeném 3. / Veškeré zprávy o nově
postavených útvarech 4. / Zprávy o početních stavech, národnostním složení jednotek,
materielní situaci důstojníků, rotmistrů a mužstva a o morálním stavu vojska. Tyto zprávy
jsem zjišťoval jednak vlastní zkušeností, ze svého služebního přidělení, vlastním pozorováním,
dotazy u různých vojenských osob zejména rotmistrů a aspirantů a z různých vojenských
publikací. Konkrétní jména osob pro jejich velký počet a časovou odlehlost uvésti nemohu“180
Z uvedené ukázky je vidět, že vojenský prokurátor měl důkazů proti Krejzovi víc než
dost. Hlavní líčení u pražského Divizního soudu bylo zahájeno 22. února 1937, jako civilní
advokát ex offo zastupoval Krejzu švagr spisovatele Karla Čapka, JUDr. Karel Scheinpflug.
Během hlavního líčení Krejza uvedl, že se cítí vinen. Soud vynesl rozsudek ještě téhož dne
odpoledne, když uznal obžalovaného vinným z vojenské zrady podle § 6 odstavce 2 Zákona
na ochranu republiky ve znění zákona č. 130/1936 Sb. a odsoudil ho k trestu smrti
provazem.181 Svým způsobem se v tomto případě jednalo o průlomové rozhodnutí, neboť „…
v ČSR byl poprvé v mírových podmínkách vynesen trest smrti za vojenskou zradu.“182 Josef
Krejza byl popraven 22. května 1937 v Praze na Hradčanech.183

177 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Divizní soud Praha, č. j. Dtr. 476/36 (Josef Krejza), 6b – Protokol sepsaný s Josefem
Krejzou.
178 Tamtéž, 6b – Protokol sepsaný s Josefem Krejzou, s. 7.
179 Tamtéž, 6b – Protokol sepsaný s Josefem Krejzou, s. 25.
180 Tamtéž, s. 12-13.
181 PLACHÝ, Jiří: Hrdelní procesy u pražského Divisního soudu v letech 1937-1938. Historica Pragensia 2,
2005, s. 168-169.
182 Tamtéž, s. 166.
183 LIŠKA, Otakar a kolektiv: Tresty smrti vykonané v Československu v letech 1918-1989. Praha 2006, s. 94.
37
2.3.c Případ kapitána generálního štábu Edmunda Kalmára
Analogickým případem k tomu Krejzovu může být například případ kpt. gšt. Edmunda
Kalmára, který jako československý důstojník z povolání maďarské národnosti zpravodajsky
pracoval pro nacistické Německo.184 Jeho případ může být dokonce vnímán jako ještě
závažnější, neboť Kalmár absolvoval v roce 1936 Vysokou školu válečnou (VŠV).185 K tomu
je třeba podotknout, že již samotné podmínky pro přijetí do Válečné školy byly velmi přísné a
na budoucí absolventy byly kladeny velké nároky, a to proto, že: „absolventi Válečné školy
(od roku 1934 Vysoké školy válečné) byli předurčeni k výkonu nejvyšších štábních i
velitelských funkcí v armádě a tvořili elitu armády.“186
V jedné zásadní věci se však Kalmárův a Krejzův případ přece jen liší, a to v motivaci.
Kalmár totiž neprováděl špionáž ze zištných důvodů, dokonce nebyl ani nikým z německé
zpravodajské služby vyhledán nebo kontaktován, ale důležité zpravodajské informace zasílal
do Německa dobrovolně sám ze své vůle, zřejmě z osobně-ideologických důvodů. Během
výslechu Kalmár ke svojí motivaci uvedl: „Při nastoupení služby i divize jsem neměl
nejmenšího úmyslu prováděti tuto svou [výzvědnou, pozn. PK] činnost. Tuto myšlenku jsem
pojal v únoru 1937 nebo v lednu 1937, kdy vlivem přepracovanosti jsem byl podrážděn
každým zásahem představeného [Kalmárovým představeným byl náčelník štábu 4. pěší divize
v Hradci Králové – pplk. gšt. Josef Chleboun, pozn. PK] natolik, že jsem si věci nerozvážil.
Měl jsem za to, že se zde nikdy neuplatním a rozhodl jsem se proto k tomuto činu. Považoval
jsem to také za svou povinnost, jakožto Maďara, abych pomohl svému národu, třebas
prostřednictvím Německa, které jsem považoval za spojence. Tomu značně napomáhala též
záliba moje k Němcům a dále výchova ve škole, která sice byla maďarská, ale byla
germanofilská.“187
Edmund Kalmár byl zadržen dne 2. února 1938. Podle Jiřího Plachého přispěla k jeho
odhalení zpráva, která byla s největší pravděpodobností získána čs. zpravodajci od agenta A51.188 Plachý k okolnostem odhalení dále uvádí: „Na podzim 1937 byla tedy československá

184 Případ Edmunda Kalmára zpracoval opět v 60. letech 20. století na základě Bartíkova vyprávění a částečně i
na základě studia archivních pramenů publicista Miroslav Ivanov, jedná se ale o formu tzv. literatury faktu. Viz
IVANOV, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z historie protišpionážního oddělení
generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992
. Na základě pečlivého archivního výzkumu zpracoval tento případ v roce 2005
Jiří Plachý, viz jeho přínosná studie: PLACHÝ, Jiří: Hrdelní procesy u pražského Divisního soudu v letech
1937-1938. Historica Pragensia 2, 2005, s. 170-175. Plachý rovněž podrobně rozebírá vývoj Kalmárovy
vojenské kariéry a upozorňuje na možné příčiny jeho pozdější výzvědné činnosti.
185 Jedním z jeho „spolužáků“ v ročníku na VŠV byl i pozdější Bartíkův kolega a spolupracovník, zpravodajský
důstojník škpt. gšt. Jan Krček.
186 HANZLÍK, František: Voják. Příklad Oskara Pejši. In: Fasora, Lukáš – Hanuš, Jiří – Malíř, Jiří – Vykoupil,
Libor (Edd.): Člověk na Moravě v první polovině 20. století. Brno 2006, s. 287-298.
187 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Divizní soud Praha, č. j. Dtr. 71/38 (Edmund Kalmár), 4b – Protokol sepsaný
s Edmundem Kalmárem, s. 20.
188 PLACHÝ, Jiří: Hrdelní procesy u pražského Divisního soudu v letech 1937-1938. Historica Pragensia 2,
2005, s. 170. O agentovi A-51 se toho v dosavadní literatuře mnoho nepíše. Jaroslav Koutek uvádí, že agent A51 byl jakýsi Spies. Podrobnější informace k němu publikoval až publicista Karel Pacner: „A-51 byl německý
důstojník, který nabídl své služby druhému oddělení v polovině třicátých let. Dodával cenné údaje o stavbě
obraných bunkrů v Bavorsku i ze západních hranic. Některé z nich dokonce vedly Francouze k tomu, že pochytali
řadu německých agentů, kteří se zajímali o jejich systém opevnění, o Maginotovu linii. Také upozornil Prahu na
některé důležité agenty. Českoslovenští zpravodajci však nikdy nezjistili, kdo jim tak dobře sloužil. Zřejmě to byl
38
vojenská zpravodajská služba upozorněna na velmi důležité zprávy, které se dostaly do
Německa vhozením do německého vlaku. Obsahovaly údaje o mobilizačních opatřeních,
opevňovacích pracích a krytu hranic. Zprávy pocházely z obranného úseku 4. pěší divize
v Hradci Králové a bylo zřejmé, že jejich autorem je štábní důstojník s přístupem
k nejtajnějším dokumentům. Podle data odeslání padlo podezření na někoho, kdo se v září
1937 pohyboval v západních Čechách, protože podle sdělení agenta byla poslední zpráva
odeslána 23. září 1937. Brzy se podezření soustředilo na přednostu 1. a 4. oddělení 4. pěší
divize kpt. gšt. Edmunda Kalmára, jedenatřicetiletého důstojníka maďarské národnosti.“189
Nejpozději dne 2. února 1938 se na scénu dostává opět mjr. Josef Bartík, který
společně s kpt. Jaroslavem Tauerem a za přítomnosti dvou dalších důstojníků provedl
v pokoji obývaném kpt. gšt. Edmundem Kalmárem domovní prohlídku.190 Kalmár byl potom
stejně jako Krejza vyslýchán v Praze trojicí zpravodajských důstojníků – plk. Moravcem, mjr.
Bartíkem a mjr. Dítětem.191 Výslech kpt. Kalmára trval poměrně dlouhou a byl několikrát
přerušen, samotný protokol z výslechu má celkem 27 stran. Plk. Moravec před soudem jako
svědek vypověděl o průběhu výslechu následující: „Obžalovaný [kpt. Kalmár, pozn. PK]
nebyl k přiznání nijak nucen. Jeho výslech započal ve středu dne 2. února 1938 a obžalovaný
3 dni zapíral a teprve až v sobotu 5. února 1937 [jedná se o překlep, správný rok má být
pochopitelně 1938, pozn. PK] se rozhodl, že se přizná. […] žalovaný při výsleších nedával
nijak najevo, že se přizná, až přijde určitý čas. Ještě v sobotu byl vyslýchán bez nějakého
positivního výsledku, ale již bylo možno pozorovati, v chování žalovaného jakýsi přelom a
večer žalovaný svědkovi [plk. Moravcovi, pozn. PK] vzkázal, že s ním chce mluvit ve 24 hodin
a teprve tehdy se žalovaný ke všemu přiznal a jako důvod svého zapírání uvedl to, že 5. února
měl [jeho] otec narozeniny a proto mu je nechtěl svým přiznáním zkalit.“192
Dne 6. února se tedy Kalmár skutečně doznal k odeslání celkem tří špionážních zpráv;
v protokolu k tomu udává: „a) Poprvé jsem přešel ř. něm hranice v únoru 1937, kdy jsem
hodil obálku se zprávou v Reinertzu do pošt. schránky […] Zásilka byla adresována
ppl.[pěšímu pluku] 38 v Kladsku. b) Podruhé jsem hodil zprávu do poštovní schránky na
nádraží v Ziegelhausenu. Bylo to v dubnu 1937. Zpráva obsahoval několik změn k průběhu
lehkého opevnění ve výběžku broumovském a hrubé materielní vybavení […] To jsem poslal

nějaký antinacista z abwehru.“ Tvrzení Karla Pacnera vypadá trochu jako by chtěl činnost tohoto agenta již
dopředu legendarizovat a postavit ho na roveň agentovi A-54, tak jak ho v minulosti vylíčili Amort s Jedličkou.
Jaroslav a Stanislav Kokoškovi uvádějí, že na začátku pátrací akce „Kalmár“ „…byla zpráva důstojníka abwehru
ze ženijního štábu číslo 16 ve Weidenu, který zprvu pracoval pro podplukovníka Kopačku a později pro majora
Strankmüllera.“ Kokoškovi nedávají sice tomuto důstojníkovi šifru A-51, ale s největší pravděpodobností se
jedná o jednu a tutéž osobu.
Srovnej KOUTEK, Jaroslav: Tichá fronta. Praha 1985; PACNER, Karel: Československo ve zvláštních službách.
Pohledy do historie československých výzvědných služeb 1914-1989. Díl I. 1914-1939. Praha 2002, s. 343;
KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 104.
189 PLACHÝ, Jiří: Hrdelní procesy u pražského Divisního soudu v letech 1937-1938. Historica Pragensia 2,
2005, s. 170.
190 Viz Přílohy, IV. Výběr z dokumentů, dokument č. 4.
191 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Divizní soud Praha, č. j. Dtr. 71/38 (Edmund Kalmár), 4b – Protokol sepsaný s
Edmundem Kalmárem, s. 1.
192 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Divizní soud Praha, č. j. Dtr. 71/38 (Edmund Kalmár), 32 – Protokol o hlavním
přelíčení, 25. 2. 1938, s. 9.
39
na 28 p. divisi v Breslau. […] c) Třetí zpráva byla podána v Chebu 23. září 1937, její obsah
je vyznačen ve spise mi čteném…“193 Z Kalmárovy výpovědi tedy vyplývá, že čs. důstojníci
zpravodajského oddělení byli o obsahu jeho třetí zprávy skutečně podrobně informováni.
Divizní soud v Praze uzavřel Kalmárův případ 25. února 1938. U soudu byly mimo
jiné čteny také znalecké posudky znalců z oboru zpravodajské služby; jedním z nich byl škpt.
gšt. Emil Strankmüller ze zpravodajského oddělení Hlavního štábu, druhým pak pplk. gšt.
Josef Jirka z operačního oddělení Hlavního štábu – druhý dědeček Milana Jirky mladšího.194
Ještě téhož dne byl kpt. gšt. Edmund Kalmár odsouzen za zločin vojenské zrady k trestu smrti
provazem. Popraven byl dne 29. dubna 1938 v Praze na Hradčanech.195 Před popravou
Kalmár zvolal: „Zemřít pro myšlenku je největší čest, která člověka může potkat! [další dvě
věty byly vyřčeny v maďarštině, pozn. PK] Ať žije Maďarsko! Ať žije vlast!“196
2.3.d Rok 1938 a 1939
Případem kpt. Kalmára jsme se dostali do roku 1938, tedy do posledního roku První
československé republiky. Než zde bude nastíněna další činnost Josefa Bartíka v roce 1938, je
potřeba se ještě na malou chvíli vrátit do roku 1937, kdy se na zpravodajském oddělení udála
závažná personální změna. Ta souvisela s tzv. aférou Bruna Weigela. Bruno Weigel byl
říšskoněmecký diplomatický kurýr, zatčený v listopadu 1936 pro vážné podezření ze
špionáže, protože „v jeho zavazadle se našla řada usvědčujících písemností, mezi nimi i pošta
týkající se ilegální organizace NSDAP na území Československa, ale po ostrých protestech
[německého] vyslance [Ernsta] Eisenlohra byl v červnu 1937 z vazby propuštěn.“197 Tohoto
případu se záhy chopila pověstná nacistická propaganda, která udělala z Weigla nevinného
mučedníka. Propagandistická kampaň vzápětí vyvrcholila požadavkem německého
ministerstva zahraničí, aby Československo odvolalo z funkce přednosty zpravodajského
oddělení přednostu plk. Františka Hájka. Ten byl skutečně formálně k 15. září 1937 přeložen
k operačnímu oddělení hlavního štábu a novým přednostou se stal plk. gšt. Jaroslav Ostřížek,
který doposud vykonával funkci styčného zpravodajského důstojníka na ministerstvu
zahraničních věcí. Kokoškovi konstatují, že: „… ve skutečnosti zůstalo takřka všechno při
starém. Plukovník Hájek pouze opustil svou dosavadní kancelář, […] ale de facto zůstal i
nadále hlavou vojenské tajné služby. Ostřížek zastupoval 2. oddělení pouze navenek, ve styku
s cizími diplomaty a při reprezentativních záležitostech.“198 Plukovník Hájek se své funkce

193 Tamtéž, 4b – Protokol sepsaný s Edmundem Kalmárem, s. 19.
194 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Divizní soud Praha, č. j. Dtr. 71/38 (Edmund Kalmár), 32 – Protokol o hlavním
přelíčení, 25. 2. 1938, s. 17. Podrobněji k pplk. Josefu Jirkovi viz poznámka číslo 31.
195 V publikaci Tresty smrti je datum Kalmárovy popravy uvedeno chybně jako 24. 9. 1938. Viz LIŠKA, Otakar
a kolektiv: Tresty smrti vykonané v Československu v letech 1918-1989. Praha 2006 2
, s. 84;
196 PLACHÝ, Jiří: Hrdelní procesy u pražského Divisního soudu v letech 1937-1938. Historica Pragensia 2,
2005, s. 175.
197 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 62.
198 Tamtéž, s. 63.
40
znovu ujal k 1. květnu 1938, tato zpráva však nesměla být nikde zveřejněna, aby Berlín
opětovně neprotestoval.199
Ve svém důsledku však měla celá tato aféra negativní vliv na činnost zpravodajského
oddělení – zejména práce v obranné sekci musely být po rozkazech „shora“ utlumeny.
Samotný Josef Bartík k tomu poznamenal: „… výkonnost obranného zpravodajství v druhé
polovině roku 1937 značně polevila v důsledku známé aféry Weigelovy.“200

V druhé polovině roku 1938 nabíraly politické události v Československu rychlý spád.
Pro nacistické Německo začala v té době nabývat na významu také tzv. „hluboká“ špionážní
síť (Netz 2), kterou Canarisův Abwehr budoval na území Československa v předchozích
letech. Obranná sekce zpravodajského oddělení však o této tajné německé síti věděla. Josef
Bartík ji v roce 1965 ve své vzpomínkové stati charakterizoval následujícími slovy: „Hluboká
agenturní síť se budovala jako válečná výzvědná základna, jíž se mělo využít při rozšíření
konfliktu. Zasahovala střední a východní část našeho státu. Po obsazení Československa se
tyto hluboké agenturní sítě měly přeměnit v nástupní špionážní střediska proti Polsku,
Rumunsku a Sovětskému svazu. Jejich výzvědná činnost měla být zahájena podle předem
sjednaného hesla vysílaného říšskoněmeckým rozhlasem nebo smluveným heslem
uveřejněným v pražském německém časopise Prager Tagblatt.“201

Od jara 1938 měla obranná sekce zpravodajského oddělení pod stálým dozorem
246 německých agentů, zásah proti nim měl však přijít až ve vhodný okamžik a pokud možno
naráz, aby narušení německých sítí bylo co nejúčinnější. Hromadný zákrok však čs.
zpravodajská služba proti německým agentům na podzim 1938 neuskutečnila.
Československé bezpečnostní složky provedly pouze několik individuálních akcí, které však
nebyly nevýznamné. Kupříkladu 6. září 1938 asistoval Bartíkův podřízený mjr. Bohumil Dítě
u likvidace výzvědné skupiny stavitele Ferdinanda Boleslawského z Mukačeva. V součinnosti
s Košickým policejním ředitelstvím bylo tehdy zatčeno sedm členů této špionážní buňky.
Jednalo se o významnou skupinu, která měla od Abwehru k dispozici tajnou vysílačku, čs.
zpravodajská služba však o vysílačce díky agentovi A-54 věděla.202 Na otázku, proč se v roce
1938 hromadný zákrok proti špiónům neuskutečnil, podal jednoduchou, ale věrnou odpověď
v roce 1946 samotný Josef Bartík, když uvedl: „Zákrok nebyl proveden, poněvadž přišel
Mnichov.“203 Mnichovským událostem však předcházela československá mobilizace a ta se
samozřejmě týkala i zpravodajských důstojníků. Zpravodajští důstojníci z druhého oddělení

199 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 81-82.
200 Citováno podle KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin
československé zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 68.
201 BARTÍK, Josef: Předmluva. In: Ivanov, Miroslav: Černý dostal mat. Zpráva o čtyřech případech z historie
protišpionážního oddělení generálního štábu. Třebíč 19992
, s. 10-11.
202 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 101-103. Případ Ferdinanda Boleslawského zevrubně popisuje ve své práci
Ota Holub, ten také poprvé upozornil na jmenné a věcné nepřesnosti, které se o tomto případu vyskytly v práci
Amorta a Jedličky. Srovnej HOLUB, Ota: Souboj s Abwehrem. Praha 1975, s. 47-62; AMORT, Čestmír –
JEDLIČKA, Ivan, Milan: Hledá se zrádce X. Praha 1968, s. 53-54.
203 Citováno podle KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin
československé zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 102.
41
Hlavního štábu se „v noci z 23. na 24. září […] s užším štábem hlavního velitelství přesunuli
do Klánovic a ráno pokračovali v cestě na své válečné stanoviště ve Vyškově.“204
Mnichovské události znamenaly konec První československé republiky. V okleštěném
nástupnickém státě, v tzv. Druhé republice, měly nově panovat již zcela jiné politické a
společenské poměry. To se také nutně muselo projevit i v činnosti zpravodajského oddělení
Hlavní štábu. Následujícími slovy charakterizoval zpravodajství za Druhé republiky v roce
1945 plk. gšt. Emil Strankmüller (v roce 1938 mjr. gšt. a vedoucí výzvědné sekce pátrací
skupiny zpravodajského oddělení): „‚Druhá republika‘ byla dekadentní erou ve všech
směrech, i ve vojenském zpravodajství. Zpravodajská činnost proti Německu byla zakázána.
Zrušili jsme PAÚ [předsunuté agenturní ústředny, pozn. PK] a soustředili illegální zprav.
činnost proti Německu výhradně do Prahy a do zahraničních expozitur. Byla to činnost
doslova illegální; toto rozhodnutí nepotvrdil svým podpisem žádný odpovědný velitel.
Zpravodajská činnost proti Maďarsku a nově zahájená činnost proti Polsku205 pokračovala
oficielně.“206
V takovém duchu se tedy odvíjela činnost zpravodajského oddělení po Mnichovu.
Snahou Německa bylo rovněž omezit činnost zpravodajského oddělení Hlavního štábu; pro
Němce byla pořád nepřijatelná osoba plk. Hájka, který musel svůj post přednosty oddělení
opustit již podruhé. K této záležitosti podal za druhé světové války dobré svědectví Josef
Bartík, který poznamenal: „… po Mnichově Němci vynaložili vše, aby se mstili za tuto [naši
dřívější] práci [proti nim] a žádali odstranění plk. gšt. Fr. Hájka, […] Němcům alespoň
formálně bylo třeba vyhovět, proto byl plk. gšt. Fr. Hájek poslán do Holandska, aby tam
pokračoval v udržování navázaných styků. Po svém příjezdu do Holandska byl a tím účelem
v Londýně, ale pak k rozvinutí této jeho činnosti nemohlo již dojíti.“207 Plk. Hájek skutečně
odjel dne 14. ledna 1939 do Haagu, kde poté působil jako vojenský atašé Č-SR. Aby se
vyhnul Německu, byla jeho cesta osobním automobilem značně komplikovaná, neboť
cestoval z Prahy přes Slovensko a Podkarpatskou Rus do Rumunska, poté přes Jugoslávii,
Itálii, Švýcarsko, Francii a Belgii, až konečně dorazil do cílového Holandska.208 Po Hájkově
odstoupení „byl pověřen výkonem jeho služebních povinností ‚až do ustanovení definitivního
přednosty‘ plukovník [František] Moravec.“209 V literatuře se někdy objevuje tvrzení, že
Moravec se stal v této době přednostou. Tvrzení Josefa Bartíka to však vyvrací, neboť ten

204 Tamtéž.
205 Za účelem organizace zpravodajské činnosti proti Polsku a Maďarsku byla na území okleštěné Podkarpatské
Rusi nově zřízena Předsunutá agenturní ústředna (PAÚ) ve Svaljavě. Jejím tajným přednostou byl plk.
Františkem Moravcem ustanoven škpt. gšt. Jan Krček. Podrobněji o činnosti této PAÚ viz KREISINGER, Pavel:
Životní osudy zpravodajského důstojníka plk. gšt. Jana Krčka. Bakalářská diplomová práce FF MU. Brno 2009,
s. 13-16.
206 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-74/1, Rozklad o situaci v roce 1938 a na jaře 1939 sepsaný Emilem
Strankmüllerem, s. 6, 2. 11. 1945.
207 VÚA-VHA Praha, sbírka 24, a. č. 24-9-7 (František Hájek), strana 107, Písemný záznam rozhovoru gen.
Rudolfa Viesta s pplk. Josefem Bartíkem ve věci plk. gšt. Fr. Hájek – plk. gšt. Fr. Moravec, 15. 4. 1942.
208 STEHLÍK, Eduard – LACH, Ivan: Vlast a čest jim byly dražší nežli život. Dvůr Králové nad Labem 2000,
s. 55.
209 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 115.
42
k této věci správně podotkl: „… plk. gšt. Fr. Hájek svého přednostenství zbaven nebyl a plk.
gšt. Fr. Moravec byl jmenován prozatimním přednostou oddělení.“210
Březnový odlet plukovníka Františka Moravce, Josefa Bartíka a dalších devíti
zpravodajských důstojníků bude popsán až v následující kapitole, neboť tvoří symbolický
spojovací článek s Bartíkovou válečnou činností ve Velké Británii a dalších evropských
zemích. Závěrem této kapitoly je však ještě potřeba Bartíkovo působení v pozici vedoucího
obranné sekce nějak zhodnotit. Je na místě konstatovat, že v letech 1935-1938 byla Bartíkova
celková kvalifikace hodnocena vždy nejvyšším možným stupněm, a to jako „výtečná“.211
Jeho působení v obranné sekci zhodnotil po vojensku stručně, avšak věcně Karel Paleček,
který zároveň podal svědectví o vysoké úrovni obranné sekce, když k Bartíkovu
„přednostování v obraně“ podotkl: „… za něho obranné zpravodajství dostalo teprve výši,
kterou mělo nakonec [až] do Mnichova.“212

210 VÚA-VHA Praha, sbírka 24 (Náhradní těleso ve Velké Británii), 24-9-7 (František Hájek), strana 106,
Písemný záznam rozhovoru gen. Rudolfa Viesta s pplk. Josefem Bartíkem ve věci plk. gšt. Fr. Hájek – plk. gšt.
Fr. Moravec, 15. 4. 1942.
211 Tamtéž, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, vložky za roky 1935-1938. Kompletní Bartíkovo hodnocení
v roce 1938 viz Přílohy, IV. Výběr z dokumentů, dokument č. 6.
212 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-2/60, Protokol sepsaný s brig. gen. Karlem Palečkem, 21. 11. 1949.
43

Léta válečná (1939-1945)
3.1 Velká Británie a Polsko (1939)
3.1.a „Jedenáctka“ – odlet zpravodajských důstojníků do Velké Británie
V březnu 1939 se dny Druhé československé republiky chýlily ke konci. Relevantní
informace o chystané německé agresi měla i čs. vojenská zpravodajská služba, a to hned
z několika zdrojů. Jedním pramenem bylo varování francouzské zpravodajské služby Service
de Renseignement (dále SdR): po sdělení obecného charakteru přišla dne 11. března zcela
konkrétní zpráva ve smyslu, že „jde o násilnou akci (action brutal) [vůči Č-SR, pozn. PK] a
že k provedení má dojít 14. nebo 15. března 1939“.213 Téhož dne se sešel škpt. František Fryč
s agentem A-54 v nádražní restauraci v Turnově.
214 Bezprostředně poté byl agent A-54
převezen do Prahy, kde mjr. Emilu Strankmüllerovi potvrdil datum 15. března a dodal další
podrobnosti.
O tom, co v dalších dnech následovalo, pojednává zevrubně početná literatura. Zde
postačí konstatovat, že plk. gšt. František Moravec informoval čs. vládu o chystané německé
agresi již 12. března, avšak „ministři ani po této výstraze nedospěli ke konkrétním závěrům či
opatřením, jež by brala podložená sdělení s patřičnou váhou na vědomí“.215 Plukovník
Moravec se nakonec rozhodl využít nabídku, kterou mu zprostředkoval styčný důstojník
britské zpravodajské služby mjr. Harold Gibson, a odletět se svými nejbližšími
spolupracovníky do Velké Británie, kde bude možné nadále zpravodajsky pracovat proti
Německu. O výběru spolupracovníků a volbě cílové země rozhodoval osobně plk. Moravec.
Ten své dojmy zaznamenal i písemně v zajímavém nedatovaném elaborátu, jehož fragment se
dochoval ve Vojenském ústředním archivu a v němž se uvádí: „Anglie projevila zájem a
zdálo se, že za normálního vývoje událostí, dostane se nejspíše do válečného konfliktu
s Hitlerovým Německem. […] Nám šlo o to, moci pracovat proti Německu, a šli jsme tam, kde
se nám tato možnost skýtala. Obtížnější byl výběr osob mezi řadou spolupracovníků oddaných
a osobně všech stejně blízkých. – Hlediska, jež byla při výběru uplatněna, byla tato: –
schopnost práce v cizině, – stupeň kompromitování zprav. činností v očích Němců a –
dobrovolná ochota odejít a opustit rodinu.“216
Moravec se rozhodl odletět s jedenácti spolupracovníky; z celkového počtu dvanácti
mužů mělo příslušet pět důstojníků k Bartíkově obranné sekci pátrací skupiny. Jelikož se
v literatuře jména těchto „Moravcových“ důstojníků často objevují v různých zkomolených

213 Citováno podle KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54. Kapitoly z dějin
československé zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 115.
214 Tamtéž, s. 119. Jiří Šolc oproti tomu uvedl, že mjr. Strankmüller se účastnil již turnovské schůzky. Srovnej:
ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 61.
215 GEBHART, Jan – KUKLÍK, Jan: Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české. Svazek XV. a 1938-1945. Praha-Litomyšl
2006, s. 168-169.
216 VÚA-VHA Praha, sbírka 20 (Ministerstvo národní obrany – Londýn), a. č. 20-21-13 (Dodatek
zpravodajských deníků z r. 1939-1944), s. 52-53.
44
podobách, případně bývá některý z nich vynechán,217 budou zde pro přehlednost uvedena
všechna jména členů oné slavné „jedenáctky“. Ta měla mít původně celkem dvanáct členů;
oním dvanáctým důstojníkem, který však nestihl odletět s ostatními, byl mjr. Bohumil Dítě
z obranné sekce.218 Nakonec tedy plk. gšt. František Moravec dne 14. března 1939 opustil
Prahu s těmito deseti důstojníky:
pplk. gšt. Oldřich TICHÝ (1898) mjr. gšt. Emil STRANKMÜLLER (1902)
mjr. konc. Josef BARTÍK (1897) mjr. pěch. Karel PALEČEK (1896)
mjr. jezd. Alois FRANK (1897) škpt. pěch František FRYČ (1895)
škpt. pěch Vladimír CIGNA (1898) škpt. pěch Václav SLÁMA (1893)
škpt. pěch. Josef FOŘT (1895) škpt. jezd. Jaroslav TAUER (1898)219
Autentické písemné svědectví z pera Josefa Bartíka o dramatickém odletu bohužel
neexistuje, a tak je třeba spokojit se tím, co uvedl později za války ve vložce ke kmenovému
listu. V kolonce „kdy, kde a jakým způsobem jste přešel hranice Č. S. R.“ Bartík napsal tuto
stručnou větu: „ Dne 14. března [1939] v 17. 45 h odletěl [jsem] angl. letadlem z ruzyňského
letiště – přílet do Londýna ve 22.40 hod.“220 Co se samotného letadla týče, přestože odlet
zajistila britská zpravodajská služba, jednalo se o stroj typu DC-3 holandské společnosti
KLM, který pilotoval nizozemský kapitán Viruly; jeho úkolem nebylo nic jiného než dopravit
muže z Prahy do Londýna.221 Někteří důstojníci z „jedenáctky“, kteří po válce publikovali své
paměti, popsali odlet a průběh samotného letu podrobněji. Pro zachycení atmosféry následuje
krátká citace ze vzpomínky Oldřicha Tichého: „Krátce po odletu jsem si uvědomil, že tito

217 Některých omylů se ve svých pracích dopustil i vojenský historik Jiří Šolc. Kupříkladu v knize Podpalte
Československo!, když v jedné z úvodních kapitol představuje jednotlivé osobnosti Moravcova týmu, úplně
zapomněl na škpt. pěch. Václava Slámu, a tak se v jeho podání stala ze zpravodajské „jedenáctky“ pouhá
desítka. Podobně nepozorně pracoval Šolc i ve druhém vydání své práce o Moravcovi, když zde nepřesně popsal
personální složení Moravcovy skupiny. Konkrétně uvedl chybně křestní jména dvou příslušníků „jedenáctky“:
škpt. pěch. Josefa Fořta „překřtil“ autor na Františka Fořta a škpt. jezd. Jaroslava Tauera na Josefa Tauera.
Srovnej ŠOLC, Jiří: Podpalte Československo! Kapitoly z historie československého zahraničního a domácího
odboje (1939-1945). Praha 2005, s. 9-12; ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho
zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 63. Rovněž v rejstříku publikace jsou jména
těchto dvou osob uvedena chybně.
218 František Moravec uvedl ve svých pamětech, že „Dítě, narychlo odvolaný ze svého mimořádného přidělení
na Slovensku měl v kritický okamžik automobilovou nehodu a zmeškal odjezd.“ Viz MORAVEC, František:
Špion, jemuž nevěřili. Praha 20022
, s. 188.
219 Z uvedeného přehledu vyplývá zajímavý fakt, a to, že všichni byli v té době přibližně stejně staří, s výjimkou
nejmladšího důstojníka ve skupině Emila Strankmüllera se všichni narodili v 90. letech 19. století.
220 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka ke kmenovému listu.
221 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 129.
45
civilní letci, na civilní lince, v mimořádném letu, za mimořádné situace, by přistáli v případě
příkazu ze země. Proč ne? Proto jsem se zvedl ze svého místa při letu nad Německem, postavil
jsem se za pilota a pozoroval jsem výškoměr. Letěli jsme v prudké sněhové bouři. Po celou
cestu nad Německem až asi k Düsseldorfu (podle sdělení letušky) jsme letěli v takové vánici,
že nebyla vidět poziční světla na křídlech letadla. Snad to bylo naše štěstí. Mým úmyslem
bylo, v případě, že by dostali ze země rádiem rozkaz přistát, donutit je pod pohrůžkou dvou
pistolí, aby letěli dál…“222
Po mezipřistání v holandském Rotterdamu přistálo letadlo ve 22.40 hod na
londýnském civilním letišti Croydon. Zde čs. důstojníky „přivítali“ britští novináři, kteří se
o příletu letadla se záhadnou posádkou od Holanďanů s předstihem dozvěděli. Následující den
ráno, v den, kdy německé jednotky prováděly okupaci Čech a Moravy, „referovaly o přistání
záhadného letadla pod nápadnými titulky téměř všechny londýnské noviny.“223 Plocha letiště
byla vzápětí vyklizena a čs. důstojníci odjeli za doprovodu bývalého britského vojenského
atašé v Praze plk. Beaumonta do centra Londýna. Novináři však byli neodbytní, a proto byla
„jedenáctka“ nakonec ubytována v menším nenápadném hotelu Van Dyke nedaleko Hyde
parku.224 Závěrem je třeba konstatovat, že do Británie nepřiletěli čs. zpravodajští důstojníci
s prázdnou. Tehdejší mjr. Emil Strankmüller k tomu po válce poznamenal: „Agenturní
evidence a nejchoulostivější zpravodajské spisy byly námi odvezeny přímo letounem do
Anglie. Z agenturní evidence jsem vzal všechny agenty skutečné, všechny agenty žijící, t.j. i ty
propuštěné […] Co vzal s sebou Bartík a co zde nechal, přesně nevím. Určitě vzal však
s sebou vše, co směřovalo k rozpoznání obranného zpravodajství proti Německu.“225
Důstojníci z „jedenáctky“ s sebou pochopitelně nemohli vzít veškerý nebezpečný
spisový materiál. O zbytek se postarali díky škpt. Aloisi Čáslavkovi (příslušníkovi Bartíkovy
obrané sekce) „pozůstalí“ důstojníci z druhého oddělení, kteří s Moravcem neodletěli.
Samotný Čáslavka po válce popsal průběh likvidace, která proběhla v noci ze 14. na

března 1939, následovně: „Rozhodli jsme se započít ihned s pálením [spisového
materiálu, pozn. PK] celého oddělení a to tak, abychom byli hotovi nejdéle v 8 ráno […]A tak
tedy jsme pálili již od ½ 1 hodiny a k pálení strhli jsme také ostatní oddělení. Bylo toho po
šéfovi [plk. Moravcovi, pozn. PK] ještě mnoho k pálení. Pamatuji si jen dvě velké věci:
popálené ruce našich rotmistrů /ku př. Synek, Šlégl, nebožtík rtm. Müller a rtm. z filmového
oddělení a. j./ a na vysoké plameny, vyšší než budova samá, když jsme pálili filmový archív.
Myslím, že to byly vagony materiálu, který byl námi zničen. […] A tak jsme spálili všechno, co
nemohl již šéf vzíti s sebou a tak zachránili sta, ba snad tisíce jmen a tím i tisíce neštěstí.“226

222 TICHÝ, Oldřich: Z pamětí zpravodajce. Poznámky k činnosti 2. oddělení a ke knize gen. Frant. Moravce.
HaV 39, 1990, č. 4, s. 131. Další líčení viz například STRANKMÜLLER, Emil: Československé ofenzivní
zpravodajství od března 1939. Odboj a revoluce 1970, s. 189-190.
223 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54. Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 131. Jeden z novinových článků viz Přílohy, IV. Výběr z dokumentů,
dokument č. 7.
224 KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54. Kapitoly z dějin československé
zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 131-132.
225 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-74-1/14, Protokol sepsaný s plk. gšt. v. v. Emilem Strankmüllerem, 25.
listopadu 1949, s. 4.
226 ABS Praha, fond „H“, a. č. H-664, Podsvazek č. 4, Generál (František Moravec) materiály o práci bývalé
vojenské rozvědky, Opis zpráva A. Čáslavky pro neznámého adresáta, nedatováno – zdoby poválečné, s. 40.
46
Pro důstojníky z „jedenáctky“ začala 15. březnem nová etapa jejich zpravodajské
činnosti. Jako první zahraniční emigranti z čs. vojenských kruhů vytvořili zárodek pro
budoucí československý zahraniční odboj, který se měl pozvolna složitě konstituovat až
v následujících měsících, a to dokonce v několika centrech.
V prvních dnech se měli Moravcovi důstojníci zabývat těmito body, tak, jak je načrtl
jejich „šéf“: „1. rozdělení a studium [přivezeného, pozn. PK] materiálu. 2. využití studijního
materiálu výzvědného a obranného pro Intelligence Service. 3. Podchycení stávající sítě.

rozšíření sítě.“227 Mimo to potřebovala londýnská zpravodajská skupina vybudovat
spolehlivé spojení s domovem (formujícím se domácím odbojem) a zajistit evakuaci svých
rodin (manželek a dětí), kterým mohlo po 15. březnu hrozit zatčení ze strany německých
bezpečnostních složek, po němž by mohli být nástrojem německého vydírání vůči Moravcově
londýnské skupině.
228
V květnu 1939 se situace v Moravcově skupině jevila již o něco jasněji. Spojení
s domovem bylo úspěšně navázáno prostřednictvím ilegální zpravodajské skupiny, sestávající
ze tří bývalých důstojníků zpravodajského oddělení Hlavního štábu. Jednalo se o škpt.
Antonína Longu, škpt. Františka Fárka a škpt. Aloise Čáslavku. V první zprávě z domova
ze 3. května, kterou Longa Moravcovi odeslal tajnou cestou, se uvádí: „… jsme zde tři, kteří
v noci na 15./3. rukou daní, svatě jsme si přislíbili, že se neopustíme navzájem, že neopustíme
[vaše] rodiny, které tu zůstaly samy a že ze všech sil budeme pracovati ke zrození naší III., jak
pevně věříme, šťastné a věčné republiky. Ty kamarády doufám již znáte od Š., ale přesto já
jejich jména zde opakuji: Franta Fousatej [František Fárek, pozn. PK] a Lojza Diplomat
[Alois Čáslavka, pozn. PK] […] Nevíš, jakou radost nám způsobila okolnost, že jsme s Vámi
konečně dosáhli spojení a jak nás potěšily Vaše zprávy, tolik překypující optimismem…“229
Od jara 1939 směřoval hlavní proud československých exulantů a emigrantů do
Polska, kde se vzápětí formovalo jedno z významných exilových center čs. odboje. V té době
proto Polsko zaujímalo důležité místo i v plánech plk. Moravce, který se rozhodl vyslat tam
se speciálními úkoly jednoho ze svých mužů – mjr. Josefa Bartíka.230
3.1.b Bartíkova první zpravodajská mise v Polsku – květen 1939
Josef Bartík cestoval z Velké Británie do Polska přes švédský Stockholm pod britským
jménem John Burton.231 Do Varšavy přijel dne 9. května 1939. Poněvadž „československé
vyslanectví ve Varšavě, československý konsulát v Krakově, československá kolonie v Polsku,

V podobném duchu vylíčil likvidaci zpravodajského materiálu ve svých pamětech i další z „pozůstalých“
František Fárek, viz FÁREK, František: Stopy mizí v archivu. Praha 1975, s. 183-184.
227 Citováno podle KOKOŠKA, Jaroslav – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Spor o agenta A-54 . Kapitoly z dějin
československé zpravodajské služby. Praha 1994, s. 132.
228 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 72, 74
229 NA Praha, fond Svaz protifašistických bojovníků – ústřední výbor Praha, pozůstalost Františka Moravce,
nezpracovaný materiál, Zpráva Tondy (Antonína Longy) ze dne 3.5. 1939, s. 1.
230 GEBHART, Jan – KUKLÍK, Jan: Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české. Svazek XV. a 1938-1945. Praha-Litomyšl
2006, s. 288, 290.
231 NA Praha, fond Svaz protifašistických bojovníků – ústřední výbor Praha, pozůstalost Františka Moravce,
nezpracovaný materiál, Potwierdzenie zameldowania dla cudzoziemca.
47
skupiny a organizace pracující doma žádaly v četných podáních, zasílaných do Londýna,
Paříže a vojenské skupině plk. Moravce, aby k nim byl vyslán zástupce, který by jednak
informoval o situaci zahraničního odboje v Londýně a v Paříži a dále pak, aby je usměrnil
v jejich činnosti. […] [Bylo Bartíkovým úkolem, aby] na místě projednal všechny otázky, které
vyžadovaly okamžitého uspořádání a vyslechl současně na místě názory a žádosti, které se
s ohledem na přímý styk s domovem daleko konkrétněji rýsují nežli tomu je v Londýně a
v Paříži a které vyžadují urychleného uspořádání a vyšetření.“232
Mimo tento úkol měl Bartík navázat zpravodajskou spolupráci s polskou vojenskou
zpravodajskou službou, která měla být orientována proti Německu. Za tím účelem „s sebou
vezl i osobní list plk. Moravce představiteli polské zpravodajské služby plk.
J. Smoleńskému.“233
Bartík o situaci v Polsku referoval plk. Moravcovi v písemné zprávě hned druhý den
po svém příjezdu: „… Záležitost s Pol. [zpravodajskou službou, pozn. aut] jsem dnes
projednával. Nemají zvláštních požadavků a naši nabídku přijali velmi radostně. Jejich šéf by
chtěl o spolupráci s tebou osobně mluvit. Řekl jsem mu, že jsi příliš vázán našimi pracemi
a bude proto zatím nemožné, aby [jsi] přijel do Varšavy.“234 O jaké nabídce pro Poláky
vlastně Bartík hovořil? Odpověď na tuto otázku byla již publikována v zevrubné studii Jana
Gebharta a Jana Kuklíka. Tito autoři mimo jiné uvádějí, že mjr. Bartík „předložil polským
zpravodajcům návrhy, které daleko přesahovaly běžné nabídky ke spolupráci. Zřejmě
nejcennější byl příslib předávání dokumentace a materiálů o německé armádě, včetně těch,
které čs. zpravodajci získali v průběhu předchozích měsíců. […] Jako důkaz dobré vůle pak
předal plk. Smoleńskému německy vytištěnou tajnou instrukci pro sabotážní a diverzní činnost
německých menšin na dosud neokupovaných územích (tedy pátých kolon), jež měla vstoupit
v platnost v případě války. Tento materiál […] prozatím polští zpravodajci neměli
k dispozici.“235 Na oplátku Bartík požadoval, aby polské úřady umožnily čs. uprchlíkům
přechod hranic bez rizika nuceného návratu do protektorátu. Čs. vojáci – specialisté měli být
dále zařazeni do polské armády, alespoň do doby, než se bude moci v Polsku vytvořit
samostatná čs. vojenská jednotka.236
Bartík se v Polsku zdržel do 14. května. Po příjezdu do Velké Británie informoval
o výsledcích své cesty plk. Moravce a čs. londýnské kruhy (Jan Masaryk, Karel Lisický).

232 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-89-1/10., Zpráva o Bartíkově působení v Polsku ve dnech 9. až 14. května

Nedatováno, nepodepsáno
233 GEBHART, Jan – KUKLÍK, Jan: Československo-polské vojenské zpravodajské styky na jaře a v létě 1939.
HaV 41, 1992, č. 3, s. 73.
234 NA Praha, fond Svaz protifašistických bojovníků – ústřední výbor Praha, pozůstalost Františka Moravce,
nezpracovaný materiál, Zpráva mjr. Bartíka plk. Moravcovi z 10. 5. 1939.
235 GEBHART, Jan – KUKLÍK, Jan: Československo-polské vojenské zpravodajské styky na jaře a v létě 1939.
HaV 41, 1992, č. 3, s. 76-77.
236 Tamtéž. Plk. Smolenski informoval o Bartíkových požadavcích náčelníka hlavního štábu polské armády gen.
Stachiewicze, který však prozatím nepovolil přijímat čs. vojenské specialisty do polské armády a stejně tak se
stavěl skepticky i k organizování samostatných čs. jednotek v Polsku.
48
Politici byli s Bartíkovými informacemi spokojeni, a proto rozhodli, aby se jako
„zplnomocněný vyslanec plk. Moravce“ vydal do Polska podruhé.237
3.1.c Bartíkova druhá zpravodajská mise v Polsku – červen až srpen 1939
Josef Bartík z Londýna do Varšavy přicestoval nejpozději dne 15. června 1939.238
Krátce po svém příjezdu se sešel s čs. armádním generálem Lvem Prchalou, který do Varšavy
přijel 26. května a z pozice hodnostně nejvýše postaveného čs. generála v zahraničí začal
organizovat čs. zahraniční akci v Polsku. Při tom se však gen. Prchala dostal do sporu s čs.
úředníky a důstojníky varšavského vyslanectví a krakovského konzulátu, kteří (stejně jako
Moravcova zpravodajská skupina) uznávali autoritu bývalého prezidenta Edvarda Beneše
a konstituující se čs. zahraniční odbojové centrum v Londýně.
239 Během setkání mjr. Bartíka
s generálem Prchalou „došlo ke vzájemné kontroverzi. Nejprve z toho důvodu, že jeden
druhého vzájemně vyslýchali stran pověření pro zahraniční akci, dále pak opět pro rozdílnou
koncepci čs. vojenského odboje v zahraničí.“240 Schůzka musela skončit roztržkou, poněvadž
Bartík navrhoval zaujmout vůči generálovi nekompromisní stanovisko, které formuloval ve
zprávě plk. Moravcovi z 18. června. Tam se mimo jiné uvádí: „… 5) Vyzvati gen. Prchalu,
aby u vojenského attaché ve Varšavě plk. Kumpošta241
učinil písemného prohlášení, že se až
do dalšího rozhodnutí ústředního výboru ve všech věcech podřizuje plk. Kumpoštovi.“242
Rozpory mezi generálem Prchalou a lidmi z okolí prezidenta Beneše pokračovaly i po
Bartíkově návratu do Londýna. Kompromis, který obě strany uzavřely těsně před vypuknutím
polsko-německé války, se ukázal jako dočasný a spíše vynucený okolnostmi.243
Bez ohledu na tuto roztržku pokračoval mjr. Bartík v jednáních o spolupráci
s polskými zpravodajskými důstojníky. Dne 19. června se sešel s polským plk. Stefanem
Mayerem, jemuž předal zpravodajský materiál. Ten na Mayera „velmi zapůsobil a mluvil o
něm v superlativech.“244 S největší pravděpodobností se jednalo o materiál, jehož seznam se
zachoval v archivu bezpečnostních složek, a v němž nechyběly pro Poláky velmi důležité
spisy, týkající se například „Organizace Abwehrstelle Praha“ nebo „Zpravodajské organizace

237 Tamtéž, s. 81. Podrobněji o výsledcích Bartíkovy první cesty do Polska viz devítistránkovou zprávu v ABS
Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-89-1/10, Zpráva o Bartíkově působení v Polsku ve dnech 9. až 14. května 1939.
Nedatováno, nepodepsáno.
238 NĚMEČEK, Jan: Armádní generál Lev Prchala a čs. odboj v Polsku. HaV 43, 1994, č. 3, s. 123.
239 Edvard Beneš přiletěl do Londýna z USA 18. července 1939.
240 NĚMEČEK, Jan: Československý odboj v Polsku v roce 1939 a arm. Gen. Lev Prchala. In: Hájek, Jan –
Kocian, Jiří – Zítko, Milan (edd.): Fragmenty dějin. Sborník prací k šedesátinám Jana Gebharta. Praha 2006,
s. 291.
241 Plk. gšt. Prokop Kumpošt (1894-1959) působil ve Varšavě od roku 1937 jako čs. vojenský atašé, po 15. 3.
1939 se odmítl vrátit do Prahy a zapojil se do odboje, poté vedl jednání s polskými orgány ve prospěch
příchozích čs. emigrantů v Polsku.
242 Citováno podle NĚMEČEK, Jan: Československý odboj v Polsku v roce 1939 a arm. Gen. Lev Prchala. In:
Hájek, Jan – Kocian, Jiří – Zítko, Milan (edd.): Fragmenty dějin. Sborník prací k šedesátinám Jana Gebharta.
Praha 2006, s. 291.
243 Tamtéž s. 297; Spor mezi oběma stranami se vyhrotil zejména po porážce Polska, kdy byl gen. Prchala
definitivně zahnán do řad protibenešovské opozice. Podrobněji k tomu viz KUKLÍK, Jan – NĚMEČEK, Jan:
Proti Benešovi! Česká a slovenská protibenešovská opozice v Londýně 1939-1945. Praha 2004.
244 Citováno podle GEBHART, Jan – KUKLÍK, Jan: Československo-polské vojenské zpravodajské styky na
jaře a v létě 1939. HaV 41, 1992, č. 3, s. 85.
49
pracující proti Polsku.“245 Zpravodajská spolupráce Moravcovy skupiny s Poláky nebyla
ovšem ideální, neboť Poláci svízelné situace konstituujícího se čs. zahraničního odboje
využívali. Bartík napsal Moravcovi 3. srpna o těchto věcech následující: „Přičteme-li ještě ke
kontu Poláků velmi hodnotné zásilky zpravodajského materiálu londýnského zprav. ústředí,
docházíme k otázce zprav. spolupráce s Poláky k těmto závěrům: 1. Spolupráce s Poláky je
jednostranná, zisk je na jejich straně. 2. Zprav. spoluprací s námi získali Poláci snad
nejvydatnější zdroj zpráv, který je nic nestojí. 3. Naše zprav. vydání v Polsku jsou převážně
vyvolávána požadavky Poláků. 4. Našim požadavkům o výměnu zprav. materiálu zatím Poláci
nevyhověli. Přislíbili po nové intervenci, že od příštího týdne budou nám zprávy pravidelně
předávat. Opoždění omlouvali tím, že bylo nutno čekati na schválení věci náčelníkem gen.
štábu. Je jisté, že zprav spolupráce s Poláky byla nám kompensována vlastně až dosud
benevolencí polských úřadů ve věcech našich uprchlíků, povolení vojenského tábora
v Krakově a zmírněnými opatřeními při sekvestraci vyslaneckých budov. [podtrženo J.
Bartíkem, pozn. PK] Nebýti tudíž vojenské zprav. spolupráce londýnské skupiny a úřadu voj.
attaché ve Varšavě, byl by stav našich věcí v Polsku politicky možná velmi špatný a
doporučuji proto, aby tohoto argumentu jsi použil v jednáních s vrtichvosty, kteří nechtějí
uznati důležitost naší zprav. složky a kteří její význam v zahr. odboji podceňují.“246
O zřízeném radiovém spojení s domovem, o které se Bartík zasazoval již během svého
květnového jednání s polskými zpravodajci, se ve stejné zprávě uvádí: „Anglická stanice
/vysílací a přijímací/ určená pro Varšavu [stanice čís. 4, vepsáno rukou, pozn. PK] je od 31.
července v provozu a ve spojení s Prahou. [podtrženo J. Bartíkem, pozn. PK] Koresponduje
zatím se stanicemi již umístěnými pražským ústředím. [odbojové organizace Obrana národa]
Záležitosti radio-spojení vede doma [mjr. Jaroslav] Hájíček /krycí jmeno Petr/247 kterému
bylo svěřeno i umístění anglických stanic proto, že má vhodné spolupracovníky, kterých
Longa nemá“.248
Během svého druhého působení v Polsku připadl Bartíkovi ještě jeden úkol, a to
dohlédnout na to, aby rodiny důstojníků z „jedenáctky“, které měly mezitím být ilegálně
dopraveny do Polska, zdárně docestovaly do Londýna. Tato velmi zajímavá a mimořádně
nebezpečná operace, již nakonec zorganizoval škpt. Alois Čáslavka, nebyla doposud
v literatuře podrobně popsána. O převozu rodin do Polska se zmiňuje pouze Jiří Šolc, který
uvádí, že rodiny důstojníků byly zachráněny z protektorátu až na třetí pokus, poté, co dva
předchozí pokusy selhaly.249

245 Kompletní seznam zpravodajského materiálu, předaného polské zpravodajské službě viz Přílohy, IV. Výběr z
dokumentů, dokument č. 8.
246 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-89-1/24-30, Zpráva Poseidona (J. Bartíka) plk. Moravcovi ze dne 3. srpna
1939, s. 2-3.
247 Mjr. gšt. Jaroslav Hájíček (1899-1978) byl jedním z čs. důstojníků, kteří již v druhé polovině března 1939
stáli u vzniku odbojové organizace Obrana národa (ON). V ON působil od počátku jako velitel zpravodajského
oddělení jejího štábu.
248ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-89-1/24-30, Zpráva Poseidona (J. Bartíka) plk. Moravcovi ze dne 3. srpna
1939, s. 1.
249 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 74-75.
50
Již bylo zmíněno, že po odletu Moravcovy skupiny se o rodiny důstojníků starali jejich
bývalí kolegové ze zpravodajského oddělení Longa, Fárek a Čáslavka. Tato trojice
zpravodajců zasílala do Londýna rovněž informace o tom, jak se rodinám daří, a snažila se
celou záležitost urychleně vyřešit. V jedné nedatované zprávě z roku 1939, dochované
v pozůstalosti Františka Moravce, je uvedeno: „Pokud jste podle svých požadavků sdělených
v dopise Tondovi [A. Longovi, pozn. PK] měli určité starosti, spolehněte se, že v každém
ohledu jsme byli a zůstaneme i nadále k dispozici dámám, aniž by Vy jste museli znova tuto
věc připomínat. Pí Moravcová bydlí ve vile a je vše zdrávo a při dobré mysli. Podle informací
odeslala šperky cestou Š. [pravděpodobně se jedná o Šmidru, což bylo krycí jméno
francouzského zpravodajského důstojníka mjr. Henryho Goyou, pozn. PK] již po Vašem
odjezdu. Pí Bartíková je dobré mysli, rodina zdráva. Šperky podle naší informace odeslala
cestou Š. již dříve jako Mme Moravcová. Tímto kurýrem budou odeslány v krabičce ještě
dolary. […] Nakonec podotýkáme: všechny dámy byly důrazně upozorněny, aby prohlédly
ještě jednou všechny svršky a zničily resp. ukryly kompromitující materiál. V tom ohledu
můžete býti bez starosti. Další prohlídky u Vašich rodin nepředpokládáme. Nevylučujeme ale
možnost, že Gestapo v krajním případě sáhne na Vaše jména připsaný majetek. Z toho důvodu
jsme poradili dámám, aby ku př. auta a jiné převedli – pokud lze – na jiná jména. Každý
případ projednáváme individuélně po předchozí právnické poradě. Jinak se v každém ohledu
spolehněte na naši kamarádskou povinnost.“250
Poté, co selhal Moravcem zorganizovaný první pokus dostat rodiny za hranice, odeslal

května A. Čáslavka do Londýna zprávu, v níž se stavěl k jednání londýnské skupiny
v „otázce odsunu dam“ značně kriticky: „Od tohoto okamžiku podle rozhodnutí naší
„Trojky“, převzal jsem starost o ženy já sám. Bylo nutno tuto ožehavou otázku svěřiti pouze
jednomu z nás, který bude věcí samou těžce kompromitován a bude muset současně s dámami
opustit zem. […] Že Vaše dámy a děti jsou ještě zde na tom máte vinu Vy sami. Předně trvalo
to 7 neděl, než došla od Vás zpráva. Máte tam venku všechny možnosti, abyste sem někoho
vyslali, ale nic se s vaší strany nedělo. O situaci zde nejste vůbec orientováni a nemůžete si
proto představiti millieu, ve kterém zde žijeme.“251
O tom, jak byl nakonec celý odsud dam a dětí za dramatických okolností proveden,
podal po skončení druhé světové války zprávu jeho hlavní organizátor A. Čáslavka. V té se
mimo jiné uvádí „… byl jsem vybrán také k tomu, abych se staral o přesun 10 rodin [jeden
důstojník z „jedenáctky“ – škpt. Václav Sláma neměl manželku ani děti, pozn. PK] za šéfem
[plk. Moravcem, pozn. PK] do Anglie. To byla práce hrozná. Znáš ženy. Byl jsem proto 3x
tajně v Polsku a to v prostoru Morávka – Kotář pro případ, že by nám selhal oficielní odjezd
do lázní v neutrálních státech. [Tento pokus, kdy měla jedna část dam a dětí odjet vlakem do
francouzské Bretaně a druhá část do janovské riviéry v Itálii, skutečně selhal, pozn. PK]
Všem jsem obstaral, řádné protektorátní pasy na falešné papíry /dělal Červený u pol.
řiditelství/ a také Durchlassscheiny [propustky, pozn. PK]za veliké peníze od Gestapa, přes
milenku mjr. G. /Francouze/ [opětovně se nejspíše jedná o francouzského zpravodajského
důstojníka mjr. Henryho Goyou, pozn. PK]. Němci nám však přece jen nevěřili a tak v sobotu

250 NA Praha, fond Svaz protifašistických bojovníků – ústřední výbor Praha, pozůstalost Františka Moravce,
nezpracovaný materiál, Zpráva s názvem RODINY. nedatováno, nepodepsáno.
251 VÚA-VHA Praha, sbírka 37, a. č. 37-91-1/238-239, Zpráva Diplomata (A. Čáslavky) z 14. května 1939, s. 1
51

6. 1939 obsadila policie všechny rodiny a odebrala jim papíry. Ke mně měli přijít v 8 hod.
večer a odvésti mě, neboť věděli, že jsem inspirátorem a vedoucím celé akce. O návštěvě
v mém bytě jsem se dozvěděl teprve v 6 hodin večer. […] Na žádost Fárka a Longy odejel
jsem [s manželkou a dvěma dcerami, pozn. PK] během 1 a pol. hodiny z Prahy do Mor.
Ostravy. Dovedeš si představit, co to znamená likvidovat všechno privátní a služební během
90 minut a když Ti malé dítě leželo v 41 stup. horečky. […] 3. dne /po opadnutí horečky
dcerky/ přešel jsem namáhavou cestou do Polska, kde mě již očekával komisař pohr. stráže
Zápřalský, se kterým jsem byl v neustálém spojení. Druhého dne po mém odjezdu z Prahy
přijel do M. Ostravy škpt. Longa a sdělil, že se rodinám nic nestalo. Vypracovali jsme spolu
plán rychlého odsunu rodin z Prahy přes Radhošť na Morávku a odtud mými lidmi na Kotář
v Polsku. A tak já na Kotáři a Longa s Fárkem v Praze řídili jsme odsun rodin i letců a během
10 dnů bylo všech deset rodin [tedy deset žen a dvanáct dětí, pozn. PK]u mě v Polsku. Rodiny
jsem posílal z hranic do jednoho hotelu v Těšíně, odkud jsem je po týdnu převezl do Varšavy,
kde byl už Bartík a mjr. [Alois] Frank a mjr. [Alexandr] Fritscher. S Frankem jsem měl ve
Varšavě velmi ostrý výstup. S Bartíkem jsem si rozuměl velice dobře.“252
Začátkem měsíce července se tedy Josef Bartík opětovně shledal se svojí manželkou
Libuší a dvěma dcerami. O tom, že rodiny konečně dorazily v pořádku za hranice
protektorátu, informoval vzápětí své kolegy z „jedenáctky“. Do Paříže, kde od 30. dubna
1939 zpravodajsky působili mjr. Karel Paleček s škpt. Františkem Fryčem,253 dorazila od
Bartíka následující zpráva: „Milý Palci a Faci – rodiny přišly v úplném zdraví a staráme se
s Frankem, aby jim nic nechybělo. […] Zdraví Vás Josef.“254 Pod stručnou zprávou byla
připsána ještě jedna věta pro Františka Fryče od jeho manželky: „Malá posílá tátovi pusu a
říká, že táta je v kanceláři.“255
Začátkem srpna měla v Polsku končit i Bartíkova druhá zpravodajská mise. Zprávu
plk. Moravcovi ze dne 3. srpna 1939 zakončil touto větou: „Potvrzuji a děkuji za telegram
o zaslání peněz a dispozicích pro můj odjezd. Počítám s odjezdem 8. neb 9. srpna. Přesné
datum příjezdu oznámím telegraficky.256 Rodiny důstojníků „jedenáctky“ odjely společně
se škpt. Čáslavkou a jeho rodinou již koncem července 1939 „přes Gdyňu a Dánsko do
Londýna.“257

252 ABS Praha, fond „H“, a. č. H-664, Podsvazek č. 4, Generál (František Moravec) materiály o práci bývalé
vojenské rozvědky, Opis zprávy A. Čáslavky pro neznámého adresáta, nedatováno – z doby poválečné, s. 41-42.
Stručně se o odsunu rodin zmínil ve svých pamětech i František Fárek a v pamětech Františka Moravce je
včleněna vzpomínka jeho manželky na tuto záležitost. Srovnej: FÁREK, František: Stopy mizí v archivu. Praha
1975, s. 204-205; MORAVEC, František: Špion, jemuž nevěřili. Praha 20022
, s. 206-209.
253 O jejich činnosti ve Francii viz ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho
zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 106-113.
254 NA Praha, fond Svaz protifašistických bojovníků – ústřední výbor Praha, pozůstalost Františka Moravce,
nezpracovaný materiál, Opisy telegramů odeslaných z hotelu Polonia ve Varšavě.
255 Tamtéž.
256 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-89-1/24-30, Zpráva Poseidona (J. Bartíka) plk. Moravcovi ze dne 3. srpna
1939, s. 7.
257 ABS Praha, fond „H“, a. č. H-664, Podsvazek č. 4, Generál (František Moravec) materiály o práci bývalé
vojenské rozvědky, Opis zprávy A. Čáslavky pro neznámého adresáta, nedatováno – z doby poválečné, s. 42.
52
3.2 Francie (1939-1940)
3.2.a Bartíkova činnost ve Francii v roce 1939
V srpnu 1939 se Josef Bartík vrátil zpátky do Velké Británie ke zpravodajskému
ústředí londýnské skupiny plk. Moravce. Zde ho musela 1. září 1939 zastihnout zpráva
o vypuknutí polsko-německé války. O dva dny později, 3. září 1939, tato válka dostala
charakter války světové, když Polsko symbolicky podpořila Francie a také Velká Británie.
V souvislosti s přepadením Polska se opakovaně nabízí otázka, zda čs. zpravodajské ústředí
znalo dopředu termín zahájení této nacistické operace. Jaroslav Kokoška na základě
důkladného archivního výzkumu konstatoval, že nikoliv: „Z archívních dokumentů […]
jednoznačně plyne, že londýnská skupina, stejně jako ústředny britské a francouzské tajné
služby, žádné z těchto dat neznala a vlastně až do konce měsíce [srpna] tápala v tomto ohledu
v nejistotě“.258
Po vypuknutí války již Bartík nepobyl v Británii se svou rodinou příliš dlouho. Do své
kvalifikační válečné listiny vlastnoručně vepsal: „Dne 7. listopadu [byl jsem] povolán gen.
Ingrem k řízení vojenského zpravodajství do Francie.“259 Ve zprávě z 5. listopadu 1939,
kterou plk. Moravec zaslal čs. zpravodajské odbočce „Karel“ do Paříže, v níž působili pplk.
Tichý, mjr. Paleček a škpt. Fryč, bylo uvedeno: „ Mjr. J Bartík jest od 7. listopadu ve
zvláštním poslání dočasně odkomandován do Paříže k p. div. gen. S. Ingrovi. Ve svém poslání
zůstává nadále členem zpravodajského ústředí v Londýně a proto se požitkově a ve věcech
administrativní povahy přiděluje po dobu jeho pobytu v Paříži zprav. odbočce v Paříži. Podle
místních poměrů podejte mi proto návrh na úpravu jeho požitků po dobu jeho přidělení
v Paříži. Pro služební styk se zpravodajskou centrálou bude užívati mjr. Bartík spojů
zpravodajské centrály v Paříži.“260 V pozadí Bartíkova listopadového odjezdu do Francie
stála s největší pravděpodobností jakási roztržka s plk. Moravcem, o níž se po skončení války
zmiňovali někteří důstojníci z „jedenáctky“. Tehdejší mjr. Emil Strankmüller k tomu uvedl:
„Po návratu do Londýna se [Bartík] několikráte dosti ostře ‚chytil‘ s plk. Moravcem. Jsa sám
ctižádostiv, nesl těžce Moravcovo nepřístojné chování k podřízeným. Asi v srpnu 1939 [ve
skutečnosti až v listopadu, pozn. PK] odejel do Paříže přímo ke gen. Ingrovi“.261 Jeho
svědectví mohou dále dokreslit slova Karla Palečka: „Mezitím se ve Francii objevil také
Bartík, […] v této době se pravděpodobně dohovořil s Ingrem a od Moravce odejel. Při
odchodu prohlásil, že se již pro Moravce dost nadělal, a že se jednou také zařídí pro sebe.
[…] Od Bartíka jsme se také dozvěděli jaká atmosfera panuje v Londýně u zbytku skupiny,
kterou měl kolem sebe Moravec. Byl v té době tak nesnesitelný, že to všichni těžce snášeli. Byl
panovačný, dával všem cítit jejich odvislost zejména finanční. To byl také snad důvod, proč
Bartík z tohoto prostředí se snažil uniknout. Bližší podrobnosti si nepamatuji, ale prý v té

258 KOKOŠKA-MALÍŘ, Jaroslav: Londýnská zpravodajská skupina plk. Moravce v předvečer druhé světové
války. HaV 38, 1989, č. 4, s. 85.
259 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík.
260 VÚA-VHA Praha, sbírka 37, a. č. 37-251-5 (Zpráva od plk. Moravce), Mjr. Bartík zvláštní poslání v Paříži,

1939, s. 7.
261 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-89-3/1, Výpověď Emila Strankmüllera k Josefu Bartíkovi, nedatováno.
53
době [udála se] řada jakýchsi vnitřních afer mezi příslušníky skupiny a samotným
Moravcem.“262 Podle Palečkova tvrzení se zdá, že ona roztržka mezi Bartíkem a Moravcem
byla způsobena neshodami v oblasti finanční. To ostatně nepřímo potvrzuje v jedné poválečné
žádosti i samotný Bartík, který v této věci poznamenal: „V měsíci září a říjnu 1939, kdy
manželka byla s dětmi v Anglii, nedostával jsem služebního platu ani žádných vyživovacích
příspěvků pro svoji rodinu. V měsíci listopadu 1939 byl jsem odvelen k čsl. armádě do
Francie, kam mne následovala manželka v prvních dnech měsíce ledna 1940. Děti jsem dal do
anglické školy, kde byly na celé zaopatření. Školné a jejich zaopatření hradil jsem z vlastních
prostředků a zápůjčkou u svých příbuzných v U.S.A.“263 Přestože se Bartík později
s Moravcem usmířil, jejich vzájemné neshody, k nimž bohužel neexistuje dostatek
relevantních pramenů, pokračovaly i nadále a nakonec vyústily v Bartíkův odchod na
Ministerstvo vnitra.264
Před podrobnějším popisem Bartíkova působení ve Francii je třeba ještě stručně
charakterizovat formování čs. vojenského odboje ve Francii. Ten zde vznikal pod vedením
generála Sergeje Ingra, který zde v srpnu ustanovil Československou vojenskou kancelář.
V září 1939 se ve Francii ustavila Prozatímní československá vláda a Československá
vojenská mise. Francie však čs. politickému vedení odmítala přiznat statut prozatímní vlády,
a proto vznikl kompromisní Československý národní výbor (dále ČSNV), který francouzská
strana oficiálně uznala dne 17. listopadu 1939. V rámci ČSVS vznikl z Ingrovy
Československé vojenské kanceláře zvláštní úřad pro věci vojenské – Československá
vojenská správa (dále ČSVS).265
U ČSVS v Paříži, jejímž nejvyšším představitelem byl generál Ingr, vznikala záhy
jednotlivá oddělení. Samozřejmě zde nemohlo chybět ani druhé oddělení – zpravodajské. Do
jeho čela byl ustanoven právě mjr. Josef Bartík. Činnost tohoto zpravodajského oddělení byla
však svým způsobem specifická, poněvadž se nezabývalo výzvědným zpravodajstvím,266 ale
pouze zpravodajstvím obranným.
Co bylo vlastně náplní činnosti Bartíkova zpravodajského-obranného oddělení ve
Francii, čím vším se toto oddělení zabývalo? Na tyto otázky může podat odpověď svodka
z Bartíkova poválečného výslechového protokolu, kde je uvedeno: „… BARTÍK vypověděl, že
po jeho příjezdu do Paříže dostal od gen. INGRA příkaz spolupracovati s 2. odd.
francouzského hlavního štábu v otázkách obranných, zejména proti německé špionážní službě,

262 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-3/5-6, Pokračování protokol sepsaného s brig. gen. Karlem Palečkem v
roce1949, s. 196-197.
263 SDMJ, Pozůstalost Josefa Bartíka, Žádost Josefa Bartíka o výplatu vyživovacích příspěvků podle VV čís. 6.
z r. 1947, s. 1-2.
264 K tomu viz kapitola 3.3.b.
265 Encyklopedický slovník českých dějin 1938-1945. Heslo: Československé pozemní jednotky ve Francii,
URL: http://www.usd.cas.cz/UserFiles/File/Publikace/Slovnik38_45.pdf [23. 3. 2011]; Podrobněji k tématice
ČSNV viz KUKLÍK, Jan: Vznik Československého národního výboru a prozatímního státního zřízení ČSR v
emigraci. Praha 1996.
266 Za účelem výzvědného zpravodajství byla v Paříži zřízena čs. zpravodajská expozitura s krycím jménem
„Karel“. Vedením této ústředny byl v létě 1939 pověřen pplk. Oldřich Tichý, kterému podléhali mjr. Karel
Paleček a škpt. František Fryč. Podrobněji k tomu viz GEBHART, Jan: Českoslovenští vojenští zpravodajci v
Paříži (1939-1940). Moderní dějiny 3, 1995, s. 129-138; TICHÝ, Oldřich: Z pamětí zpravodajce (II.). HaV 40,
1991, č. 1, s. 122-140.
54
čeliti vysílání agentů Gestapa do okupované ČSR a prověřovat osoby čs. příslušnosti
o kterých bylo prohlášeno, že jsou podezřelé ze špionážní činnosti anebo byly označeny, jako
komunističtí agitátoři. Všechny tyto věci vyřizoval pro 2. odd. franc. hl. št. a za tím účelem byl
ve spojení s mjr. GUYOU, [správně H. Gouyou, pozn. PK] který byl určen jako spojovací
důstojník k voj. správě. Veškeré jiné příkazy dle BARTÍKOVI výpovědi dostával tento od plk.
VLČKA a tomuto také předkládal vyřízené spisy. Tento je pak schvaloval a předkládal
k podpisu plk. KUDLÁČKOVI, který o závažných věcech referoval gen. NEUMANOVI nebo
INGROVI. Veškeré zprávy získané 2. odd. voj. správy byly odesílány: gen . INGROVI,
[místopředsedovi ČSNV] ŠRÁMKOVI, dr. RIPKOVI a dr. BENEŠOVI do Londýna.“267 V jiné
svodce je potom uvedeno: „U čs. občanů, o kterých měli franc. voj. úřady zprávy, že jsou
podezřelí ze spolupráce s nacisty anebo, že jsou komunističtí agitátoři, podával Bartík dotazy
do vlasti radiem, což zařizovala skupina tehd. plk. TICHÉHO. V případě, že došla u domova
zpráva,která tato podezření potvrdila, hlásil toto BARTÍK franc. vojenskému 2. odd.
prostřednictvím mjr. GUYOU [správně H. Gouyou, pozn. PK].“268
Vánoce roku 1939 strávil Josef Bartík s největší pravděpodobností společně se svou
rodinou ve Velké Británii. Dne 20. prosince 1939 odletěl z Paříže do Londýna jako „britský
občan“ John Burton.269 V lednu 1940 se znovu vrátil na své místo do Paříže, tentokrát
doprovázený svojí manželkou Libuší.270 Jejich dcery zůstaly samy ve Velké Británii, kde
chodily do klášterní školy The Sacred Heart of Jesus.
271
3.2.b Bartíkova činnost ve Francii v roce 1940
Zajímavé informace o Bartíkově činnosti ve Francii vypověděl dále Karel Paleček:
„Z některých úkonů, které Bartík dělal, a které jsem zjišťoval spíše v době před naším
odjezdem z Francie, usuzuji, že plnil i poslání úkonů ministerstva vnitra. Francouzský aparát
byl [totiž] zbyrokratizovaný. […] Jak blíže celé jeho oddělení vypadalo nevím. Bartík se
obklopil úplně novými spolupracovníky, které jsem nikdy předtím neznal.“272
Jedním z Bartíkových nových spolupracovníků na druhém oddělení byl i nadporučík
Stanislav Adam, který o svém přidělení a působení v Bartíkově oddělení po válce vypověděl:
„… dne 14. února [1940] byl jsem přeložen do Paříže k vojenské správě a přidělen k 2. odd.
pod vedení BARTÍKA. Přidělení k 2. odd. bylo provedeno na přímé vyžádání vojenské správy.
Současně se mnou byl vyžádán por. v zál. PERUTKA. Podle mého názoru moje přidělení
k 2. odd. bylo provedeno na základě mé odbojové činnosti a snad na základě hlášení, které
v Paříži sdělil kpt. HRABEC. […] Činnost odd. pozůstávala hlavně z prověřování osob, které

267 NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123,
nezpracovaný materiál. Svodka ze dne 24. března 1950, s. 34-35.
268 NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123,
nezpracovaný materiál., Svodka ze dne 25. března 1950, s. 37.
269 Viz Bartíkův Sauf Conduit vystavený na jméno John Buton, Přílohy, IV. Výběr z dokumentů, dokument č. 9.
270 SDMJ, Pozůstalost Josefa Bartíka, Žádost Josefa Bartíka o výplatu vyživovacích příspěvků podle VV čís. 6.
z r. 1947, s. 2.
271 KOLÁRIK, Peter: Josef Bartík: Životopis. Vydala Draga S. Kellick, bez bližších bibliografických údajů,
s. 18.
272 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-3/13, Pokračování protokol sepsaného s brig. gen. Karlem Palečkem v
roce1949, s. 203.
55
byly v [čs.] armádě a nebo v civilní správě, dále ve zpracování hlášení z domova o osobách,
které kolaborují [s Němci] a o osobách, které pracují proti okupantům nebo jsou žalářováni,
pak velká agenda byla se skupinou gen. PRCHALY, dále se Slovenskou národní radou,
agitace separatistů /Priedavkové/ mezi Slováky,273
příslušníky čs. armády. Pak tam byla velká
agenda s případem podvodných odvodních lístků a vůbec vyhýbání se vojenské službě.“274
Nadporučík Stanislav Adam měl během svého poválečného výslechu charakterizovat
i svého nadřízeného mjr. Josefa Bartíka, ke kterému uvedl: „… můj poměr k němu byl jako
podřízený k nadřízenému. Poznal jsem jej až v Paříži, byl velmi přísný a nekompromisní a při
sebemenším poklesku, ať podřízených a nebo v armádě neznal ohledu. Podle mého
přesvědčení jest to typ se silnou vůlí, který pevně vládne a jde svoji cestou a nezná žádných
úchylek. Z jeho činnosti vím, že v kanceláři seděl často i přes úřední hodiny, z kanceláře nesl
si práci domů, kde pracoval do pozdních hodin nočních. K jeho práci, kterou sám konal,
neměl nikdo z jiných přístup. Spisy svoje ukládal si sám osobně do své vlastní pokladny, na
rozdíl od jiných spisů, které byly společně ukládány do jiné.“275
Karel Paleček hovořil ve své výpovědi o úkonech ministerstva vnitra, které Bartíkovo
druhé oddělení provádělo. Jak bylo vidět například z výpovědi Stanislava Adama, jednalo se
o sledování aktivit formující se protibenešovské opozice, která se v letech 1939-1940
formovala ve Francii a vymezovala se proti činnosti ČSNR a zejména proti E. Benešovi.276
V té době se Bartík poprvé dostal do užšího kontaktu s vrcholnou čs. politickou reprezentací,
která působila v ČSNR. Ve svodce z jeho poválečného výslechového protokolu je k tomu
uvedeno: „ O svých stycích se členy národního výboru v Paříži BARTÍK uvedl, že tyto
udržoval jedině s RIPKOU a ŠRÁMKEM, kterým podával referáty o činnosti PRCHALY, dr.
HODŽI a PRÍDAVOKA a uvedl, že získaný materiál o této skupině, byl pak ŠRÁMKEM
a RIPKOU využíván k politickým zákrokům u francouzské vlády. BARTÍK vypověděl, že
chodil RIPKOVI a ŠRÁMKOVI na příkaz plk. KUDLÁČKA anebo INGRA tehdy, když byl
získán nějaký důležitější materiál, ke kterému bylo třeba bližšího osvětlení, […] Bartík dále
uvedl, že neměl přístup na schůze a porady národního výboru…“277
Těžiště práce pařížského obranného oddělení však pochopitelně spočívalo
v odhalování nacistických agentů. Samotný Bartík se k líčení této problematiky dostal
v roce 1941 v přednášce o nacismu, kterou přednesl ve Velké Británii u jednotek čs.
pozemního vojska v Leamingtonu. V tomto hodnotném autentickém textu je mimo jiné
uvedeno: „Do naší armády ve Francii byli vysíláni agenti s československými pasy, aby

273 Peter Prídavok byl slovenský katolický politik a novinář, který byl stoupencem slovenské autonomie a
později i samostatného slovenského státu. Po Mnichovu byl vedoucím Slovenské tiskové kanceláře. Do
zahraničního exilu odešel v dubnu 1939.
274 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-91-1, Protokol sepsaný se Stanislavem Adamem v trestnici Plzeň-Bory, 25. 3.
1950, s. 3-4.
275 Tamtéž, s. 10.
276 Jednalo se o skupiny lidí z bývalého Československa, které se vytvářely okolo arm. gen. Lva Prchaly, Petera
Prídavoka a zejména okolo bývalého meziválečného ministerského předsedy Milana Hodži, který založil 22.
listopadu 1939 opoziční orgán – Slovenskou národní radu (SNR). Podrobněji viz KUKLÍK, Jan – NĚMEČEK,
Jan: Proti Benešovi! Česká a slovenská protibenešovská opozice v Londýně 1939-1945. Praha 2004, s. 37-48.
277 NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123,
nezpracovaný materiál. Svodka ze dne 24. března 1950, s. 35.
56
získávaly zprávy o její organisaci, morálce a duchu – jiní zase, aby její morálku rozleptávali
a ničili. Na místech, kde se koncentrovali naši vojáci jako v Krakově, Varšavě, Budapešti,
Bělehradě, Cařihradě, Beyrouthu, Paříži a v Agde zjistili jsme agenty, které známe ještě
z ČSR. Několik bylo jich zatčeno ve Francii, a v Levantě. Většina z vás pamatuje se na
vyzvědače Schnabla, zatčeného v Agdu a agenta Gestapa Petelíka, který byl do čs. armády
vyslán jinou složkou německou, o které promluvím v další kapitole.
Německé výzvědné zpravodajství získalo o čs. armádě ve Francii mnoho důležitých
zpráv. Bylo to proto, že mnozí naši vojáci byli příliš sdílní – i před osobami, které neznali.
Činnost německých agentů usnadňovalo i to, že jsme neměli ve Francii možnost kontroly nad
osobami, které se o čs. vojenské věci zajímaly. Dozor prováděly orgány francouzské, které
ochraně zájmů československých z neznalosti poměrů nevěnovaly náležitou pozornost.
Bohužel je nutno konstatovat také fakt, že v řadách čs. armády ve Francii našli se
jednotlivci, kteří vědomě a se zlým úmyslem zveřejňovali vojenské věci československé a těžce
se proti zájmům naší armády a našich doma prohřešili.
Například [Vladimír] Borin – Ležák,278 který v Paříži s mnohými čs. vojáky sepisoval
protokoly o poměrech v čs. armádě, a rozesílal na francouzské úřady prý za účelem sjednání
nápravy. Pro německé agenty usazené v Paříži bylo pak lehkou prací, dostati se k zprávám
toho druhu a využíti jich. Zrovna tak činnost Viceníků, Kleinů a Rybáků – míním tak zvaného
„arcibiskupa“ – bude jednou hodnotiti československý soud.“279
V přednášce byla zmíněna řada nacistických agentů, informace o jednom z nich podal
po válce Stanislav Adam: „Ze spisů jest mě známo, že před mým příchodem do Francie,
desertoval [od čs. jednotky] npor. PETELÍK údajně do Švýcarska a odtud do Prahy, kde snad
měl Němcům podat podrobné zprávy o stavu čs. armády a jednotlivců doložené fotografiemi.
Zda byl PETELÍK v podezření před útěkem není mi známo a nic jsem o tom neslyšel.“280
Podrobné informace o prošetřování jednotlivých případů zmiňovaných agentů se
s největší pravděpodobností vůbec nedochovaly. Archiv druhého oddělení ČSVS, kde se
dokumenty pravděpodobně nacházely, byl na rozkaz gen. Neumanna spálen v létě 1940 při
evakuaci čs. jednotek a ČSNV z Francie do Velké Británie.281 Výjimkou je Bartíkem zmíněný
nacistický agent Rybák, tzv. „arcibiskup“, ke kterému se v Národním archivu dochovala
Bartíkova poválečná výpověď.
282

278 Vladimír Borin Ležák byl český komunistický a později socialistický novinář. Jako redaktor působil ve
třicátých letech v Rudém večerníku a v Haló novinách. V roce 1936 se s KSČ rozešel a působil ve Večerním
Českém slově. Do zahraniční ho exilu odešel na podzim 1939 jako zapřisáhlý odpůrce prezidenta Edvarda
Beneše.
279 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-89-7, Složky a organizace ve výbojných plánech německého nacismu –
přednáška pplk. Josefa Bartíka z roku 1941, s. 9-10.
280 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-91-1, Protokol sepsaný se Stanislavem Adamem v trestnici Plzeň-Bory, 25. 3.
1950, s. 4.
281 Viz NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123,
nezpracovaný materiál. Svodka ze dne 24. března 1950, s. 38. Torzo obsáhlé agendy druhé oddělení ČSVS viz
ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-89-2. Tyto materiály pravděpodobně odvezl do Velké Británii osobně Josef
Bartík.
282 Shodou okolností působil v Bartíkově obranné skupině v Paříži jeden rotmistr se stejným příjmením. Jednalo
se o rtm. Antonína Rybáka, Francouze československého původu, který provozoval živnost na ostrově Korsika.
57
Josef Rybák byl bývalý čs. státní příslušník, který se na podzim 1939 objevil
v Istanbulu, kde se vydával za biskupa řecko-katolické církve. Kromě toho tvrdil, že v „čsl.
armádě dosáhl hodnosti majora gen. štábu a že ve válce 1914-1918 sloužil na Ukrajině.“283
V Istanbulu navazoval styky s čs. emigranty a uprchlíky pod záminkou, že přijel organizovat
emigrantskou pomoc. Rybák nosil biskupský prsten a zlatý biskupský kříž, disponoval
obsáhlou doporučující korespondenci od různých laických a církevních institucí, kde
nechybělo ani „jakési osobní poděkování i od osobního tajemníka papežské stolice“284
–
vypadal tedy na první pohled jako důvěryhodná a významná osobnost. Proto neměl výrazné
problémy s tím, aby se vetřel „do čsl. kolonie v Cařihradě a dostal se i na čsl. vyslanectví,
kde všude mu bylo důvěřováno pro řadu doporučujících listin, takže nikoho v Cařihradě
nenapadlo, aby jeho totožnost byla přezkoušena.“285
Pochvalná zpráva o působení „čs. biskupa“ v neutrálním Turecku se záhy donesla až
do Paříže k Josefu Bartíkovi. Ten o tom, jak tohoto nacistického agenta pomohl odhalit,
vypověděl: „Když mi o něm došly zprávy, že se v Cařihradě zajímá o ilegální spojení do
[bývalého] Československa a že se vydává za bývalého důstojníka /v čsl. armádě nebyl do
r. 1938 žádný major Rybák/ a že pracoval ve zpravodajské službě /což rovněž neodpovídalo
pravdě/, vydal jsem důvěrný oběžník pro všechny složky čsl. zahraničního odboje, ve kterém
jsem upozornil na podezřelou činnost Rybákovu a současně přes vyslanectví v Cařihradě byl
Rybák vyzván k příjezdu do Francie s odůvodněním, že [Československý] Nár. výb. bude jeho
služby potřebovat. Rybák přes Bejrut a Marseille přijel do Francie a byl francouzskými úřady
v Marseille zadržen, převezen do Agde a tam podroben výslechům.
286 Během jeho výslechu
ve Francii vyšly najevo zajímavé skutečnosti, když doznal, „že se neoprávněně vydával za
řecko-katolického biskupa, že biskupský prsten a zlatý biskupský kříž, který nosil mu svěřil
pražský obchodník židovské národnosti, aby mu tyto cenné věci spolu s jinými klenoty
propašoval do Turecka a odtud do Anglie.“287 Dále však Rybák při výslechu nespolupracoval.
Nakonec byl usvědčen jedním čs. příslušníkem, vojákem z tábora v Agde, „který Rybáka
poznal jako nacistického agitátora, který jezdil v čsl. pohraničí v době mnichovských jednání
a všude prováděl nacistickou propagandu.“288 Po usvědčení Rybák přiznal, „že v roce 1935
absolvoval zpravodajský kurz v Mnichově. Jakou zpravodajskou činností byl pověřen
v Cařihradě, odmítl udati. Francouzské úřady převzaly Rybáka pro další šetření, mezi tím
však došlo ke zhroucení fronty a kapitulaci, takže jsem se o něm již více nedozvěděl.“289

Po pádu Francie byl evakuován spolu s ostatními vojáky do Velké Británie, kde byl podle Josefa Bartíka
v roce 1940 vybrán plk. Moravcem „jako dobrovolník a illeg. odeslán ponorkou na pobřeží Francie s úkolem
usadit se v Paříži jako agent a zpravodajsky pracovat pro MORAVCE. Před odjezdem do Francie, byl Angličany
vybaven radiostanicí, a pracoval ve Francii až do konce války.“ ((Viz NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ
(Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123, nezpracovaný materiál. Svodka ze dne 3.
dubna 1950, s. 50.)) K činnosti Antonína Rybáka (agenta Rossiho) viz též ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta.
Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 117-119.
283 NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123,
nezpracovaný materiál. Zápis o výpovědi Josefa Bartíka k osobě Rybák – nacistický agent, 17. 7. 1950, s. 1.
284 Tamtéž.
285 Tamtéž.
286 Tamtéž, s. 1-2.
287 Tamtéž, s. 2.
288 Tamtéž.
289 Tamtéž.
58
Z hlediska dalšího vývoje je jisté, že se Rybák z francouzského zajetí dostal anebo byl
propuštěn. S novým zpravodajským úkolem se objevil již v roce 1941 v Tunisu. Bartík
k tomu uvedl následující: „… v r. 1941 došlo [čs. exilovému] ministerstvu zahraničí
v Londýně číslo tuniského časopisu, který poslal čsl. konsulát v Bejrutu, kde byla fotografie
Rybáka, ‚biskupa řecko-katolické církve‘, se zprávou o jeho přijetí tuniským sultánem. /Je
známo, že tuniský sultán sympatisoval s nacisty a byl Američany po obsazení Tunisu zbaven
své vladařské funkce a internován./ V uvedeném časopise byl Rybák fotografován se sultánem
v rozhovoru a měl biskupský kříž, který byl u něho nalezen při zatčení v Agde a o němž udal,
že mu byl svěřen pražským obchodníkem. Od té doby jsem o ‚biskupu řecko-katolické církve‘
již neslyšel.“290
Ve své výpovědi o nacistickém agentu Rybákovi se Bartík zmínil o zhroucení fronty
ve Francii a následné kapitulaci, tedy o červnových událostech roku 1940. Ještě je však
potřeba vrátit se do května roku 1940, kdy se odehrály dvě velice zásadní události, jež naplno
zasáhly do Bartíkova života. Dne 10. května zaútočilo Německo na Nizozemí, Belgii,
Lucembursko a Francii. Za několik dní nato se došlo v Bartíkově rodině k tragické události:
Dne 14. května 1940 se měla Bartíkova starší dcera podrobit jednoduchému lékařskému
zákroku, došlo však ke komplikacím a šestnáctiletá Zora Bartíková téhož dne zemřela.
V jejím úmrtním listu, vystaveném britskými úřady, je v kolonce „příčina úmrtí“ uvedeno
následující: „Shock Novocaine anaesthesia (local) prior to ronsillestomy (lymphatiom) […]
Misadventure.“291 Z uvedené citace vyplývá, že Zora Bartíková se měla podrobit
chirurgickému vynětí části patrových mandlí. Před zákrokem jí bylo podáno lokální
anestetikum, injekce novokainu, po které však nastal šok, v důsledku něhož zemřela. Podle
úmrtního listu se jednalo o nehodu. Tato tragická zpráva se k manželům Bartíkovým donesla
hned druhý den a již 16. května Libuše Bartíková odletěla do Londýna na pohřeb své dcery.292
Josef Bartík se pravděpodobně kvůli probíhající francouzsko-německé válce nemohl pohřbu
zúčastnit.
Zpráva o tomto neštěstí, které manžele Bartíkovy postihlo, se brzy rozšířila i mezi čs.
politickou reprezentací. Mezi tou měl Bartík v té době již několik přátel, což dokládají dvě
kondolence, které se do dnešních dnů dochovaly. Autorem první z nich ze dne 26. května byl
Dr. Alexandr Kunoši, čs. diplomat a politik, který byl v roce 1939 v opozici vůči ČSNV
v Paříži.293 Druhou dochovanou kondolenci napsal dne 1. června Dr. Hubert Ripka,
meziválečný čs. novinář, který v letech 1939-1940 vykonával funkci přednosty Informační
správy u ČSVS v Paříži.294 Z výše napsaného vyplývá zajímavá skutečnost, že Bartík měl
přátele, případně známé na obou stranách čs. politické reprezentace.
Válečná situace ve Francii začínala být v červnu opravdu kritická.295 Francouzské
vrchní velení se rozhodlo nasadit na frontu veškeré možné síly, tedy i formující se čs. divizní
pěchotu (1. a 2. pěší pluk). I přesto však Francouzi nedokázali rychlý postup německé armády

290 Tamtéž.
291 SDMJ, Pozůstalost Josefa Bartíka, Úmrtní list Zory Bartíkové, Vystaveno 20. května 1940.
292 Tamtéž, Žádost Josefa Bartíka o výplatu vyživovacích příspěvků podle VV čís. 6. z r. 1947, s. 2.
293 Kunošiho kondolence Bartíkovi viz Přílohy, IV. Výběr z dokumentů, dokument č. 10.
294 Ripkova kondolence Bartíkovi viz Přílohy, IV. Výběr z dokumentů, dokument č. 11.
295 Dne 10. června 1940 vypověděla Francii válku také Itálie.
59
zastavit a 14. června 1940 vojska Wehrmachtu obsadila Paříž. Čs. vojsko ve Francii se poté
zúčastnilo tzv. ústupových bojů. Dne 17. června převzal vládu ve Francii maršál Philippe
Pétain, který vzápětí požádal Němce o příměří, a 22. června 1940 Francie kapitulovala.296
Major Josef Bartík a jeho zpravodajské oddělení se pravděpodobně evakuovali
společně se členy ČSNV. Bartík se nakonec dostal až do Bordeaux, odkud odjel na anglickém
křižníku H. M. Arethusa do Velké Británie. Podle politika Ladislava Feierabenda, jenž byl
v té době již v Británii, se celá záležitost udála takto: „… Britové přidělili Národnímu výboru
několik míst. Členové národního výboru však rozhodli, že zůstanou v Bordeaux, aby se starali
o evakuaci vojska a našich příslušníků, a do Anglie poslali jen Šrámka s páterem Hálou,
majora Bartíka a své ženy s dětmi.“297 Dá se předpokládat, že Josef Bartík odjel do Británie
na této lodi, aby mohl být na blízku své manželce a druhé dceři v těžkých chvílích, které celá
rodina po smrti Zory nepochybně prožívala. Pozdější Bartíkův spolupracovník, mjr. gšt. Jan
Krček, ve své poválečné výpovědi podotkl, že Bartík se s úmrtím své dcery Zory vyrovnával
během války jen velmi těžko: „Druhá věc, kterou velmi těžce nesl, bylo úmrtí jeho dcery.
Bylo patrno, že tím více po její ztrátě lpí nyní na mladší dceři [Draze] a na [své] ženě.“298
Do Velké Británie přijel Josef Bartík 21. června 1940 a pro informaci vojenského
atašé ČSR v Londýně vypracoval ještě téhož dne podrobnou dvoustránkovou zprávu
o aktuální situaci ve Francii. Tento dochovaný pramen dokresluje rychlý pád Francie
a rozklad její armády, který v té době naplno probíhal a ostře kontrastoval s morálkou čs.
jednotek; ty byly odhodlány bojovat za všech okolností, a proto si u francouzského velení
vysloužily uznání. Nebude proto od věci zde ze zprávy několik zajímavých pasáží ocitovat:
„Nejzávažnější okolností byl naprostý nedostatek válečného materiálu, zvláště pěchotní
munice, ručních granátů, zásobování selhalo úplně; franc. jednotky na některých místech byly
3 – 4 dny úplně beze stravy. Mezi jednotlivými armádními skupinami, štáby a jednotkami
neexistovalo vůbec žádné spojení a celé jednotky odmítaly rozkazy důstojníků jíti vpřed
odhazujíce zbraně: zanechávaly kulomety, tanky a houfně se vracely do zázemí. […] letectvo
zůstávalo pasivní, nekrylo ústup a nehájilo ani uprchlíky, kteří byli v masách bombardováni a
ostřelováni kulomety. V Charteaux byla zabita před námi 40ti členná skupina lidí. […] Na
frontě v prvních liniích byl naprostý nedostatek munice. Čs. oddíly vypravují, že měli několik
zásobníků a pro kulomet 1000 ran; ruční granáty chyběly vůbec. […] U civilního obyvatelstva
projevovala se od 14. 6. 1940 nespokojenost vůči všem cizincům, zvláště pak proti
Angličanům. V několika místech byli čsl. důstojníci vykázáni z kaváren, odmítáno jim
podávání nápojů a jídel; odmítány jim jakékoliv informace při dotazech s odůvodněním, že
Francouzi nedají Angličanům žádných informaci. […] Podle názoru nebýti Petainovy nabídky
[příměří], mohla se armáda dobře ještě držeti. 1. a 2. čsl. p. pl. byl jižně od Verdunu, byli
zasazeni s úkolem krytí franc. hlavních sil. Podle prohlášení franc. velitele divize, provedly čs.
jednotky krytí vzorných způsobem. Ne jen, že úplně zastavily něm. postup, ale i při vlastním

296 Podrobněji o nasazení čs. vojska ve Francii a jeho ústupových bojích viz Encyklopedický slovník českých
dějin 1938-1945. Heslo: Československé pozemní jednotky ve Francii, URL:
http://www.usd.cas.cz/UserFiles/File/Publikace/Slovnik38_45.pdf [23. 3. 2011].
297 FEIERABEND, Ladislav: Soumrak československé diplomacie. Londýn 1986, s. 144.
298 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-72-1-3/547, Protokol sepsaný s plk. Janem Krčkem, 2. 6. 1950, s. 78.
60
ústupu zničily vše a pokud mohly, odvezly všechen materiál a franc. generál prohlásil, že
jedině čs. jednotky provedly ústup způsobem, který ani od nich nebyl žádán.“ 299
O tom, jak situace vypadala v úterý 18. června 1940, Bartík dále poznamenal: „První
skupina [Čechoslováků]asi 500 mužů se 60ti kamiony dorazila do Bordeaux 18. VI., ostatní
byli postupně očekáváni. – Skupina byla zoufalá tím, že některé rychlé německé oddíly
pronikaly úplně volně a rychle dopředu a při ústupu našich oddílů se stalo, že tyto narazily na
města, která byla obsazena něm. vojskem a musely je proto obcházeti.“300

299 VÚA-VHA Praha, sbírka 37, a. č. 37-224-1 (Francie), Posouzení situace ve Francii, zpracováno Josefem
Bartíkem, Londýn 21. června 1940, s. 1-2.
300 Tamtéž, s. 2.
61
3.3 Zpátky ve Velké Británii (1940-1945)
3.3.a Působení Velké Británii v letech 1940-1941
Přidělení u „kanadské“ vojenské mise
Po návratu do Velké Británie se Bartík nevrátil k Moravcovu zpravodajskému ústředí,
ale místo toho byl pravděpodobně plk. Moravcem „od 20/6 1940 do 8/12 1940 přidělen ke
Kanadské vojenské misi.“301 Československá vojenská mise v Kanadě působila od roku 1941.
S jejími přípravami se začalo již v létě 1940 ve Velké Británii, což bylo dáno zejména tím, že
právě v té době – po pádu Francie – vypukla tzv. krize v získávání nových příslušníků do čs.
vojenských jednotek.302 Z Francie ustoupila do Velké Británie „pouze třetina původního stavu
československých vojenských jednotek a získávání nových příslušníků, kromě jednotlivců, na
evropském kontinentu již nebylo možné. […] Proto se od léta 1940 obracela stále více
pozornost příslušných československých orgánů na Severní Ameriku, a vzhledem k vazbám na
Velkou Británii, hlavně na Kanadu.“303 Britské úřady obdržely za účelem vyslání čs. vojenské
mise do Kanady žádost v srpnu 1940, souhlasná odpověď však dorazila až 1. prosince 1940.
Generál Ingr o dva dny později potvrdil personální složení mise: jejím velitelem se stal plk.
gšt. Čeněk Kudláček, kterému bylo dále přiděleno pět důstojníků a jeden písař.
304 Do tohoto
počtu nebyl zahrnut mjr. Josef Bartík, jehož postavení u mise bylo specifické. Július Baláž
k tomu ve své studii poznamenal: „Do konce prosince se však samotná sestava mise ještě
změnila. Kromě zabezpečování všech otázek souvisejících s náborem do čs. vojenských
jednotek byl totiž jeden z členů mise pověřen jinými, na člena vojenské mise nezvyklými úkoly.
Jednalo se o pověření v oblasti zpravodajské. Význam tohoto pověření dokládá právě ta
skutečnost, že řešením úkolů v této oblasti byl pověřen mjr. Josef Bartík. Až 31. 12. 1940 ho
v této funkci v misi nahradil taktéž zkušený prvorepublikový zpravodajský důstojník pplk. gšt.
Bohuslav Procházka (krycí jméno Karel Hron).“305 Podrobnější prameny o zpravodajské
činnosti Josefa Bartíka pro formující se „kanadskou“ misi nebyly dosud objeveny. Následující
úryvek napsaný kronikářem čs. vojenské mise v Kanadě, nadporučíkem Rudolfem Nekolou,
přehledně shrnuje účel a poslání mise, na jejímž zpravodajském zajištění se v roce 1940 Josef
Bartík podílel: „Úkolem jejím byl nábor dobrovolníků do čs. zahraniční armády, jejich
soustředění a doprava k jednotkám čs. armády, případně převod čs. příslušníků, sloužících
v kanadských jednotkách, do čs. armády, soustředění a doprava dobrovolníků z jiných států,
propaganda čs. odboje, paralysování nepřátelské podvratné činnosti mezi občany čs. původu,

301 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Návrh na povýšení důstojníka, Vypracováno plk.
gšt. Františkem Moravcem dne 23. února 1941.
302 BALÁŽ, Július: Československá vojenská mise v Kanadě (1941–1943) a Brazílii (1943-1945). In: ZudováLešková, Zlatica – Hofman Petr (Edd.): Československá zahraniční služba v letech 1939-1945. Sborník studií.
Praha 2008, s. 235.
303 Tamtéž.
304 Tamtéž, s 237.
305 Tamtéž.
62
zpravodajství a spojení, jednání s příslušnými úřady a činiteli kanadskými, jakož i provádění
jiných úkolů, které misi byly svěřovány.“306
Působení u II. odboru exilového ministerstva národní obrany (1941)
Pravděpodobně krátce předtím nebo poté, co jej u „kanadské“ mise vystřídal
podplukovník Procházka, byl Bartík „od 9/12 1940 přidělen zpravodajskému ústředí jako
přednosta obranné skupiny.“307 Podle pramenů to tedy vypadá, že se v té době již Bartík
s Moravcem usmířili, nebo byla jejich dřívější roztržka z roku 1939 zapomenuta; v každém
případě je třeba konstatovat, že Moravec se Bartíkovi v žádném případě nemstil a jako jeho
nadřízený ho hodnotil v letech 1940-1941 nejvyšším kvalifikačním stupněm, výtečně.
K Bartíkovým osobním a mravním vlastnostem a k tomu, jak se ve své funkci osvědčil,
plukovník výslovně uvedl: „Svědomitý, oddaný službě, nekompromisní běží-li o naší věc.
Osobní ctižádostivost neohrožuje nijak vážně služební zájmy. […] Dlouholetý pracovník
v obranném zpravodajství, které ovládá theoreticky i prakticky dokonale. Výsledky jeho
činnosti jsou velmi dobré.“308 Kromě toho dne 23. února 1941 navrhl povýšit Josefa Bartíka
z hodnosti majora na podplukovníka. Vlastní povýšení proběhlo dne 7. března 1941.309
V létě roku 1940 vrcholila snaha Edvarda Beneše o uznání ČSNV jako prozatímní
československé vlády. Jeho úsilí bylo nakonec po pádu Francie úspěšné – dne 21. července
roku 1940 oznámil britský ministr zahraničí lord Halifax, že „uznává prozatímní československou vládu, ustavenou Česko-Slovenským národním výborem v této zemi a navazuje s ní
styky.“310 Tímto uznáním Britové zároveň de facto přijali i prezidentskou funkci E. Beneše,
a to i přesto, že souhlas s tzv. právní kontinuitou Československé republiky nebyl
v dokumentu výslovně uveden. Přední čeští historici Jan Kuklík a Jan Gebhart shrnuli
důležitost tohoto uznání následovně: „Přes uvedená právní a politická omezení mělo britské
uznání z 21. července 1940 pro československou věc v zahraničí velký význam. Českoslovenští
exiloví představitelé přestali reprezentovat sami sebe.“311 Následující den jmenoval E. Beneš
již jako prezident v exilu první prozatímní vládu, do jejíhož čela postavil lidoveckého politika
a dosavadního místopředsedu ČSNV – Msgre. Jana Šrámka. Prozatímní vláda měla pět
ministerstev (zahraničních věcí, národní obrany, financí, vnitra a sociální péče a celkem 12
členů. Kromě pěti resortních ministrů (Jan Masaryk, Sergej Ingr, Eduard Outrata, Juraj Slávik
a František Němec) zasedali ve vládě rovněž tři státní ministři, tedy ministři bez rezortu
(Ladislav Feierabend, Jaromír Nečas, Štefan Osuský) a čtyři stání tajemníci (z nich měl
nejsilnější pozici Hubert Ripka, tajemník na ministerstvu zahraničí).312 Ministrem národní

306 Kronika Československé mise v Kanadě napsaná npor. děl. v z. Rudolfem Nekolou, s. 1. Citováno podle
BALÁŽ, Július: Kronika Československé vojenské mise v Kanadě (1941–1943). Ročenka 2006 (Vojenský
historický archiv, III. odbor VÚA Praha). Praha 2007, s. 100.
307 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Návrh na povýšení důstojníka, Vypracováno plk.
gšt. Františkem Moravcem dne 23. února 1941.
308 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Pokračování záznamu o důstojníku (1940-1941).
309 Tamtéž, Titulní strana kvalifikační listiny.
310 Citováno podle GEBHART, Jan – KUKLÍK, Jan: Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české. Svazek XV. a 1938-1945.
Praha-Litomyšl 2006, s. 382.
311 Tamtéž.
312 Tamtéž, s. 383-384.
63
obrany se stal divizní generál Sergej Ingr a jako státní tajemník působil na MNO divizní
generál Rudolf Viest.
Od podzimu 1940 začalo čs. exilové MNO řídit čs. zahraniční armádu a za tím účelem
bylo rozděleno do čtyř odborů: I. odbor byl politicko-správní, II. odbor již tradičně
zpravodajský, III. odbor letecký a IV. odbor materiální. Do čela II. odboru MNO byl
jmenován dosavadní velitel „čs. zpravodajského ústředí v Londýně“ plk. gšt. František
Moravec.313

Samotný druhý odbor MNO314 se dále členil na dvě skupiny: první byla skupina
výzvědného zpravodajství (VZ), druhá skupina obranného zpravodajství (OZ) a každá z nich
se měla dále dělit na tři sekce. Jádro II. odboru tvořili v roce 1940 muži z „jedenáctky“.
Přednosta plk. Moravec měl jako svého pobočníka škpt. Tauera a zástupcem přednosty se stal
pplk. Tichý. Přednostové obou dvou skupin zůstali stejní jako před odletem „jedenáctky“ do
Londýna: mjr. gšt. Emil Strankmüller (VZ) a mjr. konc. Josef Bartík (OZ).315
Bartík měl jako přednosta exilového obranného zpravodajství následující pracovní
náplň: „Podle pokynů přednosty oddělení [plk. Moravce] řídí činnost skupiny, osobně vede
a řídí zpravodajství politické a řídí činnost obranného zpravodajství u vojenských jednotek.
Sleduje otázky obranného rázu v širokém měřítku. Při tom soustřeďuje svoji činnost na čs.
živel v Anglii nejen s hlediska obranného, nýbrž i politického. Usměrňuje činnost obranných
agentů. Ve shodě se skupinou výzvědnou spolupracuje s obranným zpravodajstvím cizích
států, najmě anglickým a polským. Vede evidenci osob.“316
Obranná skupina se dále dělila na tři sekce. V sekci všeobecně obranné působil škpt.
konc. Václav Sláma a npor. pěch. v záloze Ing. Bedřich Wiesner. Sekci vojenskou obrannou
měl na starosti škpt. pěch. Josef Fořt, který měly tyto hlavní úkoly: „Soustřeďuje svoji činnost
na vojenské osoby a pracuje v nejužším styku s velitelstvím a se zprav. orgány smíšené
brigády. Vede příslušnou evidenci osob.“317 V sekci letecké obranné působil npor. letectva
v záloze Hugo Vejrych.318 Jeho úkoly byly shrnuty takto: „Sleduje, usměrňuje a provádí
obranné zpravodajství u leteckých jednotek. Vede evidenci osob.“319 Kromě toho měl v rámci
obranné skupiny fungovat i speciální referát pro spolupráci s anglickou zpravodajskou
službou, jehož náplň byla následující: „Projednává s příslušnými anglickými místy všechny
otázky obranného zpravodajství, které se dotýkají zájmů čs. a anglických a vyvěrající zejména
z okolnosti, že nemáme na území Anglie policejní exekutivy. Výměna zprav. informací
důležitých nejen s hlediska čs. nýbrž i anglického.“320

313 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 161.
314 V pramenech se vyskytuje i tradiční označení „2. oddělení“, které vychází z fungování meziválečně
československé armády, kdy zpravodajské oddělení bylo 2. oddělení Hlavního štábu.
315 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-1-483/, Organizace 2. oddělení štábu čs. armády, s. 6 – Personální vybavení.
316 Tamtéž, s. 4.
317 Tamtéž.
318 Úřední záznam ze dne 16. prosince 1940 o vykonané přísaze. Faksimile dokumentu je obsažena v příloze
knihy Jiřího Šolce mezi stranami 96 a 97. Viz ŠOLC, Jiří: Podpalte Československo! Kapitoly z historie
československého zahraničního a domácího odboje (1939-1945). Praha 2005.
319 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-1-483/, Organizace 2. oddělení štábu čs. armády, s. 5.
320 Tamtéž.
64
V náplni vojenské obrané sekce byla mimo jiné zmíněna i součinnost sekce se
zpravodajskými orgány čs. smíšené brigády. První čs. smíšená brigáda ve Velké Británii
vznikla v srpnu 1940 poté, co byla reorganizována původní 1. čs. divize, která působila ve
Francii a jejíž část se právě do Británie evakuovala. Jejím velitelem se stal generál Bedřich
Neumann (krycím jménem Miroslav). Brigáda měla samozřejmě vlastní štáb, sestávající
z jednotlivých oddělení; pochopitelně nemohlo chybět ani oddělení zpravodajské (druhé).
Jeho prvním přednostou byl škpt. gšt. Vilém Sacher.321Sachra vystřídal v březnu 1941 mjr.
gšt. Jan Krček. Ten působil jako zpravodajský důstojník u brigády do konce ledna 1942 a jako
takový podléhal nejenom náčelníkovi štábu brigády, ale i zpravodajskému odboru MNO.
Úkol informovat nového zpravodajského důstojníka u brigády ohledně náplně jeho funkce
připadl v roce 1941 přednostovi „obrany“ Josefu Bartíkovi, který tehdy v jeho schopnosti
vyjádřil důvěru. Jako zpravodajský důstojník brigády měl Jan Krček na starosti nejen tzv.
polní zpravodajskou službu, ale i zpravodajství obranné a politické. 322 Základní rámec
obranného a politického zpravodajství charakterizoval příznačně Jiří Šolc, když uvedl: „Vedle
československých a německých komunistů sledovala také zpravodajská obrana systematicky
německou emigraci v Anglii a všechny odstředivé proudy československé. Vše, co bylo
napravo či nalevo od oficiální politiky čs. exilové vlády a prezidenta, bylo podrobeno
zpravodajské registraci případně dohledu a sledování“.323
Do doby Krčkova zpravodajského působení u brigády spadá také organizace výběru
čs. vojáků pro speciální výsadkové operace, které tehdy II. odbor MNO organizoval.324 Výběr
budoucích parašutistů měl zpočátku na starosti pouze mjr. Karel Paleček, který adepty vybíral
z vojáků 1. praporu brigády. Jan Krček, který byl v té době velitelem 3. roty tohoto praporu,
k okolnostem prvních náborů později uvedl: „… už jako velitel roty jsem byl vyzván
praporem, abych navrhl tři nebo čtyři naprosto spolehlivé osoby. […] Od mojí roty jsem
navrhl Gabčíka, Kubiše a Málka. Od Málka jsem později upustil, poněvadž se mi nezdál dosti
energický a tvrdý.“325 Vzápětí se dostává k delikátnímu úkolu vybírat budoucí parašutisty
i Josef Bartík, který v tomto spolupracoval právě se zpravodajským důstojníkem mjr. gšt.
Janem Krčkem. To ve své výpovědi potvrdil poměrně neochotně i Karel Paleček, když uvedl:
„Do té doby dělal jsem také nábory v brigádě sám. Jednoho dne jsem se dozvěděl, že akce
s odesíláním lidí domů budou v zásadě rozšířeny a za tím účelem a za tím účelem, že jde na
nábor k brigádě sám Moravec s Bartíkem. […] Bylo mi to sice již tehdy divné a nad věcí jsem
se nepozastavoval, protože lidé nějakou cestou a nějakým výběrem přicházet museli, ať již
tento výběr dělal kdokoliv. Konečně i Bartík mohl být osobou povolanou. Dělání výběru
aspoň tak, jak jsem se jej snažil dělat já sám, nebylo nic příjemného. V tuto dobu [od března
1941] působí na 2. oddělení brigády již škpt. [správně mjr.] gšt. Krček, který v náboru také

321 Vilém Sacher napsal po válce svoje paměti, viz SACHER, Vilém: Pod rozstříleným praporem. Praha 19912
.
322 KREISINGER, Pavel: Životní osudy zpravodajského důstojníka plk. gšt. Jana Krčka. Bakalářská diplomová
práce FF MU. Brno 2009, s. 43.
323 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 164.
324 Podrobněji k tématu speciálních operací viz MATÚŠŮ, Marie: Muži pro speciální operace. SOE a zvláštní
skupina D – příprava československých parašutistů za druhé světové války. Praha 2005.
325 ABS Praha, fond 302-72-1-3/523, Protokol sepsaný s Janem Krčkem dne 2. 6. 1950.
65
spolupracoval.“326 O tom, jakým způsobem nábory probíhaly, vypověděl po válce Jan Krček,
který jezdil s pplk. Bartíkem k jednotlivým praporům a podle seznamu doporučených osob
spolu s ním prováděl s dotyčnými vojáky asi hodinové pohovory, na základě kterých
vypracovávali posudky pro II. odbor MNO: „Šlo o to, zda-li je to člověk, který se nelekne
žádného úkolu, který se jeví dostatečně tvrdým a vynalézavým a zda-li se nám jeví schopným
snášet i útrapy a nedostatek. Po stránce státní spolehlivosti byli dotyční již přezkušováni jinou
cestou…“327
Na podzim roku 1941 propukly v Londýně naplno přípravy jedné z nejvýznamnějších
výsadkových operací, které Moravcův II. odbor během druhé světové války zorganizoval.
Jednalo se o známou operaci ANTHROPOID. „Jedním z mála dochovaných dokumentů
o přípravě operace je záznam z 3. října 1941 o přijetí rotmistra Josefa Gabčíka a rotného
Karla Svobody u přednosty zpravodajského odboru MNO v Londýně plukovníka generálního
štábu Františka Moravce.“328 Tento unikátní dokument mimo jiné dokládá fakt, že do
přípravy operace ANTHROPOID byl od počátku kromě plk. Františka Moravce a mjr. Karla
Palečka zasvěcen také pplk. Josef Bartík a mjr. Jan Krček. Úřední záznam, nesoucí
zkomolený název „Antropoid“, začíná zaznamenáním přítomných osob: „3. října 1941:
Přítomni: plk. gšt. Moravec, pplk. konc. Bartík, mjr. pěch. Paleček, mjr. gšt. Krček, rotmistr
Gabčík a rotný Svoboda.“329 Protože byl tento úplný text již několikrát publikován, následuje
jen krátká ukázka toho, co plk. Moravce oběma mužům za přítomnosti tří zpravodajských
důstojníků sdělil: „… Jsou v Praze dvě osobnosti, které representují toto vybíjení. Je to K. H.
Frank a Heydrich, nově příchozí. Podle našeho názoru jakož i našich vedoucích osob, je
třeba pokusit se o to, aby jeden z nich za to zaplatil, abychom ukázali, že vracíme ránu za
ránu.“330 Autorem písemného záznamu, který tato slova zachytil, byl s největší
pravděpodobností mjr. Karel Paleček.331 Jelikož se rotný Karel Svoboda vzápětí při
padákovém výcviku vážně zranil, zahájení operace se oproti původnímu plánu zdrželo
(provedení atentátu bylo původně naplánováno již na 28. října 1941). Svoboda byl nahrazen
na přání samotného Gabčíka rotmistrem Janem Kubišem. Oba dva byli po náročném výcviku
vysazeni nad územím protektorátu až 29. listopadu 1941 „v 02.24 hodin u obce Nehvizdy
u Čelákovic.“332
Než zde bude podrobně rozebrán Bartíkův definitivní rozchod s plk. Moravcem a jeho
odchod na Ministerstvo vnitra, je třeba ještě zmínit jednu událost, která se týká dubnového

326 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-57-3/99, Pokračování protokol sepsaného s brig. gen. Karlem Palečkem v
roce1949, s. 290.
327 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-72-1-3/523, Protokol sepsaný s Janem Krčkem dne 2. 6. 1950.
328 BURIAN, Michal – KNÍŽEK, Aleš – RAJLICH, Jiří – STEHLÍK, Eduard: Atentát. Operace Antropoid 1941-

Praha 20072, s. 33.
329 Tamtéž, citováno podle faksimile dokumentu. Celý text publikoval rovněž Jiří Šolc, viz ŠOLC, Jiří: Nikdo
nás nezastaví. Praha 1992, s. 50-51.
330 Tamtéž.
331 ŠOLC Jiří: Operace Anthropoid. K nejasnostem kolem atentátu na Reinharda Heydricha. HaV 41, 1992, č. 2,
s. 24.
332 BURIAN, Michal – KNÍŽEK, Aleš – RAJLICH, Jiří – STEHLÍK, Eduard: Atentát. Operace Antropoid
1941-1942. Praha 20072, s. 44. Nejnověji k tématice atentátu a k jeho hodnocení viz HAUNER, Milan: O
terorismu a heroismu v české historii: Reflexe k 67. výročí atentátu na Reinharda Heydricha. In: Pejčoch, Ivo –
Plachý, Jiří a kolektiv (Edd.): Okupace, kolaborace, retribuce. Praha 2010, s. 57-66.
66
bombardování Londýna a která zároveň dokládá tvrzení Jiřího Šolce, že „tehdejší vojenská
a politická emigrace v Anglii byla v podstatě ‚velkou vesnicí‘.“333
V dubnu 1941 zasáhlo naplno do Bartíkova života také německé bombardování
Londýna. Jeden z největších německých nočních náletů na Londýn se udál v noci ze 16. na
dubna 1941, kdy na město zaútočilo kolem 460 německých letadel; mělo jít o německou
odvetu za předchozí britské bombardování Berlína. Tato událost je zachycena i v podrobném
deníku českého historika a diplomat Jan Opočenského. Ten si svůj deník vedl nepřetržitě od
července 1940 až do 29. října 1945 a v záznamu s názvem „Noc ze 16. na 17. dubna“
napsal: „Warning začal kolem desáté hodiny. Byli jsme před domem s Viktorem [Jansou,
pozn. PK] a viděli jsme směrem na Beghin Hill flary [světlice, pozn. PK]. Od té doby byli
jsme ve sklepě. Co chvíli jsme vycházeli, flary stále přibývaly, až byly i na třech stranách.
Také letecké obrany přibývalo i hluku od vzdáleného bombardování. O půl jedenácté vyšli
jsme ven, Bartík, Feierabend i já a viděli jsme, že Němci počínají házet zápalné bomby. Hned
jsme viděli, že nám asi tři leží v zahradě. Hasili jsme je. Teprve když jsme dohasili, viděli jsme
zejména, když pí Moellerová [sousedka Jana Opočenského, pozn. PK] začala křičet, že hoří
také v pokoji. Hořelo v mém pokoji, zápalná bomba prolétnuvší stropem, skutálela až k mé
posteli. Prohořela již noha, matrace, peřina i moje deka. Láďa [myšlen Feierabend, pozn.
PK] na ni chrstnul kbelík vody, já druhý a bombu jsme uhasili. Po zdolání prvního náletu
jsme šli spát. […] Nálet byl stále silný, ale směřoval více na Londýn. Ráno o ¾ na 4 nás
vzbudí Bartík, že hoří soused, plukovník Fox. Také naše garáž již chytala. Znovu jsme uhasili
ohně, střechu plukovníkovu hasiči, již přijeli. Spali jsme tu noc jen asi 4 hodiny.“334
Z deníkového záznamu vyplývá, že Josef Bartík se ještě před svým působením na
Ministerstvu vnitra stýkal s Janem Opočenským a státním ministrem Ladislavem
Feierabendem. Z uvedeného záznamu bohužel není jasné, zda s nimi bydlel ve stejném domě
v Beckenhamu (asi 10 km jižně od středu Londýna)335 u Viktora Jansy336 anebo je pouze
navštěvoval a v noci ze 16. na 17. dubna u nich přespával. V Opočenského deníku se
Bartíkovo jméno vyskytuje pouze v tomto a ještě jednom dalším záznamu.337 Dokud nebudou
objeveny další dokumenty, je třeba považovat za relevantní obě výše zmíněné varianty.
3.3.b Josef Bartík jako přednosta zpravodajského odboru MV (1942-1945)
Koncem roku 1941 se Josef Bartík definitivně rozešel s plukovníkem Moravcem.
V tomto ohledu nebyl prvním důstojníkem z „jedenáctky“, který Moravcův zpravodajský
odboru MNO opustil: prvním důstojníkem, který odešel, byl jeho zástupce pplk. gšt. Oldřich
Tichý, který od května 1941 působil jako čs. vojenský přidělenec u holandské exilové vlády

333 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 174.
334 ČECHUROVÁ, Jana – KUKLÍK, Jan – ČECHURA, Jaroslav – NĚMEČEK, Jan (Edd.): Válečné deníky
Jana Opočenského. Praha 2001, s. 108-109.
335 Tamtéž, s. 22, 460.
336 Viktor Jansa byl legačním radou čs. vyslanectví v Londýně. V letech 1940-1943 zastával funkci
místopředsedy Československé hospodářské poradny v Londýně. Od roku 1943 až do roku 1945 byl předsedou
Československého hospodářského sdružení.
337 ČECHUROVÁ, Jana – KUKLÍK, Jan – ČECHURA, Jaroslav – NĚMEČEK, Jan (Edd.): Válečné deníky
Jana Opočenského. Praha 2001, s. 215.
67
ve Velké Británii.338 Podplukovník Tichý vypověděl po válce o svých neshodách s plk.
Moravcem následující: „Na plk. Moravcovi jsem pozoroval jeho pánovitost a jeho
suverénnost, a že zjevně si je vědom síly svého postavení, neobyčejně častým stykem
s prezidentem Benešem. Prezidentu Benešovi referoval sám, gen. Ingrovi vlastně předkládal
vzkazy od prezidenta, místo aby Ingr s prezidentem udržoval styk sám. Tento stav byl
komentován i jinými a je s podivem, že gen. Ingr v jednání s prezidentem je závislý na
Moravcovi. Poněvadž jsem plk. Moravce znal, říkal si sám šedá eminence, mluvíval o taktice
zpráv, že se musí vědět, kdy a jak zprávy podat, měl jsem obavu, zda plk. Moravec všechny
zprávy včas podává. Tuto svoji domněnku jsem sdělil plk. Bočkovi [plk. gšt. Bohumil Boček
byl přednostou I. odboru (politicko-právního) MNO, pozn. PK], mluvil jsem o tom s pplk.
Bartíkem, který mně sdělil, že věc jest v chodu, že bude ustavena nějaká komise, která
vhodným způsobem věc prošetří….“339 To, že se Oldřich Tichý svěřil se svou domněnkou
právě Bartíkovi, jistě nebyla náhoda; pravděpodobně věděl o dřívějších Bartíkových
neshodách s plk. Moravcem, a proto se snad pokoušel o vytvoření jakési protiváhy proti
Moravcovi a jeho vlivu. Zda byla nějaká komise skutečně ustanovena, není autorovi známo.
S ohledem na další vývoj událostí se dá předpokládat, že k tomu spíše nedošlo, poněvadž jak
Tichý, tak Bartík nakonec od Moravce odešli, a naproti tomu Moravcova pozice u prezidenta
Beneše zůstala neotřesena.
O pozadí Bartíkova konečného rozchodu s Moravcem vypověděl Jan Krček, který jej
lépe poznal v roce 1941, následující: „Blíže jsem se s BARTÍKEM seznámil, teprve když
během mého úřadování na brigádě přijel BARTÍK několikrát služebně do Leamingtonu.
Večeřeli jsme obvykle v důst. jídelně a pak jsem šli procházkou ke mně do bytu, kde jsme při
černé kávě poslouchali rozhlas a hovořili. […] Ve věcech služební povahy nebyl BARTÍK
nikdy příliš sdílný, hlavně nebyl konkrétní. Naznačil mi v našich rozhovorech, že se nesnáší
s MORAVCEM, že mezi nimi bylo nějaké nedorozumění a že BARTÍK byl dokonce snad po
svém návratu z Francie nějaký čas mimo službu. [Šlo o přidělení u formující se „kanadské“
vojenské mise, pozn. PK.] V dalším pak mi naznačil, že MORAVEC nevychází dobře
s civilními představiteli našeho odboje a že jenom jeho pevná posice u Dr. BENEŠE ho drží
pevně v sedle. Tuto jeho posici u Dr. BENEŠE mi vysvětloval tím, že pochopitelně Dr. BENEŠ
měl v první době jakousi pevnější oporu jenom v MORAVCOVI.“340
Z výpovědi Jana Krčka vyplývá, že vztah Moravec – Bartík byl ve válečných letech
zřejmě založen na oboustranné antipatii. Krček rovněž zajímavým způsobem osvětlil pozadí
Bartíkova přidělení ke „kanadské“ vojenské misi v roce 1940, o kterém bylo pojednáno
dříve.341 Z jeho líčení vyplývá, že za přidělením stál pravděpodobně plk. Moravec, který se
zřejmě snažil Bartíka „uklidit“ a možná doufal i v jeho odcestování do Kanady. Jak bylo
uvedeno výše, oba důstojníci se nakonec usmířili, ale tento smír trval jen do konce roku 1941.
Na Bartíkovo rozhodnutí odejít od Moravce mohl mít vliv i „odchod“ pplk. Oldřicha Tichého.

338 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 169. Novým Moravcovým zástupcem se stal mjr. gšt. Emil Strankmüller, který však i
nadále vykonával funkci přednosty výzvědného zpravodajství.
339 Citováno podle ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve
světle archívních dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 178.
340 ABS Praha, fond 302-72-1-3/547, Protokol sepsaný s Janem Krčkem dne 2. 6. 1950, s. 78.
341 Viz kapitola 3.3a.
68
Bohužel se nedochoval výslechový protokol, který by Bartíkův konečný rozchod s plk.
Moravcem včetně případného pozadí mohl zajímavým způsobem osvětlit nebo dokreslit. Na
tomto místě je třeba konstatovat, že Bartík se s Moravcem rozešel také díky tomu, že se mu
koncem roku 1941 naskytla možnost přejít z MNO k Ministerstvu vnitra, kde se měl
počátkem roku 1942 zřizovat z původního bezpečnostního referátu tzv. „zpravodajský“ odbor,
který se poté stal IV. odborem MV. Přednostou tohoto odboru byl ustanoven k 1. únoru 1942
pplk. Josef Bartík.342 Při odchodu ze služeb MNO k MV obdržel pochvalné uznání. Z toho by
se dalo vyvodit, že se snad přece jen rozešel s plk. Moravcem „v dobrém“, nicméně tuto
domněnku by bylo potřeba potvrdit ještě dalšími prameny. Ve sborníku důvěrných výnosů
a nařízení MNO z 16. února je v prvním článku uvedeno: „Pochvalné uznání I. stupně
obdržel pplk. konc. sl. BÁRTÍK Josef při odchodu z MNO za úspěšnou a vynikající
činnost.“343
V úředním sdělení pro ministerskou radu čs. exilové vlády v Londýně je výslovně
uvedeno: „Ministerstvo vnitra žádá, aby ministerská rada vzala na vědomí, že: dnem 1. února
1942 byl v ministerstvu vnitra zřízen IV. odbor /politický a státně bezpečnostní/. Přednostou
odboru byl ustanoven pplk. Josef Bártík. Zřízení odboru vynutila si potřeba přípravných prací
pro domov, aby prostudováním mimořádných a často velmi složitých úkolů celostátní
důležitosti byla získána pevná základna pro státní exekutivu.“344 „Bartíkův“ nově zřízený
odbor se dále organizačně členil na dva samostatné referáty, 1. referát studijní a 2. referát
státně bezpečnostní, přičemž oba měly své přednosty. Přednostou studijního referátu
a zároveň Bartíkovým zástupcem se stal mjr. gšt. Jan Krček,345 který po válce vypověděl
zajímavá fakta o ustanovení IV. odboru MV a o tom, proč se rozhodl přejít od čs. brigády
k MV: „Tím způsobem přišel BARTÍK k tomu, že mi jednoho dne [pravděpodobně koncem
roku 1941] naznačil, že prý u civilních úřadů v Londýně bude v rámci ministerstva vnitra
zřízena samostatná zprav. složka – snad jako protiklad civilních resortů oproti MORAVCOVI
a proto, aby civilní resorty naší státní správy [ve Velké Británii] vymanili se ze zprav.
závislosti na MORAVCOVI. Na to potom mi sdělil, že prý on má býti ustanoven přednostou
tohoto nově proponovaného IV. odboru min. vnitra v Londýně. Při tom mi navrhl, abych šel
k němu. Vzhledem k okolnostem, které jsem již uvedl, a proto, že jsem pokládal BARTÍKA za
poctivého a spravedlivého muže, jsem nabídku přijal a přešel k němu do ministerstva vnitra

2. 1942.“346 Na jiné straně protokolu Krček dále uvedl: „…vzrůstající civilní státní aparát
v Londýně nelibě nesl, že v každém směru zpravodajské činnosti byl odkázán na 2. odděl. hl.
št. plk. Moravce, který jim nevycházel zvláštně vstříc a snad jim působil i určité těžkosti“.347
Kromě Jana Krčka si Bartík na ministerstvu národní obrany vyžádal uvolnění dalších
vojenských osob pro svůj odbor. Jednalo se dále o poručíka dělostřelectva JUDr. Oldřicha
Maláče, který jako právník dostal na starosti řízení státně bezpečnostního referátu. Kromě něj

342 Viz například VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Kvalifikační listina (1941-1942).
343 SDMJ, Pozůstalost Josefa Bartíka, Sborník důvěrných výnosů a nařízení MNO, Ročník 1942, číslo 3, s. 1.
344 NA Praha, fond MV – L, karton 239, signatura 2-59-5, inventární číslo 1431, Sdělení pro ministerskou radu
z 3. února 1942.
345 KREISINGER, Pavel: Životní osudy zpravodajského důstojníka plk. gšt. Jana Krčka. Bakalářská diplomová
práce FF MU. Brno 2009, s. 44.
346 ABS Praha, fond 302-72-1-3/548, Protokol sepsaný s Janem Krčkem dne 2. 6. 1950, s. 79.
347 Tamtéž, s. 55.
69
přešli ze služeb MNO k MV ještě rotný v záloze JUDr. Josef Dubský a štábní rotmistr
v záloze Vojtěch Čurn.348
Jak se Bartíkův odchod promítl v obranné skupině Moravcova II. odboru MNO, kde
od konce roku 1940 vykonával funkci přednosty, zaznamenal „po zpravodajsku“ stručně
a výstižně Emil Strankmüller: „V obraně dochází ke změnám. BARTÍK odchází na vnitro, kde
se zřizuje zpravodajský odbor na místo bezpečnostního referátu, který tou dobou vedl mjr.
RESSEL. Obrané oddělení přebírá mjr. FOŘT. Zřizuje se styčná obraná skupinka mjr.
SLÁMY, která udržuje styk s anglickou MI-5 [Millitary Inteligence – sekce 5, britská vojenská
vnitrostátní zpravodajská služba, pozn. PK] Pokud vím, měla být hlavní činností
BARTÍKOVOU příprava materiálu proti osobám, jež se provinily za Protektorátu.349
V čem vlastně spočívala Bartíkova činnost jako přednosty IV. odboru a jakým
způsobem byl tento odbor budován? Při odpovědi na tyto otázky bude vidět, že Bartík mohl
v mnohém navazovat na svoji práci, kterou vykonával jako přednosta II. oddělení u ČSVS ve
Francii. Ve svodce ze 14. dubna 1950 je uvedeno, že jako od svého bezprostředního
nadřízeného, ministra Juraje Slávika,350 obdržel tyto pokyny:
„1./ Vybudovati a zorganizovati v min. vnitra v rámci jeho působnosti odbor pro
politické zpravodajství [IV. odbor MV] jako samostatnou složku , která měla podléhat přímo
SLÁVIKOVI a při čemž hlavním úkolem této složky mělo býti sledování politické činnosti
emigrace cizích států v Anglii, jako emigraci maďarskou, rakouskou, polskou, při čemž měly
býti zpracovány poznatky o jejich činnosti se zřetelem na jejich politické stanovisko k zájmům
dr. BENEŠE do budoucna po obnovení ČSR.
2./ Sledovati všechna hnutí čs. příslušníků emigrantů v Anglii, která zaujímala záporný
politický postoj proti politice dr. BENEŠE. Toto se týkalo sledování činnosti t. zv. české
a slovenské národní rady /PRCHALA-PRIDAVOK a spol./, skupiny ředitele MALÍKA
/národní demokrat, býv. ředitel Živnobanky/351 stoupenců t. zv. západo-evropské unie /vedoucí
páter DVORNÍK/, skupiny poslance JAKSCHE a BEUEROVY skupiny čs. příslušníků –
německých komunistů.
3./ Prověřování všech osob čs. státní příslušnosti, které se budou ucházeti o přijetí do
státních služeb, po stránce národní spolehlivosti, pokud se na tyto osoby budou dotazovati
jednotlivá ministerstva, personální komise u předsednictva vlády, a nebo vojenská IS,

348 NA Praha, fond MV – L, karton 246, signatura 2-59-36, inventární číslo 774, Zpravodajská služba u
Ministerstva vnitra- personální úprava, 14. února 1942. K náplni jejich činnosti a k činnosti dalších (pozdějších)
zaměstnanců IV. odboru viz také ABS Praha, fond 302-72-1-3/524-526, Protokol sepsaný s Janem Krčkem dne

6. 1950, s. 55-57.
349 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-74-1/45, Protokol sepsaný s plk. gšt. v. v. Emilem Strankmüllerem, 25.
listopadu 1949, s. 19. strana.
350 JUDr. Juraj Slávik (1890-1969) byl v letech 1940-1945 ministrem vnitra v obou čs. londýnských vládách.
Podrobněji k jeho činnosti během druhé světové války viz NĚMEČEK, Jan: Ve vedení československého
zahraničního odboje v Londýně. In: Michálek, Slavomír a kolektiv (Edd.): Juraj Slávik Neresnický. Od politiky
cez diplomaciu po exil (1890-1969). Bratislava 2006, s. 215-225.
351 Ing. Josef Malík, bývalý ředitel Národní banky v ČSR. Ekonomický a finanční expert. Podrobněji o jeho
opoziční činnosti viz KUKLÍK, Jan – NĚMEČEK, Jan: Proti Benešovi! Česká a slovenská protibenešovská
opozice v Londýně 1939-1945. Praha 2004, s. 242-256.

70
[myšlena britská zprav.služba MI-5, pozn. PK] což bylo prakticky prováděno prostřednictvím
plk. SLÁMY, který byl pověřen prověřováním všech civilních i vojenských osob a jejich
výslechů pro vojenskou IS.352
4./ Zpracovávati všechny zprávy, které ministerstvo vnitra dostává z domova,
a připravovati jmenné seznamy těch čs. občanů, kteří se během války provinili spoluprací
s okupanty, případně zradou na svých spoluobčanech.353
5./ V politických otázkách cizí i naší emigrace spolupracovati s dr. RIPKOU
a předávati mu všechny získané zprávy, případně zaopatřovati pro něho materiál, který bude
potřebovati a říditi se jeho pokyny, aby nevybočoval z politické linie vedené dr. BENEŠEM
a RIPKOU.“354
Přehledné a důkladné popsání činnosti „Bartíkova“ IV. odboru MV by vydalo na
samostatnou obsáhlou studii nebo monografii,355 tudíž nemůže být úkolem této práce.
Na místě bude uzavřít Bartíkovo působení jako přednosty IV. odboru MV hodnocením
z pera ministra Juraje Slávika z roku 1942. Toto hodnocení poměrně dobře shrnuje jeho
činnost a zároveň charakterizuje hodnoceného i po stránce osobní: „Osvědčil se jako
mimořádně iniciativní a v každém ohledu výborný úředník, zejména má mimořádnou
kvalifikaci také na vedení samostatného odboru. Ve státně bezpečnostních vojenskozpravodajských a civilně-zpravodajských věcech má neobyčejný rozhled. Má neobyčejné
zkušenosti a schopnosti získávat vhodným a nenápadným způsobem potřebné informace, tyto
pak náležitě hodnotit a správně je používat. Ve styku se stranami [myšleno pravděpodobně
politickými stranami ve VB, pozn. PK] je taktní a v každém ohledu dovede si získat [jejich]
sympatie. Jeho poměr k jiným úředníkům ve spolupráci s nimi může sloužit každému
příkladem. Jako představený požívá dokonalé autority a plné úcty svých podřízených.“356
Když byla v roce 1943 za Bartíkovy účasti provedena reorganizace IV. odboru na
„Odbor pro politické zpravodajství a věci státně bezpečnostní“, jak se poté oficiálně nazýval,
rozšířila se také působnost odboru a stouply počty jeho zaměstnanců.
357 Ministr Slávik
zhodnotil Bartíkovu práci obdobně jako v předchozím roce, a to následujícími slovy:
„V každém ohledu se osvědčil jako výtečný a mimořádně iniciativní úředník. Má mimořádnou
kvalifikaci k vedení samostatného odboru a je schopen zastávat i vyšší místo a organisovat
v celostátním měřítku zpravodajskou službu buďto civilní anebo vojenskou. Výsledky jeho

352 Spolupráci Bartíka a Slámy s Brity dokládá např. zajímavý dokument z Vojenského historickém archivu, viz
Přílohy, IV. Výběr z dokumentů, dokument č. 12.
353 Jeden takovýto pracovní (tedy neúplný) seznam se dochoval ve Vojenském historickém archivu, viz VÚAVHA Praha, sbírka 20, a. č. 20-29-4, Seznam exponentů a funkcionářů říšských úřadů a nacistického režimu na
území historických zemí (Čech a Moravy), 46 listů, 20. srpna 1942.
354 NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123,
nezpracovaný materiál. Svodka ze dne 14. dubna1950, s. 64-65.
355 Tomu by samozřejmě musel předcházet důkladný archivní výzkum, zaměřený zejména na studium
dokumentů z fondu Ministerstvo vnitra – Londýn. Zde je třeba podotknout, že tento fond, který je uložený v NA
v Praze obsahuje zejména písemnosti pocházející z činnosti IV. odboru a je navíc velmi rozsáhlý. Fond čítá
dohromady 7 knih, 11 kartoték a 343 kartony, přičemž samotný inventář fondu má 162 stran.
356 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Kvalifikační listina 1942.
357 K novému vymezí působnosti IV. odboru viz NA Praha, fond MV – L, karton 239, signatura 2-59-5,
inventární číslo 1431, Odbor pro politické zpravodajství a věci státně bezpečnostní, 7. 7. 1943.
71
práce během roku 1943 opravňují plně toto hodnocení. Ve státně bezpečnostních vojenskozpravodajských a civilně-zpravodajských věcech má neobyčejný rozhled a má výjimečné
schopnosti a zkušenosti získavat vhodným způsobem informace, […] Vůči svým podřízeným
požívá naprosté autority a plné úcty a je u nich oblíben pro svou nezaujatost a smysl pro
spravedlnost.“358
V roce 1945 se druhá světová válka nachýlila ke svému konci a na návrat do vlasti se
tehdy připravovali i vedoucí činitelé československého zahraničního odboje v čele
s prezidentem Edvardem Benešem. Mezi přední stoupence prezidenta a jeho politiky patřil
i pplk. Josef Bartík, jenž byl dne 1. července povýšen do hodnosti plukovníka.359 Ministr
Slávik o jeho povýšení usiloval již mnohem dříve, ale narazil na zamítavé stanovisko
MNO.360
V březnu 1945 byl Josef Bartík jako představitel exilového MV a přednosta jeho
„zpravodajského“ odboru odeslán speciálním transportem na tzv. „Osvobozené území“ do
Košic, kde se v té době formovala první poválečná československá vláda. Než se osazenstvo
tohoto speciálního transportu do Košic dostalo, prodělo značnou anabázi: „Asi v březnu 1946
započalo se s nakládáním transportu asi 260 osob a to důstojníků, rotmistrů, civ. zaměst.
a vládních činitelů. Tento transport byl naložen v Londýně na vlakovou soupravu, která
odjela do Skotska a odtud byla naložena na loď a odjela směrem přes Gibraltar, Cařihrad do
Konstancie [do Rumunska]. Z Konstancie jsme byli navagonováni a odejeli do Trebišova
a odtud auty do Košic.“361 V jedné poválečné žádosti k tomuto Bartík poznamenal: „…
v březnu 1945[…] jsem byl s transportem odeslán přes Rumunsko do Košic, kde jsem byl
[opětovně] přidělen ministerstvu vnitra.“362 Zanedlouho ho mělo čekat povýšení do
generálské hodnosti a nové úkoly na Ministerstvu vnitra.
Závěrem této kapitoly je ještě třeba konstatovat, že do osvobozené vlasti se Bartík
vrátil ověnčený vysokými vyznamenáními, mezi nimiž nechyběl ani prestižní britský řád pro
důstojníky Order of the British Empire – officer (OBE) nebo polský řád Polonia restituta.
Bartík byl samozřejmě držitelem také Československého válečného kříže 1939.

358 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Kvalifikační listina 1943.
359 Tamtéž, titulní strana kvalifikační listiny.
360 NA Praha, fond MV – L, karton 77, signatura 2-1-941, inventární číslo 887, Osobní svazek J. Bartíka, Návrh
na mimořádné povýšení, 1944.
361 ABS Praha, fond „H“, a. č. H-664, Generál (František Moravec), Podsvazek č. 2, Protokoly zatčených osob
k osobě GENERÁLA, 26. strana zápisu s Adolfem Püchlerem, 25. 11. 1949.
362 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – spis 1T15/65, Žádost a revizi řízení nebo zahlazení odsouzení
adresovaná prezidentu republiky Antonínovi Zápotockému, 6. 6. 1955, s. 5.
72

Léta poválečná (1945-1968)
4.1 Poválečná kariéra na MV a na MNO (1945-1948)
4.1.a Přednostou odboru pro politické zpravodajství na Ministerstvu vnitra
(1945-1946)
Dne 4. dubna 1945 jmenoval prezident Edvard Beneš v Košicích novou vládu, tzv.
první vládu Národní fronty Čechů a Slováků. Jejím předsedou se stal dosavadní čs. vyslanec
v SSSR, sociální demokrat Zdeněk Fierlinger. V nové vládě získali velice silné postavení
komunisté, jimž se povedlo získat osm resortů, včetně jednoho z nejklíčovějších – vnitra.
Ministrem vnitra se nakonec stal jeden ze zakladatelů KSČ, Václav Nosek. Tzv. moskevské
vedení KSČ původně plánovalo získat post ministra vnitra pro jednu ze svých stranických
špiček, tedy pro generálního tajemníka a druhého muže strany – Rudolfa Slánského; historici
Hanzlík a Vondrášek k tomu uvedli následující: „V původním návrhu Klementa Gottwalda
z 23. února 1945 byl do funkce ministra vnitra navržen Rudolf Slánský, ale patrně pro
předpokládanou nepřijatelnost tohoto návrhu ostatními partnery jej samo vedení KSČ
nahradilo Václavem Noskem, který působil za války v Anglii.“363 Navrhnout Václava Noska
se komunistům zřejmě jevilo jako průchodnější. Nosek byl v roce 1941 jmenován členem
Státní rady – československého „quasiparlamentu“ v Londýně, vzápětí se stal místopředsedou
Státní rady a z této pozice byl v úzkém kontaktu s čs. nekomunistickými politiky, kteří ve
Státní radě a v čs. exilové vládě působili. Mimo to „od září 1941 až do února 1944 hovořil do
československého rozhlasu v Londýně.“364 Jaroslav Rokoský poznamenal, že o resort vnitra se
v roce 1945 nevedla mezi politickými stranami zastoupenými v nové vládě žádná „bitva“,
poněvadž „demokraté v Národní frontě tento klíčový resort s překvapivou politickou
lehkomyslností přenechali KSČ; nevedla se o něj žádná úporná jednání, vše proběhlo rychle
a hladce.“365
V květnu 1945 byl Josef Bartík „přidělen jako doprovod panu ministru NOSKOVI,
vracejícímu se z Košic do Prahy“366a společně s vládní delegací Košické vlády cestou
navštívil Brno. Podle komunisty Štěpána Plačka, který se na přelomu let 1945-1946 podílel na
intrice proti Bartíkovi s cílem sesadit jej z MV, byl Bartík ministru Noskovi doslova „vnucen“
samotným prezidentem Benešem.367 Bartík, jenž měl podporu politických představitelů strany
sociálně demokratické a národně socialistické, měl pravděpodobně ministru Noskovi tvořit
jakousi nekomunistickou protiváhu.

363 HANZLÍK, František – VONDRÁŠEK, Václav: Armáda v zápase o politickou moc v letech 1945-1948.
Praha 2006, s. 98. Opis návrhu vedení KSČ na složení nové vlády z 23. února 1945 viz HANZLÍK, František:
Únor 1948 výsledek nerovného zápasu. Praha 1997, s. 41.
364 KALOUS, Jan a kolektiv: Biografický slovník představitelů Ministerstva vnitra v letech 1948-1989. Ministři
a jejich náměstci. Praha 2009, s. 126-127.
365 Tamtéž, s. 127.
366 ABS Praha, zvláštní vyšetřovací spis, a. č. ZV – 4 MV (Bedřich Pokorný, B/4-V-2459), sv. II. Zápis o
výpovědi Josefa Bartíka z 12. října 1951.
367 KAPLAN, Karel: Pět kapitol o únoru. Brno 1997, s. 84.
73
Do osvobozené Prahy se Josef Bartík vrátil ve stejný den jako prezident Beneš, tedy

května 1945. To dokládá zejména slavná Benešova fotografie, na níž je kromě ministra
Noska zachycen také Bartík.368 Slavný záběr z prezidentova návratu do Prahy vyšel na titulní
straně týdeníku Svět v obrazech.
369 Když Bartík odlétal v březnu 1939 z Prahy,
pravděpodobně netušil, že na návrat do hlavního města Československa bude muset čekat
dlouhých šest válečných let.
Bartíkovo přidělení k Ministerstvu vnitra v osvobozené republice bylo zakotveno
v oficiálním ministerském výnose z 25. května 1945. Tento výnos zřídil novou zpravodajskou
službu MV, Odbor pro politické zpravodajství (odbor „Z“), jehož přednostou se stal právě
plukovník Bartík.370
K významné změně v Bartíkově profesním působení došlo dne 1. srpna 1945, kdy byl
povýšen do hodnosti brigádního generála a hodnostně se tak dostal na roveň svému kolegovi
z „jedenáctky“ Františku Moravcovi. Ten se do Prahy vrátil dne 5. června 1945, když předtím
zůstal v Londýně jako „možná politická komplikace.“371 Moravcovo nové postavení
v osvobozené republice však zůstalo značně problematické. 372
Jak byl vlastně nově vytvořený zpravodajský odbor MV organizován? Odpověď na
tuto otázku publikoval ve své práci František Hanzlík: „Odbor pro politické zpravodajství měl
celkem 10 oddělení, z nichž k nejvýznamnějším patřily – oddělení obranného zpravodajství a
oddělení agenturní a pátrací. V červenci 1945 čítal odbor pro politické zpravodajství celkem
73 osob.“373 Klíčové posty v odboru však byly od počátku obsazeny členy KSČ. Bartíkovým
zástupcem byl člen KSČ, JUDr. Zdeněk Toman (Zoltán Goldberger), jemuž zároveň
podléhala zahraniční rozvědka MV.374 Toman byl zároveň členem vedení základní organizace
KSČ, která na MV pracovala podle dispozic sekretariátu ÚV KSČ.
375 Dne 22. srpna 1945 se
konala „druhá schůze vedení závodní organizace KSČ v ministerstvu vnitra.“376 Ústředí KSČ
zde zastupoval Jindřich Veselý a bratr Marie Švermové Karel Šváb.377 Přítomní věnovali
zvláštní pozornost právě přednostovi odboru „Z“ Josefu Bartíkovi; v dochovaném důvěrném
zápise ze schůze je mimo jiné uvedeno: „Soudr. Toman nedoporučuje odstranění Bartíka,
doporučuje spíše obklopit ho našimi lidmi takovým způsobem, abychom ho blokovali

368 Viz Přílohy, III. Obrazová příloha, Obr. č. 4.1.
369 Svět v obrazech. Týdeník ministerstva informací, 1. 6. 1945. Foto na titulní straně Karel Hájek.
370 HANZLÍK, František: Únor 1948 výsledek nerovného zápasu. Praha 1997, s. 105.
371 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 313.
372 Podrobněji k Moravcovým osudům v letech 1945-1948 viz tamtéž, s. 313-324.
373 HANZLÍK, František: Únor 1948 výsledek nerovného zápasu. Praha 1997, s. 106.
374 Zdeněk Toman by mimo jiné v letech 1946-1947 hlavním organizátorem a iniciátorem nezákonného
pašování jablonecké bižuterie do Velké Británie a jejího následného prodeje na černém trhu. Cílem této akce
bylo získání finančních prostředků „údajně“ pro KSČ. Podrobněji k Tomanovi viz HANZLÍK, František: Případ
kpt. Adolf Püchler. (Svědectví agenta OBZ o nelegálním získávání financí zpravodajskou službou ministerstva
vnitra v letech 1946–1947). Praha 2006, s. 168-170.
375 HANZLÍK, František: Únor 1948 výsledek nerovného zápasu. Praha 1997, s. 105.
376 NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (fond č.100/1), Svazek 42, Archivní jednotka 306, Zápis ze den 22. srpna
1945.
377 Podrobněji k osobě Karla Švába viz KALOUS, Jan a kolektiv: Biografický slovník představitelů Ministerstva
vnitra v letech 1948-1989. Ministři a jejich náměstci. Praha 2009, s. 181-183.
74
a pomalu přejímali nejdůležitější oddělení a místa k obsazení našimi soudruhy. Jako příklad
uvádí, že v archivu, kde jsou soustředěny všechny kartotéky, spisy, data s důležitými
poznámkami, nemáme ani jednoho člověka a jestliže žádáme z archivu něco, dají nám jen to,
co uznají za vhodné […] Zkušenosti soudr. Tomana s plukovníkem Bartíkem jsou takové, že
když se na něm něco energicky žádá a prosazuje a zejména když to činí soudr. Nosek, lze
s ním docíliti nejlepších výsledků. Proto navrhuje, abychom před ním neustupovali.“378
Situaci v archivu odboru „Z“ vyřešilo ústředí KSČ poměrně rychle: již v září 1945 tam
byl nově přidělen komunista PhDr. Jurij Křížek, který později v písemných vzpomínkách na
své začátky na MV zachytil poměry, jaké tam panovaly: „Přešel jsem tam [na MV] na
doporučení strany z Archivu hlavního města Prahy. […] Především na Ministerstvu vnitra,
včetně odboru státní bezpečnosti, nebyly ještě vyjasněny mocenské poměry. Vlastní zápas
o budování nové revoluční lidové Bezpečnosti mezi námi komunisty a skupinou kolem
generála Bartíka, který byl hlavním představitelem benešovské londýnské buržoazní skupiny
na MV, teprve začínal. 379 O činnosti archiváře Křížka na MV poznamenala Jiřina Dvořáková
ve své studii o Bedřichu Pokorném následující: „Křížka v podstatě úkolovali B. Pokorný, Dr.
Štěpán Plaček, později také Karel Šváb. V roce 1946 začal Jurij Křížek na vyžádání
vypomáhat i v archivu evidenčního odboru na sekretariátu ÚV KSČ, kde vypracoval archivní
plán na uložení spisů a podle potřeby ukládal a evidoval spisy týkající se ostatních politických
stran Národní fronty a různý kádrový materiál členů KSČ.“380
Jindřich Veselý shrnul situaci na MV ve zvláštním zápisu ze dne 25. srpna 1945,
v němž je o Bartíkovi poznamenáno následující: „… Čtvrtým kamenem úrazu [pro KSČ] je
plk. Bartík, něco jako ministr v miniatuře, neboť ve svých orgánech /zpravodajství/ je
neobmezeným a absolutistickým pánem. […] je fakt, že po stránce odbornosti je vynikajícím
machrem. V každém případě je 100% představitel Hradu [přívrženec prezidenta Beneše]
a mnozí mají dojem, že je určitě ve službách I. S. [britské zpravodajské služby].381 Svůj
rozklad o Bartíkovi uzavřel Veselý těmito slovy: „Bartíka ponechat, ale přinutit stůj co stůj
k věcné a opravdové spolupráci s našimi lidmi, kteří musí dostat možnost nahlédnout do jeho
magické kuchyně.“382
Přednostou nejdůležitějšího oddělení celého odboru „Z“ – obranného zpravodajství –
se stal meziválečný zpravodajský důstojník383 Bedřich Pokorný, který do své funkce nastoupil
dne 3. července 1945 „v hodnosti štábního kapitána a jako člen KSČ“
384 Zde je však třeba
podotknout, že Pokorného do této důležité funkce vybral přímo Bartík, jenž byl
pravděpodobně pod tlakem ministra Noska, aby bylo toto místo obsazeno někým z KSČ.
Samotný Pokorný o svém přidělení k MV později uvedl: „Někdy v červnu 1945 mně BÁRTÍK

378 NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (fond č.100/1), Svazek 42, Archivní jednotka 306, Zápis ze dne 22. srpna
1945, s. 2.
379 Citováno podle DVOŘÁKOVÁ, Jiřina: Bedřich Pokorný – vzestup a pád. Sborník AMV 2, 2004, s. 236.
380 Tamtéž, s. 249.
381 NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (fond č.100/1), Svazek 42, Archivní jednotka 306, Písemný rozklad
Jindřicha Veselého o situaci na MV ze dne 25. srpna 1945, s. 1- 2.
382 Tamtéž, s. 2.
383 V roce 1938 působil B. Pokorný jako vedoucí předsunuté agenturní ústředy (PAÚ) „Rudolf“ v Košicích.
Toto ústředna byla zpravodajsky zaměřena proti Maďarsku
384 DVOŘÁKOVÁ, Jiřina: Bedřich Pokorný – vzestup a pád. Sborník AMV 2, 2004, s. 238.
75
řekl, že se líbím panu ministrovi, a co tomu říkám, že mně chtějí povolat do Prahy na min.
vnitra. Já jsem řekl, že bych do Prahy šel. Na to jsem dostal povolávací dekret do min.
vnitra.“385 Bartík k tomu, jak se Pokorný dostal na MV, uvedl následující: „Byl však
ministerstvu vnitra doporučen vedením strany KSČ a jen proto stal se vedoucím obranného
zpravodajství u zpravodajského odboru ministerstva vnitra. Brzy po svém zařazení
u ministerstva vnitra navázal POKORNÝ velmi přátelské a úzké styky s Dr. [Štěpánem]
PLAČKEM, který řídil všechny záležitosti obranného zpravodajství u tak zvaného ‚ZOB‘.“386
Na tomto místě je možné trochu předběhnout a uvést, že Bartíkovo „přednostování“
odboru „Z“ nemělo mít dlouhého trvání: již 15. ledna 1946 ho nahradil právě Bedřich
Pokorný.387 Bartík byl ze své funkce odstraněn ministrem Noskem po intrice, kterou proti
němu připravil „tandem“ Pokorný – Plaček; detailněji se jí věnuje závěr této podkapitoly.
Nejprve je však třeba se podrobněji zastavit u obou hlavních aktérů, kteří pracovali
v intencích KSČ na tom, aby jejich strana ovládla celý „Bartíkův“ zpravodajský odbor, včetně
místa jeho přednosty.
Pokorný se záhy dostal s Bartíkem do rozporů ohledně budování poválečného
zpravodajského aparátu. Ve své výpovědi k tomu výslovně uvedl: „Byly mezi námi však
rozpory ve služebních názorech na budování zpravodajství. Já jsem usiloval o to, abychom
zpravodajství vybudovali s příslušníků KSČ a to nikoliv ze starých policajtů, ale lidí
doporučených stranou, kdyžto BARTÍK chtěl vybudovat zpravodajství z úředníků bývalé
policejní služby a důstojníků a říkal, že nikdy nepřipustí do zpravodajství lidi z ulice.“388
Druhým mužem, který se podílel na odstranění Josefa Bartíka z MV, byl JUDr. Štěpán
Plaček. Ten byl členem KSČ od roku 1928 a v roce 1945 působil u pověstného ZOBu.
Jednalo se Zemský odbor bezpečnosti, tedy o v podstatě stranickou a komunisty
kontrolovanou zpravodajskou službu, přičemž Plaček byl členem jejího prezidia.389
Josef Bartík během svého pozdějšího věznění v 50. letech vypověděl o spolupráci
Pokorného a Plačka následující: „S Dr. Plačkem zařizoval Pokorný různá zpravodajská
opatření, o nichž mně neinformoval. Měl jsem za to, že jde o záležitosti, kterými byli pověřeni
vedením strany, a proto jsem se o jejich společnou činnost blíže nezajímal. Pokorný mi sám
několikráte v rozhovoru zdůrazňoval, že Dr. Plaček má značný vliv v ústředí KSČ a stejně
i Dr. Toman mi řekl, abych se stížnostmi šířenými z kruhů tehdejšího ředitelství národní
bezpečnosti v Praze proti způsobu úřední činnosti Dr. Plačka /braní úplatků, týrání při
výsleších, zaměstnávaní kolaborantů/ nezabýval, poněvadž má přes předsedu ZNV v Praze
[Ladislava] Kopřivu značný vliv v ústředí KSČ…“ 390

385 ABS Praha, zvláštní vyšetřovací spis, a. č. ZV – 4 MV (Bedřich Pokorný, B/4-V-2459), sv. I. Protokol o
výpovědi se zajištěným Bedřichem Pokorným 29. října 1952, s. 2.
386 Tamtéž, svazek II, Zápis o výpovědi uvězněného býv. gen. Josefa Bartíka k osobě a činnosti Bedřicha
Pokorného, 26. dubna 1950, s.3.
387 DVOŘÁKOVÁ, Jiřina: Bedřich Pokorný – vzestup a pád. Sborník AMV 2, 2004, s. 238.
388 ABS Praha, zvláštní vyšetřovací spis, a. č. ZV – 4 MV (Bedřich Pokorný, B/4-V-2459), sv. I. Protokol o
výpovědi se zajištěným Bedřichem Pokorným 29. října 1952, s. 2.
389 Podrobněji k ZOBu a k působení Štěpána Plačka viz KALOUS, Jan: Štěpán Plaček. Život zpravodajského
fanatika ve službách KSČ. Praha 2010, s. 42-47.
390NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123,
nezpracovaný materiál, Zápis o výpovědi Josefa Bartíka 26. dubna 1950, s. 169-170.
76
Přestože Zdeněk Toman ještě v srpnu 1945 komunistické straně nedoporučoval
Bartíka z MV odstranit, její vedení nakonec změnilo názor. Z toho vyplývá, že Bartík nezačal
pracovat v intencích KSČ, jak to komunisté původně zamýšleli. Jindřich Veselý o změně
strategie komunistů z MV vůči Bartíkovi později vypověděl: „A teď tady zatím se dělaly
všechny možné intriky, jak toho Bartíka, který zde seděl v 5. patře jako pánbůh […], jak ho
odstranit.“391 K tomu, že šlo od počátku o komplot ze strany představitelů KSČ, se později
doznal i samotný Štěpán Plaček, když uvedl: „Na vysvětlení dodávám, že jsem usilovně
hledali materiál, jenž by mohl kompromitovat Bartíka, neboť tento úkol mi byl výslovně
uložen gen. taj. KSČ Rudolfem Slánským.“392
Intriku proti generálu Bartíkovi, která se odehrála v lednu 1946, popsal podrobně
a přehledně ve své disertační práci Jan Kalous, zde tedy postačí zopakovat jeho hlavní závěry:
„K útoku na Bartíka využili Bedřich Pokorný a Štěpán Plaček bývalého agenta SD [nacistické
zpravodajské služby, jejíž oficiální název zněl Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführer der SS –
Bezpečnostní služba říšského vedoucího SS, pozn. PK] Josefa Vondráčka.393 Konstrukce
spočívala v tom, že Vondráček předával Bartíkovi důležité a důvěrné informace (mj.
o komunistech Zdeňku Nejedlém a Antonínu Zápotockém) a Bartík je dále poskytoval britské
zpravodajské službě, to vše za zády resortního ministra Noska. Bartík byl odvolán z funkce
pro ztrátu důvěry samotným Noskem v lednu 1946 – jeho nástupcem v čele odboru Z se stal
Bedřich Pokorný“394
Samotný Bartík se ke svému odvolání vyjádřil později v roce 1954: „V lednu 1946 byl
jsem ze své funkce z ministerstva vnitra odvolán a [později] ustanoven přednostou odvolacího
kárného výboru ministerstva národní obrany. Důvod mého odvolání ze služeb ministerstva
vnitra nebyl mi nikdy sdělen, ač jsem o to žádal pana ministra národní obrany generála
armády Ludvíka Svobodu.“395
Národně socialistický ministr zahraničního obchodu Hubert Ripka, u něhož měl Bartík
politickou podporu, k jeho působení na MV a pozdějšímu odvolání poznamenal: „Na
ministerstvu vnitra bylo v lednu v květnu 1945 založeno zvláštní oddělení zpravodajské služby,
jehož velení bylo svěřeno velice schopnému muži, generálu Bartíkovi. Toto oddělení se mělo
postupně přeměnit v centrální organizaci pověřenou řízením a soustředěním všech
zpravodajských služeb, které by pracovaly pro jednotlivá ministerstva. Tyto služby neměly
nadále podléhat ministerstvu vnitra, ale předsednictvu vlády. Shromážděné informace měly
být uloženy tak, aby byly k dispozici celé vládě, a nikoliv jen ministerstvu vnitra, to jest

391 Citováno podle KAPLAN, Karel: Pět kapitol o únoru. Brno 1997, s. 85.
392 Citováno podle KALOUS, Jan: Štěpán Plaček. Život zpravodajského fanatika ve službách KSČ. Praha 2010,
s. 48.
393 Podrobné zmapování konfidentské činnosti Josefa Vondráčka by vydalo na obsáhlou samostatnou studii.
Podrobněji k jeho osobě viz například KALOUS, Jan: Využívání agentů nacistických bezpečnostních složek při
vytváření politického zpravodajství MV po 2. světové válce. In: Pejčoch, Ivo – Plachý, Jiří a kolektiv (Edd.):
Okupace, kolaborace, retribuce. Praha 2010, s. 199-209; STÁTNÍK, Dalibor: Agenti nacistických
bezpečnostních složek Gestapa a Sicherheitsdienstu ve službách StB. (Kurt Wilfer a ti druzí.) Sborník Archivu
MV 1/2003, s. 5-53.
394 Tamtéž. O využívání agenta Vondráčka Štěpánem Plačkem viz tamtéž na straně 69-71. K odstranění Josefa
Bartíka z MV srovnej též KAPLAN, Karel: Pět kapitol o únoru. Brno 1997, s. 82-85.
395 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, Žádost a revizi řízení nebo zahlazení odsouzení
adresovaná prezidentu republiky Antonínovi Zápotockému, 6. 6. 1955, s. 1-2.
77
komunistické straně. […] Není divu, že toto pojetí nenašlo u komunistů příznivou odezvu. […]
V lednu 1946 byl náhle ze své funkce odvolán generál Bartík a byl nahrazen kapitánem
Pokorným, fanatickým komunistou, obzvlášť zaměřeným proti národním socialistům. Veřejné
mínění bylo touto změnou znepokojeno; dokazovala totiž úmysl komunistů zmocnit se nejen
všech složek bezpečnosti, ale také všech zpravodajských oddělení. Marně jsme protestovali
proti tomuto politickému rozhodnutí, které sloužilo jedině komunistické straně. Ani intervence
prezidenta Beneše nebyla úspěšnější.“396
Důsledky této závažné „personální“ změny na odboru „Z“ shrnul František Hanzlík:
„Tím se fakticky všechny klíčové pozice odboru pro politické zpravodajství dostaly výlučně do
rukou komunistů. Vedení nekomunistických politických stran tak ztratilo jeden z mála zdrojů
informací o poměrech v ministerstvu vnitra.“397
Jak lze vlastně časově relativně krátké – sedmiměsíční – působení Josefa Bartíka v čele
zpravodajského odboru „Z“ zhodnotit? Na prvním místě je třeba zdůraznit, že celý
zpravodajský odbor Bartík teprve budoval. Kromě toho, že byl evidentně pod tlakem
komunistické strany, řešil jakožto meziválečný zpravodajský odborník i velké množství
dalších naléhavých případů. Pro jejich ilustraci je možné uvést následující Bartíkova slova:
„Po návratu do Prahy v květnu 1945 byl jsem ustanoven přednostou politického odboru
ministerstva vnitra s úkolem vybudovat obranné zpravodajství podle zásad košického
vládního programu. Řídil jsem vyšetřování proti K. H. Frankovi a ostatním válečným
zločincům a zrádcům podle retribučního zákona, spolupracoval na všech organizačních
otázkách při výstavbě sboru národní bezpečnosti, vedl zjišťování nacistických zločinců
v Československu (Lidice, Ležáky, Terezín), zjišťování válečných zločinců v západním
Německu, zpracovávání dokladů o zločinech členů nacistické vlády proti československým
příslušníkům pro norimberský proces a spolupracoval na likvidaci nacistického
bezpečnostního aparátu z doby okupace ČSR atd.“398
Z uvedeného výčtu je vidět, že na jednoho člověka řešil v té době až příliš mnoho
případů, což mohlo být důvodem toho, proč během roku 1945 nezaregistroval přípravy KSČ
na intriku proti němu a namísto patřičné ostražitosti důvěřoval svým podřízeným Tomanovi
a Pokornému až do doby, než byl z MV odstraněn.
Jeho odstranění z MV však mělo být ze strany představitelů KSČ jen dočasným
řešením. Konečné zúčtování nastalo až o dva roky později, po únoru 1948.
4.1.b U Odvolacího kárného výboru na Ministerstvu národní obrany (1946-
1948)
Krátkou dobu poté, co byl Josef Bartík komunisty odstraněn z MV, se o jeho zařazení
postaralo MNO. Do zpravodajského oddělení se však už nevrátil a místo toho byl k 1. květnu

396 RIPKA, Hubert: Únorová tragédie. Svědectví přímého účastníka. Brno 1995, s. 148-149.
397 HANZLÍK, František: Únor 1948 výsledek nerovného zápasu. Praha 1997, s. 129.
398 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, Žádost a revizi řízení nebo zahlazení odsouzení
adresovaná prezidentu republiky Antonínovi Zápotockému, 6. 6. 1955, s. 1.
78
1946 přidělen k I. odboru MNO jako „zpravodaj kárného výboru MNO.“399 Kárné výbory
(dále KV) měly dvě instance, přičemž druhou instancí byl Odvolací kárný výbor (dále OKV),
kde byl Bartík k 25. červnu 1946 ustanoven náhradníkem. Vzápětí, dne 8. října 1946, byl
jmenován prozatímním předsedou OKV a k 1. lednu 1947 se stal jeho předsedou.400
KV a OKV byly obnoveny v roce 1945; jednalo se o meziválečnou vojenskou
„instituci“, která vznikla v roce 1923. Archivář VÚA Pavel Minařík charakterizoval jejich
činnost takto: „Kárné výbory sledovaly zejména každé jednání nebo opomenutí, kterým
důstojník nebo rotmistr ohrozil nebo poškodil dobré jméno vojska, a tedy porušil své
stavovské povinnosti a dopustil se kárného poklesku. Za kárný poklesek se přitom považovalo
porušení stavovských povinností spadající do kategorií kázeňského poklesku, trestného činu
nebo i jiného jednání nebo opomenutí, které nebylo jinak soudně ani kázeňsky trestné. Vedle
toho kárné výbory vyšetřovaly i případy takového porušení úředních a služebních povinností,
jež nespadaly pod kázeňskou pravomoc.“401 Poklesky, které kárné výbory řešily, rozdělil
Minařík do několika skupin: „a) majetková, mravnostní a stavovská provinění proti
společenskému soužití – porušení důstojnické cti, urážky, křivá obvinění, výtržnost, opilství,
nevhodné chování, zadluženost, podvody, zpronevěry aj., b) služební provinění – hrubé
zacházení s podřízenými, neúcta k představeným, neuposlechnutí rozkazu, podrývání autority
představeného, služební nedbalost, zneužití úřední moci aj., c) provinění protistátní, politické,
národnostní povahy.“402
Na tomto místě je třeba konstatovat, že generál Bartík byl na OKV zcela jistě
„uklizen“. Pro zpravodajského odborníka jeho kvalit, jenž ve zpravodajství působil od roku
1919 a šest let svého života strávil v zahraničním odboji, to sice byla důstojná funkce, ale jeho
zkušenosti zde zůstaly zcela nevyužity. Bartíkovi v té době navíc bylo teprve 49 let, takže na
to, aby zbytek své vojenské kariéry strávil na „teplém“ místě, byl poměrně mladý.
Bartíkův přítel, literární historik a vědec Václav Černý, k jeho přidělení ve svých
pamětech poznamenal následující: „Bartíka udělali předsedou odvolacího vojenského
kárného výboru, aby si tam vykládal pasiáns.“403 I přes tento fakt pracoval generál Bartík ve
funkci předsedy OKV naplno a stejné nasazení požadoval i od svých podřízených. V posudku
za kvalifikační období 1947, který byl zaslán přednostovi I. odboru MNO, je k Bartíkově
úřadování u OKV uvedeno následující: „Generál Jozef Bartík vo funkci predsedu odvolacieho
a kárneho výboru sa osvedčil sposobom vynikajúcím. Z mnohých zápisníc o záverečných
pojednávaniach bolo zrejmé, že cez mimoriadny nával práce a ťažké prípady venoval velkú
starostlivosť tomu, aby boly zachované všetky predpísané formality, každý prípad bol
dokladne prejednaný, objasnený jak po stránke objektívnej tak i po stránke subjektívnej. Svoje
zpravodajské skúsenosti uplatnil v terajšej funkcii sposobom jedinečným. Z počtu ukončených
prípadov a z vypracovaných konečných usnesení je viděť, že se postaral, aby sa u OKV
pracovalo aj mimo úradných hodin a že i k zapracovaniu nových členov venoval náležitú

399 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Vložka za kvalifikační rok 1946.
400 Tamtéž, změny a doplňky ke kval. listině; vložka za kvalifikační rok 1947.
401 http://vojenstvi.cz/vasedotazy_108.htm [10. 4. 2011]
402 Tamtéž.
403 ČERNÝ, Václav: Paměti III (1945-1972). Brno 1992, s. 327.
79
pozornosť. Odovodnenie konečných usnesení OKV svědčia o jeho mimoruadnom všeobecnom
a vojenskom vzdelanie.“404
V dubnu 1946, tedy v době, kdy Bartík již nepůsobil na MV, se u Mimořádného
lidového soudu (dále MLS) v Praze konal ostře sledovaný proces s nacistickým válečným
zločincem a protektorátním státním ministrem Karlem Hermannem Frankem. Generál Bartík
se tohoto procesu zúčastnil, na odhalení Frankovy trestné činnosti měl totiž rozhodující podíl,
poněvadž jako zpravodajský odborník předsedal speciálně ustanovené vyšetřující komisi,
která Franka v letech 1945-46 vyslýchala. V dobové edici z roku 1946 je zaznamenáno
úvodní prohlášení, jímž Bartík Frankův výslech zahájil: „Dnešního dne jste předveden
vyšetřující komisi, jejímž úkolem je zjistit všechny politické, hospodářské a zvláště všechny
kriminální skutečnosti a jednání, kterými jste se vy, jakož i nacionálně socialistický režim
a vaši pomahači provinili proti Československé republice a českému národu. Vaší povinností
je odpovědět pravdivě na všechny otázky, které vám budou kladeny členy vyšetřující komise.
Upozorňuji vás, že členové vyšetřující komise jsou odborníci, kteří sledovali průběh vaší
činnosti jako úřední orgánové čs. vlády v cizině nebo jako členové vnitřního tajného hnutí
odporu. Z tohoto důvodu, a ježto nejste nikomu ze členů vyšetřující komise neznám, je jisté, že
to, co vám bude průběhem vyšetřování kladeno za vinu, vás velmi překvapí.“405
Frankův obsáhlý soudní spis, který je v současnosti uložen ve Státním oblastním
archivu v Praze,406 se z důvodů velkého poškození badatelům nepůjčuje, a to do doby, než
bude kompletně digitalizován. Bartíkova činnost během výslechu K. H. Franka a v průběhu
samotného procesu před MLS v Praze zde proto nebude podrobně popsána. I přesto je však na
tomto místě možno říci, že nepochybně i díky Josefu Bartíkovi byl nacistický válečný
zločinec K. H. Frank dne 22. května 1946 odsouzen k trestu smrti a ještě téhož dne byl
popraven.407
Jako přednosta OKV působil Bartík i ve zlomovém roce 1948, jeho tamější úřední
činnost však byla náhle přerušena. Bezprostředně po únorových událostech byl totiž ve
večerních hodinách dne 9. března 1948 zatčen.

404 VÚA-VHA Praha, fond Kvalifikační listiny, Josef Bartík, Posudek za kvalifikační období 1947.
405 VYKUSA, Karel (ed.): Zpověď K. H. Franka. Podle vlastních výpovědí v době vazby u krajského soudu
trestního na Pankráci. Praha 1946, s. 7.
406 SOA Praha, fond Mimořádný lidový soud Praha, spis Ls 1527/46.
407 LIŠKA, Otakar a kolektiv: Tresty smrti vykonané v Československu v letech 1918-1989. Praha 2006 2
, s. 62.
80
4.2 Perzekuce a věznění (1948-1953)
4.2.a Zatčen a odsouzen ve vykonstruovaném soudním procesu (1948)
Jak již bylo výše naznačeno, do Bartíkova života zasáhly zásadním dílem únorové
události roku 1948. Bezprostředně po „osudových únorových dnech“408 se KSČ soustředila na
ovládnutí armády, která během únorových událostí zůstala pasivní a do politické krize
nezasáhla.409 V syntéze z pera historiků Vojenského historického ústavu se k tomu uvádí:
„Prvním a základním krokem, který měl KSČ zajistit ovládnutí armády, byla změna složení
jejího velitelského sboru. Proto k prvním čistkám mezi vojáky z povolání začalo docházet
hned po 25. únoru 1948, kdy byli z armády propuštěni generálové a vyšší důstojníci, které
mělo na svých seznamech ‚nespolehlivých‘ 5. oddělení Hlavního štábu.“410
Přednostou 5. oddělení Hlavního štábu (tzv. obranného zpravodajství – OBZ) nebyl
v té době nikdo jiný než nechvalně proslulý plk. Bedřich Reicin.411 V tzv. seznamech
nespolehlivých nechyběl ani brig. gen. Josef Bartík. Jeho jméno je uvedeno například na
seznamu 78 mužů – důstojníků a rotmistrů, kteří byli z rozhodnutí Armádního poradního
sboru (dále APS)412 odesláni na „dovolenou“. Pod dvanáctou položkou tohoto seznamu je
uvedeno: „BARTÍK, Josef, bydliště Praha XVI. Na Hřebenkách 6. Byl v roce 1946 propuštěn
ze služeb min. vnitra, protože vyvinul činnost namířenou proti SSSR. Důvěry našeho spojence
SSSR nepožíval již mnohem dříve. V poslední době udržoval styky s rozkolníky Národní
fronty.“413
Armádní poradní sbor schválil na prvních zasedáních ve dnech 2. a 5. března 1948
propuštění 27 generálů a 344 důstojníků. Mezi sedmadvaceti generály se ocitli i brigádní
generálové Josef Bartík a František Moravec.414 To podporuje i fakt, že jejich jména jsou
uvedena na seznamu, který se dochoval v Archivu bezpečnostních složek a jehož opis
publikovali ve své práci historici Hanzlík a Vondrášek.415
Březnová zasedání APS zahájila první etapu čistek v armádě, která trvala do dubna
1948, přičemž k výše uvedenému počtu přibylo po dubnových zasedáních APS dalších

408 K únorovým událostem nejnověji viz přehlednou syntézu VEBER, Václav: Osudové únorové dny. Praha
2008.
409 Podrobněji k roli armády v únorových událostech viz HANZLÍK, František – VONDRÁŠEK, Václav:
Armáda v zápase o politickou moc v letech 1945-1948. Praha 2006.
410BÍLEK, Jiří – LÁNÍK, Jaroslav – ŠACH, Jan: Československá armáda v prvním poválečném desetiletí.
květen 1945 – květen 1955. Praha 2006, s. 104.
411 Nejnověji a nejpodrobněji k osobnosti Bedřicha Reicina viz HANZLÍK, František: Bez milosti a slitování.
B. Reicin fanatik rudého teroru. Praha 2011.
412 Armádní poradní sbor působil v poválečné republice od roku 1946 jako poradní orgán MNO. Jeho předsedou
byl ministr národní obrany gen. Ludvík Svoboda. Členové APS byli např. gen. Bohumil Boček, nebo blízký
spolupracovník a rival Bedřicha Reicina, JUDr. Jaroslav Procházka.
413 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-290-1/12, Seznam důstojníků a rotmistrů, s. 2.
414 BŘACHOVÁ, Věra: Destrukce důstojnického sboru čs. armády po únoru 1948. HaV 41, 1992, č. 3, s. 110-
111.
415 ABS Praha, fond 302, a. č. 302-289-3/185, Seznam generálů; HANZLÍK, František – VONDRÁŠEK,
Václav: Armáda v zápase o politickou moc v letech 1945-1948. Praha 2006, s. 392.
81
469 důstojníků.
416 Autoři syntézy k poválečným dějinám čs. armády dále uvádějí, že
„k zatýkání propuštěných generálů a důstojníků [v této první etapě, pozn. PK] docházelo jen
ojediněle (gen. Miloš Žák, škpt. J. Němeček, škpt. M. Teichman) a před soudem stanuli až
v druhé polovině roku 1948. Většinou byli, vzhledem k pozdějším rozsudkům, odsouzeni
k poměrně „nízkým“ trestům (do 8 let).“417
Zde je třeba zdůraznit, že právě Josef Bartík byl jednou z těchto „výjimek“. Zatčen byl
dne 9. března 1948 ve večerních hodinách a do vazby Vojenské věznice v Praze IV byl dodán
v 21. 45 hodin.418 Domovní prohlídka, při níž byly zabaveny Bartíkovy osobní věci (zejména
se jednalo o písemný materiál a spisy), proběhla ve stejný den v době „od 20 – 21. 45 hodin
za přítomnosti [Bartíkovy manželky] pí Libuše Bartíkové.“
419 , tedy již za Bartíkovy
nepřítomnosti.
Dá se předpokládat, že bezprostředně po únoru by byl zatčen i brig. gen. František
Moravec, který byl již 28. února 1948 náčelníkem Hlavního štábu gen. Bočkem odvolán
z funkce velitele divize v Mladé Boleslavi. Oficiálně byl poslán na zdravotní dovolenou.
O měsíc později, dne 29. března 1948, však generál Moravec znovu opustil Československou
republiku, tentokrát definitivně – do své vlasti se již nikdy nevrátil.420
Bartíkovo zatčení a jeho následné odsouzení ve vykonstruovaném soudním procesu
bylo součástí plánu představitelů KSČ, pro které byl potenciálním nebezpečným soupeřem.
Rozhodující iniciativu převzal do svých rukou bývalý Bartíkův podřízený mjr. Bedřich
Pokorný, který se již v roce 1946 podílel na jeho odstranění z MV. Tentokrát Pokorný úzce
spolupracoval s náčelníkem 5. oddělení Hlavního štábu plk. Bedřichem Reicinem.
Během svého pozdějšího zatčení se mjr. Bedřich Pokorný ke své iniciativě hrdě
přihlásil. Ve výslechovém protokolu z roku 1952 odpověděl Pokorný na otázku „Říkáte, že
jste BARTÍKA udělal. Vypovězte, na základě čeho byl BARTÍK zatčen, kdo k tomu dal
podnět!“421 těmito slovy: „BARTÍK byl zatčen z mého popudu. Důvod zatčení si nepamatuji,
ale byl jsem upozorněn někým z min. vnitra, nebo z MNO na nějaký BARTÍKŮV čin, na který
mohl býti zatčen. Šel jsem za [Bedřichem] REICINEM a sdělil jsem mu to a řekl jsem
REICINOVI, že na to může být BARTÍK zatčen. BARTÍK na základě toho skutečně zatčen byl.
Byl jsem za krátký čas upozorněn voj. prokurátorem [Janem] VAŇKEM, že se dějí pokusy,
aby BARTÍK byl z vazby propuštěn. Tyto pokusy dělaly reakční soudci a prokurátoři vojenské
justice. Šel jsem znovu za REICINEM a upozornil jsem ho na tuto okolnost a žádal o výměnu

416 Podrobněji k následným čistkám a dalším etapám perzekucí v čs. armádě viz BŘACHOVÁ, Věra: Destrukce
důstojnického sboru čs. armády po únoru 1948. HaV 41, 1992, č. 3, s. 109-127.
417 BÍLEK, Jiří – LÁNÍK, Jaroslav – ŠACH, Jan: Československá armáda v prvním poválečném desetiletí.
květen 1945 – květen 1955. Praha 2006, s. 105.
418Viz VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis Vrchního vojenského soudu (dále jen VVS)
Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Hlášení přírůstku. Věra Břachová uvádí datum Bartíkova zatčení nepřesně jako 10. března.
Srovnej BŘACHOVÁ, Věra: Destrukce důstojnického sboru čs. armády po únoru 1948. HaV 41, 1992, č. 3, s.
110-116.
419 SDMJ, Pozůstalost Josefa Bartíka, Protokol o vykonané prohlídce, 9. března 1948. Viz také Přílohy, IV.
Výběr z dokumentů, dokument č. 13.
420 ŠOLC, Jiří: Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archívních
dokumentů. Praha 2007, s. 320-323. O jeho osudech ve „třetí“ emigraci viz tamtéž, s. 325-335.
421 ABS Praha, zvláštní vyšetřovací spis, a. č. ZV – 4 MV (Bedřich Pokorný, B/4-V-2459), sv. I. Protokol o
výpovědi se zajištěným Bedřichem Pokorným 29. října 1952, s. 4.
82
osob, a zajištění takového senátu, aby bylo odsouzení BARTÍKA zajištěno. Při tom jsem se ho
zeptal, zda byla u BARTÍKA udělána domovní prohlídka. Bylo zjištěno, že nebyla. Proto se
z mého popudu dal REICIN tuto prohlídku udělati dodatečně, při které se našlo asi 60
dokumentů zpravodajského obsahu, které BARTÍK odnesl buď z MV v r. 1945 a dílem z MNO
staršího data. K těmto spisům jsem já u soudu dělal znalecký posudek pro vojáky. Došlo
k výměně osob u soudu a BARTÍK byl odsouzen na k 5ti letům žaláře.“422
Pokorného výpověď je třeba objasnit. Výše bylo uvedeno, že u Bartíka byla dne

března provedena domovní prohlídka. Ta však s největší pravděpodobností nebyla
provedena dostatečně „důkladně,“ a proto byla na Pokorného popud vykonána ještě prohlídka
druhá, při níž bylo zajištěno další množství dokumentů, k nimž Pokorný později sepsal
znalecký posudek.
Reicinův osobní podíl na procesu s Bartíkem dosvědčuje dochovaný důvěrný
dokument, který Reicin zaslal vrchnímu vojenskému prokurátorovi a v němž je uvedeno:
„Vzhledem k výsledku úředního jednání ze dne 9. 3. 1948, při kterém jste převzal písemný
materiál ve věci gen. Josefa Bartíka a rozhodl se o zavedení trestního řízení proti gen.
Bartíkovi a uvalení vyšetřovací vazby, zasílám stručné trestní oznámení…“423
Bedřich Pokorný a Bedřich Reicin však nebyli jedinými osobami, které měly zájem na
Bartíkově odsouzení. Kompletní sestavu vysoce postavených příslušníků KSČ vyjmenoval
v roce 1952 opět Bedřich Pokorný. Na otázku „Vyjmenujte nyní osoby, které měly zájem, aby
Bartík odsouzen byl!“424odpověděl takto: „Byl to [Jindřich] VESELÝ, [Bedřich] REICIN,
[Karel] ŠVÁB, [Štěpán]PLAČEK, já /Pokorný/, [Jan]VANĚK, [Karel] VAŠ.“425
V uvedeném výčtu jsou vyjmenováni aktéři, kteří se podíleli na Bartíkově odstranění
z MV a v jejichž hledáčku byl Bartík už od roku 1945. Nově měli zájem na Bartíkově
odsouzení také dva představitelé komunistické vojenské justice: JUDr. Jan Vaněk a nechvalně
proslulý JUDr. Karel VAŠ, kterého „proslavil“ jeho podíl na justiční vraždě generála
Heliodora Píky.
Pokorný se ve své výpovědi dále zmínil o tom, že proto, aby byl Bartík odsouzen, bylo
potřeba zajistit výměnu justičních osob. Tato „výměna“ proběhla ještě během roku 1945
a kvůli ní začalo hlavní přelíčení s Bartíkem až v září 1948. To již byl vrchním vojenským
prokurátorem, který Josefa Bartíka žaloval, podplukovník justice Jan Vaněk.426 Ke změně
u vojenského soudu Pokorný dále podotknul: „Teprve po změnách v osobách u voj. justice,
kdy se dostal v čelo prokuratury dr. VANĚK, jsem se seznámil s několika příslušníky KSČ
z řad prokuratury a soudu a tehdy jsem již měl vliv při zákrocích v různých případech…“427

422 Tamtéž.
423 Viz VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Bartík Josef –
trestní oznámení, 10. března 1948.
424 ABS Praha, zvláštní vyšetřovací spis, a. č. ZV – 4 MV (Bedřich Pokorný, B/4-V-2459), sv. I. Protokol o
výpovědi se zajištěným Bedřichem Pokorným 29. října 1952, s. 5.
425 Tamtéž, s. 7.
426 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Protokol o hlavním
přelíčení, 6. září 1948.
427 ABS Praha, zvláštní vyšetřovací spis, a. č. ZV – 4 MV (Bedřich Pokorný, B/4-V-2459), sv. I. Protokol o
výpovědi se zajištěným Bedřichem Pokorným 29. října 1952, s. 3.
83
Ještě než začalo hlavní přelíčení, požádal buď Bartík samotný nebo někdo z jeho okolí
oficiální cestou žádosti o udělení milosti ministra národní obrany generála Ludvíka Svobodu.
Z ministerstva národní obrany však přišla k úřadujícímu vrchnímu vojenskému prokurátorovi
JUDr. Janu Vaňkovi dne 1. září 1948 zamítavá odpověď. V důvěrném dokumentu je výslovně
uvedeno: „V příloze vracím trestní spisy proti brig. gen. Josefu Bartíkovi s tím, že ministr
národní obrany neshledal důvodů k tomu, aby navrhl udělení milosti. Za ministra: [podpis
nečitelný, pozn. PK].“428
Později, v 50. letech, Josef Bartík usiloval o obnovu soudního řízení a o svoji
rehabilitaci. V té době se dovolával svědectví armádního generála Ludvíka Svobody, ten však
svou výpovědí Bartíkovi nijak nepomohl, poněvadž se pouze snažil všechnu vinu svalit na již
popraveného generála Bedřicha Reicina.429 V úředním záznamu ze dne 5. listopadu 1956 je
uvedeno: „ Zatčení býv. gen. Bartíka bylo oznámeno s. gen. Svobodovi Reicinem, který mu též
sdělil nějaké důvody, proč bylo zatčení provedeno. S. gen. Svoboda si již nevzpomíná, jaké to
byly důvody, a uvedl, že Reicin mu většinou v podobných případech říkal, že je to věc státní
bezpečnosti. S. gen. Svoboda neměl možnost nějak si blíže věc ověřit a spoléhal na pravdivost
toho, co uvádí Reicin. Skutečností, že Bartík byl zatčen, byl však [Svoboda] značně
překvapen, protože jej znal jako mimořádně schopného a spolehlivého důstojníka.“430
O tom, jakou roli sehrál generál Svoboda coby ministr národní obrany v Bartíkově
případě v roce 1948, případně později, když se Bartík dožadoval obnovy svého řízení, by se
dalo jistě spekulovat. Dokud však nebudou objeveny nové prameny, které by celou záležitost
objasnily, nelze vyslovit jasný závěr. Zajímavé by také bylo zaměřit se vzájemný vztah obou
generálů, které spojovala ještě jedna záležitost, o níž se letmo zmínil generál Svoboda
v rozhovoru, který poskytnul v březnu 1968 Svobodnému slovu. V tomto novinovém
rozhovoru generál Svoboda (toho času kandidát na prezidentskou funkci) odpověděl na
otázku reportéra „Co vám bylo tehdy vyčítáno?“, která se týkala Svobodova zatčení
v roce 1952,431 takto: „Generál Bartík byl na samotce ve vězení po tři měsíce denně
donucován k podpisu, že viděl mou přihlášku do Intel[l]igence Service, kterou jsem prý měl
poslat po gen. Ingrovi z Moskvy do Londýna. Ale zapomeňme raději můj případ. Jsou bohužel
mnohem horší, které dopadly tragičtěji a ty musíme napravit.“432 K důkladnému objasnění
události, kterou generál Svoboda zmínil, by bylo rovněž potřeba provést důkladný archivní
výzkum a teprve potom tuto zprávu zhodnotit.
Nyní je potřeba vrátit se zpět do září roku 1948. Dne 3. září zemřel v Sezimově Ústí
druhý československý prezident Edvard Beneš. O tři dny později, dne 6. září 1948, začalo
před Vrchním vojenským soudem v Praze hlavní přelíčení proti generálovi Josefu

428 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Bartík Josef brig.
gen. žádost o milost, 1. září 1948.
429 Bedřich Reicin byl odsouzen k trestu smrti ve vykonstruovaném monstrprocesu s „protistátním“
spikleneckým centem Rudolfa Slánského. Popraven byl dne 3. prosince 1952
430 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis NVS Praha – Žádost o obnovu Nt 210/56,
Úřední záznam z 5. listopadu.
431 Ludvík Svoboda byl zatčen v listopadu 1952, propuštěn byl ještě v prosinci téhož roku.
432 Svobodné slovo, List československé strany socialistické, ročník 24, číslo 89, sobota 30. března 1968, s. 2.
84
Bartíkovi.433 O tom, že celý soudní proces byl dopředu vykonstruovaný, byla již řeč. Zde Jako
hlavní svědek proti Bartíkovi vystupoval před soudem právě Bedřich Pokorný,434 který
zároveň vypracoval i znalecký posudek na materiály, které byly Bartíkovi zabaveny.
O spravedlivém soudním procesu tedy nelze hovořit.
Předsedou soudního senátu byl podplukovník justice JUDr. Otakar Matoušek.
Žalobcem byl ustanoven již zmíněný nový vrchní vojenský prokurátor JUDr. Jan Vaněk.
Žaloba proti generálu Bartíkovi byla vedena v několika bodech, přičemž její podstatou bylo,
že generál přechovával ve svém bytě (který však zároveň byl bytem služebním, tudíž v něm
Bartík i pracoval) různé tajné písemnosti a spisy, které obsahovaly součást státního
a vojenského tajemství.435 Podle zákona měl Bartík nárok zvolit si svého obhájce; v protokolu
z 8. dubna 1948 je jako obhájce uveden generál justiční služby JUDr. Bohuslav Ečer,436
u soudu však Bartíka zastupoval generál justiční služby ve výslužbě JUDr. Josef Adam.437
Zde se nabízí domněnka, že Bartíkovi nebyl generál Ečer komunistickou justicí
povolen, poněvadž se jednalo o významnou osobnost československého zahraničního odboje
a jeho zapojení do procesu by mohlo zvrátit dopředu daný výsledek v Bartíkův prospěch.
Generál Ečer měl jako zástupce československé vlády u mezinárodního soudního tribunálu
v Norimberku rozhodující zásluhu na tom, že spojenci vydali do ČSR K. H. Franka (Ečer
uzavřel 16. července 1945 dohodu s hlavním žalobcem norimberského tribunálu Robertem
Jacksonem, načež byl Frank dne 7. srpna 1945 letecky dopraven do Prahy.438) Bedřich
Pokorný a další vysocí představitelé KSČ však měli eminentní zájem na tom, aby byl Bartík
odsouzen za každou cenu, a z toho důvodu ho Ečer pravděpodobně nemohl hájit. I proto není
překvapující, že veřejnost byla z účasti na hlavním přelíčení vyloučena. Poté, co byla před
soudem přednesena žaloba, vyjádřil se generál Bartík těmito slovy: „Necítím se vinen
v žádném bodu žaloby. […] Do dnešního dne není mi vůbec známo, proč jsem vlastně
žalován. Prohlašuji, že předmětné spisy v mém bytě nalezené nejsou majetkem ministerstva
vnitra.“439
Bartík se poté vyjádřil ke všem spisům, které soudu sloužily jako důkazní materiál.
Následovalo vystoupení hlavního svědka a organizátora celé akce Bedřicha Pokorného,

433 Historik politických procesů v komunistickém Československu Karel Kaplan uvedl ve své práci společně
s Pavlem Palečkem následující tvrzení: „V dubnu [1948] proběhl proces s generálem J, Bartíkem a spol. […]
Tento proces byl politickou mstou.“ Se závěrem autorů lze bezpochyby souhlasit, ale jejich ostatní údaje se
neopírají o dostupné prameny. Samotný proces neproběhl v dubnu, ale až v září, a nejednalo se o nějakou
„skupinu Josef Bartík a spol.“, ale o proces individuální. Žalován byl pouze Bartík a nikdo další. Srovnej
KAPLAN, Karel – PALEČEK, Pavel: Komunistický režim a politické procesy v Československu. Brno 2001, s.
55; VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Protokol o hlavním
přelíčení, 6. září 1948.
434 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Ustanovení hlavního
přelíčení; ABS Praha, zvláštní vyšetřovací spis, a. č. ZV – 4 MV (Bedřich Pokorný, B/4-V-2459), sv. I. Protokol
o výpovědi se zajištěným Bedřichem Pokorným 29. října 1952, s. 5.
435 Podrobné znění žaloby viz VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis VVS Praha Ztr
264/48-III, Žaloba 5. dubna 1948, Dodatečná žaloba 1. května 1948.
436 Tamtéž, Protokol z 8. dubna 1948.
437 Tamtéž, Protokol o hlavním přelíčení, 6. září 1948.
438 ROUBAL, Jiří: Český národ soudí K. H. Franka. Praha 1947, s. 16.
439 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65 , spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Protokol o hlavním
přelíčení, 6. září 1948, s. 1.
85
potom vystoupili další svědkové. Ještě než bylo hlavní přelíčení přerušeno, navrhl Josef
Bartík společně se svým obhájcem, „ aby byli předvoláni a slyšeni jako svědci div. generál
Šimon Drgač [z] MNO, brig. generál Mojmír Soukup a ministr [vnitra] Nosek o tom, že
předmětný spisový materiál jest můj vlastní majetek a že odnesením těchto spisů nemohl býti
brzděn vývoj zprav. služby [což dával Bartíkovi za vinu Pokorný].“440 Mimo to navrhovali
Bartík a jeho obhájce předvolání dalších svědků. Soudní senát však neponechal nic náhodě
a přelíčení odročil na druhý den. Když líčení 7. září 1948 ráno pokračovalo, odebral se senát
k tajné poradě, aby rozhodl o návrzích na předvolání svědků. S ohledem na průběh procesu
nejspíš nepřekvapí, že předseda senátu po poradě „vyhlásil usnesení, kterým se návrhy
obžalovaného a jeho obhájce zamítají jako nerozhodné a nadbytečné, ježto okolnosti,
o kterých navrhovaní svědci měli býti slyšeni, jsou pro věc samou nerozhodné a jsou věcí
znaleckého posudku [tedy posudku, který vypracoval samotný Bedřich Pokorný, pozn.
PK].“441
Rozsudek byl vynesen – již za přítomnosti veřejnosti – ještě téhož dne. Generál Josef
Bartík, účastník prvního i druhého československého odboje a nositel řady čestných řádů
a vyznamenání, byl uznán vinným, že „… jako osoba pověřená v tak důležitém úseku státní
správy vedením veřejných věcí, zneužil svého služebního postavení, aby státu způsobil škodu
[…][dále pak]hrubou nedbalostí způsobil, že skutečnosti, opatření a předměty, které v zájmu
ochrany republiky mají zůstat utajeny, mohly se státi známými cizí moci, ačkoliv podle svého
veřejného postavení byl povinnen takové tajemství uchovávat v tajnosti.“442
Podle soudu tak Bartík spáchal „zločin zneužití moci úřední a služební podle
§ 380 v. tr. z. [dále pak] přečin vojenské zrady podle § 6:4 zák. č. 50/1923 Sb.“443 Kromě
kasace (ztráty vojenské hodnosti) a ztráty všech čestných vyznamenání byl odsouzen „k trestu
těžkého žaláře na dobu 5 /pět/ roků, zostřenému jednou měsíčně tvrdým ložem, jakož
i samovazbou v druhém, pátém a devátém měsíci každého roku trestu.“
444
S výsledkem nespravedlivého procesu nebyli pochopitelně Bartík ani jeho obhájce
spokojeni a oba se rozhodli na místě reagovat. V protokolu o hlavním přelíčení je výslovně
uvedeno: „Obžalovaný [Josef Bartík] na to prohlašuje: Rozsudku jsem rozuměl, trest
nepřijímám, do tohoto rozsudku ohlašuji odvolání a zmateční stížnost. Obhájce žalovaného se
připojuje k prohlášení žalovaného a prosí o doručení opisu rozsudku.“445
Zmateční stížností Josefa Bartíka se zabýval Nejvyšší vojenský soud v Praze

listopadu. Soudu předsedal gen. šéf justice JUDr. Ladislav Rutar. Soud dospěl k závěru,

440 Tamtéž, s. 10.
441 Tamtéž.
442 VÚA-VHA, fond Osobní karta legionáře, Josef Bartík, Opis rozsudku VVS, s. 1.
443 Tamtéž, s. 2.
444 Tamtéž. Opis zkráceného rozsudku VVS (bez zdůvodnění) viz Přílohy, IV. Výběr z dokumentů, dokument č.

Kompletní rozsudek Vrchního vojenského soudu má 21 stran. Viz VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS
Příbram – 1T15/65, spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Rozsudek, 7. září 1948.
445 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Protokol o hlavním
přelíčení, 6. září 1948, s. 12.
86
že žalovaný byl odsouzen právem a „zmateční stížnost se zamítá zčásti jako neodůvodněná,
zčásti jako nepřípustná, odvolání jako neodůvodněné.“446
Původní rozsudek Vrchní vojenského soudu se tak stal pravomocným ke dni
listopadu 1948, Josef Bartík měl trest nastoupit dne 25. listopadu 1948. Do trestu mu byla
započítána vazba od 9. března do 25. listopadu. Zároveň se na Bartíkovo odsouzení částečně
vztahovala amnestie nového prezidenta Klementa Gottwalda,447 vyhlášená 19. června 1948.
Bartíkův rozsudek proto uzavírají tato slova: „Podle čl. I odst. 2 rozhodnutí prezidenta
republiky ze dne 19. června 1948 promíjí se odsouzenému z uloženého trestu 5 /pěti/ roků
zostřeného těžkého žaláře část, rovnající se jednomu roku /viz usnesení poř. č. 56/.“448
Bartíka tedy čekaly čtyři roky těžkého žaláře. Propuštěn na svobodu měl být
v březnu 1952, perzekuce jeho osoby však ve skutečnosti pokračovala i po této době
449 a již
během vazby se dotkla také jeho rodiny. Samotný Bartík k tomu dne 27. listopadu na
uzavřeném oddělení ve vyšetřovací vazbě vojenské nemocnice v úředním zápise poznamenal:
„Manželka byla přestěhována během mé vazby do jiného bytu v Praze…“450
4.2.b V kriminále (1948-1953)
„Dne 27. listopadu 1948 byly odsouzenému Josefu Bartíkovi odeslány opisy rozsudků
skrze uzavřené oddělení voj. nemocnice1 v Praze, kde jmenovaný t. č. je.“451 Tato strohá věta
konstatuje, že zdravotní stav odsouzeného Josefa Bartíka byl po devíti měsících vazby značně
neuspokojivý, a proto musel být hospitalizován na uzavřeném oddělení vojenské nemocnice.
Z dochovaných lékařských zpráv z června 1948 vyplývá, že generál byl toho času v léčení pro
„chronický katar žaludeční a chron. zánět žlučníku.“452 Mimo to měl „prudké bolesti
v bederní oblasti páteře, které vyzařují do horní části obou dolních končetin. Jde zřejmě
o nervové bolesti vyvolané tlakem. Rtg. snímek ukazuje zřetelný obraz deformující
arthrosy…“453 Vánoční svátky roku 1948 strávil nyní už bývalý generál Josef Bartík ve
vojenské nemocnici.
O jeho dalším umístění rozhodlo již v lednu 1949 MNO. Ve zvláštním výnosu je
vysloven příkaz, aby odsouzený „odpykal si uložený mu trest ve vojenské trestnici
v Leopoldově.“454 Eskortování mělo být provedeno okamžitě, což se také 19. ledna stalo.455

446 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Rozsudek NVS,

listopadu 1948. Kompletní rozsudek NVS má celkem 20 stran.
447 Klement Gottwald byl zvolen prezidentem Československa dne 14. června 1948. Národní shromáždění jej
zvolilo jednomyslně. Prezident Beneš podepsal abdikační listinu již 2. června, jeho rozhodnutí však bylo
oznámeno až 7. června 1948.
448 VÚA-VHA, fond Osobní karta legionáře, Josef Bartík, Opis rozsudku VVS, s. 2.
449 Viz kapitola 4.2b.
450 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Zápis VVS Praha ze
dne 27. listopadu 1948.
451 Tamtéž, Úřední záznam ze dne 27. listopadu 1948.
452 Tamtéž, Písemná zpráva z vojenské nemocnice v Praze – I. vnitřní oddělení, 15. 6. 1948.
453 Tamtéž, Písemná zpráva z vojenské nemocnice v Praze – fysiatrické oddělení, 16. 6. 1948.
454 Tamtéž, Bartík Josef, býv. gen. – Určení trestnice, 18. ledna 1949.
455 Tamtéž, Josef Bartík- nástup trestu, 21. ledna 1949.
87
Někdy v období od ledna do května 1949 byl Bartík coby trestanec převezen
z Leopoldova do Bratislavy a právě z vězení v Bratislavě napsal dne 4. května 1949 dopis své
manželce Libuši. Část originálu tohoto dopisu se dochovala v generálově pozůstalosti. Je
třeba poznamenat, že dopis nedošel Libuši Bartíkové kompletní – „závadnou“ část, v níž se
Bartík zmiňuje o možnostech podmínečného propuštění, odstřihl vězeňský cenzor nůžkami.
Protože se jedná o unikátní dokument osobní povahy, bude zde dochovaná část ocitována
v plném rozsahu:
„Moje nejdražší, přeji Ti k Tvým narozeninám vše nejlepší, hodně zdraví, zvlášť letos!
Lituji jen, že nebudu opětně s Vámi a viděti Tě šťastnou a veselou jako v minulých letech.
Budu na Vás hodně vzpomínat. [Zbytek textu z první strany byl ustřižen, citace pokračuje
textem na druhé straně dopisu, pozn. PK]… podmínečného propuštění). Myslím, že vzhledem
k zdravotnímu stavu bych měl zákonný nárok na propuštění, resp. přerušení vazby. Informujte
se u Luby, ať zjistí, zda je tomu tak, a napište mi. Byl bych již rád, kdyby tohoto utrpení byl již
konec. Některé dny jsou přímo zoufalé. Došel sem nějaký dotaz ohledně mého zdravotního
stavu. Odkud nevím. Bylo by… [ustřiženo, pozn. PK].“456
Dne 20. května byl Josef Bartík převezen z bratislavského vězení na Mírov. Na jeho
přemístění do tvrdšího vězeňského zařízení mělo zájem Ministerstvo vnitra, v tajném
ministerském přípisu je k tomu výslovně uvedeno: „Sděluji, že jsem včera z naléhavých
bezpečnostních důvodů zařídil po dohodě s ministerstvem spravedlnosti přemístění vašeho
vězně býv. generála Josefa Bartíka z Bratislavy do trestnice na Mírově, kam Bartík byl dnes
dodán.“457
Nechvalně proslulé vězení Mírov se nacházelo na původním středověkém hradě, který
v 17. století přestavěn na barokní pevnost. „Po květnu 1945 se stal Mírov vězením, kde si
odpykávali tresty těžší zločinci spolu s odsouzenými nacisty a představiteli protektorátního
režimu.“458 Dne 22. dubna 1949 vznikl v mírovské věznici jeden z nejhorších táborů nucené
práce (dále TNP), kam byli internováni zejména vojáci z povolání, kteří byli po únoru 1948
vyloučeni z armády. Bartíkovo květnové přeložení souvisí tedy právě se vznikem TNP na
Mírově, do něhož byl zařazen.459
Podmínky na Mírově byly obzvláště kruté: „Pro vězně byly určeny podzemní kobky
s až sedm metrů silnými kamennými zdmi, které byly studené a vlhké, větrání malými
zamřížovanými okny nedostatečné. Zvlášť citelný chlad tu byl na podzim a v zimě, protože
většinu místností nebylo možné vytápět. Podobně nehostinné bylo i vnitřní zařízení, skládající
se z několika jednoduchých pryčen, stolu a sedaček. Katastrofální byly rovněž hygienické
podmínky – umývárna s pouze studenou vodou, nevyhovující WC. Vězni byli umístěni v celách
o deseti i více lidech, což překračovalo jejich kapacitu. Strava byla velmi nekvalitní
a nedostatečná.“460

456 SDMJ, Pozůstalost Josefa Bartíka, Dopis Josefa Bartíka manželce Libuši, Bratislava 4. května 1949.
457 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram, spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Bývalý generál Bartík
přemístění na Mírov, 20. května 1949.
458 BÍLEK, Jiří: Tábor nucené práce Mírov. HaV 47, 1998, č. 4, s. 94.
459 Svým způsobem bylo Bartíkovo zařazení do TNP na Mírově výjimečné. Většina internovaných vojáků
z povolání byla dána do TNP, aniž by s nimi proběhl soud.
460 BÍLEK, Jiří: Tábor nucené práce Mírov. HaV 47, 1998, č. 4, s. 107.
88
Josef Bartík musel kvůli své artróze v takových podmínkách obzvlášť trpět,
v dochované lékařské zprávě z června 1948 je totiž uvedeno: „S hlediska lékařského je nutné,
aby se vystřídal prochlazení, těžké těles. práce a pobytu ve vlhkých a studených místnostech.
[…] Jeho stav vyžaduje dalšího léčení t. j. fysikální therapie a později léčby lázeňské.“461
Artróza se u Bartíka objevila v červnu 1948, když byl ve vyšetřovací vazbě. V návrhu zrušení
vyšetřovací vazby, který byl samozřejmě zamítnut, popsal Bartík svůj zdravotní stav takto:
„Před několika dny zhoršil se můj zdravotní stav tím, že se u mne objevila artrosa,která mi
znemožňuje jakýkoliv pohyb, takže bez cizí pomoci nemohu ani z lůžka vstáti, ani se na lůžku
obrátiti…“462
O tom, jaké lékařské péče se vážně nemocným lidem v nevyhovujících mírovských
podmínkách dostávalo, si lze udělat představu z následující věty, pocházející z přínosné studie
Jiřího Bílka: „Lékařem v TNP byl k doživotí odsouzený příslušník jednotek SS MUDr.
Sekanina, který velký zájem o zdravotní stav vězňů neměl a nikdo ho k tomu ani nenutil.“463
Z doby, kdy byl Bartík na Mírově vězněn, pochází dopis, který mu adresovala jeho
manželka a jehož originál se dochoval ve ve Správním archivu AČR v Olomouci. Dopis nebyl
s největší pravděpodobností nikdy doručen. To vyplývá jednak z toho, že se nezachoval
v generálově osobní pozůstalosti, ale v soudním spise, a v dopise jsou navíc tužkou podtrhány
„závadné“ části, kvůli nimž vězeňský cenzor doručení dopisu zamítl. Tento dopis zachycuje,
co v té době Bartíkova rodina prožívala, a proto nepotřebuje zvláštního komentáře; Libuše
Bartíková jej napsala 12. června.
„Milý taťko, byly jsme rády, když jsme od Tebe dostaly zprávu. Přišel nám totiž opět
z Leopoldova balík s prádlem – s poznámkou že tam nejsi a povolení k návštěvě jsem také
nedostala – zase s poznámkou, že musím žádat vrchní vojenský soud v Bratislavi. Tak jsme
nevěděly, kde vlastně jsi. Doufám, že noha se Ti příliš nezhoršila a že máš možnost alespoň
nějakého ošetření. Přece není možné dávat Tě do pracovního tábora, dokud Tvůj zdravotní
stav nebude lepší. Napiš nám podrobnosti o svém denním životě a o možnosti ošetření nebo
léčby – za 14 dní už zase můžeš psát.
U nás zatím všechno zdrávo. Draga [dcera manželů Bartíkových, v roce 1949 jí bylo
22 let, pozn. PK] vypadá velmi dobře a už opravdu nemůže zapřít, že bude maminkou. Velmi
se na „kluka“ těší – ale ta linie ji přece jen mrzí! Má už všechno uchystáno, ačkoliv je to teď
velmi obtížné a hned teď – po lékařské prohlídce pojede ven [z Prahy na Šumavu]. Vezme
s sebou Danu [německý ovčácký pes] a budou prý chodit na houby, které už rostou. Koncem
srpna se pak už vrátí definitivně do Prahy, poněvadž teď prý se baby často narodí až o měsíc
dříve než se čekají. Tak abychom byli už v pozoru. Jinak kluk se má k životu, kope vesele
a Dragica si přeje aby Ti byl podobný – a tvrdí že bude! Janette [příbuzná z USA] psala, že se
bude znovu vdávat, ačkoliv jí je už 48 – a Jirku si nechají u sebe. Pošlou Draze také věci pro
baby – což je příjemné. Jirka Milošův tento týden maturuje a není ještě rozhodnut má-li se
věnovat geologii nebo zeměměřičství. My už také jen máme něco málo přes 14 dní do

461 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, spis VVS Praha Ztr 264/48-III, Písemná zpráva z
vojenské nemocnice v Praze – fysiatrické oddělení, 16. 6. 1948.
462 Tamtéž, Návrh na zručení vyšetřovací vazby za účelem léčení, 2. června 1948.
463 BÍLEK, Jiří: Tábor nucené práce Mírov. HaV 47, 1998, č. 4, s. 107.
89
prázdnin. Letos končí školní rok až 30. června. Ale pak tedy ještě týden musíme pracovat ve
škole – a týden před začátkem škol. roku – a mezitím brigádu a kdo se přihlásí tak také
školení, takže mnoho z prázdnin nezbude.
Miloslava už je vystěhována ze svého krásného bytu a teď zatím u pí [příjmení
nečitelné]. Má v náhradu nějaký pokojík s kuchyní v podkroví vily ve Střešovicích – ale
upravuje si to a tak snad bude delší dobu u pí [příjmení nečitelné]. Říkala, že je ráda, že už se
bytu zbaví, poněvadž úřady teď strašně otravují.
Dej pozor ať se Ti zase záněty nezhorší a napiš, co potřebuješ! Nechceš teplé prádlo,
abych Ti mohla dát ty velbloudí spodky vyčistit? Moc zdraví a líbá Libuše.“
Na konci dopisu je ještě připsán krátký vzkaz od Bartíkova zetě Milana Jirky:
„Posílám srdečný pozdrav a mnoho vzpomínek. Draga zdráva a odjíždí již na Šumavu.
Zmíněnou návštěvu jsem vykonal, jak jsem se již zmínil v minulém dopise! [podtrženo
cenzorem]Jinak u nás vše v pořádku. Zdraví a líbá Milan.“464
Další nedoručený dopis napsala svému uvězněnému otci jeho dcera Draga dne

června 1949. Draga Jirková tehdy pobývala na letním bytě v osadě Šebestov465 na
Šumavě:
„Můj milý taťko, píšu Ti již dnes v den Tvých narozenin, protože dopis posílám mamce
aby jej současně se svým poslala. Přeji Ti to nejkrásnější, vyplnění všech přání a hodně
zdraví. Doufám, žes včas, třicátého ráno, dostal můj telegram. Jak vidíš, konečně jsem
v našem koutě Šumavy a je zde opravdu krásně. Celý den se toulám po lesích, po Tvých
houbařských místech chodím denně. Houby ještě málo rostou, nejvíce sameťáci, borováci
ojediněle a bílého jsem našla jen jednoho společně s borováky v lese nad Holečků. Na Staších
jsem byla jen dvakrát […] Nepotkám nikoho, kdo by se na Tebe alespoň nezeptal
a nepozdravoval Tě. Lidé, které ani neznám mně zastavují a jestli prý by Ti mohli něco poslat.
Je to od nich moc hezké, sami mají málo, moc se musí odevzávat. […] měla jsem tak krásný
sen o Tobě, že mi mrzelo, že jsem jej nemohla dokončit. Zde se mi často o Tobě zdá a samé
krásné sny. Představ si, že Mary poslala zase 150 dollarů na [podtrženo cenzorem, pozn. PK]
baby. Byli jsme hrozně rádi, to se dá již něco pořídit. Napiš, zda něco z prádla nepotřebuješ,
abychom to mohli koupit. […] To je asi vše nového, napiš hodně o sobě, víme nyní tak málo.
V Mírově přeci musí být nemocnice, nejsi nyní tam? Moc vzpomíná a líbá Tě Tvá Draga.“466
července 1949 reagovala Libuše Bartíková na dopis, který jí manžel poslal:
„Milý, bylo to hezké dostat dopis sem [do Šebestova, pozn. PK]. Čekáme na něj
vždycky toužebně – vždyť je to teď když nemáme návštěvy, jediný spoj s tebou. A tady zvlášť
vyvolal takovou iluzi starých bývalých časů, kdy jsem byla s dětmi sama a Tys za námi
dojížděl. […] Moc na Tebe vzpomínáme – tady každý kopec a každý kout v lese volá
vzpomínkami na Tebe a těšíme se, až zase budeš chodit s námi. Zatím se řídíme heslem: Keep

464 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – spis 1T15/65, II. svazek – přílohy, Dopis Libuše Bartíkové
adresovaný Josefu Bartíkovi, 12. června 1949.
465 Šebestov se nachází cca 1,5 km od Stachů – Bartíkovy rodné obce.
466 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram, spis 1T15/65, II. svazek – přílohy, Dopis Dragy Jirkové
adresovaný Josefu Bartíkovi, 30. června 1949.
90
smiling! – a jsme si jisty, že Ty se jím řídíš také. [podtrženo cenzorem, pozn. PK] Všichni Tě
pozdravují, jsou k nám moc milí. Líbá Libuše.“467
Další dochovaný nedoručený dopis má datum 31. července 1949:
„Milý taťko, posíláme Ti balík s jídlem a tak můžeme zas napsat několik řádek. Tvůj
dopis ze 20. jsme dostali 29. a zimní prádlo Ti tedy pošleme příští týden. Psal jsi, že smíme
posílat balíky vážící 10 kg., ale bylo to v dopise škrtnuto a poznamenáno, že 10 kg. balík platí
pouze na září, jinak 5kg. Tak se prosím ještě na to zeptej, to by bylo velmi málo na celý měsíc.
Do Bratislavi maminka psala, tak budeme čekat na odpověď. Jsme rádi, že máš alespoň to
ozařování, to snad alespoň trošku zmírní bolesti. Mamce školství vyšlo velmi vstříc. Její
žádost o přeložení na Smíchov byla přijata, a představ si, že ji daly do školy v naší ulici, hned
vedle našeho domu. Jsme velmi spokojeni, ušetří tím mnoho času, zvláště v zimě, když nebude
muset honit tramvaje a stát na stupátku. Vždyť už po páté ráno vstávala, když jezdila do Libně
nebo Vysočan. Také pro mne je to mnohem příjemnější, když je vedle v domě k dosažení.
Škola začíná zítra, ne 15. září, jak jsi se domníval. Ředitelka školy zná Poldů, bydlí vedle
nich, tak samozřejmě věděla kdo maminka je a byla velmi milá. [podtrženo cenzorem, pozn.
PK] […] tak pro dnešek končím. Budeme čekat na dopis od Tebe, ale napiš více, píšeš nám
málo! Líbá Tě Tvá Draga.“468
Další nedoručený dopis napsala Draga Jirková svému otci ještě před tím, než se jí
narodil syn Milan:
„Milý taťko, Tvůj dopis jsme dostali čtrnáctého, mysleli jsme, že jsi už v nemocnici,
a proto že nepíšeš. Snad se tam již brzo dostaneš. Peníze jsi už doufám obdržel, to víš, než se
ale vypraví balík, trvá to déle než věci seženeme. […] už mě mrzí, že nejsem jako maminka,
která měla děti dříve, ráda bych to měla za sebou. Tak doufám, že to již tento týden bude, drž
mi palce, moc bychom Tě zde potřebovali! Líbá Tě a vzpomíná Tvá Draga.“
Na konci dopisu je ještě připsán jeden odstavec od Bartíkova zetě Milana Jirky:
„Milý taťko, momentálně všichni žijeme v očekávání radostné události. Vše je
v pořádku, tak myslím, že vše půjde hladce. V neděli 18. září jsme měli s Dragou první výročí
svého sňatku. Je snad zbytečné zdůrazniti, že jsem v manželství dokonale šťasten, dá-li se
ovšem dnes slova ‚štěstí‘ vůbec užíti. [podtrženo cenzorem, pozn. PK] Na druhé straně jsem
však přesvědčen, že skutečného rodinného štěstí dosáhneme jen tehdy, až Ty budeš opět mezi
námi. Vše bude opět dobré jen hodně trpělivosti. Doufám, že se Ti brzy dostane dokonalého
nemocničního ošetření a Tvůj zdravotní stav se celkově zlepší. Tedy mnoho zdaru! Tvůj
Milan.“469
Na podzim 1949 dostal Josef Bartík do vězení potěšující zprávu o tom, že se jeho dceři
narodil syn Milan, a manželům Jirkovým vzápětí došlo blahopřání od šťastného dědečka.470
Do současné doby se dochoval i tužkou psaný dopis Josefa Bartíka ze

prosince 1949, který adresoval své rodině, ale který nebyl s největší pravděpodobností

467 Tamtéž, Dopis Libuše Bartíkové adresovaný Josefu Bartíkovi, 15. července 1949.
468 Tamtéž, Dopis Dragy Jirkové adresovaný Josefu Bartíkovi, 31. srpna 1949.
469 Tamtéž, Dopis Dragy a Milana Jirkových adresovaný Josefu Bartíkovi, 18. září 1949.
470 Tamtéž, Dopis (cenzurovaný a nedoručený) Milana Jirky adresovaný Josefu Bartíkovi, 10. října 1949.
91
nikdy doručen: „Drazí, obdržel jsem od Vás americké cigarety, neměl jsem ani jediné
cigarety. Pošlete mi brzy další, dále ponožky, jinak jiné prádlo mi neposílejte, kapesníky
a ručníky dostáváme zde. Dbejte jen o sebe a malého Milana a vše ostatní nechte stranou.
Vyřiďte mé pozdravy u Jirků a všem známým. Buďte hodně zdrávi. Líbá Vás všechny –
malého Milana zvlášť – Váš táta.“471
Z dochovaných pramenů, není bohužel zřejmé, jak dlouhou dobu Bartík v táboře na
Mírově setrval. Z dokumentů, které se dochovaly v NA v Praze, vyplývá, že byl převezen do
pražské Ruzyně, kde měl setrvat další tři roky.472 Z let 1950-1952 také pocházejí některé
dochované Bartíkovy výslechové protokoly, z nichž bylo v minulých kapitolách citováno.
O tom, že by se Bartíkův zdravotní stav po převozu do pražského vězení nějak
výrazně zlepšil, se dá pochybovat. Dokládá to ostatně i dochované hlášení ze dne

července 1950, kde je uvedeno: „Při dnešní ranní vycházce mi hlásil zajištěný býv. gen.
Josef BARTÍK, že v noci z 1. na 2. července, to je ze soboty na neděli, měl srdeční záchvat.
První pomoc mu poskytovala službu konající stráž, studenými obklady. Na vysvětlenou
uvádím, že to byl již třetí srdeční záchvat u jmenovaného a po druhém srdečním záchvatu,
který mně byl asi před třemi týdny hlášen s Mráčkem hlášen, jsem zařídil lékařskou prohlídku
Bartíka zde ve věznici. Ošetřujícím lékařem mu byly předepsány léky, o kterých Bartík tvrdí,
že jsou dobré a že stejné užíval i na svobodě. Přestože jsou předepsané léky Bartíkovi
pravidelně vydávány, ochrnula mu v poslední době slabě levá ruka.“473
Josef Bartík měl být propuštěn na svobodu po odpykání trestu dne 9. března 1952. To
se však nestalo, protože již dříve se o něj začala zajímat StB, z jejíhož podnětu byl
pravděpodobně převezen do Prahy. Ve zprávě, kterou velitelství státní bezpečnosti
vypracovalo dne 28. dubna 1952, je Bartíkovo nepropuštění zdůvodněno takto: „Josef
BARTÍK však nemohl býti propuštěn, jelikož byly zjištěny nové skutečnosti, ze kterých jest
podezření, že Jos. BARTÍK byl zúčasten činnosti proti lidově demokratickému zřízení v ČSR
a za kterou nebyl souzen. Po celkovém vyšetření bude na J. BARTÍKA podáno nové trestní
oznámení.“474
Dne 27. srpna 1952 navrhl nechvalně proslulý náčelník StB mjr. Bohumil Doubek475
Bartíkovo „zatčení“, jež ale ve skutečnosti bylo pouze iluzorní, neboť Bartík byl vězněn
nepřetržitě od roku 1948. To, že návrh mjr. Doubka na „zatčení“ přišel v době, kdy měl být
Bartík téměř půl roku na svobodě, jen dokresluje atmosféru vězeňství v 50. letech
v Československu. Doubek ve svém návrhu uvedl: Navrhuji zatčení Josefa BARTÍKA,
bývalého generála, odsouzeného na 4 roky, kterému již vypršel jeho trest. Návrh na zatčení
odůvodňuji tím, že při vyšetřování případu SLÁNSKÝ476 a protistátních skupin napojených na

471 Tamtéž, Dopis Josefa Bartíka adresovaný rodině, 7. 12. 1949.
472 Viz NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123,
nezpracovaný materiál.
473 Tamtéž, Hlášení ze dne 5. července 1950.
474 Tamtéž, Josef Bartík – propuštění z vězení
475 K osobě vyšetřovatele Doubka, vyšetřovacím metodám Stb a roli sovětských poradců v ČSR, viz KAPLAN,
Karel: StB o sobě. Výpověď vyšetřovatele Bohumila Doubka. Praha 2002.
476 Podrobně k případu Slánského včetně zahraničního kontextu viz KAPLAN, Karel: Zpráva o zavraždění
generálního tajemníka. Praha 1992.
92
SLÁNSKÉHO vyšlo najevo, že BARTÍK při vyšetřování na zločiny, za které byl již odsouzen,
zatajil jinou část své protistátní činnosti, z níž je usvědčován získanými dokumenty
i výpověďmi vyšetřovaných.“477 Dne 27. srpna 1952 byl tedy Bartík opětovně „zatčen“ a
„eskortován“ do věznice ministerstva národní bezpečnosti v Ruzyni.478 Tam ostatně pobýval
již od roku 1950.
O okolnostech svého pobytu ve vězení Bartík po propuštění v roce 1955 poznamenal:
„Po odpykání dvou třetin trestu [32 měsíců, pozn. PK] měl jsem nárok na podmínečné
propuštění z vazby, neboť nebylo proti tomu žádných zákonných překážek. Nestalo se tak.
Nebyl jsem však propuštěn ani po odpykání celého čtyřletého trestu [zvýrazněno J. Bartíkem]
t. j. v březnu 1952 a ponechán ve věznici v Ruzyni dále v samovazbě a propuštěn u vojenského
prokurátora až 17. října 1953. Celkem jsem byl v nepřetržité samovazbě ve věznici v Ruzyni
3 roky. Po celou tuto dobu nebyla mi poskytována lékařská péče v míře, jakou vyžadovalo
moje těžké válečné zranění, nebyl mi ošetřován chrup, po dva roky nedostal jsem brýle, které
jsem nutně potřeboval, neměl jsem přes rok ani povolenou návštěvu, ačkoliv jsem měl trest
dávno odpykán. Mé rodině bylo na její dotaz o mém zdravotním stavu oznámeno, že jsem pod
stálou lékařskou kontrolou, což neodpovídalo pravdě.“479
Konec Bartíkova vyšetřování ze strany StB je datován k 16. červenci 1953. Tehdy
vypracoval náčelník 1. odboru správy StB mjr. Kohoutek tendenční zprávu o stavu
vyšetřování, která byla zaslána na generální prokuraturu. V ní se například uvádí:
„Vyšetřováním bylo zjištěno, že Josef BARTÍK je nepřítelem pracujícího lidu a že za první
republiky bylo jeho přesvědčení protisovětské a protilidové. […] Dále spolupracoval v Anglii
s klikou [prezidenta] BENEŠE, sám dával iniciativní návrhy aby se již v Anglii uvažovalo
o vhodných osobách, které by obsadily vedo [sic!] vedoucí místa v bezpečnosti tak, aby jako
po první válce hrstka kapitalistů se zmocnila vedení a upevnila svoji moc. […] Po osvobození
spolupracoval se zrádci tipu RIPKY, DRTINY a dalších….“480
Celou záležitost měl nyní posoudit vyšší vojenský prokurátor, před nímž Bartík v září
1953 vypovídal a upřesnil svoje výpovědi. Na základě šetření vydal prokurátor mjr. justice
JUDr. Jiří Ševčik dne 16. října 1953 následující usnesení: „Trestní stíháni proti obviněnému
Josefu Bartíkovi, býv. brig. gen. ČSA, nar. 30. 6. 1897 ve Stachách, zastavuji podle
§ 89 odst. 1, písm. c/ tr. ř. a propouštím jej podle § 104 tr. ř. na svobodu.“481
Následující den, 17. října 1953, byl Josef Bartík konečně propuštěn. V té době mu
bylo již 56 let. Ve vazbě a vězení strávil místo čtyř let celkem pět let a sedm měsíců. Po
dlouhé době mohl být konečně zase se svými nejbližšími, manželkou Libuší, dcerou Dragou,
zetěm Milanem Jirkou a malým vnukem Milanem, jemuž byly v té době již čtyři roky.

477 NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123,
nezpracovaný materiál, Návrh na zatčení Josefa Bartíka vypracovaný mjr. Doubkem, 27. srpna 1952
478 Tamtéž, Rozkaz k zatčení.
479 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – spis 1T15/65, Žádost a revizi řízení nebo zahlazení odsouzení
adresovaná prezidentu republiky Antonínovi Zápotockému, 6. 6. 1955, s. 3.
480 NA Praha, fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy), Materiály z Ruzyně, Svazek 96/ IV, Složka 123,
nezpracovaný materiál, Bartík Josef – zpráva o stavu vyšetřování, 16. července 1953.
481 Tamtéž, Usnesení vyššího vojenského prokurátora, 16. října 1953.
93
Po propuštění z vězení symbolicky začala poslední etapa Bartíkova života. I tu však
prožil naplno: věnoval se své rodině a bojoval za rehabilitaci své osoby.
94
4.3 Nový život: práce v civilním sektoru, rehabilitace (1953-1968)
Z vězení se Josef Bartík vrátil s poškozeným zdravím. Sám k tomu vzápětí
poznamenal: „Po propuštění z vězení vrátil jsem se k rodině s nalomeným zdravím a léčil se
do dubna 1954, kdy jsem našel zaměstnání v Ústavě pro péči o matku a dítě v Praze – Podolí,
Nábř. Karla Marxe 157 s měsíčním hrubým příjmem 1.050,– Kčs. Při lékařské prohlídce při
nástupu do zaměstnání byl jsem uznán jako 50% invalida.“482
Finanční a bytové podmínky Bartíkovy rodiny byly i po jeho propuštění značně
neuspokojivé. Bývalý generál k tomu podotkl: „Po plných 6 let t.j. od svého zatčení v březnu
1948 až do dubna 1954 byl jsem odkázán na podporu své manželky, která jako učitelka
s platem 700,– Kčs mně přispívala k hrazení výloh s vazbou souvisejících a která mě živila do
doby, nežli jsem nalezl zaměstnání. […] Po mém zatčení mi byl odebrán byt a bydlím se svojí
manželkou, zetěm, dcerou a 5 letým vnukem v podkrovním bytě, který komisionelně byl uznán
za neobyvatelný.“483Neuspokojivá rodinná situace se mírně zlepšila až poté, co se Josef Bartík
dal zdravotně do pořádku a mohl nastoupit do zaměstnání. To nakonec nalezl díky svým
přátelům v podolském ústavu. Bartíkův přítel literární historik a teoretik Václav Černý k tomu
ve svých pamětech uvedl: „Pak ho [Bartíka] přítel R. zaměstnal v zásobovacím oddělení
podolského sanatoria, které vedl; […] Když R. vyhodili, pracoval Bartík v skladu pivovaru
U Rozvařilů.“484
Josef Bartík v Podolí pracoval od 6. dubna 1954. Pracovní poměr s ním byl – ironií
osudu – rozvázán ke dni, kdy oslavil své 61. narozeniny, tedy 30. 6. 1958. Oficiálně byl
propuštěn „v souvislosti s prováděním vlád. usnesení 135 ze dne 6. 2. 1958 a ve smyslu
směrnic vlády, k němu vydaných, které platí pro všechny úseky státní správy a národního
hospodářství.“485 Skutečné pozadí „provádění“ vládního usnesení však již osvětlil Václav
Černý.
Když Nižší vojenský soud v Praze v roce 1956 projednával obnovení Bartíkova
procesu, vyžádal si na podolském ústavu kádrový posudek. Ředitel ústavu, profesor MUDr.
Jiří Trapl, o Bartíkově působení napsal následující hodnocení: „Jmenovaný nastoupil ve
zdejším ústavě dne 6. dubna 1954 a byl pověřen agendou nákupního referenta. Tato agenda
nebyla do nástupu soudruha Bartíka dobře organisována a vedena. S. Bartík s nevšedním
zápalem začal systematicky budovat nákupní oddělení a dosáhl v krátké době toho, že toto
oddělení, pro ústav nesmírně důležité, uvedl do naprostého pořádku, takže při revizi
ministerstvem zdravotnictví bylo prohlášeno jako vzorné a Bartík byl vyhlášen jako vzorný
pracovník. Vedle toho má zásluhu o dobré uspořádání skladů. Josef Bartík vykazuje stále
vysokou pracovní morálku, která není nikterak otřesena tím, že je se svojí rodinou
nedostatečně ubytován. Účastňuje se brigád a po stránce charakterové je čestný, vytrvalý,

482 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, Žádost a revizi řízení nebo zahlazení odsouzení
adresovaná prezidentu republiky Antonínovi Zápotockému, 6. 6. 1955, s. 5.
483 Tamtéž.
484 ČERNÝ, Václav: Paměti III (1945-1972). Brno 1992, s. 327.
485 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – 1T15/65, Oznámení Ústavu pro péči o matku a dítě pro VVS,

1. 95
  iniciativní a nekompromisní. Mezi spoluzaměstnanci je pro tyto vlastnosti oblíben. Je členem
  ROH, schůzí se účastňuje. Jeho poměr k lidově-demokratickému režimu je kladný.“486
  Profesor Trapl ohodnotil charakterové vlastnosti Josefa Bartíka podobnými slovy, jakými ho
  již dříve hodnotili jeho vojenští nadřízení v kvalifikačních listinách. Z toho vyplývá, že jeho
  pevný charakter se nikterak nezměnil ani po pětiletém věznění.
  Náčelník městského oddělení Veřejné bezpečnosti, poručík Karel Gee, se však
  k Bartíkovu postoji k lidově-demokratickému režimu stavěl kritičtěji. Ve „zprávě o pověsti“
  k tomu uvedl: „V místě svého bydliště žije isolovaně v rodinném kruhu a s nikým se nestýká.
  Veřejného života se nijak nezúčastňuje. O jeho postoji k dnešnímu státnímu zřízení nelze se
  vyjádřit. Proti dnešnímu zřízení veřejně nevystupuje a také žádným způsobem nedává najevo
  svůj kladný poměr k němu. Mimo své bydliště udržuje styky s bývalými důstojníky ČSA.“487
  S kým se ještě Josef Bartík kromě bývalých kolegů důstojníků stýkal? Na tuto otázku
  odpověděl ve svých pamětech Václav Černý, do jehož okruhu přátel Bartík patřil: „Od konce
  války udržoval jsem ještě jeden odbojářský kontakt, který potrvá zřejmě do smrti, s Karlem
  Ramešem [za války vězněn na Pankráci], a na občasných návštěvách u Ramešových vídal
  jsem se s Eisnerovými, Koptovými, Langerovými, Olgou Scheinpflugovou, generálem
  Bartíkem, byly to zbytky včerejší kulturní i politické demokracie, té oficiózní a oficiální, teď už
  jen zasvěcení svědkové.“488
  Výše bylo naznačeno, že bytová situace, v níž se Bartíkova rodina nacházela, byla
  značně neuspokojivá. Samotný Josef Bartík se ji snažil po svém nástupu do Podolí řešit,
  úspěšný však nebyl. O podmínkách, v jakých jeho rodina žila, zpravil v roce 1954 bytový
  referát Ústředního národního výboru a žádal o přidělení jiného bytu: „[V roce 1948] bydlel
  jsem se svojí rodinou v Praze XVI, Smíchov Na Hřebenkách č. 6. Po bezdůvodném zatčení
  v březnu 1948 byl mi byt odebrán a rodině dán záměrně drahý byt na Smíchově Arbesovo
  náměstí č. 1, který moje rodina zůstavší po mém zatčení bez prostředků nemohla z finančních
  důvodů udržeti. Moje manželka s provdanou dcerou Dragou Jirkovou se proto přestěhovala
  do nynějšího bytu v Praze XVI – Smíchov, Na Hřebenkách č. 53, a za tento, naprosto
  nevyhovující byt dal můj zeť Dr. Milan Jirka – asistent Karlovy university k dispozici
  bytovému úřadu byt na Arbesovém náměstí […]
  Po mém návratu z vězení v r. 1953 byl jsem proto nucen nastěhovati se k mému zeti
  a obýváme nyní všichni společně 3 malé podkrovní místnosti i s pětiletým vnukem. Celkem
  tedy 5 osob. Tento byt je neobyvatelný již proto, že nemá vůbec kuchyni a přístup do místností
  v podstřeší je po úzkých a příkrých schodech, na nichž dochází k stálým úrazům nejen nás, ale
  i malého dítěte. Vytápění místností v zimních měsících je nemožné, neboť v místnostech nejsou
  kamna ani komín a ústřední domácí topení nestačí vytopiti podstřeší domu. V loňské zimě za
  tuhých mrazů prodělali jsme všichni řadu infekčních chorob, neboť jsme se museli zdržovati
  v jediném středním pokoji, který je poněkud chráněn od mrazivého větru.“489

486 Tamtéž, Josef Bartík – kádrový posudek, 17. dubna 1956.
487 Tamtéž, Bartík Josef – zpráva o pověsti, 19. dubna 1956.
488 ČERNÝ, Václav: Paměti III (1945-1972). Brno 1992, s. 388.
489 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – spis 1T15/65, Žádost a přidělení bytu, 30. června 1954.
96
Bytová situace rodiny se zlepšila až později, více méně náhodou. Bartíkův známý
z války František Famfule490 vlastnil vilu v Miroticích (cca 70 km jižně od Prahy)
a manželům Bartíkovým nabídl, aby dočasně bydleli v jednom jejím patře. Bartíkovi byli v té
době již v důchodu, a tak nabídku přijali a do Mirotic se přestěhovali i se svým vnukem
Milanem Jirkou mladším. Protože Milanovi rodiče pracovali v Praze – Draga Jirková
vyučovala na Státním jazykovém ústavu angličtinu a Milan Jirka starší pracoval jako asistent
na lékařské fakultě UK – do Mirotic dojížděli jen o víkendu.491
Třetí a čtvrtou třídu základní školy vychodil Milan Jirka mladší v Miroticích, kde ho
vychovával dědeček (Josef Bartík) a babička (Libuše Bartíková). Na tento pobyt dodnes
vzpomíná jako na krásné životní období: „Ten dědeček bych řekl, když já jsem chodil do
školy, tak on jako zavedl takovej systém a řád doma. Moje vzpomínky jsou docela příjemný,
protože ten děda tomu dal takový jasný pravidla. To znamená: přijdeš ze školy nebo z družiny,
ale ven půjdeš, až si uděláš úkoly. Dal tomu takovej řád, v kolik musím bejt doma a učil mi
takový věci, jako že když něco provedu, že je slušný se k tomu přiznat. Takže například jako
děti jsme někde kopali do balónu a já, kdo jinej, prostě [jsem] rozbil tím kopnutím nějaký
světlo na baráku a ty děti se schovaly a já jedinej jsem zůstal a řekl jsem: ‚ano, to jsme byli
my‘. […] Samozřejmě děda prosazoval takovou jakoby spartánskou výchovu – přístup
k životu. Protože vila v Miroticích měla rozlehlou zahradu, tak mi nejdřív povolil, abych si
tam udělal stan. A posléze mi povolil, že já jsem tam spal v tom stanu. Já jsem nespal
v baráku, já jsem spal ve stanu! A dokonce mi řekl, že jak se probudím, tak aby ten den stál za
něco, tak že se musím rozcvičit, že musím cvičit. A úplně mě [do toho cvičení] zblbnul, protože
jednou jsem v tom stanu nějak usnul a někdo přišel, ještě nějak večer, a já jsem vstal a začal
cvičit. […] Děda prosazoval řád, nechci říct dril vojenskej, ne, to rozhodně ne. […] Já na to
vzpomínám velmi dobře, protože celá ta atmosféra těch Mirotic mi především změnila život.
Dodnes projíždím Miroticema dojatej. Vzpomínám na nejrůznější události, který jsem tam
prožil, protože třeba v Miroticích teče říčka Lomnice. Říčka Lomnice [v zimě] zamrzá a děda,
když viděl, jak tam na těch šlajfkách bruslíme, tak v podstatě říkal: ‚Hele, budeme to dělat
pořádně,‘ a koupil mi něco, co byla tehdy neuvěřitelná bomba – koupil mi kanady. V podstatě
moje první kroky na bruslích [jsem podnikl s dědou].492 Děda mě třeba držel a pomáhal mi,
i když kulhal, tak mě dovedl k tomu břehu a pomáhal mi s prvními kroky na tom ledě. […]
Jednou jsem přišel do školy a měl jsem v ruce plnicí pero [od dědy]. To nikdo [z dětí]
v Miroticích neměl, všechny děti psaly perem, co se namáčelo do kalamáře. Já jedinej jsem
měl plničku. Kvůli mně zasedl pedagogický sbor a hlasovali, jestli tím můžu psát, ale ředitel
byl osvícený, moudrý a měl mě rád a řekl: ‚Pokrok nezastavíme, budeš psát plničkou‘ […]
Dědovi jsem se i třeba svěřoval, věci jsem nesvěřoval konzervativní babičce, ale dědovi.“493
Vzpomínky Milana Jirky na dědečka umožnily částečně nahlédnout i do generálova
soukromého života. Kromě rodiny a práce v civilním sektoru se však Josef Bartík naplno
věnoval ještě jedné činnosti: bezprostředně po svém propuštění se rozhodl oficiální cestou

490 Podporučík letectva v záloze František Famfule byl bývalý příslušník 311. bombardovací peruti. Po válce
pracoval jako šéf dopravy v rámci vodního díla Orlík.
491 Archiv autora (dále AA), Řízený rozhovor s Milanem Jirkou ze dne 20. října 2010.
492 Milan Jirka mladší se později profesionálně věnoval hokeji.
493 AA, Řízený rozhovor s Milanem Jirkou ze dne 20. října 2010.
97
bojovat za svoji rehabilitaci. Již v červnu 1955 adresoval prezidentovi republiky Antonínu
Zápotockému pětistránkovou písemnou žádost o revizi řízení, kterou zakončil prosbou:
„Prosím proto, pane presidente, abyste rozhodl i o mé žádosti o revidování nebo zahlazení
mého odsouzení. Věřím, že Vaším zákrokem, pane presidente, dostane se mi stejného práva
a spravedlnosti.“494 Po neúspěšném pokusu u prezidenta republiky podal Josef Bartík návrh
na obnovení řízení k soudu. Žádostí se zabýval Nižší vojenský soud (v roce 1956), Vyšší
vojenský soud (v roce 1957) a nakonec i Nejvyšší vojenský soud (v roce 1958), přičemž
v každé soudní instanci byl návrh na obnovu řízení zamítnut jako neodůvodněný.495
Na tomto místě je třeba konstatovat, že v padesátých letech ještě neuzrála vhodná doba
k rehabilitacím lidí odsouzených v politických procesech; k pozvolnému obratu došlo až
v druhé polovině let šedesátých. Bohužel ne všichni perzekvovaní měli takové štěstí jako
Josef Bartík, aby se své rehabilitace dožili. Spousta neprávem odsouzených a vězněných byla
v té době již dávno po smrti.
Dne 1. července 1965 vyneslo prezidium Nejvyššího soudu rozsudek, v němž zrušilo
původní rozhodní NVS z roku 1958 a zároveň přikázalo Vyššímu vojenskému soudu (VVS)
v Příbrami, aby v potřebném rozsahu vše znovu projednal a rozhodl.496 VVS v Příbrami
vyslechl celou řadu svědků. Dne 24. listopadu 1965 soud povolil obnovu soudního řízení ve
prospěch Josefa Bartíka. Hlavní líčení se konalo hned druhý den, 25. listopadu 1965.
Soudnímu senátu předsedal pplk. justice JUDr. Karel Tibitanzl. Josef Bartík před soudem
vypověděl: „Necítím se vinen. Materiály, které jsem odnesl domů, nebyly úřední dokumenty,
neobsahovaly podle mého názoru státní, ani jiné tajemství. Obvinění o tom, že jsem nekonal
řádně svou práci jako vedoucí odboru pro politické zpravodajství se nezakládá na pravdě. Mé
obvinění bylo vyvoláno především vlivem Bedřicha Pokorného, který nepostupoval
poctivě.“497 Rozsudek byl vynesen ještě téhož dne: „Po poradě s přerušeným jednáním
vyhlásil předseda senátu rozsudek, jímž se obžalovaný podle § 226 písm. b) tr. ř. zprošťuje
žaloby vrchního vojenského prokurátora Praha čj. Ztr 264/48- 25 a ze dne 5. 4. 1948“498
Po sedmnácti letech od svého odsouzení tedy Josef Bartík dosáhl rehabilitace. Dne

června 1967 oslavil – teď již jako generálmajor ve výslužbě
499 – své sedmdesáté
narozeniny, ale jeho život se tou dobou již pomalu chýlil ke konci. Perzekvovaného
a rehabilitovaného generála dostihla rakovina. Srpnových událostí roku 1968 se již naštěstí
nedočkal; sám ostatně ani nevěřil, že období „Pražského jara“ bude moci pokračovat.500
Těžké nemoci Josef Bartík podlehl dne 18. května 1968. Smuteční obřad se uskutečnil
května ve strašnickém krematoriu v Praze a kromě nejbližších příbuzných se jej zúčastnili

494 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – spis 1T15/65, Žádost a revizi řízení nebo zahlazení odsouzení
adresovaná prezidentu republiky Antonínovi Zápotockému, 6. 6. 1955, s. 6.
495 Jednotlivé soudní spisy jsou součástí spisu z roku 1965. Viz VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram –
1T15/65.
496 VÚA-SA AČR Olomouc, spis VVS Příbram – spis 1T15/65, Rozsudek prezidia nejvyššího soudu, 1.
července 1965.
497 Tamtéž, Protokol o hlavním líčení, 25. 11 1965, s. 2.
498 Tamtéž, s. 6.
499 V roce 1953 byly československé vojenské hodnosti reorganizovány podle sovětského vzoru. Hodnost
brigádního generála byla zrušena a nahrazena hodností generálmajora.
500 AA, Řízený rozhovor s Milanem Jirkou ze dne 20. října 2010.
98
také „italští legionáři, vojáci první republiky, zahraniční vojáci II. odboje a osobní
přátelé.“501 Autor nekrologu, který vyšel v Hlasu revoluce,502 v závěru textu konstatoval:
„Škoda, že nepřišel zástupce MNO, škoda, že nepřišla mládež, odcházel totiž moudrý muž
a vlastenec. Bez úcty k práci a čistotě mužů, jako byl generál Bartík, jsou řeči o lásce k vlasti
planým klábosením.“503 Pohřben byl na hřbitově ve své rodné obci, ve Stachách na Šumavě.
Jeho manželka Libuše, která stála po jeho boku celý život a byla mu oporou
v nejtěžších chvílích, ho následovala až o dvacet let později. Zemřela v roce 1988 ve věku
osmaosmdesáti let.504
Na onen svět následoval Josef Bartík nejen svého bývalého „šéfa“, generála Františka
Moravce,505 ale i hlavního viníka své perzekuce – Bedřicha Pokorného. Ten ukončil svůj
život dobrovolně. Události začínajícího „Pražského jara“ nesl velmi těžce; dne 31. března
1968 byl nalezen mrtev v lese v blízkosti města Brna. Příčinou jeho smrti byla sebevražda
oběšením.506

501 Gen Bartík odešel. Hlas revoluce 21, 31. 5. 1968, č. 11, s. 2.
502 Čtrnáctideník Svazu protifašistických bojovníků.
503 Gen Bartík odešel. Hlas revoluce 21, 31. 5. 1968, č. 11, s. 2.
504 Viz AA, Řízený rozhovor s Milanem Jirkou ze dne 24. listopadu 2010.
505 Generál Moravec zemřel dne 27. července 1966 ve Washingtonu, při cestě na své pracoviště v Pentagonu.
506 DVOŘÁKOVÁ, Jiřina: Bedřich Pokorný – vzestup a pád. Sborník AMV 2, 2004, s. 240, 264.
99
Závěr
Takto se vyjádřil o Bartíkově úmrtí jeho přítel Václav Černý: „Roku 1968 zemřel.
Paměti nenapsal, Bartík byl člověk fantasticky mlčenlivý a uzavřený – nabytý povahový
důsledek jeho celoživotní profese – a bohužel i aliterární: nejvěrnější, nejúplnější dějiny
tajností našich osudů jeho let zanikly s ním.“507
Hlavním cílem předkládané práce bylo na základě archivního výzkumu zachytit
a pokusit se rekonstruovat složité životní osudy Josefa Bartíka. Kolik toho tato práce odhalila
z „dějin tajností našich osudů“ a kolik toho skutečně zaniklo spolu s generálem, musí již
posoudit čtenář sám. Přirozeně – s ohledem na dochované prameny – zde některé věci zůstaly
pouze načrtnuty. Není však vyloučeno, že je bude možné v budoucnu po případném objevení
dalších relevantních pramenů rozšířit.
Josef Bartík působil v armádě od svých osmnácti let. Byly to právě události Velké
války, které změnily jeho život. Následky válečného zranění mu v podobě kulhání zůstaly po
zbytek života. Aktivní účast v prvním odboji ho zároveň předurčila ke kariéře důstojníka
z povolání, který se již v polovině 30. let zapojil do boje s nacismem, konkrétně na poli
zpravodajství. Do druhého odboje odešel již 14. března 1939; dřívějším datem odchodu se
z vojenských osobností mohl pochlubit málokdo. Během druhé světové války Bartíkova
vojenská kariéra vrcholila, zároveň však do jeho života zasáhla i rodinná tragédie – smrt
dcery. Bezprostředně po skončení války dosáhl Josef Bartík generálské hodnosti, jeho další
kariéru na MV i v armádě přerušily únorové události roku 1948.
Během své vojenské kariéry byl Josef Bartík dvakrát vězněn. Poprvé ve 30. letech
v Rakousku, podruhé v letech 1948-1953 v komunistickém Československu. Druhý pobyt ve
vězení byl nepochybně horší, neboť Bartíka uvěznil stát, za jehož zájmy bojoval ve dvou
světových válkách (a právě pro tento boj byl ve 30. letech zatčen).
Josef Bartík, na rozdíl od velkého množství ostatních perzekvovaných odbojářů, měl
to štěstí, že se dožil své rehabilitace. Uznání jeho celoživotní práce pro Československo
v podobě nejvyššího státního vyznamenání však přišlo až třicet let po jeho smrti,
v obnoveném demokratickém státě. Dne 28. října 1998 prezident republiky Václav Havel
propůjčil generálmajoru Josefu Bartíkovi Řád bílého lva III. třídy vojenské skupiny „in
memoriam za vynikající velitelskou a bojovou činnost.“508
Řád převzala z prezidentových rukou ve Vladislavském sále Pražského hradu
generálova dcera Draga S. Kellick (rozená Bartíková). Ta se později v tisku vyjádřila, že toto
vyznamenání chápe „jako ocenění práce nejen svého otce, ale i celé skupiny níže
jmenovaných zpravodajských důstojníků působících v letech 1939-1945 ve Velké
Británii…“509 Následovalo všech deset dalších členů „jedenáctky“ včetně generála Františka
Moravce a také Alois Čáslavka.510 Josef Bartík je doposud jediným mužem ze zpravodajské

507 ČERNÝ, Václav: Paměti III (1945-1972). Brno 1992, s. 327.
508 SDMJ, Pozůstalost Josefa Bartíka, Fotografie dekretu k Řádu bílého lva.
509 Tamtéž, Kanadské listy, březen/duben 1999, s. 24.
510 Viz také Přílohy, IV. Výběr z dokumentů, dokument č. 20.
100
„jedenáctky“, jemuž se dostalo pocty v podobě nejvyššího státního vyznamenání. Proto jsou
citovaná slova paní Dragy S. Kellick aktuální i dnes.
Úplným závěrem nezbývá než vyjádřit přání, aby se i ostatní zpravodajští důstojníci
z „jedenáctky“ v budoucnu dočkali historiografického zpracování v podobě specializované
studie či monografie.
101
Přehled použitých pramenů a literatury
Prameny
Archiv Bezpečnostních složek Praha
fond 302 (Hlavní správa vojenské kontrarozvědky)
fond H (Historický fond; a. č. H-664)
fond Z (Mapy zpráv zpracované Studijním ústavem MV)
zvláštní vyšetřovací spis ZV – 4 MV (Bedřich Pokorný)
Národní archiv Praha
fond Ministerstvo vnitra Londýn (fond č. 828)
fond Archiv ÚV KSČ (Politické procesy)
fond Archiv Huberta Ripky (fond č. 1)
fond Svaz protifašistických bojovníků – ústřední výbor Praha (pozůstalost Františka Moravce)
Vojenský ústřední archiv – Vojenský historický archiv Praha
fond Kvalifikačních listin
fond Legionářský poslužný spis
fond Osobní karta legionáře
fond Divizní soud Praha
sbírka 20 (Ministerstvo národní obrany Londýn)
sbírka 24 (Náhradní těleso ve Velké Británii)
sbírka 37 (Velitelství vojenské zpravodajské služby)
Vojenský ústřední archiv – Správní archiv Armády České republiky Olomouc
spis Vyššího vojenského soud Příbram 1T15/65 (součástí tohoto spisu je i spis Vrchního
vojenského soudu Praha Ztr 264/48-III.)
Soukromá dokumentace Milana Jirky
Pozůstalost Josefa Bartíka
Státní oblastní archiv Praha
fond Mimořádný lidový soud Praha
102
Edice pramenů
ČECHUROVÁ, Jana – KUKLÍK, Jan – ČECHURA, Jaroslav – NĚMEČEK, Jan (Edd.):
Válečné deníky Jana Opočenského. Praha 2001.
GAJAN, Koloman a kolektiv (Edd.): Německý imperialismus proti ČSR (1918-1939). Praha
1962.
VYKUSA, Karel (Ed.): Zpověď K. H. Franka. Podle vlastních výpovědí v době vazby u
krajského soudu trestního na Pankráci. Praha 1946.
Dobový tisk
Hlas revoluce.
Mladá fronta.
Svět v obrazech.
Svobodné slovo.
Rozhovory
Řízený rozhovor s Milanem Jirkou ze dne 20. října 2010.
Řízený rozhovor s Milanem Jirkou ze dne 24. listopadu 2010.
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107
Seznam použitých zkratek
ABS – Archiv bezpečnostních složek
a. č. – archivní číslo
AJČ – Archiv Jaroslava Čvančary
arm. gen. – armádní generál
brig. gen. – brigádní generál
čs., čsl. – československý
ČSVS – Československá vojenská správa (oficiální název: Národní výbor československý –
Vojenská správa)
div. gen. – divizní generál
Dr. – doktor
gen. – generál
gestapo – Geheime Staatspolizei (Tajná státní policie)
gšt. – generálního štábu
hl. št. – Hlavní štáb
HaV – Historie a vojenství
IS – Intelligence service (britská tajná služba)
JUDr. – doktor obojího práva
konc. – konceptní
kpt. – kapitán
KSČ – Komunistická strana Československa
MI-5 – Millitary Inteligence – sekce 5 (britská vojenská vnitrostátní zpravodajská služba)
mjr. – major
MLS – Mimořádný lidový soud
MNO – Ministerstvo národní obrany
MV – Ministerstvo vnitra
NA – Národní archiv
npor. – nadporučík
NSDAP – Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei – Národně socialistická německá
strana dělnická (nacistická strana)
NVS – Nejvyšší vojenský soud
odd. – oddělení
OBZ – Obranné zpravodajství
108
OKV – Odvolací kárný výbor
ON – Obrana národa
OZ – Obrané zpravodajství
p. pl. – pěší pluk
plk. – plukovník
ppor. – podporučík
pplk. – podplukovník
por. – poručík
pozn. PK – poznámka Pavla Kreisingera (autora)
PAÚ – Předsunutá agenturní ústředna
Sb. – Sbírka zákonů
SD – Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführer der SS (Bezpečnostní služba říšského vedoucího SS;
nacistická zpravodajská služba)
SDMJ – Soukromá dokumentace Milana Jirky
SOA – Státní oblastní archiv
SS – Schutzstaffel (ochranný oddíl; nacistická zločinecká organizace)
SSSR – Svaz sovětských socialistických republik
StB – Státní bezpečnost
šrtm. – štábní rotmistr
škpt. – štábní kapitán
TNP – Tábory nucené práce
ÚV – ústřední výbor
v. v. – ve výslužbě
v zál. – v záloze
VÚA-VHA – Vojenský ústřední archiv – Vojenský historický archiv
VÚA-SA AČR – Vojenský ústřední archiv – Správní archiv Armády České republiky
VŠV – Vysoká škola válečná
VVS – Vyšší vojenský soud
VZ – Výzvědné zpravodajství
ZOB – Zemský odbor bezpečnosti
poznámka: Při přejímání citací z literatury je poznámka pod čarou uvedena slovy „Citováno podle…“
109
Přílohy
I. Důstojnické hodnosti Josefa Bartíka
kadet aspirant (důstojnický čekatel) 3. 4. 1918
poručík 4. 8. 1918
nadporučík 15. 10. 1918
kapitán 1. 5. 1919
štábní kapitán konceptní služby 4. 2. 1927 (s účinností od 3. 12. 1926)
major konceptní služby 1. 1. 1935
podplukovník konceptní služby 7. 3. 1941
plukovník konceptní služby 7. 3. 1945
brigádní generál 1. 8. 1945
generálmajor v. v. od roku 1965 (po rehabilitaci)
110
II. Výběr z řádů a vyznamenání, která Josef Bartík obdržel
Poznámka: v závorce uveden rok udělení (je-li znám)
Italský válečný kříž za statečnost (1918)
Italská medaile pro válečné zásluhy (1918)
Československý válečný kříž 1918 (1919)
Československá revoluční medaile (1922)
Spojenecká medaile vítězství (1922)
Italská pamětní medaile (1926)
Řecká medaile za vojenské zásluhy (1931)
Francouzské vyznamenání „Ľ officier ď academie“ (1935)
Řád Rumunské koruny
Jugoslávský řád „Hvězda“
Polský řád „Polonia Restituta“
Československá vojenská medaile za zásluhy I. stupně (1944)
Československý válečný kříž 1939
Československá medaile za chrabrost
Československá vojenská pamětní medaile se štítkem (Francie, Velká Británie, Londýn)
Britský řád „Order of the British Empire – Officer“ (OBE)

es Binar et al.
ARMED FORCES AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATE Part II(A)

Ales Binar et al.
ARMED FORCES AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATE Part II

November 15, 2021 xavierjamesproductions

CZECHOSLOVAK MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGAINST GERMANY IN THE YEARS 1932 TO 1938. STRATEGY, RESOURCES AND RESULTS
The onset of the general crisis in international relations caused the growing importance of the information component of government decision-making processes and the highest military command structures in the early 1930s. The importance of information increased both in the so-called revisionist states, ie those that sought to reverse the general order after the First World War, as well as in countries that did not want changes in this area, because they affected their basic existential interests. In addition to the standard sources of civilian diplomacy, the findings of military intelligence agencies occupied an essential place here. They were especially important in terms of their ability to predict future developments and decide accordingly on the overall concept of foreign policy and, in its spirit, on the necessary measures of a military nature. Thus, military intelligence formed one of the fundamental components of the creation of military strategy.
In the specific case of Czechoslovakia, military intelligence played a direct initiating role in a number of events. This is especially true in the case of extraordinary military measures from May to June 1938 and in the events that immediately preceded the occupation of the Czech lands on March 15, 1939. in relation to the defense of the state. Among other things, the very factual acceptance of the first so-called British-French plan and shortly afterwards the results of the Munich Conference by the Czechoslovak president and government in September 1938 included responsible respect for the military intelligence picture of the overall strategic situation in which Czechoslovakia was at the time .2
1 The extraordinary importance of military intelligence in the conditions of escalation of international tensions in the 1930s is very comprehensively reflected in a study published on March 3, 1938 within the 2nd (Intelligence) Department of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces as a summary of modernized intelligence doctrine for the operational apparatus. See: VÚA-VHA, Military Funds of the Study Institute of the Ministry of the Interior (FMSÚMV), archival collection (as) No. 37 – Military Intelligence Headquarters, sign. 37-153-42, News report, sheet number (No. 1) 8-41. The system of progressive methods to minimize the risk of sudden attack is contained in the Armed Forces Service Book, G-XI-1 Border Security, published in 1937 (effective February 15, 1938).
2 It was precisely this fundamental aspect that was significantly touched upon by Ferdinand Peroutka, a highly dedicated commentator of contemporary political events, in his remarkable reflection on the autumn crisis of 1938. With only
54
Definition of the topic, methodology and results of previous research
The aim of this chapter is to present a generalized and overlooked balance of the results of the work of Czechoslovak military intelligence against Germany from 1932 to 1938. This approach, which is not limited to the dramatic finale of the time period, allows you to deal in more detail with the 1932 to 1934. in the fact that a groundbreaking regime change took place in Germany during this period, which, given its fundamental influence on the military potential of the Empire, forms a very remarkable section in terms of the history of military intelligence. An analysis of this type has not yet been carried out in historiography.
In the context of this article, the phrase “military intelligence” primarily expresses its offensive sector and analytical component. In a specific organizational sense, they were represented at the top level of the army hierarchy by the B-search group and especially its offensive section P-1, which were key operational units of the 2nd (Intelligence) Department of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. For the analysis and evaluation of reports, the competent group A – the study and planning department of the same department, which with the specialized German and later also the aviation section formed the analytical section of the top intelligence apparatus for working with information about Germany. Reports from all available sources were accumulated in the mentioned workplaces and they were further worked on. Offensive resources were also used in a very significant way, especially in the years 1932 to 1934 2.
The research of military intelligence of the interwar period can be carried out in three consecutive stages. The first and basic stage form a necessary prerequisite for any further conceptual research work. Its goal is to know the internal structures, functions and methods of operation of the military intelligence system. Considerable work has been done in this field so far.3
At a minimal distance from that time, he was able to maintain an unprecedentedly objective view on January 4, 1939, which, however, respected both the tense emotional component of the events that had only briefly subsided and the relentless rational point of view. He reflected on the immense responsibility of the president, the government and also the military command in a situation where Czechoslovakia was denied allied support. Understanding the substance of the matter, he wrote: “Czech leaders were determined to lead the nation into a war more difficult. But they backed away from leading him to suicide. When our feelings calm down, it will not serve them to shame. At such moments, those who have more information must undoubtedly decide, even against the emotional and aroused voice of the nation, which rises from the square – in the interests of that very nation [underlined by K. Straka]. It is up to them to decide even if they set up a tombstone over their reputation for a while, even if they were misunderstood and insulted. ” Cited by: Ferdinand PEROUTKA, Had a war broke out… Presence 1939, No. 1, p. 1.
3 The first results of scientific research in Czechoslovak intelligence from the interwar twenties were published in the second half of the 1980s. At that time, valuable foundations were laid for a thorough knowledge, especially of the organizational development of the intelligence apparatus of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. See: Jan GEBHART – Jan KUKLIK, The struggle for Czechoslovakia in the field of intelligence in the second half of the 1930s. HaV 1988, No. 1, pp. 88-112; TITÍŽ, The struggle for Czechoslovakia in the field of intelligence in the second half of the 1930s (II). HaV 1988, No. 3, pp. 41-66. He concretized the knowledge and moved it further: Jaroslav KOKOŠKA-MALÍŘ, Czechoslovak Organization. military offensive intelligence in the years 1934-1939 (I.) Hav 1989, No. 6, pp. 51-65; TÝŽ, Organizace čs. military offensive intelligence in the years 1934-1939 (II.) Hav 1990, No. 1, pp. 34-48. The work was also important for the mentioned initial stage: Jaroslav KOKOŠKA – Stanislav KOKOŠKA, Dispute about Agent A-54. Capitols
55 The
aim of the second research phase is to evaluate the reports obtained mainly by secret agency means, which were mostly the only ones to allow access to key
from the history of the Czechoslovak intelligence service. Naše vojsko, Prague 1994. These pioneering outcomes were suitably followed by: Zdeněk TITL, Reconstruction of the Development of the Organizational Structure and Personnel of Czechoslovak Intelligence (until March 15, 1939). Study aid. General Staff, Inspectorate of the Military Intelligence Service of the Army of the Czech Republic, Prague 1995. Special focus is: S. KOKOŠKA, Czechoslovak Military Intelligence in 1938. Proceedings of the Military Academy in Brno 1999, No. 2, pp. 97-100. A more recent generally conceived presentation of the issue is provided by: Miloslav ČAPLOVIČ, Organization and Activities of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service in the Years 1919-1939. In: Bohumila FERENČUHOVÁ et al., Slovakia and the World in the 20th Century. Chapters on the 70th birthday of PhDr. Valerián Bystrický, DrSc. Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences – Prodama, Bratislava 2006, pp. 80-97. Further clarification is provided by: Milan VYHLÍDAL, Czechoslovak military intelligence after the events of Munich in 1938. Search Center for Subcarpathian Russia. In: Securitas imperii (SI) 34/1. ÚSTR, Prague 2019, pp. 46-61. With extensive use of previously unknown sources, the following contributions were made: Karel STRAKA, Czechoslovak Agency Network. armies in Bohemia and Germany (1937-1938). HaV 2012, No. 4, pp. 46-66; TÝŽ, Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Agency Network from 1933-1939. Intelligence headquarters. Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic – Military Historical Institute Prague, Prague 2017. Another part of the current production has also begun to pay more attention to cooperation with foreign partners and special activities of the Czechoslovak military intelligence authorities abroad. See: S. KOKOŠKA, Czechoslovak-Soviet intelligence cooperation in the years 1936-1941. HaV 1997, No. 5, pp. 37-52; ALSO, In neutral territory. Czechoslovak Intelligence Branch in The Hague 1936-1940. History and the Present (DaS) 2008, No. 9, pp. 41-43; K. STRAKA, Czechoslovak and French military intelligence in the years 1933-1938. HaV 2009, No. 2, pp. 32-65; TÝŽ, Czechoslovak and Polish Military Intelligence in the Context of Alliance with France in the 1930s. In: Zbigniew NAWROCKI (ed.), Secret War. II From the events of the II. Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2015, pp. 729-744; M. VYHLÍDAL, Forgotten Mission Maj. Karel Vosátka, contribution to the functioning of Czechoslovak intelligence before World War II. In: Proceedings of the Faculty of Education, Masaryk University – Social Sciences Series (SPPFMU-SV) 2017, No. 1, pp. 41-50; Matej MEDVECKÝ – M. VYHLÍDAL, Czech Office. military attaché in Berlin in the crisis of 1938 in the light of an unknown document. Military History (VH) 2018, No. 4, pp. 132-159. Most recently: K. STRAKA, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance. Czechoslovak-French Cooperation in Military Intelligence in the Years 1932-1938. In: SI 35/2. ÚSTR, Prague 2019, pp. 12-49. The results so far, especially in the structural field, are also accompanied by mostly valuable findings in numerous biographies of important personalities of Czechoslovak military intelligence. See: Jiří ŠOLC, In the Service of the President. General František Moravec in the light of archival documents. Vyšehrad, Prague 1994. In the reissue, see: TÝŽ, Po boku předsedaa. General František Moravec and his intelligence service in the light of archival documents. Our Army, Prague 2007; ALSO, General Paratroopers. HaV 1996, No. 4, pp. 156-177; Pavel KREISINGER, Brigadier General Josef Bartík. Intelligence officer and participant in the first and second Czechoslovak resistance. Prague 2011. For Bartík’s person, see also: TÝŽ, Intelligence Officer from Šumava. Brigadier General Josef Bartík (1897-1968). In: Šumava in the changes of time. Revue Jungbauerova Šumavského vlastivědného spolek 2014, No. 1, pp. 102-127; TÝŽ – M. VYHLÍDAL, The Life Fates of General Josef Zuzka (1902-1978). From an artillery officer through the intelligence department of the General Staff and the Nazi Prison to Egypt (Part I). HaV 2015, No. 1, pp. 64-76; TIEŽŽ, From an artillery officer through the intelligence department of the General Staff and the Nazi Prison to Egypt (Part II). HaV 2015, No. 2, pp. 90-99. Further: P. KREISINGER, Colonel of the General Staff Jan Krček (1901-1961). The long journey of a participant in the foreign resistance (commanders Gabčík and Kubiš) to rehabilitation. HaV 2017, No. 4, pp. 70-83; M. VYHLÍDAL, The first of three councilors. Intelligence Officer Staff Captain František Fárek (1894-1973). VH 2019, No. 1, pp. 123-145; TÝŽ, General Jan Reindl (1902-1981). Aviator, reporter, participant in the anti-Nazi resistance and commander of aviation instructors in Egypt. Svět křídel, Cheb 2018; TÝŽ, Intelligence Officer Col. gšt. František Havel (1896-1977), contribution to the functioning of military intelligence in the second half of the 1930s. HaV 2019, No. 2, pp. 45-65. century. HaV 2019, No. 2, pp. 45-65. century. HaV 2019, No. 2, pp. 45-65.
56
classified information of the States of interest. This mainly includes a comparison of the content of preserved reports with objectively documented historical reality. The news image is compared here with the results of modern research, based on the principles of critical scientific work. However, a specific aspect of the whole issue also belongs to this stage, and thus there is an unintentional or rather unconscious shift in the interpretation of the content of the reports. However, the factor of conscious, and thus deliberate, interpretation of reports, based on a certain pre-existing need and interest of those subjects who had the opportunity to influence their nature before further use, also plays an important role here. It is therefore a study of a specific interpretive aspect of information matter. At a given stage, this specific aspect concerns the processors of the relevant material, ie the military intelligence community, defined by the organizational and service framework of the 2nd Department of the General Staff and its subordinate units. Recent research has already indicated and convincingly demonstrated relatively severe symptoms in this regard. Significantly, they do not only concern the period until the break-up of the republic and the occupation of the Czech lands in March 1939. They were significantly reflected in the exile military intelligence during the Second World War.4
The third, peak stage can then be characterized as the study of the use of information outputs of the military intelligence apparatus by the highest military command and then, above all, decisive, and therefore determining, political and governmental places. The aim of the research in this stage is to answer the most important question, ie how, to what extent and with what consequences the military information system influenced the results of its work decision-making processes at the level of the highest executive of the Czechoslovak state.
This article summarizes the knowledge from the level of the second of the outlined stages. It was possible to make progress on it, especially after the recent refinement and detailed reconstruction of the organization and composition of the agency network, working in the 1930s mainly against Germany and also Austria. Now, the size and composition of its most valuable core, consisting of a secret agency, managed directly by the operational bodies of the P-1 offensive group of the B-search Group 2 of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces, has been substantially reconstructed and evaluated.5
In connection with interwar Czechoslovakia, military intelligence research finds itself in very specific heuristic conditions. The documents of the 2nd Department of the General Staff were exposed to extremely severe shredding interventions. The spring base, preserved in the Czech Republic, therefore suffers from considerable torsion. Under these unfavorable conditions, it is therefore necessary to look elsewhere. The materials that Czechoslovak military intelligence shared with allies or allied countries proved to be a key source that has considerable potential to replace lost sources. The method of systematic search for alternative sources was confirmed in the case of the Czechoslovak-French intelligence cooperation from the interwar period. This article is also based on reflections on the activities of Czechoslovak military intelligence, as recorded
4 For more details see: K. STRAKA, Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Agency Network, pp. 261-277.
5 The most important findings are contained in the following works: J. KOKOŠKA – S. KOKOŠKA, Dispute over Agent A-54; S. KOKOŠKA, Some Notes on the Czechoslovak Partial Mobilization in May 1938. In: Tribute to Professor Jan Kuklík. Karolinum, Prague 1998, pp. 99-114; ALSO Before the war broke out. Germans in the service of Czechoslovakia. intelligence services in the years 1935-1939, DaS 2007, No. 4, pp. 37-40; K. STRAKA, Czechoslovak Agency Network armies in the Czech Republic and Germany; TÝŽ, Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Agency Network; M. VYHLÍDAL, Franz Dobianer’s intelligence tipping event. An example of the work of Czechoslovak intelligence before World War II. SPPFMU-SV 2018, No. 2, pp. 76-83.
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cooperating units of the Polish army from the period of relatively intensive professional military contacts of both countries from the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s.
German military potential in the most important findings of Czechoslovak military intelligence
The activities of military intelligence were based on the Czechoslovak military strategy of the interwar period. Until the mid-1920s, Czechoslovakia’s military strategy was determined by a close connection to the then sharply anti-German strategy of France. With the weakening of French influence in Central Europe after 1925, the Czechoslovak military strategy gradually emancipated itself from its original anti-German orientation. A truly purely Czechoslovak military strategy was increasingly being profiled against Hungary’s efforts to revise the post-war order.6 During the 1920s, Czechoslovak military intelligence became more and more oriented towards Hungary. Work against Germany has not developed and stagnated in this context. The supply of essential information was provided between 1919 and 1926 by the General Staff of the French Army through the French Military Mission in the Czechoslovak Republic.7 Other important information came from the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission. Until 1927, it oversaw compliance with and compliance with the military, naval and aviation clauses of Part V of the Versailles Peace Treaty of June 28, 1919.8 The relatively low-intensity Czechoslovak information interest in Germany conditioned the political priorities of Czechoslovak foreign policy. In the late 1920s, she sought a completely conflict-free neighborhood, which was to be confirmed by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.9 part of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919.8 Relatively low-intensity own Czechoslovak information interest in Germany conditioned the political priorities of Czechoslovak foreign policy. In the late 1920s, she sought a completely conflict-free neighborhood, which was to be confirmed by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.9 part of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919.8 Relatively low-intensity own Czechoslovak information interest in Germany conditioned the political priorities of Czechoslovak foreign policy. In the late 1920s, she sought a completely conflict-free neighborhood, which was to be confirmed by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.9
At this point, it is necessary to ask the question when and under what circumstances Czechoslovak military intelligence began to escalate and expand attention also in relation to Germany. The first truly significant security threat in Czechoslovakia was the attempt to close the German-Austrian customs union, averted in the summer of 1931.10 In response to these events, the first initiatives in the field of modernization of the intelligence apparatus became apparent. At the initiative of Col. rammer. Mojmír Soukup, head of the B-search group of the 2nd Division of the General Staff, was soon after the establishment of the first so-called agency search center focusing on Germany. Soukup applied the method in Czechoslovak conditions
6 A summary of the development of the Czechoslovak military strategy is contained in the study: K. STRAKA, Minister of National Defense František Udržal and the Defense Strategy of the Czechoslovak Republic from 1921-1929. In: Jaroslav ROKOSKÝ – Jiří URBAN et al., František Udržal. Peasant and statesman. Vyšehrad, Prague 2016, pp. 103-126.
7 An early document of this fact is provided by: VÚA-VHA, f. Francouzská vojenská mise, karton (kart.) 10 – Note au sujet des militaires de l’Allemagne at the date of 30 July 1919.
8 The primary sources of Czechoslovak provenance for this period are absent. Due to this, the references of the representatives of the Polish military intelligence on the findings of the 2nd Department of the Czechoslovak General Staff at the time of the mutual exchange of information about Germany from 1927-1934 are of significant substitution importance. See: Polish-Czechoslovak military contacts 1921-1938 in the documents of the declaration and division II Rzeczypospolitej. Ed. Piotr KOŁAKOWSKI. Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, Warsaw 2018, doc. 67, p. 177.
9 On this issue, see in particular: Dagmar MORAVCOVÁ, Czechoslovakia, Germany and European movements 1929-1932. Institute for Central European Culture and Politics, Prague 2001, pp. 68-78. And more recently: Jindřich DEJMEK, Edvard Beneš. Political biography of a Czech democrat. Part One Revolutionary and Diplomat (1884-1935). Karolinum, Prague 2006, pp. 450-452.
10 This issue is very aptly discussed in particular by: Jiří KOVTUN, The Republic in a Dangerous World. The era of President Masaryk 1918-1933. Torst, Prague 2005, pp. 663-677.
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decentralization of the management of the operational activities of the offensive intelligence apparatus, which he became acquainted with in the framework of the then Czechoslovak-Polish intelligence cooperation.11 The effectiveness of these progressive measures was confirmed in many respects in the following years. During them, the entire offensive apparatus expanded towards all states of interest. In the most developed phase before Munich, it consisted of three agency search centers. Each of them managed a network of advanced agency exchanges. The construction of foreign advanced agency exchanges was also started, which was later supplemented by the offices of military attachés with special tasks in the field of offensive intelligence.12
The need to increase intelligence interest in Germany was confirmed in the context of the Geneva Arms Reduction and Reduction Conference, which took place in February 1932. The German demand for arms equality, the so-called Gleichberechtigung, was considered particularly risky in the future. Although interest in Germany increased, the priority of Czechoslovak military intelligence at the time was still Hungary. The current focus and results of the work against Germany also corresponded to this fact. In connection with it, Czechoslovak military intelligence showed interest primarily in industry with the already established or potentially possible production of military weapons and material. It focused on the covert development of new combat technology. It obtained some important information about German-Soviet military-technical cooperation, including data on events in one of the test facilities in the Soviet Union. The constant of information interest was the issue of covert development and production of chemical warfare toxic substances, the means for their deployment and defense against them. Czechoslovak military intelligence also had relatively good information on Germany’s transport and infrastructure systems, which were of military importance or were remarkable in terms of technical innovations. He was also interested in the doctrine of the Reichswehr, German military thinking and new trends in the training of senior staffs. She monitored the practical application of theoretical innovations relatively systematically during regular and larger military exercises in Germany. Preference, consisting mainly in military-technical issues, were related to relatively good conditions for providing information in this area due to the developed Czechoslovak industry, which had numerous commercial and other ties to Germany. In comparison, however, the then Czechoslovak military intelligence showed certain shortcomings in the precise knowledge of the organization and deployment of the Reichswehr, including the newly established elements. Reserves of this type persisted due to a certain inertia from the times when the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus relied somewhat on the information provided by the aforementioned Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.13 It was not until the early 1930s that the Czechoslovak offensive intelligence apparatus began to monitor the military situation more closely. related to relatively good conditions for providing information in this area due to the developed Czechoslovak industry, which had numerous commercial and other ties to Germany. In comparison, however, the then Czechoslovak military intelligence showed certain shortcomings in the precise knowledge of the organization and deployment of the Reichswehr, including the newly established elements. Reserves of this type persisted due to a certain inertia from the times when the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus relied somewhat on the information provided by the aforementioned Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.13 It was not until the early 1930s that the Czechoslovak offensive intelligence apparatus began to monitor the military situation more closely. related to relatively good conditions for providing information in this area due to the developed Czechoslovak industry, which had numerous commercial and other ties to Germany. In comparison, however, the then Czechoslovak military intelligence showed certain shortcomings in the precise knowledge of the organization and deployment of the Reichswehr, including the newly established elements. Reserves of this type persisted due to a certain inertia from the times when the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus relied somewhat on the information provided by the aforementioned Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.13 It was not until the early 1930s that the Czechoslovak offensive intelligence apparatus began to monitor the military situation more closely. In comparison, however, the then Czechoslovak military intelligence showed certain shortcomings in the precise knowledge of the organization and deployment of the Reichswehr, including the newly established elements. Reserves of this type persisted due to a certain inertia from the times when the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus relied somewhat on the information provided by the aforementioned Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.13 It was not until the early 1930s that the Czechoslovak offensive intelligence apparatus began to monitor the military situation more closely. In comparison, however, the then Czechoslovak military intelligence showed certain shortcomings in the precise knowledge of the organization and deployment of the Reichswehr, including the newly established elements. Reserves of this type persisted due to a certain inertia from the times when the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus relied somewhat on the information provided by the aforementioned Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.13 It was not until the early 1930s that the Czechoslovak offensive intelligence apparatus began to monitor the military situation more closely.
11 P. KOŁAKOWSKI, Między Warsaw and Prague. Polish-Czechoslovak military-political relations 1918-1939. Bellona, Warszawa 2007, p. 338. Polish-Czechoslovak intelligence cooperation lasted in its active form from 1927 to 1934 and was mutually beneficial. It ended due to the different views of the foreign policies of both countries on the development of international relations and the solution of related security problems. The best about this intelligence cooperation so far: Ibid., Pp. 327-355.
12 The most detailed information system of the 1930s on its own territory: Z. TITL, Reconstruction of the development of organizational structure and personnel. On foreign fulcrums most recently and comprehensively: K. STRAKA, Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Agency Network, pp. 305-377.
13 See: Polish-Czechoslovak Military Contacts, doc. 67, pp. 166-167, doc. 85, pp. 219-223 and doc. 93, pp. 248-252.
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in the near and far border of Germany.14 He gradually adapted to the new demands. Nevertheless, in 1932 he was able to obtain credible information about Germany’s violations of the aforementioned military restrictions enshrined in the Treaty of Versailles. These findings were made available to Czechoslovak diplomacy as an information base for participation in the Geneva Conference on Arms Reduction and Limitation.15
The beginnings of systematic intelligence work against Germany from the pre-Hitler era were characterized primarily by a significant overestimation of the mobilization potential and the overall material readiness of the Reichswehr. The intelligence forecast at the time was that the first operations of the future war would be aimed at the elimination of Czechoslovakia by German troops. Hungary and Austria were expected to support them with their intervention. A coalition of anti-revisionist states led by France would lose a strategically important component by defeating Czechoslovakia. It was assumed that Germany would build 21 divisions and three to six cavalry brigades during the first to sixth weeks of mobilization before or during the attacks against Czechoslovakia. The total number of Reichswehr thus mobilized was estimated at 600,000 men. In the sixth to twelfth weeks, the Reichswehr would build another 42 divisions and in the 12th to 16th weeks 63 divisions. In the case of Austria, it was expected to deploy three divisions and during the 14th to 16th days of mobilization three mountain and three motorized brigades. Hungary’s share was estimated at the beginning of the event at seven divisions and in 1933 at 10 divisions. Around the 14th day of mobilization, three to four incomplete divisions could probably be deployed. Seven divisions and one cavalry brigade could be deployed in anti-Czechoslovak actions with limited objectives.16 Compared to the objectively documented reality, these were highly exaggerated assumptions. It was the result of estimates that lacked a real documentary basis.17 Hungary’s share was estimated at the beginning of the event at seven divisions and in 1933 at 10 divisions. Around the 14th day of mobilization, three to four incomplete divisions could probably be deployed. Seven divisions and one cavalry brigade could be deployed in anti-Czechoslovak actions with limited objectives.16 Compared to the objectively documented reality, these were highly exaggerated assumptions. It was the result of estimates that lacked a real documentary basis.17 Hungary’s share was estimated at the beginning of the event at seven divisions and in 1933 at 10 divisions. Around the 14th day of mobilization, three to four incomplete divisions could probably be deployed. Seven divisions and one cavalry brigade could be deployed in anti-Czechoslovak actions with limited objectives.16 Compared to the objectively documented reality, these were highly exaggerated assumptions. It was the result of estimates that lacked a real documentary basis.17
In 1932, Germany was not perceived by Czechoslovak military intelligence only through the prism of a revisionist effort to remove the burden of the Treaty of Versailles. In terms of international comparison, it was already very early and noticeably confronted
14 In connection with this, the witness statement of František Moravec, in the years 1929 to 1934, the head of the 2nd Staff Department of the Provincial Military Headquarters (ZVV) in Prague, can be accepted as an essential source. This part of his memory seems credible after a confrontation with archival sources from the provenance of the 2nd Department of the ZVV staff. See: František MORAVEC, A Spy They Didn’t Believe. Sixty-Eight Publishers, Toronto 1977, pp. 22-24. Intelligence officers Karel Paleček and František Hieke also criticized the lack of operational penetration into Germany at the time in their retrospectives. Cf .: Security Forces Archive (ABS), f. 302 (Main Administration of Military Counterintelligence), sign. 302-57-2 – Protocol written to the MNO – General Staff with Brig. gene. K. Paleček November 23, 1949, No. 34-37. Furthermore, a written record of the memories of Col. rammer. F.
15 Archive of the Academy of Sciences, f. Edvard Beneš, card. 124, sign. R 216/1 – Disarmament Conference January to June 1933, Czechoslovak delegation to the disarmament conference. Military part. No. 44 development. OK 1932 – Violation of peace treaties by Hungary and Germany – reports, Geneva, 13 March 1933.
16 Service historique de la Défense (SHD) / Departement de l’Armee de Terre (DAT), 7 N (État-major de l’Armée et military attachments) 3109, dossier (d.) Hypotheses of European Conflicts 1932, No 2177 / Cab. French Military Mission (November 15, 1932), Meeting between Foreign Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the National Defense and the State Major General, the annual review of the operation plan.
17 According to Maj. gšt. Josef Bulandr, clerk of the German section of the Group A-Study and Planning Department of the General Staff, representatives of Polish military intelligence on the occasion of a joint conference held in Prague from 7 to 11 January 1932. Referring to primary archival sources from the Polish military The report states the following: P. KOŁAKOWSKI, Między Warsawą and Pragą, p. 340.
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with Nazism and its ever-increasing influence. During 1932, the case of the mass paramilitary organization Volkssport culminated in Czechoslovakia.18 The Czechoslovak authorities proved by extensive investigation that it had direct ties not only to the German National Socialist Workers’ Party (DNSAP) in Czechoslovakia, although it declared itself a non-political, but also a non-political the Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei; NSDAP) in Germany, and in particular its strike forces Sturmabteilung – SA. Volkssport was built on their model as a paramilitary entity with a vertical command structure and a regular army-type organization and military training. Its components were directly linked to the structure of the SA and the leading circles of the NSDAP in Germany. The goals of the union were anti-state,
Czechoslovak military intelligence played a decisive role in the convincing of the leaders of Volkssport. As part of the criminal prosecution in this matter, it prepared an expert opinion, which is remarkable for objectively accurate and correct naming of the essence and goals of Nazi ideology. The greetings of military experts20 were based on both open sources and knowledge that was kept in a private regime and did not become part of the criminal record. They relied on the information of the agency network, especially on the entities that managed the bodies of the 2nd Department of the Staff of the Provincial Military Headquarters in Prague under the command of Maj. gšt. František Moravec, Head of Department.21 The military correspondents clearly stated, on the basis of an analysis of the NSDAP program, that this political entity was fighting for the annulment of the Treaty of Versailles, promotes freedom of armaments in order to build a large army and seeks the gradual unification of all Germans, regardless of their current nationality, in a special culturally, economically and socially independent Third Reich. To this end, the NSDAP pursues progressive goals that will be achieved in stages. The first consists in taking complete state power in Germany, the second in establishing a new state and economic order within the country, and the third in the so-called liberation of all Germans and the creation of the Third Reich. According to military correspondents, the party’s program was directed against the integrity of Czechoslovakia, as it provided for the forcible annexation of most of the border areas of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia with German settlement to the future Third Reich. The DNSAP program and Volkssport activities were then assessed by the military report as consistent with the goals of the German-German NSDAP and supportive in their favor. He relied on the separatist goals of the DNSAP, which were aimed at creating and recognizing a closed German settlement, on which the leadership principle would be applied in the spirit of Nazi ideology. Military intelligence emphasized that the de facto state thus created in the state would only be a prelude to the break-up of Czechoslovakia and the incorporation of
18 Full official name of the Volkssport organization (Nationalsozialistischer Verband für Wandern, Radfahren, Spiel und Sport aller Art – National Socialist Association for Wandering, Cycling, Games and Sports of All Kinds). VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Prague, card. 1043, sign. 68-1 / 3-27, OJ II No. 13002 / report. 1932 – Military expert opinion in the criminal case Volkssport – Brno 1932, Satzungen des Verbandes „Volkssport”, Sitz Fulnek.
19 About the whole Volkssport case so far in the most detailed and relevant context: Michal BURIAN, the Sudeten German Nationalist Physical Education Organization and the Czechoslovak State in the years 1918-1938. Karolinum, Prague 2012, pp. 139-170.
20 Maj. gšt. Václav Kopačka, 2nd Department of the ZVV Prague Staff, and Maj. gšt. Jaroslav Hrabovský, 2nd Department of ZVV Brno Staff. See: VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Prague, card. 1043, sign. 68-1 / 3-96, No. 5163 – Ref. hl. no. 2nd dept. 1932 of August 4, 1932.
21 Ibid., Card. 1043, sign. 68-1 / 3-102, OJ II No. 12599 – Report. 1932 of August 12, 1932 – Volkssport – documents.
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separated territory into the Third Reich. From the point of view of the security situation in Czechoslovakia, the position was very warning in relation to SA.22 Military correspondents clearly stated: ). ”23
After the accession of Adolf Hitler to the position of Reich Chancellor, the year 1933 and almost the whole of 1934, from the point of view of Czechoslovak military intelligence, was marked by the primary and literally fundamental question of what the future German defense system would look like. Although he knew the goals of Nazism, at first he was not sure of the true meaning of the first steps of the newly established regime in the military sphere. One of the first significant reactions of military intelligence to major changes in power dates from March 22, 1933. Brig. gene. Vladimír Chalupa, head of the 2nd Department of the General Staff, then gave the intelligence units of the provincial military headquarters the first assessment of recent events. He wrote: “News from Germany after the establishment of the Hitler regime seem to indicate that the military preparations, which have so far been carried out with due regard for foreign opinion, they gain a faster decline due to the personality of Hitler. As of April 1, more changes have been reported from Germany, both in the defense system and in the detailed organization of the army. ”24 Elsewhere, he added:“ Material preparations can be part of the action. 25 He also noted that “We have a report that German industry has received a number of orders from the military administration, which are said to be camouflaged to the public under the pretext of orders for foreign states.” 26 Czechoslovak intelligence analysts admitted that the said preparations may relate to everything that had been banned by the Reichswehr so far, ie accompanying infantry weapons (anti-tank artillery weapons and mortars), armament for field, rough and anti-aircraft artillery, tanks and armored cars, special equipment, especially for anti-aircraft artillery and aviation material.27 Group A-Study and Planning 2nd Division of the General Staff completed highly detailed intelligence questionnaires on the same date. According to them, the offensive units of all levels of command proceeded in removing the mentioned ambiguities.28 It did not take long for the first significant clues to appear. The Group A report of September 4, 1933, already stated: “Germany is on the threshold of war preparations for a new world struggle. The ideal of Great Germany, otherwise called III. Empire, is currently in statu nascendi [in the state of birth, note. author]. ”29 The General Staff Department completed highly detailed intelligence questionnaires by the same date. According to them, the offensive units of all levels of command proceeded in removing the mentioned ambiguities.28 It did not take long for the first significant clues to appear. The Group A report of September 4, 1933, already stated: “Germany is on the threshold of war preparations for a new world struggle. The ideal of Great Germany, otherwise called III. Empire, is currently in statu nascendi [in the state of birth, note. author]. ”29 The General Staff Department completed highly detailed intelligence questionnaires by the same date. According to them, the offensive units of all levels of command proceeded in removing the mentioned ambiguities.28 It did not take long for the first significant clues to appear. The Group A report of September 4, 1933, already stated: “Germany is on the threshold of war preparations for a new world struggle. The ideal of Great Germany, otherwise called III. Empire, is currently in statu nascendi [in the state of birth, note. author]. ”29 The ideal of Great Germany, otherwise called III. Empire, is currently in statu nascendi [in the state of birth, note. author]. ”29 The ideal of Great Germany, otherwise called III. Empire, is currently in statu nascendi [in the state of birth, note. author]. ”29
Although intelligence analysts gradually gained somewhat firmer ground, uncertainty persisted as to whether the original Reichswehr would become the basis
. Details contains: Ibid., Kart. 1043, sign. 68-1 / 3-27, OJ II No. 13002 / report. 1932 – Military expert opinion in the criminal case Volkssport – Brno 1932.
23 Ibid., P. 2.
24 Ibid., Card. 1067, sign. 95-5 / 15-42, No. 3403 – Ref. hl. no. 2nd dept. 1933 of March 22, 1933 – Development of armaments in Germany – questionnaire, p. 1.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
, P. 2. 28 Ibid., Annexes 1-4 to File No. 3403 hl. no. 2nd dept. 1933 of March 22, 1933 – Development of armaments in Germany – questionnaire.
29 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 20 – Ministry of National Defense London, sign. 20-29-44, No. 13 214 taj. hl. No. / 2nd department – of 16 November 1938, Nos. 14-15.
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expanded and unified armies on the basis of universal conscription, or the Nazi regime will follow the path of the mixed army model, formed basically by the original professional Reichswehr, substantially expanded into a militia army. SA was a key factor in considering the second of these models. In connection with this second direction, Czechoslovak analysts said in the spring of 1934: “With German thoroughness, ‘Hitler’s’ brown army is of great military importance and must therefore be considered a serious factor.” 30 These considerations went in the right direction already that while the number of the Reichswehr in June 1934 was two hundred and fifty thousand men, the 31 numbers of SA culminated in the summer of the same year at the level of two million nine hundred thousand men.32 In this situation, it is understandable that Directive 3.
The assumptions in this direction were also supported by the first extremely serious agency gain in the field of offensive work against Germany. It was a comprehensive plan of the Reich Ministry of Defense to reorganize the peacekeeping ground of 1932. However, the agency matter also concerned a number of measures of a mobilization nature. The set of these documents was probably obtained in the first trimester of 1934. It was handed over by an agency body to which the identification data were not preserved. The document stated that the war field army was to consist of 21 divisions of the Reichswehr and Grenzschutz-Ost, 35 which was to include 34 divisions. However, they were to have a different composition from the divisions of the Reichswehr. The document also contained information on the time schedule of the overall umbrella armaments program. It was to take place within five years, specifically from April 1, 1933 to March 31, 1938.
Czechoslovak military intelligence penetrated the essence of the so-called second armament program of the Reichswehr from 1932. In summary, it can be stated that there were
30 VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Prague, kart. 1094, sign. 68-1 / 3-520 – Elaborate Headquarters 1st Division No. 6419 / news. The reason. 34 of 30 March 1934 – Summary Report on Hitler’s Brown Army for the 1st Quarter of 1934, p. 21.
31 Willhelm DEIST – Manfred MESSERSCHMIDT – Hans-Erich VOLKMANN – Wolfram WETTE, The German Reich and the Second World War. Bd. 1 (Ursachen and Prerequisites of the German War Policy). Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt – Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1979, p. 411.
32 For more details on the SA issue, for example: Heinrich BENNECKE, Hitler und die SA. Günter Olzog Verlag, Munich – Vienna 1962.
33 VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Prague, card. 1090, No. 826 / report. Taj. hl. No. / 3. odd. 1934 of 23 April 1934 – Exercise 1934/1935 – personal and secret directive, p. 1.
34 More on this issue: K. STRAKA, Czechoslovak and French military intelligence, p. 45-46. More Recently: TÝŽ, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance, pp. 19-20.
35 Grenzschutz-Ost – a paramilitary armed organization that has existed in Germany since the early 1920s. It was designed to defend the state borders with Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Prussia. In 1936 it was replaced by the Grenzwacht, subordinate to the armed forces, which covered all the borders of Germany.
36 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2682, No. 2, No. 903 Taj. hl. No. / 2. department 1934 of 15 October 1934 – German Army Armament Program (document analysis); Ibid., d. 3, Evolution of the Preparations of the German War, 6 February 1935.
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objectively correctly informed about all crucial goals of the program. Czechoslovak analysts agreed with reality on the date of the first measures on April 1, 1933. A key moment in the process of building the Reichswehr occurred shortly before the end of 1933. At that time, the so-called December program was established. until 1935. In the spring of 1934, Reich Chancellor A. Hitler stepped up the pressure to speed up the program as much as possible. Czechoslovak analysts gradually became convinced that 21 peacekeeping divisions would be built much earlier than the program had anticipated. In their opinion, it could have been the first quarter of 1936.37 at the latest
It is indisputable that the declaration of universal conscription in March 1935 marked a major turning point in the development of the military potential of the Third Reich. Under these circumstances, it was no coincidence that in June 1935, Germany was definitively designated as the state of main interest in Czechoslovak military intelligence.38 The stage of development of the Third Reich from 1935 to 1938 corresponds to the period of its maximized performance in terms of Czechoslovak military intelligence. The existing findings show that the Czechoslovak military intelligence was able to systematically monitor the progress of peace construction, deployment and the organizational composition of the German ground forces, as well as infrastructure components important for the war, through the systematic deployment of agency resources in particular. In connection with this, it was able to reveal the existence of newly established command levels and also specific types of troops, relatively soon after their creation. A good example here is the corps of command, identified before its existence was publicly announced in Germany, or the highly classified chemical forces. For some time, it also had detailed reports on the organization and armament of the main combat components of tank divisions up to platoon level.39
The question arises as to how the Czechoslovak military intelligence coped with the massive increase in the German armed forces from 1935 to 1938. The main indicators that indicate the size and strength of the German armed forces are important here. The primary issue was peaceful numbers. In the spring of 1938, Czechoslovak analysts reached a total of 945,000 men (705,000 ground troops, 200,000 air forces, 40,000 navies). The number of German armed forces was expected to increase to 1,070,000 men after the October training of civilians and the recruitment of newcomers.40 Historiographic findings to date basically confirm this analytical output. The figures for the period under review, ie around the middle of 1938, range from 600,000 to 750,000 men.41 A general conclusion was reached in June and July.
37 The above findings result from the comparison of the data in the cited report with the generally accepted findings of previous historiography. The following works were used for comparison: Burkhart MUELLER-HILLEBRAND, Das Heer 1933-1945. Bd. 1 (Das Heer bis zum Kriegsbeginn), ES Mittler und Sohn, Darmstadt 1954, pp. 13-20; Georg TESSIN, Deutsche Verbände und Truppen 1918-1939. Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück 1974, pp. 215-216. More recently and in the most detailed way, he analyzes the planning measures of 1932: W. DEIST – M. MESSERSCHMIDT – H.-E. VOLKMANN – W. WETTE, The German Reich and the Second World War. Bd. 1, pp. 387 – 415.
38 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 37, sign. 37-153-59 / no. 104-108 – Thesis on the reorganization and tasks of intelligence, signed Col. gšt. Šimon Drgáč, Head of the 2nd Department Hl. staff, dated June 18, 1935. Document without reference number.
39 For details on the origin and nature of reports in objectified processing, see: K. STRAKA, Reconstruction of the Czechoslovak Agency Network, pp. 96-109, 209-227, 240-261. See also: TÝŽ, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance, pp. 12-49.
40 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2682, d. 6, Liaison à Prague du 17 au 21 Mai 1938.
41 W. DEIST – M. MESSERSCHMIDT – H.-E. VOLKMANN – W. WETTE, The German Reich and the Second World War. Bd. 1, pp. 437-456.
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that the mobilization potential of Nazi Germany would be 96 divisions by the end of 1938, ie 46 peacekeeping divisions, including five tank and five motorized divisions, and 50 mobilization divisions (30 reserve and 20 Landwehr) .42 A comparison with objective data shows that the peace numbers of the divisions were undersized, while the estimate of mobilization options far exceeded the real possibilities. In 1938, the German Armed Forces built a total of 51 peacekeeping divisions (38 infantry, four motorized, four light and five tank). However, if forced to mobilize, it would be able to build only 27 reserve divisions and divisions of the Landwehr. The main reason was the lack of necessary equipment and materials.43
Czechoslovak military intelligence had extremely valuable knowledge about the construction of the German Air Force. The essence and core of this exceptional knowledge was the key data on the comprehensive program of organizational construction of the German Air Force for the years 1934 to 1936. It was provided by Hauptmann (E) Albrecht Spiess, Reichswehr officer, highly exposed employee of the Reich Ministry of Aviation. Czechoslovak military intelligence was objectively able, after obtaining the data communicated by it, to predict the development and expected strategic importance of a completely new German air weapon with such a degree of accuracy as the application of operational and analytical methods of working with agency information allowed. Based on the comparison of data from this material with verified and credible data on real historical facts, it is possible to conclude that that the source agency material was based on the most important programming documents of the Reich Ministry of Aviation. Based on intelligence information, the target was to be 93 squadrons (excluding naval air force) on October 1, 1936, the date of completion of the initial stages of construction.44 In fact, the Luftwaffe was 108 squadrons on that date. The difference between intelligence and reality stemmed from the increase in the number of reconnaissance and observation squadrons. In the case of fighter, bomber and dive bombers, the intelligence exactly coincided not only with the actual program of the Reich Ministry of Aviation, but also with the achieved reality.45 thus, on the date of completion of the initial stages of construction, to be 93 squadrons (excluding naval air force) .44 In fact, the Luftwaffe had that state in the state of 108 squadrons. The difference between intelligence and reality stemmed from the increase in the number of reconnaissance and observation squadrons. In the case of fighter, bomber and dive bombers, the intelligence exactly coincided not only with the actual program of the Reich Ministry of Aviation, but also with the achieved reality.45 thus, on the date of completion of the initial stages of construction, to be 93 squadrons (excluding naval air force) .44 In fact, the Luftwaffe had that state in the state of 108 squadrons. The difference between intelligence and reality stemmed from the increase in the number of reconnaissance and observation squadrons. In the case of fighter, bomber and dive bombers, the intelligence exactly coincided not only with the actual program of the Reich Ministry of Aviation, but also with the achieved reality.45
The German Air Force and everything connected with it was, of course, one of the most important subjects of Czechoslovak intelligence in the years to come. In this context, the original program data from 1933 to 1934 can be evaluated as the basis to which all other intelligence findings about the aviation potential of the Third Reich applied. From the point of view of the needs of information analysis, this was undoubtedly a great advantage. The agent was lost in the spring of 1935. The 2nd Division of the General Staff never had a similarly full-fledged source of news in the aviation sector after that. Nevertheless, it was able to predict the growth of German aviation potential with a relatively good degree of qualified estimation. However, many other intelligence tools were used to develop the necessary information and documents. Group A of the 2nd Department stated in its conclusions of 10 November 1938,
42 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 20, sign. 20-29-44, No. 13 214 – Taj. hl. No. / 2. department of 16 November 1938, Nos. 19-20.
43 B. MUELLER-HILLEBRAND, Das Heer 1933-1945. Bd. 1, pp. 25, 68; Williamson MURRAY, The Change in the European Balance of Power 1938-1939. The Path to Ruin. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984, p. 219.
44 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2682, d. 3, Liaison à Paris February 1935, Plan for building the German Air Force 1934-1936 (original material from the provenance of the 2nd Department of the Czechoslovak General Staff) .
45 Cf .: Documents and documentary photographs of the history of the German Air Force. Ed. Karl-Heinz VÖLKER. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt – Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1968, doc. 84, pp. 201-204.
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that the Luftwaffe has an operational army of one hundred squadrons. According to the 2nd Division, this total number consisted of nine observation squadrons, seven reconnaissance squadrons, 57 bombing squadrons of all purposes, 19 fighter squadrons and eight naval squadrons.46 The real situation, relative to almost the same reference date, was different in each item. The Luftwaffe had 85 squadrons at the time. The almost complete agreement of the intelligence image with reality is clear in the case of the scout and observation squadrons. Indeed, there were 14 of them at the time. There were 43 of them (including one battle squadron). The number of fighter squadrons, on the other hand, was undersized, as the Luftwaffe had 24 at the time. The Naval Air Force had four squadrons.47
As for the number of aircraft, the 2nd Department, based on the analysis of the collected indicators, concluded that the Luftwaffe is able to deploy over 3800 combat machines of various purposes. According to the situation at the end of September 1938, the German Air Force actually had at least three thousand aircraft (1128 bombers, 226 dive bombers, 773 fighters, 513 observation and reconnaissance, 195 combat and 164 naval missions) .48 The exaggeration that characterizes the Czechoslovak intelligence image was partly affected by the application of certain indicators other than those which characterize the documented fact. Above all, however, this difference reflects all the complexities of operational and analytical work in the field of military intelligence.
Strategic intentions of Nazi Germany in the findings of Czechoslovak military intelligence
It has already been documented in this chapter that the Czechoslovak military intelligence very early and objectively correctly understood the basic goals of Nazi ideology. Although it lacked concrete and credible reports from key political and military circles in Nazi Germany, its ability to predict future developments in major international relations was at an objectively good level. Above all, it correctly predicted the turning points of the 1930s. But he lacked more accurate information about when they would actually occur. It was demonstrably that from the beginning of 1933, Germany expected to try to restore a full military presence in the then still demilitarized Rhineland. However, it can rightly be assumed that this was expected from the end of 1932. In connection with this, Czechoslovak intelligence analysts did not question whether this would happen,
46 See: VÚA-VHA, f. VKPR, kart. 179, No. 783 1938, ref. 33663 hl. Thu / 2. odd. 1938 of November 10, 1938 – Reorganization of the German Air Force.
47 G. TESSIN, Deutsche Verbände und Truppen 1918-1939, pp. 292-295.
48 The following figures refer to the relevant prey archival material of German origin: W. MURRAY, German Air Power and the Munich Crisis. War and Society 1977, No. 2, pp. 112. Cf .: Horst BOOG, Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung 1935-1942. Guidance problems, top edging, general training. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1982, pp. 137-140.
49 SHD / DAT, 7 N 3446, d. 2, Conversations Franco-Czechoslovak January 1933. Entrances of 28, 30, 31 January.
50 Robert KVAČEK, Over Europe overcast. Czechoslovakia and Europe 1933-1937. Svoboda, Prague 1966, p. 224.
66 The
forecast for future development was based, among other things, on an analysis of the aforementioned Reichswehr armament program of 1932. It was a remarkably correct prediction of a fact that actually occurred in March 1935.51
Czechoslovak intelligence analysts had no illusions about the fate of Austria as an independent state. If the unsuccessful attempt at the German-Austrian customs union of 1931 led to an increase in the interest of Czechoslovak military intelligence in Germany and its intentions towards Vienna, then the failed coup of the Austrian Nazis of July 25, 1934 and especially the German-Austrian treaty of July 11, 1936 analysts in the belief that the Anschluss of Austria must be considered as a future reality.52 The General Staff of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces was certainly not surprised when the Anschluss actually took place on March 12, 1938. Although he did not know the set date for the start of the event in advance, he used his means of modern radio interception to find out at least exactly the moment when German troops crossed the Austrian state border and quickly headed for Vienna.53
Czechoslovak military intelligence interpreted the goals of National Socialism as incompatible with the existence of the Versailles system, and thus of the Czechoslovak state. For this reason, it expected that the armed actions against Czechoslovakia would become the subject of strategic planning by the German Supreme Command. Interest in them was the top priority of the offensive intelligence apparatus of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. At the same time, however, it was the most difficult to reach news target. In May 1936, Group A of the 2nd Study and Planning Department proceeded to a general balance of what it really knows and what it can build on. The results were not satisfactory at all. Strategically important information from agency sources, which was drawn from 1932 to 1935, has mostly become obsolete. Substantial residues increased all the more, especially in the basic aspects of mobilization,
The German counterintelligence barrier was broken at the end of 1936, ie objectively only about a year and a half after the first binding concepts of violent action in Central Europe began to emerge under the highest command of the German Armed Forces. At that time, Czechoslovak military intelligence obtained substantial evidence through the agency that the command of the German Armed Forces had already played a staff game in the spring with the theme of a preventive war against Czechoslovakia. The surviving sources do not specify the identity of the agency source. The outlined intelligence gain impressed in Czechoslovakia as one of the most significant
51 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2682, d. 3, Evolution of the Preparations of the German War, 6 February 1935.
52 SHD / DAT, 7 N 3115, Note from Commander Loriot concerning his interview with Colonel Hájek, head of the 2nd office of the Czechoslovak General Staff (November 28, 1936).
53 Blíže: S. KOKOŠKA, Československé vojenské zpravodajství, s. 97-98.
54 The basic data on the cited balance are based on a source entitled: List of reporting requirements, resulting from the incompleteness of existing assumptions about the possibilities of neighboring states. He had a secret character. He was signed by Col. gšt. F. Havel, Head of Group A, Study and Planning Department, 2nd General Staff. The substantive critical passage in the introduction reads as follows: substantiated by credible reports. // From the point of view of intelligence, no reliable indication has been obtained so far that would allow us to make reel assumptions of reliable value, respectively to test our current assumptions. ” Cited by: VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 37, sign. 37-153-29 – List of reporting requirements, No. 1-5 (citation from No. 1).
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factors since the beginning of modernization of the state’s defense in 1933 and 1934. The analysis of the acquired material confirmed the highest command in the correct choice of the Czechoslovak military strategy with a focus on the Third Reich.55
Another important aspect was that the knowledge about the mentioned staff game far exceeded the meaning of the Czechoslovak dimension only. In the first days of January 1937, a copy of the evaluated agency record traveled to Paris.57 There, too, the report seemed an extremely important moment. Lt. Col. gšt. Louis Rivet, chief of the French Intelligence Service, personally reported on her gen. Maurice Gamelin, Chief of the General Staff of the French Army, on January 5, 1937 in a summary report. The communication from Czechoslovakia formed its most important part. The Chief of the Intelligence Service subsequently recorded in his diary: “Gen. Gamelin ordered to speed up training in all areas. ”58
The most important thing that emerged from the analysis of the war game was to answer the basic question posed in the already mentioned balance of intelligence about Germany in May 1936. In connection with the operational capabilities of the German Armed Forces, it was questioning: “We must count on the main initial operation against us? In which directions? With what forces? How will it manifest itself initially? ”59 The main theme of the game indicated the fact that it would be Czechoslovakia that would probably be exposed to the first pre-emptive strike in the war, which the German command thought was a conflict on two fronts. The defeat of Czechoslovakia would relieve Germany of the need to cover its strategic rear in the southeast in a decisive clash with France.
The obtained document divided the ground forces of the German Armed Forces into the Army Group West and the Army Group East. The border between them was formed by the city lines Ulm – Kassel – Lübeck, which operationally divided the Empire in two in a north-south direction. The group of armies east against Czechoslovakia consisted of three armies. Among which would be divided nine army corps, 21 active infantry divisions, four reserve divisions, four Landwehr divisions and a tank corps with three tank divisions. The West Army Group, against France, also with three armies, had a total of 19 active and reserve divisions, 13 Landwehr divisions and three tank brigades. The Reserve High Command consisted of two reserve army corps. One was stationed in East Prussia. The Landwehr’s five divisions developed in a wide area from Wrocław to the Baltic Sea as a strategic cover against Poland.60
55 In this sense, in January 1937, Col. gšt. Vaclav Kalina, Czechoslovak military attaché in Paris, head of the 2nd (intelligence) department of the General Staff of the French Army, which was Lt. Col. gšt. Maurice Gauché. SHD / DAT, 7 N 3115, Account, 22 January 1937.
56 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 20, sign. 20-29-44, No. 13 214 taj. hl. No. / 2. department of 16 November 1938, No. 16.
57 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2701, d. Kriegsspiel 1936, Poste de Liaison no 22, 22 janvier 1937.
58 See: Louis RIVET, Carnets of the Head of Services of the Secretaries of the Front popular in Vichy. Edd. Olivier FORCADE – Sébastien LAURENT. Nouveau Monde edition, Paris 2010, p. 96.
59 Cited by: VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as No. 37, sign. 37-153-29 – List of reporting requirements, No. 1.
60 Uvedené poznatky plynou ze syntézy následujících pramenů. Jsou to: SHD / DAT, 7 N 2701, d. Kriegsspiel 1936, Liaison Post no 22, January 22, 1937; SHD / DAT, 7 N 3450, d. 1, Study of a French offensive operation in the Rhineland. Exhibit N ° 1 Hypothesis on the situation and possibilities of the enemy. Hypothetical initial distribution of the resources of Heeresgruppe West; VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, as č. 20, sign. 20-29-44, č. j. 13 214 taj. hl. št. / 2. odděl. z 16. listopadu 1938, č. the. 15-16.
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From the point of view of objectification, it is important to state that the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus penetrated to the very essence of the then valid concept of Germany’s strategic defense on two fronts, which, however, provided for a preventive attack on Czechoslovakia. This intention was first specified by the Schulung Directive of 1935.61 Research to date has convincingly shown that the further development of German strategic plans from 1937 to 1938 remained completely secret from Czechoslovak military intelligence. Little did he know, then, that Germany’s original conception of defense had fundamentally changed during 1938. The strategic defense with active elements was replaced by a purely aggressive plan with the aim of defeating the Czechoslovak army as quickly as possible and taking control of the Czech-Moravian area from further far-reaching conquests. The strategic plans of the German Armed Forces thus fully reflected the objectives expressed by the Reich Chancellor A. Hitler at a meeting with the highest political and military officials on November 5, 1937. On this basis, a document of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht; OKW) was created. . Hitler approved it on May 30, 1938. The action was expected to begin on October 1 of the same year.62
At this point, it is appropriate to find out whether the Czechoslovak military intelligence at least noticed certain phenomena and tendencies that could indirectly and rather partially testify to the planned German strategy against Czechoslovakia. This question is of primary importance in connection with the assumptions of the enemy’s intentions from the time when, from 23 to 25 September 1938, ie after the announcement of mobilization, a decision was made in Czechoslovakia on the choice of a specific method of defense. Arm. gene. Ludvík Krejčí, the commander-in-chief of the field army, ordered a defensive formation to be taken in accordance with the partially amended variant XIII of Plan VII (see the Chapter on Plan of the Czechoslovak Army in September 1938). He made this decision on September 25, 1938. He expected that the enemy will try to strike from the north from the area of Zittau – Bautzen via Liberec to Pardubice and from the area between the Vltava and Znojmo in the direction Zwettl – Havlíčkův Brod. The purpose of such an attack was estimated in an attempt to cut off and destroy most of the defender’s forces in the Czech Republic, and thus thwart his retreat to the east.63 The key question is what the commander in command based on his decision. The primary sources provide a clear answer in this regard. L. Krejčí based his decisions of September 25, 1938 on the content of the report of Col. gšt. František Hájek, Head of the 2nd (Intelligence) Department of the Main Headquarters.64 However, the intelligence picture of the arrival of German troops around the Czech lands did not correspond to the real intentions of the aggressor. This fact conditioned the nature of the decision of the commander-in-chief. He emphasized the Liberec and South Bohemian directions, which did not objectively coincide with the main and most endangered directions of the planned German attack. The erroneous assumptions were based on the belief that the German armed forces were creating three groups of troops. The strongest was considered to be the southern group, which the General Headquarters believed was forming between Linz and Vienna in order to strike the land border of Bohemia and Moravia.
61 Cf .: International Military Tribunal (IMT). Volume XXXIV. Secretariat of the International Military Tribunal (SIMT), Nuremberg 1949, pp. 485-486.
62 Act on German Foreign Policy (ADAP). Serie D. Bd. II. Imprimerie Nationale, Baden-Baden 1950, doc. 221, pp. 281-285, doc. 448, pp. 579-582. See also: IMT, Volume XXV. SIMT, Nuremberg 1947, pp. 433-439, 464-469.
63 VÚA-VHA, f. Sdružený fond Headquarters of the State Armed Forces (SFVÚBPS) – Headquarters (size) Palacký, kart. 6, inventory No. 232, No. 104 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 of September 25, 1938, change of variant XIII; Ibid., Inventory No. 236, No. 119 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 of 25 September 1938, Personal and Secret Directive No. 1.
64 Ibid., Inventory No. 232, No. 104 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 of September 25, 1938, change of variant XIII.
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Analysts put the Western group in the Plauen – Chemnitz area. The northern ones then guessed over the Šluknov and Frýdlant outcrops. Certain other possible concentrations were also indicated in Silesia. In terms of objectification, however, the fatal message has a seemingly insignificant mention, contained in the Commander-in-Chief’s directive to the commanders of all four armies of September 25, that “something is on the Bavarian border” .65 ground forces. The actual starting line-up of the German Armed Forces for the planned invasion of Czechoslovakia was based on a certain compromise solution. In it, the original intention of Grün’s entry was to make counterattacks from Silesia to the south and in the opposite direction from Lower Austria, with the proviso that the actual center of aggression was considered to be the direction Pilsen – Prague. The converging attacks were promoted by the General Staff of the Ground Forces through General Franz Halder. They had a professional and rational justification. Through them, the main goal of Grün’s accession was to be achieved. It consisted of preventing the retreat of Czechoslovak forces to Slovakia and their destruction in the Czech lands. According to the German strategy, this would complete the military defeat of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Chancellor A. Hitler pushed the strike in the direction of Pilsen into the whole concept. He did so definitively at meetings with military leaders on September 3 and 9, 1938. His reasons were based on political motives. He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 Through them, the main goal of Grün’s accession was to be achieved. It consisted of preventing the retreat of Czechoslovak forces to Slovakia and their destruction in the Czech lands. According to the German strategy, this would complete the military defeat of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Chancellor A. Hitler pushed the strike in the direction of Pilsen into the whole concept. He did so definitively at meetings with military leaders on September 3 and 9, 1938. His reasons were based on political motives. He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 Through them, the main goal of Grün’s accession was to be achieved. It consisted of preventing the retreat of Czechoslovak forces to Slovakia and their destruction in the Czech lands. According to the German strategy, this would complete the military defeat of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Chancellor A. Hitler pushed the strike in the direction of Pilsen into the whole concept. He did so definitively at meetings with military leaders on September 3 and 9, 1938. His reasons were based on political motives. He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 According to the German strategy, this would complete the military defeat of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Chancellor A. Hitler pushed the strike in the direction of Pilsen into the whole concept. He did so definitively at meetings with military leaders on September 3 and 9, 1938. His reasons were based on political motives. He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 According to the German strategy, this would complete the military defeat of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Chancellor A. Hitler pushed the strike in the direction of Pilsen into the whole concept. He did so definitively at meetings with military leaders on September 3 and 9, 1938. His reasons were based on political motives. He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66 He intended to present the rapid breach of the Czechoslovak defense to Prague as proof of the decision on the Czechoslovak front. He expected that this fact would discourage France in particular from engaging in any power engagement in favor of Czechoslovakia.66
The reasons for the misconceptions about hostile intentions were mainly that the intelligence picture was based on very incomplete and distorted sources. The conditions for the supply of fresh reports of the military situation in Germany deteriorated dramatically in about mid-September 1938 after the outbreak of violence on the Czech border. The information permeability of state borders has become dramatically more complicated in these circumstances.67
Impressed by the above facts, it is also possible to ask whether the Czechoslovak intelligence apparatus could have received valuable information about the planned German aggression from other sources as well. In this regard, it must be emphasized that the impending international crisis has not led to Allied cooperation with French military intelligence. This was despite the fact that the 1924 Alliance and Friendship Treaty stipulated that the parties would provide information on the impending danger. Hans-Thilo Schmidt, brother of Major General. Rudolf Schmidt, commander of the 1st Tank Division of the German Armed Forces since 1936 and one of the best dedicated agency resources of the French Intelligence Service, announced in late August and early September 1938 the planned date of the planned German action against Czechoslovakia. It was to take place on September 25, 1938.68 A comparison with the key documentation of OKW shows that the time around 25.
65 Ibid., Inventory No. 236, No. 119 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 of 25 September 1938, Personal and Secret Directive No. 1.
66 ADAP, Serie D, Bd. II, doc. No. 448, p. 580. See also: IMT, Volume XXV, p. 465.
67 The causes have been analyzed in detail so far: S. KOKOŠKA, Czechoslovak Military Intelligence, pp. 99-101.
68 SHD / DAT, 7 N 2523, d. 2, Source Z, 23, 25 août, 5 septembre 1938. The gain of these reports is also significantly reflected by: Maurice GAUCHÉ, Le Deuxième bureau au travail 1935-1940. Amiot-Dumont, Paris 1953, p. 70; L. RIVET, Carnets of the Head of Services, pp. 230.
69 IMT, Volume XXV, pp. 451-454.
70 Ibid., Pp. 445-446.
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operations cannot occur a little earlier.71 The same source also provided information on the planned deployment of the 1st Tank Division and the 1st Light Division of the German Land Forces on the main offensive direction Pilsen – Prague. H.-T. Schmidt provided a number of specific temporal and spatial data on the planned entry of these higher units to the Czechoslovak state borders. The content of these reports corresponded to the real planning measures of OKW. At this point, it is necessary to ask why the French side concealed its findings from the Czechoslovak partners. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the then allied relations in the field of military intelligence were already fundamentally conditioned by French foreign policy. In September 1938, it complied with Germany’s decisive policy of reconciliation, which the British government pursued at virtually all costs. To send a burning report to Prague, which proved the true essence of Hitler’s intentions, would mean, above all, seriously undermining the West’s policy towards the Third Reich. The Czechoslovak president and government would thus have a strong argument for their intransigence against the escalating Nazi demands. Under these circumstances, the French government would have a much harder time leaving the Allied commitments. This was the decisive reason for the non-fulfillment of allied cooperation in the field of military intelligence in the most critical period.72 Under these circumstances, the French government would have a much harder time leaving the Allied commitments. This was the decisive reason for the non-fulfillment of allied cooperation in the field of military intelligence in the most critical period.72 Under these circumstances, the French government would have a much harder time leaving the Allied commitments. This was the decisive reason for the non-fulfillment of allied cooperation in the field of military intelligence in the most critical period.72
Partial conclusion
Due to its geopolitical dispositions, economic and population power, and superpower aspirations, albeit limited in time, Germany formed the main potential source of threat to interwar Czechoslovakia. However, the conceptual and concentrated efforts of Czechoslovak military intelligence were directed against him, but only in the last four years before Munich. This fact reflected a number of political-diplomatic considerations, perspectives, economic interests, as well as an indispensable factor of warming in international relations, typical of the second half of the 1920s. The beginnings of change began to manifest themselves only with the escalation of German revisionism, which was one of the main symptoms of the general economic and political crisis of the early 1930s. It is important that Czechoslovak military intelligence objectively correctly identified Nazism at that time as an absolutely fundamental threat to the security of the state. An important aspect was that it did so objectively and without prejudice in the evaluation conclusions. In terms of international comparison, such an approach was not at all common and self-evident. The intelligence apparatus also dealt relatively quickly with the urgent need to reorient the main effort from the previously preferred Hungary to Germany. He was also well aware that after January 1933, Nazi ideology had become not only the main idea of German domestic and foreign policy, but that all the armed forces were becoming more and more subordinate to it. Until 1938, Czechoslovak military intelligence was relatively successful in monitoring the general strengthening of the German Armed Forces as a whole and in many respects in considerable detail. Until 1936, it also had important clues that testified to the overall German military strategy. In 1937 and 1938, however, his results in this area stagnated. This had a limiting effect, among other things, on estimates of the overall mobilization capabilities of the German Armed Forces and the specific intentions of the German command. Reserves in this area are very
71 Ibid., P. 450.
72 On the findings of French military intelligence on the preparations of the German Armed Forces for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see: K. STRAKA, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance, pp. 36-42.
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badly manifested in connection with the adoption of specific defensive measures in September 1938, when the then entry plan of the field army of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces objectively diverged from the German concept of war invasion of Czechoslovakia.
72
73
Boarding PLAN Czechoslovak Army in September 1938
In the Czechoslovak interwar army, the plan of grouping individual units after the mobilization was called the start plan. This plan contained all the necessary information to lead the fight in the first days of the war and was marked with Roman numerals. In the autumn of 1938, the Czechoslovak army had prepared an entry plan VII, according to which it was deployed after the announcement of the mobilization on September 23, 1938. And I would like to try to reconstruct this plan in this chapter.
It should be noted at the outset that the entry plans of the Czechoslovak army from the 1930s have not been preserved. The old entry plans were liquidated when replaced by new ones, and any parts left to them were destroyed no later than the night of March 14-15, 1939, before the arrival of the German occupiers. At the same time, the last entry plan VII was apparently liquidated. Thus, all the basic materials on which it was possible to rely disappeared irretrievably. This may also explain that in the numerous literature on the military aspects of the Munich crisis, we find only brief general information on the entry plans of the Czechoslovak army in 1938, but no details.
Despite the destruction of the basic documents, I think it is possible to reconstruct the Czechoslovak Start Plan VII at least partially, based on the following sources:
1) Staff Regulations “Entry Plans” issued in 1938 and preserved, albeit in incomplete form, in VÚA-VHA.1
2) Orders and telegrams by which the entry plan and its variant were announced on September 25, 1938, which were also preserved in VÚA -VHA.2
3) Files of the General Headquarters of the Mobilized Army of September 1938, in which there are mentions of the original concentration areas of selected units of the mobilized army, which are again preserved in the VÚA-VHA.3
4) Memorial work of former officers of the operational department of the Czechoslovak General Staff interwar armies, especially Col. gšt. Josef Fetky.4
1 VÚA-VHA, f. Collection of service books of the Armed Forces – regulation Sm XXI from 1938.
2 VÚA-VHA, f. Palacký Headquarters, card. 1, inventory Nos. 47 and 48.
3 Ibid., Kart. 1, inventory No. 20; ibid., map. 6, inventory No. 232 and 234 – Tulle Headquarters; ibid., map. 2, inventory no. 52.
4 These are two Fetka manuscripts entitled “Czechoslovak Army in 1938 in Munich” and “Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939”. The first of them is stored in the VÚA-VHA, the second remained in the possession of the family, was published in books (Josef FETKA, Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939. Mladá fronta, Prague 2015) and references in the following notes are to this book edition.
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It is from the memories of Col. J. Fetka comes from general information about the entry plan VII and its predecessors, which appear in the literature. From February 15, 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was given the entry plan VI, which paid the main attention to the defense against the German attack, smaller forces were set aside against the Hungarian attack. In the case of Austria, it was not ruled out that the German army could use its territory against Czechoslovakia. And it was the occupation of Austria in March 1938 that forced changes to the entry plan, which was designated VI-A, from April. The group of units securing the borders was modified and a larger number of reserve units in South Moravia was concentrated. From July 15, 1938, a new entry plan VII came into force. He already counted on a temporary defense on the Vltava line and the adjoining Elbe. Longer-term defense was planned in the Bohemian-Moravian Highlands, and if the enemy could not be detained, the Czechoslovak forces should retreat to Moravia and lean on the Carpathians or Javorníky. Here a tenacious defense was envisaged until the reversal of the war situation and the counter-offensive within the Allied forces.5
In August 1938, the entry plan VII was supplemented by a variant, which consisted of concentrating selected reserve units closer to the main defensive position in Bohemia and should be a reaction to the possibility of Germany deciding only to occupy the border areas of Bohemia and Moravia. The variant complemented the entry plan and joined it as a separate annex. It was from the serial number of Annex XIII that the designation “variant XIII” was created, which was also included in the official documents.6
The boarding plan and its variants were announced on the morning of September 25, 1938 with the slogans “Issue the boarding plan in green packaging” and “Carry out the variant according to Annex XIII”. variant XIII of the entry plan has been implemented with these changes ”.8 And further orders followed. Thus, the Czechoslovak army did not carry out the entry according to the original entry plan VII, nor according to the original variant of this plan, but according to the modified variant. The reconstruction thus breaks down into three different parts: the original start plan, its original variant and the modified variant carried out.
What remained the same in all three cases was the distribution of units defending the main defensive position, ie the border, as well as the division into four separate armies. The first army in Bohemia was to detain the enemy and retreat to the east under pressure. The Second Army in North Moravia and the Fourth Army in South Moravia were to defend the border at least until the First Army managed to retreat. The remaining third army in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Russia was to keep this territory and further contact with the Allies in the east. Part of the divisions, as well as two corps headquarters, formed the reserve of the commander in chief, spread mainly in the Bohemian-Moravian Highlands, southeastern Moravia and western Slovakia (see Map No. 1) .9
And it was mainly the divisions from the reserve of the commander in chief that concerned the changes related to the variant of the entry plan. Thanks to the preserved orders ordering its execution
5 J. FETKA, Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939, pp. 75, 78, 90; TÝŽ, Czechoslovak Army in 1938 to Munich, p. 93.
6 Ibid., P. 46; TÝŽ, Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939, pp. 95, 122-123. It follows from the regulation “Entry plans” that in the guidelines for armies there was a variant as Annex XIII, in the guidelines for corps as Annex X and in the guidelines for divisions as Annex VII.
7 VÚA-VHA, f. Palacký Headquarters, card. 1, inventory Nos. 47 and 48.
8 Ibid., Kart. 6, inventory No. 232. Published in: Documents of the Czechoslovak Army from the autumn of 1938. Orders of the main headquarters from 24 to 28 September. Edd. Pavel MINARIK – Pavel SRAMEK. HaV 1996, No. 5, pp. 83-110, here pp. 87-92.
9 J. FETKA, Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939, pp. 121-122; TÝŽ, Czechoslovak Army in 1938 to Munich, pp. 93-95.
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we know which volumes it concerned. There were two army headquarters, three corps headquarters and seven divisions.10 While in the army headquarters and corps the variant in my opinion meant only changes in the list of subordinate units, in the divisions it was a change in their deployment (see Table 1). Since we are able to determine at least approximately the originally planned areas for most of them from the sources mentioned in the introduction, we see that there has been a shift closer to the border, especially to the west (see map no. 2).
However, the Czechoslovak army, as already mentioned, further modified its start-up after the announcement of the mobilization. Many divisions thus took up different spaces than originally planned. It all started after the outbreak of the Henlein uprising on the border on September 13, 1938, with the concentration of three fast divisions in western and southern Bohemia and northern Moravia. At the same time, only a part of one Rapid Division (1st Rapid Division) was in the area envisaged by the entry plan.11 was identical to the entry plan. However, the other two (14th and 17th divisions) differed and the divisions were ordered to stay in new positions, which were further west than the original ones, after the announcement of the entry plan (see Table 2) .12
Already after the mobilization, the concentration of another four divisions (infantry) was changed by an order issued on September 25, 1938, together with an order to implement variant XIII. Three (3rd, 5th and 19th divisions) again moved more to the west, the last division (16th Division) in Slovakia remained at the border with Poland instead of moving to the south of Slovakia (see Table 3) .13
On September 27, 1938, the commander-in-chief of the mobilized army decided to move VI. Corps from the advance in Moravia to southern Bohemia.14 A day later, there was an order to move two rapid and one division (infantry) in order to strengthen the defense of southern Bohemia and southwestern Moravia. According to him, the 2nd Rapid Division moved west to the area of Jaroměřice, the 1st Rapid Division, on the contrary, moved east to the area of Pacov. Finally, the 13th Division was to move south to Humpolec after concentrating in the boarding area (see Table 4) .15 These were the last major changes before the adoption of the Munich Agreement on September 30, 1938 (see Map 3) .16
We do not know the further details that the individual unions and unions received, although the start plan undoubtedly included them. We know only the tasks of individual armies, but only indirectly from the commemorative work. Nevertheless, it is possible to get an idea of how the Czechoslovak command estimated the possible course of the war, based on sources from the autumn of 1938, specifically the dislocation of the headquarters of the stage districts. There were a total of sixty of them and they were in the so-called stage, which followed the operational zone, where war operations were to take place.17 Because we know the locations of almost all these headquarters,
10 VUA-VHA, f. Palacky Headquarters, kart. 1, inventory No. 48.
11 Ibid., Card. 1, inventory No. 3, 4, 16.
12 Ibid., Card. 1, inventory No. 20 and card. 6, inventory No. 232.
13 Ibid., Card. 6, inventory No. 232.
14 Ibid., Kart. 6, inventory No. 240. The corps headquarters was to be in Valašské Meziříčí. Published in: Dokumenty československé armády z podzimu 1938, pp. 101-104.
15 VUA-VHA, f. Palacký Headquarters, card. 1, inventory No. 62. Published in: Dokumenty československé armády z podzimu 1938, pp. 104-106.
16 There were still a few minor local adjustments, when, for example, the 14th Division moved from Jihlava to the area of Třešť – Telč – Stonařov.
17 VUA-VHA, f. General Staff, 1st Department, card. 159, sign. 32-22 / 33-2 and cards. 239, sign. 32-22 / 2-15.
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we can create a line where the Czechoslovak army expected the stabilization of the front (see map no. 4).
It can be seen that no stage districts were planned to the west of the Vltava, ie not even a longer defense of this area. Stage districts in Central Bohemia show that the defense of Prague was expected while maintaining at least part of northeastern Bohemia and southwestern Moravia. The location of stage districts in northern and southern Moravia, as well as in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Russia, shows that no retreat was allowed here.
After the adoption of the Munich Agreement, the entry continued according to earlier orders, but on October 3 and 4, 1938, the first orders were issued in response to the new situation. So far, they concerned only the units in southeastern Moravia and southwestern Slovakia, and the commander in them ordered a move in the southeastern and southern direction to strengthen Slovakia’s defense. On October 6, an order was established establishing a new grouping of forces, consisting in a general retreat of the unions in the Czech lands inland.18 The Accession Plan VII thus lost its meaning.
From the above it is clear that the entry of the Czechoslovak army at the end of September 1938 differed from the entry plan VII and also from its variant. If we compare it with the original variant XIII, we see that five of the 21 divisions (infantry), three of the four fast divisions and one corps changed their boarding areas. If we compare it with the original boarding plan VII, a total of twelve of the 21 divisions (infantry), three of the four fast divisions and one corps changed their boarding areas. It was mainly a shift to the west and it can be said that the center of gravity of the defense has shifted to the west. If, according to the entry plan VII, there were to be only two other divisions west of the Vltava, apart from the units defending the border, and according to variant XIII, there were three divisions, in the end there were four divisions. On the contrary, the advance from divisions in the Bohemian-Moravian Highlands ceased to exist.
In this context, the question arises as to whether it is possible to conclude from the described changes that the Czechoslovak army was only preparing to occupy the border, based on the variant of the entry plan that was created for this purpose. However, there is no evidence of this. All surviving documents clearly show that the Czechoslovak army was preparing for a war clash with Germany and Hungary, not just a limited clash at the border. The variant therefore served only as a basis for a modified entry.19
In conclusion, I would like to try to think about how the entry of the Czechoslovak army in a possible war in the autumn of 1938 would work, if it really broke out, and whether it would not be more advantageous to follow the original entry plan VII. The Czechoslovak command got into the enemy’s tow with all the changes to the original entry plan and completely gave it the initiative. He thus forced his will and gave up the opportunity to stick to his prepared plans.20
In seeking an answer, we can build on the experience of the Polish army in September 1939, whose situation was in many ways similar. At that time, it turned out, among other things, that the fate of the whole war was decided already in the battles for the main defensive position on the border, when the German attack was gradually faced by individual Polish unions. Advances concentrated inland already
18 VÚA-VHA, f. Palacký Headquarters, card. 2, inventory No. 160 and 174 and cards. 6, inventory no. 250.
19 According to Josef Fetka, it could not be ruled out that even an effort to occupy the border could bring about a general war. See: J. FETKA, Czechoslovak Army in Munich in 1938, pp. 87-88.
20 Zdenko MARŠÁLEK, from the viewpoint of a skier or from the perspective of the “big” strategy? A polemic view of the problems of the military development of Czechoslovakia in September 1938. In: The Munich Agreement of 1938 in a European perspective. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2013, pp. 141-142.
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they failed to stop or slow down the enemy invasion.21 From this point of view, the decision to move part of the reserve divisions closer to the main defensive position and the units that defended it seem justified, even if it meant resigning to the prepared plans. However, Czechoslovakia would almost certainly succumb to the fact that in a lone war with Germany, that would probably not change anything.
21 Piotr M. MAJEWSKI, Fighting or Retreating? Possibilities of the defense of Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1938. Conditio humana – Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk, Brno 2018, pp. 300-303, 308-309.
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Annex
Table 1 Volume Plan VII Variant

division
near Beroun
near Pilsen
division
?
in Sobotka
Bohemian-Moravian Highlands division
near Hradec Králové
division
?
near Zábřeh
division
Bohemian-Moravian Highlands
Zásmuky – Kouřim
division
Bohemian-Moravian Highlands
near Prague
division
?
u Mutěnic
Table No. 2 Volume Plan VII Change
fast division
near Slaný,
part of Karlovy Vary, part near Slaný
fast division
near Slavkov
Olomouc – Litovel
fast division
?
Tábor – Pacov, then Soběslav – Mezimostí
division
near Kojetín
near Jihlava
divided

in Senice

division
Hranice – Lipník
Turnov – Sobotka
Table No. 3 Volume Original Change
division
at Sobotka
Mšeno – Bělá pod Bezdězem – Sovínky
division
near Horní Cerekev
Písek – Strakonice – Protivín
Division
among Pozba
Ruzomberok – Zilina – Dolny Kubin
division
u Hustopečí
Třebíč – Náměšť – Valeč
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Table No. 4 Volume Change
fast division
Pacov – Nová Cerekev – Černovice
fast division
Želetava – Jaroměřice – Moravské Budějovice
Pelhřimov – Humpolec – Opatov division
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Maps No. 1 to 3 were prepared by the author using maps from the book: Josef FETKA, Czechoslovak War Army 1918-1939. Mladá fronta, Prague 2015. Map No. 4 was prepared by Ivo Vondrovský.
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TERRITORIAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION DEFENSE NATION IN MORAVIA IN 1939 AND 1940
The Czechoslovak military resistance during World War II is an issue that has enjoyed increased interest in recent years from both experts and the educated public. However, published book monographs or journal studies primarily focus on foreign resistance, whether it is Czechoslovak pilots operating in France and Great Britain, or ground troops participating in the fighting at Tobruk, Sokolov, Dukla or the siege of Dunkirk. The domestic military resistance has so far remained somewhat behind, although its importance has been undeniable.
The presented chapter is devoted to the resistance organization Defense of the Nation (ON), specifically to its provincial headquarters in Moravia operating in 1939 and 1940. The topic has been more or less addressed in the past by several authors, especially František Vašek and Zdeněk Štěpánek in their two-part study published 1998 in the Moravian National Journal.1 However, its authors did not have at their disposal some important archival materials stored today, especially in the Moravian Provincial Archive in Brno and the Archive of the Security Forces in Prague and Kanice. Also important is the monograph by Petr Kopečný from 2006, which, however, ends with the arrest of the Brig. gene. Bohuslav Všetička in Brno at the end of February 1940 and the subsequent interrogations of the arrested resistance fighters and court trials.2 The aim of this study is therefore to analyze the activities of the provincial headquarters of the ON in Moravia,
The establishment of the Defense of the Nation in Moravia
In the first days after the Nazi occupation of the Czech lands on March 15, 1939, it was clear that a hard regime would be established in the newly established protectorate to carry out national, political and social persecution of the Czech population. From the very beginning, this situation was assessed extremely negatively, especially by those groups of the population who stood at the birth of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. These were mainly generals and senior officers of the Czechoslovak army, who were united by the legionary past. Not
1 Francis VAŠEK – Zdenek ŠTĚPÁNEK, lifted his head among the first. Contribution to the History of the Defense of the Nation in Moravia, Part 1 and 2, Vlastivědný časopis moravský 1998, No. 1, pp. 14-25, No. 2, pp. 113-130.
2 Petr KOPEČNÝ, Defense of the Nation in the Brno Region 15. 3. 1939-29. 2. 1940. Archive of the City of Brno, Brno 2006.
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random phenomenon that the most important domestic resistance organization in the initial phase of the occupation was established in military circles. Accepting the terms of the Munich Agreement was a heavy blow to the Czechoslovak Army Command Corps, and many professional soldiers saw the situation as a loss of life. For them, the March occupation was only the culmination of the negative development brought about by the events of the autumn of 1938. The gradual liquidation of the army and the surrender of weapons and other military material to Nazi Germany evoked an understandable desire for retaliation.
The social issue also played an important role. The dissolution of the Czech-Slovak army after the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia brought existential problems to tens of thousands of people. Generals and officers were forced – often after many years of active military service – to look for a new job, which was very difficult for many of them. Only a small part could join the ranks of the government, which emerged as a protectorate armed force designed to “maintain internal security and order.” 3 At that time, active members of the army split into two mainstream. The part, consisting mainly of younger years, went abroad, especially to Poland and later to France, where Czechoslovak troops were gradually formed. However, most professional soldiers remained in the Czech lands, and it was from their ranks that he gradually became the ON.
This resistance organization began to emerge in Moravia in the first days after the March occupation. The first meeting of Czechoslovak army officers concerning the newly created situation and the need to respond to it in some way took place in Brno on March 19, 1939. Negotiations then continued in Prague on March 22 and 23. The initiators of these meetings were the Arad generals Josef Bílý4 and Sergej Vojcechovský5 together with the div. gene. Jan Sergei Ingr (see also the chapter Legionary Past of Army General Jan Sergei Ingr)
. Patriots or traitors? Libri, Prague 2002; Jindřich MAREK, Hách’s melody boys. Chronicle of the Czech government army in Italy 1944-1945. World of Wings, Cheb 2003.
4 Josef Bílý (1872 to 1941) served in the Czechoslovak Army from 1892 and fought on the Russian and Italian fronts during the First World War. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, he continued his military career and from 1928 to 1935 he held the position of provincial military commander in Prague. He gained the rank of army general on June 26, 1931. After the occupation, Bílý joined the resistance and later took over the position of commander-in-chief of the ON. He was arrested by the Gestapo on November 14, 1940, and after being imprisoned in the Pankrác prison, he was sentenced to death by a court court and executed on September 28, 1941 by shooting in the riding hall of the artillery barracks in Prague-Ruzyně. The most detailed personality of Josef Bílý is: Michaela STROJILOVÁ, Army General Josef Bílý. Bachelor’s thesis, FF MU, Brno 2018. Thesis supervisor Vladimír Černý.
5 Sergei Vojcechovsky (1883 to 1951) came from a Russian aristocratic family and served in the Tsarist army during the First World War. In September 1917 he became chief of staff of the Czechoslovak Rifle Division, then took part in the Battle of Bachmach and remained one of the few Russian officers in the legions during the fighting with the Bolsheviks. In 1921 he settled permanently in Czechoslovakia and held a number of important positions in his army. He received the rank of army general in 1929. After the occupation, he joined the activities of the ON, but later retreated to the background, as he was under the constant supervision of the Gestapo. On May 12, 1945, the NKVD commando arrested Vojcechovsky in Prague, even though he was a Czechoslovak citizen. He was abducted to the Soviet Union and imprisoned. Sergei Vojcechovsky died on April 7, 1951 in the central hospital of the Ozerlag gulag in the Taishet district. See: Vladimir BYSTROV, The Fate of the General. Commentary on some documents about the life and tragic end of Sergei Vojcechovsky. Academia, Prague 2007.
6 Jan Sergey Ingr (1894 to 1956) fought during the First World War on the Russian front and in September 1915 he was captured there. He later enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions and fought first in Russia, then in France and Italy. After the founding of Czechoslovakia, Ingr fought with the Poles for the Těšín region and also with the Hungarians
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about the possibilities of establishing an illegal resistance organization. In Brno, the meeting at the branch office of the Autoclub at the end of March 1939, which was chaired by Div. gene. Antonín Hasal.7 This meeting was already attended by several officers, who subsequently played an important role in the formation of the Moravian Land Headquarters ON. It was mainly a Capt. Čestmír Jelínek, whom A. Hasal introduced to those present as one of the leading figures of the emerging resistance organization in Brno.8 Czechoslovak officers at that time were still working under Hasal’s leadership at Headquarters III. church in liquidation, but later they had to look for new jobs. Č. Jelínek joined as an official at the Cadastral Measuring Office in Brno, and at the same time he actively worked on the organization of resistance activities.
The soldiers first called the emerging resistance organization the Military Headquarters, and the name National Resistance also appeared. The term Defense of the Nation began to be used in July 1939, and it was under it that the organization went down in history. Officers III. Corps led by A. Hasal and JS Ingr began to create an organizational structure and at that time was very active Colonel Vaclav Lysak.9 Gradually gathered around him a group of collaborators who
in Slovakia. He then remained in the army and held a number of different positions. From 1936 to 1939 he was Deputy Commander III. church in Brno. After the occupation, he joined the resistance in the ranks of ON, but in June 1939 he went abroad and joined the organization of the Czechoslovak foreign resistance. From 1940 to 1944, he held the position of Minister of National Defense in the Czechoslovak government in exile, and then he was the commander-in-chief of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces for several months. In post-war Czechoslovakia, however, JS Ingr was subjected to various persecutions and in March 1948 he went into exile for the second time. He then became involved in the management of intelligence activities within the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. See: G. SVOBODA, Army General Sergey Jan Ingr.
7 Antonín Hasal (1893 to 1960) joined the Czech retinue in Russia in August 1914 and then took part in many battles with the Bolsheviks within the Czechoslovak legions. After returning to his homeland, he served in the Czechoslovak army and from October 1934 commanded III. church in Brno. He received the rank of divisional general on January 1, 1934. After the occupation, he actively participated in the resistance in the ranks of the ON, but in March 1940 he went into exile and in France he became chief of staff of the Czechoslovak military administration. In Britain, President Edvard Beneš entrusted him with the management of the Military Office of the President of the Republic. From 1945 to 1946 he held the position of Minister of Transport and on October 26, 1945 he was promoted to the rank of Army General. After the communist coup in 1948, A. Hasal went into exile for the second time and died on April 22, 1960 in Washington. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 91-92.
8 Čestmír Jelínek (1902 to 1942) was born in Košíře. After graduating from the Czech high school in Pilsen, he joined the Military Academy in Hranice na Moravě in October 1922 as a student. After graduating, he was appointed lieutenant of artillery on August 15, 1924 and at the same time transferred to the Artillery Regiment 152 in Olomouc. From July 1925 he served in the 6th Artillery Regiment in Brno in various positions. From July 1933 he began his studies at the University of War in Prague and after its successful completion he was assigned from August 1936 to the staff of the 6th Division in Brno, where he worked until the end of September. Then he joined the 3rd Department of Headquarters III. choir. He worked here until the occupation, and on July 31, 1937 he was transferred to the rank of staff captain to a group of officers of the General Staff. After the war, he was promoted in memoriam to the rank of lieutenant colonel. See: VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification files of military persons – Qualification file of Č. Jelínek. Jelínek’s biography prepared after the war by his widow Maria Jelínková and dated in Brno on November 7, 1945, see: Brno City Museum (MMB), f. Resistance documentation, inventory no. 152 705.
9 Václav Lysák (1895 to 1942) came from the village of Trnava near Třebíč. During the First World War, he fought in the c. And k. Armies on the Eastern Front, and in June 1916 he defected to the Russians. After that, he served in the ranks of the Czechoslovak legions and took part not only in the Battle of Zborov, but also in the retreat by Ukraine, the subsequent battles with the Bolsheviks and the guarding of the Trans-Siberian Highway. After returning to his homeland, he continued his military career, graduated from the University of War in Prague and then served in the staff of the Provincial
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later they held command posts within the ON structure in Moravia. According to later recollections of some surviving members of the ON, V. Lysák was at that time a “de facto ideological leader of the movement”. gene. B. Všetička, who later became the Moravian provincial commander ON. B. Všetička had personally known himself since the beginning of the 1930s. Č. Jelínek, who at that time taught at the artillery school in Olomouc, which was commanded by B. Všetička.
The personality of Brigadier General Bohuslav Všetička
B. Všetička already had a remarkable military career in 1939. He came from Náchod, where he was born on September 25, 1893. In 1904 he joined the lower military school in Hranice and after its successful graduation he was accepted to the Military Technical Academy in Mödling. Here he completed his studies with honors and on August 1, 1914 he was appointed lieutenant of the army and army. He was assigned as a junior officer at Divisional Ammunition Park No. 13. His superiors then sent him to the Eastern Front, where he was captured on September 11 of the same year.11 He was placed in a prison camp in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia, and later enlisted in the emerging Czechoslovak army. in Russia. In August 1916, B. Všetička became the gunner of the 1st Rifle Regiment in Kiev and Belgorod, and thus began his successful work among the legionnaires. A year later, he received the rank of lieutenant and subsequently changed several positions, before he became a senior officer in the 5th Artillery Battery. In this position he also took part in the first battles with the Bolsheviks near Mariinsky on May 25, 1918
After the fighting in Central Siberia and other successful clashes of legionnaires with Bolshevik troops in the area of Lake Baikal, B. Všetička was appointed on August 22, 1918 captain and commander of the 2nd Artillery Division, assigned to the staff of the Eastern Front. He received the rank of major on September 25 and was associated with the transfer to the staff of the Yekaterinburg Group (later the North Rally Front), where he first held the position of chief accommodation officer and later deputy chief of staff. In these positions, he participated in all major battles of the group, including the Battle of Perm in December 1918, which became a great success for Czechoslovak troops. On January 15, 1919, B. Všetička was appointed lieutenant colonel and chief of staff of the Czechoslovak army in Russia, while participating in combat operations in the area from Chelyabinsk to Vladivostok. Finally received on 1. January 1920 colonel rank and commanded the 18th transport of Russian legionnaires from Vladivostok to his homeland. This transport sailed on the ship President Grant on April 27, 1920 and arrived in Trieste on June 14. This was followed by a train departure to Czechoslovakia, and on June 17, 1920, a ceremonial welcome took place in Prague.13
military headquarters in Brno. He then replaced several other positions, until December 31, 1936 he was appointed Chief of Staff of Headquarters III. choir. He performed this function until the end of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. In 1946 he was promoted in memoriam to the rank of brigadier general. See: VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification lists of military persons, qualification file of V. Lysák.
10 Moravian Museum Brno (MZM), Historical Department (HO), f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 9220 – Typescript of the former member of the ON škpt. Václav Kratochvíl entitled Activities of the Regional Command of the Defense of the Moravia – West Nation, p. 1.
11 VÚA-VHA, f.
12 Richard ŠVANDA, Three Fates, Two Wars, One City. At own expense, Náchod 2016, pp. 48.
13 Ibid., Pp. 50-58.
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The young republic needed experienced officers and B. Všetička therefore remained in the army. He first commanded the 25th Light Artillery Brigade and then on February 15, 1925 he was appointed commander of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade in Hradec Králové, where he served with a break until September 1930. He gained the rank of brigadier general on May 1, 1928. From 1930 to 1932 he was the commander of the artillery school in Olomouc and from December 15, 1932 he took command of the artillery at the Provincial Military Headquarters in Brno. He worked here until October 15, 1937, when he became the interim commander of the newly formed 15th Division in Trenčín, and from January 1, 1938, he took over its command definitively. In this capacity, he was also caught by the state’s military armed forces in September.
As for Všetiček’s commanding abilities, his superiors generally evaluated him positively in the preserved official materials. General A. Hasal, for example, used the words “very capable, independent, conscientious, very hardworking, diligent, diligent, precise, thorough” in the evaluation dated November 22, 1937. Extremely proactive with a highly developed sense of duty and responsibility. ”14 He further stated that B. Všetička is“ […] of considerable talent, a very good memory. Mentally fresh, very flexible, thoughtful, practical. Judiciary, imagination and talent make it easier for him to solve every problem and situation. ”15 During his military service, he was also a gen. B. Všetička decorated with a variety of decorations. We can name, for example, the Russian Order of St. Anne II. degree awarded in 1918, the following year it was the War Cross of the Order of MR Stefanik and also the British Distinguished Service Order. In 1920, the French War Cross followed by a palm tree and a revolutionary medal, which he took over from the then Minister of National Defense, František Udržal. In 1921, B. Všetička received the War Cross, two years later the Cross of the Knights of the Legion of Honor and the Czechoslovak Victory Medal, which was personally presented to him by President TG Masaryk.16
Only Všetiček’s family relationships were critically evaluated for a certain period of time. He brought his companion Klaudia née Lysecká from Russia, whom he married in June 1921. However, the marriage was not happy and mentions of it appeared in the evaluation of superiors. Provincial Military Commander in Brno div. gene. Eduard Kadlec, for example, described the situation on December 29, 1936 as follows: “His [Všetičkovy, note. author] private relationships in puncto marriage are wrong. He does not have a common household with the woman on the basis of a mutual agreement caused by the woman’s inconduence; this feeds a reputation very offensive to General Všetička moving in the direction that his wife can be sustained by third parties, with the knowledge of General Všetička. General Všetička, who intervened with me on his part, expressed himself in the sense that that his wife does not provide him with weapons to initiate the divorce proceedings to the extent that he would have wished; in fact, he supports his wife decently, which makes his financial situation quite precarious. ”17 The marriage finally ended in divorce in 1937, and the following year B. Všetička married Milada née Mala, whom he met in Brno at the time he commanded the artillery at ZVV.18
14 VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification documents of military persons, qualification file of B. Všetička, part II, insert for qualification year 1937.
15 Ibid.
16 Private Archive of Vladimír Černý, photocopy of the typescript of Milada Všetičková entitled Div. General Ing. Bohuslav Všetička. Dated in Brno on August 19, 1995.
17 VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification lists of military persons, qualification file B. Všetičky, part II, insert for qualification year 1938.
18 Milada Všetičková (1916 to 2008), née Malá, was born in Brno and has lived practically her whole life in this city. Her father Cyril Malý (1880 to 1947) worked for the state railway
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Gen. selection B. All for the function of earth commander ON was not accidental. Before the occupation, he worked in Brno for several years as commander of the ZVV artillery, thanks to which he was well acquainted with the local situation and knew most of the officers at the birth of the ON personally. He also gained considerable respect during the mobilization period as commander of the 15th Division. After the occupation, he lived again in Brno, where he completed an agricultural course for the retraining of officers at the University of Agriculture and from July 1939 he worked as the chief administrative councilor in the Provincial Law Enforcement Office.
Building the structure of the provincial headquarters
The first meeting of Generals B. Všetička and JS Ingra took place on April 6, 1939.19 Both at that time criticized the decision of Czechoslovak politicians to accept the terms of the Munich Agreement, and from this point of view they were also critical of some army leaders. In their plans, they anticipated that a war would break out in the near future, in which Germany would eventually be defeated by the predominance of the Allied coalition. Therefore, they considered it necessary to create an organization that would take over power in the Czech lands in the final phase of this war. This organization would also eventually prevent the communist revolution, which at that time the representatives of the military resistance circles reckoned with its possible future development. JS Ingr therefore informed B.
B. Všetička undertook this task and with the help of Col. V. Lysák and Capt. Č. The proposal was based on the then administrative division of Moravia, so there were to be a total of six regions. JS Ingr agreed with the content of this proposal and B. Všetička was invited to immediately start preparations for its gradual implementation.21 V. Lysák and Č. Jelínek began to involve other officers in the preparatory activities, mostly members of the liquidation commission
and from 1929 to 1935 he was a member of the National Assembly for the National Socialist Party. From the marriage of Bohuslav and Milada Všetiček, two children were born whose fate was tragic. Zlata’s daughter (born on April 20, 1939) died at the age of 19 of a malignant disease, her son Aleš (born on October 17, 1940) died at the age of five of pneumonia at the Brno Regional Hospital. After the death of both of her children, Mrs. Všetičková devoted her entire life to caring for the memory of her husband and his co-workers from the ranks of ON. Inheritance gen. B. All correspondence (correspondence, military jacket with insignia in the rank of brigadier general, war decorations, etc.) was donated to the collections of the Brno City Museum at the end of her life and she was always willing to help researchers who were interested in the fate of resistance fighters from ON. One of them was the author of this study, who had the opportunity to visit Mrs. M. Všetičková several times in 2000 and 2001 in her apartment on Bieblova Street in Brno. See: Internet encyclopedia of the history of Brno, password Milada Všetičková (available electronically: https://encyklopedie.brna.cz/home-mmb/?acc=profil_osobnosti&load=442 [cited on 20 September 2019]).
19 This information is also contained in the indictment prepared by the Chief Public Prosecutor at the People’s Court in Berlin No. 12 J 68/40 g against Všetiček’s group, see: ABS, f. 141 (German courts in the empire), sign. 141-237-6, pp. 13-14.
20 P. KOPEČNÝ, Defense of the Nation in the Brno Region, p. 25.
21 The content of the conversation between JS Ingr and B. Všetička is discussed in detail in the indictment of the Chief Public Prosecutor at the People’s Court, see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-237-6, pp. 27-33.
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III. Corps in Brno, of which was of great importance for the activities of the provincial headquarters, especially Capt. gšt. Jaroslav Gardavský.22
Meanwhile, during April and May 1939, the main central military headquarters of the ON in Prague, led by the arm. gene. J. Bílý. At the same time, officers working within the liquidation group of the former Ministry of National Defense stood at the birth of ON. The former commander of the artillery of the 3rd Army, Div. gene. Hugo Vojta.23 Gradually, a large resistance organization was created to cover the entire territory of the protectorate. At the same time, the Prague leadership of the ON worked closely with the Moravian leadership, and all significant steps were mutually consulted at many joint meetings and conferences.
In Moravia, the construction of the basic command structure of the ON took place until July 1939. An important event in this context was the departure of Gen. JS Ingra abroad. The general lived in Brno in the building of the Provincial Headquarters and after the March occupation he was occasionally monitored by the police. Nevertheless, he managed to cover his resistance activities and take an active part in creating the basic resistance network.24 On the instructions of Edvard Beneš, JS Ingr went abroad on June 20, 1939, which, according to surviving reports, caused a stir among the protectorate police forces. A report dated July 20, 1939, stated that “the search for the missing General Sergei Ingra was in vain. General Ingr is still reported to the police in Brno, Kounicova No. 73. This house is a former military headquarters, former tenants are evicted from it. Therefore, it could not be established when or where General Ingr moved. It was also not possible to find any person who could give information about his current stay. ”25 Moravian Provincial President JUDr. Jaroslav Caha then closed the case a week later, saying that “searching for from above
22 Jaroslav Gardavský (1906 to 1942) came from Holešov. After graduating from a real grammar school in Brno, he began his studies at the Military Academy in Hranice, where he was ceremoniously decommissioned in July 1928 as an artillery lieutenant. From October of the same year he joined the applied artillery school in Olomouc, where he successfully completed his studies in July 1929. He then joined the artillery regiment 6 in Brno and worked there until November 1935. He followed his studies at the University of War in Prague and after his termination was J. Gardavský from 19 April 1938 assigned to Headquarters III. Corps in Brno, where he first held the position of head of the material group of the 4th department and after Munich the position of head of the training group of the 3rd staff department. After the March occupation, until the end of September 1939 he participated in the liquidation work at the former headquarters III. Corps and in the meantime became involved in resistance activities. After the war, he was promoted in memoriam to the rank of lieutenant colonel. See: VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification documents of military persons, qualification file of J. Gardavský.
23 Hugo Vojta (1885 to 1941) was born in Tábor. After graduating from the Czech high school in České Budějovice, he studied three semesters at the Czech Technical University, but terminated his studies prematurely. He then worked as an official at the Provincial Finance Directorate in Prague and fought on the Italian and Russian fronts during the First World War, where he defected to the Russians in June 1916. He then served in the Czechoslovak legions and took part in many battles with the Bolsheviks. He remained in the army even after returning to his homeland and then held many positions, receiving the rank of division general on January 1, 1934. From 1930 to 1939, Vojta was commander of the artillery at the ZVV in Bratislava. After the occupation, he became involved in organizing the military resistance. He was arrested by the Gestapo in Prague on February 13, 1940, and after being imprisoned in the Pankrác prison, a martial court sentenced him to death on September 28, 1941. He was shot the same day along with the arm. gene. J. Bílý in the courtyard of the Ruzyně barracks. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, p. 324.
24 G. SVOBODA, Army General Sergey Jan Ingr, pp. 32-36.
25 Moravian Regional Archive Brno (MZA), f. B 26 (Police Headquarters Brno), card. 545 – Report of dr. Polácha the presidium of the Provincial Office in Brno No. 18 858 / V of 20 July 1939.
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nominee did not have a positive effect in the local district. His successor in ON was to be a wonder. gene. Ondřej Mézl, who settled in Tovačov after the end of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces.27 B. Všetička and V. Lysák also made their first contacts here. O. Mézl subsequently moved to the Bystrc district of Brno and after the emigration of General JS Ingr he became the new representative of Moravia in the Prague Central Headquarters ON.
The organizational structure of the ON was gradually created during meetings both in the private apartments of its leaders and in restaurants, parks, etc. The most important such places in Brno were the Muzeum café, the U Kozáků restaurant in Žabovřesky, the Besední dům in Králové Pole and the People’s House in Husovice. In addition to V. Lysák or Č. Jelínek, Col. was especially active in organizing these meetings. Ladislav Kotík, who became another important figure of the Moravian Provincial Headquarters ON.28 Gradually, in this way, all important functions were deployed. HE in Moravia, therefore, controlled the provincial headquarters headed by Brig. gene. B. Všetička, whose chief of staff was first Col. V. Lysák and from the end of May 1939 Col. L. Kotík. The change in this function took place in connection with the too “predatory” nature of Col. V. Lysák, however, after his dismissal, he continued to work within the ON as the deputy commander of the Brno-West area.29 At the head of the intelligence department became Capt. Č. Jelínek, took over the organizational department
26 Ibid. – Report of JUDr. Cahy dated July 27, 1939.
27 Ondřej Mézl (1887 to 1968) came from Klopotovice in the Prostějov district. After graduating from the Czech high school in Kroměříž, he studied at the Czech Technical University in Brno, but finished his studies after six semesters. After the outbreak of World War I, he fought on the Russian front and in April 1915 he was captured there. In the ranks of the 1st Serbian Volunteer Division, he took part in the fighting in Dobrogea and from December 1916 he served in the Czechoslovak legions, with which he took part in many battles with the Germans and Bolsheviks. After returning to his homeland, he remained in the army and held various positions. From 1925 to 1929, O. Mézl was a Czechoslovak military attaché in Belgrade. He received the rank of divisional general on March 7, 1936 and then became commander of VI. church in Košice. During the state’s military readiness in September 1938, O. Mézl served as commander of the XVI border zone. After the occupation, he became involved in resistance activities, but due to the impending arrest, he left the protectorate in France in January 1940. He then became commander of the Czechoslovak military mission in the Middle East. From April 1944 he was commander of the Czechoslovak military mission at SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force). However, after the end of World War II, he did not receive recognition and in the autumn of 1945 he was retired. After February 1948, gen. O. Mézl into exile, first in Britain and then in the USA. He died on September 6, 1968 in Norh Hollywood, California. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 195-196. However, after the end of World War II, he did not receive recognition and in the autumn of 1945 he was retired. After February 1948, gen. O. Mézl into exile, first in Britain and then in the USA. He died on September 6, 1968 in Norh Hollywood, California. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 195-196. However, after the end of World War II, he did not receive recognition and in the autumn of 1945 he was retired. After February 1948, gen. O. Mézl into exile, first in Britain and then in the USA. He died on September 6, 1968 in Norh Hollywood, California. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 195-196.
28 Ladislav Kotík (1896 to 1942) came from Lipník nad Bečvou. In 1912 he went to France with his brother Cyril and began studying business school there. However, his studies were interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War, and on August 28, 1914, L. Kotík joined the Foreign Legion as a volunteer, in whose ranks he fought on the Western Front, as well as during the battles for the Dardanelles and the Thessaloniki Front. In April 1918 he was transferred back to France and in June he began service with the 21st Rifle Regiment of the Czechoslovak legions. After returning to his homeland, he continued his military career. After studying at the University of War in Prague, he began working there first as an assistant teacher and from October 1, 1924 as a full professor. L. Kotík received the rank of colonel of the General Staff on January 1, 1931. He also received recognition as the author of professional military writings. From September 1934 he commanded 30. Infantry Regiment in Michalovce in eastern Slovakia and after the declaration of Slovak independence on March 14, 1939, he briefly participated in repelling the Hungarian aggression in the conflict called the “Little War”. At the end of March, L. Kotík arrived in Brno, where he worked as an officer to liquidate Headquarters III. choir. In 1946 he was promoted in memoriam to the rank of brigadier general. See: VÚA-VHA, f. Qualification lists of military persons, qualification file of L. Kotík.
29 Vladimír ČERNÝ, Genesis of the Introductory Phase of the Anti-Nazi Resistance in the Brno Region (March 1939-September 1941). Advanced Master’s thesis, Institute of History, Faculty of Arts, Masaryk University, Brno 2003, pp. 23.
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kpt. J. Gardavský. Other officers worked with various tasks within the provincial headquarters and the medical service was headed by MUDr. Jan Vignati.30
In the course of May 1939, the headquarters of individual subordinate regions were gradually built, the provincial command originally designating a total of six (Brno-město, Brno-venkov, Olomouc, Jihlava, Uherské Hradiště and Moravská Ostrava). However, such a division was somewhat cumbersome, for example in the field of transport, and the contacts between the center and the individual regions were also complicated. Therefore, Moravia was eventually divided according to the shape of the territory within the protectorate borders into two areas, namely Moravia-West and Moravia-East. For tactical reasons, there was a minor change of names to the western area with headquarters in Brno and the eastern area with the center in Olomouc. This division reflected the original location of the headquarters within the corps of the Czechoslovak army.31
Until the exact determination of command functions, the commander of the area of Moravia-West Col. V. Lysák. Then the brig took over the position. gene. František Slunečko32 and V. Lysák
30 MUDr. Jan Vignati (1899 to 1942) came from Přerov. He also graduated from the first five classes of the grammar school and studied in Valašské Meziříčí for the last three years. In the autumn of 1917, he passed his high school diploma, when he had been performing military service with artillery on the Russian front since March of this year. He also fought in Italy and in 1919 he took part in battles with the Hungarian Bolsheviks in Slovakia. From 1919 to 1924 he studied at the Medical Faculty of Masaryk University in Brno and after graduation he worked from December 1924 at the Institute of Microbiology prof. J. Kabelík in Olomouc. On March 1, 1930, MUDr. Vignati appointed proctor of the Provincial Hospital in Uherské Hradiště, where he worked until his arrest by the Gestapo on March 1, 1940. He was the author of a total of 35 scientific papers in the fields of chemotherapy, bacteriology, serology and colloid chemistry published in Czech, British, French and German professional journals. After the arrest, the Nazis imprisoned MUDr. J. Vignati in several prisons in Brno and Germany, and on November 18, 1941, he was sentenced to death by the People’s Court. The execution was carried out in Berlin-Plötzensee on August 26, 1942. See: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 638 – Typescript by L. Boček entitled MUDr. Jan Vignati in a German prison. Xerocopy of typewritten transcripts of skeins and letters MUDr. J. Vignati from prison see: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. No. S 553. Xerocopy of typewritten transcripts of skeins and letters MUDr. J. Vignati from prison see: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. No. S 553. Xerocopy of typewritten transcripts of skeins and letters MUDr. J. Vignati from prison see: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. No. S 553.
31 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 9220 – Typescript of a former member of ON škpt. Václav Kratochvíl entitled Activities of the Regional Command of the Defense of the Nation of Moravia – West, pp. 2-3.
32 František Slunečko (1886 to 1963) was born in Mladá Vožice, Tábor district. After graduating from the Czech High School in České Budějovice, he completed six semesters at the Czech Technical University in Prague, but later dropped out of studies. After the outbreak of World War I, he fought on the Russian front, where he was captured on December 21, 1914. From December 1916 he served in the Czechoslovak legions, taking part in a series of fighting with the Germans and later the Bolsheviks. After returning to his homeland, he remained in the army and in November 1922 he was appointed commander of the 8th Infantry Regiment in Český Těšín. He served in this position until the second half of January 1929, after which he took command of the 16th Infantry Brigade in Místek. He received the rank of brigadier general on July 16, 1929. In the first half of the 1930s, F. Slunečko held the position of deputy commander of the ZVV in Košice, then commanded the 12th Infantry Brigade in Znojmo. After episodic work as the deputy commander of the 6th Division, from the beginning of May 1938 he headed the 2nd Group in Jihlava and performed this function even under the armed state. After Munich, he joined the headquarters of III. church in Brno. F. Slunečko was the only commander of the first set of ON, who did not fall into the hands of the Gestapo or go abroad. He worked illegally from December 2, 1939 until the outbreak of the Prague Uprising. In 1944, he became the head of the ALEX military headquarters and, among other things, cooperated with the BARIUM pargroup. As the leader of the Central National Committee, he tried to unite the resistance currents under his command, but this plan did not work. After the liberation, F. Slunečko received the rank of division general on August 1, 1945, but due to his age, he was retired at the beginning of June 1946. The communist regime persecuted him, and at the turn of 1948 and 1949, F. Slunečko spent several months in custody without trial. He died in Prague on December 10, 1963. See: Military figures of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, p. 262.
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became his deputy. Brig. gene. Václav Ždímal.33 The regional headquarters included the regional headquarters, which was organizationally built at the level of divisions. The regional headquarters in Brno consisted of the Brno-město, Brno-venkov and Jihlava regions; the Olomouc, Moravská Ostrava and Uherské Hradiště regions were then subject to the regional headquarters in Olomouc. Suitable officers for command functions in these regions began to be sought during April 1939 and gradually the command positions were filled. This was mostly done on the basis of the knowledge of individual officers and the selection of commanders was made by B. Všetička with the assistance of V. Lysák and Č. Jelínek. The regional headquarters then included the district headquarters and at the lowest level stood the local headquarters.34
Its provincial political department also played an important role in shaping the ON. The beginnings of its establishment date back to the period of the mentioned meeting in the office of the Moravian branch of the Autoclub at the end of March 1939. An illegal group was founded here, headed by PhMr. Vítězslav Mečíř, 35 who was the co-founder and first chairman of this branch. At the end of May 1939, Mečíř’s organization established contact with another resistance
33 Václav Ždímal (1890 to 1942) came from Heřmanov in the district of Žďár nad Sázavou. After graduating from the Czech high school in Velké Meziříčí, he studied at the Czech Technical University in Brno, but later interrupted his studies and began working as a surveyor. During the First World War, he fought on the Russian front, where at the end of September 1915 he was taken prisoner. He later enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions, took part in the Battle of Zborov and completed the Siberian anabasis. After returning to his homeland, he remained in the army and served in various command positions. Among other things, he worked from 1923 to 1925 at the Military Academy in Hranice as an instructor and commander of the artillery division. From November 1926 to the end of September 1931 and then again from September 1932 to September 1933 he commanded the 7th Artillery Regiment in Olomouc. Then a year he commanded the 331 Artillery Regiment in Jince and from September 30, 1934 10. field artillery brigade in Banská Bystrica. V. Ždímal received the rank of brigadier general on July 1, 1936. From mid-October 1937 until the occupation, he held the position of artillery commander IV. Corps in Olomouc and under the armed forces of the state commanded the artillery of Border Zone XIII in Hranice. After joining the resistance, V. Ždímal managed to build an effectively functioning headquarters in Olomouc, but on December 11, 1939, he was arrested by the Gestapo. He was sentenced to death on April 13, 1942 by the People’s Court in Berlin. The guillotine execution took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on September 2 of the same year. After liberation, he received the rank of division general in memoriam in 1946. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 338-339. From mid-October 1937 until the occupation, he held the position of artillery commander IV. Corps in Olomouc and under the armed forces of the state commanded the artillery of Border Zone XIII in Hranice. After joining the resistance, V. Ždímal managed to build an effectively functioning headquarters in Olomouc, but on December 11, 1939, he was arrested by the Gestapo. He was sentenced to death on April 13, 1942 by the People’s Court in Berlin. The guillotine execution took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on September 2 of the same year. After liberation, he received the rank of division general in memoriam in 1946. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 338-339. From mid-October 1937 until the occupation, he held the position of artillery commander IV. Corps in Olomouc and under the armed forces of the state commanded the artillery of Border Zone XIII in Hranice. After joining the resistance, V. Ždímal managed to build an effectively functioning headquarters in Olomouc, but on December 11, 1939, he was arrested by the Gestapo. He was sentenced to death on April 13, 1942 by the People’s Court in Berlin. The guillotine execution took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on September 2 of the same year. After liberation, he received the rank of division general in memoriam in 1946. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 338-339. Ždímal managed to build an effectively functioning ON headquarters in Olomouc, but on December 11, 1939, he was arrested by the Gestapo. He was sentenced to death on April 13, 1942 by the People’s Court in Berlin. The guillotine execution took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on September 2 of the same year. After liberation, he received the rank of division general in memoriam in 1946. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 338-339. Ždímal managed to build an effectively functioning ON headquarters in Olomouc, but on December 11, 1939, he was arrested by the Gestapo. He was sentenced to death on April 13, 1942 by the People’s Court in Berlin. The guillotine execution took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on September 2 of the same year. After liberation, he received the rank of division general in memoriam in 1946. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 338-339.
34 A detailed scheme of the ON land command in Moravia and subordinate units was prepared by the former commander of the strike units of the Moravia-West headquarters, Col. Otto Francl (1895 to 1950), who, as one of the few senior officers of the First ON, managed to survive the occupation, even though he fell into the hands of the Gestapo on March 19, 1940 and was imprisoned until the end of the war. See: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. No.
35 Vítězslav Mečíř (1887 to 1942) was born in Mladá Boleslav. After studying at Charles University, he practiced medicine in Rožmitál and Prachatice. He has lived in Brno since 1911 and worked there as a pharmacist and scientific representative for Medica. After participating in resistance activities, he participated in the preparation of bacteriological means against the Nazis. He was arrested together with MUDr. J. Vignatim, March 1, 1940. The People’s Court in Berlin sentenced him to death on November 18, 1941, and on August 26, 1942, Mečíř was executed in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison. See: Internet encyclopedia of the history of Brno, password Vítězslav Mečíř (available electronically: https://encyklopedie.brna.cz/home-mmb/?acc=profil_osobnosti&load=3997 [cited on 20 September 2019]).
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a group around Masaryk University professor Jan Uhr36 and both became the basis for the creation of the provincial political department.37
The structure of ON was therefore quite extensive, fragmented and sophisticated. However, it is necessary to take into account that the outlined organizational scheme was built differently in practice in different places and in some parts of Moravia only the framework of these secret military units was created, which was then to be completed quickly in the event of a planned general uprising. The generals at the head of the ON assumed that already at the turn of 1939 and 1940 there would be a coalition of Western powers with the Soviet Union and the subsequent early defeat of Germany. In the final phase of this military conflict, a large-scale uprising was to break out in the Protectorate, in which the ON’s military units would play a key role. It would also belong to them in the first phase of post-war development. However, it was not a military dictatorship, but a
The basic tasks of organizational construction and formation of the ON structure were completed in July 1939. The organization had a large number of members throughout the protectorate, so there were representatives of all walks of life. In addition to former professional soldiers, legionnaires, police officers, members of Sokol or Orla, teachers, doctors, officials, clergy, postal and railway employees and members of various manual occupations also worked in the ON. However, the rapidly built and too large structure also posed a considerable danger, as the involvement of a large number of people in the resistance activity increased the likelihood of its disclosure. The division of the ON was clear, schematic and hierarchically organized, which later made it easier for the Gestapo to proceed with its liquidation.
36 Prof. PhDr. Jan Uher (1891 to 1942) came from Prostějov. He studied philosophy-Czech language at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University and, after obtaining his doctorate, obtained a habilitation at Masaryk University in Brno in 1925 as The Problem of Discipline. He dealt mainly with the psychology and upbringing of a preschool child. From 1935 he worked as an extraordinary professor of pedagogy at the Faculty of Arts of Masaryk University in Brno and in 1937 he became a full professor at Comenius University in Bratislava, from where he returned to Brno in the autumn of 1938. At the beginning of the following year, his major scientific work entitled Secondary School Student was published. He was also the chairman of the Czech Sokol Community and the founder of the Free Pedagogical Association. Prof. J. Uher was arrested on November 20, 1939 and after a long imprisonment in Špilberk, in Kounic’s dormitories, Wrocław, Diezu an der Lahn and Alt Moabit sentenced him to death on June 9, 1942. The execution took place in Berlin-Plötzensee on October 26 of that year. See for example: Boris UHER – Jana UHLÍŘOVÁ, Jan Uher (1891-1942). Institute for Information in Education, Prague 1993.
37 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory no.
38 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 17/1 – Typescript prof. Robert Konečný New Republic. Nation Defense Political Program.
39 Detlef BRANDES, Czechs under the German Protectorate. Occupation policy, collaboration and resistance 1939-1945. Prostor, Prague 1999, p. 72.
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Resistance activities of the Defense of the Nation
For the further development of the situation of the Moravian ON, the meeting held in the Prague apartment of the arm. gene. J. Bílý in July 1939, which was attended by Moravian representatives Generals B. Všetička, O. Mézl and Col. L. Kotík. B. Všetička reported on the development of resistance activities in Moravia, after which his words were criticized by the brig. gene. Bedřich Neumann, who pointed out the disparity in comparison with the situation in the Czech Republic.40 The resistance fighters were primarily to try to obtain as many weapons as possible, because their lack seemed to be the most significant problem of domestic resistance. The participants of the meeting then agreed on the expected early outbreak of war, which, as has already been said, should not have been too long according to the ideas of the ON commanders.
The resistance activities of the provincial headquarters of the ON and its subordinate units in Moravia manifested themselves in practice in various ways. On the one hand, there were attempts to acquire weapons and ammunition for the planned uprising, which was to break out in the Czech lands in the final phase of the expected war. These weapons could be obtained from four sources, namely by dismantling weapons stocks from military warehouses, purchase, theft or own production.42 In attempts to obtain more weapons and ammunition, the attention of Moravian ON members was focused mainly on the Brno Zbrojovka Group, which It was one of the leading arms races in Europe at the time.43 The local shooters Josef Kulka (former Russian legionnaire) and Karel Bauer joined the resistance, who came up with a plan to keep the ammunition saved from shooting at the company’s shooting range. They also included other employees, Josef Gottwald and Jaroslav Lukášek. In the period up to August 1939, about 45,000 pieces of ammunition were obtained in this way, which were then walled up in the walls of one of the dungeons on the shooting range. However, their activities were revealed and on September 5, 1939, members of the Gestapo arrested J. Kulka and his collaborators. The German court-martial sentenced J. Kulka and K. Bauer to death on December 19, 1939, and J. Lukášek and J. Gottwald received each
40 Bedřich Neumann (1891 to 1964) came from Třebichovice in the Kladno district. During the First World War, he was captured in March 1915 on the Russian front. After staying in prison camps, he enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions and later took part in the fighting with the Germans during the retreat by Ukraine and the subsequent fighting with the Bolsheviks. After returning to his homeland, he remained in the army, studied at the War College in Prague and held various command positions. In the years 1931 to 1935 was II. Deputy Chief of Staff, and on July 1, 1933, he received the rank of brigadier general. From the end of September 1935 to April 1939, B. Neumann worked for the 5th Division in České Budějovice, which he later took command of. During the state’s military readiness in the autumn of 1938, he was the commander of the 31st Border Area. gene. J. Bílý and at the same time a representative of this organization in the Political Headquarters. In January 1940, B. Neumann left the protectorate abroad and in France became chief of staff of the Czechoslovak military administration. From June 13, 1940 he was commander of the 1st Czechoslovak Division in France. After the evacuation to Britain, the division was reorganized into the 1st Czechoslovak Mixed Brigade and B. Neumann was appointed its commander. In January 1943, he took over as Chief of Staff for building the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in London. After the war he worked as an austerity commissioner of the MNO and after February 1948 he went into exile. He died on July 16, 1964 in London. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 206-207. After the evacuation to Britain, the division was reorganized into the 1st Czechoslovak Mixed Brigade and B. Neumann was appointed its commander. In January 1943, he took over as Chief of Staff for building the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in London. After the war he worked as an austerity commissioner of the MNO and after February 1948 he went into exile. He died on July 16, 1964 in London. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 206-207. After the evacuation to Britain, the division was reorganized into the 1st Czechoslovak Mixed Brigade and B. Neumann was appointed its commander. In January 1943, he took over as Chief of Staff for building the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in London. After the war he worked as an austerity commissioner of the MNO and after February 1948 he went into exile. He died on July 16, 1964 in London. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 206-207.
41 The general early assumption of the end of the war on the part of the ON leadership is also evidenced by the content of the above-mentioned recollections of the Capt. V. Kratochvíla and prof. R. Konečný.
42 V. ČERNÝ, The Genesis of the Introductory Phase of the Anti-Nazi Resistance in the Brno Region, p. 56.
43 Part three. History of the Brno Zbrojovka concern. Blok, Brno 1973.
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in the amount of two years in prison. Both convicts were then executed at Špilberk Castle on January 31, 1940, and these were the first executions of members of the domestic resistance carried out by the occupation apparatus in Brno.44 Despite all efforts to obtain more weapons, the situation was not favorable in the autumn of 1939. He had only about 30 or 40 machine guns, several thousand rifles and not a large amount of suitable ammunition in the whole of Moravia.
Furthermore, minor sabotages were carried out, the scope of which should not have been greater due to the threat of premature disclosure of the existence of ON. However, a somewhat problematic element was the attempts to use bacteriological means in the fight against the occupying power. MUDr. J. Vignati, who in May 1939 during a meeting of resistance fighters in the apartment of prof. František Nábělek in Brno-Králové Pole in the presence of B. Všetička, Č. Jelínek and V. Mečíř proposed the use of botulinum toxin (so-called sausage poison, one of the most effective natural poisons) and typhoid bacteria. These funds were to be expanded by means of sprinklers.45 B. Všetička informed about the proposal of O. Mézl, who did not speak out against him in principle. However, he stated that the possible use of these funds must be approved by the central headquarters in Prague, which was also to finance further attempts in this direction.
The tests took place in the Vignati laboratory in Uherské Hradiště, as well as in Brno, Modřice, Olomouc, Jihlava and Moravská Ostrava.46 where they were to be sprayed on mailboxes and cranks at inns, cinemas, etc. The members of the ON understood this activity as a kind of preventive measure, as they expected the German army to use chemical weapons in the coming conflict, as was the case during the First World War. The Provincial Headquarters of ON entrusted the production of sprayers Ing. Jiří Elgr and Ing. Konstantin Raclavský, whose workplace at the Sochor company in Blansko seemed to be suitable for the preparation of the whole event. The actual assembly of the sprayers took place in Elgr’s factory in Brno-Černovice. 47 About 50 or 60 pieces were made. Practical use then occurred in the infestation of horse rail transports in Stuttgart and Freiburg, killing more animals.48 According to the post-war testimony of the Gestapo criminal assistant Willi Braun, 49 who was investigating a number of arrested members of the ON, further experiments took place in June 1939.
44 Ibid., Pp. 172-173.
45 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 15 – Typescript of Miloš Mečíř entitled Report on Activities in the Underground Resistance Organization Defense of the Nation, p. 3.
46 Ibid.
47 P. KOPEČNÝ, Defense of the Nation in the Brno Region, p. 64.
48 F. VAŠEK – Z. ŠTĚPÁNEK, They raised their heads among the first, Part 2, p. 120.
49 Willi Braun (1916 to 1947) was a German from Brno who began working as an interpreter for the Brno Gestapo in April 1939. As part of Report II, BM / So was promoted to an independent investigator and was notorious for the brutality with which he approached those under investigation. Another of Braun’s work was the IV N intelligence unit, in which he carried out a number of actions against paratroopers sent to the protectorate from Great Britain and the Soviet Union. At the beginning of April 1945, W. Braun fatally shot a criminal Gestapo inspector, Alexander Schober, who cooperated with the Czech resistance in Velké Meziříčí. The Extraordinary People’s Court in Brno sentenced Braun to death on January 10, 1947, and was executed on the same day. See: MZA, f. C 141 (Extraordinary People’s Court Brno), inventory No. 2870, card. 246, file number Lsp 1999/46.
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in German villages in the Jihlava and Vyškov regions. However, there was no success in this case because “typhus cultures were destroyed by not maintaining a certain temperature” .50
An important part of the activities of the ON was also the provision of illegal crossings of protectorate borders. In Brno, Capt. J. Gardavský, and the main goal was Poland until the outbreak of World War II. People who wanted to leave the territory of the protectorate were concentrated in Přerov and Valašské Meziříčí. The most important transitional route in the direction Solanec – Bílá – Jablunkov operated until the end of August 1939 and was used by several dozen soldiers. In June 1939, a brig stayed at Solance. gene. Zdeněk Novák, who then managed the crossings from there personally.51 However, when German troops concentrated in this area at the end of August of the same year to attack Poland, it was no longer possible to use the route.52 After the war broke out, the route through Slovakia and Hungary gained importance. to Yugoslavia.
Another manifestation of ON’s activities was intelligence activities, which were managed in Brno by Capt. Č. Jelínek in close cooperation with Col. L. Kotík and Capt. J. Gardavský. An illegal radio connection between Brno and Prague was achieved, in which the lieutenant of the telegraph service Karel Štolc actively participated.53 The radio connection continued to operate between some units of the
50 MZA, f. C 141, inventory no. 2870, kart. 246, file number Lsp 1999/46 – Protocol written with Willi Braun at the Regional Office of the StB in Brno and dated June 14, 1946, pp. 4-5.
51 Zdeněk Novák (1891 to 1988) came from Paskov in the Místek district. During the First World War, he fought on the Serbian and Russian fronts, where he was captured in June 1916. He then enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions and as an artillery officer took part in retreating battles with the German army in Ukraine and then many clashes with the Bolsheviks. After returning to his homeland, he remained in the army and from November 1920 to the end of February 1929 he commanded the 11th Field Artillery Brigade in Košice. He received the rank of brigadier general on May 1, 1928. From February 1929 to October 1935 he commanded the 8th Field Artillery Brigade in Opava and later in Hranice na Moravě. Subsequently, he took command of Artillery IV. Corps in Olomouc and at the end of December 1937 he was appointed commander of the artillery at ZVV Brno. In the autumn of 1938, during the military readiness of the state, he commanded the artillery of the 2nd Army in Olomouc. After the German occupation, he retired and became involved in resistance activities. A series of Gestapo arrests at the turn of 1939 and 1940 were avoided by Z. Novák, so in the autumn of 1941 he became the commander of the ON in Bohemia, and after his arrest, Gen. On 31 December 1941, Bedřich Homola took over his position as commander-in-chief. The Gestapo came to Novák’s footsteps with the help of confidants, and on June 22, 1944, he was arrested in Prague. He was imprisoned by the Nazis in Pankrác, from where he was transported for interrogation to the headquarters of the Prague Gestapo headquarters in Petschkov Palace. After the outbreak of the Prague Uprising on May 5, 1945, Z. Novák was liberated and immediately joined the activities of the ALEX military headquarters. At the beginning of August 1945 he received the rank of divisional and April 1, 1946 army general. Novák was arrested in January 1951 and awaited trial until April 8, 1954, when he was sentenced in a fabricated trial to 18 years in prison for military treason and high treason. He was prematurely released by presidential pardon in September 1956 and in 1963 he underwent complete rehabilitation, including the restoration of the rank of army general. He died at the age of 97 in Zadní Třebán, Prague-West District. See: Military personalities of the Czechoslovak resistance 1939-1945, pp. 209-210.
52 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 4186 – Zdeněk Novák’s typescript entitled Defense of the Nation – part one, p. 2.
53 Karel Štolc (1916 to 1942) came from Kralupy nad Vltavou. He graduated from the Military Academy in Hranice and after his dismissal was assigned to the rank of lieutenant to Telegraph Battalion No. 4 in Prešov, where he served until the Nazi occupation of the Czech lands in March 1939. After joining the resistance which, after the first failure, managed to establish a connection with the Prague resistance in October 1939. After his arrest on November 3, 1939, K. Štolc was imprisoned in several places in Brno and Germany. On March 31, 1942, the People’s Court convicted him together with Maj. Petr Kaman to death. The execution took place on August 7, 1942 in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison. In memoriam he was promoted to the rank of staff captain in 1946. See: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-268-13 – Indictment of the Chief Public Prosecutor at the People’s Court
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HE in Moravia, while it was led by Maj. Petr Kaman. Attention was also paid to the situation at Brno Airport. The train staff then delivered reports on the rail transports of the German troops. It was also important to monitor and register all arrests of resistance workers and to try to find out their causes. There were also analytical comments on the situation in the factories and reports on the level of supply and overall conditions in individual cities. It goes without saying that this intelligence activity was an extremely dangerous matter from the point of view of the occupying power, and its organizers in Brno, including K. Štolc and P.
Among the individual areas of activity of the Moravian Provincial Headquarters ON were also promotional events in the form of production of various leaflets and illegal printed matter. This was supposed to be a kind of counterpoint to Nazi propaganda affecting the Czech population of the protectorate. The leaflets were distributed in Brno by all higher headquarters, ie both the provincial and the headquarters of the Brno-město region and the regional headquarters. Their greatest occurrence was recorded in the period around the anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic on October 28, 1939.55
Finally, the last important area of activity of the ON was cooperation with other resistance organizations of the Czech population of the protectorate. Sometimes there was close cooperation and intertwining, so the position of some groups is unclear for this reason. There was a close connection mainly with the group called the “civilian component of the ON” .56 It was a group of intelligence representatives, including several professors of Masaryk University, who actively cooperated with officers from the ON probably since June 1939. The National Movement of Working Youth (NHPM), which was active in the Brno region.57 Contacts were gradually established with other civic resistance organizations, but also with the communist resistance.
to Petr Kaman and Karel Štolc dated 23 December 1941. Next: Internet encyclopedia of the history of Brno, password Karel Štolc (available electronically: https://encyklopedie.brna.cz/home-mmb/?acc=profil_osobnosti&load=3236 [cited on 20 September 2019]).
54 Petr Kaman (1895 to 1942) came from Brno. During the First World War, he fought on the Italian front, where he fell into captivity at the end of the war on October 25, 1918, and then enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions. After returning to his homeland, in 1919 he took part in battles with the Hungarian Bolsheviks in Slovakia. From October 1920, P. Kaman served in the 2nd Telegraph Battalion in Brno, where in December 1926 he took over the commander of the 8th Telegraph Company. In 1933 he became a full professor at the Military Telegraph School in Turnov. He received the rank of major on July 1, 1937. After the occupation, he worked at the building telegraph office in Brno, where he established cooperation with other officers. He was arrested by the Gestapo on December 3, 1939, and after a long imprisonment, he and K. Štolc were sentenced to death on March 31, 1942, and executed in Berlin-Plötzensee on August 7 of that year. In memoriam he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1946. Investigative materials of the German People’s Court to P. Kaman see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-268-16.
55 Gendarmerie reports on the findings of individual leaflets in the period of October and November 1939 in Moravia see: MZA, f. B 72 (Zemské četnické velitelství Brno), card. 60.
56 Historian Jan Boris Uhlíř describes this group as an independent organization and calls it the Provincial National Committee. See: Jan Boris UHLÍŘ, Provincial National Committee. His place in the first resistance set. DaS, 2000, No. 1, pp. 26-30. For its history, see: Milada ŠIMSOVÁ, Resistance fighters from the Defense of the Nation judged as “Helfert Intelligenz – Gruppe”. Matice moravské 1998, pp. 107-127.
57 See: V. ČERNÝ, Left-wing Youth Organizations in Moravia in the Anti-Nazi Resistance. In: Jiří KOCIAN – Jaroslav PAŽOUT – Jakub RÁKOSNÍK (edd.), Bolshevism, Communism and the Radical
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Gestapo arrests and breaking up the structure
Its members managed to keep the activities of ON quite successful for several months. However, the turning point came in the autumn of 1939, when a large number of leaflets were found in the streets of Brno during the anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic on 28 October. Eighteen-year-old Anna Žáčková then applied to the local Gestapo office with the information that František Šmíd from the village of Chrlice is expanding them. Criminal Commissioner Otto Koslowski, who arrested F. Šmíd in Chrlice, was commissioned to investigate the case. During the house search, the leaflets were actually found.58 Šmíd was a member of the NHPM and acted as a liaison to other resistance organizations, so he had considerable knowledge of resistance activities in Moravia. During the so-called “sharpened interrogations”, the Gestapo investigators revealed a lot of information that Nazi investigators used in further interventions. In addition, the Gestapo already had some additional information gathered during interrogations of detainees in attempts to cross the protectorate’s borders illegally. On the same day as F. Šmíd, one of the leading Brno resistance fighters, prof. PhDr. Vladimír Helfert, for whom it is not clear how the Gestapo revealed his resistance activities.59 After the war, the already mentioned criminal assistant of the Brno Gestapo Willi Braun stated in the protocol to break up the ON that “this organization was found on the basis of a leaflet from the communist tendency” .60
However, Šmíd’s arrest and subsequent extensive statements became undoubtedly a significant cause of the breakdown of the ON structure in Moravia. There is an opinion in the literature that the organization’s own command, which underestimated the Nazi security authorities, was largely to blame for this situation. Such criticism contained mainly books published before 1989, with the ON operation was poorly kept secret and underground principles grossly porušovány.61 leadership, however, was rather an attempt to defame ON because its leaders were among the command
socialism in Czechoslovakia, Vol. VIII. Institute for Contemporary History (ÚSD) AS CR, Prague 2011, pp. 52-80.
58 V. ČERNÝ, Brno Gestapo 1939-1945 and post-war court proceedings with its members. Brno City Archive – Moravian Museum, Brno 2018, pp. 97-98.
59 Prof. PhDr. Vladimír Helfert (1886 to 1945) was born in Plánice near Klatovy. After graduating from the Smíchov grammar school, he began studying music aesthetics, geography and history at Charles University. After graduating, he worked as a professor of history and geography at the Czech Business Academy in Prague. In 1919 he transferred to the First Czech State Real Grammar School, where he taught until 1921. In that year he became a private associate professor in the field of musicology at the Faculty of Arts of Masaryk University. Here he became an extraordinary professor here in 1926 and a full professor five years later, from 1935 to 1936 he held the position of dean of this faculty and in the following period 1936 and 1937 he was vice-dean. He is considered the founder of the Brno School of Musicology and since his arrival in this city he has also worked in the Moravian Museum, where he stood at the birth of the music archive. After his arrest 14. November 1939 and his gradual imprisonment at Špilberk, Kounice dormitories and Wrocław, he was imprisoned from July 1940 to June 1942 in the Wohlau prison, from where he was released due to very poor health and placed in the Vinohrady hospital in Prague. After hiding in various places, the Gestapo arrested him again on June 23, 1944 in Miřetice u Vlašimi. This was followed by imprisonment in Pankrác and at the end of April 1945 transport to Terezín, where prof. V. Helfert was liberated. However, his health was already critical and he died on May 18, 1945 in Prague. Interrogation protocols written with prof. V. Helfert after his arrest, see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. in Kounice dormitories and Wrocław he was imprisoned in the Wohlau prison from July 1940 to June 1942, from where he was released due to very poor health and placed in the Vinohrady hospital in Prague. After hiding in various places, the Gestapo arrested him again on June 23, 1944 in Miřetice u Vlašimi. This was followed by imprisonment in Pankrác and at the end of April 1945 transport to Terezín, where prof. V. Helfert was liberated. However, his health was already critical and he died on May 18, 1945 in Prague. Interrogation protocols written with prof. V. Helfert after his arrest, see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. in Kounice dormitories and Wrocław he was imprisoned in the Wohlau prison from July 1940 to June 1942, from where he was released due to very poor health and placed in the Vinohrady hospital in Prague. After hiding in various places, the Gestapo arrested him again on June 23, 1944 in Miřetice u Vlašimi. This was followed by imprisonment in Pankrác and at the end of April 1945 transport to Terezín, where prof. V. Helfert was liberated. However, his health was already critical and he died on May 18, 1945 in Prague. Interrogation protocols written with prof. V. Helfert after his arrest, see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. After hiding in various places, the Gestapo arrested him again on June 23, 1944 in Miřetice u Vlašimi. This was followed by imprisonment in Pankrác and at the end of April 1945 transport to Terezín, where prof. V. Helfert was liberated. However, his health was already critical and he died on May 18, 1945 in Prague. Interrogation protocols written with prof. V. Helfert after his arrest, see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. After hiding in various places, the Gestapo arrested him again on June 23, 1944 in Miřetice u Vlašimi. This was followed by imprisonment in Pankrác and at the end of April 1945 transport to Terezín, where prof. V. Helfert was liberated. However, his health was already critical and he died on May 18, 1945 in Prague. Interrogation protocols written with prof. V. Helfert after arrest see: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003. 141, sign. 141-350-11. The personality and work of V. Helfert so far in the most detail: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Masaryk University Foundation, Brno 2003.
60 MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2870, card. 246, file number Lsp 1999/46 – Protocol written with Willi Braun at the Regional Office of the StB in Brno and dated 14 June 1946, p. 1.
61 František ZŘÍDKAVESELÝ – Jiří ADÁMEK – Milan KROUTIL, Brno citizens in the fight against fascism. Blok, Brno 1981, pp. 32.
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cadres of the First Republic “bourgeois” army and did not hide their negative attitude towards communist ideology. It is a fact that some criticisms of poorly conducted illegal activities (handwritten lists of ON members, notes on details of resistance actions found by the Gestapo during house searches) were occasionally made by a few members of the first Brno resistance who survived the war.62 However, this fact is related to the fact that the management of the ON did not anticipate the occupation of the Czech lands in the longer term. As already mentioned, the generals and officers assumed that an uprising of the Czech population and a parallel war of the Allies against Germany would take place in the near future and that the war would not last long. For this reason, the principles of illegal work have also been violated in some cases. The representatives of the domestic resistance did not expect that the Nazi security apparatus could have room for major repressive actions associated with detailed house searches. Although this assumption turned out to be a tragic mistake, in 1939 none of the leading representatives of the Czech domestic resistance could have guessed.
The first large-scale arrest operation took place in Brno on November 20, 1939. At that time, it fell into the hands of the Gestapo and Capt. Č. arrest, B. Všetička met with L. Kotík and J. Gardavský to discuss the new situation. The general proposed to suspend the activities of the provincial headquarters, whose members were to go underground. However, L. Kotík rejected the proposal. At the next meeting in the presence of gen. O. Mézla was further discussed about the problem. O. Mézl and L. Kotík intended to continue their resistance activities, but for reasons of greater security, they decided not to sleep in their apartments in the future. J. Gardavský, on the other hand, intended to remain in his residence, but with an interruption of resistance activities. However, Kotík’s arrest in his apartment at 50 Sirotkova Street took place during another Gestapo raid on November 23, and J. Gardavský was arrested seven days later. During the last decade of November and December 1939, a number of other officers were arrested and arrested in Olomouc, Moravian Ostrava and Uherský Hradiště.65 He states: “He arrested and investigated many dozens of Czech people for his executive services with the Gestapo in Brno. Richard Schetke was assigned to the so-called ‘Festnahme-Kommando’ when the illegal organization Defense of the Nation was discovered. He arrested mainly officials of the provincial movement ON in Moravia, who were mostly officers of the former Czechoslovakia. armies of which
62 See in particular the memoirs cited above. V. Kratochvíla.
63 The dates of arrests of individual resistance fighters were always listed on the front page of the indictments. In this case, see Note 19.
64 MMB, f.
65 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. No.
66 Richard Schetke (1906 to 1947) came from Hodonín. He took an active part in the occupation of some important buildings in Brno by the local Nazis on the night of March 14-15, 1939. He also entered the Gestapo this month and worked as a criminal employee at the Brno management office for the II BM departments throughout the occupation. , II BM / So and N. He was involved in the arrest of a large number of people involved in resistance operations, including the commander of the landing ZINC lieutenant. Oldřich Pechal in June 1942. The Extraordinary People’s Court in Brno sentenced him to death on January 13, 1947, and R. Schetke was executed on the same day. See: MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2895, card. 250, file number Lsp 2031/46.
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most were sentenced to death by the occupiers and executed […]. According to Eiselt’s Gestapo, Schetke arrested about 500 people during his tenure at Department II BM / So. ”67
Among the officers wanted by the Gestapo was also Col. V. Lysák, who initially managed to escape. He changed his hiding places in Brno many times, but he refused the opportunity to go abroad and join the emerging Czechoslovak troops on the grounds that he should keep the orders to the extreme. He was arrested by a command under the leadership of R. Schetke on December 23, 1939, shortly after leaving the shelter in the Dědák family’s house in Brno-Maloměřice and telephoning his wife from the Koliště wine bar.68 After the war, R. Schetke described the situation in the minutes: I arrested Major Ptašinský69 and Colonel Lysák, and after they were presented to the Gestapo office, I handed them over to custody in Sušil’s dormitories. The arrests were handed over to Sušil’s dormitory because the investigation revealed that the ON organization was large and that further arrests would have to be made. For this reason, other co-participants of the ON organization were delivered to custody in Sušilovy dormitories and later also to Kounic dormitories […]. Colonel Lysák and Major Ptašinský were interrogated by the head of department, Commissioner Taudt, and I interpreted for him. Colonel Lysák confessed to us that he was a member of the ON organization and that he was the Chief of General Staff for the West. ”70
B. Všetiček, who stayed in Prague with his mother in the critical days of the end of November 1939, managed to escape from the circle of leading representatives of the Moravian Land Headquarters. During the Christmas holidays, his wife Milada arrived in Prague, who was then sent back to Brno with a request to find out information about the fate of Col. V. Lysák and gen. O. Mézla. After finding out that V. Lysák was arrested and O. Mézl managed to escape from the protectorate, she subsequently returned to Prague and in vain persuaded her husband to leave the border.71 During her stay in Prague, B. Všetička met with Gen. J. Bílý, who, after getting acquainted with the crisis situation of the ON in Brno, decided to suspend the activities of the Moravian Provincial Headquarters. B. He offered Všetička the opportunity to leave
67 MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2895, card. 250, file number Lsp 2031/46 – Final report of the Regional Office of the StB in Brno on the investigation of the activities of Richard Schetke dated 11 November 1946, p. 2.
68 Jiří MIKULKA, Portraits of the Brave. The fates of prominent Moravian representatives of the national resistance from 1939-1945, which were to be forgotten. Masaryk University, Brno 1995, p. 18.
69 František Ptašinský (1897 to 1942) came from Hranice na Moravě. During the First World War, he fought on the Russian front, where he was captured on July 6, 1916. He later enlisted in the Czechoslovak legions and was sent to France, where he was assigned to the 21st Rifle Regiment. After returning to his homeland, he took part in battles with the Hungarian Bolsheviks in Slovakia and then served in various positions in the Czechoslovak army. F. Ptašinský was known primarily as a theater and literary critic, writer and translator of Russian literature. As an enlightenment officer for the 304 Artillery Regiment in Brno, he wrote many contributions to the Theater List of the National Theater in Brno and also to the Center for Arts and Culture. He was also the author of several poetry collections, a collection of short stories People from the Circus, and in 1932 Ptašinský’s book Zlomky Anabase was published, in which he described the experiences of legionnaires from Russia. After being involved in resistance activities in the ranks of the ON, he was arrested in Brno on November 20, 1939. The People’s Court sentenced him to death on July 24, 1942, and was executed on November 16 of that year in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison. The fact that he devoted the time between the sentencing and the execution to studying Spanish from a textbook he managed to get in prison testifies to the unbreakable character of F. Ptašinský. He studied this textbook for several hours before the execution and it has been preserved in the collections of the Brno City Museum under inventory number 152 794. For F. Ptašinský, see below: VÚA-VHA, f. He was executed in Berlin-Plötzensee in November of the same year. The fact that he devoted the time between the sentencing and the execution to studying Spanish from a textbook he managed to get in prison testifies to the unbreakable character of F. Ptašinský. He studied this textbook for several hours before the execution and it has been preserved in the collections of the Brno City Museum under inventory number 152 794. For F. Ptašinský, see below: VÚA-VHA, f. He was executed in Berlin-Plötzensee in November of the same year. The fact that he devoted the time between the sentencing and the execution to studying Spanish from a textbook he managed to get in prison testifies to the unbreakable character of F. Ptašinský. He studied this textbook for several hours before the execution and it has been preserved in the collections of the Brno City Museum under inventory number 152 794. For F. Ptašinský, see below: VÚA-VHA, f.
70 MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2895, card. 250, file number Lsp 2031/46 – Protocol written with Richard Schetka at the Regional Office of the StB in Brno and dated 7 September 1946, p. 7.
71 According to an interview by M. Všetičková with the author of this study in Brno on 15 May 2000.
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to France, with the proviso that he could hold the position of commander of the artillery of Czechoslovak troops. However, B. Všetička refused the offer. J. Bílý also went underground, while B. Všetička returned to Brno at the end of January 1940, where he mostly stayed away from home. However, the Gestapo obtained information about his stay and was finally arrested on February 29, 1940 in the Slavia café in Brno, where he had a meeting with his wife. The arrest was again made by R. Schetke, who entered only one sentence in the minutes after the war: “At the beginning of February 1940, I also arrested General Všetička, in the Slavia café in Brno.” 72 HE, because the general was the last of the representatives of the provincial headquarters to escape the Gestapo.
Investigation of arrested members of the Nation’s Defense
The scope of the ON’s activities in Brno and its surroundings was a shock to the Nazi security apparatus. The Brno Gestapo headquarters therefore created a special report under the leadership of Criminal Commissioner Ewald Taudt.73 The report was later designated II BM / So (short for Sonderreferat) and its task was to investigate only the activities of members of the ON. It was located in the Nazi-confiscated Sušilov student dormitory building at Klácelova Street No. 2, where the Gestapo also set up an improvised prison for some of those arrested.74 B. Všetička, L. Kotík, V. Lysák, Č. Jelínek, J. Gardavský and next. The first interrogations also took place in Sušil’s dormitories. At first, the focus was mainly on Col. V. Lysák and Capt. No. Jelínek, who was interrogated by criminal assistant Braun. The post-war investigation report on Braun’s activities during the occupation states: “Braun interrogated the arrested captain during this operation. Čestmír Jelínek, who was an intelligence officer in the Defense of the Nation. It is well known that Capt. During the first interrogations, Jelínek denied any activity in the ON organization and did not want to admit anything. He was therefore cruelly abused by Braun during interrogations, and when his forces were over, Braun threatened to use other means of torture at his disposal at his disposal and to dismiss him. This will force Jelínek to confess and reveal her co-workers. Capt. Jelínek could not withstand the long-term torment and therefore made Braun a full confession in order to prevent further torment. ”75 Preserved interrogation protocols During the first interrogations, Jelínek denied any activity in the ON organization and did not want to admit anything. He was therefore cruelly abused by Braun during interrogations, and when his forces were over, Braun threatened to use other means of torture at his disposal at his disposal and to dismiss him. This will force Jelínek to confess and reveal her co-workers. Capt. Jelínek could not withstand the long-term torment and therefore made Braun a full confession in order to prevent further torment. ”75 Preserved interrogation protocols During the first interrogations, Jelínek denied any activity in the ON organization and did not want to admit anything. He was therefore cruelly abused by Braun during interrogations, and when his forces were over, Braun threatened to use other means of torture at his disposal at his disposal and to dismiss him. This will force Jelínek to confess and reveal her co-workers. Capt. Jelínek could not withstand the long-term torment and therefore made Braun a full confession in order to prevent further torment. ”75 Preserved interrogation protocols
72 MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2895, card. 250, file number Lsp 2031/46 – Protocol written with Richard Schetka at the Regional Office of the StB in Brno and dated 7 September 1946, p. 9.
73 Ewald Taudt (born 1909) came from Berlin. In 1938 he was assigned to the Gestapo office in Karlovy Vary and after the construction of the management office in Brno he took over the BM II department in 1939. Due to the extensive activities of the Defense of the Nation in the Brno region, a special department II BM / So, headed by E. Taudt, was subsequently assigned to investigate the activities of this resistance organization. In 1940, E. Taudt obtained the rank of criminal councilor and under both martial rights in 1941 and 1942 he served as an associate of the Brno martial court. He later led the intelligence report IV N. In the spring of 1945, after the retreat of the Nazi security forces from Jihlava, he disappeared and his fate remained unknown. See: MZA, f. C 130 (Public Prosecutor at the Extraordinary People’s Court Brno), card. 17, folder 17, file 153 – Report of the head of the public prosecutor JUDr. Emil Čermák on unidentified war criminals to the Political Intelligence Department of the Ministry of the Interior in Prague. It bears the date of July 31, 1946 and E. Taudt is listed here under number 304. Biographical data see further for example: Vladimír FILIP – Vlastimil SCHILDBERGER – Jan BŘEČKA – Marie KUDĚLKOVÁ, Brno 1939-1945. Years of lack of freedom. Part II. Josef Filip 1938, Brno 2012, p. 193.
74 V. ČERNÝ, Brno Gestapo 1939-1945, pp. 99-101.
75 ABS, f. 52 (Statements of Gestapo and SD employees), sign. 52-1-36 – Final investigation report of the StB Regional Office in Brno concerning the activities of the former Gestapo criminal assistant Willi
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Col. V. Lysák are quite extensive and it is clear from the content that he tried to tactical in his statements. Nevertheless, he provided a number of data and named the gene. B. Všetička, who was still at large at that time.76
Some other members of the ON found themselves at Špilberk Castle after their arrest and here after the establishment of the prison in the building of Kounic’s student dormitories in January 1940. Conditions in Brno prisons were already harsh and prisoners suffered in all respects. Physical violence was used during the interrogations, although to what extent it was not possible to say to the extent of the representatives of the provincial headquarters of the ON due to the lack of credible testimonies. However, there is a suspicion that V. Lysák suffered a broken rib during interrogations at Sušil’s dormitories in May and June 1940, which subsequently caused liver injuries.77 they revealed more than was necessary. This opinion appeared in one of the letters of the imprisoned MUDr. J. Vignati, who was 25. January 1941 transferred from Sušil dormitories to the nearby Kounice dormitories, from there on March 7 of the same year he was transported to the prison in Wohlau in Lower Silesia (now Wołów in Poland) and in July of that year to Diez an der Lahn near Koblenz.78 Vignati’s last suffering the prison in Berlin-Plötzensee became death, from where he wrote in one of the skeins intended for his wife: “Then to the court. General Všetička betrayed me, in fact, he stated, without being forced to do so by the circumstances. Captain Jelínek told the others, you would see how these heroes changed. Only an old pharmacist [meaning Vítězslav Mečíř, note. author] we saved what we could with me. ”79 March of the same year he was transported to the prison in Wohlau in Lower Silesia (now Wołów in Poland) and in July of the same year to Diez an der Lahn near Koblenz.78 addressed to his wife, he wrote: “Then to the court. General Všetička betrayed me, in fact, he stated, without being forced to do so by the circumstances. Captain Jelínek told the others, you would see how these heroes changed. Only an old pharmacist [meaning Vítězslav Mečíř, note. author] we saved what we could with me. ”79 March of the same year he was transported to the prison in Wohlau in Lower Silesia (now Wołów in Poland) and in July of the same year to Diez an der Lahn near Koblenz.78 addressed to his wife, he wrote: “Then to the court. General Všetička betrayed me, in fact, he stated, without being forced to do so by the circumstances. Captain Jelínek told the others, you would see how these heroes changed. Only an old pharmacist [meaning Vítězslav Mečíř, note. author] we saved what we could with me. ”79 without being forced to do so by the circumstances. Captain Jelínek told the others, you would see how these heroes changed. Only an old pharmacist [meaning Vítězslav Mečíř, note. author] we saved what we could with me. ”79 without being forced to do so by the circumstances. Captain Jelínek told the others, you would see how these heroes changed. Only an old pharmacist [meaning Vítězslav Mečíř, note. author] we saved what we could with me. ”79
Apparently psychological pressure was exerted on B. Všetička by the investigators, and the Gestapo investigators also carried out personal confrontations of the arrested. After the war, Braun described in the protocol a confrontation between B. Všetička and the commander of the ON in the Uherské Hradiště region, Lt. Col. Vladimír Štěrba: “I was present at the confrontation of Lieutenant Colonel Štěrba with the executed General Všetička. This confrontation took place in Sušilov’s dormitories, about March 1940. General Všetička was brought to the room where Lieutenant Colonel Štěrba was. It was in Jahnov’s office80 and they were present if
Braun, dated October 30, 1946, p. 3. During his investigation, Capt. Č. Jelínek unsuccessfully attempted suicide.
76 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-225-2 – Interrogation protocols Col. V. Lysák, registered on 27 and 28 December 1939 at the Gestapo management office in Brno, 13 pages. The interrogation was conducted by criminal assistant Wilhelm Trepp.
77 J. MIKULKA, Portraits of the Brave, pp. 20.
78 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 638 – Work of L. Boček MUDr. Jan Vignati in a German prison.
79 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory no. V. Entangled.
80 Friedrich Jahn (born 1898) was a native of Brno. He has been working at the Gestapo’s headquarters in Brno since 1939, and during his work in the intelligence department N, he became famous for his cruel methods used in the interrogation of those arrested. Due to his rude nature, he was not popular with other Gestapo people, who gave F. Jahn the nickname “Ivan the Terrible”. Outside Brno, he also worked at Gestapo offices in Moravian Ostrava and Uherské Hradiště. In 1944 he was drafted into the German Armed Forces and at the end of the war he apparently fell into American captivity. His other destinies are unknown; allegedly in 1947 he was to move somewhere in the American occupation zone of Germany. See: MZA, f. C 130, folder 17, card. 7, fol. 118-127 – List of war criminals detected in the Brno district prepared by the chief public prosecutor at the Extraordinary People’s Court Brno JUDr. Emil Čermák.
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I remember, Taudt, Jahn, Schetke and I. General Všetička acquitted Lieutenant Colonel Štěrba of secrecy, which Štěrba was supposed to pass to General Ingra. He advised Štěrb to say everything. Štěrba replied: ‘Order, General,’ and he was given a pencil and paper to write in prison what he knew about the Hradiště regional organization ON. The next day I heard, I don’t know from whom and I don’t know from what report, that Lieutenant Colonel Vladimír Štěrba had been hanged in a cell in Špilberk at night. ”81 Štěrba was imprisoned in Špilberk in a solitary confinement on a cell on the first floor and according to the memories of the prison doctor MUDr. Karel Frinta was in very poor health, with frozen fingers and toes. On March 25, 1940, he had to undergo a full-day interrogation in the building of the Brno Gestapo control office on Mozart Street no. 3 and then there was also a confrontation with B. Všetička. The next day, another Strabba interrogation took place, and at that time he also decided to commit suicide on the grounds that, although he had endured seven interrogations so far, he could have spoken the next one.82
Testimony of similar content concerning gen. V. Ždímala then comes from Capt. Václav Kratochvíl. According to him, “Ždímal urged the officers to admit that it was honest – perhaps he believed in the humanity of the Germans and in the development of events in favor of the Allies. Ždímal’s activities contradicted the principles of secrecy of the organization at all costs, there were embarrassing scenes in the Gestapo and many lives were lost because of them. “83 In connection with these statements, however, it should be noted that General B. Všetička the officers believed in the imminent defeat of Germany and their liberation, so they apparently did not attach much importance to the content of their own statements. The concept of military honor was also an important factor for them. Senior officers in particular acknowledged their defeat after their arrest and considered the denial low and dishonest, which the Gestapo abused to its advantage. K B. Všetička should be noted that he was arrested at the end of February 1940. At that time, most members of the Moravian leadership of the ON were in custody for several weeks and the Gestapo had extensive knowledge about the activities of this organization, so his statement could not be crucial. Lt. Col. V. Štěrba fell into the hands of the Gestapo on November 30, 1939, and at the time of Všetiček’s arrest he was investigated for three months.
Trials and executions
Gene. B. Všetička was transferred on June 1, 1940 to the Moabit prison in the western part of Berlin, where he was followed by other members of the Moravian Land Command ON. Here they were to await trial. The indictment against Všetiček’s group was prepared as early as the summer of 1940, and this fact was also stated by the Reich Minister of Justice Franz Gürtner in his report to Adolf Hitler of September 23 of the same year. The trial could begin in the near future, but A. Hitler took a negative view. During a consultation with the Reich Protector Konstantin von Neurath and Secretary of State Karl Hermann Frank, he refused to hold a trial and said that an execution squad would be enough against the “Czech rebels”, as a possible trial would make them martyrs. In addition, the Czechs would consider the convictions handed down to be illegal, so that these issues should be resolved through the courts
81 MZA, No. C 141, inventory No. 2870, card. 246, file number Lsp 1999/46 – Protocol written on 18 October 1946 at the Regional Office of the StB in Brno with Willi Braun.
82 Ludvík BURIÁN, The past is urgently present. District People’s Committee, Uherské Hradiště 1980, p. 56.
83 MZM, HO, f. Correspondence, inv. No. S 9220 – Typewriting V. Kratochvil Activity Regional Command Defense of the Nation Moravia-West, p. 9.
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until the end of the war. At the same time, only death sentences would be issued, which in exceptional cases could be converted into life imprisonment or deportation.84 This Hitler opinion was the reason for the fact that the preparation of trials with members of the ON was suspended for a year. The change came only after Reinhard Heydrich took over as deputy imperial protector in September 1941. R. Heydrich convinced A. Hitler of the need to hold trials with representatives of the Czech resistance, referring in particular to the planned trial of the former prime minister’s prime minister, General Alois Elias. This trial took place during an external session of the People’s Court in Prague on October 1, 1941 and ended with a death sentence.85
Since German criminal law was introduced in the Protectorate after March 15, 1939, the resistance fighters were paradoxically tried for “high treason,” even though the Nazis actually occupied the Czech lands in violation of international law. Members of the ON were brought before the so-called People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof; VGH). It was a Nazi “revolutionary” tribunal whose task was to hear crimes against the state.86 This tribunal was established in 1934 as a court competent to try cases of high treason and treason. Gradually, however, its scope expanded to a number of other offenses. He was originally based in Leipzig, but moved to Berlin shortly after its founding. The law of 18 April 1936 then determined that it was not an extraordinary court, but an ordinary court, and the rules for its composition were laid down. This composition fully corresponded to the mission of the VGH as a revolutionary tribunal of National Socialism. The main trials were decided by five-member chambers, whose members consisted of both professional judges and honorary judges, who were mostly convinced Nazis and mostly deserving members of the Nazi NSDAP. They were appointed by A. Hitler on the proposal of the Reich Minister of Justice, first for a term of five years, then from 1936 for life. All VGH members had to be over 35 years old. Honorable judges often included celebrities, such as the Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank Protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 The main trials were decided by five-member chambers, whose members consisted of both professional judges and honorary judges, who were mostly convinced Nazis and mostly deserving members of the Nazi NSDAP. They were appointed by A. Hitler on the proposal of the Reich Minister of Justice, first for a term of five years, then from 1936 for life. All VGH members had to be over 35 years old. Honorable judges often included celebrities, such as the Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank Protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 The main trials were decided by five-member chambers, whose members consisted of both professional judges and honorary judges, who were mostly convinced Nazis and mostly deserving members of the Nazi NSDAP. They were appointed by A. Hitler on the proposal of the Reich Minister of Justice, first for a term of five years, then from 1936 for life. All VGH members had to be over 35 years old. Honorable judges often included celebrities, such as the Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank Protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 which were mostly convinced Nazis and mostly deserving members of the Nazi NSDAP. They were appointed by A. Hitler on the proposal of the Reich Minister of Justice, first for a term of five years, then from 1936 for life. All VGH members had to be over 35 years old. Honorable judges often included celebrities, such as the Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank Protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 which were mostly convinced Nazis and mostly deserving members of the Nazi NSDAP. They were appointed by A. Hitler on the proposal of the Reich Minister of Justice, first for a term of five years, then from 1936 for life. All VGH members had to be over 35 years old. Honorable judges often included celebrities, such as the Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank Protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 for example, Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87 for example, Secretary of State and senior SS and police chief in the KH Frank protectorate. There were originally three judicial chambers at the VGH, but due to the increase in the number of pending cases, their number increased and in December 1942 there were already six of them.87
The body of the lawsuit at the VGH was the Reich High Prosecutor’s Office, whose members also took part in the executions of convicts. The largest number of executions of VGH convicts took place in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison.88 The indictment itself was based on the results of investigations by the Gestapo and investigating judges. Each of the defendants was identified by a first name and surname, followed by the date and place of birth, occupation and residence. Each was also marked where and when the arrest took place and when the investigating judge decided to detain him. This was followed by the legal qualification of crime
84 Walter WAGNER, Der Volksgerichtshof im Hitler Nationalsozialistischen Staat. Oldenbourg Verlag, Stuttgart 1974, p. 486.
85 Robert KVAČEK – Dušan TOMÁŠEK, General Alois Eliáš. One Czech destiny. Epoch, Prague 1996, pp. 85-93. For an excerpt from the judgment on Elijah, see: W. WAGNER, Der Volksgerichtshof, Annex No. 13, pp. 891-895.
86 For more details see: Lukáš VLČEK, People’s Court in Berlin – Volksgerichtshof – and its history. In: SI 18/1. ÚSTR, Prague 2011, pp. 144-167.
87 Jaromír TAUCHEN, Development of Criminal Justice in Germany 1933-1945. Dissertation, Faculty of Law MU, Brno 2009, p. 192.
88 On the tragic history of this prison, see for example: Brigitte OLESCHINSKI, Gedenkstätte Plötzensee. Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, Berlin 1994.
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with reason for the action.89 Finally, proposals for witnesses, further detention and the appointment of a lawyer were made. The lawyer could either be selected (usually by the defendant’s relatives) or compulsorily assigned to the VGH. The presiding judge then had to approve his choice. However, the defense was more or less a formal matter, as the lawyer rarely suggested presenting any evidence. The lawyers also did not usually attend their mandates before the main trial, but there were exceptions for those chosen by the defendant’s family. However, even such advocates could not change the harshness of the verdict, although they often tried to suggest a different classification for the offense of their principals (for example, because instead of preparing for high treason, it was only a failure to report or a serious case).
Following the verdict, the elected lawyers also usually asked the chairman of the senate to allow the convicted person to have a final interview with family members if they attended the main trial. These main trials used to be public, but in some cases with the exclusion of the public, especially in state secret cases. The verdict was announced by the President of the Senate, whose speech was very short in most cases and in many cases lacking legal qualifications. The President and the Associate Professional Judges also signed the judgment together.90 The judgments were published in the daily press, which was informed of the results of the proceedings through the press service of the High Public Prosecutor’s Office at the VGH. Many such cases can be found on the pages of the Protectorate press from 1941 and 1942. In addition, red posters with Czech and German text were also displayed in public spaces informing about the executions of convicts. These posters were displayed in large numbers, especially in the place of residence of the convict, which was to increase the intimidating effect on the population.
The first judgment of the VGH over the ON resistance fighters from South Moravia was handed down on November 18, 1941 and concerned the group of MUDr. J. Vignatiho. He and V. Mečíř were sentenced to death, two other doctors received four years and one two and a half years in prison. About the course of the trial, J. Vignati wrote to his wife in one of the skates: “Our trial was a complete comedy. Absolutely no evidence. Advocate of a patient figure. Before the trial, I had a five-minute conversation with him during which he inquired about my affairs. He did not speak at all during the hearing, until he finally said a few sentences. It was just disgusting. ”91 These words clearly illustrate how the processes before VGH went.
The trial with members of the ON Land Command in Moravia took place in Berlin on 26 and 27 November 1941 before the 1st Senate of the VGH. B. Všetička, L. Kotík, Č. Jelínek and J. Gardavský, who were all placed in Alt Moabit Prison at the time, appeared in court. The five-member tribunal was personally chaired by VGH President Otto Georg Thierack, who did so only in important cases. Všetička’s relatives tried to obtain a lawyer of their choice, but the authorities rejected their proposals and the lawyer was assigned ex officio. The indictment was based on the testimony of the accused and other additional Gestapo investigations. It contained a detailed description of the activities of all four defendants within the provincial headquarters of the ON, including a detailed breakdown and tasks of this organization, as well as staffing of command functions and the share of individual defendants in resistance actions.
89 A large number of indictments of members of the ON were preserved in the ABS in the already cited fund 141.
90 František VAŠEK, Czech patriots before the Volksgerichtshof. Journal of Legal Science and Practice 2001, No. 1, pp. 62-70.
91 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inventory No. S 637 – Description of the report MUDr. Jan Vignati before the execution.
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Headquarters ON. It was clear from the indictment that this was a particularly dangerous organization for the Nazis.92
During the process itself, the key issue became the possible use of violence by resistance organizations against the occupation regime. B. Všetička stated in his statement before the investigating judge that violence was planned during the liberation of the country within the planned uprising. However, he denied it during the trial. L. Kotík and J. Gardavský also testified in court in the same way, while Č. Jelínek, on the other hand, admitted the use of violence. The tribunal also emphasized in the reasoning of the verdict that the resistance had been preparing violent actions, citing the preparation of a bacteriological war and the hiding of a larger number of weapons. All four members of the provincial headquarters of the ON were therefore found guilty of plotting high treason (Vorbereitung zum Hochverrat) and aiding the enemy (Feindbegünstigung) and sentenced to death.93
After the verdict, they sentenced the convict to pardon. A. Hitler personally had the power to decide on this matter, who later allowed the Minister of Justice to decide on similar matters. At the same time, the families of the convicts tried to achieve a possible mitigation of the verdict through their contacts with important protectorate officials, including President Emil Hácha. During the first years of the occupation, E. Hácha repeatedly intervened for various imprisoned representatives of the Czech resistance.94 Letters of a similar nature were written by convicted officers themselves, for example Č. Jelínek turned to E. Hácha on February 6, 1942, they watched closely.95 Všetiček’s father-in-law Cyril Malý then tried to achieve some relief for the convicts through the protectorate envoy in Berlin and the former Czechoslovak foreign minister JUDr. František Chvalkovský. This concerned, in particular, the granting of permission to visit relatives in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison, where the convicts were transferred after the sentencing. In his letter of 31 December 1941, F. Chvalkovský informed C. Malý that “[…] in the matter in question, your kind letter of 29 December 1941, I intervened again in the appropriate places. 96 On January 7, 1942, M. Všetičková visited her father F. Chvalkovský in person, and the family tried to find another intercessor in the person of the Protectorate Minister of the Interior, General Gendarmerie Josef Ježek. However, the case of the members of the Moravian Land Command ON was considered so important and serious in Berlin that
Convicted officials of the ON were forced to wait long months for the death penalty because the appeal proceedings were very lengthy. However, all appeals were eventually rejected and the verdicts confirmed by the Reich Minister of Justice on July 31, 1942.97 Execution gen. B. Všetičky and his three collaborators took place on the morning of August 19, 1942 in the prison in Berlin-Plötzensee by guillotine. A conviction before the execution behaved bravely and B. Všetička in his last letter to his wife on August 18, 1942 wrote: “Tomorrow morning at 5 o’clock to finish your life, knowing that I have served our nation in the last
92 ABS, f. 141, signed. 141-237-6. The total scope of the indictment is 145 pages.
93 Ibid. – Judgment of the VGH over the group gen Všetičky of 28 November 1941 with a total length of 59 pages.
94 For this see: Tomáš PASÁK, Under the Protection of the Empire. Prague, Prague 1998.
95 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-237-7, pp. 36-37.
96 MMB, f. Resistance documentation, inventory No. 152 870.
97 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-237-7, fol. 44 – Description of the decision of the Imperial Minister of Justice in the cases of Bohuslav Všetička, Ladislav Kotík, Čestmír Jelínek and Jaroslav Gardavský.
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breath. It was not pleasant to wait many months in the dungeon for death, yet I am glad that I had reached a time when I could get an idea of the outcome of the war. Death no longer frightens me anymore. ”98 The execution of the death sentences against Všetiček’s group was subsequently reported by the protectorate press, which stated that the“ […] People’s Court had sentenced to death . These convicts performed treacherous activities for the German Empire and against the order established in the Czech-Moravian area at the forefront of the secret organization. ”99
The Nazis also paid considerable attention to the group of Col. V. Lysák, whose indictment was dated October 15, 1941.100. František Blabolil, Capt. Jaroslav Konopásek, Lt. Col. Otto Francl and Capt. V. Kratochvíl. During the trial, V. Lysák tried to take most of the blame because he was aware of the fact that, given his important position in the ON hierarchy, he had no hope of a sentence other than the death penalty. This tactic came in part because V. Lysák and F. Blabolil were sentenced to death by the tribunal for preparing high treason and aiding the enemy, but the others were sentenced to prison, namely O. Francl for life, V. Kratochvíl for ten, and J. Konopásek for five years.101 The three officers managed to survive imprisonment. Medical condition of Col. IN. However, Lysák was already very bad at the time of the trial and died on July 3, 1942 in the Berlin-Plötzensee prison. The official medical report identified cancer as the cause of death.102 However, it is probable that the real cause was the consequences of unhealed liver injury caused by beatings during interrogations in the spring of 1940. In 1942 and 1943, a number of other trials took place with were carried out not only in Berlin-Plötzensee, but also in prisons in Frankfurt am Main and Wrocław.
Partial conclusion
HE was an important domestic resistance organization since the second half of March 1939. Many members of the Czechoslovak army and other citizens participated in anti-Nazi resistance activities. At the turn of 1939 and 1940, this first resistance set fell victim to the Gestapo, but the Nazis did not completely eliminate the domestic military resistance. Attempts were also made in Brno to resume operations, and in 1940 and 1941 the second ON land command was established, albeit in a more modest form. At the head was a brig. gene. Otakar Zahálka executed on June 21, 1942 in Kounice’s dormitories. This second leadership was also broken by the Nazi security apparatus, but scattered groups of resistance fighters who escaped arrest continued to operate. A number of successor organizations have also been set up (Preparatory Revolutionary Committee, Vela). Members of the Czechoslovak army thus clearly showed that the Munich Agreement and the occupation on March 15, 1939 did not break them. Many paid for their participation in the fight against Nazism with their lives, including 16 soldiers with general ranks who ended up in 1941.
98 Private Archive of Vladimír Černý, photocopy of the letter provided in 2000 by Mrs. Milada Všetičková.
99 Countryside, No. 197 of 20 August 1942, p. 2.
100 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-225-1 – Indictment No. 12 J 8/40 g dated October 15, 1941, 42 pages.
101 Ibid. – Judgment of Col. Lysák from December 3, 1941, 32 pages.
102 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-225-7 – Official report of the Berlin-Plötzensee prison on the death of Col. V. Lysák dated July 11, 1942. Intended for the Chief Public Prosecutor at the VGH.
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to 1945 on execution sites (Army General J. Bílý, five divisional and ten brigadier generals). Therefore, we should not forget them even today.
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Appendix
Figure No. 1. Title page of the qualification file of Čestmír Jelínek. From these files it is possible to reconstruct in detail the military careers of all members of the Nation’s Defense. Source: VÚA-VHA.
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Picture No. 2. Brigadier General Bohuslav Všetička, Provincial Commander of the Defense of the Nation in Moravia. Source: MZM, HO.
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Picture No. 3. Colonel Ladislav Kotík, Chief of Staff of the Provincial Defense of the Nation in Moravia. Source: MMB.
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Figure 4. Title page of the judgment of the People’s Court in Berlin over the members of the Provincial Command of the Defense of the Nation in Moravia of 27 November 1941. Source: ABS.
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RESISTANCE GROUP THREE CONSULES. CHAPTER ON THE HISTORY OF DOMESTIC PRONACISTIST RESISTANCE
In the afternoon of March 14, 1939, a transport plane with special passengers took off from Ruzyně Airport. Eleven intelligence officers of the 2nd Division of the General Staff, under the command of Col. gšt. František Moravec. They left Czechoslovakia with important intelligence material to be one of the first from abroad to start resistance activities against Nazi Germany.
Although Col. F. Moravec apparently flew into exile with a certain idea of the fight against the German occupiers, so from the beginning it was an isolated event, which was known only to its direct participants. The aspect of resistance preparation at home was underestimated for several reasons. The frantic formation of the future resistance began only after obtaining initial information about the impending occupation of the Czech lands. Within a few hours, the remaining agency material was destroyed, some of which were destroyed and some of which hid the radio stations, and thought about how to deal with the intelligence effectively. At the same time, several resistance groups from the ranks of professional intelligence officers are beginning to emerge.
The following lines are intended to acquaint the reader with one such resistance formation called the Three Councilors1 and to describe and evaluate its contribution to the construction of structures of the foreign resistance around the group of Col. F. Moravce.
Occupation of the Czech lands
According to the memories of the first German unit, Victory Square in Prague, where the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces was based at that time, arrived at around 10 a.m. on March 15, 1939. At that time, remnants of intelligence were already burning. The next day she caused more commotion
1 The issue of the resistance group Three Councilors has not yet received a comprehensive elaboration, however, it has already entered the professional literature, at least marginally. For example, let’s mention: Jaroslav KOUTEK, Tichá fronta. Our Army, Prague 1985; J. GEBHART – J. KOUTEK – J. KUKLIK, On the fronts of the secret war. Chapters from the struggle of Czechoslovak intelligence against Nazism in the years 1938-1941. Panorama, Prague 1989; J. KOKOŠKA – S. KOKOŠKA, Dispute over Agent A-54. A memoirs by one of the main actors of František Fárek occupy a very specific position, see: František FÁREK, Footprints Disappear in the Archive… Vyšehrad, Prague 1975.
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visit of the head of the German Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who visited the Abwehrstelle office building being built there. Subsequently, the interim head of the 2nd Department, Col. gšt. He thanked František Havel for providing offices to his officers and then returned to Berlin.2
Otherwise, there was a seeming calm before the storm in the General Staff building, and as one of Moravec’s subordinate corpses recalled after the war. František Fárek: “In the offices of the 2nd dept. various issues related to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the passing military and police transports and the balls followed various plans for the future. ”3
The occupation of the Czech lands and the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia became a prerequisite for the emergence of the first resistance movements. The former intelligence officers had certain preconditions due to the nature of their previous profession, and indeed within a few days, the first resistance units began to be constituted within the liquidated 2nd Department of the MNO HŠ.
On the first day of the occupation, three officers from the former Moravec’s search party met in Prague on their own initiative. The already mentioned Capt. F. Fárka with Antonín Longa and Alois Čáslavka not only had the same job, but also an unwavering friendship. They agreed that their abilities and skills would be much more useful at home and would not follow their colleagues abroad. The oldest of them – F. Fárek – took over the leadership of the formation, which soon received the cover designation Three Councilors, or just the Councilors (see photos no. 1 to 3 in the appendix to the chapter).
According to surviving reports, contact was established between the Moravec Center Abroad and A. Longa in the Protectorate as early as the beginning of April. It should be noted that with the considerable help of the French. In case the French mediator dropped out, other possible ways were also sought. The first letters sent to Moravec’s people in exile were apparently full of remorse. After all, Moravc’s hasty departure4 from the republic left a considerable dose of bitterness in many members of the 2nd Division. However, at least to A. Long and his colleagues, whose names were hidden in the letters for the time being, he tried to defend his departure. After all, they were the first and for a long time the only ones with which they managed to establish direct and high-quality connections to the protectorate.5
Among other things, the departure of families that intelligence officers had to leave in the occupied Czech lands began to be addressed. Moravec relied as much as possible on the French side to relocate the families, and Fárek’s people were only to play a supportive role in dealing with small things. From the beginning, the event was at least adequately secured. Couriers from France brought the former Czechoslovak crowns to the protectorate, which were to be used to finance various services. What was not spent on the needs of the resistance was exchanged for the Reichsmark and sent back abroad. Of course, everything took place without the knowledge of the protectorate authorities. Just in late April A. Long over the French
2 TÝŽ, Situation in 2. odd. after March 15, 1939. – Admiral Canaris in the General Staff. – Colonel Longin. – Capt. Fárek and Maj. A child at the head of the Abwehrstelle. – A member of the Abwehr wants to make a courtesy visit to Capt. Farka. – Visit to Maj. Baby. – Characteristics of members of the Abwehr and German officers. Manuscript, property of prof. Jiří Fárek, pp. 1-2.
3 Ibid., P. 5.
4 Col. F. Moravec on March 14, 1939 left Prague with the following collaborators: Lt. Col. gšt. Oldrich Tichy, Maj. gšt. Emil Strankmüller, Maj. conc. Josef Bartík, Maj. rammer. Karel Paleček, Maj. ride. Alois Frank, Capt. rammer. František Fryč, Capt. gšt. Vladimir Cigna, Capt. rammer. Václav Sláma, Capt. rammer. Josef Fořt, Capt. ride. Jaroslav Tauer, while five officers belonged to the defense section of the search group of the 2nd Department of HŠ MNO. P. KREISINGER, Brigadier General Josef Bartík, pp. 57-58.
5 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-91-19 – Dear Longo (report from April 10, 1939), folio 3.
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news exponent in Prague Maj. Henri Gouyou received CZK 600,000 from the treasury of the former search party.6
At the beginning of May, there was already a regular and reliable connection. A. Longa also definitively confirmed his determination and made himself fully available to Moravec: “[…] there are three of us here, who on the night of 15/3. We promised ourselves that we would not abandon each other, that we would not abandon the families who were left alone, and that we would do our best to give birth to our III, as we firmly believe, happy and eternal republics. ” In the report of Capt. A. Longa also introduced the cryptonyms of his closest comrades-in-arms – Frant Fousatej and Lojza Diplomat. From now on, our reporters in exile knew who they had contacted and who they had found dedicated collaborators with. They clearly acknowledged this fact in exile, as not all of their former colleagues were willing to cooperate with them for personal reasons.7
Despite all the complications of the activities of the German security forces, it was possible in a relatively short time to open an information channel between the protectorate and intelligence structures abroad. It should be noted again that the French intelligence exponents, who were still in Prague, helped a lot in this phase. One of the most important of the pre-war years was undoubtedly the aforementioned Major. H. Gouyou. Josef Záruba, the driver of the French embassy, on the other hand, became an important person for his connections with his French colleagues. Due to his profession, he was already making a number of trips to France in the Protectorate at the time of escalating security measures.8
Under the cover of Three Councilors9, they began sending large-scale news reports abroad through French partners about the occupation of the Czech lands, 10 Nazi security forces, the organization and strength of the German armed forces, and last but not least the economic and political situation in the protectorate. Fárek’s people were greatly assisted by their former colleagues from the analytical group – Lt. Col. gšt. Tomáš Houška and Maj. gšt. Josef Zuska. An extensive network of railway employees also took part in the collection of reports. Otherwise, the group maintained strict isolation from other resistance groups. At the direct command of Col. F. Moravec even refused to merge the Three Councilors with the Defense of the Nation. The group did during so very short
6 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-91-19 – Dear Longo (report of April 10, 1939), folio 4. and Liquidation record of April 27, 1939, folio 8.
7 NA, f. Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters – Central Committee Prague (SPB-ÚV (unprocessed) – Dear Chief (Report of May 3, 1939).
8 NA, f. Police Headquarters Prague – General Registry 1941-1950, sign. Z 483/5 – Police Directorate Supplementary Department of the Corps of Uniformed Security Guards.
9 The origin of this designation can be found in the request of F. Fárek and his colleagues not to be identified by real names in secret correspondence. From that point on, London headquarters used the code name Three Consuls. It is not entirely clear who exactly invented this designation. F. Fárek stated in his memoirs that the author could be Maj. E. Strankmüller: F. FÁREK, Fárek, Longa and Čáslavka to retire. – First report from London. Gene. Ingr. – Gen. Elijah. – Moving the eleven families beyond the borders. – Dr. Mountain from the middle director in Prague. – Farek and Long “Counselors”. – Caslav’s report from London. – Čáslavek’s biography. – Maj. gšt. Tuscany. Manuscript, property of prof. Jiří Fárek, p. 10.
10 The most recent topic: Aleš BINAR, Evaluation of the Military Occupation of the Czech Lands in March 1939 in Documents XIII. Army Corps. HaV 2018, No. 1, pp. 4-27.
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times in contact with Col. F. Moravcem gained a specific position and began to be used for a number of tasks.
Expulsion of intelligence officers’ families
Basically, immediately after the occupation, the councilors took care of the families that the intelligence officers left in the protectorate. By their very nature, the new guardians had to face a number of pitfalls. Of course, after the secret departure of the husbands, the wives were overcome by a certain nervousness, they misjudged the situation and only dealt with the idea of leaving behind them. Fárek’s people ordered them to limit their contact. With the intervention of Col. F. Moravec was at least well taken care of financially.11
Random inspections by the German secret police increased their nervousness. For example, the wife of Maj. Karel Paleček, the Gestapo carried out a really detailed inspection of several hours, starting with the powder puff and ending with knocking on the walls. There is nothing to be surprised about. Before the occupation, Paleček’s Střešovice villa was also a secret branch of the offensive unit of the 2nd Department of the HŠ.12
It was more threatening that at a time when the French were to play a significant role in the evacuation of the intelligence families, cooperation with them began to be dangerously stifled. According to F. Fárek, the French share was generally disproportionate to the Czechoslovak effort. In addition, the three councilors found that their reports for colleagues abroad were read by someone from the French. A major failure occurred during the necessary action in connection with the expulsion of the families of intelligence officers.
It is necessary to state that F. Moravec did not provide anything for the departure of family members into exile before his departure abroad. In the first months of the occupation, Moravec’s intelligence officers relied on the help of the British and French authorities, which were still operating in the protectorate, to evacuate family members. The long-awaited help, despite constant reassurances, especially from the French side, totally failed due to their lax approach. The lack of time combined with the often naive notions of many members of Moravc’s group about the situation in the protectorate became a great enemy.
The original French plan provided that the wife of Col. F. Moravce, together with his daughters and Mrs. Tichá, Palečková and Franková, will leave abroad, accompanied by proven Frenchmen with French passports. The rest of the intelligence officers’ wives were to travel to their passports, which would be bribed to pass, the so-called Durchlassscheins. According to the proposal, the ladies with Czech passports were to be divided into two separate groups. Mrs. Fořtová, Tauerová and Cignová were to go to Warsaw in particular, and Mrs. Bartíková, Strankmüllerová and Fryčová were to go to the Italian resort of Villaregia. For this plan, A. Long received from Col. F. Moravce even a power of attorney in the handling of funds.13
11 NA, f. SPB-ÚV, Families (undated).
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. – Dear Toník (report of 5 June 1939); VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-144-1, PAÚ Karla, ref. 101/39 – Case: Situation Report, Page 4. A. Long had relatively large sums of money at his disposal. His task was also to change the original currency to German marks and send it back abroad. At the end of April 1939, A. Long received CZK 599,680 through French intermediaries. VÚA-VHA, f. Military Intelligence Command (Sb. 37), sign. 37-144-1 – Liquidation record, fol. 8.
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undoubted fact is that the relocation of “intelligence” families abroad has also become a personal matter of Col. F. Moravec and his collaborators. At the same time, it was an objectively necessary precondition for our correspondents abroad to gain the necessary peace of mind and to be able to fully develop their activities against Nazi Germany.
Due to distrust in the French partners, the deteriorating security situation and growing nervousness on the part of the wives, the people around F. Fárek decided to carry out the evacuation with their own inventions and means, as quickly as possible on the way – to Poland. As the original French variants failed, A. Čáslavka14 decided to conduct a survey on the border with Poland. He also crossed it several times at the same time. At the beginning of July 1939, A. Čáslavka transferred the family across the border in several groups. Since his wife was Jewish, he decided to go to Poland as well. After their safe removal, Moravec’s people fully developed their intelligence work against Hitler’s Germany.15
The circumstances of the expulsion of intelligence families were still reverberated in the reports from the beginning of August, also due to the fact that the original failed plans from the French workshop cost quite a lot of money, especially on bribes to various competent persons. A. Longa believed that part of the money remained with the well-known majors. H. Gouyou, who were extremely involved in the original variants of the removal – specifically his Prague girlfriend Karolína Slapničková and officials of the former Czechoslovak car club Ing. Karel Poláček. However, despite some surprises for Fárek’s people, at least for the families and their property, the Gestapo still did not show much interest.16
Cooperation with Polish correspondents
After the successful evacuation of the families, F. Fárek and A. Longa, at the instigation of the exile control center and in an effort to open a new communication channel through Warsaw, began to focus on the Poles. A. Čáslavka, according to a previous agreement in Poland, arranged a meeting with the liaison officer from the Polish consulate in Prague. The Poles did very well in July 1939
14 After the original plan fell through, A. Čáslavka wrote a rather emotional report for foreigners: “We split up about the ladies (each was in charge of 3 ladies) and we did everything for them that was only in our power and strength. This was the case until the departure of the last Smrdolin [Major. H. Gouyou – note author]. May God forgive him and all the French for all their crimes. We gave him very valuable material all the time he was here, and he shit on us (please excuse my boyish words, but I have to relieve myself of remembering all the French). In truth, we put our lives here for those French degenerate whores, and they wonder didn’t give us to the Gestapo – see camrání fran. leg. clerk in front of a company that franc. the consulate receives messages for Paris and London from the 2nd Department. hl. staff, see also the detention of the letter, etc.… [Čáslavka encounters the detention and opening of mail to the French embassy – note. author] “. VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-91-1, Part I – Diplomat’s Report (The report is devoted purely to the issue of the removal of ladies), fol. 236.
15 More on the departure of intelligence families abroad, for example: M. VYHLÍDAL, První ze Tří konšelů, pp. 134-135. On the activities of A. Čáslavka in exile and in the immediate post-war period, for example: Matej MEDVECKÝ, Unnecessary diplomat. The activity of the Czechoslovak attaché in Stockholm after the end of the Second World War. VH 2015, No. 1, pp. 60-80.
16 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-91-1, Part I – our beloved boss (Report of August 10, 1939), fol. 276
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aware of the dangers on the part of National Socialist Germany, and so welcomed the reports on the status and location of the Wehrmacht in the Protectorate. 17
The primary goal of the Councilors at this time thus became the maximum satisfaction of the Polish side by providing valuable intelligence regarding the threat of the German invasion of Poland. For example, thanks to cooperation with the employees of the Protectorate Railways, they received valuable reports about the movement of troops from the Přerov railway junction, Pilsen, Moravian Ostrava and Česká Třebová. Valuable reports continued to be processed by a former intelligence analyst and expert on the German Armed Forces, Lt. Col. T. Houška. A. Longa was especially active in connection with the Polish consulate in Prague. The connection with Czechoslovak foreign centers took place under the so-called Polish route under the slogan “Pour la patrie” .18
The councilors praised the cooperation with the Poles and constantly underlined the willingness of the Poles in their dispatches. Due to the shredding interventions on our part, it is not yet possible to reveal the content of the messages going along this northern route, however, the preserved archives show that there were more of
them.19 Unfortunately, at the end of August The Czechoslovak exile exchange abroad knew about this, but nevertheless considered it important to keep them going. However, if the possible effectiveness did not exceed the security risks, according to the instructions of the headquarters, the decision on further cooperation with the French was entirely up to A. Long. The declining co-operation with the French was at least partially offset by the above-mentioned co-operation with the Polish side, but it also ended forcibly due to imminent events.20
The Gestapo intervenes The
councilors worked more or less independently, refused to merge with the resistance group Defense of the Nation, and also tried not to involve more people in their activities than was necessary. However, even these set rules evoked only a deceptive sense of security. In order to be interconnected, the German secret police liquidated one resistance group after another in the first months of the occupation. The noose around F. Fárek and his colleagues slowly began to tighten after the Gestapo raid against the so-called group of Schmoranz press confidants, 21 in which a number of former intelligence officers from the intelligence headquarters worked. The investigative procedures of the German secret police have borne fruit.
17 Klára PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Life Fates of an Intelligence Officer and Military Diplomat of Colonel Alois Čáslavka. Master’s thesis, Faculty of Arts, Palacký University in Olomouc (UP), Olomouc 2015, p. 71.
18 F. FÁREK, Cooperation of the resistance group 2nd dept. with the Polish intelligence authorities. Manuscript, property of prof. Jiří Fárek, pp. 5-6; VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-89-56 – Report of Poseidon, page 2.
19 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, as 37, sign. 37-259-6 – Marie, ref. 45, Subject: Tonda material – sending (report of 8 August 1939), fol. 39.
20 VÚA-VHA, f. Ministry of National Defense London, sign. 20-29-1 – Case: Spojení Alfons (record from August 19, 1939), fol. 72, ibid. – Dear Alfons! (Report of August 21, 1939), fol. 73; F. FÁREK, Cooperation of the resistance group 2nd section, pp. 5-6.
21 More about the mentioned resistance group, for example: Arnošt BAREŠ – Tomáš PASÁK, Zdeněk Schmoranz’s resistance organization in 1939. HaV 1968, No. 6-7, pp. 1003-1033.
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Gestapo skillfully used brutal investigative methods in which the interrogated police brought in more and more people.
As F. Fárek stated in his memoirs regarding other groups, the control of T. Houška was very difficult. Already in the pre-war years, he was considered an excellent expert on the German army, and so he became indispensable for many resistance figures. In a way, F. Fárek knew about Houšek’s contacts with other former reporters. But he apparently did not know about contacts with specific members of the Schmoranz group.22
For interconnectedness through certain persons, the Gestapo also intervened against the Councilors. Already in October, Major was arrested in connection with another case. gšt. J. Zuska.23 F. Fárka was seized by the German police on 6 November 1939 and at the beginning of December by A. Long and T. Houška.
The resistance group Three Councilors was led in the investigation as a “Farek-Gruppe” and included only F. Fárek, A. Long and now also the driver of the French embassy J. Záruba. T. Houšek did not get to court because he committed suicide during difficult interrogations at Petschkov Palace in Prague. Although we already know that the resistance movement began to emerge essentially spontaneously after the Nazi occupation, Gestapo officials from the beginning of the investigation operated with the construct that the germs of the intelligence resistance movement were created before its departure by F. Moravec, and F. Fárek with A. Longou was one of his closest collaborators in the occupied republic.24
In September 1940, their chief investigator, the infamous Oskar Fleischer, ended a series of long interrogations, and in December 1941, the whole case went to the People’s Court in Berlin. Fortunately, the Court, unlike the Gestapo, saw their own activities as primarily helping the families of fugitive intelligence officers. Also during the interrogations and the actual trial, F. Fárek and A. Longa, for tactical reasons, blamed A. Čáslavka, who was no longer in any real danger. The final sentence, which included a ten-year prison sentence for both of them, was helped by the public prosecutor’s inability to prove an active connection with foreign countries. A. Long and F. Fárek could partially rest because the indictment proposed the death penalty for both of them.25
The court even acquitted J. Záruba of all charges. But he did not enjoy the acquired freedom for long. At the end of January 1942, he was arrested again by the Prague Gestapo. Subsequently,
22 F. FÁREK, Letter of Col. gšt. Moravce. – Government army. – Maj. gšt. Salzer. – Capt. Novotný. – Conflict Col. gšt. Hájek contra plk. gšt. Moravec. – Capt. No. – License plates of Gestapo vehicles and him. authorities. – Cooperation with other resistance groups. – Meeting with Col. gšt. Kudláček. – Cover addresses to the Netherlands. – Václav Klabík and his activities. – Press group. – Death of Maj. gšt. Little. – Concerns with Maj. gšt. A bitch. – Courier to London. – Message through Beneš to the homeland. – Letter to Col. Moravce for Maj. Hush. Manuscript, property of prof. Jiří Fárek, p. 4.
23 More on the person of J. Zuska and his World War II anabasis, for example: P. KREISINGER – M. VYHLÍDAL, The Life Fates of General Josef Zuska (1902-1978). From an artillery officer through the intelligence department of the General Staff and the Nazi Prison to Egypt (Part I). HaV 2015, No. 1, pp. 64-76; TITÍŽ, The Life Fates of General Josef Zuska (1902-1978). From an artillery officer through the intelligence staff of the General Staff and the Nazi Prison to Egypt (Part II). HaV 2015, No. 2, pp. 90-99.
24 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-63-3 / 95–96 – Conclusion on the Dormitory and Other, page 95-96.
25 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-63-3 / 196 – In Namen des deutschen Volkes, 4, fol. 196.
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to the Auschwitz concentration camp, where he died on August 24, 1942 under not entirely clear circumstances.26
The group’s last collaborator, J. Zuska, was sentenced by the Berlin People’s Court in the “Simon Drgac und 11 andere” trial a month earlier, to eight years in prison. The German Gestapo failed to reveal a direct connection to the people around F. Fárek in his case.27
Both F. Fárek, A. Long, J. Zusek and, of course, A. Čáslavek were granted the desired freedom. At the end of the war, F. Fárka was evacuated from the prison from Ebrach to Straubing in the south of Germany, and from there at the end of April a march in the direction of Dachau began. F. Fárek, along with some other prisoners, broke away from the march and subsequently managed to come into contact with the vanguard of the advancing American army, where everyone received proper care.28
J. Zuska was transferred from Ebrach to the advancing front, where he was also serving his sentence, but for a change to Freising in Bavaria near Munich, where he was liberated by the American army on April 30, 1945.29
A. Long was also liberated by the American army at the Bayreuth prison. This also begins the rather vague and unfortunately final chapter of his life. On April 12, 1945, he was still alive. He worked as one of the officials of the concentration camp for prisoners in Kulmbach and sent a positive message to the family at home in Prague. Later, together with another former prisoner, Rudolf Vyleta, he was to make himself available to the American army for intelligence tasks on Czechoslovak territory. At the end of April, they were to be transported to the front in Šumava, somewhere in the area of St. Catherine, and have been missing ever since.30
Most likely, they were assassinated on the threshold of freedom by retreating German soldiers. Their bodies were never found and also the search for surviving friends – F. Fárek and A. Čáslavka – sounded empty. After two years, ie in April 1947, the lieutenant colonel in memoriam was already pronounced dead in court.31
Partial conclusion
The intelligence group called Three Councilors was one of the first resistance groups of former members of the 2nd Department of the Primary School, which was established in the protectorate. Col. played its key role mainly due to its close connection with the exile intelligence headquarters. F. Moravce. It was in their service that its members carried out a number of events for the needs of the emerging Czechoslovak foreign resistance. Important activities included the successful evacuation of intelligence officers’ families abroad, which provided members of the exile intelligence center with the necessary peace to launch an intelligence offensive against Nazi Germany. In addition, members of group
26 NA, f. Police Headquarters Prague – General Registry 1941-1950, sign. Z 483/5 – Security Dept. Bubeneč – official record.
27 P. KREISINGER – M. VYHLÍDAL, The Life Fates of General Josef Zuska. Part I, pp. 74-75.
28 F. FÁREK, Transport to Straubing. – Death march. – Liberation. – Reunion with family. Manuscript, property of prof. Jiří Fárek, pp. 2-7.
29 Ibid
., P. 75. 30 VÚA-VHA, f. Certificate according to Act 255/46 Coll., Personal file of Antonín Longy – Subject: Request for supplementation of the Certificate according to Act 255/46 Coll.
31 Ibid. – Declaration of the Dead – transcript.
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for the needs of the foreign resistance in the territory of the protectorate carried out intelligence activities, as well as large-scale financial transactions to help finance the foreign resistance.
However, its importance is limited to the year 1939, ie the key period of the establishment and formation of Czechoslovak foreign resistance centers. With its activity and commitment, it significantly helped to strengthen the position of Moravc’s foreign intelligence center. With the arrest of their indirect collaborators, and especially with the fall of Poland, when all high-quality communication channels with foreign countries were interrupted, their activities lost their intensity. In a very short time, the remaining “Councils” were also exposed to repression by the Nazi security forces. Their activities can in no way be overestimated, and despite their specific tasks and status, they must be evaluated only as an integral part of the Czechoslovak resistance.
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Appendix
Photo No. 1. The head of the resistance group Three Councilors František Fárek in a post-war film – at the time he started his service at the Ministry of the Interior. Source: Collection of prof. Jiří Fárek.
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Photo No. 2. Škpt. Antonín Longa as the photographer captured him during the Free Republic. It was he who was in charge of the connection with the Moravc Center in exile. Source: Collection of prof. Jiří Fárek.
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Photo No. 3. Alois Čáslavka, an important person in the evacuation of the families of intelligence officers, already in the rank of lieutenant colonel, after his return from abroad. Source: Collection of prof. Jiří Fárek.

Aleš Binar a kol.
OZBROJENÉ SÍLY A ČESKOSLOVENSKÝ STÁT | Part II

ČESKOSLOVENSKÉ VOJENSKÉ ZPRAVODAJSTVÍ PROTI NĚMECKU V LETECH 1932 AŽ 1938. STRATEGIE, PROSTŘEDKY A VÝSLEDKY
Nástup obecné krize mezinárodních vztahů vyvolal počátkem třicátých let 20. století nárůst významu informační složky rozhodovacích procesů vlád a nejvyšších vojenských velitelských struktur. Význam informací stoupal jak v tzv. revizionistických státech, tj. těch, které usilovaly o zvrat obecného uspořádání po první světové válce, tak také v zemích, jež si změny v této oblasti nepřály, neboť se dotýkaly jejich základních existenčních zájmů. Vedle standardních zdrojů civilní diplomacie zde zaujímaly podstatné místo poznatky vojenských zpravodajských orgánů. Důležité byly zejména z hlediska schopností predikovat příští vývoj a podle toho rozhodovat o celkové koncepci zahraniční politiky a v jejím duchu o nezbytných opatřeních branného charakteru. Vojenské zpravodajství tvořilo tedy jednu z fundamentálních složek tvorby vojenské strategie. Radikalizace celkového vývoje ovšem umocnila hodnotu včasné informovanosti klíčových činitelů též z hlediska rychlosti a účelnosti reakcí na náhlé a tím pádem stěží předvídatelné hrozby.1
V konkrétním případě Československa sehrály vojenské zpravodajské informace v řadě událostí přímo iniciační roli. Příznačné je to zejména v případě mimořádných vojenských opatření z května až června 1938 a v událostech, které bezprostředně předcházely okupaci českých zemí 15. března 1939. Výsledky vojenské zpravodajské práce z období do Mnichova byly však přítomny více či méně zjevně ve všech zásadních rozhodnutích československých vlád se vztahem k obraně státu. Mimo jiné též sám naprosto zlomový fakt akceptování nejprve takzvaného britsko-francouzského plánu a krátce na to výsledků mnichovské konference československým prezidentem a vládou v září 1938 obsahoval mimo jiné též odpovědný respekt vůči vojenskému zpravodajskému obrazu celkové strategické situace, v níž se Československo v daných chvílích nacházelo.2
1 Mimořádnou důležitost vojenského zpravodajství v podmínkách eskalace mezinárodního napětí třicátých let velmi uceleně reflektuje studie, která vznikla 3. března 1938 v rámci 2. (zpravodajského) oddělení Hlavního štábu československé branné moci jako souhrn modernizované zpravodajské doktríny pro potřeby operativního aparátu. Viz: VÚA-VHA, Fondy militárií Studijního ústavu Ministerstva vnitra (FMSÚMV), archivní sbírka (a. s.) č. 37 – Velitelství vojenské zpravodajské služby, sign. 37-153-42, studie Zpravodajství, číslo listu (č. l.) 8-41. Soustavu progresivních metod, jimiž mělo být minimalizováno nebezpečí náhlého napadení, obsahuje předpis Služební knihy branné moci, G-XI-1 Zajištění hranic, vydáno tiskem 1937 (platnost od 15. února 1938).
2 Právě tohoto zásadního aspektu se podstatně dotkl Ferdinand Peroutka, vysoce zasvěcený komentátor dobového politického dění, ve své pozoruhodné reflexi podzimní krize roku 1938. S jen
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Vymezení tématu, metodika a výsledky dosavadního výzkumu
Cílem této kapitoly je podat zobecněnou a z nadhledu koncipovanou bilanci výsledků práce československého vojenského zpravodajství proti Německu z let 1932 až 1938. Tento přístup, jenž není omezen pouze na dramatické finále daného časového úseku, dovoluje zabývat se podrobněji též etapou let 1932 až 1934. Důvod spočívá v tom, že se v tomto období odehrála v Německu přelomová změna režimu, která tvoří vzhledem ke svému zásadnímu vlivu na vojenský potenciál Říše velice pozoruhodný úsek z hlediska dějin vojenského zpravodajství. Rozbor tohoto typu nebyl v historiografii dosud uskutečněn.
Zmiňované slovní spojení „vojenské zpravodajství“ vyjadřuje v kontextu této statě především jeho ofenzivní odvětví a analytickou složku. V konkrétním organizačním smyslu je na vrcholové úrovni armádní hierarchie reprezentovala skupina B-pátrací a speciálně její ofenzivní sekce P-1, které byly klíčovými operativními složkami 2. (zpravodajského) oddělení Hlavního štábu československé branné moci. Pro rozbor a vyhodnocení zpráv byla kompetentní skupina A – studijní a plánovací téhož oddělení, jež se specializovanou německou a později také leteckou sekcí tvořila analytický úsek vrcholového zpravodajského aparátu pro práci s informacemi o Německu. V uvedených pracovištích se kumulovaly zprávy ze všech dostupných zdrojů a dále se s nimi pracovalo. Velmi podstatným způsobem se zejména v letech 1932 až 1934 uplatňovaly též ofenzivní prostředky 2. oddělení štábu Zemského vojenského velitelství Praha, které vzhledem k rozsahu a geografické poloze svého obvodu tvořilo od počátku přirozený první zpravodajský sled proti Německu.
Výzkumu vojenského zpravodajství meziválečného období lze provádět ve třech na sebe navazujících etapách. První a základní etapa tvoří nezbytný předpoklad k jakékoli další koncepční badatelské práci. Její cíl spočívá v poznání vnitřních struktur, funkcí a metod práce armádního zpravodajského systému. Na tomto poli bylo dosud vykonáno nemálo závažné práce.3
minimálním odstupem od oné doby dokázal 4. ledna 1939 zachovat nebývale objektivní nadhled, jenž ovšem respektoval jak vypjatou emocionální složku teprve krátce odezněných událostí, tak také neúprosné racionální hledisko. Zamýšlel se nad nesmírnou odpovědností prezidenta, vlády a také vojenského velení za situace, kdy byla Československu odepřena spojenecká podpora. S pochopením podstaty věci napsal: „Čeští vůdcové byli odhodláni vést národ do války sebetěžší. Ale couvli před tím, aby jej vedli až do sebevraždy. Až se naše city uklidní, nebude jim to sloužit k haně. V takových chvílích nepochybně musejí rozhodnout ti, kdo mají více informací, i proti citovému a vzrušenému hlasu národa, který se úpěnlivě zdvihá z náměstí – v zájmu právě toho národa [podtrženo K. Strakou]. Jest jim tak rozhodnouti, i kdyby tím na nějakou dobu zřizovali náhrobní kámen nad svou pověstí, i kdyby byli nechápáni a haněni.” Citováno podle: Ferdinand PEROUTKA, Kdyby byla vypukla válka… Přítomnost 1939, č. 1, s. 1.
3 První výsledky vědeckého výzkumu československého zpravodajství z meziválečného dvacetiletí byly publikovány ve druhé polovině osmdesátých let. Tehdy byly položeny hodnotné základy k důkladnému poznání především organizačního vývoje zpravodajského aparátu československé branné moci. Viz: Jan GEBHART – Jan KUKLÍK, Zápas o Československo na poli zpravodajství v druhé polovině 30. let. HaV 1988, č. 1, s. 88-112; TITÍŽ, Zápas o Československo na poli zpravodajství v druhé polovině 30. let (II). HaV 1988, č. 3, s. 41-66. Poznání konkretizoval a posunul dále: Jaroslav KOKOŠKA-MALÍŘ, Organizace čs. vojenského ofenzivního zpravodajství v letech 1934-1939 (I.) Hav 1989, č. 6, s. 51-65; TÝŽ, Organizace čs. vojenského ofenzivního zpravodajství v letech 1934-1939 (II.) Hav 1990, č. 1, s. 34-48. Pro uvedenou počáteční etapu byla významná též práce: Jaroslav KOKOŠKA – Stanislav KOKOŠKA, Spor o agenta A-54. Kapitoly
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Cíl druhé výzkumné etapy tkví ve zhodnocení zpráv, získaných především tajnými agenturními prostředky, které povětšinou jako jediné dovolovaly proniknout ke klíčovým
z dějin československé zpravodajské služby. Naše vojsko, Praha 1994. Na tyto průkopnické výstupy vhodně navázal: Zdeněk TITL, Rekonstrukce vývoje organizační struktury a personálií československého výzvědného zpravodajství (do 15. března 1939). Studijní pomůcka. Generální štáb, Inspektorát vojenské zpravodajské služby Armády České republiky, Praha 1995. Zvláštní zaměření má: S. KOKOŠKA, Československé vojenské zpravodajství v roce 1938. Sborník Vojenské akademie v Brně 1999, č. 2, s. 97-100. Novější obecně koncipované podání dané problematiky poskytuje: Miloslav ČAPLOVIČ, Organizácia a činnosť československej spravodajskej služby v rokoch 1919-1939. In: Bohumila FERENČUHOVÁ a kol., Slovensko a svet v 20. storočí. Kapitoly k 70. narodeninám PhDr. Valeriána Bystrického, DrSc. Historický ústav Akademie věd – Prodama, Bratislava 2006, s. 80-97. Další upřesnění přináší: Milan VYHLÍDAL, Československé vojenské zpravodajství po mnichovských událostech roku 1938. Pátrací středisko pro Podkarpatskou Rus. In: Securitas imperii (SI) 34/1. ÚSTR, Praha 2019, s. 46-61. S rozsáhlým využitím dříve neznámých pramenů vznikly následující příspěvky: Karel STRAKA, Agenturní síť čs. armády v Čechách a v Německu (1937-1938). HaV 2012, č. 4, s. 46-66; TÝŽ, Rekonstrukce československé agenturní sítě z let 1933-1939. Zpravodajské ústředí. Ministerstvo obrany České republiky – Vojenský historický ústav Praha, Praha 2017. Další část dosavadní produkce se začala výrazněji věnovat též spolupráci se zahraničními partnery a speciálním činnostem československých vojenských zpravodajských orgánů v zahraničí. Viz: S. KOKOŠKA, Československo-sovětská zpravodajská spolupráce v letech 1936-1941. HaV 1997, č. 5, s. 37-52; TÝŽ, Na neutrálním území. Československá zpravodajská expozitura v Haagu 1936-1940. Dějiny a současnost (DaS) 2008, č. 9, s. 41-43; K. STRAKA, Československé a francouzské vojenské zpravodajství v letech 1933-1938. HaV 2009, č. 2, s. 32-65; TÝŽ, Czechoslovak and Polish Military Intelligence in the Context of Alliance with France in the 1930s. In: Zbigniew NAWROCKI (ed.), Sekretna wojna. II Z dziejów kontrwywiadu II RP. Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2015, s. 729-744; M. VYHLÍDAL, Zapomenutá mise mjr. Karla Vosátky, příspěvek k fungování československého zpravodajství před 2. světovou válkou. In: Sborník prací Pedagogické fakulty Masarykovy univerzity – řada společenských věd (SPPFMU-SV) 2017, č. 1, s. 41-50; Matej MEDVECKÝ – M. VYHLÍDAL, Úřad čs. vojenského přidělence v Berlíně v krizovém roce 1938 ve světle neznámého dokumentu. Vojenská história (VH) 2018, č. 4, s. 132-159. Nejnověji: K. STRAKA, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance. Czechoslovak-French Cooperation in Military Intelligence in the Years 1932-1938. In: SI 35/2. ÚSTR, Praha 2019, s. 12-49. K dosavadním výsledkům zejména ve strukturální oblasti přistupují též povětšinou hodnotné poznatky v četných biografiích významných osobností československého vojenského zpravodajství. Viz: Jiří ŠOLC, Ve službách prezidenta. Generál František Moravec ve světle archivních dokumentů. Vyšehrad, Praha 1994. V reedici viz: TÝŽ, Po boku prezidenta. Generál František Moravec a jeho zpravodajská služba ve světle archivních dokumentů. Naše vojsko, Praha 2007; TÝŽ, Generál parašutistů. HaV 1996, č. 4, s. 156-177; Pavel KREISINGER, Brigádní generál Josef Bartík. Zpravodajský důstojník a účastník prvního i druhého československého odboje. Praha 2011. K Bartíkově osobě viz ještě: TÝŽ, Zpravodajský důstojník ze Šumavy. Brigádní generál Josef Bartík (1897-1968). In: Šumava v proměnách času. Revue Jungbauerova šumavského vlastivědného spolku 2014, č. 1, s. 102-127; TÝŽ ‒ M. VYHLÍDAL, Životní osudy generála Josefa Zuzky (1902-1978). Od důstojníka dělostřelectva přes zpravodajské oddělení Hlavního štábu a nacistické káznice do Egypta (I. část). HaV 2015, č. 1, s. 64-76; TITÍŽ, Od důstojníka dělostřelectva přes zpravodajské oddělení Hlavního štábu a nacistické káznice do Egypta (II. část). HaV 2015, č. 2, s. 90-99. Dále: P. KREISINGER, Plukovník generálního štábu Jan Krček (1901-1961). Dlouhá cesta účastníka zahraničního odboje (velitele Gabčíka a Kubiše) k rehabilitaci. HaV 2017, č. 4, s. 70-83; M. VYHLÍDAL, První ze tří konšelů. Zpravodajský důstojník štábní kapitán František Fárek (1894-1973). VH 2019, č. 1, s. 123-145; TÝŽ, Generál Jan Reindl (1902-1981). Letec, zpravodajec, účastník protinacistického odboje a velitel leteckých instruktorů v Egyptě. Svět křídel, Cheb 2018; TÝŽ, Zpravodajský důstojník plk. gšt. František Havel (1896-1977), příspěvek k fungování vojenského zpravodajství ve 2. polovině 30. let 20. století. HaV 2019, č. 2, s. 45-65.
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utajovaným skutečnostem zájmových států. Náleží sem především komparace obsahu dochovaných zpráv s objektivně doloženou historickou realitou. Zpravodajský obraz je zde podroben srovnání s výsledky novodobých výzkumů, založených na principech kritické vědecké práce. Do této etapy ovšem patří také specifický aspekt celé problematiky a tím je neúmyslný, či spíše nevědomý posun ve výkladu obsahu zpráv. Podstatnou roli zde ovšem také hraje faktor vědomé, a tedy záměrné interpretace zpráv, vycházející z určité předem existující potřeby a zájmu těch subjektů, které měly možnost jejich povahu ovlivnit před dalším využitím. Jde zde tedy o studium specifické interpretační stránky informační materie. V dané etapě se tato specifická stránka týká zpracovatelů příslušné materie, to znamená vojenské zpravodajské komunity, vymezené organizačním a služebním rámcem 2. oddělení Hlavního štábu a jemu podřízených složek. Nejnovější výzkum již v tomto směru indikoval a přesvědčivě doložil poměrně závažné symptomy. Významově se netýkají pouze období do rozbití republiky a okupace českých zemí v březnu 1939. Výrazně se projevily v exilovém vojenském zpravodajství během druhé světové války.4
Třetí, vrcholnou etapu je pak možné charakterizovat jako studium využití informačních výstupů vojenského zpravodajského aparátu nejvyšším armádním velením a pak především rozhodujícími, a tedy určujícími politickými a vládními místy. Cíl výzkumu v této etapě má směřovat k zodpovězení té nejpodstatnější otázky, tedy jak, do jaké míry a s jakými důsledky ovlivňoval armádní informační systém výsledky své práce rozhodovací procesy na úrovni nejvyšší exekutivy československého státu.
Tato stať shrnuje poznání z úrovně již druhé z nastíněných etap. Do ní bylo možné pokročit zejména poté, co se v nedávné době podařilo především podstatně upřesnit a podrobně rekonstruovat organizaci a skladbu agenturní sítě, pracující ve třicátých letech hlavně proti Německu a také Rakousku. Nyní je již z podstatné části zrekonstruována a vyhodnocena velikost a složení jejího nejhodnotnějšího jádra, tvořeného tajnou agenturou, řízenou přímo operativními orgány ofenzivní sekce P-1 skupiny B-pátrací 2. oddělení Hlavního štábu československé branné moci.5
Výzkum vojenského zpravodajství se v souvislosti s meziválečným Československem ocitá ve velmi specifických heuristických podmínkách. Písemnosti 2. oddělení Hlavního štábu byly vystaveny mimořádně těžkým skartačním zásahům. Pramenná základna, dochovaná na území České republiky proto trpí značnou torzovitostí. Za těchto nepříznivých podmínek je tedy nutné pátrat jinde. Jako klíčový zdroj, jenž má značný potenciál substituovat ztracené prameny, se ukázaly být materiály, které československé vojenské zpravodajství sdílelo se spojenci či spřátelenými zeměmi. Metoda systematického vyhledávání náhradních zdrojů se potvrdila v případě československo-francouzské zpravodajské kooperace z meziválečného období. Tato stať se opírá též o reflexe činnosti československého vojenského zpravodajství, jak je zaznamenaly
4 Blíže viz: K. STRAKA, Rekonstrukce československé agenturní sítě, s. 261-277.
5 Nejvýznamnější poznatky jsou obsaženy v následujících pracích: J. KOKOŠKA – S. KOKOŠKA, Spor o agenta A-54; S. KOKOŠKA, Několik poznámek k československé částečné mobilizaci v květnu 1938. In: Pocta profesoru Janu Kuklíkovi. Karolinum, Praha 1998, s. 99-114; TÝŽ, Než vypukla válka. Němci ve službách čs. zpravodajské služby v letech 1935-1939, DaS 2007, č. 4, s. 37-40; K. STRAKA, Agenturní síť čs. armády v Čechách a v Německu; TÝŽ, Rekonstrukce československé agenturní sítě; M. VYHLÍDAL, Zpravodajská tipařská akce Franze Dobianera. Příklad práce československé rozvědky před 2. světovou válkou. SPPFMU-SV 2018, č. 2, s. 76-83.
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spolupracující složky polské armády z období poměrně intenzivních odborných vojenských kontaktů obou zemí z dvacátých let a z první poloviny třicátých let.
Německý vojenský potenciál v nejvýznamnějších poznatcích československého vojenského zpravodajství
Činnost vojenského zpravodajství vycházela z československé vojenské strategie meziválečného období. Do poloviny dvacátých let vojenskou strategii Československa determinovala úzká vazba na tehdejší ostře protiněmeckou strategii Francie. S oslabením francouzského vlivu ve střední Evropě po roce 1925 se československá vojenská strategie postupně emancipovala od původní protiněmecké orientace. Stále více se profilovala skutečně ryze československá vojenská strategie, zaměřená vůči snaze Maďarska o revizi poválečného uspořádání.6 Československé vojenské zpravodajství se během dvacátých let stále výrazněji orientovalo na Maďarsko. Práce proti Německu se v tomto kontextu nestačila rozvinout a stagnovala. Přísun podstatných informací byl v letech 1919 až 1926 zajištěn Generálním štábem francouzské armády prostřednictvím Francouzské vojenské mise v Československé republice.7 Další významné informace plynuly od Mezispojenecké vojenské kontrolní komise. Ta do roku 1927 dohlížela na plnění a dodržování vojenských, námořních a leteckých klauzulí V. části Versailleské mírové smlouvy z 28. června 1919.8 Poměrně málo intenzivní vlastní československý informační zájem o Německo podmiňovaly politické priority československé zahraniční politiky. Koncem dvacátých let usilovala o zcela bezkonfliktní sousedský vztah, jenž měl být potvrzen uzavřením smlouvy o neútočení.9
Na tomto místě je nutné klást si otázku, kdy a za jakých okolností československé vojenské zpravodajství začalo stupňovat a rozšiřovat pozornost též ve vztahu k Německu. Jako první skutečně výrazná bezpečnostní hrozba byl v Československu pocítěn pokus o uzavření německo-rakouské celní unie, odvrácený v létě 1931.10 V reakci na tyto události se projevily první iniciativy v oblasti modernizace výzvědného aparátu. Z podnětu plk. pěch. Mojmíra Soukupa, přednosty skupiny B-pátrací 2. oddělení Hlavního štábu, byly brzy poté zřízený první takzvané agenturní pátrací ústředny se zaměřením na Německo. Soukup aplikoval v československých poměrech metodu
6 Souhrn vývoje československé vojenské strategie je obsažen ve studii: K. STRAKA, Ministr národní obrany František Udržal a branná strategie Československé republiky z let 1921-1929. In: Jaroslav ROKOSKÝ ‒ Jiří URBAN a kol., František Udržal. Sedlák a státník. Vyšehrad, Praha 2016, s. 103-126.
7 Raný doklad této skutečnosti poskytuje: VÚA-VHA, f. Francouzská vojenská mise, karton (kart.) 10 – Note au sujet des forces militaires de l’Allemagne à la date du 30 juillet 1919.
8 Primární prameny československé provenience pro toto období absentují. Vzhledem k tomu mají podstatný substituční význam reference zástupců polského vojenského zpravodajství o poznatcích, jimiž v době vzájemné výměny informací o Německu z let 1927-1934 disponovalo 2. oddělení československého Hlavního štábu. Viz: Polsko-czechosłowackie kontakty wojskowe 1921-1938 w dokumentach wywiadu i dyplomacji II Rzeczypospolitej. Ed. Piotr KOŁAKOWSKI. Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, Warszawa 2018, dok. č. 67, s. 177.
9 O této problematice viz zejména: Dagmar MORAVCOVÁ, Československo, Německo a evropská hnutí 1929-1932. Institut pro středoevropskou kulturu a politiku, Praha 2001, s. 68-78. A nověji: Jindřich DEJMEK, Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část první Revolucionář a diplomat (1884-1935). Karolinum, Praha 2006, s. 450-452.
10 Tuto problematiku velmi výstižně pojednává zejména: Jiří KOVTUN, Republika v nebezpečném světě. Éra prezidenta Masaryka 1918-1933. Torst, Praha 2005, s. 663-677.
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decentralizace řízení operativních činností ofenzivního zpravodajského aparátu, s níž se seznámil v rámci tehdejší československo-polské zpravodajské spolupráce.11 Efektivita těchto progresivních opatření se v mnoha ohledech potvrdila v následujících letech. Během nich se celý ofenzivní aparát rozrostl směrem ke všem zájmovým státům. V nejrozvinutější fázi před Mnichovem jej tvořila tři agenturní pátrací střediska. Každé z nich řídilo síť předsunutých agenturních ústředen. Zahájena byla též výstavba zahraničních předsunutých agenturních ústředen, doplněných posléze úřady vojenských atašé se speciálními úkoly v oblasti ofenzivního zpravodajství.12
Nutnost zvýšit zpravodajský zájem o Německo se potvrdila v souvislosti s Konferencí o redukci a omezení zbrojení v Ženevě, probíhající od února 1932. Jako zvlášť rizikový byl do budoucna pociťován německý požadavek na rovnoprávnost ve zbrojení, tedy takzvané Gleichberechtigung. Informační zájem o Německo sice vzrostl, ale prioritou československého vojenského zpravodajství té doby bylo stále ještě Maďarsko. Této skutečnosti také odpovídalo dosavadní zaměření a výsledky práce proti Německu. Československé vojenské zpravodajství projevovalo v souvislosti s ním zájem především o průmysl s již zavedenou anebo potenciálně možnou produkcí vojenských zbraní a materiálu. Zaměřovalo se na utajovaný vývoj nové bojové techniky. Získalo určité významné informace o německo-sovětské vojensko-technické spolupráci včetně údajů o dění v jednom ze zkušebních zařízení na území Sovětského svazu. Konstantu informačního zájmu tvořila problematika skrytého vývoje a výroby bojových chemických otravných látek, prostředků pro jejich nasazení i na obranu proti nim. Československé vojenské zpravodajství disponovalo také poměrně dobrými informacemi o dopravních a infrastrukturních systémech Německa, jež měly vojenský význam anebo byly pozoruhodné z hlediska technických inovací. Dále se zajímalo také o doktrínu Reichswehru, německé vojenské myšlení a nové trendy, jež se projevovaly v přípravě vyšších štábů. Praktickou aplikaci teoretických novinek sledovalo poměrně soustavně při pravidelných a větších vojenským cvičeních na území Německa. Preference, spočívající zejména ve vojensko-technické problematice, souvisely s poměrně dobrými podmínkami pro opatřování informací z této oblasti vzhledem k rozvinutému československému průmyslu, jenž měl četné komerční a jiné vazby do Německa. Ve srovnání s tím však tehdejší československé vojenské zpravodajství vykazovalo určité nedostatky v přesných znalostech organizace a dislokace Reichswehru včetně nově zřizovaných prvků. Rezervy tohoto typu přetrvávaly kvůli jisté setrvačnosti z dob, kdy se československý zpravodajský aparát poněkud spoléhal na informace, zajišťované již zmíněnou Mezispojeneckou vojenskou kontrolní komisí.13 Teprve na počátku třicátých let začal československý ofenzivní zpravodajský aparát výrazněji sledovat vojenskou situaci
11 P. KOŁAKOWSKI, Między Warsawą a Pragą. Polsko-czechoslovackie stosunki wojskowo-polityczne 1918-1939. Bellona, Warszawa 2007, s. 338. Polsko-československá zpravodajská spolupráce trvala ve své aktivní podobě v letech 1927 až 1934 a byla oboustranně přínosná. Ukončena byla vlivem rozdílného nazírání zahraničních politik obou států na vývoj mezinárodních vztahů a na řešení s nimi spjatých bezpečnostních problémů. O této zpravodajské kooperaci dosud nejlépe: Tamtéž, s. 327-355.
12 O zpravodajské soustavě třicátých let na vlastním teritoriu dosud nejpodrobněji: Z. TITL, Rekonstrukce vývoje organizační struktury a personálií. O zahraničních opěrných bodech nejnověji a uceleně: K. STRAKA, Rekonstrukce československé agenturní sítě, s. 305-377.
13 Viz: Polsko-czechosłowackie kontakty wojskowe, dok. č. 67, s. 166-167, dok. č. 85, s. 219-223 a dok. č. 93, s. 248-252.
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v blízkém i vzdálenějším pohraničí Německa.14 Novým nárokům se přizpůsoboval postupně. Přesto však byl v roce 1932 schopen opatřit hodnověrné informace o tom, jak Německo porušuje zmíněná vojenská omezení, zakotvená ve Versailleské mírové smlouvě. Tyto poznatky byly dány k dispozici československé diplomacii jako informační podklad k účasti na ženevské Konferenci o redukci a omezení zbrojení.15
Počátky soustavné zpravodajské práce proti Německu z předhitlerovské éry charakterizovalo především výrazné přecenění mobilizačního potenciálu a celkové materiální připravenosti Reichswehru. Tehdejší zpravodajská prognóza zněla tak, že první operace budoucí války by směřovaly k eliminaci Československa německými vojsky. Počítalo se s tím, že by je svou intervencí podpořilo Maďarsko a Rakousko. Koalice antirevizionistických států v čele s Francií by porážkou Československa přišla o strategicky významný komponent. Předpokládalo se, že Německo by před napadením Československa anebo v průběhu akcí proti němu, postavilo během prvního až šestého týdne mobilizace 21 divizí a tří až šestí jezdeckých brigád. Celkový početní stav takto mobilizovaného Reichswehru byl odhadnut na 600 000 mužů. V šestém až dvanáctém týdnu by Reichswehr stavěl dalších 42 divizí a ve 12. až 16. týdnu 63 divizí. V případě Rakouska se očekávalo, že nasadí tři divize a během 14. až 16. dne mobilizace tři horské a tři motorizované brigády. Podíl Maďarska se pro počátek akcí odhadoval na sedm divizí a v roce 1933 již na 10 divizí. Kolem 14. dne mobilizace by mohlo patrně nasadit tři až čtyři neúplné divize. Do protičeskoslovenských akcí s omezenými cíli by mohlo být nasazeno sedm divizí a jedna jezdecká brigáda.16 Ve srovnání s objektivně doloženou realitou šlo o vysoce nadsazené předpoklady. Šlo o výsledek odhadů, které postrádaly reálný dokumentární základ.17
Německo nebylo v roce 1932 vnímáno československým vojenským zpravodajstvím pouze prizmatem revizionistické snahy sejmout ze sebe břímě Versailleské mírové smlouvy. Z hlediska mezinárodního srovnání bylo již velmi brzy a citelně konfrontováno
14 Jako podstatný pramen lze v souvislosti s tím akceptovat pamětnické podání Františka Moravce, v letech 1929 až 1934 přednosty 2. oddělení štábu Zemského vojenského velitelství (ZVV) Praha. Tato část jeho pamětí působí věrohodně po konfrontaci s archivními prameny z provenience 2. oddělení štábu ZVV. Viz: František MORAVEC, Špión, jemuž nevěřili. Sixty-Eight Publishers, Toronto 1977, s. 22-24. Nad nedostatečností operativního průniku do Německa té doby se kriticky ve svých retrospektivách pozastavovali též zpravodajští důstojníci Karel Paleček a František Hieke. Srov.: Archiv bezpečnostních složek (ABS), f. 302 (Hlavní správa vojenské kontrarozvědky), sign. 302-57-2 – Protokol sepsaný na MNO ‒ hlavním štábu s brig. gen. K. Palečkem 23. listopadu 1949, č. l. 34-37. Dále též písemný záznam vzpomínek plk. pěch. F. Hiekeho (kopii posledně citovaného záznamu autorovi laskavě poskytl PaedDr. Jindřich Marek, Vojenský historický ústav Praha).
15 Archiv Akademie věd, f. Edvard Beneš, kart. 124, sign. R 216/1 – Odzbrojovací konference leden až červen 1933, Československá delegace na odzbrojovací konferenci. Vojenská část. Č. 44 voj. O. K. 1932 – Porušování mírových smluv Maďarskem a Německem – zprávy, Ženeva 13. března 1933.
16 Service historique de la Défense (SHD)/Departement de l’Armee de Terre (DAT), 7 N (État-major de l’Armée et attachés militaires) 3109, dossier (d.) Hypothèses de conflits européens 1932, No 2177/Cab. Mission militaire française (15 novembre 1932), Réunion entre ministres des affaires étrangères, de la Défense nationale et État-major général, révision éventuelle du plan d’operation.
17 Podle sdělení mjr. gšt. Josefa Bulandra, referenta německé sekce skupiny A-studijní a plánovací 2. oddělení Hlavního štábu, zástupcům polského vojenského zpravodajství při příležitosti společné konference, konané v Praze ve dnech 7. až 11. ledna 1932. S odvoláním na primární archivní prameny z provenience polského vojenského zpravodajství uvádí tuto skutečnost: P. KOŁAKOWSKI, Między Warsawą a Pragą, s. 340.
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s nacismem a jeho neustále rostoucím vlivem. Během roku 1932 vyvrcholila v Československu kauza masové paramilitární organizace Volkssport.18 Československé orgány prokázaly rozsáhlým vyšetřováním, že má přímé vazby nejen na Německou nacionálněsocialistickou dělnickou stranu (Deutsche nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei; DNSAP) v Československu, ačkoli se deklaroval jako nepolitický spolek, ale také na Nacionálněsocialistickou dělnickou stranu (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei; NSDAP) v Německu, a zvláště na její úderné oddíly Sturmabteilung – SA. Volkssport byl budován po jejich vzoru jako polovojenský subjekt s vertikální strukturou velení a pravidelnou organizací armádního typu a branným výcvikem. Jeho složky byly přímo navazovány na strukturu SA a vedoucí kruhy NSDAP v Německu. Cíle svazu měly protistátní charakter, neslučitelný s československým právním řádem.19
Československé vojenské zpravodajství mělo rozhodující podíl na tom, že předákům Volkssportu byla přesvědčivě prokázána vina. V rámci trestního stíhání v této věci vypracovalo znalecký posudek, jenž je pozoruhodný objektivně přesným a správným pojmenování podstaty a cílů nacistické ideologie. Dobrozdání vojenských znalců20 vycházela jednak z otevřených zdrojů a jednak z poznatků, jež byly vedeny v neveřejném režimu a nestaly se součástí trestního spisu. Opíraly se totiž o informace agenturní sítě, především o subjekty, které řídily orgány 2. oddělení štábu Zemského vojenského velitelství Praha pod velením mjr. gšt. Františka Moravce, přednosty oddělení.21 Vojenští zpravodajci jasně konstatovali na základě analýzy programu NSDAP, že tento politický subjekt vede boj za zrušení Versailleské mírové smlouvy, propaguje volnost ve zbrojení za účelem vybudování velké armády a usiluje o postupné spojení všech Němců, a to bez ohledu na jejich stávající státní příslušnost, ve zvláštní kulturně, hospodářsky a sociálně samostatné Třetí říši. Za tím účelem NSDAP sleduje postupné cíle, jež budou dosahovány po etapách. První spočívá v převzetí úplné státní moci v Německu, druhá v nastolení nového státního a hospodářského řádu uvnitř země a třetí v takzvaném osvobození všech Němců a ve vytvoření Třetí říše. Program strany byl podle výkladu vojenských zpravodajců namířen proti integritě Československa, neboť počítal s násilným připojením větší části pohraničního území Čech, Moravy a Slezska s německým osídlením k budoucí Třetí říši. Program DNSAP a aktivity Volkssportu pak vojenský posudek ohodnotil jako souladné s cíli říšskoněmecké NSDAP a podpůrné v jejich prospěch. Opíral se o separatistické cíle DNSAP, jež směřovaly k vytvoření a uznání uzavřeného sídelního území Němců, na němž by byl uplatněn vůdcovský princip v duchu nacistické ideologie. Vojenské zpravodajství kladlo důraz na to, že takto vzniklý faktický stát ve státě by však byl pouze předstupněm k rozbití Československa a k začlenění
18 Plný oficiální název organizace Volkssport (Nationalsozialistischer Verband für Wandern, Radfahren, Spiel und Sport aller Art – Nacionálněsocialistický svaz pro putování, jízdu na kole, hru a sport všeho druhu). VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Praha, kart. 1043, sign. 68-1/3-27, Dův. II č. j. 13002/zprav. 1932 – Vojenský znalecký posudek v trestní věci Volkssport – Brno 1932, Satzungen des Verbandes „Volkssport”, Sitz Fulnek.
19 O celé kauze Volkssport dosud nejpodrobněji a v příslušném kontextu: Michal BURIAN, Sudetoněmecké nacionalistické tělovýchovné organizace a československý stát v letech 1918-1938. Karolinum, Praha 2012, s. 139-170.
20 Jako vojenští znalci, kteří koncipovali též vojenský znalecký posudek v dané trestní věci, působili mjr. gšt. Václav Kopačka, 2. oddělení štábu ZVV Praha, a mjr. gšt. Jaroslav Hrabovský, 2. oddělení štábu ZVV Brno. Viz: VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Praha, kart. 1043, sign. 68-1/3-96, č. j. 5163 – Dův. hl. št. 2. odd. 1932 ze 4. srpna 1932.
21 Tamtéž, kart. 1043, sign. 68-1/3-102, Dův. II č. j. 12599 – Zprav. 1932 z 12. srpna 1932 – Volkssport – dokumenty.
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separovaného území do Třetí říše. Z hlediska bezpečnostní situace Československa zaznělo velmi varovně stanovisko ve vztahu k SA.22 Vojenští zpravodajci jasně konstatovali: „Tvoří tedy Sturmabteilungen SA zvláštní illegální armádu, která je mnohem početnější, než Reichswehr a která v poslední době upravuje své materiální vybavení (zbraně, dopravní prostředky).”23
Po nástupu Adolfa Hitlera do funkce říšského kancléře se rok 1933 a téměř celý rok 1934 nesl z hlediska československého vojenského zpravodajství ve znamení primární a doslova fundamentální otázky, jak bude vypadat budoucí německá branná soustava. Přestože znalo cíle nacismu, zpočátku si přece jen nebylo jisto pravým smyslem prvních mocenských kroků nově nastoleného režimu v branné sféře. Jedna z prvních podstatných reakcí vojenského zpravodajství na zásadní mocenské změny pochází z 22. března 1933. Brig. gen. Vladimír Chalupa, přednosta 2. oddělení Hlavního štábu, tehdy sdělil zpravodajským složkám zemských vojenských velitelství první ohodnocení nedávných událostí. Napsal: „Zprávy z Německa po nastolení Hitlerova režimu zdají se nasvědčovati, že branné přípravy, prováděné doposud s patrnými ohledy na mínění ciziny, dostávají vlivem osobnosti Hitlerovy rychlejší spád. K 1. dubnu jest hlášeno z Německa více změn, a to jak v branné soustavě, tak i v detailní organizaci armády.”24 Na jiném místě, kde se právě projevila ona zmíněná pochybnost, k tomu dodal: „Přípravy materiální mohou býti součástí akce pro řešení nezaměstnanosti, respektive o udržení průmyslového provozu, hlavně velkých podniků.”25 Dále podotkl, že „Máme zprávu, že německý průmysl dostal od vojenské správy celou řadu objednávek, jež prý jsou pro veřejnost kamuflovány pod záminkou objednávek pro cizí státy.”26 Československá zpravodajská analytika připustila, že se zmíněné přípravy mohou týkat všeho toho, co bylo Reichswehru doposud zapovězeno, tedy doprovodných zbraní pěchoty (protitankové dělostřelecké zbraně a minomety), výzbroje pro polní, hrubé a protiletadlové dělostřelectvo, tanků a obrněných automobilů, speciálních přístrojů zejména pro protiletadlové dělostřelectvo a leteckého materiálu.27 Skupina A-studijní a plánovací 2. oddělení Hlavního štábu dokončila ke shodnému datu vysoce detailní zpravodajské dotazníky. Ofenzivní složky všech stupňů velení podle nich postupovaly při odstraňování zmíněných nejasností.28 Netrvalo příliš dlouho a dostavily se první podstatné indicie. Elaborát skupiny A ze 4. září 1933 již konstatoval: „Německo stojí na prahu válečných příprav pro nové světové zápolení. V programu hnutí vytýčený ideál Velkoněmecka, jinak zvaný III. říší, je prozatím in statu nascendi [ve stavu zrodu, pozn. autora].”29
Přestože zpravodajská analytika získávala postupně poněkud pevnější půdu pod nohama, nejistota přetrvávala v tom, zda se původní Reichswehr stane základem
22 Skutečnosti, uváděné v dané pasáži, jsou souhrnem jednotlivých věcných zjištění vojenských znalců. Podrobnosti obsahuje: Tamtéž, kart. 1043, sign. 68-1/3-27, Dův. II č. j. 13002/zprav. 1932 – Vojenský znalecký posudek v trestní věci Volkssport – Brno 1932.
23 Tamtéž, s. 2.
24 Tamtéž, kart. 1067, sign. 95-5/15-42, č. j. 3403 – Dův. hl. št. 2. odd. 1933 z 22. března 1933 – Vývoj zbrojení v Německu – dotazník, s. 1.
25 Tamtéž.
26 Tamtéž.
27 Tamtéž, s. 2.
28 Tamtéž, přílohy 1-4 k č. j. 3403 Dův. hl. št. 2. odd. 1933 z 22. března 1933 – Vývoj zbrojení v Německu – dotazník.
29 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, a. s. č. 20 – Ministerstvo národní obrany Londýn, sign. 20-29-44, č. j. 13 214 taj. hl. št./ 2. odděl. – z 16. listopadu 1938, č. l. 14-15.
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rozšířené a jednotné armády na bázi všeobecné branné povinnosti, anebo se nacistický režim vydá cestou modelu smíšené armády, tvořené v základu původním profesionálním Reichswehrem, podstatně rozhojněným do podoby miliční armády. Zásadní faktor úvah o druhém ze zmiňovaných modelů tvořily SA. Českoslovenští analytici se v souvislosti s tímto druhým směrem vyjádřili na jaře 1934 takto: „Při německé důkladnosti má ‚Hitlerova‘ hnědá armáda velký vojenský význam a nutno s ní proto počítati jako s vážným činitelem.”30 Tyto úvahy spěly správným směrem již z toho důvodu, že zatímco početní stav Reichswehru činil v červnu 1934 dvě stě padesát tisíc mužů,31 stavy SA kulminovaly v létě téhož roku na úrovni dvou milionů devíti set tisíc mužů.32 Za této situace je pochopitelné, že směrnice 3. (operačního) oddělení Hlavního štábu československé branné moci pro velitelská cvičení v období 1934/1935 kalkulovala s masivním nasazením SA do německých válečných akcí proti Československu.33 V podobném duchu vyznívaly též mezištábní československo-francouzské rozhovory z července 1934.34 S jistým odstupem od událostí kolem 30. července 1934, tedy od pověstné noci dlouhých nožů, však bylo stále více zřejmé, že budoucnost bude v Německu patřit výstavbě mohutné a jednotné branné moci, nikoliv smíšené koncepci.
Předpoklady v uvedeném směru podpořil též první mimořádně závažný agenturní zisk na poli ofenzivní práce proti Německu. Šlo o komplexní plán Říšského ministerstva obrany na reorganizaci mírového pozemního vojska z roku 1932. Agenturní materie se však týkala i celé řady opatření mobilizačního charakteru. Soubor těchto podkladů byl získán pravděpodobně v prvním trimestru roku 1934. Předal jej agenturní subjekt, k němuž se identifikační údaje nedochovaly. Z dokumentu plynulo, že válečnou polní armádu má tvořit 21 divizí Reichswehru a Grenzschutz-Ost,35 který měl zahrnovat 34 divizí. Ty však měly mít složení odlišné od divizí Reichswehru. Dokument obsahoval též údaje o časovém prováděcím rozvrhu celkového zastřešujícího výzbrojního programu. Uskutečnit se měl během pěti let, konkrétně od 1. dubna 1933 do 31. března 1938. Pro případ příznivých podmínek předvídal harmonogram i možnost urychlené realizace.36
Československé vojenské zpravodajství proniklo k podstatě takzvaného druhého výzbrojního program Reichswehru z roku 1932. V souhrnu lze konstatovat, že bylo
30 VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Praha, kart. 1094, sign. 68-1/3-520 – Elaborát Velitelství 1. divize č. j. 6419/zprav. Dův. 34 z 30. března 1934 – Souhrnná zpráva o Hitlerově hnědé armádě za 1. čtvrtletí 1934, s. 21.
31 Willhelm DEIST ‒ Manfred MESSERSCHMIDT ‒ Hans-Erich VOLKMANN ‒ Wolfram WETTE, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Bd. 1 (Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik). Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt – Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1979, s. 411.
32 K problematice SA blíže například: Heinrich BENNECKE, Hitler und die SA. Günter Olzog Verlag, München – Wien 1962.
33 VÚA-VHA, f. ZVV Praha, kart. 1090, č. j. 826/zprav. Taj. hl. št./3. odd. 1934 z 23. dubna 1934 – Cvičení 1934/1935 – osobní a tajná směrnice, s. 1.
34 O této problematice blíže: K. STRAKA, Československé a francouzské vojenské zpravodajství, s. 45-46. Nověji: TÝŽ, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance, s. 19-20.
35 Grenzschutz-Ost ‒ polovojenská ozbrojená organizace, existující v Německu od počátku dvacátých let. Byla určena k obraně státních hranic s Polskem, Československem a ve Východním Prusku. V roce 1936 ji nahradil Grenzwacht, podřízený branné moci, jenž pokrýval všechny hranice Německa.
36 SHD/DAT, 7 N 2682, d. 2, č. j. 903 Taj. hl. št./2. odděl. 1934 z 15. října 1934 – Výzbrojní program německé armády (rozbor dokumentu); tamtéž, d. 3, Évolution des préparatifs de guerre allemands, 6 février 1935.
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objektivně správně informováno o všech rozhodujících cílech programu. Československá analytika se s realitou shodovala v datu spuštění prvních opatření 1. dubna 1933. Klíčový moment v procesu budování Reichswehru nastal krátce před koncem roku 1933. Tehdy byl stanoven takzvaný prosincový program, jenž si kladl za cíl realizovat podstatnou část původního projektu z roku 1932 již do roku 1935. Říšský kancléř A. Hitler vystupňoval na jaře 1934 tlak na maximální urychlení programu. Českoslovenští analytici postupně nabyli přesvědčení, že 21 mírových divizí bude postaveno mnohem dříve, než program předpokládal. Podle jejich mínění to mohlo být nejdéle do první čtvrtiny roku 1936.37
Je nesporné, že vyhlášení všeobecné branné povinnosti v březnu 1935 znamenalo zásadní předěl ve vývoji vojenského potenciálu Třetí říše. Za těchto okolností nebylo náhodné, že v červnu 1935 bylo Německo definitivně označeno za stát hlavního zájmu československého vojenského zpravodajství.38 Etapa vývoje Třetí říše v letech 1935 až 1938 odpovídá z hlediska československého vojenského zpravodajství období jeho maximalizovaných výkonů. Z dosavadních poznatků vyplývá, že československé vojenské zpravodajství bylo schopno soustavným nasazením zejména agenturních prostředků celkem optimálně sledovat postup mírové výstavby, dislokace a také organizační skladby německého pozemního vojska a také infrastrukturních komponentů, významných pro vedení války. V souvislosti s tím dokázalo odhalovat existenci nově zřizovaných velitelských stupňů a také specifických druhů vojsk, a to poměrně brzy po jejich vzniku. Dobrým příkladem je zde sborový stupeň velení, identifikovaný ještě dříve, než byla v Německu veřejně ohlášena jeho existence, či vysoce přísně utajované útvary chemického vojska. Do jisté doby disponovalo též detailními zprávami o organizaci a výzbroji hlavních bojových součástí tankových divizí až do stupně čety.39
Nabízí se zde otázka, jak se československé vojenské zpravodajství vyrovnalo s mohutným nárůstem německé branné moci z let 1935 až 1938. Podstatné jsou zde hlavní ukazatele, jež vypovídají o velikosti a síle německé branné moci. Primární otázku tvořil mírový početní stav. Českoslovenští analytici došli na jaře 1938 k celkovému číslu 945 000 mužů (pozemní vojsko 705 000, letectvo 200 000, válečné námořnictvo 40 000). Předpokládalo se, že po říjnovém odchodu již vycvičených ročníků do civilu a po nástupu nováčků vzroste početní stav německé branné moci na 1 070 000 mužů.40 Dosavadní historiografické poznatky v zásadě tento analytický výstup potvrzují. Údaje se pro sledované období, tedy zhruba kolem poloviny roku 1938, pohybují v rozmezí od 600 000 do 750 000 mužů.41 V červnu a červenci byl pak vysloven souhrnný závěr
37 Uvedené poznatky plynou z komparace údajů v citovaném elaborátu s obecně uznávanými poznatky dosavadní historiografie. Pro srovnání byly využitý následující práce: Burkhart MUELLER-HILLEBRAND, Das Heer 1933-1945. Bd. 1 (Das Heer bis zum Kriegsbeginn), E. S. Mittler und Sohn, Darmstadt 1954, s. 13-20; Georg TESSIN, Deutsche Verbände und Truppen 1918-1939. Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück 1974, s. 215-216. Nověji a dosud nejpodrobněji analyzuje plánovací opatření z roku 1932: W. DEIST ‒ M. MESSERSCHMIDT ‒ H.-E. VOLKMANN ‒ W. WETTE, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Bd. 1, s. 387-415.
38 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, a. s. č. 37, sign. 37-153-59/č. l. 104-108 – Teze k reorganizaci a úkolům výzvědného zpravodajství, podepsán plk. gšt. Šimon Drgáč, přednosta 2. oddělení Hl. štábu, opatřeno datem 18. června 1935. Dokument bez čísla jednacího.
39 Podrobně o původu a charakteru zpráv v objektivizovaném zpracování viz: K. STRAKA, Rekonstrukce československé agenturní sítě, s. 96-109, 209-227, 240-261. Viz též: TÝŽ, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance, s. 12-49.
40 SHD/DAT, 7 N 2682, d. 6, Liaison à Prague du 17 au 21 Mai 1938.
41 W. DEIST ‒ M. MESSERSCHMIDT ‒ H.-E. VOLKMANN ‒ W. WETTE, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Bd. 1, s. 437-456.
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o tom, že mobilizační potenciál nacistického Německa bude do konce roku 1938 činit 96 divizí, tedy 46 mírových divizí, mezi nimi pět tankových a pět motorizovaných, a 50 mobilizačně vytvářených divizí (30 záložních a 20 Landwehru).42 Srovnáním s objektivními údaji lze zjistit, že mírové počty divizí byly poddimenzovány, zatímco odhad mobilizačních možností značně převýšil reálné možnosti. Německá branná moc postavila v roce 1938 celkem 51 mírových divizí (38 pěších, čtyři motorizované, čtyři lehké a pět tankových). Pokud by byla ovšem nucena mobilizovat, byla by schopna postavit pouze 27 záložních divizí a divizí Landwehru. Hlavní důvod spočíval v nedostatku potřebné výzbroje a materiálu.43
Československé vojenské zpravodajství disponovalo mimořádně hodnotnými poznatky o výstavbě německého vojenského letectva. Podstatu a jádro těchto výjimečných znalostí tvořila klíčová data o komplexním programu organizační výstavby německého vojenského letectva na léta 1934 až 1936. Opatřil je Hauptmann (E) Albrecht Spiess, důstojník Reichswehru, značně exponovaný pracovník Říšského ministerstva letectví. Československé vojenské zpravodajství bylo objektivně schopno po získání jím sdělených údajů predikovat vývoj a předpokládanou strategickou závažnost zcela nové německé letecké zbraně s takovou mírou přesnosti, jakou vůbec dovolovala aplikace operativních a analytických metod práce s agenturními informacemi. Na základě komparace dat z tohoto materiálu s ověřenými a hodnověrnými údaji o reálné historické skutečnosti je možné dojít k závěru, že zdrojová agenturní materie vycházela z nejvýznamnějších programových dokumentů Říšského ministerstva letectví. Cílový stav měl na základě zpravodajských informací k 1. říjnu 1936, tedy k datu dokončení počátečních etap výstavby, činit 93 letek (bez námořního letectva).44 Ve skutečnosti měla Luftwaffe k uvedenému datu ve stavu 108 letek. Diference mezi zpravodajskou materií a realitou plynula z navýšení počtu zvědných a pozorovacích letek. V případě stíhacích, bombardovacích a střemhlavých bombardovacích letek se zpravodajské informace přesně kryly nejen s reálně existujícím programem Říšského ministerstva letectví, ale i s dosaženou realitou.45
Německé vojenské letectvo a vše, co s ním souviselo, bylo pochopitelně i v dalších letech jedním nejčelnějších předmětů zájmu československého zpravodajství. V těchto souvislostech lze zhodnotit původní programová data z let 1933 až 1934 jako základnu, k níž se vztahovaly všechny další zpravodajské poznatky o leteckém potenciálu Třetí říše. Z hlediska potřeb informační analýzy šlo nepochybně o velkou výhodu. Zmíněný agent byl ztracen na jaře 1935. Obdobně plnohodnotný zdroj zpráv v sektoru letectví 2. oddělení Hlavního štábu poté již nikdy nemělo. Přesto však dokázalo s poměrně dobrou mírou kvalifikovaného odhadu predikovat růst německého leteckého potenciálu. K potřebným informacím a podkladům se ale propracovávalo s použitím mnoha jiných zpravodajských prostředků. Skupina A 2. oddělení konstatovala ve svých závěrech z 10. listopadu 1938,
42 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, a. s. č. 20, sign. 20-29-44, č. j. 13 214 – Taj. hl. št./2. odděl. z 16. listopadu 1938, č. l. 19-20.
43 B. MUELLER-HILLEBRAND, Das Heer 1933-1945. Bd. 1, s. 25, 68; Williamson MURRAY, The Change in the European Balance of Power 1938-1939. The Path to Ruin. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984, s. 219.
44 SHD/DAT, 7 N 2682, d. 3, Liaison à Paris février 1935, Plán budování německého vojenského letectva 1934-1936 (původní materiál z provenience 2. oddělení československého Hlavního štábu).
45 Srov.: Dokumente und Dokumentarfotos zur Geschichte der deutschen Luftwaffe. Ed. Karl-Heinz VÖLKER. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt – Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1968, dok. č. 84, s. 201-204.
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že Luftwaffe disponuje operativní armádou v rozsahu jednoho sta perutí. Toto celkové množství tvořilo podle mínění 2. oddělení devět pozorovacích perutí, sedm zvědných perutí, 57 bombardovacích perutí všeho určení, 19 stíhacích perutí a osm perutí námořního letectva.46 Reálný stav, vztažený k téměř totožnému referenčnímu datu, byl v jednotlivých položkách odlišný. Luftwaffe měla v té době 85 perutí. Téměř úplná shoda zpravodajského obrazu s realitou je zřetelná v případě zvědných a pozorovacích perutí. Skutečně jich v té době existovalo 14. V případě bombardovacích perutí byl kvalifikovaný odhad zpravodajských analytiků nadhodnocený. Existovalo jich 43 (včetně jedné bitevní perutě). Počet stíhacích perutí byl naproti tomu poddimenzován, neboť Luftwaffe jich měla v dané době 24. Námořní letectvo disponovalo čtyřmi perutěmi.47
Co se počtu letounů týká, dospělo 2. oddělení na základě rozboru shromážděných ukazatelů k tomu, že Luftwaffe je schopna nasadit přes 3800 bojových strojů různého určení. Podle stavu z konce září 1938 německé letectvo disponovalo skutečně minimálně třemi tisíci letounů (1128 bombardovacích, 226 střemhlavých bombardovacích, 773 stíhacích, 513 pozorovacích a zvědných, 195 bitevních a 164 námořních různého určení).48 Nadsazení, jež charakterizuje československý zpravodajský obraz, bylo částečně ovlivněno uplatněním některých jiných ukazatelů, než jaké charakterizují doloženou skutečnost. Především se v této diferenci ale projevují veškeré složitosti operativní a analytické práce v oboru vojenského zpravodajství.
Strategické záměry nacistického Německa v poznatcích československého vojenského zpravodajství
V této kapitole bylo již doloženo, že československé vojenské zpravodajství velmi brzy a objektivně správně pochopilo základní cíle nacistické ideologie. Přestože postrádalo konkrétní a hodnověrné zprávy z rozhodujících politických a vojenských kruhů nacistického Německa, jeho schopnost predikovat příští vývoj hlavních tendencích vývoje mezinárodních vztahů byla na objektivně dobré úrovni. Především správně předvídalo zlomové momenty třicátých let. Scházely mu ale přesnější poznatky o tom, kdy skutečně nastanou. Prokazatelně od počátku roku 1933 počítalo s tím, že se Německo pokusí obnovit plnohodnotnou vojenskou přítomnost v tehdy stále ještě demilitarizovaném Porýní. Oprávněně lze však předpokládat, že s tím počítalo již od závěru roku 1932. Československá zpravodajská analytika si v souvislosti s tím již tehdy nekladla otázku, zda k tomu dojde, ale kdy Němci takový krok uskuteční.49 V roce 1930 vzala na vědomí, že stažením spojeneckých vojsk z Porýní na základě výsledků Haagské konference vzniká určité vakuum, které Německo bude chtít dříve či později vyplnit mocenskými prostředky, a tak zlepšit svou strategickou pozici vůči Francii.50
46 Viz: VÚA-VHA, f. VKPR, kart. 179, č. j. 783 dův. 1938, č. j. 33663 dův. hl. št/2. odd. 1938 z 10. listopadu 1938 ‒ Reorganizace německého letectva.
47 G. TESSIN, Deutsche Verbände und Truppen 1918-1939, s. 292-295.
48 Tato čísla uvádí s odvoláním na relevantní kořistní archivní materiál říšskoněmecké provenience: W. MURRAY, German Air Power and the Munich Crisis. War and Society 1977, č. 2, s. 112. Srov.: Horst BOOG, Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung 1935-1942. Führungsprobleme, Spitzengliederung, Generalstabsausbildung. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1982, s. 137-140.
49 SHD/DAT, 7 N 3446, d. 2, Conversations franco-tchécoslovaques janvier 1933. Entretien du 28, 30, 31 janvier.
50 Robert KVAČEK, Nad Evropou zataženo. Československo a Evropa 1933-1937. Svoboda, Praha 1966, s. 224.
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Prognóza budoucího vývoje vycházela mimo jiné též z rozboru již zmíněného výzbrojního programu Reichswehru z roku 1932. Vzhledem ke zprávám o jeho urychleném plnění byl na podzim 1934 vyjádřen názor, že nejpozději do října 1935 lze s největší pravděpodobností očekávat zavedení všeobecné branné povinnosti v Německu. Šlo o pozoruhodně správnou predikci skutečnosti, jež reálně nastala v březnu 1935.51
Československá zpravodajská analytika si nečinila žádné iluze ani o osudu Rakouska jako nezávislého státu. Jestliže nevydařený pokus o německo-rakouskou celní unii z roku 1931 vedl ke zvýšení zájmu československého vojenského zpravodajství o Německo a jeho záměry vůči Vídni, pak zmařený puč rakouských nacistů z 25. července 1934 a zejména německo-rakouská smlouva z 11. července 1936 utvrdila vojenské analytiky v přesvědčení, že s anšlusem Rakouska je nutné počítat jako s budoucí realitou.52 Hlavní štáb československé branné moci rozhodně nebyl překvapen, když 12. března 1938 k anšlusu skutečně došlo. Předem sice neznal stanovený termín zahájení akce, ale svými prostředky moderního rádiového odposlechu alespoň přesně zjistil okamžik, kdy německá vojska překročila rakouské státní hranice a rychle směřovala k Vídni.53
Československé vojenské zpravodajství interpretovalo cíle nacionálního socialismu jako neslučitelné s existencí versailleského systému, a tedy i československého státu. Z toho důvodu očekávalo, že se ozbrojené akce proti Československu stanou předmětem strategického plánování německého nejvyššího velení. Zájem o ně tvořil vrcholnou prioritu ofenzivního zpravodajského aparátu československé branné moci. Současně však šlo o nejobtížněji dosažitelnou zpravodajskou metu. Skupina A-studijní a plánovací 2. oddělení přistoupila v květnu 1936 k všeobecné bilanci toho, co skutečně zná a na čem může dále stavět. Výsledky nebyly vůbec uspokojivé. Strategicky významné informace z agenturních zdrojů, z nichž se čerpalo v letech 1932 až 1935, povětšinou již zastaraly. Zásadní rezidua o to více narůstala především v základních aspektech mobilizačních, nástupových a operačních opatření německé branné moci.54
Německou kontrašpionážní bariéru se podařilo prolomit koncem roku 1936, tedy objektivně jen asi rok a půl poté, co začaly v nejvyšším velení německé branné moci vznikat první závazné koncepty násilných akcí v oblasti střední Evropy. Československé vojenské zpravodajství v té době získalo agenturní cestou podstatné doklady o tom, že velení německé branné moci rozehrálo již na jaře štábní hru s námětem preventivní války proti Československu. Dochované prameny identitu agenturního zdroje nespecifikují. Nastíněný zpravodajský zisk zapůsobil v Československu jako jeden z nejvýraznějších
51 SHD/DAT, 7 N 2682, d. 3, Évolution des préparatifs de guerre allemands, 6 février 1935.
52 SHD/DAT, 7 N 3115, Note du commandant Loriot au sujet de son entretien avec le colonel Hájek, chef du 2o bureau de l’État-major tchécoslovaque (28 novembre 1936).
53 Blíže: S. KOKOŠKA, Československé vojenské zpravodajství, s. 97-98.
54 Základní údaje o citované bilanci vycházejí z pramene, jenž nese název: Seznam zpravodajských požadavků, vyplývajících z neúplnosti dosavadních předpokladů o možnostech sousedních států. Měl tajný charakter. Podepsal jej plk. gšt. F. Havel, přednosta skupiny A-studijní a plánovací 2. oddělení Hlavního štábu. Meritorní kritická pasáž v úvodu zní takto: „Předpoklady o mobilizaci sousedních států, o válečném složení jejich armád, o způsobu zahájení válečného konfliktu a o počátečních operacích jsou sestaveny velkou většinou na základě logických úvah, postrádajících vesměs spolehlivého dokumentárního podkladu a nejsou z valné části ani spolehlivě doloženy hodnověrnými zprávami. // Po stránce zpravodajské nebyl dosud získán žádný spolehlivý náznak, jenž by nám dovolil vytvořiti si reelení předpoklady spolehlivé hodnoty, respektive přezkoušeti naše dosavadní předpoklady.” Citováno podle: VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, a. s. č. 37, sign. 37-153-29 – Seznam zpravodajských požadavků, č. l. 1-5 (citace z č. l. 1).
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faktorů od zahájení modernizace obrany státu v letech 1933 a 1934. Rozbor získané materie především utvrdil nejvyšší velení ve správnosti volby československé vojenské strategie s těžištěm proti Třetí říši.55 Vzhledem k povaze věci bylo vše podstatné ze zprávy sděleno prezidentu republiky Edvardu Benešovi.56
Další důležitý aspekt spočíval v tom, že poznatky o zmíněné štábní hře dalece překračovaly svým významem pouze československou dimenzi. V prvních dnech ledna 1937 putoval opis vyhodnoceného agenturního záznamu do Paříže.57 Také tam zpráva zapůsobila jako mimořádně významný moment. Pplk. gšt. Louis Rivet, náčelník francouzské Zpravodajské služby, o ní osobně referoval gen. Maurici Gamelinovi, náčelníkovi Generálního štábu francouzské armády, 5. ledna 1937 v rámci souhrnného hlášení. Sdělení z Československa tvořilo jeho nejvýznamnější část. Náčelník Zpravodajské služby si do svého deníku následně zaznamenal: „Gen. Gamelin nařídil urychlit přípravu ve všech oblastech.”58
To vůbec nejpodstatnější, co vyplynulo z rozboru válečné hry, spočívalo v odpovědi na základní otázku, kladenou v již zmiňované bilanci zpravodajských poznatků o Německu z května 1936. V souvislosti s operačními možnostmi německé branné moci tehdy zaznělo tázavě: „Musíme počítat s hlavní počáteční operací proti nám? Ve kterých směrech? S jakými silami? Jak se projeví zpočátku?”59 Námět hry především nasvědčoval skutečnosti, že to bude Československo, kdo bude vystaveno pravděpodobně prvnímu preventivnímu úderu ve válce, kterou německé velení promýšlelo jako konflikt na dvou frontách. Porážka Československa by zbavila Německo nutnosti krýt svůj strategický týl na jihovýchodě při rozhodujícím střetu s Francií.
Získaný dokument členil pozemní vojsko německé branné moci na Skupinu armád západ a Skupinu armád východ. Rozhraní mezi nimi tvořila linie měst Ulm – Kassel – Lübeck, která Říši operačně dělila ve dví v severojižním směru. Skupinu armád východ proti Československu tvořily tři armády. Mezi něž by bylo rozděleno devět armádních sborů, 21 aktivních pěších divizí, čtyři záložní divize, čtyři divize Landwehru a tankový sbor se třemi tankovými divizemi. Skupina armád západ proti Francii rovněž se třemi armádami, měla k dispozici celkem 19 aktivních a záložních divizí, 13 divizí Landwehru a tři tankové brigády. Záloha vrchního velení sestávala ze dvou záložních armádních sborů. Jeden byl dislokován ve Východním Prusku. Pět divizí Landwehru se rozvinulo v širokém pásmu od Vratislavi k Baltskému moři jako strategický kryt proti Polsku.60
55 V tomto smyslu referoval v lednu 1937 plk. gšt. Václav Kalina, československý vojenský atašé v Paříži, přednostovi 2. (zpravodajského) oddělení Generálního štábu francouzské armády, jímž byl pplk. gšt. Maurice Gauché. SHD/DAT, 7 N 3115, Compte-rendu, 22 janvier 1937.
56 VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, a. s. č. 20, sign. 20-29-44, č. j. 13 214 taj. hl. št./2. odděl. z 16. listopadu 1938, č. l. 16.
57 SHD/DAT, 7 N 2701, d. Kriegsspiel 1936, Poste de Liaison no 22, 22 janvier 1937.
58 Viz: Louis RIVET, Carnets du chef des services secrets du Front populaire à Vichy. Edd. Olivier FORCADE – Sébastien LAURENT. Nouveau Monde édition, Paris 2010, s. 96.
59 Citováno podle: VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, a. s. č. 37, sign. 37-153-29 – Seznam zpravodajských požadavků, č. l. 1.
60 Uvedené poznatky plynou ze syntézy následujících pramenů. Jsou to: SHD/DAT, 7 N 2701, d. Kriegsspiel 1936, Poste de Liaison no 22, 22 janvier 1937; SHD/DAT, 7 N 3450, d. 1, Étude d’une operation offensive française en Rhenanie. Pièce N° 1 Hypothèse sur la situation et les possibilites de l’ennemi. Repartition initiale hypothétique des moyens de Heeresgruppe West; VÚA-VHA, f. FMSÚMV, a. s. č. 20, sign. 20-29-44, č. j. 13 214 taj. hl. št./2. odděl. z 16. listopadu 1938, č. l. 15-16.
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Z hlediska objektivizace je důležité konstatovat, že československý výzvědný aparát pronikl k samé podstatě tehdy platné koncepce strategické obrany Německa na dvou frontách, jež ovšem počítala s preventivním napadením Československa. Tento záměr poprvé specifikovala směrnice Schulung z roku 1935.61 Dosavadní výzkum již přesvědčivě prokázal, že další vývoj německých strategických plánů z let 1937 až 1938 zůstal československému vojenskému zpravodajství zcela utajen. Netušilo tedy, že původní pojetí obrany Německa se v průběhu roku 1938 zásadně koncepčně změnilo. Strategickou defenzívu s aktivními prvky nahradil čistě agresivní plán s cílem co nejrychleji porazit československou armádu a ovládnout českomoravský prostor před dalšími dalekosáhlými výboji. Strategické plány německé branné moci tímto plně reflektovaly cíle, které vyjádřil říšský kancléř A. Hitler na poradě s nejvyššími politickými a vojenskými činiteli 5. listopadu 1937. Na tomto základě vznikl dokument Vrchního velitelství branné moci (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht; OKW), nesoucí název Válka na dvou frontách s těžištěm jihovýchod (nástup Grün). Hitler jej schválil 30. května 1938. Se zahájením akce se počítalo již od 1. října téhož roku.62
Na tomto místě je vhodné zjistit, zda československé vojenské zpravodajství alespoň vypozorovalo určité jevy a tendence, které mohly nepřímo a spíše dílčím způsobem vypovídat o chystané německé strategii proti Československu. Uvedená otázka má primární význam v souvislosti s předpoklady o záměrech protivníka z doby, kdy se ve dnech 23. až 25. září 1938, tedy po vyhlášení mobilizace, rozhodovalo v Československu o volbě konkrétního způsobu obrany. Arm. gen. Ludvík Krejčí, hlavní velitel polní armády, nařídil zaujmout obrannou sestavu podle částečně pozměněné varianty XIII nástupového plánu VII (viz kapitolu Nástupový plán československé armády v září 1938). Toto rozhodnutí učinil 25. září 1938. Očekával, že se protivník pokusí udeřit jednak od severu z prostoru Žitava – Budyšín přes Liberec na Pardubice a jednak z oblasti mezi Vltavou a Znojmem na směru Zwettl – Havlíčkův Brod. Smysl takto vedeného útoku byl odhadnut v pokusu odříznout a zničit většinu sil obránce v Čechách, a tak mu zmařit ústup na východ.63 Klíčová otázka spočívá v tom, z čeho hlavní velitel při svém rozhodování vycházel. Primární prameny poskytují v tomto ohledu jednoznačnou odpověď. L. Krejčí postavil svá rozhodnutí z 25. září 1938 na obsahu referátu plk. gšt. Františka Hájka, přednosty 2. (zpravodajského) oddělení Hlavního velitelství.64 Zpravodajský obraz nástupu německých vojsk kolem českých zemí ale neodpovídal reálným záměrům agresora. Tímto faktem byl podmíněn charakter rozhodnutí hlavního velitele. Důraz kladl na liberecký a jihočeský směr, které se objektivně nekryly s hlavními a nejohroženějšími směry plánovaného německého útoku. Mylné předpoklady vycházely z přesvědčení, že německá branná moc vytváří tři skupiny vojsk. Za nejsilnější byla pokládána jižní skupina, o níž se Hlavního velitelství domnívalo, že se vytváří mezi Lincem a Vídní za účelem úderu na zemské rozhraní Čech a Moravy.
61 Srov.: International Military Tribunal (IMT). Volume XXXIV. Secretariat of the International Military Tribunal (SIMT), Nuremberg 1949, s. 485-486.
62 Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik (ADAP). Serie D. Bd. II. Imprimerie Nationale, Baden-Baden 1950, dok. č. 221, s. 281-285, dok. č. 448, s. 579-582. Viz též: IMT, Volume XXV. SIMT, Nuremberg 1947, s. 433-439, 464-469.
63 VÚA-VHA, f. Sdružený fond Velitelství útvarů za branné pohotovosti státu (SFVÚBPS) – velitelství (vel.) Palacký, kart. 6, inv. č. 232, č. j. 104 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 z 25. září 1938, změna varianty XIII; tamtéž, inv. č. 236, č. j. 119 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 z 25. září 1938, osobní a tajná směrnice č. 1.
64 Tamtéž, inv. č. 232, č. j. 104 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 z 25. září 1938, změna varianty XIII.
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Západní skupinu analytici kladli do prostoru Plauen – Chemnitz. Severní pak odhadli nad šluknovským a frýdlantským výběžkem. Určité další možné soustředění naznačovali také ve Slezsku. Z hlediska objektivizace má však fatální vyznění zdánlivě nepatrná zmínka, obsažená ve směrnici hlavního velitele pro velitele všech čtyř armád z 25. září, že také „něco je na bavorských hranicích”.65 Právě ono citované „něco“ bylo ve skutečnosti nejsilnějším úderným uskupením německého pozemního vojska. Skutečná nástupní sestava německé branné moci k chystanému napadení Československa vycházela z určitého kompromisního řešení. V něm se stýkal původní záměr nástupu Grün podniknout vstřícné údery ze Slezska na jih a opačným směrem z Dolního Rakouska s tím ovšem, že za faktické těžiště celé agrese byl pokládán směr Plzeň – Praha. Sbíhavé útoky prosazoval Generální štáb pozemního vojska prostřednictvím generála Franze Haldera. Měly odborné a racionální zdůvodnění. Jejich prostřednictvím měl být dosažen hlavní cíl nástupu Grün. Spočíval v zamezení ústupu československých sil na Slovensko a v jejich zničení ještě na ploše českých zemí. Tím by byla podle německé strategie dovršena vojenská porážka Československa. Úder na plzeňském směru naproti tomu prosadil do celé koncepce kancléř A. Hitler. Učinil tak definitivně na poradách s armádními špičkami 3. a 9. září 1938. Jeho důvody byly založeny na politických motivech. Rychlé proražení československé obrany ku Praze hodlal prezentovat jako důkaz rozhodnutí na československé frontě. Očekával, že tento fakt by zejména Francii odradil od jakéhokoli mocenského angažmá ve prospěch Československa.66
Příčiny mylných předpokladů o nepřátelských záměrech spočívaly především v tom, že zpravodajský obraz vycházel z velmi neúplných a zkreslených zdrojů. Podmínky pro přísun čerstvých zpráv o vojenské situaci na území Německa se dramaticky zhoršily přibližně v polovině září 1938 po propuknutí násilí v pohraničí českých zemí. Informační prostupnost státních hranic se za těchto okolností dramaticky zkomplikovala.67
Pod dojmem uvedených skutečností se lze dále ptát, zda československý zpravodajský aparát mohl obdržet hodnotné informace o chystané německé agresi též z jiných zdrojů. V tomto směru je nutné zdůraznit, že vlivem blížící se mezinárodní krize se nenaplnila spojenecká kooperace s francouzským vojenským zpravodajstvím. Stalo se tak i přesto, že smlouva o spojenectví a přátelství z roku 1924 stanovila, že si smluvní strany poskytnou informace o hrozícím nebezpečí. Hans-Thilo Schmidt, bratr genmjr. Rudolfa Schmidta, od roku 1936 velitele 1. tankové divize německé branné moci a jeden z nejlépe zasvěcených agenturních zdrojů francouzské Zpravodajské služby, oznámil koncem srpna a počátkem září 1938 plánovaný termín chystané německé akce proti Československu. Dojít k němu mělo 25. září 1938.68 Z komparace s klíčovou dokumentací OKW plyne, že čas kolem 25. září byl vskutku exponovaný, neboť na půlnoc z 27. na 28. září byl stanoven začátek platnosti nástupu Grün ve znění pro nové mobilizační období 1938/1939.69 Říšský kancléř uvedl v konceptu nového znění nástupu z 18. června 1938, že s akcí proti Československu počítá od 1. října téhož roku.70 To ale vůbec neznamenalo, že k zahájení
65 Tamtéž, inv. č. 236, č. j. 119 – Taj. HV./oper. 1938 z 25. září 1938, osobní a tajná směrnice č. 1.
66 ADAP, Serie D, Bd. II, dok. č. 448, s. 580. Viz též: IMT, Volume XXV, s. 465.
67 Příčiny analyzoval dosud nejpodrobněji: S. KOKOŠKA, Československé vojenské zpravodajství, s. 99-101.
68 SHD/DAT, 7 N 2523, d. 2, Source Z, 23, 25 août, 5 septembre 1938. Zisk těchto zpráv významně reflektují též: Maurice GAUCHÉ, Le Deuxième bureau au travail 1935-1940. Amiot-Dumont, Paris 1953, s. 70; L. RIVET, Carnets du chef des services secrets, s. 230.
69 IMT, Volume XXV, s. 451-454.
70 Tamtéž, s. 445-446.
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operací nemůže dojít již o něco dříve.71 Ze stejného zdroje pocházely též informace o plánovaném nasazení 1. tankové divize a 1. lehké divize německého pozemního vojska na hlavním útočném směru Plzeň – Praha. H.-T. Schmidt sdělil řadu konkrétních časových a prostorových údajů o plánovaném nástupu těchto vyšších jednotek k československým státním hranicím. Obsah těchto zpráv odpovídal reálným plánovacím opatřením OKW. Na tomto místě je nutné klást si otázku, proč francouzská strana zamlčela své poznatky před československými partnery. Vysvětlení je nutno hledat v tom, že tehdejší mezispojenecký styk v oblasti vojenského zpravodajství byl již zásadně podmíněn francouzskou zahraniční politikou. V září 1938 se podřídila určující politice usmiřování Německa, kterou prakticky za každou cenu prosazovala vláda Velké Británie. Oznámit do Prahy ožehavou zprávu, která dokazovala skutečnou podstatu Hitlerových záměrů, by znamenalo především vážně narušit politiku Západu vůči Třetí říši. Československý prezident a vláda by takto získala pádný argument pro neústupnost vůči vyhroceným nacistickým požadavkům. Francouzská vláda by za těchto okolností politicky mnohem hůře opouštěla stále platné spojenecké závazky. Právě v tom tkvěl rozhodující důvod nenaplnění mezispojenecké spolupráce v oblasti vojenského zpravodajství právě v nejkritičtějším období.72
Dílčí závěr
Německo tvořilo vzhledem ke svým geopolitickým dispozicím, ekonomické a populační síle i velmocenským aspiracím, byť načas omezeným, hlavní potenciální zdroj ohrožení meziválečného Československa. Koncepční a soustředěné úsilí československého vojenského zpravodajství směřovalo proti němu ale až zhruba v posledních čtyřech letech před Mnichovem. Do této skutečnosti se promítla celá řada politicko-diplomatických ohledů, hledisek, hospodářských zájmů a také neopominutelný faktor oteplení v mezinárodních vztazích, typický pro druhou polovinu dvacátých let. Počátky změn se začaly projevovat až s eskalací německého revizionismu, jež byla jedním z hlavních symptomů obecné hospodářské a politické krize počátku třicátých let. Podstatné je, že československé vojenské zpravodajství objektivně správně identifikovalo nacismus již v té době jako naprosto zásadní hrozbu pro bezpečnost státu. Důležitý aspekt spočíval v tom, že tak ale činilo věcně a bez předpojatosti v hodnotících závěrech. Z hlediska mezinárodního srovnání nebyl takový přístup vůbec běžný a samozřejmý. Zpravodajský aparát se také poměrně rychle vyrovnal s naléhavou nutností přeorientovat hlavní úsilí z dříve preferovaného Maďarska na Německo. Správně si také uvědomoval, že nacistická ideologie se stávala po lednu 1933 nejen nosnou ideou německé vnitřní a zahraniční politiky, ale že jí byly stále silněji podřizovány i veškeré branné síly. Československé vojenské zpravodajství dokázalo do roku 1938 poměrně úspěšně sledovat obecné sílení německé branné moci v celku a v řadě ohledů i ve značných podrobnostech. Do roku 1936 mělo též k dispozici důležité indicie, které podstatně vypovídaly o celkové německé vojenské strategii. V letech 1937 a 1938 jeho výsledky v této oblasti ale stagnovaly. To mělo limitující vliv mimo jiné na odhady celkových mobilizačních schopností německé branné moci a konkrétních záměrů německého velení. Rezervy v této oblasti se velmi
71 Tamtéž, s. 450.
72 K poznatkům francouzského vojenského zpravodajství o přípravách německé branné moci na napadení Československa blíže: K. STRAKA, The Covert Connections of an Asymmetrical Alliance, s. 36-42.
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neblaze projevily v souvislosti s přijetím konkrétních obranných opatření v září 1938, kdy se tehdejší nástupový plán polní armády československé branné moci objektivně rozcházel s německou koncepcí válečného napadení Československa.
72
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NÁSTUPOVÝ PLÁN ČESKOSLOVENSKÉ ARMÁDY V ZÁŘÍ 1938
V československé meziválečné armádě se plán seskupení jednotlivých svazků po provedené mobilizaci označoval jako nástupový plán. Tento plán obsahoval veškeré potřebné údaje k vedení boje v prvních dnech válečného konfliktu a označoval se římskými číslicemi. Na podzim 1938 měla československá armáda připravený nástupový plán VII, podle kterého se rozmisťovala po vyhlášení mobilizace 23. září 1938. A právě o rekonstrukci tohoto plánu bych se v této kapitole chtěl pokusit.
Úvodem je třeba říct, že nástupové plány československé armády z třicátých let 20. století se nedochovaly. Staré nástupové plány byly při nahrazení novými likvidovány a jejich případně ponechané části byly zničeny nejpozději v noci ze 14. na 15. března 1939 před příchodem německých okupantů. Ve stejné době byl zřejmě zlikvidován i poslední nástupový plán VII. Nenávratně tak zmizely veškeré základní podklady, z nichž se dalo vycházet. Tím lze také vysvětlit, že v početné literatuře o vojenských aspektech mnichovské krize najdeme o nástupových plánech československé armády v roce 1938 jen stručné obecné údaje, ale žádné podrobnosti.
Přes zničení základních dokumentů je myslím možné československý nástupový plán VII aspoň částečně zrekonstruovat, a to na základě těchto zdrojů:
1) Služební předpis „Nástupové plány“ vydaný roku 1938 a dochovaný, byť v nekompletní podobě, ve VÚA-VHA.1
2) Rozkazy a telegramy, jimiž byl 25. září 1938 vyhlášen nástupový plán a jeho varianta, které se dochovaly rovněž ve VÚA-VHA.2
3) Spisy Hlavního velitelství mobilizované armády ze září 1938, v nichž se objevují zmínky o původních prostorech soustředění vybraných svazků mobilizované armády, které se opět dochovaly ve VÚA-VHA.3
4) Vzpomínkové práce bývalých důstojníků operačního oddělení Hlavního štábu československé meziválečné armády, především plk. gšt. Josefa Fetky.4
1 VÚA-VHA, f. Sbírka služebních knih branné moci – předpis Sm XXI z roku 1938.
2 VÚA-VHA, f. Velitelství Palacký, kart. 1, inv. č. 47 a 48.
3 Tamtéž, kart. 1, inv. č. 20; tamtéž, kart. 6, inv. č. 232 a 234 – Velitelství Tyl; tamtéž, kart. 2, inv. č. 52.
4 Jde o dva Fetkovy rukopisy nazvané „Československá armáda v roce 1938 do Mnichova“ a „Československá válečná armáda 1918-1939“. První z nich je uložen ve VÚA-VHA, druhý zůstal v držení rodiny, byl vydán knižně (Josef FETKA, Československá válečná armáda 1918-1939. Mladá fronta, Praha 2015) a odkazy v následujících poznámkách jsou na toto knižní vydání.
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Právě ze vzpomínek plk. J. Fetky pochází obecné údaje o nástupovém plánu VII a jeho předchůdcích, které se objevují v literatuře. Od 15. února 1938 platil pro československou armádu nástupový plán VI, který věnoval hlavní pozornost obraně proti německému útoku, menší síly byly vyčleněny proti maďarskému útoku. V případě Rakouska se nevylučovalo, že německá armáda může využít jeho území proti Československu. A právě okupace Rakouska v březnu 1938 si vynutila provést od dubna změny v nástupovém plánu, který byl označen jako VI-A. Došlo k úpravě sestavy jednotek zajišťujících hranice a k soustředění většího počtu záložních svazků na jižní Moravě. Od 15. července 1938 pak začal platit nový nástupový plán VII. Ten již počítal s dočasnou obranou na linii Vltavy a na ní navazujícího Labe. Dlouhodobější obrana se plánovala na Českomoravské vrchovině, a pokud by se nepodařilo protivníka zadržet, měly československé síly ustoupit na Moravu a opřít se o Karpaty, případně Javorníky. Zde se předvídala houževnatá obrana až do zvratu válečné situace a protiofenzivy v rámci spojeneckých sil.5
V srpnu 1938 byl nástupový plán VII doplněn variantou, která spočívala v soustředění vybraných záložních svazků blíže k hlavnímu obrannému postavení v Čechách a měla být reakcí na možnost, kdyby se Německo rozhodlo jen pro obsazení pohraničních oblastí Čech a Moravy. Varianta představovala doplněk nástupového plánu a připojila se k němu jako zvláštní příloha. Právě z pořadového čísla přílohy XIII vzniklo označení „varianta XIII“, které se dostalo i do oficiálních dokumentů.6
K vyhlášení nástupového plánu a jeho varianty došlo 25. září 1938 dopoledne hesly „Vydejte nástupový plán v zelených obalech“ a „Proveďte variantu podle přílohy XIII“.7 Vzápětí však následoval další rozkaz, který dále upravoval prostory soustředění a výslovně uváděl, aby „byla provedena varianta XIII nástupového plánu s těmito změnami“.8 A následovaly ještě další rozkazy. Československá armáda tak neprováděla nástup podle původního nástupového plánu VII, ani podle původní varianty tohoto plánu, nýbrž podle upravené varianty. Rekonstrukce se tak rozpadá na tři různé části: původní nástupový plán, jeho původní variantu a prováděnou upravenou variantu.
Co zůstalo ve všech třech případech stejné, bylo rozložení svazků bránících hlavní obranné postavení, tj. hranice, a také rozdělení na čtyři samostatné armády. První armáda v Čechách měla zadržovat protivníka a pod tlakem ustupovat na východ. Druhá armáda na severní Moravě a čtvrtá armáda na jižní Moravě měly bránit hranice aspoň do doby, než se první armádě podaří ustoupit. Zbývající třetí armáda na Slovensku a Podkarpatské Rusi měla držet toto území a dále kontakt se spojenci na východě. Část divizí a také dvě velitelství sborů tvořila zálohu hlavního velitele rozloženou především na Českomoravské vrchovině, jihovýchodní Moravě a západním Slovensku (viz mapu č. 1).9
A právě především divizí ze zálohy hlavního velitele se týkaly změny související s variantou nástupového plánu. Díky dochovaným rozkazům nařizujícím její provedení
5 J. FETKA, Československá válečná armáda 1918-1939, s. 75, 78, 90; TÝŽ, Československá armáda v roce 1938 do Mnichova, s. 93.
6 Tamtéž, s. 46; TÝŽ, Československá válečná armáda 1918-1939, s. 95, 122-123. Z předpisu „Nástupové plány“ vyplývá, že ve směrnicích pro armády byla varianta jako příloha XIII, ve směrnicích pro sbory jako příloha X a ve směrnicích pro divize jako příloha VII.
7 VÚA-VHA, f. Velitelství Palacký, kart. 1, inv. č. 47 a 48.
8 Tamtéž, kart. 6, inv. č. 232. Publikováno v: Dokumenty československé armády z podzimu 1938. Rozkazy hlavního velitelství od 24. do 28. září. Edd. Pavel MINAŘÍK – Pavel ŠRÁMEK. HaV 1996, č. 5, s. 83-110, zde s. 87-92.
9 J. FETKA, Československá válečná armáda 1918-1939, s. 121-122; TÝŽ, Československá armáda v roce 1938 do Mnichova, s. 93-95.
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víme, kterých svazků se týkala. Jednalo se o dvě velitelství armád, tři velitelství sborů a sedm divizí.10 Zatímco u velitelství armád a sborů varianta podle mého názoru znamenala jen změny v seznamu podřízených svazků, u divizí šlo o změny v jejich dislokaci (viz tabulku č. 1). Protože jsme ze zdrojů zmíněných v úvodu schopni pro většinu z nich určit aspoň přibližně původně plánované prostory, vidíme, že došlo k posunu blíže hranici, především západním směrem (viz mapu č. 2).
Československá armáda však, jak již bylo řečeno, svou nástupovou sestavu po vyhlášení mobilizace dále upravovala. Řada divizí tak zaujala jiné prostory než původně plánované. Vše začalo již po vypuknutí henleinovského povstání v pohraničí 13. září 1938 soustředěním tří rychlých divizí v západních a jižních Čechách a na severní Moravě. Přitom pouze část jedné rychlé divize (1. rychlá divize) byla v prostoru předvídaném nástupovým plánem.11 O týden později opustily své posádky tři mírové (pěší) divize nezajišťující obranu hranic a zaujaly nařízené prostory, který u jedné z nich (15. divize) byl shodný s nástupovým plánem. U zbývajících dvou (14. a 17. divize) se však lišil a divize dostaly po vyhlášení nástupového plánu rozkaz zůstat na nových místech, která byla více na západ oproti původním (viz tabulku č. 2).12
Už po mobilizaci byly rozkazem vyhlášeným 25. září 1938 současně s rozkazem k provedení varianty XIII změněny prostory soustředění dalších čtyř divizí (pěších). U třech (3., 5. a 19. divize) se jednalo opět o přesun více na západ, poslední divize (16. divize) na Slovensku zůstala u hranic s Polskem místo přesunu na jih Slovenska (viz tabulku č. 3).13
Dne 27. září 1938 rozhodl hlavní velitel zmobilizované armády o přesunu VI. sboru ze zálohy na Moravě do jižních Čech.14 O den později pak následoval ještě rozkaz k přesunu dvou rychlých a jedné divize (pěší) s cílem posílit obranu jižních Čech a jihozápadní Moravy. Podle něj se 2. rychlá divize přesunula na západ do prostoru Jaroměřice, 1. rychlá divize naopak na východ do prostoru Pacov. Konečně 13. divize se měla po soustředění v nástupovém prostoru přesunout na jih k Humpolci (viz tabulku č. 4).15 To byly poslední zásadní změny před přijetím Mnichovské dohody 30. září 1938 (viz mapu č. 3).16
Další podrobnosti, které jednotlivé svazy a svazky dostaly, neznáme, přestože je nástupový plán nepochybně obsahoval. Známe jen úkoly jednotlivých armád, ovšem pouze zprostředkovaně ze vzpomínkových prací. Přesto je možné udělat si představu, jak odhadovalo československé velení možný průběh války, a to na základě pramenů z podzimu 1938, konkrétně dislokace velitelství etapních okrsků. Těch bylo celkem šedesát a nacházely se v tzv. etapě, která navazovala na operační pásmo, kde měly probíhat válečné operace.17 Protože známe místa dislokace téměř všech těchto velitelství,
10 VUA-VHA, f. Velitelství Palacký, kart. 1, inv. č. 48.
11 Tamtéž, kart. 1, inv. č. 3, 4, 16.
12 Tamtéž, kart. 1, inv. č. 20 a kart. 6, inv. č. 232.
13 Tamtéž, kart. 6, inv. č. 232.
14 Tamtéž, kart. 6, inv. č. 240. Velitelství sboru mělo být ve Valašském Meziříčí. Publikováno v: Dokumenty československé armády z podzimu 1938, s. 101-104.
15 VUA-VHA, f. Velitelství Palacký, kart. 1, inv. č. 62. Publikováno v: Dokumenty československé armády z podzimu 1938, s. 104-106.
16 Došlo ještě k několika drobným místním úpravám, kdy například 14. divize se přesunula z Jihlavska do prostoru Třešť – Telč – Stonařov.
17 VUA-VHA, f. Hlavní štáb, 1. oddělení, kart. 159, sign. 32-22/33-2 a kart. 239, sign. 32-22/2-15.
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můžeme si vytvořit linii, kde československá armáda očekávala stabilizaci fronty (viz mapu č. 4).
Je vidět, že na západ od Vltavy se s žádnými etapními okrsky nepočítalo, tedy ani s delší obranou tohoto prostoru. Etapní okrsky ve středních Čechách ukazují, že se předpokládala obrana Prahy při udržení aspoň části severovýchodních Čech a jihozápadní Moravy. Z umístění etapních okrsků na severní a jižní Moravě a také na Slovensku a Podkarpatské Rusi pak vyplývá, že zde se ústup nepřipouštěl.
Po přijetí Mnichovské dohody pokračoval ještě nástup podle dřívějších rozkazů, 3. a 4. října 1938 však byly vydány první rozkazy reagující na novou situaci. Týkaly se zatím jen svazků na jihovýchodní Moravě a jihozápadním Slovensku a hlavní velitel v nich nařizoval přesun jihovýchodním a jižním směrem k posílení obrany Slovenska. Dne 6. října pak následoval rozkaz stanovující nové uskupení sil a spočívající ve všeobecném ústupu svazků v českých zemích směrem do vnitrozemí.18 Nástupový plán VII tak ztratil svůj smysl.
Z výše uvedeného je zřejmé, že nástupová sestava československé armády na konci září 1938 se lišila od nástupového plánu VII a také od jeho varianty. Pokud ji srovnáme s původní variantou XIII, vidíme, že své nástupové prostory změnilo pět z 21 divizí (pěších), tři ze čtyř rychlých divizí a jeden sbor. Pokud bychom ji srovnali s původním nástupovým plánem VII, změnilo své nástupové prostory celkem dvanáct z 21 divizí (pěších), tři ze čtyř rychlých divizí a jeden sbor. Jednalo se hlavně o přesun západním směrem a lze říct, že došlo k posunu těžiště obrany právě na západ. Jestliže podle nástupového plánu VII měly být západně od Vltavy kromě svazků bránících hranice jen dvě další divize a podle varianty XIII tři divize, nakonec zde byly čtyři divize. Naopak přestala existovat záloha z divizí na Českomoravské vrchovině.
V této souvislosti se nabízí otázka, zda nelze z popsaných změn usuzovat, že se československá armáda chystala jen na obsazení pohraničí, když vycházela z varianty nástupového plánu, která za tím účelem vznikla. Tomuto však nic nenasvědčuje. Všechny dochované dokumenty jednoznačně ukazují, že se československá armáda chystala na válečné střetnutí s Německem a Maďarskem, nikoliv jen na omezený střet v pohraničí. Varianta tedy posloužila jen jako podklad pro upravený nástup.19
Závěrem bych se chtěl pokusit o zamyšlení, jak by se asi osvědčila nástupová sestava československé armády v případné válce na podzim 1938, pokud by skutečně vypukla, a zda by nebylo výhodnější řídit se původním nástupovým plánem VII. Československé velení se totiž všemi změnami původního nástupového plánu dostalo do vleku protivníka a zcela mu přenechalo iniciativu. Nechalo si tak vnutit jeho vůli a vzdalo se možnosti držet se svých připravených plánů.20
Při hledání odpovědi můžeme vycházet ze zkušeností polské armády v září 1939, jejíž situace byla v mnohém podobná. Tehdy se mimo jiné ukázalo, že o osudu celé války se rozhodlo již v bojích o hlavní obranné postavení na hranicích, kdy německému útoku čelily postupně jednotlivé polské svazky. Zálohy soustřeďované ve vnitrozemí už
18 VÚA-VHA, f. Velitelství Palacký, kart. 2, inv. č. 160 a 174 a kart. 6, inv. č. 250.
19 Podle Josefa Fetky se nevylučovalo, že i snaha jen o obsazení pohraničí může přinést všeobecnou válku. Viz: J. FETKA, Československá armáda v roce 1938 do Mnichova, s. 87-88.
20 Zdenko MARŠÁLEK, Aus dem Blickwinkel einer Schießscharte oder aus der Perspektive der „großen“ Strategie betrachtet? Ein polemischer Blick auf die Problematik der militärischen Verteidigung der Tschechoslowakei im September 1938. In: Das Münchener Abkommen von 1938 in europäischer Perspektive. Oldenbourg Verlag, München 2013, s. 141-142.
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nedokázaly nepřátelský vpád zastavit ani výrazněji zbrzdit.21 Z tohoto pohledu se rozhodnutí posunout část záložních divizí blíže k hlavnímu obrannému postavení a svazkům, které ho bránily, jeví jako opodstatněné, i když to znamenalo rezignaci na připravené plány. Na faktu, že v osamocené válce s Německem by Československo téměř jistě podlehlo, by to ale nejspíš nic nezměnilo.
21 Piotr M. MAJEWSKI, Bojovat, či ustoupit? Možnosti obrany Československa na podzim 1938. Conditio humana – Muzeum druhé světové války v Gdaňsku, Brno 2018, s. 300-303, 308-309.
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Příloha
Tabulka č. 1 Svazek Plán VII Varianta

divize
u Berouna
u Plzně
divize
?
u Sobotky
divize
Českomoravská vrchovina
u Hradce Králové
divize
?
u Zábřehu
divize
Českomoravská vrchovina
Zásmuky – Kouřim
divize
Českomoravská vrchovina
u Prahy
divize
?
u Mutěnic
Tabulka č. 2 Svazek Plán VII Změna
rychlá divize
u Slaného
část Karlovy Vary, část u Slaného
rychlá divize
u Slavkova
Olomouc – Litovel
rychlá divize
?
Tábor – Pacov, pak Soběslav – Mezimostí
divize
u Kojetína
u Jihlavy
divize

u Senice

divize
Hranice – Lipník
Turnov – Sobotka
Tabulka č. 3 Svazek Původní Změna
divize
u Sobotky
Mšeno – Bělá pod Bezdězem – Sovínky
divize
u Horní Cerekve
Písek – Strakonice – Protivín
divize
u Pozby
Ružomberok – Žilina – Dolný Kubín
divize
u Hustopečí
Třebíč – Náměšť – Valeč
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Tabulka č. 4 Svazek Změna
rychlá divize
Pacov – Nová Cerekev – Černovice
rychlá divize
Želetava – Jaroměřice – Moravské Budějovice
divize
Pelhřimov – Humpolec – Opatov
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Mapy č. 1 až 3 zpracoval autor s využitím map z knihy: Josef FETKA, Československá válečná armáda 1918-1939. Mladá fronta, Praha 2015. Mapu č. 4 zpracoval Ivo Vondrovský.
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ZEMSKÉ VELITELSTVÍ ODBOJOVÉ ORGANIZACE OBRANA NÁRODA NA MORAVĚ V LETECH 1939 A 1940
Československý vojenský odboj za druhé světové války je problematikou, která se v posledních letech těší zvýšenému zájmu jak ze strany odborníků, tak i poučené veřejnosti. Vydané knižní monografie či časopisecké studie se však primárně zaměřují na zahraniční odboj, ať se již jedná o československé letce působící ve Francii a Velké Británii, nebo pozemní jednotky účastnící se bojů u Tobrúku, Sokolova, na Dukle či obléhání Dunkerque. Domácí vojenský odboj zatím zůstává poněkud upozaděn, přestože jeho význam byl nepopiratelný.
Předložená kapitola je věnována odbojové organizaci Obrana národa (ON), konkrétně pak jejímu zemskému velitelství na Moravě působícímu v letech 1939 a 1940. Tématem se již v minulosti více či méně zabývalo několik autorů, především pak František Vašek a Zdeněk Štěpánek ve své dvoudílné studii publikované roku 1998 ve Vlastivědném věstníku moravském.1 Její autoři však neměli k dispozici některé důležité archivní materiály uložené dnes zejména v Moravském zemském archivu v Brně a Archivu bezpečnostních složek v Praze a Kanicích. Významná je také monografie Petra Kopečného z roku 2006, která však končí zatčením zemského velitele brig. gen. Bohuslava Všetičky v Brně koncem února 1940 a následnými výslechy zatčených odbojářů a soudními procesy se již nezabývá.2 Cílem této studie je tedy rozbor činnosti zemského velitelství ON na Moravě, postupu nacistických bezpečnostních složek při odhalení jeho činnosti a následného vyšetřování i soudních procesů konaných před Lidovým soudním dvorem v Berlíně.
Vznik Obrany národa na Moravě
Již v prvních dnech po nacistické okupaci českých zemí 15. března 1939 bylo zřejmé, že v nově zřízeném protektorátu dojde k zavedení tvrdého režimu, který bude provádět národnostní, politickou i sociální perzekuci českého obyvatelstva. Tento stav byl od počátku hodnocen krajně negativně především těmi skupinami obyvatelstva, jež stály u zrodu Československé republiky v roce 1918. Jednalo se zejména o generály a vyšší důstojníky československé armády, které spojovala legionářská minulost. Nebylo
1 František VAŠEK – Zdeněk ŠTĚPÁNEK, Zvedli své hlavy mezi prvními. Příspěvek k dějinám Obrany národa na Moravě, 1. a 2. část, Vlastivědný věstník moravský 1998, č. 1, s. 14-25, č. 2, s. 113-130.
2 Petr KOPEČNÝ, Obrana národa na Brněnsku 15. 3. 1939-29. 2. 1940. Archiv města Brna, Brno 2006.
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náhodným jevem, že nejvýznamnější domácí odbojová organizace v počáteční fázi okupace vznikla právě ve vojenských kruzích. Pro velitelský sbor československé armády bylo přijetí podmínek Mnichovské dohody těžkou ranou a mnozí vojáci z povolání chápali nastalou situaci jako ztrátu životního poslání. Březnová okupace pak již pro ně představovala jen vyvrcholení negativního vývoje nastoleného událostmi podzimu 1938. Postupná likvidace armády a odevzdávání zbraní a dalšího vojenského materiálu do rukou nacistického Německa vyvolávala u vojáků pochopitelnou touhu po odvetě.
Důležitou úlohu hrála také sociální otázka. Rozpuštění česko-slovenské armády po vzniku protektorátu Čechy a Morava přineslo existenční problémy desítkám tisíc osob. Generálové a důstojníci byli nuceni – často po mnoha letech aktivní vojenské služby – hledat novou práci, což bylo pro mnohé z nich velmi obtížné. Jen malá část mohla přejít do řad vládního vojska, jež vzniklo jako protektorátní ozbrojená složka určená k „udržení vnitřní bezpečnosti a pořádku“.3 Aktivní příslušníci armády se tehdy rozdělili do dvou hlavních proudů. Část tvořená zejména mladšími ročníky odcházela do zahraničí, především do Polska a později Francie, kde se postupně vytvářely československé jednotky. Většina profesionálních vojáků však zůstala v českých zemích, a právě z jejich řad se postupně vytvořila ON.
Tato odbojová organizace začala na Moravě vznikat hned v prvních dnech po březnové okupaci. První porada důstojníků československé armády týkající se nově vzniklé situace a nutnosti na ni nějakým způsobem reagovat se v Brně konala již 19. března 1939. Jednání potom pokračovala v Praze ve dnech 22. a 23. března. Iniciátory těchto schůzek se stali arádní generálové Josef Bílý4 a Sergej Vojcechovský5 společně s div. gen. Janem Sergejem Ingrem (k němu viz též kapitolu Legionářská minulost armádního generála Jana Sergeje Ingra).6 Již během těchto porad se diskutovalo
3 K historii vládního vojska viz zejména: Miroslav KALOUSEK, Vládní vojsko 1939-1945. Vlastenci či zrádci? Libri, Praha 2002; Jindřich MAREK, Háchovi melody boys. Kronika českého vládního vojska v Itálii 1944-1945. Svět křídel, Cheb 2003.
4 Josef Bílý (1872 až 1941) sloužil od roku 1892 v c. a k. armádě a v průběhu první světové války bojoval na ruské a italské frontě. Po vzniku Československa ve vojenské kariéře pokračoval a v letech 1928 až 1935 zastával funkci zemského vojenského velitele v Praze. Hodnost armádního generála získal k 26. červnu 1931. Po okupaci se Bílý zapojil do odboje a posléze převzal funkci vrchního velitele ON. Gestapo jej zatklo 14. listopadu 1940 a po věznění v pankrácké věznici byl stanným soudem odsouzen k smrti a 28. září 1941 popraven zastřelením v jízdárně dělostřeleckých kasáren v Praze-Ruzyni. K osobnosti Josefa Bílého dosud nejpodrobněji: Michaela STROJILOVÁ, Armádní generál Josef Bílý. Bakalářská diplomová práce, FF MU, Brno 2018. Vedoucí práce Vladimír Černý.
5 Sergej Vojcechovský (1883 až 1951) pocházel z ruské šlechtické rodiny a za první světové války sloužil v carské armádě. V září 1917 se stal náčelníkem štábu československé střelecké divize, poté se zúčastnil bitvy u Bachmače a jako jeden z mála ruských důstojníků v legiích zůstal i v období bojů s bolševiky. Roku 1921 se natrvalo usadil v Československu a v jeho armádě zastával řadu významných funkcí. Hodnost armádního generála obdržel roku 1929. Po okupaci se zapojil do činnosti ON, ale posléze ustoupil do pozadí, jelikož byl pod stálým dohledem gestapa. Dne 12. května 1945 zatklo Vojcechovského v Praze komando NKVD, přestože byl československým občanem. Následovalo odvlečení do Sovětského svazu a uvěznění. Sergej Vojcechovský zemřel 7. dubna 1951 v ústřední nemocnici gulagu Ozerlag v Tajšetském okrese. Viz: Vladimír BYSTROV, Osud generála. Komentář k některým dokumentům o životě a tragickém konci Sergeje Vojcechovského. Academia, Praha 2007.
6 Jan Sergej Ingr (1894 až 1956) bojoval za první světové války na ruské frontě a v září 1915 zde padl do zajetí. Posléze se přihlásil do československých legií a bojoval nejprve v Rusku, poté ve Francii a v Itálii. Po vzniku Československa bojoval Ingr s Poláky o Těšínsko a také s Maďary
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o možnostech vzniku ilegální rezistenční organizace. V Brně pak měla z hlediska dalšího vývoje značný význam schůze v kanceláři odbočky Autoklubu koncem března 1939, kterou řídil div. gen. Antonín Hasal.7 Této schůzky se již zúčastnilo několik důstojníků, kteří následně hráli významnou úlohu při utváření moravského zemského velitelství ON. Šlo především o škpt. Čestmíra Jelínka, jehož A. Hasal představil přítomným jakožto jednoho z vedoucích činitelů vznikající odbojové organizace v Brně.8 Českoslovenští důstojníci v této době ještě působili pod Hasalovým vedením na velitelství III. sboru v likvidaci, ale posléze si museli hledat nová uplatnění. Č. Jelínek nastoupil jako úředník na Katastrálním měřickém úřadě v Brně, a přitom aktivně pracoval na organizaci odbojové činnosti. Také mnoho dalších důstojníků začalo postupně pracovat v různých úřednických pozicích.
Vznikající rezistenční organizaci nazývali vojáci nejprve Vojenské ústředí a objevil se také název Národní odboj. Termín Obrana národa začal být používán v červenci 1939 a právě pod ním vstoupila organizace do historie. Důstojníci III. sboru v čele s A. Hasalem a J. S. Ingrem začali vytvářet organizační strukturu a velmi aktivní byl tehdy plukovník Václav Lysák.9 Postupně kolem sebe soustředil skupinu spolupracovníků, kteří
na Slovensku. V armádě poté zůstal a zastával řadu různých funkcí. V letech 1936 až 1939 byl zástupcem velitele III. sboru v Brně. Po okupaci se zapojil do odboje v řadách ON, ale v červnu 1939 odešel do zahraničí a zapojil se do organizování československého zahraničního odboje. V letech 1940 až 1944 zastával funkci ministra národní obrany v československé exilové vládě a poté byl několik měsíců hlavním velitelem československé branné moci. V poválečném Československu však byl J. S. Ingr vystaven různým perzekucím a v březnu 1948 odešel do exilu podruhé. Zapojil se pak do řízení zpravodajské činnosti v rámci Rady svobodného Československa. Viz: G. SVOBODA, Armádní generál Sergěj Jan Ingr.
7 Antonín Hasal (1893 až 1960) vstoupil už v srpnu 1914 do řad České družiny v Rusku a v rámci československých legií se poté zúčastnil mnoha bojů s bolševiky. Po návratu do vlasti působil v československé armádě a od října 1934 velel III. sboru v Brně. Hodnost divizního generála obdržel k 1. lednu 1934. Po okupaci se aktivně zapojil do odboje v řadách ON, ale v březnu 1940 odešel do exilu a ve Francii se stal náčelníkem štábu Československé vojenské správy. V Británii jej poté prezident Edvard Beneš pověřil řízením Vojenské kanceláře prezidenta republiky. V letech 1945 až 1946 zastával funkci ministra dopravy a k 26. říjnu 1945 byl povýšen do hodnosti armádního generála. Po komunistickém převratu roku 1948 odešel A. Hasal do exilu podruhé a zemřel 22. dubna 1960 ve Washingtonu. Viz: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939-1945, s. 91-92.
8 Čestmír Jelínek (1902 až 1942) se narodil v Košířích. Po maturitě na české reálce v Plzni nastoupil v říjnu 1922 jako frekventant na Vojenskou akademii v Hranicích na Moravě. Po ukončení studia byl 15. srpna 1924 jmenován poručíkem dělostřelectva a současně přemístěn k dělostřeleckému pluku 152 v Olomouci. Od července 1925 sloužil u dělostřeleckého pluku 6 v Brně v různých funkcích. Od července 1933 zahájil studium na Vysoké škole válečné v Praze a po jeho úspěšném dokončení byl od srpna 1936 přidělen ke štábu 6. divize v Brně, kde pracoval do konce září. Poté nastoupil k 3. oddělení velitelství III. sboru. Zde působil až do okupace, přičemž byl k 31. červenci 1937 přeložen v hodnosti štábního kapitána do skupiny důstojníků generálního štábu. Po válce byl in memoriam povýšen do hodnosti podplukovníka. Viz: VÚA-VHA, f. Kvalifikační spisy vojenských osob – Kvalifikační spis Č. Jelínka. Jelínkův životopis zpracovaný po válce jeho vdovou Marií Jelínkovou a datovaný v Brně 7. listopadu 1945 viz: Muzeum města Brna (MMB), f. Dokumentace odboje, inv. č. 152 705.
9 Václav Lysák (1895 až 1942) pocházel z obce Trnava u Třebíče. Za první světové války bojoval v řadách c. a k. armády na východní frontě a v červnu 1916 zde přeběhl k Rusům. Poté působil v řadách československých legií a zúčastnil se nejen bitvy u Zborova, ale i ústupu Ukrajinou, následných bojů s bolševiky i střežení Transsibiřské magistrály. Po návratu do vlasti pokračoval ve vojenské kariéře, vystudoval Vysokou školu válečnou v Praze a poté sloužil ve štábu zemského
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posléze zastávali velitelská místa v rámci struktury ON na Moravě. Podle pozdějších vzpomínek některých přeživších příslušníků ON byl V. Lysák v tehdejší době „faktickým ideovým vůdcem hnutí“.10 Právě V. Lysák také pravděpodobně získal pro spolupráci brig. gen. B. Všetičku, jenž se posléze stal moravským zemským velitelem ON. B. Všetička se osobně znal již od počátku třicátých let také se škpt. Č. Jelínkem, který tehdy učil na dělostřeleckém učilišti v Olomouci, jemuž B. Všetička velel.
Osobnost brigádního generála Bohuslava Všetičky
B. Všetička již měl za sebou roku 1939 pozoruhodnou vojenskou kariéru. Pocházel z Náchoda, kde se narodil 25. září 1893. Roku 1904 vstoupil do nižší vojenské reálky v Hranicích a po jejím úspěšném absolvování byl přijat na Vojenskou technickou akademii v Mödlingu. Zde dokončil studium s vyznamenáním a 1. srpna 1914 byl jmenován poručíkem c. a k. armády. Zařazen byl jako mladší důstojník u divizního muničního parku č. 13. Nadřízení jej poté odveleli na východní frontu, kde padl již 11. září téhož roku do zajetí.11 Umístěn byl v zajateckém táboře v Krasnojarsku na Sibiři a posléze se přihlásil do vznikajícího československého vojska na Rusi. V srpnu 1916 se stal B. Všetička střelcem 1. střeleckého pluku v Kyjevě a Bělgorodu a tím začalo jeho úspěšné působení mezi legionáři. O rok později obdržel hodnost poručíka a následně vystřídal několik funkcí, než se stal starším důstojníkem u 5. dělostřelecké baterie. V této pozici se také zúčastnil prvních bojů s bolševiky u Mariinsku dne 25. května 1918.12
Po bojích v oblasti střední Sibiře a dalších úspěšných střetech legionářů s bolševickými jednotkami v prostoru jezera Bajkal byl B. Všetička jmenován 22. srpna 1918 kapitánem a velitelem 2. dělostřeleckého oddílu s přidělením u štábu východní fronty. Hodnost majora získal již 25. září a s tím bylo spojeno přemístění ke štábu jekatěrinburské skupiny (později severouralské fronty), kde zastával nejprve funkci vrchního ubytovatele a později zástupce náčelníka štábu. V těchto funkcích se podílel na všech významných bojích zmíněné skupiny včetně bitvy o Perm v prosinci 1918, jež se stala velkým úspěchem československých jednotek. K 15. lednu 1919 byl B. Všetička jmenován podplukovníkem a náčelníkem štábu československého vojska na Rusi, přičemž se zúčastnil bojových operací v prostoru od Čeljabinska po Vladivostok. Nakonec obdržel k 1. lednu 1920 plukovnickou hodnost a velel v pořadí 18. transportu ruských legionářů z Vladivostoku do vlasti. Tento transport odplul na lodi President Grant 27. dubna 1920 a 14. června dorazil do Terstu. Odtud následoval odjezd vlakem do Československa a 17. června 1920 proběhlo slavnostní uvítání v Praze.13
vojenského velitelství v Brně. Vystřídal pak několik dalších funkcí, až byl 31. prosince 1936 jmenován podnáčelníkem štábu velitelství III. sboru. Tuto funkci vykonával až do zániku československé branné moci. Roku 1946 byl in memoriam povýšen do hodnosti brigádního generála. Viz: VÚA-VHA, f. Kvalifikační listiny vojenských osob, kvalifikační spis V. Lysáka.
10 Moravské zemské muzeum Brno (MZM), historické oddělení (HO), f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 9220 – Strojopis bývalého člena ON škpt. Václava Kratochvíla nadepsaný Činnost oblastního velitelství Obrany národa Morava – západ, s. 1.
11 VÚA-VHA, f. Kvalifikační listiny vojenských osob, kvalifikační spis B. Všetičky, část I, přehled činnosti a služební zařazení.
12 Richard ŠVANDA, Tři osudy, dvě války, jedno město. Vlastním nákladem, Náchod 2016, s. 48.
13 Tamtéž, s. 50-58.
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Mladá republika potřebovala zkušené důstojníky a B. Všetička proto zůstal v armádě i nadále. Nejprve velel 25. lehké dělostřelecké brigádě a poté byl k 15. únoru 1925 jmenován velitelem 4. polní dělostřelecké brigády v Hradci Králové, kde působil s přestávkou až do září 1930. Hodnost brigádního generála získal k 1. květnu 1928. V letech 1930 až 1932 byl velitelem dělostřeleckého učiliště v Olomouci a od 15. prosince 1932 převzal velení dělostřelectva u Zemského vojenského velitelství v Brně. Zde působil až do 15. října 1937, kdy se stal zatímním velitelem nově se tvořící 15. divize v Trenčíně a od 1. ledna 1938 převzal její velení definitivně. V této funkci jej také zastihla zářijová branná pohotovost státu.
Pokud jde o Všetičkovy velitelské schopnosti, nadřízení jej v dochovaných úředních materiálech hodnotili vesměs kladně. Generál A. Hasal například v hodnocení datovaném 22. listopadu 1937 použil slova „velmi schopný, samostatný, svědomitý, velmi pracovitý, snaživý, pilný, přesný, důkladný. Neobyčejně iniciativní s vysoce vyvinutým smyslem pro povinnost a odpovědnost.“14 Dále zde uvedl, že B. Všetička je „[…] značného nadání, velmi dobré paměti. Duševně svěží, velmi pružný, hloubavý, praktický. Soudnost, představivost a nadání usnadňují mu řešení každého problému a situace“.15 Během své vojenské služby byl také gen. B. Všetička dekorován celou řadu vyznamenání. Jmenovat lze například ruský Řád svaté Anny II. stupně udělený roku 1918, v následujícím roce to byl Válečný kříž řádu M. R. Štefánika a také britský Distinguished Service Order. V roce 1920 pak následoval francouzský Válečný kříž s palmou a revoluční medaile, kterou převzal z rukou tehdejšího ministra národní obrany Františka Udržala. V roce 1921 získal B. Všetička Válečný kříž, o dva roky později kříž Rytíře Čestné legie a Československou medaili Vítězství, kterou mu osobně předal prezident T. G. Masaryk.16
Kriticky byly po určitou dobu hodnoceny pouze Všetičkovy rodinné poměry. Z Ruska si totiž přivezl družku Klaudii rozenou Lyseckou, s níž se v červnu 1921 oženil. Manželství však nebylo šťastné a zmínky o tom se objevily i v hodnocení nadřízených. Zemský vojenský velitel v Brně div. gen. Eduard Kadlec například situaci popsal 29. prosince 1936 takto: „Jeho [Všetičkovy, pozn. autora] soukromé poměry in puncto manželství jsou v nepořádku. Nevede se ženou společnou domácnost na podkladě vzájemného ujednání, vyvolaného inkonduitou ženy; tato dává potravu pověstem velmi urážlivým pro generála Všetičku pohybujícím se ve směru, že jeho žena se dává vydržovati třetími osobami, a to s vědomím generála Všetičky. Generál Všetička mnou stran toho služebně interpelován vyjádřil se v tom smyslu, že jeho žena neposkytuje mu zbraně k zahájení rozvodového procesu v té míře, jak by si on sám přál; ve skutečnosti podporuje svou ženu slušně, což právě jeho finanční situaci činí dosti prekérní“.17 Manželství nakonec skončilo roku 1937 rozvodem a B. Všetička se v následujícím roce oženil s Miladou rozenou Malou, kterou poznal v Brně v době, kdy zde velel dělostřelectvu u ZVV.18
14 VÚA-VHA, f. Kvalifikační listiny vojenských osob, kvalifikační spis B. Všetičky, část II, vložka za kvalifikační rok 1937.
15 Tamtéž.
16 Soukromý archiv Vladimíra Černého, fotokopie strojopisu Milady Všetičkové nadepsaného Div. generál Ing. Bohuslav Všetička. Datován v Brně 19. srpna 1995.
17 VÚA-VHA, f. Kvalifikační listiny vojenských osob, kvalifikační spis B. Všetičky, část II, vložka za kvalifikační rok 1938.
18 Milada Všetičková (1916 až 2008), rozená Malá, se narodila v Brně a v tomto městě prožila prakticky celý život. Její otec Cyril Malý (1880 až 1947) pracoval u státních železničních drah
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Výběr gen. B. Všetičky pro funkci zemského velitele ON nebyl náhodný. Před okupací působil v Brně několik let ve funkci velitele dělostřelectva ZVV, díky čemuž byl dobře obeznámen se zdejší situací a většinu důstojníků stojících u zrodu ON znal osobně. Značný respekt si také vydobyl v období mobilizace jakožto velitel 15. divize. Po okupaci žil opětně v Brně, kde absolvoval zemědělský kurz pro přeškolení důstojníků při Vysoké škole zemědělské a od července 1939 pracoval jako vrchní administrativní rada v Zemské donucovací pracovně.
Budování struktury zemského velitelství
První schůzka generálů B. Všetičky a J. S. Ingra proběhla 6. dubna 1939.19 Oba tehdy kritizovali rozhodnutí československých politiků přijmout podmínky Mnichovské dohody a z tohoto pohledu se stavěli kriticky také k některým vedoucím představitelům armády. Ve svých plánech počítali s tím, že v dohledné době dojde k vypuknutí války, v níž bude Německo nakonec převahou spojenecké koalice poraženo. Proto pokládali za nutné vytvořit organizaci, která by v závěrečné fázi této války převzala v českých zemích moc. Tato organizace by také eventuálně zabránila komunistické revoluci, se kterou tehdy představitelé armádních odbojových kruhů počítali jeho s možnou eventualitou budoucího vývoje. J. S. Ingr proto informoval B. Všetičku o obsahu jednání na předchozích poradách v Praze a v Brně a pověřil jej zpracováním návrhu na výstavbu ilegální vojenské odbojové organizace na Moravě.20
B. Všetička se tohoto úkolu ujal a za pomoci plk. V. Lysáka a škpt. Č. Jelínka vypracoval koncept, který předpokládal postupné vytvoření hierarchizované struktury v podobě zemského velitelství a jemu podléhajících krajských, okresních a místních velitelství. Návrh vycházel z tehdejšího správního rozdělení Moravy, takže krajů mělo být celkem šest. J. S. Ingr s obsahem tohoto návrhu souhlasil a B. Všetička byl vyzván, aby ihned zahájil přípravy k jeho postupné realizaci.21 V. Lysák s Č. Jelínkem začali do přípravné činnosti zapojovat další důstojníky, většinou příslušníky likvidační komise
a v letech 1929 až 1935 byl poslancem Národního shromáždění za národně socialistickou stranu. Z manželství Bohuslava a Milady Všetičkových se narodily dvě děti, jejichž osud byl tragický. Dcera Zlata (nar. 20. dubna 1939) zemřela ve věku 19 let na zhoubnou nemoc, syn Aleš (nar. 17. října 1940) zemřel ve věku pěti měsíců na zánět plic v brněnské Zemské nemocnici. Po smrti obou svých dětí se paní Všetičková celý život věnovala péči o zachování památky svého manžela a jeho spolupracovníků z řad ON. Pozůstalost gen. B. Všetičky (korespondenci, vojenské sako s výložkami v hodnosti brigádního generála, válečná vyznamenání atd.) věnovala na sklonku života do sbírek Muzea města Brna a vždy byla také ochotna pomoci badatelům, kteří se o osud odbojářů z ON zajímali. Jedním z nich byl i autor této studie, který měl možnost v letech 2000 a 2001 několikrát paní M. Všetičkovou navštívit v jejím bytě na Bieblově ulici v Brně. Viz: Internetová encyklopedie dějin Brna, heslo Milada Všetičková (dostupné elektronicky: https://encyklopedie.brna.cz/home-mmb/?acc=profil_osobnosti&load=442 [citováno k 20. září 2019]).
19 Tuto informaci obsahuje i obžalovací spis zpracovaný vrchním státním žalobcem při Lidovém soudním dvoře v Berlíně č. 12 J 68/40 g proti Všetičkově skupině, viz: ABS, f. 141 (Německé soudy v říši), sign. 141-237-6, s. 13-14.
20 P. KOPEČNÝ, Obrana národa na Brněnsku, s. 25.
21 Obsah rozhovoru mezi J. S. Ingrem a B. Všetičkou je podrobně rozebrán v obžalobě vrchního státního zástupce při Lidovém soudním dvoře, viz: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-237-6, s. 27-33.
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III. sboru v Brně, z nichž měl pro činnost zemského velitelství značný význam zejména kpt. gšt. Jaroslav Gardavský.22
Mezitím došlo v průběhu dubna a května 1939 k vytvoření hlavního centrálního vojenského velitelství ON v Praze v čele s arm. gen. J. Bílým. Zde přitom stáli u zrodu ON důstojníci působící v rámci likvidační skupiny někdejšího ministerstva národní obrany. Zemským velitelem v Čechách byl jmenován bývalý velitel dělostřelectva 3. armády div. gen. Hugo Vojta.23 Postupně tak došlo k vytváření rozsáhlé rezistenční organizace, která měla pokrýt celé území protektorátu. Pražské vedení ON přitom úzce spolupracovalo s vedením moravským a všechny významné kroky byly vzájemně konzultovány na mnoha společných setkáních a poradách.
Na Moravě probíhalo budování základní velitelské struktury ON do července 1939. Důležitou událostí se stal v této souvislosti odchod gen. J. S. Ingra do zahraničí. Generál bydlel v Brně v budově Zemského velitelství a po březnové okupaci jej příležitostně sledovala policie. Přesto se mu dařilo krýt svou odbojovou činnost a aktivně působit při vytváření základní odbojové sítě.24 Na základě pokynu od Edvarda Beneše pak J. S. Ingr 20. června 1939 odešel do zahraničí, což podle dochovaných hlášení vyvolalo u protektorátních policejních složek rozruch. Hlášení datované 20. července 1939 konstatovalo, že „[…] pátrání po nezvěstném generálu Sergěji Ingrovi bylo bezvýsledné. Generál Ingr jest dosud hlášen policejně v Brně, Kounicova č. 73. Tento dům je bývalé vojenské velitelství, dřívější nájemci jsou z něho vystěhováni. Proto se nedalo zjistiti, kdy nebo kam se generál Ingr přestěhoval. Nepodařilo se také zjistiti nějakou osobu, která by mohla dáti informace o jeho nynějším pobytu.“25 Moravský zemský prezident JUDr. Jaroslav Caha pak případ o týden později uzavřel s tím, že „pátrání po shora
22 Jaroslav Gardavský (1906 až 1942) pocházel z Holešova. Po maturitě na reálném gymnáziu v Brně zahájil studium na Vojenské akademii v Hranicích, kde byl v červenci 1928 slavnostně vyřazen jako poručík dělostřelectva. Od října téhož roku nastoupil jako frekventant do aplikační dělostřelecké školy v Olomouci, kde studium úspěšně dokončil v červenci 1929. Poté nastoupil službu u dělostřeleckého pluku 6 v Brně a působil zde až do listopadu 1935. Následovalo studium na Vysoké škole válečné v Praze a po jeho ukončení byl J. Gardavský od 19. dubna 1938 přidělen k velitelství III. sboru v Brně, kde vykonával nejprve funkci přednosty materielní skupiny 4. oddělení a po Mnichovu funkci přednosty výcvikové skupiny 3. oddělení štábu. Po březnové okupaci se až do konce září 1939 podílel na likvidačních pracích u bývalého velitelství III. sboru a mezitím se zapojil do odbojových aktivit. Po válce byl in memoriam povýšen do hodnosti podplukovníka. Viz: VÚA-VHA, f. Kvalifikační listiny vojenských osob, kvalifikační spis J. Gardavského.
23 Hugo Vojta (1885 až 1941) se narodil v Táboře. Po maturitě na české reálce v Českých Budějovicích studoval tři semestry na České vysoké škole technické, ale studium předčasně ukončil. Poté pracoval jako úředník Zemského finančního ředitelství v Praze a za první světové války bojoval na italské i ruské frontě, kde v červnu 1916 přeběhl k Rusům. Poté sloužil v československých legiích a zúčastnil se mnoha bojů s bolševiky. V armádě zůstal i po návratu do vlasti a prošel pak mnoha funkcemi, přičemž hodnost divizního generála obdržel k 1. lednu 1934. V letech 1930 až 1939 byl Vojta velitelem dělostřelectva u ZVV v Bratislavě. Po okupaci se zapojil do organizování vojenského odboje. Zatčen gestapem byl v Praze 13. února 1940 a po věznění v pankrácké věznici jej stanný soud odsoudil 28. září 1941 k smrti. Zastřelen byl ještě téhož dne společně s arm. gen. J. Bílým na dvoře ruzyňských kasáren. Viz: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939-1945, s. 324.
24 G. SVOBODA, Armádní generál Sergěj Jan Ingr, s. 32-36.
25 Moravský zemský archiv Brno (MZA), f. B 26 (Policejní ředitelství Brno), kart. 545 – Hlášení dr. Polácha presidiu Zemského úřadu v Brně č. 18 858/V z 20. července 1939.
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jmenovaném nemělo ve zdejším obvodě kladného účinku“.26 V této době však již byl J. S. Ingr mimo území protektorátu a do zahraničí se mu podařilo odejít přes Polsko. Jeho nástupcem v ON měl být div. gen. Ondřej Mézl, který se po zániku československé branné moci usadil v Tovačově.27 Zde s ním také B. Všetička a V. Lysák navázali první kontakty. O. Mézl se následně přestěhoval do brněnské čtvrti Bystrc a po emigraci generála J. S. Ingra se stal novým zástupcem Moravy v pražském centrálním velitelství ON.
Organizační struktura ON vznikala postupně během schůzek jak v soukromých bytech jejích předáků, tak i v restauracích, parcích apod. Mezi nejdůležitější taková místa patřila v Brně kavárna Muzeum, dále restaurace U Kozáků v Žabovřeskách, Besední dům v Králově Poli a Lidový dům v Husovicích. Vedle V. Lysáka či Č. Jelínka byl při organizování těchto schůzek aktivní zejména plk. Ladislav Kotík, který se stal další významnou osobností moravského zemského velitelství ON.28 Postupně došlo tímto způsobem k rozmístění všech důležitých funkcí. ON na Moravě tedy řídilo zemské velitelství v čele s brig. gen. B. Všetičkou, jehož náčelníkem štábu byl nejprve plk. V. Lysák a od konce května 1939 plk. L. Kotík. Změna v této funkci proběhla v souvislosti s příliš „dravou“ povahou plk. V. Lysáka, který však po svém odvolání nadále působil v rámci ON jako zástupce velitele oblasti Brno-západ.29 V čele zpravodajského oddělení stanul škpt. Č. Jelínek, organizačního oddělení se ujal
26 Tamtéž – Zpráva JUDr. Cahy datovaná 27. července 1939.
27 Ondřej Mézl (1887 až 1968) pocházel z Klopotovic v okrese Prostějov. Po maturitě na české reálce v Kroměříži studoval na České vysoké škole technické v Brně, ale studium po šesti semestrech ukončil. Po vypuknutí první světové války bojoval na ruské frontě a v dubnu 1915 zde padl do zajetí. V řadách 1. srbské dobrovolnické divize se zúčastnil bojů v Dobrudži a od prosince 1916 sloužil v československých legiích, s nimiž se zúčastnil mnoha bojů s Němci i bolševiky. Po návratu do vlasti zůstal v armádě a zastával různé funkce. V letech 1925 až 1929 byl O. Mézl československým vojenským atašé v Bělehradu. Hodnost divizního generála obdržel k 7. březnu 1936 a poté se stal velitelem VI. sboru v Košicích. Za branné pohotovosti státu v září 1938 vykonával O. Mézl funkci velitele hraničního pásma XVI. Po okupaci se zapojil do odbojových aktivit, ale vzhledem k hrozícímu zatčení odešel v lednu 1940 z protektorátu do Francie. Poté se stal velitelem československé vojenské mise na Středním východě. Od dubna 1944 pak byl velitelem československé vojenské mise u SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force). Po skončení druhé světové války se však uznání nedočkal a na podzim 1945 byl penzionován. Po únoru 1948 odešel gen. O. Mézl do exilu, nejprve v Británii a posléze v USA. Zemřel 6. září 1968 v Norh Hollywood v Kalifornii. Viz: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939-1945, s. 195-196.
28 Ladislav Kotík (1896 až 1942) pocházel z Lipníku nad Bečvou. Roku 1912 odešel za svým bratrem Cyrilem do Francie a začal zde studovat obchodní školu. Studium však přerušilo vypuknutí první světové války a L. Kotík vstoupil 28. srpna 1914 jako dobrovolník do Cizinecké legie, v jejíž řadách bojoval na západní frontě, dále během bojů o Dardanely a na frontě soluňské. V dubnu 1918 byl převelen zpět do Francie a v červnu zahájil službu u 21. střeleckého pluku československých legií. Po návratu do vlasti pokračoval ve vojenské kariéře. Po studiích na Vysoké škole válečné v Praze zde začal působit nejprve jako pomocný učitel a od 1. října 1924 jakožto řádný profesor. Hodnost plukovníka generálního štábu obdržel L. Kotík k 1. lednu 1931. Uznání si získal také jako autor odborných vojenských spisů. Od září 1934 velel 30. pěšímu pluku v Michalovcích na východním Slovensku a po vyhlášení slovenské samostatnosti 14. března 1939 se zde krátce podílel na odražení maďarské agrese v rámci konfliktu označovaného termínem „malá vojna“. Koncem března pak přijel L. Kotík do Brna, kde působil jako důstojník k likvidaci velitelství III. sboru. Roku 1946 byl in memoriam povýšen do hodnosti brigádního generála. Viz: VÚA-VHA, f. Kvalifikační listiny vojenských osob, kvalifikační spis L. Kotíka.
29 Vladimír ČERNÝ, Geneze úvodní fáze protinacistického odboje na Brněnsku (březen 1939-září 1941). Rigorózní práce, Historický ústav FF MU, Brno 2003, s. 23.
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kpt. J. Gardavský. S různými úkoly pak působili v rámci zemského velitelství další důstojníci a zdravotní službu řídil MUDr. Jan Vignati.30
V průběhu května 1939 probíhalo postupné budování velitelství jednotlivých podřízených krajů, kterých zemské velení určilo původně celkem šest (Brno-město, Brno-venkov, Olomouc, Jihlava, Uherské Hradiště a Moravská Ostrava). Takové rozdělení však vykazovalo určitou těžkopádnost například v oblasti dopravy a také kontakty mezi centrem a jednotlivými kraji byly komplikované. Proto byla Morava nakonec rozdělena podle tvaru území v rámci protektorátních hranic na dvě oblasti, a to Moravu-západ a Moravu-východ. Z taktických důvodů později ještě došlo k menší změně názvů na oblast západní s velitelstvím v Brně a oblast východní s centrem v Olomouci. Toto rozčlenění odráželo původní rozmístění velitelství v rámci sborů československé armády.31
Dokud neproběhlo přesné určení velitelských funkcí, byl velitelem oblasti Morava-západ plk. V. Lysák. Poté funkci převzal brig. gen. František Slunečko32 a V. Lysák se
30 MUDr. Jan Vignati (1899 až 1942) pocházel z Přerova. Zde také absolvoval prvních pět tříd gymnázia a poslední tři roky studoval ve Valašském Meziříčí. Na podzim 1917 složil válečnou maturitu, když již od března tohoto roku vykonával vojenskou službu u dělostřelectva na ruské frontě. Bojoval také v Itálii a v roce 1919 se zúčastnil bojů s maďarskými bolševiky na Slovensku. V letech 1919 až 1924 studoval na Lékařské fakultě Masarykovy univerzity v Brně a po promoci pracoval od prosince 1924 v mikrobiologickém ústavu prof. J. Kabelíka v Olomouci. Dne 1. března 1930 byl MUDr. Vignati jmenován prosektorem Zemské nemocnice v Uherském Hradišti, kde působil až do svého zatčení gestapem 1. března 1940. Byl autorem celkem 35 vědeckých prací z oborů chemoterapie, bakteriologie, sérologie a koloidní chemie uveřejněných v českých, britských, francouzských a německých odborných časopisech. Po zatčení věznili nacisté MUDr. J. Vignatiho v několika věznicích v Brně i Německu a 18. listopadu 1941 byl Lidovým soudním dvorem odsouzen k smrti. Poprava byla vykonána v Berlíně-Plötzensee 26. srpna 1942. Viz: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 638 – Strojopis L. Bočka nadepsaný MUDr. Jan Vignati v německém vězení. Xerokopie strojopisných přepisů motáků a dopisů MUDr. J. Vignatiho z vězení viz: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 553.
31 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 9220 – Strojopis bývalého člena ON škpt. Václava Kratochvíla nadepsaný Činnost oblastního velitelství Obrany národa Morava – západ, s. 2-3.
32 František Slunečko (1886 až 1963) se narodil v Mladé Vožici, okres Tábor. Po maturitě na české vyšší reálce v Českých Budějovicích absolvoval šest semestrů na České vysoké škole technické v Praze, ale studia posléze zanechal. Po vypuknutí první světové války bojoval na ruské frontě, kde padl 21. prosince 1914 do zajetí. Od prosince 1916 pak sloužil v československých legiích, přičemž se zúčastnil řady bojových střetnutí s Němci a posléze bolševiky. Po návratu do vlasti zůstal v armádě a v listopadu 1922 byl jmenován velitelem pěšího pluku 8 v Českém Těšíně. V této funkci sloužil až do druhé poloviny ledna 1929, načež převzal velení 16. pěší brigády v Místku. Hodnost brigádního generála obdržel k 16. červenci 1929. V první polovině třicátých let zastával F. Slunečko funkci zástupce velitele ZVV v Košicích, poté velel 12. pěší brigádě ve Znojmě. Po epizodním působení ve funkci zástupce velitele 6. divize pak od počátku května 1938 stál v čele 2. skupiny v Jihlavě a tuto funkci vykonával i za branné pohotovosti státu. Po Mnichovu nastoupil k velitelství III. sboru v Brně. F. Slunečko byl jediným velitelem první garnitury ON, který nepadl do rukou gestapa ani neodešel do zahraničí. V ilegalitě působil od 2. prosince 1939 do vypuknutí Pražského povstání. Roku 1944 se postavil do čela vojenského velitelství ALEX a mj. spolupracoval s paraskupinou BARIUM. Jako vedoucí představitel Ústředního národního výboru se pokusil sjednotit odbojové proudy pod svým velením, ale tento plán nevyšel. Po osvobození obdržel F. Slunečko 1. srpna 1945 hodnost divizního generála, ale vzhledem ke svému věku byl počátkem června 1946 penzionován. Komunistický režim jej perzekvoval a na přelomu let 1948 a 1949 strávil F. Slunečko několik měsíců bez soudu ve vazbě. Zemřel v Praze 10. prosince 1963. Viz: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939-1945, s. 262.
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stal jeho zástupcem. V čele oblastního velitelství ON v Olomouci stanul brig. gen. Václav Ždímal.33 Pod oblastní velitelství spadala velitelství krajská, jež byla organizačně postavena na úroveň divizí. Oblastní velitelství v Brně sestávalo z krajů Brno-město, Brno-venkov a Jihlava; oblastnímu velitelství v Olomouci pak podléhaly kraje Olomouc, Moravská Ostrava a Uherské Hradiště. Vhodní důstojníci pro velitelské funkce v těchto krajích začali být hledáni už v průběhu dubna 1939 a postupně byly velitelské funkce obsazovány. Většinou se tak dělo na základě známosti jednotlivých důstojníků a výběr velitelů prováděl B. Všetička za asistence především V. Lysáka a Č. Jelínka. Pod krajská velitelství pak spadala velitelství okresní a na nejnižším stupni stála velitelství místní.34
Důležitou úlohu při formování ON mělo také její zemské politické oddělení. Počátky jeho vzniku spadají již do období zmíněné schůzky v kanceláři moravské pobočky Autoklubu koncem března 1939. Zde došlo k založení ilegální skupiny, do jejíhož čela se postavil PhMr. Vítězslav Mečíř,35 který byl spoluzakladatelem a prvním předsedou této odbočky. Mečířova organizace navázala koncem května 1939 kontakt s další odbojovou
33 Václav Ždímal (1890 až 1942) pocházel z Heřmanova v okrese Žďár nad Sázavou. Po maturitě na české zemské reálce ve Velkém Meziříčí studoval na České vysoké škole technické v Brně, ale studia posléze přerušil a začal pracovat jako geometr. Za první světové války bojoval na ruské frontě, kde koncem září 1915 přešel do zajetí. Posléze se přihlásil do československých legií, účastnil se bitvy u Zborova a absolvoval sibiřskou anabázi. Po návratu do vlasti zůstal v armádě a sloužil v různých velitelských funkcích. Mimo jiné působil v letech 1923 až 1925 na Vojenské akademii v Hranicích jako instruktor a velitel dělostřeleckého oddílu. Od listopadu 1926 do konce září 1931 a pak znovu od září 1932 do září 1933 velel dělostřeleckému pluku 7 v Olomouci. Poté rok velel dělostřeleckému pluku 331 v Jincích a od 30. září 1934 10. polní dělostřelecké brigádě v Banské Bystrici. Hodnost brigádního generála obdržel V. Ždímal 1. července 1936. Od poloviny října 1937 až do okupace pak zastával funkci velitele dělostřelectva IV. sboru v Olomouci a za branné pohotovosti státu velel dělostřelectvu Hraničního pásma XIII v Hranicích. Po zapojení do odboje se V. Ždímalovi podařilo vybudovat v Olomouci efektivně fungující velitelství ON, ale 11. prosince 1939 jej zatklo gestapo. Lidovým soudním dvorem v Berlíně byl odsouzen 13. dubna 1942 k smrti. Poprava gilotinou proběhla ve věznici v Berlíně–Plötzensee 2. září téhož roku. Po osvobození obdržel roku 1946 in memoriam hodnost divizního generála. Viz: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939-1945, s. 338-339.
34 Podrobné schéma zemského velitelství ON na Moravě a podřízených složek zpracoval někdejší velitel úderných oddílů velitelství Morava-západ plk. Otto Francl (1895 až 1950), jemuž se jako jednomu z mála vyšších důstojníků první garnitury ON podařilo okupaci přežít, i když 19. března 1940 padl do rukou gestapa a byl vězněn do konce války. Viz: MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 66 – Strojopis O. Francla nadepsaný Vznik a vývoj domácího odboje Obrana národa na Moravě v roce 1939.
35 Vítězslav Mečíř (1887 až 1942) se narodil v Mladé Boleslavi. Po studiích na Karlově univerzitě vykonával lékařskou praxi v Rožmitálu a Prachaticích. V Brně žil od roku 1911 a pracoval zde jako lékárník a vědecký zástupce firmy Medica. Po zapojení do odbojové činnosti se mj. podílel na přípravě bakteriologických prostředků proti nacistům. Zatčen byl společně s MUDr. J. Vignatim 1. března 1940. Lidový soudní dvůr v Berlíně jej 18. listopadu 1941 odsoudil k smrti a 26. srpna 1942 byl Mečíř popraven ve věznici v Berlíně-Plötzensee. Viz: Internetová encyklopedie dějin Brna, heslo Vítězslav Mečíř (dostupné elektronicky: https://encyklopedie.brna.cz/home-mmb/?acc=profil_osobnosti&load=3997 [citováno k 20. září 2019]).
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skupinou kolem profesora Masarykovy univerzity Jana Uhra36 a obě se staly základem pro vytvoření zemského politického oddělení.37
Struktura ON tedy byla značně rozsáhlá, členitá a propracovaná. Je však nutné vzít v úvahu, že nastíněné organizační schéma bylo v praxi budováno na různých místech rozdílně a v některých částech Moravy byl vytvořen pouze rámec těchto tajných vojenských jednotek, který se pak měl rychle dobudovat až v případě plánovaného všeobecného povstání. Generálové stojící v čele ON totiž předpokládali, že již v období na přelomu let 1939 a 1940 dojde ke vzniku koalice západních mocností se Sovětským svazem a následné brzké porážce Německa. V konečné fázi tohoto vojenského konfliktu mělo na území protektorátu vypuknout rozsáhlé povstání, v němž by právě vojenské jednotky ON sehrály klíčovou úlohu. Ta by jim také náležela v první fázi poválečného vývoje. Nemělo se však jednat o nějakou vojenskou diktaturu, nýbrž o to, aby v tomto přechodném období vojáci v Čechách a na Moravě udrželi „takový vojenský jistý pořádek a kázeň, ale bez diktatury“.38
Základní úkoly organizační výstavby a formování struktury ON byly dokončeny v červenci 1939. Organizace disponovala na celém území protektorátu značným počtem příslušníků, takže se zde objevili zástupci všech společenských vrstev. V ON působili vedle bývalých profesionálních vojáků, legionářů, policistů, členů Sokola či Orla také učitelé, lékaři, úředníci, duchovní, zaměstnanci pošt či železnic a příslušníci různých dělnických profesí. Rychle budovaná a příliš rozsáhlá struktura však zároveň představovala značné nebezpečí, jelikož zapojením velkého okruhu osob do rezistenční činnosti se zvyšovala pravděpodobnost jejího prozrazení. Členění ON bylo přehledné, schematické a hierarchicky uspořádané, což později usnadnilo gestapu postup při její likvidaci.39 Přesto však byl mimořádný rozsah této odbojové organizace pro nacistické vyšetřující orgány šokem a stal se přesvědčivým důkazem odhodlání českého národa bojovat proti okupaci.
36 Prof. PhDr. Jan Uher (1891 až 1942) pocházel z Prostějova. Vystudoval obor filozofie-český jazyk na Filozofické fakultě Univerzity Karlovy a po dosažení doktorátu se v roce 1925 habilitoval na Masarykově univerzitě v Brně dílem Problém kázně. Zabýval se zejména psychologií a výchovou dítěte v předškolním věku. Od roku 1935 působil jako mimořádný profesor pedagogiky na Filozofické fakultě Masarykovy univerzity v Brně a roku 1937 se stal řádným profesorem na Komenského univerzitě v Bratislavě, odkud se na podzim 1938 vrátil zpět do Brna. Počátkem následujícího roku byla publikována jeho stěžejní vědecká práce pod názvem Středoškolský student. Dále byl předsedou České obce sokolské a zakladatelem Volného pedagogického sdružení. Prof. J. Uher byl zatčen 20. listopadu 1939 a po dlouhém věznění na Špilberku, v Kounicových kolejích, Vratislavi, Diezu an der Lahn a Alt Moabitu jej Lidový soudní dvůr odsoudil 9. června 1942 k trestu smrti. Poprava byla vykonána v Berlíně-Plötzensee 26. října téhož roku. Viz například: Boris UHER – Jana UHLÍŘOVÁ, Jan Uher (1891-1942). Ústav pro informace ve vzdělávání, Praha 1993.
37 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 66 – Strojopis O. Francla Vznik a vývoj domácího odboje Obrana národa na Moravě v roce 1939, s. 42-47.
38 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 17/1 – Strojopis prof. Roberta Konečného Nová republika. Politický program Obrany národa.
39 Detlef BRANDES, Češi pod německým protektorátem. Okupační politika, kolaborace a odboj 1939-1945. Prostor, Praha 1999, s. 72.
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Rezistenční aktivity Obrany národa
Pro další vývoj situace moravské ON měla značný význam porada uspořádaná v pražském bytě arm. gen. J. Bílého v červenci 1939, jíž se z moravských představitelů zúčastnili generálové B. Všetička, O. Mézl a plk. L. Kotík. B. Všetička zde referoval o vývoji odbojové činnosti na Moravě, načež jeho slova kritizoval brig. gen. Bedřich Neumann, který poukazoval na nepoměr ve srovnání se stavem v Čechách.40 Odbojáři se měli především pokoušet získávat co největší počet zbraní, protože právě jejich nedostatek se jevil jako nejpodstatnější problém domácí rezistence. Účastníci porady se pak shodli v názoru na očekávané brzké vypuknutí války, jež, jak již bylo řečeno, neměla mít podle představ velitelů ON příliš dlouhého trvání.41 Z tohoto důvodu se jako primární úkol jevilo co nejrychlejší dobudování struktury celé organizace a moravské zemské velitelství mělo o vývoji situace podávat každých čtrnáct dní do Prahy zprávu.
Rezistenční aktivity zemského velitelství ON a jeho podřízených složek na Moravě se v praxi projevovaly různými způsoby. Jednak šlo o pokusy získávat zbraně a munici pro plánované povstání, jež mělo v českých zemích vypuknout v závěrečné fázi očekávané války. Tyto zbraně se daly získat ze čtyř zdrojů, a to jednak rozebíráním zbrojních zásob z vojenských skladů, dále nákupem, odcizením nebo vlastní výrobou.42 Při pokusech o získání většího počtu zbraní a munice byla pozornost moravských příslušníků ON zaměřena zejména na koncern brněnské Zbrojovky, který patřil k předním zbrojním závodům tehdejší Evropy.43 Do odboje se zapojili zdejší nastřelovači Josef Kulka (bývalý ruský legionář) a Karel Bauer, kteří přišli s plánem uschovávat munici ušetřenou při nastřelování na podnikové střelnici. Do plánu zasvětili ještě další zaměstnance Josefa Gottwalda a Jaroslava Lukáška. V období do srpna 1939 se podařilo tímto způsobem získat zhruba 45 000 kusů munice, které pak zazdili do obložení stěn jedné z kobek na střelnici. Jejich činnost však byla prozrazena a 5. září 1939 příslušníci gestapa J. Kulku a jeho spolupracovníky zatkli. Německý válečný soud odsoudil J. Kulku a K. Bauera 19. prosince 1939 k trestu smrti, J. Lukášek a J. Gottwald obdrželi trest každý
40 Bedřich Neumann (1891 až 1964) pocházel z Třebichovic v okrese Kladno. Za první světové války padl v březnu 1915 do zajetí na ruské frontě. Po pobytu v zajateckých táborech se přihlásil do československých legií a posléze se zúčastnil bojů s Němci během ústupu Ukrajinou i následných bojů s bolševiky. Po návratu do vlasti zůstal v armádě, studoval na vysoké škole válečné v Praze a zastával různé velitelské funkce. V letech 1931 až 1935 byl II. zástupcem náčelníka hlavního štábu, přičemž k 1. červenci 1933 získal hodnost brigádního generála. Od konce září 1935 do dubna 1939 pak B. Neumann působil u 5. divize v Českých Budějovicích, jejíž velení posléze převzal. Za branné pohotovosti státu na podzim 1938 byl velitelem Hraniční oblasti 31. V ON se stal zástupcem arm. gen. J. Bílého a zároveň zástupcem této organizace v Politickém ústředí. V lednu 1940 odešel B. Neumann z protektorátu za hranice a ve Francii se stal náčelníkem štábu Československé vojenské správy. Od 13. června 1940 byl velitelem 1. československé divize ve Francii. Po evakuaci do Británie zde proběhla reorganizace divize na 1. československou smíšenou brigádu a B. Neumann byl jmenován jejím velitelem. V lednu 1943 převzal funkci náčelníka Štábu pro vybudování československé branné moci v Londýně. Po válce působil jako úsporný komisař MNO a po únoru 1948 odešel do exilu. Zemřel 16. července 1964 v Londýně. Viz: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939-1945, s. 206-207.
41 O všeobecném brzkém předpokladu konce války ze strany vedení ON svědčí i obsah výše citovaných vzpomínek škpt. V. Kratochvíla a prof. R. Konečného.
42 V. ČERNÝ, Geneze úvodní fáze protinacistického odboje na Brněnsku, s. 56.
43 K historii Zbrojovky v období nacistické okupace viz dosud nejpodrobněji: Otakar FRANĚK, Koncern brněnské Zbrojovky v letech 1939/1945. Třetí díl. Dějin koncernu brněnské Zbrojovky. Blok, Brno 1973.
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ve výši dvou let káznice. Oba odsouzenci k smrti pak byli popraveni v prostorách hradu Špilberk 31. ledna 1940, přičemž se jednalo o vůbec první popravy příslušníků domácího odboje provedené okupačním aparátem přímo v Brně.44 Přes veškeré snahy získat větší počet zbraní však situace nebyla na podzim 1939 příznivá. ON disponovala na celé Moravě jen asi 30 či 40 kulomety, několika tisíci puškami a nepříliš velkým množstvím vhodné munice.
Dále byly prováděny drobné sabotáže, jejichž rozsah neměl být větší z důvodu hrozby předčasného prozrazení existence ON. Poněkud problematický prvek však představovaly pokusy využít v boji proti okupační moci bakteriologické prostředky. U zrodu této myšlenky stál MUDr. J. Vignati, který v květnu 1939 během setkání odbojářů v bytě prof. Františka Nábělka v Brně-Králově Poli za přítomnosti B. Všetičky, Č. Jelínka a V. Mečíře navrhnul použít botulotoxin (tzv. klobásový jed, jeden z nejúčinnějších přírodních jedů) a bakterie břišního tyfu. Tyto prostředky měly být rozšiřovány pomocí rozstřikovačů.45 B. Všetička informoval o návrhu O. Mézla, který se proti němu v zásadě nevyslovil. Prohlásil však, že případné použití těchto prostředků musí být schváleno centrálním velitelstvím v Praze, které také mělo financovat další pokusy v tomto směru. V případě nasazení botulotoxinu se mělo jednat zejména o infikování masových konzerv určených pro německou armádu a tyfové bakterie měly být použity na koně zrekvírované okupační moci k vojenským účelům.
Zkoušky probíhaly jednak ve Vignatiho laboratoři v Uherském Hradišti, dále pak v Brně, Modřicích, Olomouci, Jihlavě a Moravské Ostravě.46 Zasaženy měly být těmito prostředky lokality nikoliv v protektorátu (s výjimkou oblastí s převahou německého obyvatelstva), nýbrž na území vlastního Německa, kde se měly rozprašovat na poštovní schránky a kliky u hostinců, kinosálů apod. Příslušníci ON chápali tuto aktivitu jako jakési preventivní opatření, neboť očekávali, že v nastávajícím konfliktu použije německá armáda chemické zbraně, podobně jako tomu bylo za první světové války. Zemské velitelství ON pověřilo výrobou rozprašovačů Ing. Jiřího Elgra a Ing. Konstantina Raclavského, jehož pracoviště ve firmě Sochor v Blansku se zdálo být vhodným pro přípravu celé akce. Vlastní montáž rozprašovačů proběhla v Elgrově továrně v Brně-Černovicích.47 Zhotoveno bylo asi 50 nebo 60 kusů. K praktickému použití pak došlo při zamoření železničních transportů koní ve Stuttgartu a Freiburgu, přičemž uhynul větší počet zvířat.48 Podle poválečné výpovědi kriminálního asistenta gestapa Williho Brauna,49 který vyšetřoval řadu zatčených příslušníků ON, proběhly asi v červnu 1939 další pokusy
44 Tamtéž, s. 172-173.
45 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 15 – Strojopis Miloše Mečíře nadepsaný Zpráva o činnosti v podzemní odbojové organizaci Obrana národa, s. 3.
46 Tamtéž.
47 P. KOPEČNÝ, Obrana národa na Brněnsku, s. 64.
48 F. VAŠEK – Z. ŠTĚPÁNEK, Zvedli své hlavy mezi prvními, 2. část, s. 120.
49 Willi Braun (1916 až 1947) byl brněnský Němec, který začal v dubnu 1939 pracovat jako tlumočník u brněnského gestapa. V rámci referátu II BM/So povýšil na samostatného vyšetřovatele a neblaze proslul brutalitou, s níž postupoval vůči vyšetřovaným. Dalším Braunovým působištěm se stal zpravodajský referát IV N, v jehož rámci provedl řadu akcí proti parašutistům vyslaným do protektorátu z Velké Británie i Sovětského svazu. Počátkem dubna 1945 pak W. Braun ve Velkém Meziříčí smrtelně postřelil kriminálního inspektora gestapa Alexandra Schobera, který spolupracoval s českým odbojem. Mimořádný lidový soud v Brně odsoudil Brauna 10. ledna 1947 k trestu smrti a téhož dne byl popraven. Viz: MZA, f. C 141 (Mimořádný lidový soud Brno), inv. č. 2870, kart. 246, spisová značka Lsp 1999/46.
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v německých vesnicích na Jihlavsku a Vyškovsku. Úspěch se však v tomto případě nedostavil, protože „kultury tyfové byly zničeny nedodržováním určité teploty“.50
Důležitou součást činnosti ON dále představovalo zajišťování ilegálních přechodů protektorátních hranic. V Brně řídil organizaci přechodů škpt. J. Gardavský, a hlavním cílem bylo až do vypuknutí druhé světové války Polsko. Lidé, kteří chtěli opustit území protektorátu, se soustřeďovali v Přerově a Valašském Meziříčí. Nejvýznamnější přechodová trasa ve směru Solanec – Bílá – Jablunkov fungovala do konce srpna 1939 a využilo ji k odchodu několik desítek vojáků. V červnu 1939 se na Solanci ubytoval brig. gen. Zdeněk Novák, který pak odtud řídil přechody osobně.51 Když se však v tomto prostoru koncem srpna téhož roku soustředily německé vojenské jednotky k útoku na Polsko, nebylo již možné trasu dále používat.52 Po vypuknutí války tak získala na významu trasa přes Slovensko a Maďarsko do Jugoslávie.
Dalším projevem aktivit ON se stala zpravodajská činnost, kterou v Brně řídil škpt. Č. Jelínek za úzké spolupráce s plk. L. Kotíkem a škpt. J. Gardavským. Podařilo se dosáhnout ilegálního rádiového spojení Brna s Prahou, na čemž se aktivně podílel poručík telegrafní služby Karel Štolc.53 Rádiové spojení dále fungovalo mezi některými složkami
50 MZA, f. C 141, inv. č. 2870, kart. 246, spisová značka Lsp 1999/46 – Protokol sepsaný s Willi Braunem na Oblastní úřadovně StB v Brně a datovaný 14. června 1946, s. 4-5.
51 Zdeněk Novák (1891 až 1988) pocházel z Paskova v okrese Místek. Za první světové války bojoval na srbské a ruské frontě, kde padl v červnu 1916 do zajetí. Přihlásil se pak do československých legií a jako dělostřelecký důstojník se zúčastnil ústupových bojů s německou armádou na Ukrajině a poté mnoha střetnutí s bolševiky. Po návratu do vlasti zůstal v armádě a od listopadu 1920 do konce února 1929 velel 11. polní dělostřelecké brigádě v Košicích. Hodnost brigádního generála obdržel k 1. květnu 1928. Od února 1929 do října 1935 velel 8. polní dělostřelecké brigádě v Opavě a posléze v Hranicích na Moravě. Následně převzal velení dělostřelectva IV. sboru v Olomouci a koncem prosince 1937 byl ustanoven velitelem dělostřelectva u ZVV Brno. Za branné pohotovosti státu velel na podzim 1938 dělostřelectvu 2. armády v Olomouci. Po německé okupaci odešel do výslužby a zapojil se do odbojových aktivit. Série zatýkacích akcí gestapa na přelomu let 1939 a 1940 se Z. Novákovi vyhnula, takže na podzim 1941 se stal velitelem ON v Čechách a po zatčení gen. Bedřicha Homoly 31. prosince 1941 převzal jeho funkci vrchního velitele. Gestapo se dostalo na Novákovu stopu pomocí konfidentů a 22. června 1944 byl v Praze zatčen. Nacisté jej věznili na Pankráci, odkud byl převážen k výslechům do sídla pražské řídící úřadovny gestapa v Petschkově paláci. Po vypuknutí Pražského povstání 5. května 1945 se Z. Nováka podařilo vysvobodit a ihned se zapojil do činnosti vojenského velitelství ALEX. Počátkem srpna 1945 obdržel hodnost divizního a 1. dubna 1946 armádního generála. V lednu 1951 byl Novák zatčen a ve vazbě čekal na soud až do 8. dubna 1954, kdy byl ve vykonstruovaném procesu odsouzen k 18 letům odnětí svobody za vojenskou zradu a velezradu. Na základě prezidentské milosti byl předčasně propuštěn v září 1956 a roku 1963 se dočkal úplné rehabilitace včetně navrácení hodnosti armádního generála. Zemřel ve věku 97 let v Zadní Třebáni, okres Praha-západ. Viz: Vojenské osobnosti československého odboje 1939-1945, s. 209-210.
52 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 4186 – Strojopis Zdeňka Nováka nazvaný Obrana národa – část první, s. 2.
53 Karel Štolc (1916 až 1942) pocházel z Kralup nad Vltavou. Absolvoval Vojenskou akademii v Hranicích a po vyřazení byl v hodnosti poručíka přidělen k telegrafnímu praporu č. 4 v Prešově, kde sloužil až do nacistické okupace českých zemí v březnu 1939. Po zapojení do odboje v řadách ON sestrojil několik přenosných vysílacích i přijímacích stanic, s nimiž se po prvním neúspěchu podařilo v říjnu 1939 navázat spojení s pražským odbojem. Po zatčení 3. listopadu 1939 byl K. Štolc vězněn na několika místech v Brně a v Německu. Lidový soudní dvůr jej 31. března 1942 odsoudil společně s mjr. Petrem Kamanem k smrti. Poprava byla vykonána 7. srpna 1942 ve věznici v Berlíně-Plötzensee. In memoriam byl roku 1946 povýšen do hodnosti štábního kapitána. Viz: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-268-13 – Obžaloba vrchního státního zástupce při Lidovém soudním dvoře
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ON na Moravě, přičemž jej řídil mjr. Petr Kaman.54 Zpravodajské oddělení zemského velitelství ON si vytvořilo poměrně širokou síť spolupracovníků, kteří například sledovali přesuny jednotek německé branné moci na výpadových silnicích z Brna a po celé jižní Moravě. Pozornost byla věnována i situaci na brněnském letišti. Zaměstnanci vlakových souprav pak dodávali zprávy o železničních transportech německých jednotek. Důležité rovněž bylo sledování a registrace všech případů zatčení odbojových pracovníků a pokusy o zjištění jejich příčin. Nechyběly ani analytické komentáře k situaci v továrnách a zprávy týkající se úrovně zásobování a celkových poměrů v jednotlivých městech. Je samozřejmé, že tato zpravodajská činnost představovala z pohledu okupační moci krajně nebezpečnou záležitost a její brněnští organizátoři včetně K. Štolce a P. Kamana byli posléze odsouzeni k smrti a popraveni.
Mezi jednotlivé oblasti činnosti moravského zemského velitelství ON patřily také propagační akce v podobě výroby různých letáků a ilegálních tiskovin. Toto mělo představovat jakýsi protipól k nacistické propagandě působící na české obyvatelstvo protektorátu. Letáky rozšiřovala v Brně všechna vyšší velitelství, tedy jak zemské, tak i velitelství kraje Brno-město a velitelství oblastní. Jejich největší výskyt byl zaznamenán v období okolo výročí vzniku Československé republiky 28. října 1939.55
Konečně poslední významnou oblast činnosti ON představovala spolupráce s dalšími rezistenčními organizacemi českého obyvatelstva protektorátu. Někdy docházelo k úzké kooperaci a vzájemnému prolínání, takže postavení některých skupin je z tohoto důvodu nejasné. Úzké propojení existovalo především se skupinou označovanou jako „civilní složka ON“.56 Jednalo se o skupinu představitelů inteligence včetně několika profesorů Masarykovy univerzity, kteří aktivně spolupracovali s důstojníky z ON pravděpodobně již od června 1939. Spolupráce zemského velitelství dále probíhala s levicově orientovanou mládežnickou organizací Národní hnutí pracující mládeže (NHPM), které vyvíjela na Brněnsku aktivní činnost.57 Kontakty byly postupně navazovány i s dalšími občanskými rezistenčními organizacemi, ale také s komunistickým odbojem.
na Petra Kamana a Karla Štolce datovaná 23. prosince 1941. Dále: Internetová encyklopedie dějin Brna, heslo Karel Štolc (dostupné elektronicky: https://encyklopedie.brna.cz/home-mmb/?acc=profil_osobnosti&load=3236 [citováno k 20. září 2019]).
54 Petr Kaman (1895 až 1942) pocházel z Brna. Za první světové války bojoval na italské frontě, kde padl v závěru války 25. října 1918 do zajetí a vzápětí se přihlásil do československých legií. Po návratu do vlasti se roku 1919 zúčastnil bojů s maďarskými bolševiky na Slovensku. Od října 1920 sloužil P. Kaman u 2. telegrafního praporu v Brně, kde v prosinci 1926 převzal funkci velitele 8. telegrafní roty. V roce 1933 se stal řádným profesorem na Vojenském telegrafním učilišti v Turnově. Hodnost majora obdržel k 1. červenci 1937. Po okupaci pracoval u stavebního telegrafního úřadu v Brně, kde navázal spolupráci s dalšími důstojníky. Gestapo jej zatklo 3. prosince 1939 a po dlouhém věznění byl společně s K. Štolcem odsouzen 31. března 1942 k smrti a popraven v Berlíně-Plötzensee 7. srpna téhož roku. In memoriam byl roku 1946 povýšen do hodnosti podplukovníka. Vyšetřovací materiály německého Lidového soudního dvora k P. Kamanovi viz: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-268-16.
55 Četnická hlášení o nálezech jednotlivých letáků v období října a listopadu 1939 na Moravě viz: MZA, f. B 72 (Zemské četnické velitelství Brno), kart. 60.
56 Historik Jan Boris Uhlíř označuje tuto skupinu za samostatnou organizaci a nazývá ji Zemský národní výbor. Viz: Jan Boris UHLÍŘ, Zemský národní výbor. Jeho místo v rámci první rezistenční garnitury. DaS, 2000, č. 1, s. 26-30. K její historii viz: Milada ŠIMSOVÁ, Odbojáři z Obrany národa souzení jako „Helfert Intelligenz – Gruppe“. Časopis Matice moravské 1998, s. 107-127.
57 Viz: V. ČERNÝ, Levicové mládežnické organizace na Moravě v protinacistickém odboji. In: Jiří KOCIAN – Jaroslav PAŽOUT – Jakub RÁKOSNÍK (edd.), Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální
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Zatýkací akce gestapa a rozbití struktury Obrany národa
Aktivity ON se jejím členům dařilo několik měsíců vcelku úspěšně tajit. Zlom však nastal na podzim 1939, když bylo v období výročí vzniku Československé republiky 28. října nalezeno v brněnských ulicích větší množství letáků. Na zdejší úřadovně gestapa se poté přihlásila osmnáctiletá Anna Žáčková s informací, že je rozšiřuje František Šmíd z obce Chrlice. Vyšetřením případu byl pověřen kriminální komisař Otto Koslowski, který F. Šmída v Chrlicích zatknul. Během provedené domovní prohlídky byly letáky skutečně nalezeny.58 Šmíd byl členem NHPM a působil jako spojka na další odbojové organizace, takže disponoval značnými znalostmi rezistenčních aktivit na Moravě. Během tzv. „zostřených výslechů“ vyzradil vyšetřovatelům gestapa mnoho informací, které nacističtí vyšetřovatelé využili při dalších zásazích. Gestapo mimoto již mělo určité další poznatky shromážděné při výsleších osob zadržených při pokusech o ilegální přechod protektorátních hranic. Ve stejný den jako F. Šmíd byl navíc zatčen jeden z předních brněnských odbojářů prof. PhDr. Vladimír Helfert, u něhož není zřejmé, jakým způsobem odhalilo gestapo jeho odbojovou činnost.59 Již zmíněný kriminální asistent brněnského gestapa Willi Braun po válce do protokolu k rozbití ON uvedl, že „tato organisace byla zjištěna na základě jednoho letáku z komunistické tendence“.60
Šmídovo zatčení a následné obsáhlé výpovědi se nicméně bezesporu staly podstatnou příčinou rozbití struktury ON na Moravě. V literatuře se lze setkat s názorem, že značnou vinu na této situaci mělo samo velení organizace, které podcenilo nacistické bezpečnostní orgány. Takovouto kritiku obsahovaly zejména publikace vydané před rokem 1989 s tím, že činnost ON byla špatně utajována a zásady ilegality hrubě porušovány.61 Vedena však byla spíše ve snaze ON očernit, protože její vedoucí představitelé patřili mezi velitelské
socialismus v Československu, sv. VIII. Ústav pro soudobé dějiny (ÚSD) AV ČR, Praha 2011, s. 52-80.
58 V. ČERNÝ, Brněnské Gestapo 1939-1945 a poválečné soudní procesy s jeho příslušníky. Archiv města Brna – Moravské zemské muzeum, Brno 2018, s. 97-98.
59 Prof. PhDr. Vladimír Helfert (1886 až 1945) se narodil v Plánici u Klatov. Po maturitě na smíchovském gymnáziu zahájil studia hudební estetiky, zeměpisu a dějepisu na Karlově univerzitě. Po promoci působil jako profesor dějepisu a zeměpisu na České obchodní akademii v Praze. Roku 1919 přešel na I. české státní reálné gymnázium, kde učil do roku 1921. V tomto roce se habilitoval jako soukromý docent v oboru hudební věda na Filozofické fakultě Masarykovy univerzity. Zde se v roce 1926 stal mimořádným a o pět let později řádným profesorem, v letech 1935 až 1936 zastával funkci děkana této fakulty a v následujícím období 1936 a 1937 byl proděkanem. Je považován za zakladatele brněnské muzikologické školy a od svého příchodu do tohoto města také pracoval i v Moravském zemském muzeu, kde stál u zrodu hudebního archivu. Po svém zatčení 14. listopadu 1939 a postupném věznění na Špilberku, v Kounicových kolejích a Vratislavi byl od července 1940 do června 1942 vězněn v káznici ve Wohlau, odkud byl pro velmi špatný zdravotní stav propuštěn a umístěn v pražské vinohradské nemocnici. Po ukrývání na různých místech jej gestapo znovu zatklo 23. června 1944 v Miřeticích u Vlašimi. Následovalo věznění na Pankráci a koncem dubna 1945 transport do Terezína, kde se prof. V. Helfert dočkal osvobození. Jeho zdravotní stav však již byl kritický a zemřel 18. května 1945 v Praze. Výslechové protokoly sepsané s prof. V. Helfertem po zatčení viz: ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-350-11. K osobnosti a dílu V. Helferta dosud nejpodrobněji: Rudolf PEČMAN, Vladimír Helfert. Nadace Universitas Masarykiana, Brno 2003.
60 MZA, f. C 141, inv. č. 2870, kart. 246, spisová značka Lsp 1999/46 – Protokol sepsaný s Willi Braunem na Oblastní úřadovně StB v Brně a datovaný 14. června 1946, s. 1.
61 František ZŘÍDKAVESELÝ – Jiří ADÁMEK – Milan KROUTIL, Brněnští občané v boji proti fašismu. Blok, Brno 1981, s. 32.
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kádry prvorepublikové „buržoazní“ armády a nijak se netajili svým negativním postojem ke komunistické ideologii. Je skutečností, že určitá kritika týkající se špatně vedené ilegální činnosti (ručně psané seznamy členů ON, poznámky o podrobnostech odbojových akcí nalezené gestapem v průběhu domovních prohlídek) občas zazněly i z řad nemnoha příslušníků první garnitury brněnského odboje, kteří válku přežili.62 Tato skutečnost však souvisí s faktem, že vedení ON nepočítalo s okupací českých zemí v delším časovém horizontu. Jak již bylo uvedeno, generálové a důstojníci předpokládali, že k povstání českého obyvatelstva a souběžné válce spojenců proti Německu dojde v blízké budoucnosti a válka nebude mít dlouhého trvání. Z tohoto důvodu také v některých případech došlo k porušení zásad ilegální práce. Představitelé domácího odboje totiž nepočítali s tím, že by nacistický bezpečnostní aparát mohl mít prostor k velkým represivním akcím spojeným s podrobnými domovními prohlídkami. Tento předpoklad se sice ukázal být tragickým omylem, to však roku 1939 nemohl nikdo z vedoucích představitelů českého domácího odboje tušit.
První rozsáhlá zatýkací akce proběhla v Brně 20. listopadu 1939. Tehdy padl mimo jiné do rukou gestapa i škpt. Č. Jelínek.63 Jak vyplývá ze vzpomínek Milady Všetičkové, gestapo již v této době sledovalo také jejího manžela, který z důvodu větší bezpečnosti často měnil místa svého pobytu, přespával u přátel v Brně a v Praze u své matky a sestry.64 Po Jelínkově zatčení se B. Všetička sešel s L. Kotíkem a J. Gardavským k prodiskutování nově vzniklé situace. Generál navrhoval pozastavit činnost zemského velitelství, jehož členové měli přejít do ilegality. L. Kotík však návrh zamítnul. Na další schůzce za přítomnosti gen. O. Mézla bylo o problému dále diskutováno. O. Mézl s L. Kotíkem měli v úmyslu pokračovat v odbojové činnosti, ale z důvodu větší bezpečnosti se rozhodli napříště nepřespávat ve svých bytech. J. Gardavský naopak hodlal ve svém bydlišti setrvat, ale s přerušením odbojové činnosti. Ke Kotíkově zatčení v jeho bytě na Sirotkově ulici č. 50 však došlo během další razie gestapa 23. listopadu a J. Gardavský byl zatčen o sedm dní později. V průběhu poslední dekády listopadu a v prosinci 1939 došlo k zatčení řady dalších důstojníků a zatýkání probíhalo také v Olomouci, Moravské Ostravě a Uherském Hradišti.65 Vlastní zatýkací akce provádělo v Brně komando, jehož aktivním členem byl kriminální zaměstnanec Richard Schetke.66 Poválečná vyšetřovací zpráva k tomu uvádí: „Za své exekutivní služby u gestapa v Brně zatkl a vyšetřoval mnoho desítek českých lidí. Při odhalení ilegální organisace Obrana národa byl Richard Schetke zařazen do takzvaného ‚Festnahme-Kommando‘. Zatýkal hlavně funkcionáře zemského hnutí ON na Moravě, kteří byli většinou důstojníci bývalé čs. armády, z nichž
62 Viz zejména citované vzpomínky škpt. V. Kratochvíla.
63 Data zatčení jednotlivých odbojářů bývala vždy uvedena na titulní straně obžalovacích spisů. V tomto případě viz poznámku 19.
64 MMB, f. Dokumentace odboje, inv. č. 156 414 – Strojopis Milady Všetičkové nadepsaný In memoriam divizního generála Bohuslava Všetičky.
65 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 66 – Strojopis O. Francla Vznik a vývoj domácího odboje Obrana národa na Moravě v roce 1939, s. 57.
66 Richard Schetke (1906 až 1947) pocházel z Hodonína. Aktivně se podílel na obsazování některých významných budov v Brně místními nacisty v noci ze 14. na 15. března 1939. Ještě v tomto měsíci také vstoupil do služeb gestapa a po celou dobu okupace působil jako kriminální zaměstnanec na brněnské řídící úřadovně postupně u referátů II BM, II BM/So a N. Podílel se na zatčení značného množství osob zapojených do odbojových akcí včetně velitele desantu ZINC npor. Oldřicha Pechala v červnu 1942. Mimořádný lidový soud v Brně jej 13. ledna 1947 odsoudil k trestu smrti a téhož dne byl R. Schetke popraven. Viz: MZA, f. C 141, inv. č. 2895, kart. 250, spisová značka Lsp 2031/46.
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většina byla odsouzena okupanty k trestu smrti a popravena […]. Podle odhadu gestapáka Eiselta zatkl Schetke během své činnosti u referátu II BM/So asi přes 500 osob.“67
Mezi důstojníky hledané gestapem patřil také plk. V. Lysák, jemuž se zpočátku dařilo unikat. Mnohokrát měnil své úkryty v Brně, ale možnost odejít do zahraničí a připojit se ke vznikajícím československým jednotkám odmítal s odůvodněním, že má rozkazy setrvat až do krajnosti. Zatčen byl komandem pod vedením R. Schetkeho 23. prosince 1939 krátce poté, co opustil úkryt v domě rodiny Dědákových v Brně-Maloměřicích a z vinárny na Kolišti telefonoval své ženě.68 R. Schetke po válce popsal nastalou situaci do protokolu těmito slovy: „Já jsem zatýkal majora Ptašinského69 a plukovníka Lysáka a po předvedení do úřadovny gestapa jsem je pak předal do vazby v Sušilových kolejích. Zatčení byli předáni do Sušilových kolejí proto, poněvadž během šetření se ukázalo, že organisace ON je rozsáhlá a že bude muset dojít k dalšímu zatčení. Z toho důvodu byli další spoluúčastníci organisace ON dodáni do vazby v Sušilových kolejích a později také do Kounicových kolejí […]. Plukovníka Lysáka a majora Ptašinského vyslýchal protokolárně šéf oddělení komisař Taudt a já jsem mu dělal tlumočníka. Plukovník Lysák se nám přiznal, že je příslušníkem organisace ON a že je šéfem generálního štábu pro oblast západ.“70
Z okruhu vedoucích představitelů moravského zemského velitelství ON se tak nejdéle dařilo unikat B. Všetičkovi, který se v kritických dnech konce listopadu 1939 zdržoval v Praze u své matky. V době vánočních svátků přicestovala do Prahy jeho žena Milada, jež pak byla vyslána zpět do Brna se žádostí, aby zjistila informace o osudech plk. V. Lysáka a gen. O. Mézla. Po zjištění, že V. Lysák byla zatčen a O. Mézlovi se podařilo uprchnout z protektorátu, se následně vrátila do Prahy a bezvýsledně svého manžela přemlouvala k odchodu za hranice.71 Během pobytu v Praze se B. Všetička sešel s gen. J. Bílým, který se po seznámení s krizovou situací ON v Brně rozhodl pozastavit činnost moravského zemského velitelství. B. Všetičkovi nabídl možnost odchodu
67 MZA, f. C 141, inv. č. 2895, kart. 250, spisová značka Lsp 2031/46 – Závěrečná zpráva Oblastní úřadovny StB v Brně k vyšetřování činnosti Richarda Schetkeho datovaná 11. listopadu 1946, s. 2.
68 Jiří MIKULKA, Portréty statečných. Osudy význačných moravských představitelů národního odboje z let 1939-1945, na něž se mělo zapomenout. Masarykova univerzita, Brno 1995, s. 18.
69 František Ptašinský (1897 až 1942) pocházel z Hranic na Moravě. Za první světové války bojoval na ruské frontě, kde padl 6. července 1916 do zajetí. Posléze se přihlásil do československých legií a byl poslán do Francie, kde jej přidělili k 21. střeleckému pluku. Po návratu do vlasti se podílel na bojích s maďarskými bolševiky na Slovensku a v československé armádě pak působil v různých funkcích. F. Ptašinský byl znám především jako divadelní a literární kritik, spisovatel a překladatel ruské literatury. Ve funkci osvětového důstojníka dělostřeleckého pluku 304 v Brně napsal mnoho příspěvků do Divadelního listu Národního divadla v Brně a také do revue pro umění a kulturu Středisko. Byl rovněž autorem několika básnických sbírek, sbírky povídek Lidé z cirku a roku 1932 vyšla Ptašinského kniha Zlomky Anabase, ve které popsal zážitky legionářů z Ruska. Po zapojení do odbojové činnosti v řadách ON byl v Brně zatčen 20. listopadu 1939. Lidový soudní dvůr jej 24. července 1942 odsoudil k smrti a 16. listopadu téhož roku byl ve věznici v Berlíně-Plötzensee popraven. O nezlomném charakteru F. Ptašinského svědčí skutečnost, že dobu mezi vynesením rozsudku a popravou věnoval studiu španělštiny z učebnice, kterou se mu ve věznici podařilo sehnat. Z této učebnice studoval ještě několik hodin před popravou a dochovala se ve sbírkách Muzea města Brna pod inv. č. 152 794. K F. Ptašinskému viz dále: VÚA-VHA, f. Kvalifikační listiny vojenských osob, kvalifikační spis F. Ptašinského.
70 MZA, f. C 141, inv. č. 2895, kart. 250, spisová značka Lsp 2031/46 – Protokol sepsaný s Richardem Schetkem na Oblastní úřadovně StB v Brně a datovaný 7. září 1946, s. 7.
71 Podle rozhovoru M. Všetičkové s autorem této studie v Brně 15. května 2000.
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do Francie s tím, že by zde mohl zastávat funkci velitele dělostřelectva československých jednotek. B. Všetička však nabídku odmítl. Do ilegality poté odešel i J. Bílý, zatímco B. Všetička se koncem ledna 1940 vrátil do Brna, kde většinou pobýval mimo domov. Gestapo však o jeho pobytu získalo informace a nakonec byl 29. února 1940 zatčen v brněnské kavárně Slavia, kde měl schůzku se svou ženou. Zatčení opět provedl R. Schetke, který o tom po válce do protokolu uvedl pouze jedinou větu: „Asi začátkem února 1940 zatkl jsem také generála Všetičku, a sice v kavárně Slavia v Brně.“72 Touto akcí došlo v podstatě k završení rozbití struktury moravské ON, protože generál byl posledním z představitelů zemského velitelství, který až dosud gestapu unikal.
Vyšetřování zatčených příslušníků Obrany národa
Rozsah činnosti ON v Brně a okolí byl pro nacistický bezpečnostní aparát šokem. Brněnská řídící úřadovna gestapa proto vytvořila speciální referát pod vedením kriminálního komisaře Ewalda Taudta.73 Referát byl posléze označen jako II BM/So (zkratka od Sonderreferat) a jeho úkolem bylo vyšetřovat pouze činnost příslušníků ON. Umístěn byl v nacisty konfiskované budově Sušilových studentských kolejí na Klácelově ulici č. 2, kde gestapo také zřídilo improvizovanou věznici pro některé ze zatčených.74 Skončili zde B. Všetička, L. Kotík, V. Lysák, Č. Jelínek, J. Gardavský a další. V Sušilových kolejích také probíhaly první výslechy. Zprvu se pozornost zaměřila především na plk. V. Lysáka a škpt. Č. Jelínka, jehož vyslýchal kriminální asistent Braun. V poválečné vyšetřovací zprávě týkající se Braunovy činnosti za okupace je k tomu uvedeno: „Braun při této akci vyslýchal zatčeného škpt. Čestmíra Jelínka, který byl v Obraně národa zpravodajským důstojníkem. Je všeobecně známo, že škpt. Jelínek při prvních výsleších jakoukoliv činnost v organisaci ON popřel a nechtěl se k ničemu doznat. Byl proto při výsleších Braunem surovým způsobem týrán, a když již byly jeho síly u konce, pohrozil mu Braun, že použije proti němu ještě jiných mučících prostředků, které má on k dispozici a že škpt. Jelínka tím přinutí k doznání a vyzrazení svých spolupracovníků. Škpt. Jelínek nemohl již delší trýznění vydržet a učinil proto Braunovi úplné doznání, aby předešel dalšímu trýznění.“75 Dochované výslechové protokoly
72 MZA, f. C 141, inv. č. 2895, kart. 250, spisová značka Lsp 2031/46 – Protokol sepsaný s Richardem Schetkem na Oblastní úřadovně StB v Brně a datovaný 7. září 1946, s. 9.
73 Ewald Taudt (nar. 1909) pocházel z Berlína. V roce 1938 byl přidělen k úřadovně gestapa v Karlových Varech a po vybudování řídící úřadovny v Brně převzal roku 1939 referát II BM. Vzhledem k rozsáhlé činnosti Obrany národa na Brněnsku byl posléze vyčleněn speciální referát II BM/So s E. Taudtem v čele určený k vyšetřování činnosti této rezistenční organizace. Roku 1940 získal E. Taudt hodnost kriminálního rady a za obou stanných práv v letech 1941 a 1942 působil ve funkci přísedícího brněnského stanného soudu. Později vedl zpravodajský referát IV N. Na jaře 1945 po ústupu nacistických bezpečnostních složek z Jihlavy zmizel a jeho osud zůstal neznámý. Viz: MZA, f. C 130 (Veřejný žalobce u Mimořádného lidového soudu Brno), kart. 17, složka 17, fol. 153 – Zpráva vedoucího veřejného žalobce JUDr. Emila Čermáka o nezjištěných válečných zločincích určená Odboru pro politické zpravodajství Ministerstva vnitra v Praze. Nese datum 31. července 1946 a E. Taudt je zde uveden pod číslem 304. Životopisná data dále viz například: Vladimír FILIP – Vlastimil SCHILDBERGER – Jan BŘEČKA – Marie KUDĚLKOVÁ, Brno 1939-1945. Roky nesvobody. Díl II. Nakladatelství „Josef Filip 1938“, Brno 2012, s. 193.
74 V. ČERNÝ, Brněnské Gestapo 1939-1945, s. 99-101.
75 ABS, f. 52 (Výpovědi zaměstnanců gestapa a SD), sign. 52-1-36 – Závěrečná vyšetřovací zpráva Oblastní úřadovny StB v Brně týkající se činnosti bývalého kriminálního asistenta gestapa Williho
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plk. V. Lysáka jsou poměrně obsáhlé a z obsahu je zřejmé, že se pokoušel ve svých výpovědích taktizovat. Přesto však uvedl řadu údajů a jmenoval i gen. B. Všetičku, který byl v té době ještě na svobodě.76
Někteří další příslušníci ON se po zatčení ocitli na hradě Špilberku a po zřízení věznice v budově Kounicových studentských kolejí v lednu 1940 i zde. Již podmínky v brněnských věznicích byly kruté a vězni zde strádali po všech stránkách. Během výslechů bylo používáno fyzické násilí, i když u představitelů zemského velitelství ON nelze pro nedostatek hodnověrných svědectví říct, do jaké míry. Existuje však podezření, že V. Lysák utrpěl během výslechů v Sušilových kolejích v květnu a červnu 1940 zlomeninu žebra, což následně zapříčinilo zranění jater.77 Pokud jde o samotné výsledky vyšetřování gestapa, někteří z přeživších důstojníků ON po válce prohlašovali, že jejich kolegové údajně prozradili více, než bylo nutné. Tento názor se objevil již v jednom z dopisů vězněného MUDr. J. Vignatiho, jenž byl 25. ledna 1941 převezen ze Sušilových kolejí do nedalekých Kounicových kolejí, odtud 7. března téhož roku odtransportován do věznice v dolnoslezském Wohlau (dnes Wołów v Polsku) a v červenci téhož roku do Diez an der Lahn nedaleko Koblence.78 Posledním místem Vignatiho utrpení se po odsouzení k smrti stala věznice v Berlíně-Plötzensee, odkud v jednom z motáků určených své manželce napsal: „Tak ještě k tomu soudu. Prozradil mne generál Všetička, vlastně lépe řečeno udal, aniž by byl k tomu okolnostmi donucen. Ostatní dopověděl kapitán Jelínek, to bys koukala, jak se tito hrdinové změnili. Jen starý lékárník [míněn Vítězslav Mečíř, pozn. autora] se mnou zachránili jsme, co se dalo.“79
Na B. Všetičku byl zřejmě ze strany vyšetřovatelů vyvíjen značný psychologický nátlak a vyšetřovatelé gestapa prováděli také osobní konfrontace zatčených. Braun po válce do protokolu popsal konfrontaci mezi B. Všetičkou a velitelem ON v uherskohradišťském kraji pplk. Vladimírem Štěrbou: „Byl jsem přítomen konfrontaci podplukovníka Štěrby s popraveným generálem Všetičkou. Tato konfrontace odehrála se v Sušilových kolejích, asi v březnu 1940. Do místnosti, ve které byl podplukovník Štěrba, byl přiveden generál Všetička. Bylo to v kanceláři Jahnově80 a přítomni byli, pokud si
Brauna datovaná 30. října 1946, s. 3. V průběhu svého vyšetřování se škpt. Č. Jelínek neúspěšně pokusil o sebevraždu.
76 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-225-2 – Výslechové protokoly plk. V. Lysáka zapsané 27. a 28. prosince 1939 na řídící úřadovně gestapa v Brně, 13 stran. Výslech prováděl kriminální asistent Wilhelm Trepp.
77 J. MIKULKA, Portréty statečných, s. 20.
78 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 638 – Práce L. Bočka MUDr. Jan Vignati v německém vězení.
79 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 553 – Xerokopie strojopisných přepisů Vignatiho motáků a dopisů z vězení z pozůstalosti MUDr. V. Zapletala.
80 Friedrich Jahn (nar. 1898) byl rodákem z Brna. Na řídící úřadovně gestapa v Brně působil od roku 1939 a během činnosti v rámci zpravodajského referátu N proslul svými krutými metodami uplatňovanými při výsleších zatčených. Vzhledem k hrubé povaze nebyl oblíben ani u ostatních gestapáků, kteří dali F. Jahnovi přezdívku „Ivan Hrozný“. Mimo Brno působil také na služebnách gestapa v Moravské Ostravě a Uherském Hradišti. Roku 1944 byl povolán do služby v německé branné moci a koncem války zřejmě padl do amerického zajetí. Jeho další osudy nejsou známy; údajně se měl roku 1947 pohybovat někde v americkém okupačním pásmu Německa. Viz: MZA, f. C 130, složka 17, kart. 7, fol. 118-127 – Seznam válečných zločinců zjištěných v brněnském obvodu zpracovaný vedoucím veřejným žalobcem u Mimořádného lidového soudu Brno JUDr. Emilem Čermákem. Byl určen Odboru pro politické zpravodajství Ministerstva vnitra v Praze a nesl datum 23. dubna 1947. F. Jahn zde má pořadové číslo 666.
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pamatuji, Taudt, Jahn, Schetke a já. Generál Všetička zprostil podplukovníka Štěrbu mlčenlivosti, který měl údajně Štěrba složiti generálu Ingrovi. Doporučil Štěrbovi, aby vše vypověděl. Štěrba na to odpověděl slovy: ‚Rozkaz, pane generále,‘ a byla mu dána tužka a papír, aby ve vězení všechno napsal, co ví o hradišťské krajské organizaci ON. Druhého dne jsem slyšel, nevím již od koho a nevím na základě jakého hlášení, o tom, že podplukovník Vladimír Štěrba se v noci v cele na Špilberku oběsil.“81 Štěrba byl na Špilberku vězněn v samovazbě na cele v prvním poschodí a podle vzpomínek tehdejšího vězeňského lékaře MUDr. Karla Frinty byl ve velmi špatném zdravotním stavu, s omrzlými prsty na rukou i nohou. Dne 25. března 1940 musel podstoupit celodenní výslech v budově brněnské řídící úřadovny gestapa na Mozartově ulici č. 3 a tehdy také došlo ke konfrontaci s B. Všetičkou. Následujícího dne proběhl další Štěrbův výslech a tehdy se také rozhodl spáchat sebevraždu z toho důvodu, že sice vydržel dosavadních sedm výslechů, ale při dalším by již mohl promluvit.82
Svědectví obdobného obsahu týkající se gen. V. Ždímala pak pochází od škpt. Václava Kratochvíla. Podle něj „Ždímal nabádal důstojníky, aby se přiznali, že je to čestné – snad věřil v humánnost Němců a ve vývoj událostí ve prospěch Spojenců. Ždímalova činnost odporovala zásadám o utajení organisace za každou cenu, docházelo až k trapným scénám na gestapu a ztraceno kvůli tomu bylo mnoho životů.“83 V souvislosti s těmito výpověďmi je však třeba uvést, že generál B. Všetička i mnozí další ze zatčených generálů a důstojníků věřili v brzkou porážku Německa a své osvobození, takže zřejmě nepřikládali obsahu vlastních výpovědí přílišný význam. Důležitým faktorem pro ně byl i pojem vojenské cti. Zejména starší důstojníci uznali po zatčení svou porážku a zapírání považovali za nízké a nečestné, což gestapo zneužívalo ve svůj prospěch. K B. Všetičkovi je pak třeba poznamenat, že byl zatčen až koncem února 1940. V té době již byla většina členů moravského vedení ON několik týdnů ve vazbě a gestapo disponovalo o činnosti této organizace rozsáhlými poznatky, takže jeho výpověď nemohla mít klíčový význam. Pplk. V. Štěrba padl do rukou gestapa již 30. listopadu 1939 a v době Všetičkova zatčení byl tedy vyšetřován tři měsíce.
Soudní procesy a popravy
Gen. B. Všetička byl převezen 1. června 1940 do moabitské věznice v západní části Berlína, kam jej následovali další členové moravského zemského velitelství ON. Zde měli očekávat soud. Obžaloba proti Všetičkově skupině byla připravena již v létě 1940 a tuto skutečnost také přednesl říšský ministr justice Franz Gürtner ve své zprávě Adolfu Hitlerovi z 23. září téhož roku. Soudní proces mohl být zahájen v nejbližší době, ale A. Hitler zaujal odmítavé stanovisko. Během porady s říšským protektorem Konstantinem von Neurathem a státním tajemníkem Karlem Hermannem Frankem konání soudního přelíčení odmítl a prohlásil, že proti „českým rebelům“ bude stačit exekuční komando, jelikož případný proces by z nich udělal mučedníky. Češi by prý navíc pokládali vynesené rozsudky za protiprávní, takže řešení těchto záležitostí soudní cestou mělo proběhnout
81 MZA, f. C 141, inv. č. 2870, kart. 246, spisová značka Lsp 1999/46 – Protokol sepsaný 18. října 1946 na Oblastní úřadovně StB v Brně s Willi Braunem.
82 Ludvík BURIÁN, Minulost naléhavě přítomná. Okresní národní výbor, Uherské Hradiště 1980, s. 56.
83 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 9220 – Strojopis V. Kratochvíla Činnost oblastního velitelství Obrany národa Morava-západ, s. 9.
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až po skončení války. Vynášely by se přitom pouze rozsudky smrti, které bude možné ve výjimečných případech změnit na doživotní vězení či deportaci.84 Toto Hitlerovo stanovisko bylo příčinou skutečnosti, že příprava procesů s příslušníky ON byla na rok pozastavena. Změna nastala až po nástupu Reinharda Heydricha do funkce zastupujícího říšského protektora v září 1941. R. Heydrich přesvědčil A. Hitlera o nutnosti konání procesů s představiteli českého odboje, přičemž měl na mysli zejména připravovaný proces s bývalým předsedou protektorátní vlády divizním generálem Aloisem Eliášem. Tento proces se konal během výjezdního zasedání Lidového soudního dvora v Praze 1. října 1941 a skončil vynesením rozsudku smrti.85 Poté již postupně probíhaly procesy s dalšími příslušníky vojenského odboje, z nichž někteří měli v té době za sebou více jak dvouletý pobyt v nacistických věznicích.
Jelikož po 15. březnu 1939 došlo k zavedení německého trestního práva i na území protektorátu, byli tak odbojáři paradoxně souzeni za „velezradu“, přestože nacisté ve skutečnosti okupovali české země v rozporu s mezinárodním právem. Příslušníci ON byli postaveni před tzv. Lidový soudní dvůr (Volksgerichtshof; VGH). Jednalo se o nacistický „revoluční“ tribunál, jehož úkolem bylo projednávat trestné činy proti státu.86 Tento tribunál vznikl roku 1934 jakožto soud kompetentní k souzení případů velezrady a zemězrady. Postupně se však jeho působnost rozšiřovala o řadu dalších deliktů. Původně sídlil v Lipsku, ale krátce po svém založení přesídlil do Berlína. Zákon z 18. dubna 1936 poté určil, že se jedná nikoliv o mimořádný, nýbrž o řádný soudní dvůr a došlo ke stanovení pravidel jeho složení. Toto složení plně odpovídalo poslání VGH jakožto revolučního tribunálu nacionálního socialismu. V hlavních líčeních rozhodovaly pětičlenné senáty, jejichž členové se skládali jednak ze soudců z povolání a jednak ze soudců čestných, což byli vesměs přesvědčení nacisté a většinou zasloužilí členové nacistické strany NSDAP. Jmenováni byli A. Hitlerem na návrh říšského ministra justice nejprve na funkční období pěti let, od roku 1936 potom na doživotí. Všichni členové VGH museli být starší 35 let. Mezi čestnými soudci se často nacházely známé osobnosti, například státní tajemník a vyšší vedoucí SS a policie v protektorátu K. H. Frank. Soudní senáty u VGH byly původně tři, ale vzhledem k nárůstu počtu projednávaných případů jejich počet stoupal a v prosinci 1942 jich už fungovalo šest.87
Orgánem žaloby při VGH bylo Vrchní říšské státní zastupitelství, jehož členové se také zúčastňovali poprav odsouzených. Největší počet exekucí osob odsouzených VGH byl proveden ve věznici v Berlíně-Plötzensee.88 Samotná obžaloba byla sestavena na základě výsledků vyšetřování gestapa a vyšetřujících soudců. Každý z obžalovaných v ní byl označen křestním jménem a příjmením, dále následovalo datum a místo narození, povolání a bydliště. U každého bylo také vyznačeno, kde a kdy došlo k zatčení a kdy rozhodl vyšetřující soudce o uvalení vazby. Následovala právní kvalifikace trestného činu
84 Walter WAGNER, Der Volksgerichtshof im Hitler Nationalsozialistischen Staat. Oldenbourg Verlag, Stuttgart 1974, s. 486.
85 Robert KVAČEK – Dušan TOMÁŠEK, Generál Alois Eliáš. Jeden český osud. Epocha, Praha 1996, s. 85-93. Výtah z rozsudku nad Eliášem viz: W. WAGNER, Der Volksgerichtshof, příloha č. 13, s. 891-895.
86 Podrobněji viz: Lukáš VLČEK, Lidový soudní dvůr v Berlíně – Volksgerichtshof – a jeho historie. In: SI 18/1. ÚSTR, Praha 2011, s. 144-167.
87 Jaromír TAUCHEN, Vývoj trestního soudnictví v Německu 1933-1945. Disertační práce, Právnická fakulta MU, Brno 2009, s. 192.
88 K tragické historii této věznice viz například: Brigitte OLESCHINSKI, Gedenkstätte Plötzensee. Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, Berlin 1994.
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s odůvodněním žaloby.89 Na závěr byly uváděny návrhy na svědky, další trvání vazby a ustanovení obhájce. Obhájce mohl být jednak vybrán (obvykle příbuznými obžalovaného), nebo povinně přidělen VGH. Předsedající soudce pak musel jeho výběr schválit. Obhajoba však byla víceméně formální záležitostí, protože obhájce navrhoval předložení nějakých důkazních materiálů jen zřídkakdy. Obhájci také většinou nenavštěvovali své mandanty před hlavním líčením, ovšem existovaly výjimky u těch, které vybrala rodina obžalovaného. Ani takovíto obhájci však nemohli na tvrdosti rozsudku nic změnit, i když se často snažili navrhovat jinou kvalifikaci trestného činu svých mandantů (například tím způsobem, že místo přípravy k velezradě šlo pouze o neoznámení, nebo že se nejednalo o těžký případ tohoto zločinu).
Po vynesení rozsudku také zvolení obhájci zpravidla žádali předsedu senátu, aby umožnil poslední rozhovor odsouzeného s rodinnými příslušníky, pokud se zúčastnili hlavního líčení. Tato hlavní líčení bývala obvykle veřejná, ale v některých případech probíhala s vyloučením veřejnosti, především když šlo o kauzy týkající se státních tajemství. Rozsudek vyhlašoval předseda senátu, jehož projev býval u většiny procesů velmi krátký a právní kvalifikace v mnoha případech chyběla. Předseda a přísedící soudce z povolání pak rozsudek také společně podepisovali.90 Rozsudky zveřejňoval denní tisk, jenž byl o výsledcích procesů informován prostřednictvím tiskové služby vrchního státního zastupitelství při VGH. Na stránkách protektorátního tisku z let 1941 a 1942 lze nalézt mnoho takových případů. Mimoto bývaly také na veřejných prostranstvích vyvěšovány rudé plakáty s českým a německým textem informující o vykonaných exekucích odsouzenců. Tyto plakáty se ve velkém množství vyvěšovaly především v místě bydliště odsouzeného, což mělo zvyšovat zastrašující účinek na obyvatelstvo.
První rozsudek VGH nad odbojáři ON z jižní Moravy byl vynesen 18. listopadu 1941 a týkal se skupiny MUDr. J. Vignatiho. Ten byl společně s V. Mečířem odsouzen k smrti, další dva lékaři obdrželi čtyři roky a jeden dva a půl roku káznice. O průběhu přelíčení J. Vignati své ženě v jednom z motáků napsal: „Náš soud byla úplná komedie. Naprosto žádné důkazy. Obhájce trpná figura. Před přelíčením jsem s ním měl pětiminutovou rozmluvu, během níž se informoval o mé záležitosti. U přelíčení se vůbec neozval, až nakonec řekl několik vět. Bylo to prostě hnusné.“91 Tato slova jasně dokládají, jakým způsobem procesy před VGH probíhaly.
Proces se členy zemského velitelství ON na Moravě proběhl v Berlíně ve dnech 26. a 27. listopadu 1941 před 1. senátem VGH. Před soudem stanuli B. Všetička, L. Kotík, Č. Jelínek a J. Gardavský, kteří byli v té době všichni umístěni ve věznici Alt Moabit. Pětičlennému tribunálu osobně předsedal prezident VGH Otto Georg Thierack, který tak činil jen u významných případů. Všetičkovi příbuzní se snažili získat obhájce podle vlastního výběru, ale úřady jejich návrhy zamítly a obhájce byl přidělen ex offo. Obžaloba byla sestavena na základě výpovědí obviněných a dalšího doplňujícího vyšetřování gestapa. Obsahovala podrobné vylíčení činnosti všech čtyř obžalovaných v rámci zemského velitelství ON včetně podrobného rozčlenění a úkolů této organizace, dále personální obsazení velitelských funkcí a podíl jednotlivých obžalovaných na odbojových akcích. Dále zde byly vylíčeny podrobnosti o Všetičkových kontaktech s generály J. S. Ingrem a O. Mézlem a také informace o schůzkách se členy pražského centrálního
89 Velké množství obžalob příslušníků ON se dochovalo v ABS v již citovaném fondu 141.
90 František VAŠEK, Čeští vlastenci před Volksgerichtshofem. Časopis pro právní vědu a praxi 2001, č. 1, s. 62-70.
91 MZM, HO, f. S Písemnosti, inv. č. S 637 – Opis zprávy MUDr. Jana Vignatiho před popravou.
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velitelství ON. Z obžaloby jasně vyplývalo, že se v tomto případě jedná o pro nacisty zvlášť nebezpečnou organizaci.92
V průběhu samotného procesu se stala klíčovou otázka případného použití násilí ze strany odbojových organizací vůči okupačnímu režimu. B. Všetička ve své výpovědi před vyšetřujícím soudcem prohlásil, že se s násilím při osvobození země v rámci připravovaného povstání počítalo. Během soudního přelíčení to však popíral. Stejně vypovídali před soudem také L. Kotík a J. Gardavský, zatímco Č. Jelínek naopak použití násilí připouštěl. Také tribunál při odůvodnění rozsudku zdůrazňoval, že odbojáři připravovali násilné akce a jako hlavní argument přitom uvedl přípravu bakteriologické války a ukrývání většího počtu zbraní. Všichni čtyři členové zemského velitelství ON byli proto uznáni vinnými z přípravy velezrady (Vorbereitung zum Hochverrat) a napomáhání nepříteli (Feindbegünstigung) a odsouzeni k trestu smrti.93
Po vynesení rozsudku požádali odsouzení o milost. Pravomoc rozhodnout v této věci měl osobně A. Hitler, který později umožnil rozhodovat v podobných záležitostech i ministru justice. Rodiny odsouzených se přitom snažily prostřednictvím svých kontaktů na významné protektorátní činitele včetně prezidenta Emila Háchy dosáhnout případného zmírnění rozsudku. E. Hácha ostatně v průběhu prvních let okupace opakovaně intervenoval za různé vězněné představitele českého odboje.94 Dopisy obdobného charakteru psali i sami odsouzení důstojníci, například Č. Jelínek se na E. Háchu obrátil s žádostí 6. února 1942 a nacistické úřady tuto korespondenci velmi pozorně sledovaly.95 Všetičkův tchán Cyril Malý se pak pokoušel dosáhnout nějakých úlev pro odsouzené prostřednictvím protektorátního vyslance v Berlíně a bývalého československého ministra zahraničí JUDr. Františka Chvalkovského. Týkalo se to zejména poskytnutí povolení k návštěvě příbuzným ve věznici v Berlíně-Plötzensee, kam byli odsouzenci po vynesení rozsudku převezeni. F. Chvalkovský ve svém dopisu z 31. prosince 1941 informoval C. Malého, že „[…] ve věci, o které jedná Váš laskavý dopis z 29. prosince 1941, jsem opětovně na příslušných místech intervenoval. Návštěvy povolují se jen výjimečně, a to nejbližším příbuzným.“96 Dne 7. ledna 1942 pak navštívila M. Všetičková se svým otcem F. Chvalkovského osobně a dalšího přímluvce se rodina snažila nalézt v osobě protektorátního ministra vnitra generála četnictva Josefa Ježka. Případ členů moravského zemského velitelství ON byl však v Berlíně považován za natolik důležitý a závažný, že kromě povolení k návštěvě odsouzených nebylo v možnostech protektorátních představitelů dosáhnout případné změny rozsudku.
Odsouzení představitelé ON byli nuceni čekat dlouhé měsíce na vykonání trestu smrti, protože odvolací řízení probíhala velmi zdlouhavě. Všechna odvolání však byla nakonec zamítnuta a vynesené rozsudky potvrzeny říšským ministrem justice 31. července 1942.97 Poprava gen. B. Všetičky a jeho tří spolupracovníků proběhla ráno 19. srpna 1942 ve věznici v Berlíně-Plötzensee gilotinou. Odsouzení se před popravou chovali statečně a B. Všetička ve svém posledním dopisu manželce z 18. srpna 1942 napsal: „Zítra ráno v 5 hodin dokončím svůj život u vědomí, že jsem sloužil svému národu do posledního
92 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-237-6. Celkový rozsah obžaloby je 145 stran.
93 Tamtéž – Rozsudek VGH nad skupinou gen Všetičky z 28. listopadu 1941 o celkovém rozsahu 59 stran.
94 K tomu viz: Tomáš PASÁK, Pod ochranou říše. Práh, Praha 1998.
95 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-237-7, fol. 36-37.
96 MMB, f. Dokumentace odboje, inv. č. 152 870.
97 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-237-7, fol. 44 – Opis rozhodnutí říšského ministra justice v případu Bohuslava Všetičky, Ladislava Kotíka, Čestmíra Jelínka a Jaroslava Gardavského.
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dechu. Nebylo příjemné čekat mnoho měsíců v žaláři na smrt, přesto vše jsem rád, že jsem se dočkal doby, kdy si mohu učiniti představu o výsledku války. Smrt mne naprosto již neleká.“98 O vykonání rozsudků smrti nad Všetičkovou skupinou následně referoval protektorátní tisk, který uváděl, že dotyčné „[…] lidový soud odsoudil na smrt a k trvalé ztrátě občanských čestných práv pro přípravu k velezradě a některé také pro napomáhání nepříteli. Tito odsouzení vyvíjeli na čelném místě v tajné organisaci velezrádnou činnost pro Německé říši a proti řádu zavedenému v českomoravském prostoru.“99
Značnou pozornost věnovali nacisté také skupině plk. V. Lysáka, jejíž obžaloba byla datována 15. října 1941.100 Proces konaný před 1. senátem VGH proběhl 3. prosince 1941 a kromě V. Lysáka byli ve skupině souzeni škpt. František Blabolil, škpt. Jaroslav Konopásek, pplk. Otto Francl a škpt. V. Kratochvíl. Během přelíčení se V. Lysák pokoušel vzít většinu viny na sebe, protože si byl vědom skutečnosti, že vzhledem ke svému významnému postavení v hierarchii ON nemá naději na jiný rozsudek než trest smrti. Tato taktika částečně vyšla, protože V. Lysákovi a F. Blabolilovi udělil tribunál trest smrti za přípravu velezrady a napomáhání nepříteli, ale ostatní byli odsouzeni k trestům káznice, a to O. Francl na doživotí, V. Kratochvíl na deset a J. Konopásek na pět let.101 Těmto třem důstojníkům se podařilo věznění přežít. Zdravotní stav plk. V. Lysáka však byl již v době konání procesu velmi špatný a 3. července 1942 ve věznici v Berlíně-Plötzensee zemřel. Úřední lékařská zpráva stanovila jako příčinu smrti rakovinu.102 Je však pravděpodobné, že skutečnou příčinou byly následky nezhojeného poranění jater způsobeného bitím během výslechů na jaře 1940. V letech 1942 a 1943 pak proběhla řada dalších procesů s příslušníky ON působícími na Moravě, přičemž jejich popravy byly vykonávány nejen v Berlíně-Plötzensee, ale také ve věznicích ve Frankfurtu nad Mohanem a Vratislavi.
Dílčí závěr
ON představovala významnou domácí odbojovou organizaci vznikající již od druhé poloviny března 1939. Mnoho příslušníků československé armády i dalších občanů se v jejím rámci zapojilo do protinacistických rezistenčních aktivit. Na přelomu let 1939 a 1940 sice tato první odbojová garnitura padla za oběť gestapu, ale zcela zlikvidovat se nacistům domácí vojenský odboj nepodařilo. Také v Brně probíhaly pokusy o obnovení činnosti a v letech 1940 a 1941 vzniklo druhé zemské velitelství ON, byť ve skromnější podobě. V čele stál brig. gen. Otakar Zahálka popravený 21. června 1942 v Kounicových kolejích. Také toto druhé vedení bylo nacistickým bezpečnostním aparátem rozbito, ale roztroušené skupinky odbojářů, kteří unikli zatčení, pokračovaly v další činnosti. Došlo také k vybudování řady nástupnických organizací (Přípravný revoluční výbor, Rada tří, Vela). Příslušníci československé armády tedy jasně ukázali, že je Mnichovská dohoda ani okupace 15. března 1939 nezlomily. Mnoho z nich zaplatilo svou účast v boji proti nacismu životem včetně 16 vojáků s generálskými hodnostmi, kteří skončili v letech 1941
98 Soukromý archiv Vladimíra Černého, fotokopie dopisu poskytnutá roku 2000 paní Miladou Všetičkovou.
99 Venkov, č. 197 z 20. srpna 1942, s. 2.
100 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-225-1 – Obžaloba č. 12 J 8/40 g datovaná 15. října 1941, 42 stran.
101 Tamtéž – Rozsudek nad skupinou plk. Lysáka z 3. prosince 1941, 32 stran.
102 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-225-7 – Úřední zpráva věznice v Berlíně-Plötzensee o smrti plk. V. Lysáka datovaná 11. července 1942. Určena vrchnímu státnímu zástupci při VGH.
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až 1945 na popravištích (arm. gen. J. Bílý, pět divizních a deset brigádních generálů). Neměli bychom na ně proto zapomínat ani v dnešní době.
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Příloha
Obrázek č. 1. Titulní strana kvalifikačního spisu Čestmíra Jelínka. Z těchto spisů lze podrobně rekonstruovat vojenskou kariéru všech příslušníků Obrany národa. Zdroj: VÚA-VHA.
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Obrázek č. 2. Brigádní generál Bohuslav Všetička, zemský velitel Obrany národa na Moravě. Zdroj: MZM, HO.
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Obrázek č. 3. Plukovník Ladislav Kotík, náčelník štábu zemského velitelství Obrany národa na Moravě. Zdroj: MMB.
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Obrázek č. 4. Titulní strana rozsudku Lidového soudního dvora v Berlíně nad příslušníky zemského velitelství Obrany národa na Moravě z 27. listopadu 1941. Zdroj: ABS.
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ODBOJOVÁ SKUPINA TŘI KONŠELÉ. KAPITOLA Z DĚJIN DOMÁCÍ PRONACISTICKÉ REZISTENCE
V odpoledních hodinách 14. března 1939 z ruzyňského letiště vzlétlo dopravní letadlo se zvláštními pasažéry. Na palubě stroje nizozemské letecké společnosti se nacházelo jedenáct zpravodajských důstojníků 2. oddělení Hlavního štábu pod vedením plk. gšt. Františka Moravce. Z Československa odcházeli s důležitým zpravodajským materiálem, aby jako jedni z prvních ze zahraničí zahájili odbojovou činnost proti nacistickému Německu.
Ačkoli plk. F. Moravec zřejmě do exilu odlétal s určitou představou o boji proti německým okupantům, tak se z počátku jednalo o izolovanou akci, o níž měli povědomí jen její přímí účastníci. Aspekt přípravy odboje na domácí půdě byl z několika důvodů podceněn. Horečné formování budoucího odboje se zahájilo teprve po získání prvotních informací o nastávající okupaci českých zemí. Během několika málo hodin došlo ke zničení zbylého agenturního materiálu, z části se zlikvidovaly a z části se ukryly radiostanice a přemýšlelo se, jak účelně naložit se zpravodajskými finančními prostředky. Současně začíná vznikat několik odbojových skupin z řad profesionálních zpravodajských důstojníků. Ve stejné době se realizovaly obousměrné pokusy o založení komunikačních kanálů mezi Moravcovými exilovými zpravodajci a jejich kolegy z bývalého zpravodajského ústředí v okupované Praze.
Následující řádky mají za úkol čtenáře seznámit s jednou takovou odbojovou formací nazvanou Tři konšelé1 a popsat a zhodnotit její přínos při výstavbě struktur zahraničního odboje kolem skupiny plk. F. Moravce.
Okupace českých zemí
Na samotné Vítězné náměstí v Praze, kde tehdy sídlil Hlavní štáb československé branné moci, včetně jeho 2. oddělení, dojely podle vzpomínek první německé jednotky 15. března 1939 kolem 10.00 hodiny dopoledne. V uvedenou dobu již dohořívaly zbytky zpravodajského materiálu. Větší rozruch pak následující dne způsobila spíše zdvořilostní
1 Problematika odbojové skupiny Tři konšelé se prozatím nedočkala komplexního zpracování, nicméně do odborné literatury se již alespoň okrajově dostala. Za všechny například uveďme: Jaroslav KOUTEK, Tichá fronta. Naše vojsko, Praha 1985; J. GEBHART – J. KOUTEK – J. KUKLÍK, Na frontách tajné války. Kapitoly z boje československého zpravodajství proti nacismu v letech 1938-1941. Panorama, Praha 1989; J. KOKOŠKA – S. KOKOŠKA, Spor o agenta A-54. Zcela specifické postavení pak zaujímá memoárová publikace jednoho z hlavních aktérů Františka Fárka, viz: František FÁREK, Stopy mizí v archívu… Vyšehrad, Praha 1975.
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návštěva šéfa německého Abwehru admirála Wilhelma Canarise, který zavítal k tamější budované úřadovně Abwehrstelle. Následně prozatímnímu přednostovi 2. oddělení plk. gšt. Františku Havlovi poděkoval za poskytnutí kanceláří jeho důstojníkům a poté se vrátil zpět do Berlína.2
Jinak v budově Hlavního štábu panoval zdánlivý klid před bouří, a jak po válce vzpomínal jeden z Moravcových podřízených škpt. František Fárek: „V kancelářích 2. odd. se přetřásaly nejrůznější otázky související s okupací Československa, sledovaly projíždějící vojenské i policejní transporty a kuly nejrůznější plány do budoucna.“3
Okupace českých zemí a vznik Protektorátu Čechy a Morava se staly předpokladem pro vznik prvních odbojových hnutí. Bývalí zpravodajští důstojníci měli povahou svého předchozího povolání jisté předpoklady a skutečně během několika málo dnů se v rámci likvidovaného 2. oddělení HŠ MNO začínají konstituovat první odbojové složky.
Již první den okupace se v Praze z vlastní iniciativy sešli tři důstojníci z bývalé Moravcovy pátrací skupiny. Již zmíněného škpt. F. Fárka s Antonínem Longou a Aloisem Čáslavkou nepojilo jen stejné pracovní zařazení, ale současně také nezlomné přátelství. Shodli se, že jejich schopnosti a dovednosti budou mnohem užitečnější doma a nebudou následovat své kolegy do zahraničí. Vedení formace, která zanedlouho dostala krycího označení Tři konšelé, či jen Konšelé, se ujal nejstarší z nich – F. Fárek (viz fotografie č. 1 až 3 v příloze kapitoly).
Podle dochovaných zpráv došlo již počátkem dubna k navázání kontaktu mezi Moravcovým střediskem v zahraničí a A. Longou v protektorátu. Nutno uvést, že za značné pomoci Francouzů. Pro případ, že by francouzský prostředník vypadl, byly hledány také další možné cesty. První dopisy odeslané Moravcovým lidem do exilu byly zřejmě plné výčitek. Koneckonců Moravcův kvapný odchod4 z republiky zanechal v mnoha příslušnících 2. oddělení značnou dávku hořkosti. Nicméně alespoň A. Longovi a jeho spolupracovníkům, jejichž jména byla ale v dopisech prozatím tajena, se svůj odlet snažil obhájit. Koneckonců byli prozatím první a na delší dobu jediní, se kterými se podařilo do protektorátu navázat přímé a kvalitní spojení.5
Mimo další se začal řešit odchod rodin, které museli v okupovaných českých zemích zpravodajští důstojníci zanechat. Moravec se ve věci odsunu rodin maximálně spoléhal na francouzskou stranu a Fárkovi lidé měli sehrát pouze pomocnou roli při vyřizování drobností. Od počátku byla akce alespoň dostatečně jištěna finančními prostředky. Kurýři z Francie do protektorátu přiváželi bývalé československé koruny, kterých mělo být využito na financování různých úsluh. Co se neutratilo pro potřeby odboje, bylo směňováno na říšské marky a odesíláno zpět do zahraničí. Vše samozřejmě probíhalo bez vědomí protektorátních úřadů. Jen koncem dubna A. Longa přes francouzského
2 TÝŽ, Situace v 2. odd. po 15. březnu 1939. – Admirál Canaris v hlavním štábu. – Oberst Longin. – Škpt. Fárek a mjr. Dítě u přednosty Abwehrstelle. – Příslušník Abwehru chce udělat zdvořilostní návštěvu u škpt. Fárka. – Návštěva u mjr. Dítěte. – Charakteristika příslušníků Abwehru a německých důstojníků. Rukopis, vlastnictví prof. Jiřího Fárka, s. 1-2.
3 Tamtéž, s. 5.
4 Plk. F. Moravec 14. března 1939 opustil Prahu s těmito spolupracovníky: pplk. gšt. Oldřich Tichý, mjr. gšt. Emil Strankmüller, mjr. konc. Josef Bartík, mjr. pěch. Karel Paleček, mjr. jezd. Alois Frank, škpt. pěch. František Fryč, škpt. gšt. Vladimír Cigna, škpt. pěch. Václav Sláma, škpt. pěch. Josef Fořt, škpt. jezd. Jaroslav Tauer, přičemž pět důstojníků patřilo k obranné sekci pátrací skupiny 2. oddělení HŠ MNO. P. KREISINGER, Brigádní generál Josef Bartík, s. 57-58.
5 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, a. s. 37, sign. 37-91-19 – Milý Longo (zpráva z 10. dubna 1939), fol. 3.
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zpravodajského exponenta v Praze mjr. Henriho Gouyou obdržel 600 000 Kčs z pokladny bývalé pátrací skupiny.6
Počátkem května běželo již pravidelné a spolehlivé spojení. A. Longa také definitivně potvrdil své odhodlání a dal se Moravcovi plně k dispozici: „[…] jsme zde tři, kteří v noci na 15./3. rukou dání svatě jsme si přislíbili, že se neopustíme navzájem, že neopustíme rodiny, které tu zůstaly samy, a že ze všech sil budeme pracovati ke zrození naší III., jak pevně věříme, šťastné a věčné republiky“. Ve zprávě škpt. A. Longa uvedl také kryptonymy svých nejbližších spolubojovníků – Franta Fousatej a Lojza Diplomat. Naši zpravodajci v exilu od tohoto okamžiku věděli, s kým se jim podařilo navázat kontakt a v kom právě našli oddané spolupracovníky. Uvedenou skutečnost v exilu jednoznačně kvitovali s nadšením, protože ne všichni z jejich bývalých kolegů s nimi byli z osobních důvodů ochotni spolupracovat.7
Přes všechny komplikace dané činnosti německých bezpečnostních složek se během poměrně krátké doby podařilo otevřít informační kanál mezi protektorátem a zpravodajskými strukturami v zahraničí. Je nutno opětovně podotknout, že v této fázi značně pomohli francouzští zpravodajští exponenti, kteří v Praze ještě stále pobývali. Mezi nejvýznamnější již z předválečných let bezesporu patřil již zmíněný mjr. H. Gouyou. Důležitou osobou pro spojení s francouzskými kolegy se naopak stal řidič francouzského vyslanectví Josef Záruba. Z titulu svého povolání již v době stupňujících se bezpečnostních opatření v protektorátu celkem nerušeně vykonával řadu cest Francie.8
Pod krycím značením Tři konšelé9 začali do zahraničí během krátké doby přes francouzské partnery posílat rozsáhlé zpravodajské elaboráty o okupaci českých zemí,10 nacistických bezpečnostních složkách, organizaci a síle německé branné moci a v neposlední řadě o hospodářské a politické situaci v protektorátu. V uvedeném Fárkovým lidem značně pomáhali jejich bývalí kolegové z analytické skupiny – pplk. gšt. Tomáš Houška a mjr. gšt. Josef Zuska. Samotného sběru zpráv se zúčastnila také rozvětvená síť železničních zaměstnanců. Jinak si skupina udržovala od dalších odbojových skupin přísnou izolaci. Na přímý pokyn plk. F. Moravce dokonce došlo k odmítnutí splynutí Tři konšelů s Obranou národa. Skupina si během tak velice krátké
6 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, a. s. 37, sign. 37-91-19 – Milý Longo (zpráva z 10. dubna 1939), fol. 4. a Likvidační záznam z 27. dubna 1939, fol. 8.
7 NA, f. Svaz protifašistických bojovníků – ústřední výbor Praha (SPB-ÚV; nezpracováno) – Milý šéfe (zpráva z 3. května 1939).
8 NA, f. Policejní ředitelství Praha – všeobecná spisovna 1941-1950, sign. Z 483/5 – Policejnímu ředitelství doplňovacímu oddělení sboru uniformované stráže bezpečnosti.
9 Původ uvedeného označení můžeme nalézt v žádosti F. Fárka a jeho kolegů, aby nebyli v tajné korespondenci označováni pravými jmény. Od uvedeného okamžiku londýnské ústředí používalo krycího označení Tři konšelé (Konšelé). Kdo přesně toto označení vymyslel, není zcela zřejmé. F. Fárek ve svých vzpomínkách uvedl, že by autorem mohl být mjr. E. Strankmüller: F. FÁREK, Fárek, Longa a Čáslavka do výslužby. – První zpráva z Londýna. Gen. Ingr. – Gen. Eliáš. – Odsun rodin jedenáctky za hranice. – Dr. Hora z pol. řed. V Praze. – Fárek a Longa „Konšelé“. – Čáslavkova zpráva z Londýna. – Čáslavkův životopis. – Mjr. gšt. Toscani. Rukopis, vlastnictví prof. Jiřího Fárka, s. 10.
10 Nejnověji na uvedené téma: Aleš BINAR, Hodnocení vojenské okupace českých zemí v březnu 1939 v dokumentech XIII. armádního sboru. HaV 2018, č. 1, s. 4-27.
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doby ve styku s plk. F. Moravcem vydobyla specifické postavení a začala být využívána k řadě úkolů.
Odsun rodin zpravodajských důstojníků
V podstatě ihned po okupaci Konšelé převzali péči o rodiny, které zpravodajští důstojníci zanechali v protektorátu. Již ze své povahy museli noví opatrovníci narážet na řadu úskalí. Manželky samozřejmě po tajném odchodu manželů zachvátila určitá nervozita, odhadovaly špatně situaci a zabývaly se jen myšlenkou na odjezd za nimi. Fárkovi lidé jim přikázali omezit vzájemný styk. Zásahem plk. F. Moravce bylo o všechny alespoň dobře finančně postaráno.11
Nervozitu zvyšovaly namátkové prohlídky ze strany německé tajné policie. Například u manželky mjr. Karla Palečka provedlo Gestapo několikahodinovou skutečně podrobnou prohlídku počínaje pudřenkou a konče proklepáváním stěn. Není se čemu divit. Palečkova střešovická vila byla před okupací současně také utajenou expoziturou ofenzivní složky 2. oddělení HŠ.12
Hrozivější bylo, že v době, kdy měli Francouzi sehrát významnou roli při evakuaci rodin zpravodajců, začala spolupráce s nimi nebezpečně váznout. Podle F. Fárka nebyl obecně francouzský podíl úměrný československému snažení. Tři konšelé navíc zjistili, že jejich zprávy pro kolegy do zahraničí někdo od Francouzů čte. K zásadnímu selhání došlo právě při potřebné akci spojené s odsunem rodin zpravodajských důstojníků.
Je nutné uvést, že F. Moravec před svým odchodem do zahraničí nic pro odchod rodinných příslušníků do exilu nezajistil. V prvních pookupačních měsících se Moravcovi zpravodajci ve věci evakuace rodinných příslušníků spoléhali na pomoc britských a francouzských úřadů, které v protektorátu stále ještě fungovaly. Toužebně očekávaná pomoc, i přes neustále ujišťování zvláště z francouzské strany, kvůli jejich liknavému přístupu totálně selhala. Velkým nepřítelem se stal nedostatek času v kombinaci s často naivními představami řady příslušníků Moravcovy skupiny o situaci v protektorátu.
Původní francouzský plán počítal, že manželka plk. F. Moravce spolu s dcerami a paní Tichou, Palečkovou a Frankovou odjedou v doprovodu prověřených Francouzů s francouzskými pasy za hranice. Zbytek manželek zpravodajských důstojníků měl odcestovat na své pasy, ke kterým by se pomocí úplatků opatřily propustky, tzv. Durchlassscheiny. Podle návrhu měly být dámy s českými pasy rozděleny ještě do dvou samostatných skupin. Zvlášť do Varšavy měla odjet paní Fořtová, Tauerová a Cignová a do italského letoviska Villaregia paní Bartíková, Strankmüllerová a Fryčová. Pro tento plán dostal A. Longa od plk. F. Moravce dokonce plnou moc při zacházení s finančními prostředky.13
11 NA, f. SPB-ÚV, Rodiny (bez datace).
12 Tamtéž.
13 Tamtéž – Milý Toníku (zpráva z 5. června 1939); VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, a. s. 37, sign. 37-144-1, PAÚ Karla, čj. 101/39 – Věc: situační hlášení, fol. 4. A. Longa disponoval poměrně značnými finančními obnosy. Jeho úkolem bylo také původní měnu měnit na německé marky a posílat zpět do zahraničí. Koncem dubna roku 1939 A. Longa přes francouzské prostředníky obdržel 599 680 Kčs. VÚA-VHA, f. Velitelství vojenské zpravodajské služby (Sb. 37), sign. 37-144-1 – Likvidační záznam, fol. 8.
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Nepochybnou skutečností je, že odsun „zpravodajských“ rodin do zahraničí se stal také osobní záležitostí plk. F. Moravce a jeho spolupracovníků. Současně byl objektivně nezbytným předpokladem pro to, aby naši zpravodajci v zahraničí získali k práci potřebný klid a mohli naplno rozvinout své aktivity proti nacistickému Německu.
Pro nedůvěru ve francouzské partnery, stále zhoršující se bezpečnostní situaci a rostoucí nervozitou ze strany manželek se lidé kolem F. Fárka rozhodli evakuaci provést zcela vlastní invencí a prostředky, a to co nejrychleji nejsnáze možnou cestou – do Polska. Jelikož původní francouzské varianty selhaly, rozhodl se A. Čáslavka14 provést na hranicích s Polskem sondáž. Současně ji také několikrát přešel. Počátkem července roku 1939 pak A. Čáslavka rodiny v několika skupinách přes hranice převedl. Jelikož jeho manželka byla Židovka, rozhodl se do Polska odejít také. Po jejich bezpečném odsunu Moravcovi lidé naplno rozvinuli zpravodajskou práci proti Hitlerovu Německu.15
Okolnosti odsunu zpravodajských rodin nacházely dozvuk ještě ve zprávách z počátku srpna, a to i vzhledem k faktu, že původní neúspěšné plány z francouzské dílny stály poměrně dost finančních prostředků, zvláště na úplatcích různým kompetentním osobám. A. Longa se domníval, že část peněz zůstala u známých mjr. H. Gouyou, kteří se v původních variantách odsunu nadmíru angažovali – konkrétně jeho pražské přítelkyně Karolíny Slapničkové a funkcionáře bývalého československého autoklubu Ing. Karla Poláčka. Nicméně i přes určité překvapení Fárkových lidí alespoň o rodiny a jejich majetek gestapo stále nejevilo většího zájmu.16
Spolupráce s polskými zpravodajci
Po úspěšné evakuaci rodin se F. Fárek s A. Longou na popud exilového řídícího střediska a ve snaze otevřít nový komunikační kanál přes Varšavu začali orientovat na Poláky. A. Čáslavka jim dle předchozí domluvy v Polsku vyjednal schůzku se spojkou z polského konzulátu v Praze. Poláci si v červenci roku 1939 totiž velmi dobře
14 Po tom, co padl původní plán, A. Čáslavka pro zahraničí sepsal poměrně emotivní zprávu: „O dámy jsme se rozdělili (každý měl na starosti 3 dámy) a dělali jsme pro ně vše, co bylo jen v naší moci a silách. Tak tomu bylo až do odjezdu posledního Šmrdolína [mjr. H. Gouyou – pozn. autora]. Jemu a všem Francouzům nechť Bůh odpustí všechny jejich zločiny. My po celou tu dobu, co zde byl, dávali mu velmi cenný materiál, a on se na nás zato vysral (prosím, abyste mi omluvili chlapská slova, musím si však odlehčit při vzpomínce na všechny Francouze). V pravdě nasazovali jsme zde pro ty francouzské degenerované kurvy naše životy a oni div nás neudali gestapu – viz camrání fran. leg. úředníka před společností, že franc. konsulát přijímá pro Paříž a Londýn zprávy od 2. odděl. hl. štábu, dále viz zadržování dopisu atd… [Čáslavka naráží na zadržování a otevírání pošty francouzském vyslanectví – pozn. autora]“. VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, a. s. 37, sign. 37-91-1, I. díl – Zpráva Diplomata (Zpráva je věnována čistě otázce odsunu dam), fol. 236.
15 Více k odchodu zpravodajských rodin do zahraničí například: M. VYHLÍDAL, První ze Tří konšelů, s. 134-135. K činnosti A. Čáslavky v exilu a v těsně poválečném období například: Matej MEDVECKÝ, Nepotrebný diplomat. Pôsobenie československého atašé v Štokholme po skončení druhej svetovej vojny. VH 2015, č. 1, s. 60-80.
16 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, a. s. 37, sign. 37-91-1, I. díl – Milý náš šéfe (zpráva z 10. srpna 1939), fol. 276.
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uvědomovali nebezpečí hrozící ze strany nacionálně socialistického Německa, a tak vítali referáty o stavu a dislokaci německé branné moci v protektorátu.17
Primárním cílem Konšelů v této době se tak stalo maximální uspokojení polské strany předáváním cenných zpravodajských informací týkajících se hrozby německého vpádu do Polska. Například díky spolupráci se zaměstnanci protektorátních drah získávali hodnotné zprávy o přesunech vojsk z přerovského železničního uzlu, Plzně, Moravské Ostravy a České Třebové. Hodnotné elaboráty nadále zpracovával bývalý zpravodajský analytik a odborník na německou brannou moc pplk. T. Houška. Zvláště aktivní ve spojení s polským konzulátem v Praze byl A. Longa. Spojení s československými zahraničními centry tzv. polskou cestou probíhalo pod heslem „Pour la patrie“.18
Konšelé si spolupráci s Poláky nadmíru pochvalovali a ochotu Poláků ve svých depeších neustále podtrhávali. Z důvodů skartačních zásahů z naší strany není prozatím zcela možné rozkrýt obsah zpráv jdoucí touto severní cestou, nicméně z dochovaných archiválií vyplývá, že jich bylo větší množství.19
Bohužel koncem srpna spojení Tří konšelů s francouzskými partnery definitivně skončilo. Československá exilová ústředna v zahraničí o tom věděla, nicméně považovala za důležité je udržovat dál. Pokud by ovšem možná účelnost nepřevyšovala bezpečnostní rizika, bylo podle instrukcí ústředí rozhodnutí na další spolupráci s Francouzi plně na A. Longovi. Chřadnoucí spolupráci s Francouzi alespoň částečně vyvažovala výše uvedená spolupráce s polskou stranou, nicméně také ta pro blízké události nuceně skončila.20
Gestapo zasahuje
Konšelé pracovali více méně samostatně, sloučení s odbojovou skupinou Obrana národa odmítali, a taktéž se snažili do svých aktivit nezapojovat více osob, než bylo potřeba. Nicméně i tato nastavená pravidla budila pouze klamný pocit jistoty. Pro vzájemnou provázanost německá tajná policie v prvních měsících okupace likvidovala jednu odbojovou skupinu za druhou. Smyčka kolem F. Fárka a jeho spolupracovníků se začala pomalu utahovat po velké razii gestapa proti tzv. skupině Schmoranzových tiskových důvěrníků,21 ve které působilo množství bývalých zpravodajských důstojníků ze zpravodajského ústředí. Vyšetřovací postupy německé tajné policie přinesly své plody.
17 Klára PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Životní osudy zpravodajského důstojníka a vojenského diplomata plukovníka Aloise Čáslavky. Magisterská diplomová práce, FF Univerzity Palackého v Olomouci (UP), Olomouc 2015, s. 71.
18 F. FÁREK, Spolupráce odbojové skupiny 2. odd. s polskými zpravodajskými orgány. Rukopis, vlastnictví prof. Jiřího Fárka, s. 5-6; VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, a. s. 37, sign. 37-89-56 – Zpráva Poseidona, fol. 2.
19 VÚA-VHA, FMSÚMV, a. s. 37, sign. 37-259-6 – Marie, čj. 45, Věc: materiál Tonda – zaslání (zpráva z 8. srpna 1939), fol. 39.
20 VÚA-VHA, f. Ministerstvo národní obrany Londýn, sign. 20-29-1 – Věc: Spojení Alfons (záznam z 19. srpna 1939), fol. 72, tamtéž – Milý Alfonsi! (zpráva z 21. srpna 1939), fol. 73; F. FÁREK, Spolupráce odbojové skupiny 2. odd, s. 5-6.
21 Více k uvedené odbojové skupině například: Arnošt BAREŠ – Tomáš PASÁK, Odbojová organizace Zdeňka Schmoranze v roce 1939. HaV 1968, č. 6-7, s. 1003-1033.
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Gestapo umně využívalo brutálních vyšetřovacích metod, při kterých vyslýchaní tajnou policii přiváděli na další a další osoby.
Jak F. Fárek ve svých vzpomínkách uvedl, co se týká dalších skupin, velice obtížná byla především kontrola T. Houšky. Sám již v předválečných letech platil za výborného znalce německé armády, a tak se stal pro řadu odbojově činných osob nepostradatelným. F. Fárek svým způsobem věděl o Houškových kontaktech s dalšími bývalými zpravodajci. Zřejmě ale nevěděl o stycích s konkrétními členy Schmoranzovy skupiny.22
Pro vzájemnou provázanost přes určité osoby gestapo zasáhlo také proti Konšelům. Již v říjnu byl v souvislosti s jinou věcí zatčen mjr. gšt. J. Zuska.23 F. Fárka německá policie zajistila 6. listopadu 1939 a počátkem prosince pak také A. Longu a T. Houšku.
Odbojová skupina Tři konšelé byla při vyšetřování vedena jako „Farek-Gruppe“ a zahrnovala pouze F. Fárka, A. Longu a nově též řidiče francouzského vyslanectví J. Zárubu. T. Houška se k soudu nedostal, protože v průběhu těžkých výslechů v Petschkově paláci v Praze spáchal sebevraždu. Dnes sice již víme, že odbojové hnutí začalo vznikat v podstatě živelně až po nacistické okupaci, nicméně úředníci gestapa od počátku vyšetřování operovali s konstruktem, že zárodky zpravodajského odbojového hnutí vytvořil ještě před svým odletem F. Moravec, a právě F. Fárek s A. Longou v okupované republice patřili k jeho nejbližším spolupracovníkům.24
V září roku 1940 jejich hlavní vyšetřovatel, nechvalně známý Oskar Fleischer, šňůru dlouhých výslechů skončil a v prosinci roku 1941 se celý případ dostal k Lidovému soudu do Berlína. Soudní dvůr naštěstí jejich vlastní činnost, na rozdíl od gestapa, spatřoval především v ilegální pomoci rodinám uprchlých zpravodajských důstojníků. Také během výslechů a vlastního přelíčení F. Fárek s A. Longou vše, co se dalo, z taktických důvodů svalovali na A. Čáslavku, kterému již žádné reálné nebezpečí nehrozilo. Konečnému rozsudku, který pro oba čítal desetiletý trest káznice, pomohla neschopnost státního zástupce prokázat aktivní spojení se zahraničím. A. Longa s F. Fárkem si mohli částečně oddechnout, protože obžaloba pro oba navrhovala trest smrti.25
J. Zárubu soud dokonce všech obvinění zbavil. Z nabyté svobody se ale netěšil dlouho. Koncem ledna roku 1942 ho opětovně zatklo pražské gestapo. Posléze byl transportován
22 F. FÁREK, Dopis plk. gšt. Moravce. – Vládní vojsko. – Mjr. gšt. Salzer. – Škpt. Novotný. – Konflikt plk. gšt. Hájek contra plk. gšt. Moravec. – Škpt. Č. – Poznávací značky vozidel gestapa a něm. úřadů. – Spolupráce s jinými odbojovými skupinami. – Schůzka s plk. gšt. Kudláčkem. – Krycí adresy do Holandska. – Václav Klabík a jeho činnost. – Tisková skupina. – Smrt mjr. gšt. Kleina. – Starosti s mjr. gšt. Houškou. – Kurýr do Londýna. – Vzkaz přes Beneše do vlasti. – Dopis plk. Moravce pro mjr. Houšku. Rukopis, vlastnictví prof. Jiřího Fárka, s. 4.
23 Více k osobě J. Zusky a jeho druhoválečné anabázi například: P. KREISINGER – M. VYHLÍDAL, Životní osudy generála Josefa Zusky (1902-1978). Od důstojníka dělostřelectva přes zpravodajské oddělení Hlavního štábu a nacistické káznice do Egypta (I. část). HaV 2015, č. 1, s. 64-76; TITÍŽ, Životní osudy generála Josefa Zusky (1902-1978). Od důstojníka dělostřelectva přes zpravodajské oddělení Hlavního štábu a nacistické káznice do Egypta (II. část). HaV 2015, č. 2, s. 90-99.
24 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-63-3/95–96 – Schlußbericht zum Vorgang Schmoranz und Andere, fol. 95-96.
25 ABS, f. 141, sign. 141-63-3/196 – In Namen des deutschen Volkes, 4, fol. 196.
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do koncentračního tábora v Osvětimi, kde 24. srpna 1942 za ne zcela jasných okolností zemřel.26
Posledního spolupracovníka skupiny, J. Zusku, odsoudil Lidový soud v Berlíně v procesu „Simon Drgac und 11 andere“ již o měsíc dříve, a to k osmiletému trestu káznice. Přímé spojení na osoby kolem F. Fárka se nepodařilo německému gestapu v jeho případě odhalit.27
Jak F. Fárek, tak A. Longa, J. Zuska a samozřejmě též A. Čáslavka se vytoužené svobody dočkali. F. Fárka koncem války evakuovali z káznice z Ebrachu do Straubingu na jih Německa a odtud koncem dubna nastoupil pochod směr Dachau. F. Fárek se spolu s některými dalšími vězni od pochodu utrhl a následně se jim podařilo vejít ve styk s předvojem postupující americké armády, kde se všem dostalo patřičné péče.28
J. Zusku kvůli postupující frontě převezli z Ebrachu, kde si taktéž odpykával svůj trest, pro změnu ale do bavorského Freisingu nedaleko Mnichova, zde se 30. dubna 1945 dočkal osvobození americkou armádou.29
Také A. Longu v káznici v Bayreuthu osvobodila americká armáda. Tím také začíná dosti nejasná a bohužel závěrečná kapitola jeho života. Dne 12. dubna 1945 byl podle všech indicií ještě živý. Působil jako jeden z funkcionářů sběrného tábora pro vězně v Kulmbachu a domů do Prahy poslal rodině pozitivně laděnou zprávu. Posléze se měl spolu s dalším bývalým vězněm Rudolfem Vyletou dát k dispozici americké armádě pro plnění zpravodajských úkolů na československém území. Koncem dubna měli být dopraveni na frontu na Šumavě, někde do prostoru Svaté Kateřiny, a od té doby byli nezvěstní.30
S největší pravděpodobností je tak na prahu svobody zavraždili ustupující němečtí vojáci. Jejich těla se nikdy nepodařilo nalézt a taktéž pátrání přeživších kamarádů – F. Fárka a A. Čáslavky – vyznělo naprázdno. Po dvou letech, tedy v dubnu roku 1947, byl již podplukovník in memoriam soudně prohlášen za mrtvého.31
Dílčí závěr
Zpravodajská skupina s názvem Tři konšelé se zařadila k prvním odbojovým skupinám bývalých příslušníků 2. oddělení HŠ, která v protektorátu vznikla. Svou klíčovou roli sehrála především kvůli svému úzkému sepjetí s exilovou zpravodajskou centrálou plk. F. Moravce. Právě v jejich službách uskutečnili její členové řadu akcí pro potřeby vznikajícího československého zahraničního odboje. Mezi významné aktivity patřila především úspěšná evakuace rodin zpravodajských důstojníků do zahraničí, která příslušníkům exilové zpravodajské ústředny zajistila nezbytný klid pro zahájení zpravodajské ofenzivy proti nacistickému Německu. Mimo to příslušníci skupiny
26 NA, f. Policejní ředitelství Praha – všeobecná spisovna 1941-1950, sign. Z 483/5 – Bezpečnostní odd. Bubeneč – úřední záznam.
27 P. KREISINGER – M. VYHLÍDAL, Životní osudy generála Josefa Zusky. I. část, s. 74-75.
28 F. FÁREK, Transport do Straubingu. – Pochod smrti. – Osvobození. – Shledání s rodinou. Rukopis, vlastnictví prof. Jiřího Fárka, s. 2-7.
29 Tamtéž, s. 75.
30 VÚA-VHA, f. Osvědčení podle zákona 255/46 Sb., Osobní spis Antonína Longy – Věc: Žádost o doplnění Osvědčení podle zákona 255/46 Sb.
31 Tamtéž – Prohlášení za mrtvého – opis.
119
pro potřeby zahraničního odboje na území protektorátu realizovali zpravodajskou činnost, a navíc také rozsáhlé finanční transakce s cílem pomoci zahraniční odboj financovat.
Její význam se nicméně omezuje pouze na rok 1939, tedy na klíčovou dobu vzniku a formování československých zahraničních odbojových středisek. Svou aktivitou a nasazením významným způsobem pomohla upevnit především pozici Moravcova zahraničního zpravodajského střediska. Zatýkáním v řadách jejich nepřímých spolupracovníků, a především pádem Polska, kdy se zpřetrhaly veškeré kvalitní komunikační kanály se zahraničím, jejich činnost ztratila na intenzitě. Během velice krátké doby pak byli také zbylí „Konšelé“ vystaveni represi ze strany nacistických bezpečnostních složek. Jejich činnost nelze v žádném případě přeceňovat, a i přes specifické úkoly a postavení musí být hodnocena pouze jako integrální součást československého odboje.
120
Příloha
Fotografie č. 1. Šéf odbojové skupiny Tři konšelé František Fárek na poválečném snímku – v době, kdy nastoupil službu na ministerstvu vnitra. Zdroj: Sbírka prof. Jiřího Fárka.
121
Fotografie č. 2. Škpt. Antonín Longa tak jak ho fotograf zachytil ještě v době svobodné republiky. Právě on měl na starosti spojení s Moravcovým centrem v exilu. Zdroj: Sbírka prof. Jiřího Fárka.
122
Fotografie č. 3. Alois Čáslavka, důležitá osoba při evakuaci rodin zpravodajských důstojníků, již v hodnosti podplukovník, po svém návratu ze zahraničí. Zdroj: Sbírka prof. Jiřího Fárka.

Moravec Gibby

OBSAH
Úvod ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 9
Legionářská minulost armádního generála Jana Sergeje Ingra
(Pavla Pokoráková) ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 11
Nástup do rakousko-uherské armády ……………………………………………………………… 11
Srbsko ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12
Rusko …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 13
Francie ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
Itálie …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 16
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 17
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 18
Vojtěch Preissig (1873 až 1944). Životem pro vlast. Statečnost a výtvarná propaganda
(Ivo Barteček) …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 19
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 23
Geografové ve službách meziválečné armády: Antonín Basl a Jiří Čermák
(Jiří Martínek) ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 27
Civilní protiletecká ochrana v ČSR v letech 1929 až 1938
(Vít Němec) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 33
Současný stav bádání ……………………………………………………………………………………. 34
Prameny ke studiu problematiky civilní protiletecké ochrany ……………………………. 35
Letecká válka a bombardovací letectvo …………………………………………………………… 37
Obrana proti letadlům …………………………………………………………………………………… 38
Civilní protiletecká ochrana ………………………………………………………………………….. 41
Organizace civilní protiletecké ochrany v Československu ……………………………….. 41
Organizace služeb civilní protiletecké ochrany ………………………………………………… 45
První škola protiletecké ochrany v Olomouci-Lutíně ………………………………………… 47
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 48
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 49
4
Československé vojenské zpravodajství proti Německu v letech 1932 až 1938. Strategie, prostředky a výsledky
(Karel Straka) ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 53
Vymezení tématu, metodika a výsledky dosavadního výzkumu …………………………. 54
Německý vojenský potenciál v nejvýznamnějších poznatcích československého vojenského zpravodajství ……………………………………………………………………………… 57
Strategické záměry nacistického Německa v poznatcích československého vojenského zpravodajství ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 65
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 70
Nástupový plán československé armády v září 1938
(Pavel Šrámek) …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 73
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 78
Zemské velitelství odbojové organizace Obrana národa na Moravě v letech 1939 a 1940
(Vladimír Černý) ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 81
Vznik Obrany národa na Moravě …………………………………………………………………… 81
Osobnost brigádního generála Bohuslava Všetičky ………………………………………….. 84
Budování struktury zemského velitelství ………………………………………………………… 86
Rezistenční aktivity Obrany národa ……………………………………………………………….. 92
Zatýkací akce gestapa a rozbití struktury Obrany národa …………………………………… 96
Vyšetřování zatčených příslušníků Obrany národa …………………………………………… 99
Soudní procesy a popravy …………………………………………………………………………… 101
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 105
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 107
Odbojová skupina Tři konšelé. Kapitola z dějin domácí protinacistické rezistence
(Milan Vyhlídal) ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 111
Okupace českých zemí ……………………………………………………………………………….. 111
Odsun rodin zpravodajských důstojníků ……………………………………………………….. 114
Spolupráce s polskými zpravodajci ………………………………………………………………. 115
Gestapo zasahuje ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 116
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 118
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 120
Spolupráca Special Operations Executive s československými spravodajcami vo svetle britských prameňov
(Martin Posch) ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 123
Vznik Special Operations Executive a koncepcia tajných armád ………………………. 123
Spojenectvo z núdze? …………………………………………………………………………………. 127
Čiastočný záver …………………………………………………………………………………………. 133
Príloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 135
Britský zpravodajský důstojník Harold Gibson a československá vojenská zpravodajská služba
(Pavel Kreisinger) …………………………………………………………………………………………… 137
Harold „Gibbie“ Gibson (1897 až 1960) ……………………………………………………….. 138
Vedoucím zpravodajské pobočky SIS (MI6) v Praze (1934 až 1939) ………………… 138
5
Organizace odletu Moravcovy zpravodajské jedenáctky a spolupráce za druhé světové války (1939 až 1945) ………………………………………………………………………………….. 141
Lieutenant Colonel Harold Gibson opět v Praze (1945 až 1948) ………………………. 144
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 145
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 147
No. 311 Servicing Echelon. Historie opravárenské jednotky 311. československé perutě
(Petr Žižka) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 151
Volyňští Češi v 1. československém armádním sboru v SSSR
(Jaroslav Vaculík) …………………………………………………………………………………………… 169
Vzpomínky válečných veteránů ve sbírkách Slezského zemského muzea
(Ondřej Kolář – Kamila Poláková) ……………………………………………………………………. 179
Etapy práce v muzeu revolučních bojů ………………………………………………………….. 180
Sbírky muzea revolučních bojů ……………………………………………………………………. 181
Jak vznikl fond vzpomínek? ………………………………………………………………………… 182
Vypovídací hodnota fondu vzpomínek ………………………………………………………….. 184
Využití fondu vzpomínek v současné práci zaměstnanců Slezského zemského muzea ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 184
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 185
Strategické vzestupy a pády Emanuela Moravce
(Stanislav Polnar) …………………………………………………………………………………………… 187
Literární začátky a československé legie ……………………………………………………….. 187
Emanuel Moravec a jeho koncepce obrany československého státu ………………….. 188
Strategické odcházení Emanuela Moravce …………………………………………………….. 194
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 198
Personální struktura venkovní služebny gestapa v Olomouci
(Vojtěch Češík) ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 199
Analýza některých aspektů personálu olomouckého gestapa ……………………………. 200
Odborná způsobilost …………………………………………………………………………………… 201
Původ a vzdělání ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 202
Věk ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 203
Členství v nacistických organizacích a politická angažovanost ………………………… 204
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 205
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 207
Českoslovenští důstojníci věznění na Mírově v době nacistické okupace (1938 až 1945)
(Anna Blatecká) ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 209
Oldřich Fictum ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 210
Melichar Boček vězněm ústavu pro plicně choré slovanské vězně ……………………. 214
Další osudy ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 216
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 217
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 218
6
Československé opevnění jako cíl inspekčních cest Adolfa Hitlera
(Josef Novák) …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 219
Obrana hranic a pomnichovské události ………………………………………………………… 219
Manifestační cesty Adolfa Hitlera ………………………………………………………………… 222
Návštěvy československého opevnění Adolfem Hitlerem ……………………………….. 223
Lužické hory ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 225
Slezsko …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 225
Jižní Čechy ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 227
Slovensko …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 228
Jižní Morava ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 228
Králicko ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 231
Závěrem ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 233
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 234
Záměry vojenského využití československého opevnění německým velením na konci druhé světové války
(Aleš Binar) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 243
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 250
Frankova depeše
(Tomáš Jakl) …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 253
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 259
Střet na Maguře 5. srpna 1947. Boj československé armády s Burlakovou jednotkou Ukrajinské povstalecké armády
(Tomáš Řepa) …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 261
Situace z pohledu československé armády a Burlakův příchod ………………………… 263
Okolnosti střetu u Ľupčianské Magury, bilance a následné vyšetřování …………….. 266
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 274
Československí vojenskí diplomati po skončení 2. svetovej vojny
(Matej Medvecký) ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 275
Jsem smířen s tím, že za pravdu třeba zemřu. Zpravodajský důstojník plk. František Fryč v restaurovaném Československu
(Marek Vašut) ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 287
V uniformě monarchie a republiky ……………………………………………………………….. 287
Poválečné intermezzo na ministerstvu zahraničních věcí …………………………………. 288
Perzekuce po únoru 1948 ……………………………………………………………………………. 289
Druhé zatčení …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 290
„Lámání“ Františka Fryče v celách věznice Mírov …………………………………………. 291
Pokus o rehabilitaci a život v ústraní …………………………………………………………….. 296
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 298
Počátky Pohraniční stráže na severu. Organizace 19. děčínské pohraniční brigády v letech 1952 až 1954
(Pavel Vaněk) …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 299
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 305
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Některé aspekty výstavby ČSLA ve druhé polovině padesátých let
(Jan Šach) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 307
Spolková republika Německo – hlavný záujmový priestor vojenskej rozviedky ČSĽA (1960 až 1989)
(Miloslav Púčik) ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 319
Armáda na rozcestí
(Prokop Tomek) ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 350
Listopad 1989 v armádě ……………………………………………………………………………… 355
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 362
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 363
Armáda České republiky v misi ISAF
(Bronislav Prokop) ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 367
Kořeny dnešních problémů ………………………………………………………………………….. 367
Jedenácté září a reakce západního světa ………………………………………………………… 370
Mise International Assistance Forces ……………………………………………………………. 371
Československo a Afghánistán …………………………………………………………………….. 372
Čeští vojáci v misi ISAF……………………………………………………………………………… 373
Armáda České republiky a asymetrické vedení boje ……………………………………….. 377
Hodnocení ISAF ………………………………………………………………………………………… 379
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 380
Vliv vojenského umění na rozvinutí Ozbrojených sil České republiky
(Jaroslav Staněk)…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 383
Vojenské umění …………………………………………………………………………………………. 383
Rozvinutí ozbrojených sil ……………………………………………………………………………. 384
Vojenské umění a rozvinutí ozbrojených sil – praktické využití ……………………….. 388
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 389
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 390
Addendum. Koncepce přípravy občanů k obraně státu
(Miroslav Jurenka – Jiří Kalenda) …………………………………………………………………….. 391
Historické aspekty ……………………………………………………………………………………… 391
Současný právní rámec pro přípravu občanů k obraně státu …………………………….. 393
Situace ve společnosti ………………………………………………………………………………… 394
Vzdělávání na základních školách v období 2013 až 2018 ………………………………. 395
Vzdělávání na základních školách v roce 2019 s výhledem do roku 2024 ………….. 397
Cíle koncepce ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 397
Dílčí závěr ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 399
Příloha ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 400
Závěr ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 403
Resumé …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 407
8
Použité zdroje ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 421
Archivní prameny ………………………………………………………………………………………. 421
Edice dokumentů a tištěné prameny ……………………………………………………………… 424
Dobový tisk ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 425
Dobová literatura ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 426
Memoárová literatura …………………………………………………………………………………. 427
Odborná literatura ………………………………………………………………………………………. 429
Elektronické zdroje …………………………………………………………………………………….. 442
Ostatní zdroje ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 443
Seznam zkratek …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 445
9
ÚVOD
Kolektivní monografie „Ozbrojené síly a československý stát“ je výsledkem společné práce třiceti jedna autorů. Jimi jsou zastoupeny reprezentativní pracoviště Česka a Slovenska, která se zabývají vojenskou historií a příbuznými obory. To také znamená, že v publikaci je využit interdisciplinární přístup; byť v ní metody historiografie převažují, využívá též přístupů vojenské vědy. Jak již název napovídá, záběr publikace je široký. Než o postižení celku však usiluje zdokumentovat jednotlivé vývojové etapy v dějinách československého vojenství a jeho vazby na státnost na vybraných tématech, a to od počátku bojů za suverénní stát za první světové války do nedávné minulosti. Takto koncipovaná publikace přitom poskytuje aktuální přehled o současném stavu bádání a o aktuálních badatelských tématech.
Publikaci tvoří celkem dvacet osm chronologicky řazených kapitol a doplněk (addendum). Velká válka je zastoupena jednak biografií pozdějšího československého generála a ministra národní obrany Jana Sergeje Ingra, a to s důrazem na jeho působení v legionářském hnutí v Srbsku, Rusku, Francii a v Itálii, jednak Vojtěcha Preissiga, československého výtvarného umělce, jehož životopis dokumentuje nasazení i oběti, které přinesl ve prospěch nezávislosti československého státu.
Čtyři další kapitoly se týkají meziválečné éry. První z nich navazuje na biografický přístup a zaměřuje se na dvě osobnosti československé armády, Antonína Bastla a Jiřího Čermáka, kteří prosluli jako významní vojenští geografové. Další kapitola přehledově mapuje vývoj civilní protiletecké ochrany v Československu s důrazem na třicátá léta. Následující dvě pak shodně reflektují zhoršující se bezpečnostní postavení státu a hrozbu ze strany nacionálně socialistického Německa; první z obou se zabývá vojenským zpravodajstvím a jeho činnosti proti Německu po roce 1938, druhá již přímo přípravou na vlastní vojenskou konfrontaci, totiž nástupovým plánem československé armády na podzim 1938.
Nejvíce zastoupeno je téma druhé světové války. Domácí odboj, především ve svých počátcích, je předmětem kapitoly o vývoji moravského zemského velitelství vojenské odbojové organizace Obrana národy v letech 1939 a 1940. Následující kapitola pak pojednává o nepříliš známé odbojové skupině, která vstoupila do dějin pod názvem Tři konšelé. Výhradně vojenskému zpravodajství je věnována jednak kapitola o spolupráci britské zpravodajské služby Secret Operations Executive s československými vojenskými zpravodajci, jednak kapitola, která rovněž zkoumá vztahy k československým zpravodajcům, a to ty, jenž navázal Harold Gibson, britský zpravodajský důstojník, těžiště jehož činnosti spadá do období formování československého odboje.
Zahraničního československého odboje se týká kapitola o působení pozemního personálu 311. československé (bombardovací) perutě, tématu, které se dosud nedostalo

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